Controversy on the mutual conditioning of *avidyā* and *ayoniśomanas(i)kāra* in Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa*

Marek Mejor

0. In the Buddhist scriptures the term *ayoniśomanas(i)kāra* (Pāli *ayonisomanas(i)kiira*), ‘incorrect attention, erroneous judgement’ appears usually as a negative counterpart of *yonisomanas(i)kāra*, ‘correct attention, right judgement’. In general, the concept of *ayoniśomanas(i)kāra* is connected with the process of defilement; it is listed among the factors conducive to defilement. Its role in the doctrinal expositions has not been comprehensively studied by the scholars yet. The Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma assigned, it seems, more importance to that factor in its dharma-doctrine than the Theravāda. The controversy on the possible conditioning of *avidyā*, the first member of the twelve-membered formula of the dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), by the factor of incorrect attention (*ayoniśomanaskāra*), has been treated in some detail in Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośa*. In the present paper, after having sketched in brief the role of the concept of *ayoniśomanas(i)kāra* in the selected Pāli and Sanskrit Buddhist sources, the author will focus on the controversial issue of the mutual conditioning of *avidyā* and *ayoniśomanaskāra*. The Appendix contains an English translations of the fragment from the *Abhidharmakośa* and of two versions of the *Sahetusapratyayasanidiṇī*.

1. In the Pali canon, the *ayoniso-manasikāra* is classified as a single factor conducive to loss or degradation (*eko dhammo hāna-bhāgiyo*). It is said that it makes the bad states which have not yet originated to
come out, and the good states which have originated to come to decay. It prevents arising of the [seven] elements conducive to enlightenment (bojjhaṅga), and, when they come out, it prevents their completion by meditation. It also makes the false view, which has not yet arisen to come out, and it makes the false view to grow up, when it has already arisen.

2. In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the ayoniṣomanasikāra is listed among the 10 kleśamahābhūmika dharmas (cf. AK II. 26a-c, AK II. 24), i.e. elements which are existent in every defiled (kliśta) thought. These are the following:
1. aśrāddhya (āśraddhya) - disbelief,
2. kausīdya - idleness,
3. muṣitasmṛtitā - default of memory,
4. vikṣepa - distraction,
5. avidyā - ignorance,
6. asaṃprajanya - non-observation,
7. ayoniṣomanasikāra - wrong judgment (incorrect attention),
8. mithyādhimokṣa - wrong resolution,
9. auddhatya - dissipation,
10. pramāda - non-diligence.

The canonical Abhidharma works, Dhātukāya (T1540, p. 614b10) and the Prakaraṇa (T1541, p. 698b28), contain the same list. Other Abhidharma treatises repeat the list with minor changes in the order of the items.

3. In Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa there are listed only 6 kleśamahābhūmikas, viz.: 1. moha (delusion), 2. pramāda (non-diligence), 3. kausīdya (indolence), 4. āśraddhya (incredulity, lack of faith), 5.
styiina (sloth), 6. auddhatya (dissipation, recklessness).

Vasubandhu explains that the items 3-4-6-7-8 of the ten-membered canonical list represent but the defiled (kliṣṭa) mahābhūmika elements. Therefore there is no need to repeat them here. The erroneous judgement (incorrect attention) (ayoniṣomanasikāra) is just the defiled manasikāra.

Further, ayoniṣomanasikāra is listed among the factors of the sequence of origination of the 10 anuṣayas (AKBh V.32-33):

avidyā-moha (i.e. confusion with regard to the Truths) → vicikitsā mithyādṛṣṭi → satkāyadrṣṭi → antagrāhadrṣṭi → sīlavrataparāmarśa → drṣṭiparāmarśa → rāga, māna, dveṣa.

Moreover, ayoniṣomanasa(i)kāra is classified as one of the conditioning factors in the process of origination of the klesi (defilement) -AK V.34:

“Klesi [with complete causes] arise from the non-abandoning of the anuṣayas, from the presence of their object, and from erroneous judgement (incorrect attention) - (ayoniṣomanasa(i)kāra).”

It is also present among the operations of an active klesi.

According to the Abhidharmadīpa, ayoniṣomanasikāra cannot be classified among the faculties: “Correct attention verily becomes connected with faith and other [similar factors], but incorrect attention [becomes connected] with feeling and other [factors] which are associated with lust and other [similar factors]; therefore it is not a faculty.”

4. The question of the eventual beginning of the chain of twelfofold dependent origination (dvādaśāṅgah pratītyasamutpādaḥ) has been repeatedly raised in the Buddhist texts. According to some canonical Pāli sources, avijjā may be preceded by another element, e.g. upadhi, anusāya, ayoniṣomanasikāra.
4.1. Two Suttas from the Aṅguttara Nikāya, no.61 and no. 62 (Avījja-sutta, AN V, pp. 113ff. and Tanhā-sutta, AN V, p. 116ff., respectively), contain two parallel chains of causation, which illustrate the process of ‘nutrition’ (āhāra) and the process of ‘accomplishment’ (paripūra), respectively: one is starting with ignorance (avījja) or craving for existence (bhava-taṇhā), and the other is starting with emancipation through knowledge (vijja-vimutti). Every link of the causal sequence conditions the following one as its nutriment (āhāra) in two parallel sequences. In the former Sutta (No. 61) ignorance is juxtaposed with the seven members of enlightenment (bojjhaṅga), in the latter Sutta (No. 62), ignorance itself is a nutriment of craving for existence, which is the starting point of the whole causal chain of dependent origination.

Moreover, it is interesting to observe the presence of the element of incorrect attention (ayoniṣomanaśikāra) in the causal sequences beginning with ignorance (Sutta 61) and craving for existence (Sutta 62). The question of the beginning of the twelfeved chain and the relation between avidyā and ayoniṣomanasikāra will be analysed below.

Sutta 61: “The beginning of ignorance, monks, is not known, so that it is said: ‘Before this [moment] ignorance did not exist, then, afterwards [it] came into existence’. So, monks, it is known that ignorance is having its foundation on this (idappaccayā avijja).

