The Problem
of the Sentience of Plants
in Earliest Buddhism

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Studia Philologica Buddhica
Monograph Series
VI

Tokyo • The International Institute for Buddhist Studies • 1991
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Tokyo : The International Institute for Buddhist Studies : 1991
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Foreword

In a previous study of the problem of Buddhism and Nature (Schmithausen 1985), I already touched upon the question of the sentience of plants in earliest Buddhism. But later I found that this problem requires being dealt with more carefully. Between 1987 and 1990, I have reconsidered the matter several times on the occasion of giving lectures on it in various places (Munich, Tübingen, Vienna, Oslo, La Trobe, Canberra, Bangkok, Kyoto and Tokyo), and I take the opportunity to express my sincere thanks to all those who raised objections, made suggestions or drew my attention to useful materials. Yet, I am fully aware of the fact that not only an earlier and much shorter paper (which is being published as Basham Lecture 1989 by the A.N.U., Canberra) but even the present study is still merely a preliminary attempt, far from being exhaustive. For, firstly a comprehensive treatment of the issue should perhaps, with due caution, also investigate similes, poetical imagery, narrative literature and artistic representations, etc., referring to plants; but this would by far have exceeded the limits of the present study. Secondly, even within these limits I may still have overlooked or misinterpreted important evidence, especially in the field of Vinaya in which I am anything but a specialist. In spite of this, I have decided to present the essay as it stands, hoping that at any rate it provides a relatively sound basis for discussion, and one reason for my decision has been that the problem dealt with is of more than merely academic relevance.

In order to spare the less specialized reader all too many details, I have deliberately relegated documentation and discussion of specific matters to the notes.

My deepest thanks are due to M. Maithri Murthi and A. Wezler for valuable information and advice, to S. A. Srinivasan, who, in addition, also corrected my faulty English with untiring patience, to Dr. Akira Yuyama for kindly accepting this study for publication, and to B. Quessel for his constant help in preparing the final printout.
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I. The Problem and its Context

1.1 In connection with the requirement of a non-anthropocentric ethics encompassing all creatures, or nature as a whole,\(^1\) the Buddhist precept — valid for monks and nuns as well as lay followers — to abstain from killing any living, animate being (pāṇātipāta veramanī),\(^2\) occasionally\(^3\) supplants or supplemented by the injunction not to injure them (ahimsā), is no doubt very important. Even though in everyday practice the ideal is rarely fulfilled and although the present ecological situation has created additional complications,\(^4\) the precept does seem to have had some protective influence in at least some traditional Buddhist societies.\(^5\)

1.2 However, being a living or animate being (e.g. \(p(r)āṇa/p(r)āṇin, satt(v)a, jīva,\) \(bhūta\))\(^6\) is, in India, at any rate in theoretical contexts, by and large equated

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\(^1\) I take the liberty to intuitively presuppose this requirement, without entering into the philosophical problems involved. But I find it necessary to disclose the motive that inspired me to embark on this subject. One reason is that I cannot of course exclude that my motive may after all have influenced the results of my historical investigation, even though I have tried my best to interpret the sources as objectively as possible. The second reason is my hope that this article may not only be a scholarly contribution to the understanding of the history of Buddhist thought and practice but also arouse or strengthen sensitivity and sympathy towards our fellow beings, including plants, which is badly needed.

\(^2\) E.g. DN III 235; 269; AN V 274ff; Vin I 83 (sāmañera); Hārtel 1956, p. 54 (upāsaka); the earlier, fuller formulation (pāṇātipātaṃ pahāya pāṇātipāta paṭīvirato ... sabba-pāṇabhūta-hitānukampī ...) e.g. DN I 4; I 53 (ascetic or monk); AN II 66; III 203; 211f (layman). That in the term \(p(r)āṇātipāta\) '\(p(r)āṇa\) has, as elsewhere in Buddhist (and Jaina) texts, the same meaning as \(p(r)āṇin\)' is confirmed, e.g., by Sūy I.8.4 atīvāyāya pāṇīn. Cp. also the explicit statement at Sv 69,21f. pāṇo ti c' ettha vohārato satto, paramatthato jīvitindriyaṃ. The meaning of 'atīpāta' is corroborated by verbal expressions in the context of the five or ten precepts, e.g. Sn 394 pāṇaṃ na hane; DN I 123 pāṇaṃ pi haneyya; cp. also Hārtel, loc. cit. (prāṇi ... jīvitān na vyaparopayita-tavya(h)).

\(^3\) E.g. AN III 213: na himse pāṇabhūtāni (versified version of the first precept for lay followers); MN I 42 (avihimsa prefixed to the series pāṇātipāta paṭīvirato, etc.).

\(^4\) Cp. Add. I.A and I.B.

\(^5\) For a detailed and well-balanced description of the situation in the traditional society of Sri Lanka, see Maithri Murthi 1986.

\(^6\) For 'jīva' in the sense of "living being" in Jaina sources see § 6.2.2 + n. 106 and § 20.1 + ns. 342 and 344. For an example in a Hindu text, see Rāmacandra ad Manu X.84.

\(^7\) In order to distinguish the different terms in translation, I consistently render 'p(r)āṇa' by "animate being", 'jīva' by "living being", 'satt(v)a' by "[sentient] being" or "sentient being", and 'bhūta' (even if used as a quasi-synonym of 'p(r)āṇa', etc.) simply by "being". — As far as I can see, 'jīva', which in some contexts means "soul", is largely avoided in the Early Buddhist texts in the sense of "living being" except when the view of "people" or non-Buddhists is referred to, as in the
with being sentient\(^8\) \((sa)cetana,\(^9\) sacittaka,\(^10\) cittamānta,\(^11\) etc.), with being, to a certain extent at least, capable of perception and sensation, and in doctrinally developed Buddhism it is, apart from men and mythological beings, only animate beings that are regarded as sentient beings.\(^12\) Except for certain developments in the Far East\(^13\) and perhaps Tantric Buddhism (which requires special investigation), plants are not admitted in Buddhism as sentient beings, let alone crystals, stones, earth, water or other inorganic things. These are hence not, at least not directly, protected by the precept to abstain from killing/injuring animate beings.

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\(^8\) Explicitly so: TBV 651,36 (caitanyalakṣanam jīvatvam); cp. also VĀvBh 1753 (jīvanā as one of the reasons for sentience; cp. Kir 39,21).

\(^9\) E.g. NBi III.59; TBV 651,35; 652,1; Wezler 1986, 431; 436; 440; 442ff. For a more restricted use of 'cetana' in the sense of "possessing intellect" see Thieme, KISchr, 377 (and Wezler 1986, 466 a. 4). Cp. the similar ambiguity of the term 'samjñin' in Jainism (Wezler 1987b, 125f [fn. 63]). — Actually, at least five positions may be distinguished:

a) lifeless and insentient;
b) living but entirely insentient (rare in Indian thought; but cp. § 30);
c) living and sentient in the sense of being capable of rudimentary forms of perception or sensation, e.g. possessing only the sense of touch (as, e.g., element beings and plants in Jainism);
d) also possessing higher faculties of perception (as, e.g., lower animals in Jainism);
e) also possessing intellect.

In theoretical contexts, '(sa)cetana' etc. are usually employed from \(c\) onward, but sometimes they seem to imply even \(e\) (cp. Thieme, loc. cit.; TJv 354b5ff [see n. 493]) or at least \(d\) (as, e.g., at MBh 12.177.10-18).

\(^10\) E.g. MHRd IX.140ff.

\(^11\) E.g. Āyārs p. 41,5; Dasav 4 (p. 5,15ff).

\(^12\) Cp. TRD 159,21f for a statement that sentience of animals is undisputed among the Indian systems of thought.

\(^13\) See BN § 30.1-3.
2.1 As for Vedic religion, there is sufficient evidence that not only animals but also plants as well as seeds and even water and earth were, more or less naively, believed to be living and even sentient,\(^{14}\) and fire and wind had at least a personalized, divine aspect (viz. the gods Agni on the one hand, and Vāyu and Vāta on the other; cp. also the idea of water and fire as principles of life in late Vedic thought). Even in post-Vedic Hinduism, at least the view that plants and seeds capable of germination are sentient beings is still well documented,\(^{15}\) although some circles and authors disagree.\(^{16}\) Occasionally, even stones, water or the earth are admitted as living or sentient.\(^{17}\)

2.2 In Jainsm the view that plants and seeds are sentient beings is clearly expressed and undisputed,\(^{18}\) and according to the view prevailing in Jaina sources even earth, water, wind and fire are alive,\(^{19}\) i.e., consist of minute living beings

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\(^{14}\) E.g., ŚB 11.6.1 (trees, plants, water); 3.3.1.7 and 6.4.3.1ff (earth); 3.8.5.9f (plants, trees, water); 1.2.2.11 (grain); 11.1.2.1f (grain, plant (soma)). [Some of these passages I owe to C. Nenninger.\(^{1}\) Cp. Schmidt 1968, 644-648. Cp. also ChU VI.11.1-2 (tree as living (jīva)).

\(^{15}\) E.g., MBh 12.177.10-18; Yogavāsiṣṭha 7.62.7 (tree perceiving its leaves, flowers and fruits with the "eye" of self-perception [personal communication from Dr. W. Slaje]). For seeds: Gautama-Dharmasūtra 3.22: varjayed bija-vadham; MBh 3.199.20 (dhānyabijānī ... jivānī). Cp. Wezler 1986, 432ff and 455ff (plants); 439 and 458f (seeds); id. 1987a, 335ff; id. 1987b, 111ff; Halbfass 1980, 291f and 301; 1991, 317f and 327; Slaje 1989, 151ff.

\(^{16}\) Cp. Halbfass 1980, 291f and 1991, 317f (Praśastapāda and others); Wezler 1986, 460f and 476 n. 74 (pointing out a certain tendency, at least in certain circles, to abandon the idea of the sentience of plants in the course of time); Wezler 1987b, 129f; Slaje 1989, 152 (Abhinavagupta).

\(^{17}\) Slaje 1989, 152 (Śaiva author Bhāskara, 18th century: water and earth) and 157 (Yogavāsiṣṭha: stones but not atoms and elements); cp. also Rāmānuja on BhG 14.18 (rebirth as a stone or clod). Yogavāsiṣṭha 7.62.8 (ocean perceiving all aquatic animals [personal communication from Dr. W. Slaje]).

\(^{18}\) E.g., Āyārs pp. 4.26-31 (cp. Bhatt 1989, 136 and 138) and 41.4; Dasav 4 (p. 6,3-8); 8.2 (... tāṇa rukkha sabīyagā ... jīva tti ii vuttaṃ mahesinā); 10.3; Śūy I.11.7-8; cp. Schubring 1935, 133ff.

\(^{19}\) Thus, e.g., Āyārs p. 41.3-5; Dasav 4 (p. 5,12-6,3); 8.2 (puḍhavi daga agant mārūya ... jīva tti ii vuttaṃ mahesinā); Śūy I.11.7-8; I.7.7a (puḍhavī vi jīvā āū vi jīvā). — According to B. Bhatt (1989, 135ff), in the earliest source (viz. Āyār I.1) the view that the elements themselves are living, animate beings is still absent; cp. also § 17.2 and n. 338, but also n. 316. At a later point, the sentience of the elements themselves is expressly rejected in the Nīlakācī (371), for which see n. 472.
possessing, like plants, the sense of touch.\textsuperscript{20}

3.1 Against this background, it appears natural to raise the question whether in earliest Buddhism, too, at least plants and seeds (but perhaps even earth and water) may still have been viewed as living, sentient beings, in spite of the later rejection of such a view. To be sure, in this case it would be necessary to explain how the later view arose. But in the opposite case, too, one would have to search for a reason why the Buddhists, or the Buddha, abandoned the view, current at their time, that plants are sentient beings.

3.2 It would be easy to determine the status of plants and seeds in earliest Buddhism if the canonical Buddhist texts, and especially such layers as can be regarded as comparatively old, did contain fully explicit statements either rejecting or asserting the sentience of plants. But there are none, as far as I can see. Hence, the matter has to be decided by induction. In view of the later doctrinal position of Buddhism that plants (etc.) are not sentient beings, the \textit{onus probandi} is, of course, incumbent on him who maintains that in earliest Buddhism the situation was different. Therefore, I shall, in the following chapters (II-IV), discuss passages which may indicate that in earliest Buddhism plants were still regarded as living, sentient beings, or at least not yet definitely considered to be lifeless and in sentient.

\textsuperscript{20} Cp., e.g., Schubring 1935, 133; Frauwallner 1956a, 266f.
II. General Prohibition to Injure Seeds and Plants

II.A. Text and Literal Meaning

4.1 Let me start with a passage in the Pāṭimokkhasutta, viz. Pācittiya 11:
"If [a monk or nun] is ruthless with regard to plants, this is an offence to be atoned" (bhūtagāmapātavyatāya pācitti-
yan).  

21 Vin IV 34; cp. V 38 (bhūtagāmaṁ pānten...). Cp. T vol. 24, 905c12 砇鬼村 (Upāliparipr-
chā; cp. Stache-Rosen 1984, 63; for probable affiliation of the text to the Abhayagiri school, ib. 12ff
and 28ff); Mi.: T vol. 22, 41c17 and 23f: 殺生草木, but 42a6 and 85b24: 伐鬼村; Mā.: 339a17
bījagrāma-bhūtagrāma-pātāpanake (see n. 39) pācattikam; Dh.: 641c13f = 1026b8: 墓鬼神村; Sa.: Finot 1913, 504, aad v. Simson 1986, 49 and 88: bijagrāma-bhūtagrāma-pātānāt pātayantikā (v.
Simson, p. 88, has “patanāt”, which is probably a scribal error or misprint); T vol. 23, 75a22
[Vin.Sa.] (= 482c29 [Prāt.Bh.B.Sa.]); 砇拔 (伐) 鬼村種子村 (v.l. om. 他村); 474b7 [Prāt.Sa.]:
殺生草木; same text in a Tunhuang fragment of Prāt.Bh.Sa., probably also by Kumārajīva (Yuyama
24 (T 1464, a Vinayavibhanga of the Sa. transl. by Chu Fo-nien in 383 A.D. acc. to Yuyama 1979,
p. 7, § 1.15.C.1), 879c5: 自手數他殺; Prāt.Sa.7n (Yabuki 1930, fol. 40, upper col., line 35;
Inoguchi 1981, 196 [No. 185]): 墓生草花葉斷殺樹木 (Tunhuang ms., dated 405 A.D., of yet
another early version of Prāt.Sa.: cp. Yuyama 1979, p. 2, § 1.11.C.2); Mā.: GBM (FacEd) I, p. 31,
fol. 51, line 4, and II, p. 77, fol. 142, line 1: bijagrāma-bhūtagrāma-pātāna-pātāpanāt pāyattikā;
Vin.Mā., je 260a3: sa bon gyi tshogs dañ/’hyaṅ po’i gnas ’jig gam/’jig tu ’dzud (D.R: ’jud) na luṅ
byed do//; T vol. 23, 776b5f (= vol. 24, 504a18): 自坡種子有情村及今他坡; cp. MvY no. 8431:
bījagrāma-bhūtagrāma-vināṣānam (cp. Vin.Mā., je 265a7: sa bon dañ skye ba ’jig pa...; T vol. 23,
775c10; 墓生鬼村); Kā.: T vol. 24, 662b10: 墓種子鬼神村. — Cp. also T vol. 24 (T 1463: *Vinaya-
mātrkā, see § 12.4 + n. 218), 823b28f (felling of a caitya tree is pācittiya).

21 Vin IV 34; cp. V 38 (bhūtagāmaṁ pānten...). Cp. T vol. 24, 905c12 砇鬼村 (Upāliparipr-
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bījagrāma-bhūtagrāma-vināṣānam (cp. Vin.Mā., je 265a7: sa bon dañ skye ba ’jig pa...; T vol. 23,
775c10; 墓生鬼村); Kā.: T vol. 24, 662b10: 墓種子鬼神村. — Cp. also T vol. 24 (T 1463: *Vinaya-
mātrkā, see § 12.4 + n. 218), 823b28f (felling of a caitya tree is pācittiya).


20 Cp. Sp 761: rāsi; Paṭis-a 690: samāha; cp. also T vol. 23, 474b7 (see n. 21) 神 and Vin.Mā.,
ce 249b5f (Vin.Mā.) tshogs (but je 260a3 and 7 has gnas). Cp. also the analogous cpd. 'bīja-g(r)āma'
(see §§ 4.3-4.4 and 5.2 + ns. 63 and 64).


25 Cp. n. 30.
'bhūtag(r)āma' usually and, so it seems, originally\(^{27}\) occurs in complementary opposition to 'bijā-g(r)āma' ("multitude of seeds")\(^{28}\) and by the fact that in canonical Jainā sources we find, in similar contexts, the pair "seeds and green [plants]" (bīya/hariya, = bija/harita).\(^{29}\) It is furthermore confirmed by the commentaries\(^{30}\) as well as by some Chinese translations,\(^{31}\) and also by some parallel passages,\(^{32}\) and

\(^{26}\) Cp. also CPD s.v. amūlaka-bhūtagāma ("plants without root"). — Buddhaghosa’s etymological remark (Sp 761: jāyanti vaddhanti jātā vaddhītā cā ti attho) may not be far off the mark; cp. M. Mayrhofer, Kurzgefasstes Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen (Heidelberg 1956-1980), mentionimg, s.v. bhavati, Armenian boys “Schößling, Pflanze”; cp. also German “Gewächs”, mainly used for plants. — The phraseology of Pāc. 11 does not necessarily presuppose a habitual use of ‘bhūta’ in the special sense of "plants". It is possible if not probable that ‘bhūtag(r)āma’ acquired this special meaning only in this special context, viz. by being used, for want of a specific word for plants in general, in complementary opposition to bija(g)rāma) (see §§ 4.3-4.4), i. e. in the sense of "what has arisen or grown up [from seeds]", just as ‘harita’ in the Jainā sources (see n. 29).

\(^{27}\) See § 4.4.

\(^{28}\) See §§ 4.3 and 4.4.

\(^{29}\) Cp., e.g., Āyār, p. 41,4; 37,24; Āyār II.1.1.1; Dasav 4.11 (p. 13,11+13); 5.1.3; 5.1.26; 5.1.29; 5.1.57; 8.11b; 10.3. Sūy I.7.8-9 even has harīyāṇī b h ā yā nī (JAS ed. §§ 388: haritāṇi bhūtāṇi) besides bīya.

\(^{30}\) E.g., Sp 761 (pattīthita-harita-tīnarukkhaḍī); Sv I 77 (alla-tīnarukkhāḍika); Spk III 134 (paṇṇa-sampannam-nilabhāvato-pathāya); Mṇ IV 51 (nīkkhanta-mūla-paṇṇamharitakaṃ); T vol. 23, 75a26f. — Irrespective of the interpretation of the components, all versions of the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga agree in that the c o m p o u n d ‘bhūtag(r)āma’ as a whole is taken to refer to p l a n t s : cp. T vol. 22, 339a19 (Vin.Mā.); 641c14f (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 75a23 (Vin.Sa.); 776b19f (Vin. Mū.; Vin. Mū., je 260a8: gnas [i.e. (bhūta)-grāma] ses bya ba ni śīn lījon pa la sogs pa’o), and implicitly also Vin. Mī. (cp. 42a2f and 7ff). — In the Pāli Suttavibhaṅga (Vin IV 34f), bhūtagāma is explained as the "five kinds of seeds (or rather: parts of plants capable of propagation)" (paṭca bija-jātāṇi), viz. mūla-bija, etc., which at first glance looks like (and in Vin.Mā. [T vol. 22, 339a18f], Vin.Sa. [vol. 23, 75a28f] and Vin. Mū. [776b7ff, Vin. Mū., je 260a3f in fact is) an explanation of bija-gāma, not bhūta-gāma (cp. also the casuistics at Vin IV 35: bije bijasahñī, etc.). But actually these paṭca bijajātāṇi are further explained as five groups of p l a n t s, distinguished according to their way of propagation (cp. also T vol. 22, 42a2f; 641c14ff; vol. 23, 75a29ff). Accordingly, Buddhaghosa (Sp 761) explains bija-jāta as " a r i s e n f r o m s e e d s" or "seeds that have developed [into plants]" (cp. also his explanation of bija in the casuistics as bija-ta sambhūto bhūtagāma (Sp 762)). At DN I 5 the same five bijajātāṇi are used to explain the c o m p o u n d ‘bijagāme-bhūtagāma’, and Buddhaghosa (Sp 1 81,22-26) may be right in indicating that in this passage both the propagating parts and the plants arising from them are meant, which would be possible if the expressions mūla-bija, etc., are understood both as karmadhārayos ("root as a propagating part") and bahuvrīhīs ("propagated from roots").

\(^{31}\) See n. 21: T vol. 22, 41c17 (Vin.Mī.): 生草木 "fresh/growing/living herbs and trees"; T vol.
even by a Jaina commentary specifying, in a quite different context, bhūta as trees.  

4.2.2 As for 'pātavyatā', its derivation is doubtful and my rendering "ruthlessness" is not much more than a guess. In order to cover also other contexts, like kāmesu pātavyatā, one could start from a meaning like "lack of restraint". In the case of sensual pleasures (kāma), lack of restraint would mean indulging in them. In the present case, however, as also when referring to animate beings (pānesu pātavyatā), lack of restraint would rather be ruthless, destructive behaviour; and

23, 474b7 (Prāt.Sa.,): "all herbs and trees"; T vol. 24 (no. 1464). 879c5: "trees"; Prāt.Sa., (see n. 21): "fresh/growing/living grass, flowers and leaves" (生草花葉) and "trees" (樹木).

32 MN I 230: ye kec' ime bijagāma-bhūtagāmA vuddhīṁ virūḍhīṁ veppulam āpajjantī, sabbe te paṭhavīṁ nissāya paṭhavīṁ paṭiṭhāyā; SN V 46; AN IV 100: dehe ... avassanie ye kec' ime bijagāma-bhūtagāma (B): cp. CPD II 791) osadhi-tīna-vanappatayo, te sabbe uṣsussanti visussanti na bhavanti (where osadhi-tīna-vanappatayo is best taken as a gloss on bhūtagāma); similarly SHT IV, 100f; Šiks 206,10: tṛṇauṣadhi-bhūta-gana (with gana for grāma, and "grass and herbs" concretizing bhūta which otherwise probably have been misunderstood by the audience); Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra (ed. Vaidya) 84,20f (where bija-grāma is accompanied by osadhi-grāma instead of bhūta-grāma).