I tell [you], monks, that ignorance has a nutriment (āhāra) too, and it is not without a nutriment. What is the nutriment of ignorance? -- It should be said that five hindrances (pañca nīvaraṇā) are its [nutri-
ment].

I tell [you], monks, that the five hindrances have [their] nutriments too, they are not without nutriments. What are the nutriments of the five hindrances? -- It should be said that the three [kinds of] bad conduct
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(tiṇi duccaritāni) are their [nutriments].

I tell [you], monks, that the three [kinds of] bad conduct have [their] nutriment too, they are not without nutriment. What is the nutriment of the three [kinds of] bad conduct? -- It should be said that the non-restraint of the senses (indriyāsaṃvara) is their [nutriment].

I tell [you], monks, that the non-restraint of the senses has [its] nutriment too, it is not without nutriment. What is the nutriment of the three [kinds of] bad conduct? -- It should be said that the forgetfulness and non-discrimination (asatāsam-pajāṇa) is its [nutriment].

I tell [you], monks, that the forgetfulness and non-discrimination has [its] nutriment too, it is not without nutriment. What is the nutriment of the forgetfulness and non-discrimination? -- It should be said that the incorrect attention (ayoniṣo-manasiṅkāra) is its [nutriment].

I tell [you], monks, that the incorrect attention has [its] nutriment too, it is not without nutriment. What is the nutriment of the incorrect attention? -- It should be said that the disbelief (assaddhiya) is its [nutriment].

I tell [you], monks, that the disbelief has [its] nutriment too, it is not without nutriment. What is the nutriment of the disbelief? -- It should be said that the listening to the untrue doctrine (asaddhamma-savaṇa) is its [nutriment].

I tell [you], monks, that the listening to the untrue doctrine has [its] nutriment too, it is not without nutriment. What is the nutriment of the listening to the untrue doctrine? -- It should be said that the associating with wicked people (asappurisasaṃseva) is its [nutriment]. (...)"

Sutta 62: “The beginning of craving for existence (bhavataṇṇhā), monks, is not known, so that it is said, monks: ‘Before this [moment] craving for existence did not exist, then, afterwards [it] came into

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existence.' Now, it is known that craving for existence is having its foundation on this.

I tell you, monks, that the craving for existence has a nutriment too, and it is not without a nutriment. What is the nutriment of craving for existence? -- It should be said that ignorance (*avijjā*) is its [nutriment].

I tell you, monks, that ignorance has a nutriment too, it is not without a nutriment. What is a nutriment of ignorance? -- It should be said that five hindrances are its [nutriment]. (...)

Here are presented in a tabular form the two parallel causal sequences from Sutta 61 (in Sutta 62 the element of ignorance from the column A is preceded by the element of craving for existence):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column A</th>
<th>Column B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A) ignorance as having its foundation this (<em>idappaccayā avijjā</em>),</td>
<td>(B) liberation by knowledge (<em>vijjā-vimutti</em>):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or craving for existence (<em>bhava-tañhā</em>):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) ignorance (<em>avijjā</em>),</td>
<td>(1) seven members of enlightenment (<em>satta bojjhaṅgā</em>),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) four applications of mindfulness (<em>cattāro satipaṭṭhānā</em>),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) five hindrances (<em>pañca nīvaranā</em>),</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) three kinds of bad conduct (<em>tiṇī duccaritāni</em>),</td>
<td>(3) three kinds of good conduct (<em>tiṇī sucaritāni</em>),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) non-restraint of the senses (<em>indriyāsāraṇvāra</em>),</td>
<td>(4) restraint of the senses (<em>indriyāsāraṇvāra</em>),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) forgetfulness and non-discrimination (<em>asatāsampajañña</em>),</td>
<td>(5) memory and discrimination (<em>satisampajañña</em>),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) erroneous judgement (incorrect attention) (<em>ayoniso-manasikāra</em>),</td>
<td>(6) proper judgement (correct attention) (<em>yoniso-manasikāra</em>),</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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(7) disbelief (assaddhiya),
(8) listening to the untrue doctrine (asaddhammasavana),
(9) associating with wicked people (asappurisasamseva).

4.2. Buddhaghosa in his Visuddhimagga, chapter XVII §§ 36-42, also raised the question why ignorance was stated at the beginning of the chain (kasma pan'ettha avijja adito vutta). He referred to the passage from the MN I.9 (vol. I, p. 54, quoted above), where it was said that the arising of cankers (āsava) conditions arising of ignorance (avijja): "From the arising of cankers arises ignorance." In the following discussion (§§ 38-42) Buddhaghosa quoted also the two passages from the Aṅguttara Nikāya (V, p. 113, 116, see above), where two things were specified by the Bhagavat as the starting points of the round of births, i.e. ignorance (avijja) and craving for existence (bhavataṇhā). Accordingly, ignorance is the specific cause of actions which lead to an unhappy (future) existence, and craving for existence is the specific cause of actions which lead to a happy (future) existence.

4.3. The Nettippakaraṇa is an early Pāli post-canonical treatise giving guidelines for explanation and interpretation of the canonical texts. The process of defilement (saṃkilesa) and the process of purification (vodāna) of two kinds of persons is juxtaposed in the following way, which resembles the list from the Aṅguttara Nikāya referred to above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>saṃkileso</th>
<th>vodānām</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. taṇhā ‘desire’</td>
<td>samatho ‘quietude’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. avijja ‘ignorance’</td>
<td>vipassanā ‘insight’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ahirikāmañ ‘shamelessness’</td>
<td>hiri kaṁ ‘sense of shame’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Pali Word</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>anottappan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>asati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>asampajañña</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>ayonisomanasikāro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>kosajjam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>dovacassa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>ahaṃkāro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>mamāṃkāro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>asaddhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>pamādo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>asaddhammasavanam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>asaṃsavaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>abhijjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>byāpādo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>nīvaraṇāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>saṃyojanam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ottappan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sampajañña</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>yonisomanasikro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>viriyārambhō</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sovacassa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dhamme-ṇāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anvaye-ṇāṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>khaye-ṇāṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anuppade-ṇāṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>saddhā</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>appamādo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>saddhammasavanam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>saṃvaro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anabhijjhā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abyāpādo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rāga-virāgā cetovimutti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>avijjā-virāgā paññāvimutti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>appicchatā</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nection</th>
<th>santuṭṭhi 'satisfaction'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20. kodho 'anger'</td>
<td>akodho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. upanāho 'ill-will, enmity'</td>
<td>anupanāho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. makkho 'depreciation of another's worth'</td>
<td>amakkho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. palāso 'malice'</td>
<td>apalāso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. issā ‘jealousy’</td>
<td>issāpahānanam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. macchariyaṇ ‘avarice’</td>
<td>macchariyapahānanam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. māyā ‘deceit’</td>
<td>saṃkhatārammaṇo vimokkho 'liberation having conditioned object'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. sātheyyaṇ ‘treachery’</td>
<td>asaṃkhatārammaṇo vimokkho 'liberation having unconditioned object'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. sassatadiṭṭhi ‘belief in eternalism’</td>
<td>sa-upādisasā nibbānadhaṭu ‘the sphere of final liberation with remaining attachment to existence’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. ucchedadiṭṭhi ‘belief in annihilation’</td>
<td>anupādisasā nibbānadhaṭu ‘the sphere of final liberation without remaining attachment to existence’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.1. Moreover, the Nettippakaraṇa contains a passage\(^9\) where it is explicitly said: “Ignorance has ignorance as its cause and incorrect attention as its condition”.

The passage continues: “Previous ignorance is the cause of latest ignorance. Here, previous ignorance is proclivity of ignorance, and latest ignorance is the state of being possessed by ignorance. Previous proclivity of ignorance becomes the cause of latest state of being pos-
sessed by ignorance for the sake of increase -like a seed and a sprout - of the immediate causativeness. The result which comes here into being becomes the cause of its successive causativeness. The cause is, then, twofold: immediate cause and successive cause. Thus also ignorance has two causes: the immediate cause and the successive cause”.

5. The \textit{Sahetusapratyayasanidana-sutra} is a text which has been preserved in two versions: Tibetan (longer) and Chinese (shorter). A few Sanskrit fragments are quoted by Yaśomitra in his \textit{Abhidharmakosa-\c{y}a\c{k}hya} (see Matsuda 1984\textsuperscript{20}). The text offers still another causal sequence, in which \textit{ayonisomanas(i)kāra} plays a role of a condition of \textit{avidyā}. It is as follows:

\begin{enumerate}
\item the eye (\textit{caksu})
\item ear (\textit{srotra})
\item ... (6) mind (\textit{manas})
\item action (\textit{karma})
\item desire (\textit{trṣṇa})
\item ignorance (\textit{avidyā})
\item incorrect attention (\textit{ayonisomanas(i)kāra}).
\end{enumerate}

The causal sequence has its reverse order, from \textit{ayonisomanas(i)-kāra} to \textit{caksu}.

5.1. According to the \textit{Sahetusapratyayasanidana-sutra}, incorrect attention (\textit{ayonisomanas(i)kāra}) conditions \textit{avidyā}, and vice versa, in the chain of causation (AKBh ad \textit{III}.27: \textit{ayonisomanaskārahetukāidyoktā Sūtrāntare})\textsuperscript{21}). This doctrinal tenet raised a heated debate in which were involved Vasubandhu the elder, the Kosākāra Vasubandhu, and a Sāutrāntika master Bhadanta Śrilāta, who based his argument on the \textit{Sahetusapratyaya}\textsuperscript{C}.

5.2. A similar passage is offered by the \textit{Milindapa\textsc{n}ha \textit{II}.3.2 (p. 40)}: cakkhu ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviniñāṇam, tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ, upādānapaccayā kammaṃ, kammato puna cakkhu jāyati

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"By reason of the eye and of forms there arises sight, when these three come together there is touch, by reason of touch sensation, by reason of sensation a longing (tañhā), by reason of the longing action (kamma), and from action eye is once more produced." (Tr. Rhys Davids, vol. I, p. 80).

6. The Yogācārabhūmi (p. 215.17ff.) contains an interesting passage too. In answer to the question: -'Since it was said that ignorance is caused by incorrect attention, why incorrect attention (ayoniṣomana-skāra) was not put at the beginning of the chain of dependent origination?'-it is replied:

-'Because non-abandoning and non-defilement have [their] causative capacity. Thus, with those who are not bewildered, attention does not arise, and dependent origination is conditioned by defilements. Both ignorance is defiled in its nature, as well as incorrect attention is defiled in its nature; the latter does not make ignorance defiled, but itself becomes defiled by force of ignorance. (Re-)birth is created by actions and defilements; ignorance, as a cause of action(s) is put at the beginning of dependent origination. Therefore incorrect attention has not been mentioned as the first member [of the twelve-membered chain]."

6.1. According to the Arthaviniścaya-ṭīkā, nescience of the former period of life, i.e. past time, is identified with incorrect judgement (attention) (ayoniṣomanasikāra, tshul bzhin ma yin par yid la byed pa) concerning the past formations: ‘Did I exist in the past? [Or,] did I not exist in the past?’

In the following definitions of ignorance (avidyā) as a particular kind of nescience (ajñāna), in place of the term ‘incorrect judgement (attention)’ is substituted the expression ‘one who is incorrectly imagining’
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(*tshul bzhin ma yin par rtog pa, *ayoniṣas kalpayant*). The latter expression, together with its variant: 'one who is incorrectly thinking or concentrating his mind' is also found in the parallel definitions in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

6.2. The notion of incorrect judgement (attention) (*ayoniṣomanaskāra-prajñāpatti*) is mentioned in the *Yogācārabhūmi* also in connection with the discussion of the sixteen rival false doctrines (*paravāda*).