33 ĀyārViv 47,34a and 47,37 (verse quotation: bhūtās tu taravah smṛtāh) (ad Āyārś p. 5,6).

34 In Hindu sources, 'bhūtagrāma' is mostly used in the less specific sense of "multitude, or totality, of creatures" (cp. PW), including both stationary and mobile beings, thus at any rate plants as well as animals and even men; see, e.g., Yāska, Nirukta 14.4; MBh 12.249.6-7; 14.42.19; Śaṅkara on Brāhmaśūtra 3.1.20 and on BhG 8.19; cp. Sugimoto 1978, 625. A likewise comprehensive use is found at Samavāya 14.1 (JĀŚ ed., p. 351); cp. Avāsaya 4.15-16; Utt 5.8; Sūy II.6.21. Occasionally, 'bhūtagrāma' means "assemblage of the elements" (e.g., Śaṅkara on Brāhmaśūtra 3.3.35 (as one of two alternatives)); Sarvatobhadra ad BhG 17.6.

35 O. von Hnüber, Das ältebre Mittelindisch im Überblick, Wien 1986, § 255. Buddhaghosa takes 'pātavya' as a gerundivum in the sense of either pivitabba, i.e., (pari)bhūjītabba/sevitabba (Sp 761; Ps II 371; Mp II 369,6; Sv III 869,31) or ghamsitabba (Sp 288). But in this case the expression 'pātavyatām ā-pad' would have to be taken to mean "to regret as something to be enjoyed, or to be crushed" (cp. Sp 288 [ad Vin III 42, see below]: mā pāhe pātabbe ghamsitabbe eva m a n a n i), which is highly improbable since ā-pad rather means "to fall into, undergo, commit" (CPD) or, with the acc. of an abstract of x, "to become x". Hence, the explanation of 'pātavyatā as the abstract of a gerundivum is hardly acceptable.

36 Vin V 123; MN I 305 (eke ... evamdiṭṭhino: "naththā kāmesu doso" ti; te kāmesu pātavyatām āpajjantī); 307; AN I 266; 295; cp. also DN III 89 (asmiṃ asaddhamme, i.e. methune).

37 Vin III 42, reporting the case of a monk who had been a potter and had built for himself a hut out of clay which he had then baked with fire — an action displaying lack of compassion (anudayā,
as the commentaries\(^{38}\) as well as the Sanskrit versions\(^{39}\) and Chinese translations\(^{40}\) suggest, this would, in the case of plants, consist in cutting, felling, splitting, etc.

4.3 This is also confirmed by a parallel in the Suttapiṇḍaka,\(^{41}\) where a monk's morality (silā) is said to include abstention from killing or injuring seeds and plants (bijagāma-bhūtagāma-samārambha).\(^{42}\) By some later sources\(^{43}\) and by a contem-

**anukampā** and of the attitude of not injuring (avihesā). The monk is reproached lest future generations might become ruthless towards animate beings (mā pacchimā janarā pānesu pāravyatān āpajjī). In this passage, the meaning of pāravyatā appears to be opposed to "compassion" and come close to "injuring" (avihesā = hiṃsā).

\(^{38}\) Sp 761: chedanabhedanādīṇi; cp. Vin IV 35: chindati ... bhindati ... pacati. Cp. also Vin.Mū.: je 260a8f (T vol. 23, 776b20f), explaining pātana ("jig pa, "to destroy") as "to pull out, throw down(?) ; Ch. break), cut, pierce, and chop" ('byin pa dañ/ sñol [P,D,R; read stil?] ba dañ/ gcod pa dañ/ 'big s pa dañ/ 'tshog (R: 'chaq) pa).

\(^{39}\) Prāṭ. Sa. (see n. 21) pātana "felling" or, in a more general sense "destroying" (cp. MW s.v. pat, caus.); Prāṭ. Mū. (see n. 21) pātana-pāṭoṇāt. Prāṭ. Mā. Lok. (see ib.) pāṭoṇake is rather obscure. Cp. also pāẹnī at Vin V 38.

\(^{40}\) See n. 21, e.g. T vol. 22, 41c17: 斬 "chopping"; 42a6: 伐 "felling"; 552b6: 破 "breaking"; 641c13: 砸 "destroying"; vol. 23, 75a22: 割 "pulling out"; 474b7: 殺 "killing"; Prāṭ. Sa. (see n. 21) 耳 "destroying" and 斬 斬 "cutting and chopping".

\(^{41}\) DN I 5: 64; MN I 180; 268; III 34; AN II 209; V 205; cp. SN V 470.

\(^{42}\) This (minor) precept is missing in the parallel versions known to me (Sāṅghabhā II, 233,6ff = Vin.Mū., ce 249a2ff; T vol. 1, 83c27ff, 89a6ff, 264c4ff and 273a8ff [Dīrghāgama]; 657b6ff and 733b20ff [Madhyamāgama]), some of which have abstention from drinking wine instead. K. Meisig (Das Śrāmānyaphala-sūtra, Wiesbaden 1987, 58) thinks that the latter is the original item and that the first series of the precepts to which it belongs is modelled on the latter part of the tenth sīkṣāpadas for lay followers practising uposatha. But it is more probable that special uposatha rules for lay followers were moulded after the monastic precepts and that in this connection the precept not to injure plants and seeds was ignored because it was impracticable for lay people (see § 26.1). On the other hand, if the precept not to drink alcohol was originally missing in the monastic precepts, it is understandable that it was introduced later on, since monks too should not of course drink wine, as is clear from Pāc. 51. At any rate, it is quite difficult to see why the Theravāda tradition should have removed the prohibition to drink alcohol, which has hardly lost its importance in later times, and should have replaced it by the archaic rule to abstain from injuring seeds and plants. If, however, we start from the assumption that the latter is the original one, it is quite easy to understand that when it had become more or less obsolete it came to be replaced by the more topical precept not to drink alcohol, which was missed (cp. also SN V 467 where this precept has been incorporated but still remains outside the traditional series (ib. 468-474)). This way of looking at things is, by the way, supported also by another fact: In some Sūtras (DN I 5ff; 64ff) the series of precepts under discussion is followed by another one, which Meisig (op. cit., 59) supposes to be a kind of "commentarial extension". Now, this latter series, too, starts with a paragraph criticizing ascetics injuring seeds and
porary German Buddhist,\textsuperscript{44} this rule is understood as a prohibition of agriculture.\textsuperscript{45} Though 'samārāmbha' can have the meaning "undertaking" or "effort", Buddhaghosa is certainly right in preferring the meaning "injuring".\textsuperscript{46} At Sn 311, 'samārāmbha' unambiguously means the slaughtering of cattle (in a Vedic ritual). In this sense, 'samārabhati' as well as 'ārabhati\textsuperscript{47} continue Vedic 'ālabhate' "to seize", used as a euphemism for "to kill [a victim in sacrificial ritual]".\textsuperscript{48} It seems, however, that in Pāli 'ā-rahb' is also used for profane killing for the sake of food, without reference to Vedic ritual, and this is perhaps also true of 'ā-labhā/ā-rahbh' in the Asoka inscriptions.\textsuperscript{50} In the canonical Jain sources, 'sam-ā-rahbh' is preferred and plants, and, what is more, this paragraph is found also in some versions where the precept not to injure seeds and plants is missed in the preceding series (T vol. 1, 84a9-11 and 89a17-19; Saṅghabhī IV 234,3-7).

\textsuperscript{43} Vin.Mū., ce 249b5 and 7: "rtṣom pa" "undertaking". Cp. also T vol. 1, 84a10 and 89a18, prohibiting monks from sow ing or planting trees which may become the abode (*grāma) of demons or spirits (*bhūta) (see § 5.3). — One reason for a reinterpretation may have been that at any rate in the case of 'sam-ārāmbha' the meaning "killing", "injuring" had fallen into oblivion in at least some currents of continental Buddhism (cp., e.g., the fact that there is no example for such a use in AKBh-I).

\textsuperscript{44} Hellmuth Hecker, Die Ethik des Buddha (Hamburg 1976), 218.

\textsuperscript{45} In earliest Buddhism, there was hardly any need for such a prohibition since the monks and nuns had no fixed residence outside the rainy season. Some Vinaya texts expressly allow sowing/planting, e.g. T vol. 23, 601a4ff (sowing trees for the sake of shade or flowers). Cp. also T vol. 22, 496b15ff and 875a12-14. The matter would seem to require special investigation.

\textsuperscript{46} As 146,5f: bijagāma-bhūtagāma-samārāmbhā paṭīvirato hoti ti ettha chedanabhātanādānām (read "dīnā" vikopanaṁ (see § 7.1); Sv I 77 (samārāmbhā chedana-bhedana-panacādā-bhāvena vikopanā paṭīvirato hoti). Cp. also Mp II 267 (ad AN I 169): pītaka (read 6ā? -samkhāto samārambho.

\textsuperscript{47} CPD s.v. "ārabhati. Cp. also SN I 76 and AN II 43: (mahāyānī) mahārāmbhā ... ajēlakā ca gāvo ca vividhā yattha haṅhāre (cp. H. Lüders, Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons, Berlin 1954, p. 34; BoBh 82,24f: ... mahārāmbheṣu, yeṣu bahavah pṛāṇināḥ ... jīvirāḥ vyaparopyante).


\textsuperscript{49} MN I 368: sāmaṇḍ Gotamaṁ uddissa pāṇaṁ ārabhanti, tāṁ so ... māṁsaṁ paribhujata.

\textsuperscript{50} RE I.B: no kichi jīve/jīvaṁ ālabhitu pajohitaviye (probably referring to Vedic ritual); I.F: pule
used for any kind of killing or injuring. Therefore, this Suttapitaka passage refers to the same issue as Pācittiya 11, viz. (abstention from) destroying or injuring plants.

4.4 The only essential difference is that the Suttapitaka passage speaks of seeds of plants, whereas the Pātimokkha rule mentions only plants. But this discrepancy may not be original. For, among the Prātimokṣasūtra versions of other Buddhist schools, preserved in Sanskrit and Chinese, a majority speaks not of plants only but, just as the Suttapitaka passage, of seeds of plants. In view of the Suttapitaka parallel, this reading is likely to be the original one; the more so since the versions containing it stem from schools unrelated to each other, whereas the versions omitting the seeds belong, as far as I can see, to closely related schools. It would, moreover, seem to be more difficult to conceive of a reason for

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mahānasasi... Piyadasine lājine... pānasatasahāsāni ālabhitīsu sūpathāye (for food, without, at least without explicit, reference to ritual [but see H.-P. Schmidt, Ahiṃsā und Wiedergeburt (forthcoming), ch. II]; cp. also I.G); (not specified: III.D pānānāṁ anālaṁbhe; IV.A pānālaṁbhe; etc.

51 E.g., Āyār 15.17 (no pāṇīṇam pāṇe samārabhejāsi) beside Já 168 (na pāṇo pāṇīṇam haññā te); Dasav 6.29 (puṭhavikāya-samārambhā [comm.: ālekhanādī]; similarly afterwards: āu-kāya-, vanassai- and tasakāya-samārambhā) beside 6.27, etc. (puṭhavikāyan etc. ... himsanti); Sūy I.1.2.28 (putaṁ ... samāraḥbha āhāreja; text acc. to Bollé 1977); Utt 12.41: chajīvākāe asamārabhantā (cp. Alsdorf 1961, 604: "... nicht verletzten"); Vīyāh VII 18b (Deleu 1970, 131): tasapāṇa-samārambhā; ĀyārViv 23,7 and 10 (ad ĀyārN 102): samārabhatye = vyāpādayati. Cp. also Jain 1983, 70f (samārambhā = injuring or killing the six classes of living beings). — Even when samārambhā or sam-ā-rabh is used in the sense of "seizing" or "undertaking/committing [an act]", the meaning is in most cases, explicitly or implicitly, that of "seizing a w e a p o n" or "committing v i o l e n c e" (cp., e.g., Āyār, pp. 2,10f; 2,31f; 8,1ff; 33,28ff). In all these cases, the connotation of injury and violence seems to have become an integral part of the meaning. Nor do I see any reason why 'sam-ā-rabh' should, in Jainism, still have a euphemistic function. Hence Schubring's rendering "to have to do with ..." (e.g., Schubring, KISchr 217 [transl. of Dasav 6.29, etc.]) is hardly felicitous.

52 See n. 21 (Mā., Mā.Lok., part of Sa. [cp. also n. 55], Mū., Kā.).

53 Cp. also the above-mentioned fact (see § 4.2.1 + n. 29) that in Jain sources, too, the combination of green plants (harita) with s e e d s (bhīya, bhīja) is not infrequently met with, and in similar contexts at that.

54 There is no special relationship or close connection between the Mahāsāṅghikas, Mūlasarvāstivādins and Kāśyapiyas. As for the Sarvāstivādins, their Vinaya- and Śuttapitaka has, to be sure, many features in common with that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, but this may be due to close contact from a certain time onward, and not to original relationship. According to E. Frawallner (1956b, 24ff), the Sarvāstivādins originally rather belong to the same group as the Therāvādins. Actually, the reading of the older versions of their Prātimokṣasūtra goes with that group (see n. 55).

55 Viz. Therāvādins, Mahāsānakas, Dharmaguptakas, and Sarvāstivādins (see n. 21). As for the
a later addition of the seeds than to account for their omission.\textsuperscript{56}

5 There can thus be hardly any doubt that what the Pātimokkhasutta declares to be a pācittiya offence, just like killing animals (Pāc. 61), and that abstention from which the Suttapitaka parallel lists as an element of a monk's morality, is in fact injuring or destroying plants, and originally probably even seeds. The question is, however, whether destroying plants and seeds was prohibited because in earliest Buddhism plants and seeds were still considered as living, maybe even sentient beings, just as in Vedic religion and Jainism, or whether there is some other explanation.

5.1 One might, e.g., suppose that the seeds and plants monks and nuns should not injure are crops and cultivated plants, and that destroying or injuring them is interdicted, of course, because of the damage it would inflict upon the owner.\textsuperscript{57} To be sure, such an argument is in fact occasionally met with in specific contexts.\textsuperscript{58} But there is no indication of such a restriction in the case of the general prohibition under discussion, nor has the latter, as far as I can see, ever been understood in such a sense in the exegetical tradition. On the contrary, the exegetical tradition defines "(seeds and) plants" by what appears to be meant as a comprehensive classification (viz. mūla-bīja, etc.; see n. 30), and occasionally even close relationship of these schools, see Frawullner 1956b, 8ff. As regards the Sarvāstivādins, it is, to be sure, only in some versions that the reference to seeds is missing: viz. in Kumārajīva's translation of Prāt.Sa. (somewhat after 404 A.D.: Yuyama 1979, p. 1, § 1.11.C.1) and in the Tunhuang version of his (?) translation of Prāt.Bhī.Sa. (see n. 21), in a Vinayavibhaṅga of this school transl. in 383 (see ibid.), and in a Tun-huang ms., dated 405 A.D., of yet another version of Prāt.Sa. (see ibid.). In view of their early date these documents may well represent an earlier tradition of the school; for the Skt. fragments are probably somewhat later, and the "official" Chinese Vin.Sa. has been revised (Yuyama 1979, p. 8, § 1.15-19.C.2; cp. also L. Schmithausen in: H. Bechert (ed.), Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hinayāna-Literatur, 2. Teil, Göttingen 1987, 315ff).

\textsuperscript{56} One might be tempted to see a connection between the omission of the seeds and the explanation of the precept in terms of plants as a habitation of deities or spirits (see below § 5.3), since 'bīja-grāma' does not allow of a similar reinterpretation. But the problem is that this secondary explanation of the sūtra is missing in at least one of the Vinayas of those schools which omit the seeds from the precept (see § 5.3 + n. 75). Hence, this omission may, in the community from which these schools derive (see n. 55), have preceded the attempts to reinterpret it, and may have been motivated by the fact that non-injuring of seeds was found too cumbersome and no longer required by society. But I admit that the matter requires further investigation.

\textsuperscript{57} Cp. Wetzlar 1986 for this kind of motivation in grammatical literature (436ff: as an alternative to that of the sentence of plants; cp. also 451ff) and Dharmaśāstra (446ff).

\textsuperscript{58} E.g., Vin IV 47 (monks destroying the barley field of a brahmin: cp. n. 190); III 51 (vanappati: felling a tree owned and used by somebody is "theft", hence a pārājika offence); T vol. 22, 495c9ff (Vin.Mā.: prohibition to fell flower and fruit trees; the introductory story stresses the interests of the donor). Cp. also §§ 11.3 and 14.4.
explicitly states that any plant is included, provided it is green and fresh. And when discussing details, some commentaries expressly mention plants that are not utilized or owned by man, like moss. Hence, it is not, or at least not primarily, human interest that constituted the original motive for the prohibition to injure (seeds and) plants; the more so as it would be unintelligible that such a motivation, though perfectly fitting in with the later view — noticeable, as a tendency at least, already in the Suttavibhāṅga (see § 5.5) — that plants are not sentient beings, is nevertheless entirely ignored in our sources.

5.2 Similar objections would arise against the suggestion that the original motive behind the prohibition to destroy or injure plants might have been an ecological one, viz. the fact that plants are the basic of animal life. Actually, there are a few commentarial passages indicating such a motive in that they explain 'bhūta-grāma' as "village" (grāma), i.e. abode, of beings (bhūta), i.e. insects and other animals. This is doubtless a secondary interpretation of the expression 'bhūta-größe' — secondary not only as a kind of interpretatio facitul but because it is also asymmetric to the complementary 'bijā-gréma' or would render the latter redundant. Moreover, in this case, too, it would be difficult to see

59 Spk III 303 (ad SN V 470): y a s s a k a s s a c i nīla-tīṇa-rakkhādikassa bhūta-gāmāssa.

60 This explains why mūsḥ̣rooms and mould or mildew are border-line cases, and injuring them only a minor offence or none at all (cp. Sp. 765; T vol. 22, 340a24 [Vin. Mā.]; vol. 23, 777a8ff [= Vin. Mā. je 265a6ff] and 975a4ff). Cp. also the fact that at Āyār. p. 41, 4 mould (panagā) appears as a category of its own between the elements and plants-and-seeds.

61 E.g., T vol. 23, 777a5ff (= Vin. Mā., je 264b5ff: sa ḫal = "moss") and 974c29ff (Vin. Mā.-Bhf.).

62 T vol. 23, 75a23ff (Vin. Sa.); 776b18ff (Vin. Mā.; here as well as at 776b5 [= Pāc. 11], 'bhūtagrāma' is rendered by 有情村, i.e. "village/abode of sentient beings"); Vin. Mā., je 260a7f:  "byū̄ha po (= bhūta) ēs bya ba ni greg sbur (= pipiliki) dag daň/ phye ma leb (= pataṅga) dag daň/ sbran bu dag daň/ il daň phub ma za ba dag daň/ sbrul (= sarp manual or ahi) dag daň/ sdi pa (= ṭaśi) dag daň/ sbran bu trem[a] bu ka (= trembuka/tryanbuka "wasp": see Ch. Lindtner in: A Green Leaf, Papers in Honour of Jēs P. Asmussen [Acta Iranica 28, Leiden 1988], 440) dag daň/ tre la tā ga (R: tre'ī la tā ka, = trellāka) dag go/ (?); T vol. 24, 577a16-18. Cp. Rosen 1959, 138. Cp. also Sn- a I 154,23f (see n. 204) and VinMañ 201, justifying the Pāṭimokkha rule that destroying or injuring plants is an offence by (among other things) the need to protect the beings dwelling in them (kasmā bhūtagāmā-saptabhyatāyā pācittī lecitthi? ... tannissitasattānurakkhanato), though in the context of the Pāli Vinaya (see § 5.3) the [sentient] beings (sattta) have perhaps to be understood, primarily at least, as deities, not animals.

63 In fact, as regards the meaning of 'grāma' in this cpd., the Chinese sources referred to in n. 62 do not seem to deviate in their explanation from Buddhaghosa's explanation of 'gama' in 'bhūta-gāma' (see § 4.2.1 + n. 23). T vol 24, 577a6 expressly states that 'grāma' in 'bijagrāma' means "assemblage, multitude" (集).

64 Viz. if 'bijagrāma' were interpreted in the sense of "[plants as] the abode of seeds". But I have
why this motive, in harmony as it is with the later view that plants themselves are not sentient beings, should have come to be ignored by the majority of the sources. Besides, (in case the cpd. "bija-gräma" is not also re-interpreted) this motivation too would not easily account for the prohibition to injure seeds, nor would it explain the fact that tradition unanimously limits the prohibition to green, unwithered plants\(^65\) (for animals inhabit "dead" plants as well)\(^66\) or that the prohibition includes the tearing off of single leaves, buds or fruits.\(^67\) Hence, it seems that this motivation is most likely a later attempt to justify the prohibition to injure plants on the basis of the dogmatic denial of their sentience.

5.3 For all rules of the Pätimokkha, the canonical commentary (Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga) relates an introductory story of the event (or events) supposed to have led to the enunciation of the respective rule. In the case of the prohibition to injure plants, the Pāli version of this story\(^68\) discloses two different motives, which strictly speaking belong to two different stories.\(^69\) One of them relates that a monk by felling a tree hit the arm of the child of the deity inhabiting that tree. According to other versions,\(^70\) the effect was merely that the deity loses her abode. According to this explanation, destroying or injuring plants would have been prohibited because they are the abode (g(r)āma) of spirits (bhūta) or deities.\(^71\) Hence, this motivation, like the preceding one (§5.2), appears to be linked to a secondary interpretation of "bhūtag(r)āma". And similar to the preceding one it can, to be sure, explain a prohibition to fell or injure trees, at best plants in general (if, as a few passages suggest,\(^72\) even grass and herbs are inhabited by deities); but it can hardly

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\(^{65}\) Cp. Sp 761, etc. (see n. 30), and the causistics in T vol. 22, 42a7ff (Vin.Mū.), 340a12-14 (Vin.Mā.), 642a2ff (Vin.Dh.; a12f: cutting a withered plant is no offence), vol. 23, 75c7ff (Vin.Sa.), and 776b25ff = Vin.Mū., je 269b3ff.

\(^{66}\) Cp. Aṣoka, PE V.E, prohibiting to burn c h a f f containing living beings (tuse sajīve no jhāpayitaviye).

\(^{67}\) T vol. 22, 340a8ff (Vin.Mā.); vol. 23, 776 c 24-27 (Vin.Mū.). Cp. also n. 76.

\(^{68}\) Vin IV 34.

\(^{69}\) As is actually the case in Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 74c22ff) and especially in Vin.Mū. (T vol. 23, 775c11-776a7 and 776a24-b3 (Vin.Mū., je 258a6-259a3 and 259b2-260a2). Cp. also the story discussed in §10.1.

\(^{70}\) T vol. 23, 75a2ff, esp. 6ff (Vin.Sa.); 775c11ff, esp. 18ff (Vin.Mū.); Vin.Mū., je 258a6ff, esp. b2ff. Cp. also n. 149.

\(^{71}\) Cp. T vol. 23, 75a23f (Vin.Sa.); vol. 24, 577a16 (Mū.). Cp. also the rendering of 'bhūtagrāma' in Pāc. 11 by 鬼 (神) 村 (see n. 21).

\(^{72}\) MN I 306; SN IV 302. Cp. also T vol. 24, 879b29ff, esp. c4 (*in a l l h e r b s (*oṣadhi),
explain the prohibition to injure seeds. Hence, it too appears to be secondary. Actually, it is, in the Pāli version, easily recognizable as intercalated, and it is in fact missing in both the Vinaya of the Mahāsāṅghikas and at least one of the Sthavira branch.

5.4 The original motivation as recorded in the Suttavibhaṅga must hence be contained in the other story, which relates that when monks felled a tree this action was disapproved by people as an act of injuring because they regard trees as living beings (jīvasaṅhīno ... rukkhasmo) more precisely as living beings with one sense-faculty (ekindriya jīva). In fact, this motivation is, more or less

gasses and trees, there are spirits/deities*).

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72 Cp. the repetition of the act of felling, first ascribed to the monks of Álavī (plural!) and then again to a single monk. It is with the latter that the story of the tree deity (devatā) is connected. After this story, the text returns to the plural (samanā Sakya puttiyā ... chindissanti). There is no further mention of the deity, not even in the Buddha’s reproof of the monks’ (pl.) behaviour. If the "devatā block” is athetized, the remaining text is fully consistent in both form and content. Should there still be any doubt, it is removed by a glance at the introductory story to Pāc. 10 (on digging the earth), the structure of which is exactly the same as that of the one under discussion if cleared of the "devatā block". — In Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 74c22ff), too, the intercalatedness of the "devatā block", though partly disguised by redactional additions (esp. 75a2), is still recognizable, for 75a21f does not fit in with the "devatā story" but resumes the preceding one (cp. 75a1f). Cp. also n. 148.

73 T vol. 22, 339a.

75 Viz. in that of the Mahāsāṅgikas (T vol. 22, 41c), where a similar combination as in Vin I 34 is, however, found in the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 (see n. 148). The devatā story is, in the introduction to Pāc. 11, also missing in the version of the Dharmaguptakas (T vol. 22, 641c5ff), but this version does not offer conclusive evidence since it gives the impression of having a considerable lacuna (in line 5). However, when interpreting the word in the sūtra it explains bhūta as "demon" (*amanuṣya) (641c14), which may indicate that this version did contain the devatā story (cp. n. 148).

76 Vin.Mū. (T vol. 22, 41c8) adds cutting grass, Vin.Mū (339a7) chopping branches and leaves and plucking flowers and fruits; Vin.Sa. (T vol. 74c22ff and 75a19f) has pulling out grass in the cloister walk and plucking flowers but omits felling trees; Vin.Mū. (776a25f; Vin.Mū., je 259b2f): felling trees, cutting green grass and plucking flowers.

77 Similarly T vol. 22, 41c14f (Vin.Mū.: 枝木之中人生命) and vol. 23, 74c24 (Vin.Sa.: 於草木中有命想; “grass and trees” = plants); cp. also vol. 22, 339a9f (Vin.Mū.): “although they (viz. the Buddhist monks) praise not killing living beings, yet they are now, by their own hands, felling trees and plucking flowers, [thereby] injuring and killing living creatures”. Cp. also 830b22 (Vin.Dh., corresponding to the passage discussed in §§ 9.1-9.2).

78 This specific expression, which reminds one of the terminology of the Jainas, does not seem
explicitly, 79 found both in the Vinayas of the Sthavira branch 80 (except for two dubious exceptions) 81 and in that of the Mahāsāṅghikas 82 as well as in that of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, 83 and it is doubtless applicable to all plants and seeds and hence perfectly suited to explain the prohibition as it stands; for as was stated above 84 at least the Jainas consider all plants as well as seeds to be living beings with one sense-faculty, and a similar belief (though not necessarily using the same terminology) was probably still widespread in early post-Vedic India, 85 perhaps even among Buddhist lay followers. For I was told by a Burmese scholar 86 that in Burma people (i.e. Buddhists) still regard plants as living beings and speak of rukkha-jīva, etc.; and M. Maithri Murthi 87 writes the same about Sri Lanka where, as he states, the idea of plants as living beings with one sense-faculty (ekindriya-pāṇin) is still found in popular Buddhism. Cp., in this connection, also traditional popular Buddhist texts like the Bhaddasālajātaka 88 where the tree deity shows characteristic features of a tree soul since she (or: he?) is so closely connected with the tree she inhabits that she has to die when it is felled, and since she even calls it her body and the saplings her children. 89

to have an equivalent in any of the Chinese and Tibetan versions except Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 74c25, to be read as 一個 根 之 生 with v.l.). Cp. also ns. 122, 130, 146 and 281.

79 As for Vin.Mū. (see n. 83), it contains the story but does not explicitly state the motive why people (or rather, in this version, non-Buddhists (see n. 91)) object to the monks' felling trees, etc.

80 I.e., apart from the Pāli version, T vol. 22, 41c5ff (Vin.Mū.); vol. 23, 74c22ff (Vin.Sa.).

81 T vol. 22, 641c5ff (Vin.Dh.) appears to have a considerable lacuna (see n. 75); T vol. 24, no. 1464 (Sa., see n. 21), 879b27ff shows no trace of this explanation, but this text may not be a complete and literal translation.

82 T vol. 22, 339a6ff.

83 T vol. 23, 776a24ff; Vin.Mū., je 259b2ff.

84 See ns. 18 and 20.

85 See n. 15. Cp. also Wezler 1986, 461 and 476 n. 72.

86 In a discussion after a lecture on the present subject which I delivered at the Australian National University, Canberra, on Oct. 26, 1989. I cannot but apologize for not having noted down his name.

87 Maithri Murthi 1986, 62.

88 Jā IV 144ff, esp. 153ff; cp. Henrichs 1979, 103; Maithri Murthi 1986, 65.

89 Cp. also the fact that in some Sri Lankan temple wall paintings trees are represented with a face in the branches (Maithri Murthi 1986, 65, referring to A. K. Coomaraswamy, Mediæval Sinhalese Art, New York 1956, 123).
5.5 According to the explanation of the Suttavibhaṅga under discussion (§ 5.4), it would, however, be only in order to allow for such a view of people (manussa), i.e. other people (be it ordinary, lay people or adherents of other religions like Jainism), that a monk should not injure or destroy plants (and seeds). In view of the fact that, e.g., in the case of killing an animal such a reference to people’s belief in sentience is missing, its presence in the case of plants seems to imply that the monks themselves do not share the belief in plants (and seeds) being living, sentient beings. Hence, not to injure plants would not be an element of moral, or ethically motivated, conduct in the strict sense but, at least from the point of view of the monk, rather a matter of ascetic decorum. There is no intrinsic contradiction in such a view because one of the main purposes of the the Pāṭimokkha (though some of its prohibitions do also refer to morality proper) is no doubt, besides internal harmony, the correct and decorous behaviour of the Order and its members in society. If — as appears

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92 Thus explicitly T vol. 22, 339a13 (Vin.Mā.).

93 I.e., a case of pāṇḍatti-vajja/prajñāpiti-sāvadaya ("fault because [the Buddha] has declared or decided it to be so [for monks]") or pratiṣeṣpata-sāvadaya and not of lokā(pakati)-vajja or prakṛti-sāvadaya ("fault by nature, or for ordinary people [too]") (Mil 266,18ff; Sp 228; BoBh 112,20ff and 113,17; AKBh 218,15ff). Cp. also Max Weber’s (1978, 244) concept of "Anstandsregeln". Actually, destroying or injuring plants is explicitly stated to be pāṇḍatti-vajja at Mil 266,21 + 26f and Sp 769. — It may however be necessary to distinguish between various (though sometimes overlapping) types or grades of (in)decorum, esp.: (in)decorum because, in the eyes of people, an ethical or religious aspect (e.g. ahimsā) is involved; (in)decorum from the point of view of ascetic standards ("rules of ascetic decorum"); (in)decorum from the point of view of everyday standards ("rules of mere decorum").

94 Cp. the stereotyped formula that the misbehaviour prohibited by the respective Pāṭimokkha rule does not serve to engender or increase a favourable disposition (/faith) towards Buddhism, or the Buddhist Order, in people, but has the contrary effect (n'etaṁ appasannānaṁ vā pasādāya, etc.: e.g. Vin III 21; cp. T vol. 22, 3b14f [Vin.Mf.], but as far as I can see missing in the other versions). Engendering and increasing a favourable disposition [towards Buddhism in people] (appasannānaṁ pasādāya, pasannānaṁ bhīyyobhāvā) are also contained in another, more complex stereotyped formula of ten purposes of proclaiming the Prātimokṣa rules (also found at Vin III 21; for parallels in other versions see Waldschmidt 1926, 49), besides others like excellence, well-being and solidarity of the Order. Cp. also Buddhagosa’s (Sp 225) interpretation of the item dīthadhammikānaṁ āsavānaṁ samvāraya as meaning that following the Pāṭimokkha rules protects from trouble in this life
to have been the case — many people still believed plants and seeds to be sentient beings and hence considered not to injure or destroy them as part of the proper behaviour of an ascetic (who in contrast to a layman is expected to practise complete *ahimsā*). Then it makes good sense that Buddhist monks, too, were enjoined not to injure plants and seeds even if they themselves no longer shared this belief. As a historian, however, I cannot be sure that this explanation given by the Suttavibhaṅga, doubtless possible, does indeed represent the original situation. For, modern scholars have good reasons to consider the Suttavibhaṅga, as we have it, to be of somewhat later origin than the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself, and there is conclusive evidence that its explanations and motivations do not always represent the original purport of the Pāṭimokkha rules themselves. Hence it cannot be excluded *a priori* that the Suttavibhaṅga has reduced to a mere rule of decorum what originally had (at least also) an ethical dimension; for, the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself would make equally good sense if originally also the *mokṣa* the *mokṣs*, and even the Buddha, still somehow held the view that plants and seeds were living beings. In order to decide this fundamental question, I shall first (viz. in ch. II.B) examine more closely the terminology and the context of the Pāṭimokkha rule on seeds and plants and of its parallel in the Suttapiṭaka (see § 4.3), and then (in chs. III-IV) turn to additional textual evidence.

II.B. Closer Examination of Terminology and Context as to their Significance for the Question of Plant Sentience

6.1 As for the Pāṭimokkha rule on plants (and seeds), viz. Pāc. 11, the meaning of the term used, in the Pāli version, for designating misbehaviour towards plants, viz. *pātavyatā*, is not certain (see § 4.2.2), but at any rate it can be used for misbehaviour towards living beings (see ib. + n. 37) Yet, it is also used with other complements (see ib. + n. 36). And even on the (doubtful) condition that in the meaning of "ruthless behaviour" the complement is usually living beings we cannot exclude the possibility that its employment in the case of plants is an extended or metaphorical one. As for *pātana* which replaces *pātavyatā* in some Skt. versions (see n. 39), it appears to be a kind of *lectio facilior*, and no less ambiguous at that,

like being beaten, mutilated or disgraced, i.e. from coming into conflict with society. Cp. also Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, A Comparative Study of Bhikkhuni Pāṭimokkha, Varanasi/Delhi 1984, 157f.

85 Cp. Mil 266,21ff: *katamam pannattivajjam* (as e.g. destroying or injuring plants: see n. 93)? *yam ... sam aṇaṇ aṃ an a nu cch a vik aṃ an a nulomi k aṃ, gihīnaṃ anavajj aṃ ...*; AnnMajh 201: *kasmā bhūtagāmassa pātavyatāya pācitti ichchita ti. samaṇa a-sā ru p pa t o.*


87 In this case, the motivations discussed in §§ 5.2 and 5.3, though doubtless secondary as to their specific content, would still have preserved or restored an essential original feature, viz. the ethical dimension of the prohibition.
since it may mean "felling" or "destroying" as well as "killing". 98

6.2.1 As for the context of Pāc. 11, though in the Prātimokṣa sometimes rules form groups dealing with more or less closely related matters, the rules following Pāc. 11 are concerned with entirely different matters. The rule preceding it, viz. not to dig the earth (see § 15.1), points, to be sure, to the same sphere of problems but is placed before Pāc. 11 only in the Pāli version and the closely related one of the Dharmaguptakas, whereas in all the other versions it occupies a completely different position. 99 On the other hand, if systematically related rules are taken into consideration, one could argue that seeds and plants were obviously not regarded as living beings by the Buddhist monks or even the Buddha himself since killing an animate being (pāṇa) is prohibited in a separate rule, viz. Pāc. 61. 100 If plants too had been regarded as living beings, this latter rule would have included them, and hence it would have been superfluous to issue a special rule to prohibit destroying plants (and seeds).

6.2.2 Yet, one could respond that it is not only seeds and plants that are not included among the animate beings (pāṇa) at Pāc. 61 but also man; for killing a man is not a pācittiya but a pārājika offence, an offence entailing expulsion from the Order. 101 Hence, man, though doubtless an animate being, cannot be comprised in

98 Cp. PTS s.v. pātana and pāeti, Tib. 'jig (pa) (Vin.Mū., je 260a3) and Ch. 墳 (Vin.Mū.), 斬伐 (Prāt.Bhi.Sa.), 毙 and 斬 (Prāt.Sa.,) besides 賣 (Prāt.Sa.,) (see n. 21), though we cannot be absolutely sure that the two latter sources actually presuppose "pātana.

99 See Rosen 1959, 45+48, and Hirakawa 1970, 453+456. — The rules preceding Pāc. 11 in the other versions do not show any affinity of content to it.


101 Pārājika 3: yo pana bhikkhu sañcicca manussaviggaham jīvitā voropeyya ..., ayaṁ pi pārājiko hotī ... (Vin III 71). — It would be hardly justified to conclude, from the considerable difference in gravity of offence between killing a man and killing an animal in the Vinaya context (cp. also HärTEL 1956, 90; T vol. 23, 157a22f), that the difference is equally great from the ethical point of view. If it were, it would be inexplicable that not to kill animals (regardless of their utility to man (cp. Add. § 39.3)) is part of the first moral precept. The reason for the considerable difference of gravity in the Vinaya is rather that killing a man was considered by society as a criminal act and would have entailed public sanctions against the Order, whereas killing an animal was, to be sure, judged by society as being discreditable for an ascetic, but (unless the animal was somebody’s property) not regarded as a crime, especially if the animal belonged to a less appreciated or detested species (like crows, which are the example in the introductory story to Pāc. 61).
the pāṇa of Pāc. 61. Actually, 'pāṇa' appears to be used, quite frequently, in the special sense of "animal",\(^ {102} \) and in some versions of Pāc.61\(^ {103} \) it is explicitly specified to refer to animals (tiryagyoginigata) only. Therefore, if at Pāc 61 plants are not included in the pāṇa, this need not necessarily exclude them from the realm of living beings. This is confirmed by the fact that in early Jaina sources, too, 'pāṇa' is not unfrequently reserved for the mobile, breathing\(^ {104} \) living beings, i.e. men\(^ {105} \) and — in the ahimsā context — especially animāls, in contrast to plants (and elements) which are nevertheless in these contexts expressly declared to be living, nay sentient beings (jīva, cittamānta), too.\(^ {106} \) A similar use of 'prāṇin' is also found in Brahmanical literature.\(^ {107} \) But although we thus cannot derive, from the fact that in the Paṭimokkhasutta plants are not included in the pāṇa, that they are not living, still the Paṭimokkhasutta is also compatible with an exclusion of plants (and seeds) from the sphere of living beings. At any rate, this phraseology would seem to indicate a certain awareness of the difference between animals and plants. This appears to be underlined by the fact that the expression used for killing animāls is the same unam - bi guous one as in the case of killing men (viz. jīvītā voropeti), whereas in order to denote destructive behaviour against plant s a less unambiguous one (viz. pātavyatā: see § 4.2.2) is used.

7.1 In the case of the Suttapitaka parallel to Pāc. 11 (bijagāma-bhūtagāma-samārambhā paṭivirato hoti), we doubtlessly have to take 'samārambha' as referring to acts of violence, as at Sā 311, where it means "killing" or "slaughtering" cows (see § 4.3). But this does not necessarily imply that in the present passage, too, its implication is that seeds and plants are living beings. For we cannot exclude the possibility that "killing" is applied to seeds and plants only by way of a metaphor or by extension (e.g., for want of a better term), or that a current idiom, or an idiom current in a certain group (like ascetics), was kept irrespective of the belief underlying it. The more so since in Jaina sources the use of 'samārambha' and 'sam-ā-rabh' in

\(^ {102} \) Thus, e.g., also at Pāc. 20 and 62 (see § 16.3). Cp. also BHSD s.v. prāṇa and prāṇaka.

\(^ {103} \) See n. 100.

\(^ {104} \) For this connotation of the word 'pāṇal/prāṇin' see Thieme, KISchr, 377 n. 5; cp. also Sv-pṭ I 288: pāṇarato assasana-passasana-vasena pavattiyā pāṇā.

\(^ {105} \) Heavenly beings and beings of hell may be disregarded in the present discussion.

\(^ {106} \) Cp., e.g., Kapp 4.28 = Āyār p. 37,23f = Āyār II.1.1.1 (ahimsā context!): app'ānde appa-pā ne appa-bie appa-harie app'ose app'ude ...; Dasav 4 (p. 5,15-6,17); 5,1.3; 6,27ff. 8,2: pudhavi daga agani māruya taṇa rukkha sa-biyagā / tasā ya pā nā jiva tti ti vuttaṃ mahesiṇā //; Sūy I.7.1 (see n. 371) + 7 (puḍhavi vi jivā āi vi jivā, pāṇā [animals!] ya sampātima ...); I.11.7-8.

\(^ {107} \) Thieme, KISchr, 377 n. 5; Medhātithi ad Manu I.49 (cp. Wezler 1987b, 114).
the sense of "slaughtering, killing" appears to have coalesced with that of "seizing [a weapon]" or "committing [acts of violence]" so as to cover both killing and injuring or damaging. Such a broader use could of course still more easily be extended to insentient objects, and it seems to be such an extension that Buddhaghosa has in mind when he takes 'samārāmbha' in the present passage to mean vikopana, which may mean "disturbing", but also "destroying" and perhaps also "injuring, damaging".

7.2 As for the context of the Suttapitaka passage under discussion, it is morals (siła). Therefore, one might think that destroying seeds and plants is a morally bad action. This, however, would be hardly intelligible unless seeds and plants themselves are somehow affected by that action, hence living if not sentient beings. But the context is not simply morals, but morals or siła of a monk, and may hence include matters of ascetic decorum, or at least points considered as immoral not by the monks themselves but only by (a significant part of) society.

7.3 One could even argue that as in the Pātimokkhasutta so in this case too abstention from killing animate beings (pañña) is stated separately, viz. in the beginning of the list of the primary moral precepts which precedes the one starting with abstention from destroying seeds and plants, and that this means that seeds and plants are not comprised in animate beings. But although in this context the animate beings (pañña) from killing which a monk abstains no doubt also

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108 See n. 51.

109 Thus explicitly Thāna (JĀŚ, 1985), § 571, where, among other things, violence (samārāmbha) is stated to be sevenfold, viz. referring to any of the six kinds of living beings (those having earth bodies, etc.) and to inanimate matter (ajīvakāya).

110 See n. 46.

111 Cp. BHSD s. v. vikopayati.

112 Cp. PTS s. v. vikopeti; CPD s. v. avikopana; VisM XXIII.35 (vikuppati = vinassati); XXIII.34 avikopana explained as avināsana by the Paramatthamaṇḍūṣā; Mil 266,26 bhūtagāma-vikopanam beside MVy 8431 bhūtagrāma-vināśanam. Cp. also the Tibetan rendering by nams pa (MVy 9326 and AKBh-I s. v. vikopana) and the Chinese equivalent (毁 in Wogihara 1988, 1201.

113 Cp. PTS s. v. vikopana and vikopeti, and the Ch. rendering 無於 for avikopita (Wogihara 1988, 148). Cp. also Sp 756 (sukhama-rajān) and 759 (pathavinī).

114 At least later on, siła is often understood to include pātimokkha-samvara (e.g., VisM I.18; Nidd I 188).

115 See n. 2.
inculde man, in view of what was said (in § 6.2.2) about the use of 'pañā'/prānin' we still cannot be sure that what is not comprised in it is not a living, sentient being. Besides, the two precepts belong to different series, which form part of a larger literary unit which, albeit, perhaps, fairly old, yet appears to be composed of components some of which originally may well have had an independent existence. Hence we can hardly a priori be sure that the second series of precepts (the one beginning with abstention from destroying seeds and plants) was conceived from its very beginning as a supplement to the series of the primary precepts. And even if it was, the motive for adding, to the precept to abstain from killing animate beings, the one not to destroy seeds and plants need not necessarily have been that seeds and plants were not considered to be comprised in the animate beings (pañā) and hence required a separate precept. The addition could also be accounted for by assuming that seeds and plants were felt to be a kind of border-line case, and that in the case of monks (in contrast to lay people) it had to be made explicit that they too should not be killed or injured. But of course this is nothing but a possibility,

116 This is made explicit at Dharmaskandha (ed. S. Dietz, Göttingen 1984), 82f. Cp. also AN III 208f, where pāṇātipāṇa = itthīṁ vā purīsaṁ vā jīvīta voropeti. For 'pañā' being used also in the sense of "man" cp. also Vin III 52: pāṇo nāma manussapāṇo vuccati.