7. In the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* VI.C (p. 48) is described bodhisattva's meditation on the origination and destruction of the world (*lokaṣya saṃbhava, vibhava*). The bodhisattva takes notice of the fact that all the arisings of the worldly performance are due to their insistence on the false belief that there is a self (*atmābhinivesa*). Further, the bodhisattva thinks that the foolish people, attached to a self, covered by the blindness of ignorance, desirous of being and non-being, intent on the incorrect judgement (attention) (*ayoniṣomanasikāra*), set out on a wrong path, and falsely following [it], accumulate performances of karman which are good, bad, or leading to immovable states.

In another place in the *Daśabhūmika* (VI.G) it is said that *avidyā* has a tendency to produce results of two kinds, viz. it makes the living beings deluded with regard to the objects of sense, and gives a cause to the conditionings to come into being (*saṃskārabhinirvṛtti*)

8. The concept of *ayoniṣomanas(i)kāra* also plays a significant role in the *Ratnagotravibāhga*, a Mahāyāna text teaching the doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha*. 

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Appendix

I. Vasubandhu’s polemics against a Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta on the notion of incorrect attention (ayoniṣomanas(i)kāra) as a supposed cause of ignorance (avidyā) in the Abhidharmaṇa AKBh ad III.27 (p. 134.20ff.; P Gu. 147a-148a; cf. LVP, Kośa, III, pp. 69-72), with the extracts from Yaśomitra’s Abhidharmaṇa-vyākhyā.

[AKBh, p. 134.20-25; P Gu. 147a3-5]:

“[Question:] If, indeed, the dependent origination had twelve members, then it follows that, since the cause of ignorance (avidyā) [no. 1] has not been indicated, the transmigration has a beginning (ādi), and also - since the result of the old age and death (jarāmaraṇa) [no. 12] has not been indicated [too], the transmigration has an end (anta), or, in consequence one should add another member and still another one, and so to infinity (anavasthāprasāṅga)!

[Answer:] No, there is no need to add another member, since it was clearly taught by the Bhagavat [that the twelve-membered dependent origination has a threefold nature, viz. it is defilement (kleśa), action (karman), and base (vastu)].

From defilement [arise] defilement and action, from that [arises] base, from it again originate base and defilement-this is the way [of coming] of the links of existence”.

Accordingly, in short-

a.) from defilement originates defilement: 8. desire → 9. attachment,

b.) from defilement originates action: 9. attachment → 10. existence, 1. ignorance → 2. formations,
c.) from action originates base: 2. formations → 3. consciousness, 10. existence → 11. birth, 
d.) from base originates base: 3. consciousness → 4. name and form, 4. name and form → 5. six bases, 5. six bases → 6. contact, 6. contact → 7. feeling, 11. birth → old age and death, 
e.) from base originates defilement: 7. feeling → 8. desire. 
Moreover, the members 1-2, and 8-10 are called cause (hetu), while the members 3-7, and 11-12 are called result (phala).

[Continued from AK Bh, p. 135.7ff.; Gu. 147b2]:

"Now, [there is another explanation of it, viz.] it was said in another Sūtra [i.e. Sahetusapratyayasanidāna], that ignorance has for its cause incorrect attention (ayoniśo-manas(i)kāra); [and] the incorrect attention has for its cause ignorance. That [turbid attention (āvilo manas(i)kāra)] was also mentioned here, [in this Sūtra, i.e. Pratītyasamutpāda], since it is included into attachment (upādāna) [no. 9], so says [Vasubandhu the elder (sthavira)].

[Kośakāra Vasubandhu:] 'How is incorrect attention included into attachment (upādāna)?' [Yaśomitra: Yet incorrect attention does not have the nature of attachment.] If by means of association (samprāyoga), it results in the applicability of inadmissible consequence (prasāṅga) that it is included also in desire (trṣṇā) [no. 8] and ignorance [which both have the nature of defilement, like attachment]. [Yaśomitra: In such a case the Sūtra should run like this: 'It is also mentioned in this (Sūtra), because of its inclusion in ignorance, desire, and attachment'. However, the wording of the text is not such.] And if it were included, [Yaśomitra: even having assented to this inclusion (although in fact it is non-happening...),] how it has been made known here that the incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance? [Yaśomitra: Because
it was not said so in the Sūtra."

If [the fact of] being the cause or result is known by means of inclusion (antarbhāva) only, then, due to inclusion of desire and ignorance in it too, one cannot differentiate members [of the twelve-membered dependent origination]. [Yaśomitra: Since incorrect attention is included in attachment, it is made known that incorrect attention is the cause of ignorance, and it should not be called another member [apart], since it is established from the mention of attachment only. So, because of inclusion of both in it, there is no need to create another member. Because it is established from attachment alone. And if desire and ignorance were mentioned apart, therefore this is not a valid objection.] [135.12; Gu. 147b6]

Other master [Śrīlā] says: "Incorrect attention was declared in the other Sūtra as the cause of ignorance. It was also mentioned at the time of contact (sparśa), [i.e. at the moment of arising of the eye consciousness]: 'In dependence on the eye and the visible objects arises turbid attention, which originated from bewilderment (āvilo manaskāro mohaja)'. And also, according to another Sūtra, it is necessary [to admit] the occurrence of ignorance at the time of sensation (vedanā): 'Desire (trṣṇā) arises in dependence on sensation, which originated from the contact with ignorance".30)

Therefore, being present at the time of contact, it is established that the incorrect attention is the condition of ignorance, which is accompanied by sensation. [And] therefore ignorance is not lacking its cause, and there is no need to add another member. Moreover, there is no fallacy of reduction to absurdity, because also that incorrect attention again was declared to be born from bewilderment, i.e. turbid attention originated from bewilderment. [Yaśomitra: Thus, there is arguing in a circle - from incorrect attention is ignorance, and from ignorance is incorrect attention.]
Well then, what was said in another [Sūtra, i.e. in Sahetu], now again it should be explained here, [in the Pratītyasa-mutpāda-sūtra]?