117 At any rate the similarity of phraseological structure would fit in quite well with such an assumption.

118 It is, perhaps worth noting that the sequence of the items under discussion in the Suttapitaka text on sīla (abstention from killing animate beings (pañā) in the beginning, abstention from damaging seeds and plants later) is the reverse of the sequence in the Pātimokkhasutta (where the prohibition to damage plants precedes the prohibition to kill animals (pañā)). Likewise, in the Suttapitaka text abstention from killing precedes abstention from stealing, which in its turn precedes abstention from sexual misbehaviour, whereas in the Pārājika section of the Pātimokkhasutta it is just the other way round. This may be explained by the assumption that in the Pārājika the principle of sequence is not moral gravity (nor even gravity of the offence in the eyes of society) but rather the greater probability of occurrence of the respective misbehaviour (or even the temporal sequence of actual occurrences of such misbehaviour in the early order). If this is true [but for a different suggestion see: C. Caillat in: Yamamoto 1984, I, 201f], and in case it could be extended to the relation between the prohibition to destroy plants (and seeds) and that to kill animals, this would suggest the possibility that in the Pātimokkhasutta (and in all its versions at that) the prohibition to destroy plants (and seeds) precedes the prohibition to kill animals because violence against plants (or seeds) was more probable or had occurred earlier. In this case, Pāc. 61 may (but, of course, need not) be a kind of a fortiori extension of Pāc. 11, and this would mean that Pāc. 61 does not intend (and need not even tacitly presuppose) an exclusion of plants (and seeds) from the sphere of the pāṇa, let alone of living beings as such. — At any rate, the mere fact that there is a separate rule concerning plants besides the one concerning the pāṇa does not eo ipso prove that these two rules must necessarily refer to mutually exclusive spheres, since this is not true in other cases either, namely in the case of the rules prohibiting sprinkling and drinking water containing tiny animals (Pāc. 20 and 62: see ns. 311 and 312), which are doubtless nothing but border-line cases falling under the general rule not to kill animals (and, by the way, precede the latter in all or, in the case of Pāc. 62, at least
beside the other and perhaps more probable one that seeds and plants were not felt to form part of the "animate beings" (pañña) (though not necessarily, for that reason, entirely insentient).\textsuperscript{119} Hence, as for the status of seeds and plants, this passage is as inconclusive as Pācittiya 11. Therefore, I shall now turn to additional evidence, first from Vinaya materials (ch. III), and then from the Suttapiṭaka (ch. IV), without, of course, claiming to be exhaustive.

\textsuperscript{119} In this text, too, the fact that different terms for killing/destroying are used (atipāta versus samārambha) may be taken to indicate that there was at any rate a clear feeling of the difference between men and animals on the one hand and plants on the other.
III. Further Vinaya Material

As for the evidence from Vinaya materials (including, to be sure, a few related Suttapiṭaka passages), I shall first (ch. III.A) discuss additional evidence concerning plants, and then (ch. III.B), for the sake of comparison or contrast, some materials concerning earth, water and fire.

III.A. Plants

8 Apart from the general prohibition to destroy or injure plants (and seeds), the Vinaya materials contain several more specific rules concerning seeds and plants. Some of them are motivated in a way similar to the original motivation of the general rule in the Suttavibhaṅga (see § 5.4). E.g., in the Khandhaka section of the Vinayapiṭaka monks are blamed by the Buddha because they had young palmyra (Borassus flabellifer) leaves (tāla-tarunā, tāla-patta) or bamboo leaves (velu-tarunā, velu-patta) cut off in order to wear them as sandals. Here, too, the reason adduced is that people consider trees to be living beings (jīvasaṅhīna hi manusṣā rukkhasmiṃ), more precisely: living beings with one sense-faculty (ekindriya jīva), and hence object to the monks cutting off shoots — which wither, i.e., die, after having been cut off — as an act of injuring (vi-heth) a living being. Here, too, the implication seems to be that the Buddhist monks themselves do not believe in the sentience of the plants concerned, but once again this need not have been the position of earliest Buddhism since the Khandhaka, like the Suttavibhaṅga, was composed at a somewhat later date.

9 An interesting case is the motivation of the prescription to have a fixed residence during the rainy season without wandering around. This rule is not contained in the Prātimokṣasūtra except as a rule for nuns, as a general rule valid

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120 Syed 1990, 308ff.

121 Vin I 189. Cp. T vol. 22, 847b12ff (Vin.Dh.). — Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 693b12) seems to be the only version to motivate also the rule not to upholster a couch with cotton (Pāc. 88) by the view of people that such an act would disclose lack of pity since it involves killing living beings.

122 No corresponding expression in Vin.Dh. (which merely reports people saying that the monks destroy life: 斷絶生命 [T vol. 22, 847b14]). Cp. ns. 130 and 146, but also ns. 78 and 281.

123 Acc. to Vin.Dh. 847b13 and 16 it is the tree that withers.

124 Cp. Frauwallner 1956b, 67; v. Hinüber 1989, 24; 42. — Besides, as far as I can see after an admittedly cursory investigation, the episode under discussion does not seem to form part of all the transmitted Vinayas.

for monks (too), it is, however, found in the Khandhaka.\footnote{Vin I 137: anujānāmi, bhikkhave, vassam upagantum; for parallels, see Frauwallner 1956b, 82; Vin.Mū., khe 223b3ff.}

9.1 In the latter passage and — probably secondarily\footnote{Cp. O. v. Hinüber, Sprachliche Beobachtungen zum Außbau des Pāli-Kanons, in: StH 2/1976, 34.} — also in some versions of the Vinayāvibhāṅga on the former,\footnote{Viz. Vin IV 296; Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 746a13ff), Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 322b24ff) and Vin.Mū., (1003b10ff), but not in Vin.Bhī., (the 244b6-8).} the rule is motivated by the fact that p e o p l e disapprove of the monks wandering around during the rainy season (i.e. during the vegetation period) because thereby they crush g r e e n g r a s s e s (haritāni tiṇāni sammadantā),\footnote{In the Skandhaka passage (T vol. 22, 450c4), Vin.Mā. does not specify what is injured by trampling; in its comm. on Pāc.Bhī 39 (in Vin.Mā.: 134), it does not mention injuring beings by trampling on them at all (Hirakawa 1982, 359; Roth 1970, p. 283); in Vin.Mū., at both places (T vol. 23, 104b3 and 4f, and 1003b13, respectively), only injuring or killing tiny a n i m a l s (1003b15 has "sentient [beings]" (含識) instead) is mentioned; similarly Vin.Mū., khe 223b5: srog chags phra mo dañ śin tu phra mo mañ po'i tshogs rnams brdzis (R) nas srog dañ bral bar byas so.} injure a living being with one sense-faculty (ekindriyaṁ jīvaṁ viheṭhentā),\footnote{Not in any of the other versions (cp. ns. 122 and 146, but also ns. 78 and 281). But Vin.Dh. (830b22) explicitly states that householders consider plants to have life-force (命根, *jīvitendriya; in its structure and purport, the sentence seems to correspond to the Pāli expression jīvasāththino hi manussā rukkhasāmi) of Vin IV 34 and I 189, but on the other hand the occurrence of *indriya in connection with "life" reminds one of the expression ek i n d r i y a a j i v a ). Besides, several versions speak of "growing or living or fresh (i.e. unwithered and not eradicated) plants" (生草木): T vol. 22, 830b7f etc. and 746a16 etc. [Vin.Dh.]; vol. 23, 173b5 etc. and 322b27 etc. [Vin.Sa.]) or seem to refer to them, too, as "living beings" (T vol. 22, 129a10f [Vin.Mī.]; T vol. 23, 173b9f [Vin.Sa.]).} and kill many tiny animals (bāhū k heedake pāne

89b4) suggests problems with robbers or fire(!), but at T vol. 22, 542b12f (Vin.Mā.; cp. Hirakawa 1982, 360; Roth 1970, p. 283) fear of robbers, etc., or anything menacing life or chastity, is, on the contrary, adduced as a legitimate reason for moving to another place.
Even non-Buddhist ascetics — so the people’s complaint — do not leave their residence during this season, and even small birds build nests and stay there.

It is probable that, just as in the motivation of Pāc. 11 (see § 5.4), so in the present passage, too, the expression "living being with one sense-faculty" (ekindriya jīva), in spite of the surprising singular, refers to the plants mentioned just before and is hence a kind of explanatory addition. At the same time, here too, what is described in this way is only what people think (and in the present passage surely: common people, not non-Buddhist ascetics, since the latter are expressly referred to as another group (see § 9.1)). But in the present case there is an important difference in so far as not only plants but also tiny animals are referred to, and these are at any rate regarded as living beings by the Buddhist monks and nuns too. Hence, if it were the mere fact of killing that constituted an offence, this would hold good for the Buddhist monks and nuns as well, irrespective of whether they regarded plants too as living beings or not. If, then, as the text in fact appears to suggest, wandering around during the rainy season was prohibited in order not to scandalize people, i.e. as a rule of decorum, the decisive difference of view must, in the present case, have consisted in something else. In fact, for the Buddhist monks and nuns it is only intentional killing of a living being — whatever its size — that

131 In Vin.Dh., at both places animals are not mentioned at all (T vol. 22, 830b7f and 9 and 746a12f, respectively); consequently, when this version, somewhat later (830b12; 14f; 17f; 746a17 and 20), adds, after having mentioned the crushing-killing of growing/living/fresh plants, the phrase "destroying the life-force of others / of living beings" this phrase, too, must refer to plants and cannot be an explication of the former, the more so since this version explicitly states that people consider plants to be living beings (see n. 130).


133 Perhaps the expression was mechanically taken over from another context like Vin IV 34 (see § 5.4) where the sg. fits the context, referring as it does to rukkham, or even Vin IV 32 (see § 15.2) where it refers to the earth (pathavī).

134 As for the fact that there is, in this passage, no (at least no reliable) equivalent for this sentence in any of the Chinese translations, see n. 130.

135 Thus all Ch. versions except Vin.Sa. and Vin.Mū., but even these have "non-Buddhist (ascetics)" only in the Skandha passage (T vol. 23, 173b5 and 1041b3; Vin.Mū., khe 223b3f: mustegs can rnams), whereas in the comm. on Pāc.Bhī. 39 Vin.Sa. has "householders" (322b27), and Vin.Mū. has both "householders" and "non-Buddhists" (1003b11f).

136 Cp. Sp 864 (tam khuddakaṃ pi mahantam pi mārentassa āpattinānakaraṇaṃ natthi; cp. also the sentence next but one stating that even the conscious crushing of the egg of a bug, due to lack of compassion, is a pācittiya offence. From the mor a l point of view, however, there is a difference since in the case of a larger animals the aggressive act is usually more complex. Cp. Add. n. 93.
constitutes an offence (both from the ethical and from the disciplinary point of view)\textsuperscript{137}. But destroying or killing plants and tiny animals while walking around during the rainy season is, of course, unintentional, and hence, from the Buddhist point of view, not by itself an offence, not even in the case of animals.\textsuperscript{138} From the point of view of people, on the other hand, it is, as in Jainism, obviously the fact of killing as such that counts, irrespective of the intention. The more so since in the case of wandering around in the rainy season such killing is inevitable and hence foreseeable — an aspect which the Buddhists too could not easily ignore.\textsuperscript{139} At any rate, since animals are also involved, it would not, in the present case, make a difference, and hence it cannot be decided from the present context, whether also the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves regarded plants, too, as living beings or not. It is, at best (i.e. provided that we can exclude mere stylistic reasons), the phraseology of the text, viz. the fact that it uses "killing" (sāṃghātam āpādentā)\textsuperscript{140} only with regard to the tiny animals but prefers "crushing" (sāmmaddantā) in the case of the grasses,\textsuperscript{141} that may, perhaps, be taken to indicate that at any rate the (Buddhist) author or redactor of the text on his part advocated an essential difference of status between animals and plants. But even if this is correct, it would not, in view of the somewhat later date of the Khandhaka,\textsuperscript{142} be evidential of the situation in earliest Buddhism.

\textbf{10} In the rules regulating how a monk has a hut or a larger building constructed for himself (Saṅgh. 6 and 7)\textsuperscript{143} it is specified that the site (vatthu) where the

\textsuperscript{137} For the latter, Pāc 61 (see n. 100).

\textsuperscript{138} Cp. T vol. 22, 677a21ff and b6ff. Accordingly, Pāc.Bhī. 39 is, according to Buddhaghosa (Sp 933), merely paṇṇatti-vajja (see n. 93).

\textsuperscript{139} Cp. Sp 865, enjoining carefulness based on compassion even in the case of tiny animals or even eggs of animals: \textit{tasmā evarūpesu tāṇesu kāruṇāṁ upatthapetvā a p p a m a t t e n a vattam kāṭabbāṁ}.

\textsuperscript{140} An intr. pendant to this expression also Āyārā p. 4,11, obviously, here too, with reference to tiny animals. Cp. also § 16.4.

\textsuperscript{141} In the Chinese versions, this distinction is preserved only at T vol. 23, 173b4f, [Vin.Sa.], whereas in other passages both "crushing" and "killing" (vol. 22, 129a7 [Vin.Mf.I]) or "killing" alone (vol. 23, 322b27 [Vin.Sa.]) are connected with both grasses and tiny animals. At T vol. 22, 830b7f and 746a15f [Vin.Dh., see n. 131] "crushing-killing" even refers to plants/grasses only.

\textsuperscript{142} See n. 124.

hut may be erected must be "free from damage or trouble" (anārambhā).

10.1 The second of these rules is motivated in the Pāli version by the story of a monk who in order to clear the ground for his building had a holy tree (cetiya-rukkha) felled — an act which people (manussā), who regard the tree as a living being (jīvasaṅchnino ... rukkhasmin), mind as an act of injuring (vi-heṭhi) a living being with one sense-faculty (ekindriya jīva). Here, too, the fact that what is reported is only the belief of people suggests that the monks themselves do not share this belief, but once again we have to bear in mind that the Suttavibhaṅga does not belong to the oldest stratum of Buddhist literature. Besides, the fact that the tree felled is not just a tree but a cetiya-rukkha would seem to indicate that it is, in this case, not so much the felling of a tree as a living being but rather the felling of this tree as an object of religious veneration (pājita) that upsets people, and


144 Thus CPD s.v. 'anārambhā; cp. Schlingloff 1963, 543 + n. 40.

145 Vin III 155f.

146 The only versions in which we find at least the idea that householders disapprove of the felling of the cātīya tree as an act of killing a living being are Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 586b10f: 薪不殺命) and T vol. 24, 823b26 (*Vinayamātṛkā: see n. 218): ... 諸人皆以此樹有命之想. As for the lack of an equivalent of ekindriya jīva, see ns. 122 and 130, but also ns. 78 and 281.

147 See § 5.5 + n. 96.

148 As in the original introductory story to Pac. 11 (see § 5.4). Cp. also the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 in Vin.Mî. (T vol. 22, 13a12ff), reporting that the monks, after having strained, by excessive begging for building materials, the nerves of lay people who start clearing off as soon as the monks show up, began to cut grass, fell trees and dig the earth by themselves (a15). — By the way, the reaction of the monks, though not understandable, is, in this context, not confirmed by the majority of the other versions (it is found only in Vin.Dh. and T 1463 (*Vinayamātṛkā: see n. 218)). It is indeed, at least in Vin.Mî. and Vin.Dh., superfluous in the wider context (relating how Mahākassapa, entering the place for alms, is astonished at the unusual behaviour of lay people and, after learning the reason, reports the matter to the Buddha), and may hence to be an intrusion. Interestingly enough, it is followed (15a15-24) by another intrusive element which is almost the same as the intercalated story in the Pāli version of the introduction to Pac. 11 (see § 5.3). In Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 584a24-b7), it is only this story (but without the incident of hurting the deity’s child) that has been inserted into the introduction to Saṅgh. 6. This is also true of T vol. 24, 823b13f (*Vinayamātṛkā), where it has entirely supplanted the continuation of what appears to have been the original introductory story to Saṅgh. 6.
this is actually what we find in the versions of some other schools.\textsuperscript{149}

10.2 On the other hand, one cannot but note that both forms of the introductory story do not easily fit in with the wording of the Prātimokṣa rule itself.\textsuperscript{150} For according to the story it would be the process of constructing the building that should be free from damage, i.e. not involve injuring or damaging the holy tree or other living beings\textsuperscript{151} or highly esteemed objects.\textsuperscript{152} According to the wording of the Prātimokṣaśāstra, however, it is the site that should be "free from damage or trouble". To be sure, it may not be impossible to take the attribute to mean that the site should be one of the choice which as a site for the building would not entail damaging a caitya tree (as the introductory story takes it) or small animals dwelling there (as Buddhaghosa suggests)\textsuperscript{153}. But the Suttavibhaṅga proper, i.e. the word-by-word explanation of the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion, suggests an entirely different explanation. According to it,\textsuperscript{154} the site should not contain a nest of ants, termites, rats, snakes, scorpions or centipedes\textsuperscript{155} nor the lair of animals like

\textsuperscript{149} T vol. 22, 14b28ff, esp. c16ff (Vin.Mt., expressly mentioning the existence of a deity in the tree, and stating that felling the tree means injuring a heavenly being (or gods and men?) (天人)); 279b10ff (Vin.Mā.: felled tree inhabited by a deity whose family is deprived of its shelter); T vol. 24, 866c2ff (T 1464, Sa. [see n. 21]: felled tree inhabited by a deity); T vol. 23, 21b9ff (Vin.Sa., only mentioning the felling of a caitya tree); 690b19ff, esp. c15f (= Vin.Mū., che 227a8ff, esp. 228a4: only reporting the felling of a large tree under which a brahmin had taught his students). In most versions, it is people who are upset, but in Vin.Mā. and T 1464 it is the deity that complains to the Buddha, just as in the story intercalated into the introduction to Pāc 11 (see § 5.3) and into some versions of the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 (see n. 148). But in the present context, we do not read that one of the deity’s children is hurt by the blow. It is only into one version of the introduction to Saṅgh. 6 that this form of the story has found its way (cp. n. 148).

\textsuperscript{150} Cp., in this connection, the fact that the *Vinayamārka (T vol. 24, 823b28f) inserts, before the rule concerning the construction of a building, another one declaring the felling of a caitya tree to be a pācittiya offence.

\textsuperscript{151} Cp. CPD s.v. 'anārambha, supplementing "(scil. to different living creatures)".

\textsuperscript{152} Cp., in this connection, Pāc. 19 (difficult rule, cp. Schlingloff 1963, 542, and, for the pertinent words, esp. v. Hinüber 1968, p. 164 n. 4), perhaps stating that a monk who has a large hut constructed may supervise (?) a part of the construction work while standing at a spot where there are, if possible, no green plants (appaharite, cp. § 11.1 + n. 171): surely in order not to injure or destroy them; but cp. also n. 190.

\textsuperscript{153} See below + n. 163.

\textsuperscript{154} Vin III 151.

\textsuperscript{155} Similar list T vol. 23, 20c17f (Vin.Sa.); cp. T vol. 22, 276b9 (Vin.Mā., only insects and snakes); 585b22 (Vin.Dh., abbreviated list, ending with ants); cp. also Vin.Mū., che 222a3f = 229b5f (T vol. 23, 688b29f; in connection not with anārambha but with *kalpika (see n. 143)).
elephants, lions, tigers, etc.,\textsuperscript{156} nor should it be situated near\textsuperscript{157} a field of cereals or vegetables,\textsuperscript{158} or near a slaughtering-place, place of execution, prison, cemetery, king's estate, public park, tavern, carriage road, crossroad or the like.\textsuperscript{159} One of the other versions states that there should not be trees bearing flowers or fruits either,\textsuperscript{160} and others even exclude the presence of a large or excellent tree\textsuperscript{161} or a caiya tree\textsuperscript{162}. But it is not probable that the purport is that these items should be absent because the monk might injure or damage them by building his hut (though this is in fact what Buddhaghosa suggests in the case of the first series of animals, viz. ants, etc.).\textsuperscript{163} On the contrary, one version expressly enjoins the monk to have trees or thorny shrubs moved.\textsuperscript{164} The damage or trouble from which the site should be free is rather, as the list of animals, which are all animals troublesome or dangerous\textsuperscript{165} to man, and especially the last group of items,\textsuperscript{166} viz. slaughterhouse, etc.,\textsuperscript{167} indicate, the trouble they would all create for the monk,

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{156} Similar list T vol. 22, 14a25f (Vin.Mi.) and 585b21f (Vin.Dh.).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{157} Thus CPD s.v. aparantu-nissita, following Sp 570,1f.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{158} Cp. also T vol. 22, 14a27.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{159} Similar lists: T vol. 22, 14a24f (Vin.Mi.); vol. 23, 20c21-23 (Vin.Sa., though not in connection with anārāmbha but with saparākrama); Vin.Mū., che 222a4f = 229b6f (= T vol. 23, 688c2f); cp. also vol. 22, 585b25f (Vin.Dh.).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{160} T vol. 22, 278b8f (Vin.Mā.).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{161} T vol. 22, 14a26 (Vin.Mi.); Vin.Mū., che 222a5 = 229b7 (= T vol. 23, 688c3f): tree that would have to be felled; T vol. 23, 20c20 (Vin.Sa., in connection with saparākrama (see n. 159)).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{162} T vol. 22, 14a26 (Vin.Mi.).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{163} Sp 569: imāni tāva chaṭhānāni (viz. from ants to centipedes) s a t t ā n u d d a y ā y a paṭikkhittāni.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{164} T vol. 22, 585b23f (Vin.Dh.).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{165} Thus Buddhaghosa with reference to elephants, etc. (Sp 569: imāni satta ṭhānāni s a - p p a t i b h a y ā n i ...).}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{166} Some versions have still another series, viz. dangerous or uncomfortable forms of nature, like cliffs, stones, pits, dangerous rivers or ponds, or thorny shrubs: T vol. 22, 14a26 (Vin.Mi.); 585b24 (Vin.Dh.); cp. also vol. 23, 20c20 (Vin.Sa.) and Vin.Mū., che 222a6 = 229b7f (T vol. 688c5f: in connection with saparākrama: cp. n. 159).

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{167} With reference to these, Buddhaghosa says: "The rest entails trouble in the form of several kinds of trouble" (Sp 569: sesāni nānā-upaddavehi sa-upaddavāni).}
as is, once again, made explicit by one of the other versions:¹⁶⁸ trouble in the form of danger or nuisance, or merely — as in the case of cultivated fields, a public park, trees bearing flowers or fruits or a caitya tree — by attracting people disturbing his solitude and meditation. If such was in fact the original purport of the expression "free from damage" in the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion, it would seem to have little if any evidential value for the problem of the status of plants in earliest Buddhism.