[Śrīlāta:] No, it should not.

[Vasubandhu:] How to understand what has not been explained?

[Śrīlāta:] By means of reasoning (yukti).

[Vasubandhu:] By what kind of reasoning?

[Śrīlāta:] By the following reasoning:- Because with the arhats sensation deprived of ignorance (niravidyā) does not condition desire, and the non-perverted (aviparita) contact [does] not [condition] defiled sensation, and again, the arhat without ignorance does not have a perverted contact.

[Vasubandhu:] In this way [your argument] results in the fallacy of too wide application (atiprasaṅga): as much is rendered possible by reasoning, that much remains not mentioned. [In other words, if we accept your reasoning, the important terms in our Sūtra may be omitted altogether, since you argue that they can be deduced by means of reasoning.] And therefore this is not a [valid] objection (parihāra).

This, however, cannot be objected (acodya): - Because, beside ignorance [no.1] and old age and death [no. 12], other members [of the twelfefold chain of dependent origination] were not mentioned [in the Pratītyasa-mutpāda-sūtra], there is [implied] a fallacy of application of the beginning and the end to the [circle of] transmigration. Moreover, the definition is complete. Why? -Because of intended here [i.e. in the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra] explanation of the meaning for the [sake of] trainees (vineya), who are bewildered (saṃmūḍha) by the process (pravṛtti) [of transmigration]: how is connected this world from the other world, and [how is connected] the other world from this world? Because it [- its meaning] was said previously: 'In order to make cessation of bewilderment in the former, in the later, and in the middle
[parts, i.e. in the past, in the future, and in the middle]'[AK Ⅲ.25.]


1. The Bhagavat dwellt in the village Kalmāṣadamya of the Kurus.
2. Then the Bhagavat addressed the monks:
3. ‘Monks, good at the beginning, good in the middle’, etc. up to [the words] ‘brahmānic conduct, I shall explain, viz. the religious discourse called Sahetusaprtyayasyasansanidāna, therefore listen well’, etc. up to [the words] ‘I shall speak’.
4. ‘Which is, monks, the religious discourse called Sahetusapratyayasanidāna?
   -- Monks, the eye (cakṣus) has a cause (hetu), has a condition (pratvaya), has a ground (nidāna). What is, monks, the cause of the eye, what is the condition, what is the ground?
   -- Monks, action (karman) is the cause, action is the condition, action is the ground.
§ 5. Monks, action [too] has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. What is, monks, the cause of action, what is the condition, what is the ground? -- Monks, desire (trṣṇā) is the cause of action, desire is the condition, desire is the ground.
§ 6. Monks, desire too has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. What is, monks, the cause of desire, what is the condition, what is the ground? -- Monks, ignorance (avidyā) is the cause of desire, ignorance is the condition, ignorance is the ground.
§ 7. Monks, ignorance too has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. What is, monks, the cause of ignorance, what is the condition, what is the ground? -- Monks, incorrect attention (ayoniśo-manas(i)kāra) is
the cause of ignorance, incorrect attention is the condition, incorrect attention is the ground.

§ 8. Monks, incorrect attention too has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. What is, monks, the cause of incorrect attention, what is the condition, what is the ground?

-- Depending on the eye (caksus) and the visible objects (rupa) arises turbid attention (avilo-manas(i)kāra) originated from bewilderment (mohaja).

--The ignorance (avidyā) which arises in a bewildered, in completely bewildered [person], this provides for desire. When [one] is provided with desire, [then] performs actions [which are] making known (vijñapti-karman).

§ 9. Monks, incorrect attention has ignorance for [its] cause; ignorance has desire for [its] cause; desire has action for [its] cause; action has the eye for [its] cause.

§ 10. Monks, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, the mind too has a cause, has a condition, has a ground.

§ 11. What is, monks, the cause of the mind (manas), what is the condition, what is the ground? -- Monks, action is the cause of the mind, action is the condition, action is the ground.

§ 12. Monks, action too has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. What is, monks, the cause of action, what is the condition, what is the ground? -- Monks, desire is the cause of action, desire is the condition, desire is the ground.

§ 13. Monks, desire too has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. What is, monks, the cause of desire, what is the condition, what is the ground? -- Monks, ignorance is the cause of desire, ignorance is the condition, ignorance is the ground.

§ 14. Monks, ignorance too has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. What is, monks, the cause, the condition, the ground of ignorance? --
Incorrect attention is the cause, incorrect attention is the condition, incorrect attention is the ground.

§ 15. Monks, incorrect attention too has a cause, incorrect attention too has a condition, incorrect attention too has a ground. What is, monks, the cause, the condition, the ground of incorrect attention? -- Monks, depending on the mind (manas) and the mental objects (dharma) arises turbid attention (avilo manas(i)kāra), originated from bewilderment (mohaja).

The ignorance which is [present] in bewildered, in completely bewildered [person], this provides for desire. When [one] is provided with bewilderment, [then] performs actions [which are] making known (vijñapti-karman).

§ 16. Monks, incorrect attention has ignorance for [its] cause; ignorance has desire for [its] cause; desire has action for [its] cause; action has the mind for [its] cause.

§ 17. This is the religious discourse called Sahetusapratyayasanidāna.

§ 18. 'Monks, the dharma(s) accompanied with a cause, accompanied with a condition, accompanied with a ground I shall explain', from these words, and [again,] like previously, 'The dharma accompanied with a cause, accompanied with a condition, accompanied with a ground I shall proclaim', [up to the words] 'According to the teaching has been fully explained', it was said [by the Bhagavat].