11.1 In the Khandhaka¹⁶⁹ as well as in a few passages of the Suttapiṭaka¹⁷⁰ it is stated that remnants of food should be either thrown away [at a spot of the ground] where there are, if possible, no green plants (appaharite),¹⁷¹ or dropped into water free from animate beings, i.e. tiny animals (appāṇake udake). At least the latter alternative is hardly intelligible unless one supposes that throwing remnants of food into water containing tiny animals is conceived of as injuring these animals. This becomes clear from other passages¹⁷³ where it is not just remnants of food but remnants of a dangerous dish indigestible for any being except the Buddha and his followers that are ordered to be either thrown away at a spot free from green plants or dropped into water free of tiny animals. In view of the para 1-

¹⁶⁸ T. vol. 22, 585b22f; cp. also the fact that most Chinese translations render ārambha in this context by 难 (處) ("difficulties").

¹⁶⁹ Vin I 157; 352; II 216; I have, so far, found parallels only in Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 802b1f; 835c26-28; 904c21f; 933b26f; 934c6-8) and Vin.Sa. (T vol. 23, 165a14f; 187a8f); but cp. also n. 173 (Vin.Mi).

¹⁷⁰ MN I 13 (T vol. 1, 570a11f [MĀ], with "clean (i.e. bare) ground" for appaharite); cp. also n. 173 (Sn and SN). — Completely different view AN I 161: throwing the water with which a cooking-pot or dish has been washed into a dirty village pool as food for the animals living in it is meritorious.

¹⁷¹ For appa̲c coming close to a̲ or nis̲ see CPD s.v. appa and appa-harita; v. Hinüber 1968, p. 273f. Cp. Spk I 236,3: appa-harite ti ahari. Sn-a I 154,20f says that appa̲c may either be understood as "few" or in a privative sense: appa-harite ti paritta-harita-tiṇe a-pparāda-harita-tiṇe vā pāśaṇa-piṭṭhi-sadise; but Ps I 94,19ff, though giving only the explanation aparādhaharite, does not understand it as "where no green grass grows, as on the surface of a stone", but rather as "where there is no [freshly] grown (i.e. young, tender) grass", in opposition to both a place free of grass and one where the grass is so strong that it is not destroyed by any amount of remnants of food.

— For harita in Jaina sources see § 4.2.1 + n. 29.

¹⁷² It appears difficult to decide whether ⁷ka is bahuvrihi-marker or (as BHSD s. v. prāṇaka suggests) diminutive-suffix (as it is, e.g., taken at Sn-a I 154 [see n. 204]).

¹⁷³ Vin I 225 (with parallels in T vol. 22, 149b17 [Vin.Mī!]; Jaworski 1931, 70], 627b28f [Vin.Dh., Sūtravibhaṅga!]; 870a10 [Vin.Dh.]; vol. 23, 189b11 [Vin.Sa.]; Sn p. 14; SN I 169 (= T vol. 2, 320c21 [SĀ]; 409b6f [SĀṣ] has only an equivalent for appāṇake udake but not for appaharite).
I e l i s m between (tiny) animals and green plants, however, the latter, too, are obviously regarded as being damaged by the food remnants.\footnote{This is expressly corroborated by the post-canonical commentaries: Sn-a I 154,23f (... t i n a m pāṇakānaḥ ca a n u r a k k h a n a t hāya); Spk I 236,3f (sace hi haritesu tīneṣu pakkhepyya, ... tināṇī pūtīni (C) bhaveyyum); Ps I 94,20f (yasmīṃ tāne pinḍapātotharāṇena vinassanadhammāni tināṇī n’āthī) and 23f (bhuṭagāma-sikkhāpadassa [i.e. Pāc. 11] hi avikopana-
thatham etam vuttam). Cp. also Vidyāśāgara ad MBh 12.177.15: vyādhīnāṁ (sc. of plants) naramūreṇa māladattena janitānāṁ darśanāt.}

Since in the case of the tiny animals no human interests are involved, there is good reason to assume that this holds good also in the case of the green plants, and that it is these plants themselves that would suffer injury; but this, in its turn, would, in the Indian context, hardly make good sense unless they are regarded as living, sentient beings.\footnote{Cp. Wezler 1986, 455 and 457f.} To be sure, at least in the Khandhaka (i.e. Vinaya) passages this may not be the view of the Buddhist monks themselves but rather the belief of people, which has to be taken into account by them, just as in the case of the prohibition to wander about during the rainy season (see § 9(1-2)); but in the Suttapitaka passage we can hardly be sure of this.

11.2 Yet, the situation is more complicated. For there is a similar rule (more precisely: a pair of rules) in the Prātimokṣaśūtra.\footnote{A} To be sure, it primarily deals

\footnote{A} Bhikṣu-Vinaya/Prātimokṣa, Sekhiya/Saikṣa: Pāli: Vin IV 205f, Ṣekh. 74: na harite agilāno uccāram vā passāvaṃ vā kheṭaṃ vā karissāmi ti sikkhā karanīyā and 75: na udake ...; Upālipariprachā (see n. 21): T vol. 24, 910a28 and b1 (Stache-Rosen 1984, 110); Mi.: T vol. 22, 76c5 and 12f; Mā.: T vol. 22, 411c25f and 555a18f; Mā. Lok.: Prāt. Mā. Lok. p. 34, ros. 65: na harite tṛṇa uccāram vā prasṛvāvam vā kheṭaṃ (Pachow/Mishra 1956: kheḍaṇā) vā sīnḥānaṃ vā agilāno karisāyāmi sīkṣā karanīya and 66: na udake ...; Dh.: T vol. 22, 709b12f and c5f; 1029a22f; Sā.: T vol. 23, 140c4 and 141a6f; 478a24f (Prāt. Sā.k); cp. also T vol. 24, 899a12 and 15 and Prāt. Sā.m (Inoguchi 1981) 202, Nos. 392-393; the reconstructed Skt. version in Rosen 1959, 225 and 228 (taken from Finot 1913, 537) looks like Mā.(see below), not Sā., for fragments of which see v. Simson 1986, 59 (suggesting a restoration to na ... <udake pāribho> giye uccāraprasā<van> ...); 95; 169 //harita uccārapras<ā> va<m> kh/// and //raprasravāṃ kheṭaṃ singhānakaṁ///; 224 //haritam tṛṇa .. glāna (em. to “ta- or “te tṛṇa aglāna?” uccāraprasām vhe///, suggesting a different version); Mū.: GBM(FacEd) I, p. 33, fol. 56, l. 2-4: nāglāna udake uccāraprasāvam kheṭaṃ singhānakam vāṃtam virikṣaṃ chorajīṣyāmi sīkṣā karaniya and nāglāna saharite prthivipradesa ...; cp. MVy nos. 8627f; Prāt. Mū., che 17a3f; Vin.Mū., te 251a4f; T vol. 23, 904 a 17f and 22 (Vin.); vol. 24, 507a26-29 (Prāt.); Kā.: T vol. 24, 664c25-27. — B) Bhikṣunī-Vinaya/Prātimokṣa, Pācittiya: Pāli: Vin IV 266, Pāc.Bhi. 9: yā pana bhikkhiṇi uccāraṇam vā passāvān vā sankkariṇaṃ vā vighāsām vā harite chaḍḍeya ...; Mi.: T vol. 22, 94a21f and 27f (two rules, one concerning excrements, etc., and another one concerning rubbish and food remnants); Mā.: 543a28f; 563a29f; HiraKawa 1982, 36f; Mā. Lok.: Roth 1970, p. 290: yā pana bhikṣunī harite tṛṇa uccāram vā pasṛvāram vā kheṭaṃ vā singhānakam vā kuryāt, pācattiṇam and: yā pana ... udake ...; Dh.: 739e9f; Sā.: T vol. 23, 319b1f (throwing excrements and urine on plants) and 344b9 (defecating and...}
with evacuating or pouring out excrements, urine, phlegm and snot,\textsuperscript{177} and only some of its versions\textsuperscript{178} mention food remnants (\textit{vighāsa}) and other rubbish (\textit{sāmkāra}), but this does not seem to make an essential difference. What does make a difference is that in the Prātimokṣa passages we find, as the places where one should not drop the above-mentioned substances, not [ground] where there are green plants and water containing animals but green plants (\textit{harita})\textsuperscript{179} and just water (\textit{udaka})\textsuperscript{180}. Thus, in these passages, there is no parallelism between green plants and animals but one between green plants and water. This evidence would not hence favour the assumption that at that time Buddhism too still regarded plants as sentient beings. For as far as I can see, in the case of water the evidence of the early Buddhist texts rather suggests that sentience was no longer accepted or was at least largely ignored (see §§ 16.3f). Therefore, it is not improbable that the Prātimokṣa rule against dropping excrements, etc., into water is a mere rule of decorum. Actually, it is, in the case of monks\textsuperscript{181} and in most versions\textsuperscript{182} also in urinating on plants; \textit{Mū.}: Prāt.Bhi. Mū., the 21a1f: \textit{yañ dge sloñ ma gañ rtswa shon po'i steñ du bṣaṅ gci 'dor na ltuḥ byed do}; cp. Vin.Bhi., 238a1f: \textit{ni'u bṣin (R: ne'u gsin) shon po la bṣaṅ ba 'dor na ...}; T vol. 998c28f (Vin.Bhi.); vol. 24, 514a15f (Praṭ. Bhi.). — \textbf{C} Bhikṣuṇi-Vinaya/Prātimokṣa, Śaikṣa: \textit{Mū.}: 100c20f (Vin.: two rules, concerning water and plants, respectively; but v.l. omits the one concerning plants); 213a29f (Prāt.Bhi.: water and plants); \textit{Dh.}: 1039b26f (Prāt.Bhi.: water and plants); \textit{Sa.}: T vol. 23, 487c7f (Prāt.Bhi.: water and plants), but in the case of plants only mentioning phlegm and snot, dropping of excrements and urine being pācittiya (see \textbf{B}); \textit{Mū.}: Prāt.Bhi. Mū., the 23a8: \textit{chu'i nañ du bṣaṅ gci dahi/ mchil ma dahi/ snabs dahi/ skyugs pa dahi/ rlung pa mi dor bar ...}; T vol. 23, 1019b23 (Vin.) and vol. 24, 516c8f (Prāt.Bhi.) (water only; but Vin.Bhi., includes, before the śaikṣa rule for nuns concerning water, another one concerning plants (the 288a1 and 3f), which is, however, missing in R (faa 440a5)).

\textsuperscript{177} The versions of Pāc.Bhi. 9 (see n. 176, \textbf{B}) except those of Mā./Mā.Lok. (and the Chin. version of Mū.) omit phlegm (\textit{kheṭa}) and snot (\textit{sīṅghāna}(ka)). In the śaikṣa rules, the Pāli version (n. 176, \textbf{A}) lacks snot (but cp. Sp 898: \textit{kheleña c'etha sīṅghānīka pi saṅghahīṭā}), and the Mū. version (n. 176, \textbf{A} and \textbf{C}) both snot and phlegm, whereas the Skt. Mū. version and Prāt.Kā. add vomit (\textit{vānita}) and excretions through purging (\textit{vīrīka}; Prāt.Kā.: "(?) blood"); for the special case of the Śa. version of the śaikṣa rule for nuns concerning plants, see n. 176, \textbf{C}. — The tetrad uccāra, paśāva, \textit{kheṭa} and sīṅghāna is also found in Jainas sources: cp., e.g., Kapp 1.19; Dasav 8.18; Utt 24.15.

\textsuperscript{178} Viz. the Pāli and Mū. versions of Pāc.Bhi. 9 (see n. 176, \textbf{B}).

\textsuperscript{179} The variants "on green grass" (\textit{harite ṭṛṇe}, esp. Mā.Lok., see n. 176) and "on a spot of the ground where there are green plants" (\textit{saharite pṛthivīpradeśe}, Prāt.Mū., see ib.) look explicative; cp. T vol. 23, 999a1f, explaining "fresh grass/(plants)" as "a place where green, living (\textit{gūp}) grass/(plants) grow(s)"). — That \textit{harite} in this strand is the positive pendant to \textit{oppaharite} in the other strand (§ 9.1) is also evident from Sp 898 where both terms are used in a complementary way.

\textsuperscript{180} Some Ch. versions (esp. most Mū. and Dh. witnesses as well as T 1465 (Sa.?) and Prāt.Sa.m (see n. 176, \textbf{A}) have "pure water". For \textit{pāribhogika udaka}, see n. 200.

\textsuperscript{181} See n. 176, \textbf{A}.
the case of nuns, merely considered as a sekhiya or śaikṣa rule, i.e. a mere pattern of decorous behaviour breaking which is no offence, or at least not an offence requiring atonement.\textsuperscript{183} Likewise, the rule not to evacuate or drop excrements, etc., on green plants is, in the case of monks, merely a sekhiya/śaikṣa rule.\textsuperscript{184} In the case of nuns, however, it is reckoned among the pācittiya offences.\textsuperscript{185} This may indicate that this rule was taken slightly more seriously than the one concerning water,\textsuperscript{186} and this may (but of course need not) mean that the sentience of plants was, in earliest Buddhism, or at least among the "people" whose opinion had to be respected, less obsolete than the sentience of water.

11.3 It is only in the canonical commentary on the Prātimokṣaśūtra of the Mahāsāṅghikas that plants and water where excrements, etc., should not be dropped are explained as including all [green] plants\textsuperscript{187} and all kinds of water\textsuperscript{188}. And it is only in a few passages that one or the other version of the canonical commentary points out that throwing excrements, etc., on plants may injure or kill them.\textsuperscript{189} But

\textsuperscript{182} I.e. except in the Mā./Mā.Lok. tradition (see n. 176, B), where defecating, etc., into water, too, is, in the case of nuns, regarded as a pācittiya offence.

\textsuperscript{183} In the terminology of the Suttavibhangha, it is a dukkata offence (Vin IV 206; T vol. 23, 141a7f [Vin.Sa.]; with some differentiation: T vol. 22, 709c6ff [Vin.Dh.]).

\textsuperscript{184} See n. 176, A.

\textsuperscript{185} Cp. n. 176, B. Strangely enough (perhaps due to inadvertency when supplementing the special Prātimokṣa rules for nuns by those they had in common with the monks?), in some schools (Mf., Dh., Sa.: see n. 176, C) it occurs also among the śaikṣa rules for nuns, which of course constitutes a contradiction. It is only in the Sa. version that this contradiction has been resolved by referring the two rules concerning the pollution of plants by nuns to different polluting substances (see n. 176, C).

\textsuperscript{186} This does not, however, explain why defecating, etc., on green plants was considered a more serious offence in the case of nuns than in the case of monks. I have not been able to decide so far whether the different grouping of the rule is merely the effect of a certain heterogeneity in the formation of the two sets (viz. the rules for monks and the special rules for nuns), and of lack of harmonization, or an expression of a general view that in the case of nuns stricter rules of decorous behaviour have to be applied, or whether there is any other reason.

\textsuperscript{187} T vol. 22, 543b1: 草者一切草; but Vin.Mā.Lok. (Roth 1970, p. 290,23) explains green plants as "green grass (sādvala) not cut or mowed (a-chhinna-lāna)". Cp., however, also Sp 898 where Buddhaghosa includes, into harita, the roots of "living" trees (jīva-rukkha) in the ground as far as they are perceived, as well as branches hanging down to the ground; cp. T vol. 24, 788a14f (Ch. version of Sp).

\textsuperscript{188} Roth 1970, p. 290,23ff (ten kinds of water, including even that of the ocean).

\textsuperscript{189} T vol. 22, 739b21 and 29f (Vin.Dh.); T vol. 23, 140b26 and 319a22f (Vin.Sa.). Cp. also T vol. 24, 829c22ff (*Vinayamārūkā: see n. 218), where the tree deity becomes annoyed because
on the whole the explanation and motivation offered by the canonical commentary for the rules under discussion is decidedly anthropocentric. In the introductory stories, what is spoilt by some nasty monks or nuns is cereals in a field\textsuperscript{190} or vegetables in a garden,\textsuperscript{191} or the grass of a lawn where people meet\textsuperscript{192} or of a park where the harem of a king enjoy themselves,\textsuperscript{193} and water used by people for bathing or washing themselves,\textsuperscript{194} drinking,\textsuperscript{195} or washing clothes;\textsuperscript{196} and what is violated by such acts is the interest of the human owner or user(s).\textsuperscript{197} Accordingly, in the Pāli Suttavibhaṅga the plants concerned are expressly

\begin{flushleft}
a monk defecates on a tree.
\end{flushleft}

\textsuperscript{190} Vin IV 266. Cp. in this connection also the way appaharite at Pāc. 19 (see n. 152) is understood in the introductory story: here, too, the green plants that are (but ought not to be) injured by the monk are taken to be barley on a field belonging to a brahmin (Vin IV 47; cp. also T vol. 22, 44c11 [Vin.Mī.]); hence, here too it seems to be primarily human interests that are at stake; but T vol. 22, 345b24f (Vin.Mā.) merely states that people, being upset and flocking together around the building under construction, "injur and kill fresh grass/plants", with no sign of human interest being involved.

\textsuperscript{191} T vol. 23, 140b22ff (Vin.Sa.); cp. Rosen 1959, 224; Vin.Mū., te 250b3ff (= T vol. 23, 904a13ff); vol. 24, 899a1ff (Sa.?). All these passages introduce the śāikṣa rule for m o n k s . The śāikṣa rule for n u n s concerning plants in Vin.Bhī., (the 288a4ff; only in P, not in R!) has a somewhat different introduction.

\textsuperscript{192} T vol. 22, 94a13ff (Vin.Mī.); 739b15ff (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 319a16ff (Vin.Sa.); 998c15ff (Vin.Mū.); Vin.Bhī., the 237b5ff. All these passages introduce the pācātiya rule for n u n s (cp. Waldschmidt 1926, 163 (= 1979, 167)).

\textsuperscript{193} T vol. 22, 411c4ff and 543a15ff (cp. Hirakawa 1982, 366); Roth 1970, p. 289f. — Mā./Mā.Lok. tradition, introductory story to both the pācātiya rule for nuns and the śāikṣa rule for monks.

\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{195} T vol. 24, 899a13 (Sa.?); cp. also T vol. 23, 140c22ff (Vin.Sa.), reporting that monks defecated, etc., into a large pond used by people; it is not quite clear for what purpose, but Skt. (Rosen 1959, 226 § 4) has uḍāpāna "well", which would seem to suggest drinking water. — Both passages introduce the śāikṣa rule for monks.

\textsuperscript{196} T vol. 23, 140b7ff (Vin.Sa.; see Rosen 1959, 225f); Vin.Mū., te 250a4ff (= T vol. 23, 904a19ff). Both passages introduce the śāikṣa rule for m o n k s . Similar story at Vin.Bhī, the 288b4ff and T vol. 23, 1019b21f (introducing the śāikṣa rule for n u n s ).

\textsuperscript{197} Cp., for the same tendency, also §§ 12.1, 13.3, 14.4 and 17.1; cp. also Schlingloff 1963, 539. I wonder whether this development may have been influenced by Hindu Dharmaśāstra, where the same tendency can be observed (cp. Wezler 1986, 446ff).
defined as cultivated plants — cereals and vegetables —, and in Buddhaghosa's commentary and even in one version of the Prātimokṣasūtra water is specified as water used [for drinking, etc.] (paribhoga-udaka).

11.4 It would exceed the limits of this paper to investigate in detail the situation in Jainism and early Hinduism (where comparable regulations can be found). But it seems that in Hinduism, too, aspects of decorum, hygiene and human interests intermingle with motives of ahimsā (and also such of various kinds of religious belief and awe). In Jainism, the ahimsā motive is naturally prominent, but aspects of decorum, public hygiene and human interests are by no means absent. It would

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198 Vin IV 267: haritam nāma pubhaṇṇam aparāṇṇam, yam m annu sā n a m upabhoga-paribhogam ropimam. Sp 924 includes coconut groves, etc. — As for the terms upabhoga and paribhoga, cp. their use in Jaina texts (Williams 1983, 102).

199 Sp 898, as against toilet water and water of the ocean; cp. T vol. 24, 787a26f (Ch. version of Sp).

200 T vol. 23, 141a6f (Vin.Sa.) and 478a25 (Prät.Sa.); 淨川水; cp. Rosen 1959, 226 (udake pāribhogike).

201 Cp., e.g., Manu IV.45cd-52, esp. 46a (not urinating on a cultivated field or into water); 56 (not dropping urine, excrements, spittle, etc., into water). In the case of water, the motive appears to be complex (cp. in this connection, H. P. Duerr, Nacktheit und Scham, Frankfurt 1988, 216: the Dhodia avoiding defecating and urinating in a river or pond because it would offend the water-spirits; cp. T vol. 23, 604c4-6: water deity may be irritated at washing after easing nature). In the case of cultivated fields, human interests would seem to outweigh. Decorum is probably a major motive when it is, e.g., prohibited to urinate while standing (47b; cp. Vin IV 205: Sekh. 73); ahimsā: 47a, interdicting urinating into pits containing living beings (na sasvatveṣu gaṛteṣu; cp. Uttar 24.18: bilavaṭṭie, and Āyār II.10.11 (JĀS § 656): pagattāṇi); special religious belief (and fear) is certainly involved when, e.g., urinating into an ant-hill is prohibited (46d; cp. D. König, Das Tor zur Unterwelt: Mythologie und Kult des Termiṭhenhügels in der schriftlichen und mündlichen Tradition Indiens, Wiesbaden 1984, esp. p. 148 + n. 57).

202 Cp., e.g., Utt 24.15-18 (decorum: that the place should not be frequented nor seen by others; ahimsā: e.g., that it should be free from animals and seeds and — as follows from acirakālakayaṃmi — green plants); Āyār II.10 (JĀS §§ 645-668; decorum: e.g. not to ease nature on a pillar or roof, etc. [10.7 = § 652], or on pathways, entrances or courtyards [10.15-16 = § 660f]; human interests: not where people have sown or will sow rice, etc. [10.10 = § 655], not in gardens, parks or into wells [10.14 = § 659] or in a vegetable field [10.20 = § 665]; ahimsā: in a place where there are, if possible, no eggs or animals (app'-ande appa-pāne), no seeds or green plants (appa-bāe a p p a - h a r i e), no dew or water (app'-ose app'-u d a e ) [10.1 = § 647; full wording see § 324], not on animate (citamanta, i.e. still living) stones or clods, not on (dead) wood inhabited by living beings [10.8 = § 653]). — As for not spoiling (or injuring?) w a t e r, cp. Kapp 1.19 (excrements, etc., should not be deposited on the bank of water (daga-tirāṃsi)). As for not injuring the e a r t h by excrements, etc., see n. 298.
explain the existence of the two different strands discussed above (§§ 11.1 and 11.3) if we suppose that in earliest Buddhism, too, the rule not to drop excrements, etc., on green plants and into water had such a mixed motivation, in the sense that the Buddha, or the Buddhist monks and nuns, were aware of, and made allowance for, both the ahiṃsā and the decorum or hygiene motive, although they themselves may not have shared the belief in the sentence of plants, let alone water, anymore, or may not have regarded pollution by excrements, etc., as a serious (or at least not an intentional: cp. § 9.2) form of injuring them. Later on, the two above-mentioned strands of (re-) interpretation developed: the purely anthropocentric one of the Prātimokṣa exegesis (§ 11.3), and the ahiṃsā-orientated one of the Suttapiṭaka and Khandaka materials (§ 11.1). In both of them, the rule concerning water is (re-)motivated in a way consonant with the view of the in sentience of water by basing its protection on the interests of man and tiny animals, respectively. In the anthropocentric strand, the same procedure has been applied to the rule concerning plants, but even here, a few sources still testify to the idea that the plants themselves are injured by the excrements, etc. In the ahiṃsā-orientated strand, however, there is no re-motivation in the case of plants, except, though only indirectly, in a few Chinese translations and in a post-canonical source. This difference of treatment may indicate a certain difference in the status of water and of plants, though, it is true, perhaps only in the eyes of "people" and not necessarily of the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves.

III.B. Fruits, Raw Grain and Garlic

In the following paragraphs (§§12.1-14.5), I shall discuss some rules concerning food plants, though, once again, anything but exhaustively.

12.1 In a passage of the Khandhaka, the Buddha is stated to have prohibited monks to eat mangoes. The preceding story motivates the prohibition by the fact that some monks misused the permission to gather mangos in the king’s park to the extent that no fruits were left, and thereby violated the king’s inter-

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203 T vol. 22, 627b28f [Vin.Dh.] has "clean (i.e. bare) ground" (淨地) instead, but cp. 835c27(f) [Vin.Dh.] where this is combined with 無華處 to render appa-°/alpa-harite.

204 Sn-a I 154,23f states that the injunction to drop the remnants of the dangerous dish either at a spot where there are only few green plants or into water without tiny animals has the purpose to protect the grasses along with the animals dwelling in them and the tiny animals [in water], respectively (saha tiṇa-nisṣitehi pāṇehi tiṇānam pāṇakānam ca anurakkhaṇa-thāya). Even this explanation does not necessarily imply that plants do not deserve protection for their own sake, but by referring also to the animals dwelling in them it indicates how this part of the injunction makes sense even when this is denied because of the view that plants are insentient (cp. § 5.2).

ests. But why should the Buddha have prohibited the monks to eat mangos merely because some of them had, on one occasion, eaten too many? It would have been sufficient to blame unseemly greed. Hence, the motive for the prohibition must have been a different one.

12.2 One could imagine that eating mangos was prohibited because they were probably the most delicious fruit available, and might hence not have been regarded as suitable for ascetics who have renounced worldly pleasures. But on the whole Buddhism does not prohibit monks to accept delicious food when it is spontaneously offered to them; what is considered detrimental is only greed for such food. In fact, in the next paragraph of the text the Buddha does allow the acceptance of mango slices. Hence, it is hardly a matter of delicious taste either.

12.3 The fact that mango slices offered by a layman are allowed rather points to another direction. What is prohibited is that the monks eat fruits which they have plucked themselves and which have not been rendered fit [for ascetics] (kappiya/kalpika: kosher, so to speak) by a layman. This point is made explicit by the third paragraph of the text, stating that monks are allowed to accept even whole mango fruits under the provision that these fruits satisfy the five requirements [of food] for ascetics (pañcahi samanakapphā), viz. that they have been injured (parijita) by fire, or a knife, etc., or finger-nails, or that they

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206 The monks eat all fruits (Vin.Dh.); they eat some fruits, throw away some half-eaten and take the rest home (Vin.Mi., Vin.Mā.); they finish them while they are young (Pāli; cp. Vin.Mū., de 8b5f = T vol. 24, 209c29f, where however the mango grove has been donated to the Order); in Vin.Sa., the story has been remodeled so as to show the monks in a less unfavourable light.

207 Cp. the scruptles of the monks expressed at T vol. 23, 268c1f.

208 Vin II 109: anujānāmi... ambapesikam. T vol. 23, 268b29-c3 (Vin.Sa.): mango soup (allowed if offered spontaneously); T vol. 22, 953b21-25 (Vin.Dh.): mango juice, fried mangos, thick mango juice. The remaining versions seem to lack a corresponding paragraph.

209 Cp. T vol. 23, 268a28ff and b6f (Vin.Sa.): prohibition to eat a mango fruit which one has received from a layman after having first touched it with one’s own hand; cp. T vol. 22, 875b18 (Vin.Dh., general formulation). Acc. to Vin I 212, such a procedure is allowed only in case of seed.

210 In fact, in T vol. 22, 171a6 (Vin.Mi.) already the initial prohibition interdicts the consumption of fruits that have not yet been “purified” (i.e. rendered suitable for ascetics).

211 Or: “[have undergone] the five treatments [that make food fit] for ascetics”. This rendering of the term would not, it is true, fit in with abīja nor with nibbatta-bīja, but the former is missing and the latter seems to have a causative equivalent in at least most of the other versions (cp. n. 215).

212 Cp. CPD s.v. aggi-parijita.
are free from seeds (*abīja*) or have discharged their seeds\(^{214}\) (*nibbatā-bīja*).\(^{215}\) At the same time, this rule is stated in a general form, valid for all kinds of fruits,\(^{216}\) and in other texts it is even applied to seeds and other edible parts of plants capable of propagation.\(^{217}\)

12.4 On the doctrinal background of the prescription to eat only fruits conforming to the requirements of suitability for ascetics all versions of the passage under discussion remain silent, but it is made fully explicit in a *Vinaya-mātrkā* of doubtful affiliation,\(^{218}\) where it is stated that when monks ate fruits although these had not been rendered pure they were reproached by non-Buddhist ascetics with lack of compassion; for — so these ascetics (who may well be Jinas)\(^{219}\) — *fruits are*

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\(^{213}\) The last two items of the Pāli version of the list seem to refer not to human activity but to natural events (cp. Sp 767: *abīja-nibbaṭṭabījāni soyan eva kappiyāni*), as is confirmed by Vin I 215 (cp. also n. 225), where the Buddha allows, under certain circumstances at least, to eat fruits that are free from seeds or have discharged their seeds even when they have not been rendered "suitable" [by a lay person] (*akatakappam*).

\(^{214}\) Thus PTC s.v. *nibbatā-bīja*; Sp 1093 (ad Vin I 215): "which can be eaten after [somebody] has removed (*nibbatērā apanērā*) the seed".

\(^{215}\) Vin II 109: *anujānāmi ... pañcahi samānakappehi phalam paribhuñjītum: aggi-parijitam, sattha-parijitam, nakha-parijitam, abījam, nibbattabījanīveva (v.l. nibbatā*) pañcamam. Cp. T vol. 22, 171a11f (Vin.Mā.): fire, knife, birds, injury [suffered by some accident], no seeds having developed; 478b10ff (Vin.Mā.): peeling, or at least scratching with a finger-nail; having been pecked by birds; having been injured in a vessel; removal of the kernel; fire; 875a18f (Vin.Dh., different context): fire, knife, wound. birds, containing no seeds; vol. 23, 268c4f (Vin.Sa.): fire, knife, fingernail or claw, parrots, no seeds having developed; 826a20ff (Vin.Mū., different context): fire, knife, finger-nail or claw, decaying or drying up, pecking by birds; cp. also vol. 24, 817b21ff (*Vinaya-mātrkā, see n. 218): fire, knife, birds, spontaneous damage on the fruit, removal of the seeds. There is more material, and there are also other lists of methods for making edible plants suitable for ascetics, with some variation according to the type of vegetable food concerned (e.g., T vol. 22, 171a12ff; 339a21ff; 875a21ff; vol. 24, 817b23f).

\(^{216}\) The word used is now *phala*, not *amba* as in the preceding lines. Cp. also T vol. 22, 171a6; 478b10f; vol. 23, 268c3, and esp. b7f expressly stating that the rule concerning mangos has to be extended to all fruits. Cp. also T vol. 22, 875a17ff (Vin.Dh.), and vol. 23, 275c8-11 (Vin.Sa.).

\(^{217}\) Cp., e.g., T vol. 22, 171a12-15; 339a21ff and c23-25; Sp 767f.

\(^{218}\) Cp. Yuyama 1979, 44 (§ 1.05); Hirakawa 1970, 262-264, according to whom both the ascription of the text, by some scholars like A. Bareau (Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule, Saigon 1955, 112), to the Haïmavata school is not sufficiently established, nor affiliation, proposed by others on the basis of a certain doctrinal affinity, to the Dharmaguptakas. Cp. also de Jong 1979, 289 n. 6.

\(^{219}\) Cp., e.g., Dasav 5.2.21, 23 and 24; Āyār II.1.8.4 and 6 (JĀS ed. §§ 377 and 379).
living beings, and hence eating them (unless they have already been killed by someone else) means eating (and killing) a living being. According to the *Vinayamātrkā, it is on account of such censure that the Buddha established the above restriction, allowing acceptance and consumption only under condition that they had already been injured by somebody else (or had at least burst or begun to rot by themselves) and had their seeds removed (since these were, in view of their germinative vitality, likewise considered to be living beings). It hence seems that this passage of the *Vinayamātrkā, similar to other passages of the Khandhaka/Skadha and the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga (see §§ 5.4-5.5; 8; 9.1; 10.1), presupposes that it is only out of respect for the belief of others in the sentience of fruits (seeds, plants) that the Buddhist monks are enjoined to abstain from injuring them, and that they themselves rather did not share this belief. But once again we cannot be sure that this was the original situation.

12.5 It may be worth noting that in the Pāli version of the Khandhaka and in at least one other version a transgression of the prohibition to eat mango fruits (which have not been offered and made suitable for ascetics) is expressly stated to be a dukkata offence, whereas injuring the plant itself or the seeds is, according to Pāc. 11, a pācittiya offence. At least according to the relation of these terms established in the Suttavibhaṅga, injuring a fruit is thus considered less grave. Cp., perhaps, also the rule, found in the Khandhaka, that fruits may, in case of need, be eaten without having been rendered "suitable" if only they lack seeds or have discharged them, or have had their kernel removed. We can hardly be sure that such a different evaluation goes back to the earliest days of Buddhism and perhaps even indicates that if plants were indeed regarded as sentient the sentience of fruits was from the outset taken somewhat less seriously than that of plants proper and of seeds;

220 T vol. 24, 817b18-20. Cp. also T vol. 22, 875b11-16 (Vin. Dh.) where we read that lay people, seeing monks eating vegetables that had not been rendered "pure" (i.e. suitable for ascetics), resented it as killing a living being, the final effect being that the Buddha prescribes that vegetables have to be "purified" before they may be eaten by monks.

221 T vol. 24, 817b20ff.

222 T vol. 22, 171a6 (Vin.Mi); cp. T vol. 23, 268b7 (Vin.Sa.).

223 The problem is whether the kernel or the seeds have to be absent or removed because their destruction is unnecessary or because they are, due to their sprouting capacity (which is absent in the rest of the fruit) felt to have a higher degree of vitality.

224 I.e., if there is nobody to render it suitable, and, acc. to Vin.Mi., only in time of famine (T vol. 22, 148a12; cp. Jaworski 1931, 61); the rule is expressly declared not to be applicable under normal conditions (b4-9).

225 Vin I 215 (see n. 213).

226 T 22, 148a25-27.
but at least it would show a development in the direction of reducing the seriousness of injury inflicted upon fruits, and this means a decreasing significance of their sentence (or people's belief in it). This may have something to do with their importance for nutrition, as is confirmed by the fact that at least in the Theravāda tradition injuring seeds too — in the wider sense including all parts of plants separated from the mother plant and still capable of propagation, and hence a considerable part of vegetable food — has come to be regarded as being merely dukkata. Finally, the act of rendering fruits, seeds, etc., suitable for ascetics by cutting them with a knife, etc., becomes a mere formality, cutting or scratching one item being sufficient to render a whole heap of fruits, seeds, etc., suitable. At this stage, at the latest, the idea that even seeds and fruits are, somehow, living, sentient beings would seem to have definitely become obsolete in Buddhism, to say the least.

13.1 Among the minor moral precepts for monks in the Suttapiṭaka (cp. §§ 4.3 and 7.3), we find abstention from accepting raw grain (āmaka-dhaṇṇa-pañjagahāṇa pratīvīrata). This might be taken to aim at preventing the acceptance of an article of food especially suitable for storing or bargain, both of which are interdicted by other items of the same series of precepts. But a similar rule in the Pāṭimokkhasutta points to another direction. There, it is stated that a nun commits a pācittiya offence if she orders, or [expressly] begs for, raw grain, raw seeds, pounds or cooks it or has others do so, and finally eats it. This would seem to suggest that the primary motive is, in both cases, rather the fact that in order to use raw grain (i.e. seeds capable of germination) for food, the monk or nun has to destroy

277 Sp 762; Sv 81,26.

278 Cp., e.g., T vol. 22, 171a15f (Vin.Mī.); 339c25ff (Vin. Mā.); vol. 24, 577b13f; Sp 767f. — It would seem that this procedure was developed in connection with edible seeds or small fruits since rendering them kappiya one by one was extremely time-consuming if not impracticable (hence originally raw grain was unacceptable for monks; cp. § 13.1).

279 See n. 41. Cp. also Saṅghabhī II 233, 17 (āmadhānyapratīvīrata pratīvīrata bhavati) and T vol. 1, 657b16 (Mā, Sa.: 離生諸穀芽). Cp. also T vol. 22, 431a1 and 478a14ff (Vin.Mā.); vol. 24, 558b11 (Vin.Mū.).

280 Pac.Bhī. 7 (Vin IV 264): yā pana bhikkhunī āmakadhaṅnāṃ viṇṇavā (v.l. viṇṇitvā and viṇṇāpetvā) vā viṇṇāpetvā (v.l. viṇṇāpāpetvā) vā bhajjitvā vā bhajāpetvā vā koṭṭhitvā (v.l. śīrtvā) vā koṭṭhāpetvā vā pacitvā vā pacāpetvā vā bhūjeyya, pācittiyaṁ), Mī.: T vol. 22, 96c3f (preparing food by cooking raw stuff herself); Mā.: 530a10-12 (eating food after cooking, frying or stewing it again, or having others do so; cp. Hirakawa 1982, 263f); Mā.Lok.: Roth 1970, p. 215 (… parāḥṛtya khamaniyam vā bhujaniyam vā puno puno pacitvā vā pacāpetvā vā bhujeyya vā … kathitvā vā … khaḍaye (216: khaḍeya) vā bhūjeyya vā …); Dh.: 739b8 (begging raw grain); Sa.: vol. 23, 318b10 (like Mī.); Mū.: Prāt.Bhī., the 20a1 (… tjen pa ’tshod na …; cp. Vin.Bhī., the 237a6: … tjen pa ’tshed par byed na …) = T vol. 24, 998b17 (cooking raw food herself). Cp. Waldschmidt 1926, 155 (= 1979, 159).
them by roasting, etc., and that this was regarded as an act of killing a living, sentient being, though, once again, the belief in the sentence of seeds need not have been shared by the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves; they may only have been ordered to adjust their behaviour to common standards of ascetic decorum.

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231 This is surely the normal way of preparing cereals like rice or barley for food. Hence, the prohibition is hardly an implicit permission to eat them in a raw state. — (Raw) grain is defined by the Suttavibhaṅga (cp. also Sv 178) as rice, barley, etc., i.e. as what in other places (e.g. Sp 340) is equated with "primary food" (pubbaṇṇa), as opposed to sesame seed, beans, etc., called "secondary food" (aparaṇṇa). I do not, however, understand Vogel's statement (IIJ 13/1971, 20) that pubbaṇṇa, hence āmakadhaṇṇa, is food eaten in the natural (= raw) state, whereas aparaṇṇa is eaten in the cooked state. Who eats rice in the natural state? If the distinction between pubba- and aparaṇṇa has anything at all to do with the state in which food-stuffs are usually consumed, it would rather be sesame or beans (at least as long as they are young) and other vegetables that are often eaten in the raw state. — At any rate, as long as the rule not to accept raw grain is primarily motivated by considerations of seed āhimsā, it is difficult to see why it should not hold good also for beans, etc., and it would not matter whether they have to be cooked or may be eaten in the raw state. In fact, at T vol. 22, 739a22f (Vin.Dh.) beans are explicitly included among the things for begging which in a raw state the nuns are reproached. Cp. also the addition of "beans" (ṉ) in the translation of āmakadhaṇṇa at T vol. 1, 657b16, and T vol. 24, 558b11 (Vin.Mū.; but cp. also, for possible counter-evidence, Vin IV 265 and (? T vol. 22, 478a18f). The reason why only the acceptance of raw grain is prohibited and not that of raw vegetables is probably that, roughly speaking, vegetables are big enough to be rendered "suitable" for ascetics (kappiya) one by one by the lay person, whereas grains are too small for such a procedure (a problem which was, later on, solved by making them "suitable" in a lump (see § 12.5)). Besides, when the main motive of the prohibition to accept (or beg and prepare) raw grain came to be seen in the cooking activity (see § 13.2.2), vegetables to be eaten in the raw state could be exempted, as is perhaps the intention of the anāpatti formula of the Suttavibhaṅga (Vin IV 265: anāpatti ... aparaṇṇam viññāpeti). Interestingly enough, Buddhaghosa (Sp 924) suggests, besides the usual explanation as beans, etc. (mugganāsādhi), an alternative interpretation of aparaṇṇa as bottle-gourds, etc., which hardly require cooking (and, by the way, can easily be made "suitable"). But the whole matter surely requires more careful investigation.

232 The association of āmaka with killing is also evoked by the fact that side by side with abstention from accepting raw grain (āmaka-dhaṇṇa) the Suttapitaka list of minor moral precepts (see n. 229) enjoins abstention from raw meat (āmaka-mūṣa); cp. also T vol. 22, 478a2ff. For the association of āma with injury cp. also Seyfort Ruegg 1980, 240.

233 As is, of course, the Jaina point of view: cp., e.g., Dasav 3.7 (it is forbidden to eat raw seeds (bie āmage) since they, too, are sentient (saccitta); cp. also DasavViv 235,5 and 8.10 (āhimsā context: a monk should not even think of obtaining raw seeds, expressly declared to be living beings (jīva) at 8.2).

234 This is, of course, the view of later sources: cp. Sp 924 classifying the matter as pannatti-vajja (see n. 93), or T vol 23, 998b20 (Vin.Mū.) stating that if the cooking is done for the monks in a hidden house where no outsider can see it, it is no offence (cp. also Vin.Bhī., the 237a7).
13.2 It is, however, worth noting that there are some interesting differences between the Pāṭimokkha rule and the Suttapiṭaka passage.

13.2.1 Firstly, the Pāṭimokkha rule prohibits begging (viṇṇatti) for raw grain, whereas according to the Suttapiṭaka passage even acceptance (patīgghahana), which doubtless includes acceptance even of spontaneously given raw grain, has to be abandoned. Hence, the Suttapiṭaka rule is obviously the stricter one, coming close to the corresponding regulation for Jaina monks.235 Does this mean that it is more archaic, perhaps adopted from some pre-existing, non-Buddhist codex of ascetic behaviour? But it is also possible that the Pāṭimokkha rule was not meant to tacitly sanction acceptance of spontaneously offered raw grain236 but rather limited itself to stigmatize such forms of behaviour as were likely to scandalize lay people most, in that they disclosed a deliberate intention237 to violate or disregard accepted principles of ascetic life.

13.2.2 Such a consideration would seem to be corroborated by the second difference between the Pāṭimokkha and the Suttapiṭaka rule, namely that in the Pāṭimokka the rule declaring begging, preparation and consumption of raw grain to be a pacittiya offence is found only among the (additional) monastic precepts for nuns. It is, to be sure, not allowed to monks either,238 but in their case it is, according to the terminology of the Suttavibhaṅga and Khandhaka, merely dukkata.239 The reason suggesting itself is that for a nun the temptation to ask for raw grain in order to prepare a delicious dish was much greater, since cooking was, of course, a typically female activity. But what was natural for housewives was utterly unbecoming for a female ascetic,240 obliged to live on alms not only in order to avoid destruction of living beings (or of what was regarded so by people) but also because she had to be indifferent towards the quality of food. In the Mahāsāṅghika version of the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion, which omits the reference to raw food-stuff,241 it even seems to be only the effort to improve the quality of food that is reproved, as is made fully explicit in the Mahāsāṅghika(—Lokottaravādin)

235 Cp., e.g., Dasav 8.10cd (see n. 233); Āyār II.1.8.11 (JĀS ed. § 384).

236 Though T vol. 22, 739b12f (Vin.Dh.) understands the rule to do precisely this.

237 Cp. Vin IV 264f: b hu n j i s s ā m i t i paṭiṇahati, āpati dukkataṁass.

238 Vin I 210f: ... ānando ... sāmaṁ tiṭṭaṁ pi tāṇḍulaṁ pi muggataṁ pi viṇṇāpetvā ... sāmaṁ pacitvā ... and na ... sāmaṁ pakkam paribhūjītabbām; yo paribhūjeyya, āpati dukkataṁass; cp. T vol. 22, 148a28ff (Vin.Mī.). Cp. also 477c20f (Vin.Mā.) and n. 239.

239 Vin I 211 (see n. 238); T vol. 22, 739b10 (Vin.Dh.); cp. Roth 1970, p. 216,12f (vinayāṭikrama).

240 Cp. T vol 22, 96b29f.

241 See n. 230.
version of the introductory story.\textsuperscript{242}

13.3 Thus, the Prātimokṣa rule under discussion shows a clear tendency towards shifting emphasis from the ahiṃsā aspect towards matters of ascetic decorum. In some versions of the introductory story,\textsuperscript{243} a nun's (or nuns') cooking is even taken to infringe upon the economic interests of people,\textsuperscript{244} viz. the interests of the kitchen personnel or of a professional cook. But such an interpretation is doubtless rather far-fetched. Nor is it probable that the inappropriateness, for an ascetic, of cooking as such, though explaining well why the prohibition is stricter in the case of nuns, was the primary reason from the outset. For as the Mahāsāṅghika(-Lokottaravaśin) version of the introductory story shows,\textsuperscript{245} even ready-made (alms-)food may be done up to make it more savoury. But apart from the Mahāsāṅghika(-Lokottaravaśin) version of the Prātimokṣa rule\textsuperscript{246} (which seems to be adapted to the case of doing up alms-food) all versions speak of cooking (or even only begging) raw food-stuff or raw grain,\textsuperscript{247} and in the Vinayavibhaṅga and Skandhaka re-cooking is occasionally expressly allowed,\textsuperscript{248} and this suggests that also in Buddhism the primary motive for the prohibition was that ascetics were expected not to injure intact seeds, which were believed to be living beings by people and other ascetics though, as stated above, not necessarily also by the Buddhist monks and nuns.