1. Thus I have heard. Once the Bhagavat dwelt among the Kurus, in a village [called] Kalmāṣadāmya.

2. Then the Bhagavat addressed the monks:
3. ‘Now [I shall] tell you the Dharma which is good in the beginning, good in the middle, good at the end, having good sense, being good as to the letter (lit. having good flavour), [and] explain the unique (lit. unmixed), complete, pure, clear brahmanic conduct; [so] listen well and consider [in your minds], [I shall] tell [you] the Sutra on the dharmas having causes, conditions, and grounds (sahetuspaprtyayasa-nidana, you-yin you-yuan you-fu).

4. Which is the Sutra on dharmas having cause(s), condition(s) and ground(s)?

It is said, the eye has a cause (hetu, yin), has a condition (pratyaya, yuan), has a ground (nidana, fu). How is it that the eye has a cause, has a condition, has a ground? It is said, the eye has action (karma, ye) for [its] cause, has action for [its] condition, has action for [its] ground.

5. [And] action [too] has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. How is it that action has a cause, has a condition, has a ground? It is said, action has desire (trṣṇā, ai) for [its] cause, desire for [its] condition, desire for [its] ground.

6. [And] desire [too] has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. How is it that desire has a cause, has a condition, has a ground? It is said, desire has ignorance (avidyā, wu-ming) for [its] cause, ignorance for [its] condition, ignorance for [its] ground.

7. [And] ignorance [too] has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. How is it that ignorance has a cause, has a condition, has a ground? It is said, ignorance has incorrect attention (ayoniśo-manasikāra, bu-zheng si-wei) for [its] cause, incorrect attention for [its] condition, incorrect attention for [its] ground.

8. [And] incorrect attention [too] has a cause, has a condition, has a ground. How is it that incorrect attention has a cause, has a condition, has a ground? It is said, depending on the eye and the visible objects
originate (sheng) incorrect attention produced (sheng) with reference to (yu) bewilderment (moha, chi). 

This bewilderment (moha, chi) is ignorance (avidyā, wu-ming).

The bewilderment [as] a seeking lust (qiū yu) is called desire (trṣṇā, ai).

What is made (zuo) by desire, this is called action (karman, ye).

9. In such manner, monks, incorrect attention (ayoniṣo-manasikāra, bu-zheng si-wei) is caused by ignorance [and] becomes desire.

Ignorance causes desire.

Desire is because of action.

Action is because of the eye.

10. Likewise is said [with regard to] the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body, the mind.

[Paragraphs 11-16 are omitted in the Chinese.]

17. This is called the Sūtra on dharmas having cause(s), having condition(s), having ground(s).

18. When the Buddha had finished proclaiming this Sūtra, the monks, having heard the Buddha’s word, were happy (huan xi) and carried out orders (feng xing).

Abbreviations


AVN=Arthaviniścaya-sūtra and its commentary (nibandhana), ed. N.
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H. Samtani, 1971, Patna.
AVṭākā=Arvhatīścaya-ṭīkā (Tanjur P 5852)
BSOAS=Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies
CPD=Critical Pāli Dictionary
D=Derge Tanjur
DN=Dīgha Nikāya, PTS ed.
JIABS=The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
May, Prasannapada=May, J., 1959, Candrabhair Prasannapada Mad-
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hyamikāvṛtti, Paris.


MN = Majjhima Nikāya, ed. PTS

Nettippakaraṇa = PTS ed.


P= Peking Tanjur


PTS = Pāli Text Society

PTSD = Pāli Text Society Dictionary


SWTF = Sanskrit-Wörterbuch aus Turfan Funden, Göttingen

T = Taishō

Uttaratantra = ed. by E.H. Johnson, (Patna 1950), re-edited by H.S. Prasad.


YBh = Yogācārabhūmi, ed. V. Bhattacharya, 1957, Calcutta.

ZDMG = Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

Notes

*) An earlier, shorter version of this paper was presented at the 12th Conference of The International Association of Buddhist Studies, Lausanne, August 23-28, 1999.

1) CPD I, p. 411: ayoniso-manasikāra, m. ‘unmethodical thought, unwise attention’.
2) DN III, p. 273. hāna-bhāgiya PTSD: 'conducive to relinquishing (of perversity and ignorance)', seems to be wrong; cf. BHSD p. 408 sub-bhāgiya. Edgerton quotes a gloss on the passage DN III, 273 (III, 1055.10) apāyagāmi, parīhānāya saṃvattanako-'going to ruin, conducive to decay'.

3) Viriyārambha-vagga (AN I, p. 13): "Monks, I know not of any other single thing of such power to cause the arising of evil states not yet arisen or the waning of good states already arisen as unsystematic attention. In him who makes unsystematic attention evil states not yet arisen do arise and good states arisen do wane." (I, p. 9f. Tr. F.L. Woodward.)

4) Kalyāṇamittādi-vagga (AN I, p. 14): "Monks, I know not of any other single thing of such power to prevent the arising of the limbs of wisdom, if not yet arisen, or, if they have already arisen, to prevent their reaching fulfilment by cultivation thereof, as unsystematic attention. In him who practices unsystematic attention, monks, the limbs of wisdom if not yet arisen, arise not: and if arisen they reach no fulfilment by cultivation thereof..." (I, p.10. Tr. F.L. Woodward.).

5) Bija-vagga (AN I, p. 31): "Monks, I know not of any single thing so apt to cause the arising of perverted view, if not yet arisen, or the increase of perverted view, if already arisen, as unsystematic attention. In him who gives not systematic attention perverted view, if not arisen, does arise, or, if already arisen, does increase." (I, p. 27-28. Tr. F.L. Woodward).

6) BHSD p. 418: manasi-kāra, m. 'fixing in mind, mental concentration, (esp. intense) attention, thought, notice'. BHSD p. 64: ayoniśas, adv./comp. 'not in a fundamental or thoroughgoing way; superficially'. SWTf I, p. 140 (cf. Add. p. 543): ayoniśo-manasikāra, m. 'das nicht-gründliche oder oberflächliche Überdenken oder Sich-Konzentrieren; Unaufmerksamkeit; Abziehen der Aufmerksamkeit'.