14.1 In the Khandhaka,\textsuperscript{249} the Buddhist monks are prohibited from eating garlic (except for medical purposes), transgression being a dukkata offence, and in the Pāṭimokkhasutta for nuns\textsuperscript{250} consumption of garlic is declared to be a pācittiya

\textsuperscript{242} T vol. 22, 529c23ff (Hirakawa 1982, 262f); Roth 1970, 214f.

\textsuperscript{243} T vol. 22, 529c23ff, esp. 28ff (Hirakawa 1982, 263); Roth 1970, p. 214f (cp. de Jong 1979, 301), esp. 214,20ff (where one should probably read paṭitavyaṃ in l. 21); vol. 23, 318a21ff, esp. 29ff (Vin.Sa.); 998a27ff, esp. b11ff (Vin.Mū.; cp. also Vin.Bhi., the 236b1ff); in the Sa. and Mū. versions, the nun(s) cook(s) for other people.

\textsuperscript{244} Cp. also §§ 11.3, 12.1, 14.4 and ?.

\textsuperscript{245} See n. 242.

\textsuperscript{246} Cp. n. 230 (... p a r ā h t a m khaḍanīyaṃ vā bhojanīyaṃ vā p u n o p u n o p a cītvā ...).

\textsuperscript{247} See n. 230.

\textsuperscript{248} E.g., T vol. 23, 318b13 (Vin.Sa.); Vin I 211: anujānāmi ... puna-pākaṃ paccitum.

\textsuperscript{249} Vin II 140: na, bhikkhave, lasuṇam khaḍitaṃ bbaṃ; yo khaḍeyya, āpatti dukkaṭassa; T vol. 22, 176a14f (Vin.Mū.); 483b10f (Vin.Mū.); 956b18 (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 275b23f (Vin.Sa.); Vin.Mū., de 61b5 (cp. a5f) = T vol. 24, 230b2f (cp. a18f); T vol. 24, 826c10 (*Vinaya-māṭrka, see n. 218).

\textsuperscript{250} Prāṭ.Bhi., Pāc. 1 (Vin IV 259): yā pana bhikkhuni lasuṇam khaḍeyya, pācittiyaṃ; Mū.: T vol.
offence. In view of the preceding paragraphs (especially §§ 12.4, 13.1 and 13.3) one might be inclined to assume, in this case, too, that the motive for the prohibition was, originally, the idea, at least of "people", that garlic is a living, sentient being that ought not to be injured.

14.2 In fact, in Jainism monks and nuns are not allowed to accept any bulbs, bulbous roots or other pieces of plants (like sugar-cane) capable of sprouting as long as they are not fully deprived of life by means of cutting or cooking.251 This holds, of course, good also for garlic.252 The reason is that they are animate, sentient beings,253 most of them containing, at least according to later canonical texts, even a plurality of souls.254 In Buddhist texts, too, such bulbs and rhizomes capable of germination are occasionally declared to require being rendered fit for ascetics (kappiya) before monks or nuns are allowed to eat them,255 and this surely presupposes the idea that such vegetables are living beings. But as in the case of fruits (§ 12.4) we cannot be sure whether the Buddhist monks and nuns still shared this belief since no explicit statement to this effect seems to occur.

14.3 The prohibition to eat garlic, however, does not seem to be motivated by this idea, not even in the sense that one had to show regard for the belief of others. For in this case one would have to assume that in these passages garlic stands for all kinds of edible bulbs (just as in the passage treated in § 12.1ff the mango represents fruits in general), but there is no indication of this.256 Besides, in this case


251 Dasav 3.7; 5.1.70; 5.2.18(f); Āyār II.1.8.3 (JĀS ed. § 375).

252 Āyār II.1.8.14 (JĀS ed. § 386).

253 Cp., e.g., Dasav 3.7: kande mūle ya saccittte.


255 E.g., T vol. 22, 171a12-15 (Vin.Mī.); 339a21ff (Vin.Mā.).

256 Only the Skandhaka passage in Vin.Mū. (Vin.Mū., de 61a5f: ... sgog skya dañ ska doñ (MVy 5734: palāndu) dañ ki'u (MVy 5733: grñjanaka) ...; T vol. 24, 230a18f) includes eating of onions and leek in the prohibition. But in their case too it is bad smell (cp. § 14.5) that is the motive. This is confirmed by the fact that the isolation prescribed in case of eating them lasts shorter than in the case of having eaten garlic (Vin.Mū., de 62a7f = T vol. 24, 230b19f), which makes good sense if bad smell (which is less penetrating in the case of onions and leek) is the motive, but not if the reason were sentience, which would be the same in all the three.
the prohibition ought to refer to raw garlic only, but it is only in Buddhaghosa's that such a qualification is found. As against this, several versions of the Vinaya- 
the Prātimokṣa and/or Skandhaka passage concerned and one Chinese version of the 
Prātimokṣa rule itself are unambiguous in stating that both raw and cooked garlic are included in the prohibition.

14.4 Yet, the motivation for the prohibition to eat garlic, reported in the introductory story to the Prātimokṣa rule for nuns, by the economic interest of the owner is not the original one either. The story adduces the case of nuns who, being offered, or allowed to collect, garlic, misbehaved by taking much or spoiling the rest, thereby impairing or even ruining the owner. But, as has already been noted by Waldschmidt, this explanation does not at all fit in with the precept itself; for just as in the case of the story meant to motivate the prohibition to eat mango fruits (§ 12.1) it would have been sufficient to recommend careful behaviour and condemn unseemly greed but not the very eating of garlic as such.

14.5 On the other hand, the introductory story to the Khandhaka passage

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257 Kākhāvitarāceti 172.9: ā m a k a -bhaṇḍika-lasuna.

258 T vol. 22, 86c7 and 176a11 (Vin.Mi.); 483b25, 487a25 and 530b24 (Vin.Mā.); Roth 1970, 218.9f: āman na kṣamati, pakwan na kṣamati; T vol. 22, 737b10f (Vin.Dh.). At T vol. 22, 86c21 (Vin.Mi.) it is stated that for a nun only eating raw garlic is a pācittiya offence, whereas eating cooked garlic is merely dukkata. But even this much would not make much sense if it were motivated by the sentience of garlic. On the other hand, it would seem to support bad smell (see § 14.5) as a motive since the effect of raw garlic is, as far as I know, significantly stronger. — I refrain from entering into a discussion of further sophistications of the rule found in some Vinayavibhaṅgas and subcommentaries.

259 Viz. the one in Vin.Sa. (see n. 250).

260 Cp. §§ 11.3 and 12.1; cp. also § 13.3.

261 Vin IV 258f; T vol. 22, 86c11ff (Vin.Mi.); 530b14ff (Vin.Mā.; cp. Hirakawa 1982, 266f); Roth 1970, p. 217f; T vol. 22, 736c4ff (Vin.Dh.); vol. 23, 317a28ff (Vin.Sa.); in this version, the garlic is spontaneously given to the nuns by the cultivator, but it seems that their unrestrained acceptance is the cause of the ruin of his business: cp. b2 and b8); 997a6ff (Vin.Mū., cp. Vin.Bhv., the 234a8ff); in this version, a nun takes garlic although only allowed to gather (other) vegetables. Cp. also T vol. 24, 826c18ff (Vin.mātrkā), and T vol. 22, 483b5-10 (see n. 264). See also Waldschmidt 1926, 153f, and, for Vin.Mū., Panglung 1981, 166f.

262 Waldschmidt 1926, 153.

263 As is actually done in the inserted tale of the golden goose (Waldschmidt 1926, 153-155).

264 There are two types of stories: one according to which the monks have continually been eating
motivates the prohibition to eat garlic explicitly or implicitly by the bad smell annoying other people. This sounds plausible, and it would also be a plausible motive for the prohibition to eat garlic in the case of nuns. Yet, here too the question remains whether there is any specific reason why in the case of nuns a transgression of the rule was regarded to be a more serious offence (sc. pācittiya) than in the case of monks (sc. dukkatas). Perhaps the real reason for this is that garlic is considered to be sexually stimulating, and since it is a truism in the Indian ascetic tradition that women are by nature particularly inclined to lasciviousness, this reason would best explain why in the Pātimokkhasutta eating garlic is prohibited for nuns only. At any rate, there is, in this case, no indication that the prohibition has any connection with the view that plants, and especially bulbous plants, are living, sentient beings.

III.C. Earth, Water and Fire

15 As for the status of the elements in terms of being alive or sentient, let us start with the earth.

15.1 In Pāc. 10, the Pātimokkhasutta states that digging the earth is a

garlic and scandalize the lay followers by the bad smell spreading wherever they stay or move around (T vol. 22, 176a11-14 [Vin.Mī.]; vol. 24, 230b7ff [Vin.Mū.]; cp. also n. 267), and another one according to which a monk (or a group of monks) who has eaten garlic does not come to the Buddha's preaching (T vol. 22, 176a16-20 [Vin.Mī.]) or stands aside (Vin II 140; T vol. 22, 483b1ff [Vin.Dī.]; 956b14ff. [Vin.Dī.]; vol. 23, 275b12ff [Vin.Sa.]; vol. 24, 826c11ff [Vin. māṭkā]) or is unconcentrated (Vin.Mū., de 60b6ff, esp. 8ff; T vol. 24, 230a6ff, esp. 9ff) because he fears that the bad smell may annoy others. — Vin.Mā. (T vol. 22, 483b5ff) has, in addition, adapted, to the present context, the introductory story to the Prātimokṣa rule for nuns (see n. 261).

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265 E.g. T vol. 22, 176a12f; 483b15; vol. 23, 275b14; Vin.Mā., de 61a1 and 62a3 = T vol. 24, 230a10 and b12f.

266 E.g., Vin II 140 (mā bhikkhū vyābādhīṇsu); T vol. 22, 956b15ff; vol. 24, 826c11ff.

267 In the Vinayavibhaṅga of the Mahiśāsakas there are three introductory stories to the Prātimokṣa rule for nuns not to eat garlic, according to the first two of which the reason for the prohibition was in fact that the nuns had continually eaten garlic and scandalized the lay followers by the bad smell resulting therefrom (T vol. 22, 86c7-11; corresponding to the first type of the Khandhaka stories (see n. 264)).

268 See § 14.1 and ns. 249 and 250. Cp. also T vol. 22, 737b11.

269 Oral communication by M. Maithri Murthi. There is, however, to my knowledge no explicit statement to this effect in the sources; but cp., perhaps, the critical remark, by lay people, that the nuns eat garlic like lay women (T vol. 23, 317b11f).
pācittiya offence. The question is whether this rule has to be understood, like the rule not to injure or destroy plants (and seeds) which it in fact precedes in some versions, as an expression of not injuring (ahimsā) the earth itself, as is doubtless the primary purport of the almost identical rule for Jaina monks and as was also a reason for reserves against agriculture in Hindu Dharmaśāstra, — and, what consequences this would have for the question of sentience, both of the earth itself and of plants (and seeds).

15.2 From the later Buddhist point of view, it might suggest itself to understand the rule as referring to not injuring small animals living in the soil, like earthworms. But although this aspect is clearly expressed (as an additional one) even in early Jaina and in Hindu sources, it is not even hinted at in any of the Viśnayavibhāṅgas on the rule under discussion, except, perhaps, the Chinese translation of the Mūlasarvāstivāda version. Nor is it probable that the main motive for the

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270 Vin IV 33: yo pana bhikkhu pathavim khaneyya va khanāpeyya va, pācittiyaṃ; Mi.: T vol. 22, 60c9; 15f; 21f; Mā.: 384c20f; 553c2f; 561b3f; Mā.Lok.: Prāt.Mā.Lok. p. 26, No. 73: yo pana bhikkṣuḥ svahastam prthivim khaneyya va khanāpeyya va antamaśato iha khanēhīti va (Pachow/Mishra 1956, 31: evam) vadeya, pācattikam; Dh.: T vol. 22, 641a26; b12f; 1026b7; Sa.: v. Simson 1986, pp. 68, 262 and 264: yah punar bhikkṣuḥ svahastam prthivim khaneyya va antamaśato iha khanēhīti va (Pachow/Mishra 1956, 31: evam) vadeya, pācattikam; Dh.: T vol. 22, 641a26; b12f; 1026b7; Sa.: v. Simson 1986, pp. 68, 262 and 264: yah punar bhikkṣuḥ svahastam prthivim khaneyya va antamaśato iha khanēhīti va (Pachow/Mishra 1956, 31: evam) vadeya, pācattikam; Dh.: T vol. 22, 641a26; b12f; 1026b7; Sa.: v. Simson 1986, pp. 68, 262 and 264: yah punar bhikkṣuḥ svahastam prthivim khaneyya va antamaśato iha khanēhīti va (Pachow/Mishra 1956, 31: evam) vadeya, pācattikam.

271 See § 6.2.1 + n. 99.

272 Dasav 10.2a: puḍhaviṃ na khaṇe na khaṇāvac; 8.4 (puḍhavi ... silaṃ lelaṃ neva bhinde na samālīhe). The latter passage follows shortly after a verse (8.2) which express states that earth itself is a living being (jīva) and therefore must not be injured, at least primarily, in its own right (i.e. even when free of other living beings); cp. also Dasav 5.1.68c (puḍhavi-jīve vi himsejjā); 4, opening portion (p. 5.15f + 6,20ff); 6.27. Williams 1983, 118; cp. ibid. 68 and 124f.

273 E.g., Manu X.83f; cp. also IV.70a.


275 Manu X.84cd = MBh 12.254.44: bhūmiṃ bhūmiṃ is a yā mś caiva hanti kāṣṭham ayomukham; MBh 3.199.19.

276 Cp. the fact that according to this version the monks also damage ant-hills (T vol. 23, 854a8). But there is no equivalent in Vin.Mū., which has "digging [irrigation] channels" (yur ba 'dren pa) instead (te 1a2f).
prohibition to dig the earth was that bodily toil or peasants' activity was considered inappropriate for monks by the society of those days. For although such an idea is expressed in a few versions of the story introducing the rule, it would not explain the fact that the monk is also prohibited from ordering someone else to dig the earth. Actually, the majority of the versions understand the rule as prohibiting digging the earth as an act of injury inflicted upon the earth's being, regarded as a living being. Yet, as in the case of plants (cp. § 5.5), it is only people (manussā) who are reported to have such a view (jīva-sațhino hi ... manussā pathavīya) and hence to mind the monks digging the earth as an act of injuring a living being with one sense-faculty (kathan hi nāma ... ekindriyam jīvam vihetthessanti). Here too it seems to be implied that the monks themselves do not share this belief but are nevertheless enjoined to behave as if they did.

277 T vol. 24, 891a7-9 (Sa.; "... how are they different from peasants?!'"; vol. 23, 854a9f (Vin.Mū.); "How [is it possible that] the monks, [although being] ascetics, do ordinary work?"; cp. Vin.Mū., te 1a4-7 (see n. 281). Cp. also vol. 24, 600b29 ("by dedicating themselves to vulgar work, they obstruct the correct [spiritual] practice").

278 See n. 270 (khandāpeyya vā, etc.).

279 Similarly most of the other versions (T vol. 22, 384c11 [Vin.Mā.] 闩 n; 641a12 [Vin.Dh.] 長者; vol. 23, 117b17 [Vin.Sa.] 居士). In the latter source, the lay people are, however, explicitly characterized as followers of non-Buddhist religious groups. In Vin.Mū. (Vin.Mū., te 1a3 = T vol. 23, 854a9), too, it is non-Buddhists (gžan ma stegs can = *anātirihika) who blame the monks. — As regards the belief that earth is living or even sentient in Jainism and in the Vedic religion, see ns. 14 and 20. For the idea that earth is animate in tribal religion see, e.g., C. P. Zoller in: Rustomji/-Randle 1990, 166f (Bangān; ploughing is, however, regarded by the agricultural Bangani as a purification of the earth, by means of killing demons, cobras and rats: ibid., 168). — I disregard, in the present context, the fact that there are at least two different forms of belief in the animateness or sentience of the earth: one according to which earth as a whole is an animate being (thus the Bangani: Zoller, op. cit., 166; cp. also DasavViv 280,9: iyam ca (i.e. prthivī) ... anekājīvī, na puvar ekațīvā, yathā v a i d i k ā n ā m ...), and one according to which the earth consists of a plurality or infinitude of minute living beings (as in Jainism).

280 Vin IV 32f; cp. T vol. 23, 117b18 (地中命根).

281 Explicitly so Vin IV 32; T vol. 22, 384c13 (with v.l.): 傷一命根 (Vin.Mā.), and vol. 23, 117b19f: 傷一命根。 At Vin.Dh. (vol. 22, 641a13) people only state that by digging the earth the monks destroy life or life-force (*jīvendriya, but cp. n. 130), and that this shows lack of pity (641b1). Similarly Vin.Mū., (T vol. 23, 854a10), but there is no corresponding phrase in Vin.Mū., Here (te 1a3-8), the non-Buddhists merely wonder if there is, in view of the monks' behaviour, any difference between them and "bramins and householders". Similarly, in the old Sa. Vinaya T 1464 (vol. 24, 891a6ff), the householders only blame the monks for behaving like peasants (see n. 277) but do not mention destruction of life.

282 Explicitly so T vol. 22, 384c16f (Vin.Mā.).
because this is what people, or society, expects from ascetics.

15.3 There is no reason to doubt that the (majority of the versions of the) introductory story is correct in so far as it regards the rule not to dig the earth to be, if only indirectly, motivated by the belief that earth should not be injured because she herself is living, sentient. This is confirmed also by the fact that according to the Suttavibhaṅga it is not only digging but also other kinds of hurting the earth, like splitting, burning, scratching up, planting in a post or peg or causing a landslide on a steep river bank. Yet, in view of the fact that the Suttavibhaṅga does not belong to the earliest stratum of Buddhist texts we cannot be sure that the introductory story is also right in attributing the belief in the sentence of earth to people only. Without additional evidence, we may not be able to exclude the possibility that in the very earliest days the Buddhist monks and nuns, too, still shared this belief. And even if they did not, this would not necessarily imply that they had abandoned, already at the very beginning, the belief in the sentence of plants and seeds. The mere fact that the Suttavibhaṅga motivates both rules — the prohibition to dig the earth and the prohibition to injure (seeds and) plants — by means of the same pattern is hardly sufficient to prove that in terms of being alive and sentient the status of earth and plants must have been the same from the outset. Even in case the belief that earth is a living being had already been abandoned, belief in the sentence of plants may still have continued. Or there may at least have been a difference in the extent to which the sentence of the two had become observant. Without additional evidence, this is difficult to decide.

15.4 In this connection, it is interesting that the canonical word commentary on the rule not to dig the earth distinguishes two kinds of earth or soil, viz. jāta and ajāta, and some versions make explicit that it is only in the case of the former kind that digging or injuring constitutes a pācittiya offence. It is not easy to say

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283 Vin IV 33 (khaṇati ... bhindati ... dahati ...); burning also T vol. 22, 641b17 (Vin.Dh.), and esp. 495a1ff (Vin.Mā., see § 17.1 + n. 332).

284 E.g. T vol. 22, 641b15f (Vin.Dh.); 385a4f (Vin.Mā.): if a monk sweeps the ground with the intention to level it, already a scratch of the size of a mosquito’s leg constitutes a pācittiya offence.

285 T vol. 22, 385a16f; vol. 23, 854a27f = Vin.Mā., te 2b2 (... sa la phur pa ‘debs na ...).

286 T vol. 22, 385a10f; vol. 23, 854b2f = Vin.Mā., te 2b3 (... hogs tib par byed na ...).

287 Cp. § 5.5 + n. 96.

288 Vin IV 33.

289 According to T vol. 23, 117c4-6 (Vin.Sa.) and Vin.Mā., te 2b1 (= T vol. 23, 854a25f), only digging jāta earth is, to be sure, pāyattikā, but digging ajāta earth is still duskrta. On the other hand, Vin.Mā., te 2b7ff (= T vol. 23, 854b10-12) states that digging soil containing much earth (clay, loam) but few stones or little sand (i.e. jātā pathavi acc. to Vin IV 33) is pāyattikā, digging soil containing
what, precisely, "born" (jāta) and "not born" (ajāta) mean in this context; but it seems that two aspects intermingle: on the one hand the aspect of fertility (as of mould or clay) and barrenness (as of stones or sand), and on the other the aspect of "living", natural soil and of soil that is "dead" — as it is actually called in one Chinese version because it has been worked by digging or ploughing or burnt by fire (until, after a certain time, it becomes "living" soil again). Unfortunately, the texts do not at all make clear what, precisely, the being "alive" of earth or soil means. But it would seem that the distinction is comparable to that of "living" (green, lush) and "dead" (withered) plants, and hence could be retained even when the belief in the sentience of the earth or of plants had been abandoned.

15.5 One might suggest that the rule not to dig the earth is of lesser significance than the rule not to injure plants (and seeds) because in contrast to the latter it has no counterpart in the list of minor moral precepts for monks in the Suttapiṭaka (see §§

little earth but many stones or much sand (i.e. ajāta pathavī acc. to Vin IV 33) is duṣkṛta, whereas digging soil consisting of nothing but stones or sand is no offence. Similarly T vol. 22, 385b17f (Vin.Mā.). Cp. also T vol. 23, 117c11-15, where also digging in metalliferous mines, jewel- and salt-mines is stated to be no offence.

200 Cp. the Ch. rendering 生/不生 ("producing / not producing": T vol. 23, 117b28.[Vin.Sa.]), and the explanation (b29f) that in areas with much rain the soil is productive for eight months, in areas with little rain for four months (cp. also Rosen 1959, 200f). It seems that Vin.Sa. regards ruined walls, stony ground, ant-hills and heaps of [dry?] earth (b28f) as similar to "not producing" soil (cp. c4-6).