7) See LVP, Kośa, II, p. 150-151 note; Dessein 1996, p. 631f., 633. The same list with the same order have the Abhidharmaibhāṣā-sāstra (Buddhavarman, T 1546, p. 169c18-19 - Dessein 1996:635) and the Nyāyānusāra-sāstra
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9) AK II. 24 lists the 10 mahābhūmikāḥ dharmāḥ: vedanā (sensation), cetanā (volition), saṃjñā (motion), chanda (desire for action), sparśa (contact), mati (discernment), smṛti (memory), manaskāra (the act of attention), adhimukti (approval) and samādhi (concentration), which coexist in every moment of the mind (sarvacetas). Cf. LVP, Kośa, II, p. 162.


11) AKBh ad V.1a (tr. Pruden, vol. 3, p. 767): "When a klesa or defilement enters into action, it accomplishes ten operations: 1. it makes solid its root, its prāpti - the possession that a certain person already had of the klesa (ii.36, 38a) - preventing it from being broken; 2. it places itself in a series (that is, it continues to reproduce itself); 3. it accommodates its field, rendering the person (āśrava, ii.5, 6, 44d) fit for the arising of the klesa; 4. it engenders its offspring, that is, the upaklesas (v.46): hatred engenders anger, etc.; 5. it leads to action; 6. it aggregates its causes, namely, incorrect judgement [incorrect attention - ayoniṣo-manas(i)kāra]; 7. it causes one to be mistaken with regard to the object of consciousness; 8. it bends the mental series towards the object or towards rebirth (iii.30); 9. it brings about a falling away of good; and 10. it becomes a bond (bandhana, v.45d) and prevents surmounting of the sphere of existence to which it belongs."

12) Abhidharmadīpa (p. 51.1-2): yoniṣomanasikāraḥ khalu śraddhādināṁ saṅgībhavati, ayoniṣomanasikāro 'pi vedanādīnāṁ rāgādisamprayuktā-nāṁ iti so 'pi nendriyam.

13) E.g. AN V, p. 113; AKBh ad III.27, p. 134.20ff.; YBh, p. 215.17ff.; AVN

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p. 99f.; AVṭikā P 5852, Jo. fol. 37b6-38a6.
16) "For the Blessed One, in discoursing on the round of births, has made two states the heads. The first is ignorance, as he has said: 'Monks, the ultimate point of ignorance does not appear, so that one may say: ignorance did not exist formerly, but it has since come to being. Such a statement, monks, is made. However, it is apparent that ignorance is conditioned by that, (i.e. cankers).'

The second head is the craving for becoming, as it has been said: 'Monks, the ultimate point of craving for becoming does not appear, so that one may say: craving for becoming did not exist formerly, but it has since come to being. Such a statement, monks, is made. However, it is apparent that the craving for becoming is conditioned by that, (i.e. feeling).’” Tr. Pe Maung Tin 1931, p. 625f.; Vism XⅦ 37, p. 447.
18) Nettippakarana, p. 126-7. The identification of the parallel terms is tentative only; in some cases it is difficult to draw such a precise parallelism.
19) Nettippakarana, p. 79.7: ayam hi samāsāro sahetu sapaccayo nibbatto / vuttaṃ hi: avijjāpaccayi saṃkhārā, saṃkhārapaccayā viññāṇam / evam sabbo paṭiccasamuppado / iti avijjā avijjāya hetu, ayonisomanasikāro paccayo purimikā avijjā paṭimikāya avijjāya hetu / tattha purimikā avijjā avijjānusayo, paṭimikā avijjā avijjāpārinyaṭṭhānam / purimiko avijjānusayo paṭimikāsa avijjāpārinyaṭṭhānassa hetubhūto paribrāhānāya bijāṃ kuro viya samanantarathutāya / yaṃ para yattha phalam nibbattati, idam tassa paraṃparaḥ hetutāya hetubhūṭam / dwidho hi hetu: samanantarathetu paraṃparaḥ hetu ca / evam avijjāya pi dwidho hetu: samanantarathetu paraṃparaḥ hetu ca /.

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20) A passage is quoted in Candrakirti’s Prasannapadā (May, p. 180f. & nn. 584-586, esp. n. 586 which contains the explication of relations between moha, avidyā, ayoniśo-manasikāra, and saṃkālaṃpa).

21) Cf. also AVN, p. 100.2ff. and AVṭikā, P Jo. 38a6-8: mdo sde kha cig las thsul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa ni ma rig pa’i rgyu las ma rig pa yang tshul bzhin ma yin pa’i rgyu’o zhes bshad pa yang gong du ṇon mongs pa las ṇon mongs pa ’byung ba dang las las ṇon mongs pa ’byung ba la sogs par bstan pa’i tshul gyi nang du ’dus zin pas logs shing tu ma bshad do //.

22) YBh, p. 215.17 yadāyoniśomanaskārahetukāvidyoktā kena kāraṇena sa pratītyasamutpādanirodḥa ādito na nirdīṣṭaḥ/ aprahāṇahetutvāt, 〈’a〉 - saṃklesahetutvāt / tathā hi / nāmuḍhāsyā sa manaskāra upadyyate / saṃklesahetuṣa ca pratītyasamutpādaḥ / avidyā ca svabhāvasaṃkliṣṭā ayoniśomanaskāraś ca svabhāvasaṃkliṣṭāḥ/sa no ‘vidyāṃ saṃklesayati / api tu avidyāvaśena saṃklesyate / karmaklesaprabhāvitaṃ ca janma / tatra karmacahetur ādir avidyā pratītyasamutpādasya / tasmād apy avoniśomanaskāro noktaḥ //.

YBh P 5536, Dzi. 126b2-6; D 4035, Tshi. 110b7-111a3: ma rig pa ni tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa’i rgyu las byung ngo zhes kyang gsungs na / rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba bshad pa’i skabs su ci’i phyir de thog mar ma bstan ce na / spong ba’i rgyu ma yin pa dang / kun nas ṇon mongs pa’i rgyu *ma yin pa’i phyir / ’di ltar yid la byed pa de ni rmongs pa ma yin pa la mi skye la / rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba ni kun nas ṇon mongs pa’i rgyu yin pa dang / ma rig pa ni ngo bo ŉid kyis kun nas ṇon mongs pa can yin la tshul bzhin ma yin pa yid la byed pa ni / ngo bo ŉid kyis kun nas ṇon mongs pa can ma yin pa dang / des ni ma rig pa kun nas ṇon mongs par mi byed kyi / ma rig pa’i dbang gis de kun nas ṇon mongs par ’gyur pa dang / skye ba yang las dang ṇon mongs pas bskyed pa yin la / de la las kyi rgyu (xyll.: rgyun) ni rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba’i dang po ma rig pa yin pa’i phyir te / de’i phyir yang tshul bzhin ma
yin par yid la byed ma gsungs so //.
23) YBh, p. 118.2-12: tatrāyoniśomanaskāraprajñaptivyavasthāpanaṃ katamat / tatroddānaṃ /
hetāu phalam abhivyaktir atitānañgatāstītā /
ātmā ca sāśvataṁ karma īśvarādivihiṃsatā //
antānantaṁ ca vikṣepaḥ ahetūcchedanāstītā /
agraṃ śuddhiś ca maṅgalyaṁ paravādaḥ ca śoḍaśa //
śoḍaśa ime paravādaḥ / tadyathā / hetuphalasadvādaḥ / abhivyaktivādaḥ /
ātitānagatadravyasadvādaḥ / ātmavādaḥ / sāśvatavādaḥ / pūrvakṛtahetu-
tusadvādaḥ / īśvarādikartṛkavādaḥ / vihisādharavādaḥ / antānantika-
vādaḥ / amarāvikṣepavādaḥ / ahetuvaṇaḥ / ucchedavādaḥ / agravādaḥ / śuddhi-
vādaḥ / kautukamaṅgalavādaḥ ca //.
24) BHSD sub abhinirvṛtta.
25) Ratnagotravibhāga verses 55-61 (Tr. J. Takasaki, p. 236-7):
“The earth is supported by water,
Water by air, and air by space;
Space has, however, no support
Neither in air, nor in water, nor in the earth. // 55 //
Similarly all the component elements [of Phenomenal Life]
Have their foundation in the Active Force and Defilements,
And the Active Force and Defilements exist always
On the basis of the Irrational Thought. // 56 //
The irrational Thought is founded
In the [innate] mind which is pure,
The innate mind has, however, no support
In any [of the worldly] phenomena. // 57 //
All the component elements of Phenomenal Life
Are known as akin to the earth,
And the Active Force and Defilements of living beings
Are known as akin to water. // 58 //
The Irrational Thought is known
As having resemblance to air;
Being of no root and of no support,
The Innate Mind is like space. // 59 //
Abiding in the Innate Mind,
There occurs the irrational action of mind.
By the Irrational Action of mind,
The Active Force and Defilements are produced. // 60 //
All the component elements of Phenomenal Life,
Originated from the water-like Active Force and Defilements,
Show their appearance and disappearance [repeatedly],
Just as [the world repeats its] evolution and devolution. // 61 //"

_Uttaratantra_ (ed. by E.H. Johnston (Patna 1950), reed. by H.S. Prasad, p. 110-111):

prthivyambau jalaṁ vāyau vāyur vyomni pratiṣṭhitaḥ /
apratiṣṭhitam ākāśaṁ vāyymbukṣitidhātuśu // 55 //
skandhadhātvindriyaṁ tadvat karmakleśapratīṣṭhitam /
karmakleśāḥ sadāyonimanaskārapratīṣṭhitāḥ // 56 //
ayonisomanaskāraś cittaśuddhipratīṣṭhitāḥ /
sarvadharmesu cittasya prakṛtis tv apratiṣṭhitā // 57 //
prthivīdhātuwaj jñeyāḥ skandhāyatatanadhātavah /
abdhātusadṛśā jñeyāḥ karmakleśāḥ śārīrinām // 58 //
ayonisomanaskāro vijñeyo vāyudhātuvat /
tadāmulapratiṣṭhānā prakrtir vyomadhātuvat // 59 //
cittaprakṛtīm ālīṇayoniśo manasaḥ kṛtiḥ /
ayonisomanaskāraprabhave klesakarmaṇaḥ // 60 //
karmakleśāmbusambhūtāḥ skandhāyatanadhātavah /
upadyante nirudhyante tatsaṃvartavivaṃtavat // 61 //
Controversy on avidyā and ayoniṣomanaś(i)kāra (Mejor)

28) PSVy, P 19a5; D 17a7; cf. LVP, Kośa, III, p. 71 n. 4; AVN, p. 129.4-5, 10.
29) Cf. MN. I, p. 67 (Cūlasihanādasutta): ime cattāro upādānā taṇhāni-
dānā taṇhāsamudayā taṇhājātikā taṇhāpabhāvī.
30) PSVy, p. 618.8-10: kvacid bhagavatā tṛṣṇāyā avidyevaktaḥ prayayahaḥ / tṛṣṇāyā bhikṣavo 'vidyā hetur avidyā prayayo 'vidyā nidānam iti /.
31) Śamathadeva: "[originated] from ignorance (avidyāja)". Cf. AK II. 26a: mohaḥ pramādaḥ /; AKBh p. 56.6: tatra moho nāmāvidyā, ajñānam asamprakhyānam /. Cf. Dharmaskandha, p. 25 (3r1): saṁmohāḥ pramoḥo moham (!) mohajam iyaṁ ucyate avidyā (/).
32) See Lamotte 1973, pp. 313-316 (a reconstruction of the Paramārthaśū-
nyatāsūtra [T 99, No. 335, p. 92c12-26] into Sanskrit).
34) This sentence is repeated twice.
35) Or, perhaps: "received respectfully and practised (the Buddha’s word)". Cf. Lamotte 1973, p. 316.