201 T vol. 22, 385a16, 19 and b3 (BE) [Vin.Mā.]; at 384c26ff, the renderings 生 and 作文 (something like "unworked" or "natural" and "cultivated" or "artificial") are used. T vol. 23, 854a16 (Vin.Mū.,) says 生和非生, i.e., "living" and "not living", whereas Vin.Mū., (te 2a6) has "[soil] in its natural state" (rāh bēzin can, cp. the explanation 性 at T vol. 23, 854a17) and "[soil] that is not in his natural state" (rāh bēzin can ma yin pa), the former kind including also such soil as has recovered after having been dug, etc. (see n. 295); cp. also T vol. 24, 600c3ff. Finally, T vol. 22, 641b13f (Vin.Dh.) calls the two types of earth simply "dug" and "not yet dug".

202 See n. 291.


204 Vin IV 33 (daḍḍhā pi vuccatti ajātā pathavī). Cp. also T vol. 24, 600c7.

205 Acc. to Vin.Dh. (T vol. 22, 641b14f), earth that has been dug is restored to its original state (of "living" earth) when soaked by rain for four months. Cp. Vin IV 33: yo pi ... māttikāpuśjo ... atirekaćāyuṁśaṇa ovāṭho, ayām pi vuccati jātā pathavī. Acc. to Vin.Mū., the same happens after three months in case it rains sufficiently, and without rain after six months (T vol. 23, 854a17f; Vin.Mū., te 2a6f: char chu żod na zla gsum gyis sa (R) t'has (R: mthas) par gyur pa'o/char chu ma žod (R) na zla ba drug gas sa 't'has par gyur pa'o//; solid ('t'has pa = sra ba) soil seems to be "living" soil, as against crumbled (grugs pa) soil: cp. Vin.Mū., te 2b2 and 3f).
4.3, 7.3 and 13.1). But we do find a counterpart in a sermon\(^{296}\) where a pious layman, who is a potter, is said to fulfil not only the five precepts for lay followers but also some of the minor precepts for monks, viz. eating only once a day and renouncing gold and silver;\(^{297}\) and in addition, thus the text, he does not dig the earth with his own hands (\textit{na sahatthā paṭhavim khaṅati}) for the sake of getting clay for his pottery, but uses what has broken off from a bank or has been thrown up by mice.

15.6 One might furthermore argue that in Jaina sources monks and nuns are enjoined to deposit remnants of food or excrements, etc., at a lifeless spot of the ground,\(^{298}\) not on a sentient (\textit{citamānta}) rock or clod,\(^{299}\) and that they are ordered to walk on paths that have been made lifeless by chariots, beasts of burden, etc., or other people,\(^{300}\) not on (moist, living) clay,\(^{301}\) whereas in the Prātimokṣa-sūtra no such restrictions are to be found.\(^{302}\) But on the one hand the Jaina evidence would seem to require more careful sifting from the chronological point of view,\(^{303}\) and on the other disregarding the earth in such contexts may also mean that the Buddhists simply did not consider such superficial operations to injure her, in contrast to an operation like digging which wounds the surface (her skin, so to speak), and which is hence unambiguously prohibited in the Prātimokṣa-sūtra as well as in one of the earliest Jaina sources\(^{304}\).

\(^{296}\) MN II 51; Sa. version: T vol. 1, 501b11ff, esp. 502a5f (MĀ.).

\(^{297}\) Acc. to the Sa. version (see n. 296), the potter fulfils all the ten main moral precepts and also all the minor moral precepts for monks.

\(^{298}\) E.g., Vaṭṭakera, Mūlācāra V.124f (Okuda 1975, 63 and 130), prescribing that excrements, urine, phlegm and snot should be got rid of [only] at an inanimate spot of the ground, i.e. where the earth has been made [lifeless] by forest conflagration, agriculture or crushing to powder. Cp. also Āyār II.1.1.2 (JĀS ed., p. 104,8f), where it is stated that \textit{r e m n a n t s o f f o o d} should be deposited on a burnt (i.e. lifeless) spot of the ground, etc.; cp. Dasav 5.1.81. As for excrements considered to be a “weapon” against (i.e. to injure) the earth-beings, see ĀyārN 95 (p. 22).

\(^{299}\) Āyār II.10.8 (JĀS ed. § 653).

\(^{300}\) Vaṭṭakera, Mūlācāra 1.11 and 5.107-109 (Okuda 1975, 59 and 125).

\(^{301}\) Āyār II.3.1.7 (JĀS § 470): \textit{se bhikkhā ... gāmānugāman dājjamaṅge, antarā se ... udae vā m a t t i yā vā a v i d d h a t t hā, ... no ujjuyan gacchejjā ...}; cp. Dasav 5.1.3 (\textit{... care vajjanto ... daga- m a t t i y a m} ).

\(^{302}\) For regulations concerning deposition of food remnants and excrements, etc., in early Buddhism see §§ 11.1-11.4.


\(^{304}\) See n. 272.
16.1 As for water, there is no rule similar to that prohibiting monks from digging the earth and explicitly connected, by the Suttavibhaṅga, with the belief in the sentience of the elements. As mentioned in § 11.2, the rule not to pollute water with remnants of food or excrements, etc., is already there in the Prātimokṣasūtra, in the case of monks and, except for the Mahāsāṅghikas, also in the case of nuns, grouped with the rules of mere decorum (sekhya-dhamma, saīkṣa-dharma); hence, such pollution was obviously not understood any longer as an act of injuring water itself as a living being, even though such an idea would seem to have been, originally, part of the conceptual background from which the standard of decorum underlying the rule derived (cp. § 11.4).

16.2 There are some more Prātimokṣa rules which have to do with water. One of them declares, exceptions apart, bathing more than once in a fortnight,\(^{305}\) another one sporting or splashing in the water,\(^{306}\) to be a pācittiya offence. In Jainism, bathing (except in case of illness),\(^{307}\) and, a fortiori, water-splashing,\(^{308}\) is entirely prohibited, and one of the reasons may be not to injure water.\(^{309}\) But at the same time, refraining from bathing or at least bathing as rarely as possible is, like fasting or at least restricting food to one meal a day, an element of a scenic practice, showing detachment from one’s body and from external comfort; and the same would be true of wanton sporting in water, quite apart from the fact that it does not fit in with the sedate demeanour expected of an ascetic. In the case of Buddhism, there is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, good reason to assume that these rules were motivated by nothing but this.\(^{310}\)

\(^{305}\) Pāc. 57 (Vin IV 117): *yo pana bhikkhu oren’ aḍḍhamāsam naḥāyeyya, pācittiyaṃ*, followed by enlarged formulas making allowance for special situations. There is no need, in this and most of the following cases, to refer to the versions of other schools.

\(^{306}\) Pāc. 53 (Vin IV 112): *udake hāsadhamme pā*

\(^{307}\) E.g., Dasav 3.2; 4.26; 6.61-64; Āyārś p. 43,24f.


\(^{309}\) Alsdorf 1961, 570f. Williams 1983, 129. Cp. Āyārś p. 3,23 (… vibhūsāe … satthehim viuṭtanti), where "adorning oneself" may, first of all, mean bathing; more explicit: ĀyārN 111f (p. 28,3ff). — For the idea that bathing and esp. water-splashing may injure tiny a n i m a l s living in the water cp. Dasav 6.62 and, implicitly, 6.31; cp. also Williams, loc. cit. Also in the Chinese translation of the Mū. version of the Vinayavibhaṅga on the Prātimokṣa rule prohibiting sporting in water, the playful, uncaring behaviour of the monks is said to have included striking water-frogs, hence injuring a n i m a l s (T vol. 23, 849a17, but not confirmed by Vin.Mū., (ñe 239b6f)).

\(^{310}\) Cp. the first introductory story to the rule not to bathe more often than necessary in Vin.Mī. (T vol. 22, 65c29-66a4). But as a second introductory story in Vin.Mī. as well as in all other versions we find the rather implausible (Schlingloff 1963, 539) motivation by the story that by using the private
16.3 Of considerable importance in connection with the question of the sentience of water in earliest Buddhism are two other Prātimokṣa rules, stating that sprinkling water containing tiny animate beings (i.e. small animals) (sappāṇakam udakam) on grass or clay \footnote{311} as well as drinking such water\footnote{312} is a pācittiya offence. The motive for these two rules is clearly to abstain from injuring living beings (or to come up to what society expected, in this regard, from ascetics). But the restriction of water not to be poured out or drunk to water containing tiny animals makes it perfectly clear that the living beings injuring which constitutes the offence (both ethically and in the eyes of people) are the tiny animals, not water itself. Drinking of water such, provided that it is free from tiny animals, is no offence.\footnote{313} The monks are even allowed to drink water without having received it from a lay person,\footnote{314} in contrast to fruits or other vegetable food which, 

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{311}{Pāc. 20 (Vin IV 49): yo pana bhikkhu jānam sappāṇakam udakam tinam vā mātikam vā sīhceya vā sīhçepeya vā, pā°; Prāt.Mā.Lok. (p. 20, No. 19): yo puna bhiksur jānam sappāṇakenodakena (text "pramāṇa", but see Pachow/Mishra 1956, 23) tinam vā mṛttikām vā sīhceya vā sīhçepeya vā, pā°; Prāt.Sa. (v. Simson 1986, pp. 124 and 177): yah punar bhiksur jānam sappāṇakenodakena tinam vā mṛttikām vā sīhceya vā sīhçepeya vā, pā°; some ms. (pp. 49, 108 and 256) seem to omit vā mṛttikām vā sīhceya vā sīhçepeya vā, pā°; the first ms. has a gap and seems to read sim/campayed, "pa"° being added below the line.}
\footnotetext{312}{Pāc. 62 (Vin IV 125): yo pana bhikkhu jānam sappāṇakam udakam paribhujñeyya, pā°. Other versions practically identical. Cp. also the prescription to carry a strainer (parissāvana) while travelling (Vin II 118f; T vol. 22, 173a21ff; 954b10ff; vol. 23, 273a32ff; vol. 24, 224c24ff; cp. also vol. 22, 373a23f). — Similar rules for Brahmanical renouncers: Manu 6.46; cp. Baudhāyanadharmaśūtra 2.6.11.24 (H.-P. Schmidt, op. cit. [see n. 308], ch. II.5).}
\footnotetext{313}{Cp. Vin IV 125: appāṇake appāṇaka-sāthi, anāpatti, i.e. if the water is free from animals and the monk knows it to be so, no offence. [Of course, if it is free but he thinks it is not and still drinks it, this is problematic (dukkata according to the Suttavinibhanga) since his intention is wrong.] — As for drinking cold = unboiled water, see also Mīl 259.5ff, where non-Buddhists (doubtless Jaina ascetics) object to the Buddhist practice by asserting (just as "people" do in the Vinayavinibhanga with reference to plants and earth) that drinking unboiled water means injuring a living being with one sense-faculty (ekindriya jīva). In this case, however, the Buddhist reaction is to present a set of arguments refuting the sentience of water (see § 38.3).}
\footnotetext{314}{Pāc. 40 (Vin IV 90): yo pana bhikkhu adinnam mukhadvāram āhāram āhareyya a h a t r a u d a k a -dantapoṇa, pā°; Prāt.Mā.Lok. (p. 22, No. 35): yo puna bhiksur adinnam apratigrāhitam mukhadvārikam āhāram āhareyya anyatrodakadantapoṇe, pā°; Prāt.Sa. (v. Simson 1986, pp. 7: 10; 167; 258; 277): yah punar bhiksur aparigrāhitam āhāram mukhadvārenāhared (p. 7: "ābhyavahared anyatrodakadantakāṭhābhyām. pā°; Prāt.Mū. (Lokesh Chandra 1960, 3; GBM(FacEd) II p. 78, fol.}
as stated above (§ 12.3), may be eaten by them only when received from a lay person who has rendered them "suitable" for ascetics. By Jaina monks, on the other hand, water, too, may not be consumed unless a lay person has rendered it "suitable" by boiling, drinking cold (i.e. unboiled) water being strictly prohibited.315 The fact that, in contrast to this, the Prātimokṣaśra has no objection at all to drinking fresh water as such clearly shows that already in earliest Buddhism, in contradistinction to Jainism,316 the sentience of water has, to say the least, become more or less irrelevant.

16.4  This seems to be confirmed by a passage from the Suttapiṭaka, where in the context of describing his earlier, futile attempts at severe asceticism, the Buddha also mentions extreme mindfulness in walking, aiming at not killing (saṅghātām āpāde-sī(m))317 any tiny animate beings (khuddake pāne) in uneven spots,318 to the extent of having pity even with a drop of water.319 This passage does not expressly deny the drop of water sentience, nor does it necessarily imply such a denial. But what it does imply is that from the Buddhist point of view the sentience of water is, or would be, a matter to be ignored in practical life, even in that of an ascetic.

17.1  There is also a Prātimokṣa rule concerning fire, prohibiting monks from kindling fire in order to warm themselves (except in case of illness or for some other strong reason).320 As D. Schlingloff321 has rightly pointed out, the original

143. 1. if): yah punar bhikṣur adattaṁ mukhābhyaḥavāḥyam āhāram āhared anyatrodakadantakāśṭhāt, pā°.

315  Dasav 8.6; 10.2; 3.6; Schubring 1935, 173; Alsdorf 1961, 571.

316  According to Bhatt 1989, 136 and 138, in the oldest source, viz. Āyār I.1, water is not yet conceived of as a living being. But though agreeing with his reserves in the case of fire (see § 17.2 and n. 338), my impression is that as regards water and earth his arguments need reconsideration.

317  Cp. n. 140.

318  Or: in his way, across his path? Cp. AN V 33, stating that a lion roars thrice before going forth for his hunt, thinking māham khuddake pāne visamagute saṅghātām āpādesīṃ ti.

319  MN I 78 (.... yāva udakabindumhi pi me dayā paccupāṭhitā hoti — "māham khuddake pāne visamagute saṅghātām āpādesīṃ" ti). Cp. SHT V, Kat.-Nr. 1102 R2ff. Cp. also MN I 377, where the reference to the water drop is, however, missing. Jainna monks and nuns are expressly enjoined to be careful not to injure even water while walking; cp., e.g., Āyār II.3.1.7 (see n. 301: uḍaie); Dasav 5.1.3 (see ibid.: daga°). Cp. also Dasav 8.13 (dvāhihīrī bhūṣu) + 15 (śīneha "moisture") and, as regards ahiṁsā with regard to drops of water, Kapp 5.12 and Āyār II.1.1.1 (JĀS ed., p. 103,10f: sīvadāṣa vā osittan).

320  Pāli: Pāc. 56 (Vin IV 115f): yo pana bhikkhu (agilōṇo) visibbanāpekkho jotiṃ samādaheyya vā samādahāpeyya vā (aññatra tathāgipapaccayā), pā°; Upālipariprcchā: T vol. 24, 907b4 (Stache-
motive is probably not, as is — once again — suggested by the introductory story of the Suttavibhanga, human interests (e.g. the apprehension that the monks might be bitten by poisonous animals, like snakes, disturbed by the fire, or even that they might cause damage or disturb others by becoming nervous on that account). Schlingloff suggests, instead, that the original motive — of which the fleeing snake may still be a last trace — was that by kindling fire one easily endangers small, living in the dry grass or wood used as fuel or insects flying into the fire (or at least — so I should add — that people mind ascetics performing such a potentially though unintentionally harmful act). However, the words "in order to warm themselves" would rather seem to point to an ascetic motive, viz. to the fact that people expected ascetics to endure bodily hardship like cold. On the other hand, in a few versions of the rule there is either no such restriction, or the restricted formulation is introduced as having supplanted an earlier, unrestricted one. Such an unrestricted formulation of the rule not to kindle a fire is also

Rosen 1984, 79); Mi.: see n. 328; Mā.: see ns. 327 and 328; Mā.Lok.: Prāt.Mā.Lok. p. 23, No. 41: yo puna bhikṣur āṁraṭhāya ... jyotisminā vitāpanāprekṣo ṭiṁam vā kāṣṭham vā ... ādaheya vā ādahepeya vā ... pā; Dh.: T vol. 22, 675b11f, 15f and 19-21; 1027b5f; Sa.: Prāt.Sā. (v. Simson pp. 14, 125 and 168): yah punar bhikṣur ... vitapanāprekṣi abhyavakāśe (see p. 247) jyotisā samindhyāt samedhayed vā ... pā; on p. 247 we find //kāsē jyotisah āṁrath//, which indicates a different version; T vol. 23, 104c15-17 (Vin.Sā.); 475b1f (Prāt.Sā.); Inoguchi 1981, 197, Nos. 240-241 (Prāt.Sā.); for T 1464 see n. 327; Mū.: Prāt.Mū. (Lokesh Chandra 1960, 5): yah pu < nar bhikṣur āṁratham aglāne vitapana > prekṣī jyotisā samavadadhyāt samavadadhāpayed vā, pā; Prāt.Mū., che 12a5f = Vin.Mū., ne 188b1 (yah dge sloṅ gnyan mi na bar bdag tīd kyi phyir me la reg gam/ reg tu 'jug na, ... ) and Prāt.Mū., (T vol. 24, 505a15f = T 23, 837c15f: ... 無病爲身若自然火 ...) confirm *āṁratham and *aglāno but not < vitapana > prekṣī ("pre" is damaged in the ms.); Kā.: see n. 327.

331 Schlingloff 1963, 539.


333 Vin IV 115; T vol. 22, 64b14ff (Vin.Mī.); 364c12ff (Vin.Mā.); vol. 24, 887c29ff (Sa.?).

334 T vol. 22, 675a17ff, esp. 27f (Vin.Dh.).

335 T vol. 23, 104b29ff, esp. 66ff (Vin. Sa.; cp. Rosen 1959, 177; cp. also T vol. 24, 888a1); vol. 23, 835c10ff (Vin.Mū.).

336 See n. 321.

337 T vol. 24, 663a7 (Prāt.Kā.); 888a2-4 (T 1464 (Sa.?).) T vol. 22, 365a7-9 (Vin.Mā.) and at least the Tibetan and Chinese versions of Prāt.Mū. (see n. 320) have "for himself" (cp. Prāt.Mā.Lok. āṁrathāya: see n. 320) in spite of "in order to warm himself".

338 T vol. 22, 64b25 [Vin.Mī.] (beside c13f); 364c23 [Vin.Mā.] (beside 365a7-9, for which see n. 327).
found in the Skandhaka;\textsuperscript{330} and in the Sarvāstivāda version\textsuperscript{331} of this unrestricted rule in the Skandhaka the ahimsā motive is expressly confirmed, the prohibition being motivated by an introductory story relating that a monk who had set fire to grass and trees had killed, thereby, many insects. In the Mahāsāṃghika version of this passage,\textsuperscript{332} we even find the prohibition to kindle a fire motivated by the protest of people who regard burning the earth as an act of killing or injuring a living being with one sense-faculty (*ekendriya)\textsuperscript{333}.

17.2 There is, however, no way to deduce, from the rule not to kindle a fire, any evidence in favour of a belief in the sentience of fire itself.\textsuperscript{335} On the contrary, in this case one would expect the rule to prohibit monks not so much from kindling as from extinguishing fire,\textsuperscript{336} as some Jaina texts actually do.\textsuperscript{337} But even in the early Jaina sources there are passages where — in the context

\textsuperscript{329} I.e., not restricted by the qualification "in order to warm himself".

\textsuperscript{330} Corresponding to Vin II 138, prohibiting monks from setting fire to a forest (except counter-fire in case of emergency). Here, the reason adduced is that people (manussā) object to it as being like the behaviour of "forest-conflagrators" (dava-dāhaka: slash-and-burn tribes??). It is, however, not clear whether this refers merely to undignified comportment or (also) to the fact that setting fire to a forest, even when not a conscious and intentional act of injuring and hence only dukkata, still in fact endangers the animals living there. At T vol. 24, 232c18ff (Vin.Mū.), the reason for the prohibition is clearly indecorous behaviour only, some monks having set fire to a forest in order to frighten and ridicule others who had been meditating there.

\textsuperscript{331} T vol. 23, 274b10-13. Cp. the parallel passage in Vin.Dh. (960a7ff), where the motive for the prohibition is, however, that people are irritated at the monk’s setting fire to grass (which then spreads to the king’s deer-park) as an act of destroying the life of sentient beings. — Cp. also Asoka, PE V.E-F (tuṣe sajīve no jhāpayitaviye; dāve anāthaṇye va vihīsāye va no jhāpayitaviye), addressing, of course, primarily lay people.

\textsuperscript{332} T vol. 22, 495a1ff.

\textsuperscript{333} Provided that the expression 擊傷?? (T vol. 22, 495a4) corresponds to the Pāli phrase ēkandriyam jīvam vi-ḥeth- (see §§ 5.4, 8, 9.1 and 15.2).

\textsuperscript{334} Accordingly, in this version the rule merely prohibits monks from kindling fire on an unhurt spot (T vol. 22, 495a6 and 10).

\textsuperscript{335} To be distinguished from the concept of fire deities (*agnī-devatā), as in the Mī. version of the Skandhaka passage on kindling a fire or setting fire to a forest (see § 17.1 and ns. 330-332) where a fire deity is ordered by the Buddha to extinguish a bush fire threatening to burn the monks' hermitage (T vol. 22, 175c19ff).

\textsuperscript{336} Thus actually T vol. 23, 837c22 (Vin.Mū.), though surely not implying sentience of fire (cp. Vin.Mū., ūṇ 188b5).

\textsuperscript{337} E.g., Dasav 8.8 (... agaṇīḥ ... no ... nivvāvae munīḥ), in a context where it is expressly stated
of an otherwise comprehensive treatment of *ahimsā* — it is only kindling or application of fire that is prohibited because it is dangerous for other living beings.\(^{338}\) without any evidence for fire itself being regarded as sentient. Hence, even in Jainism the sentence of fire does not seem to have been, from the outset, a matter of general recognition.

18 To sum up, it seems that among the elements it is only earth with regard to which monks and nuns have to behave in a way which appears to be based, as in the case of plants and seeds, on the belief that earth is by itself a kind of living, sentient being (or aggregate of such beings). But the source material investigated so far does not allow to decide, in the case of earth no more than in the case of seeds and plants, whether this belief was, as the Suttavibhaṅga puts it, only the belief of "people" which the Buddhist monks and nuns were enjoined to take into account in their behaviour, or whether it was, in the earliest period, still shared by the Buddhist monks and nuns themselves, or had at least not yet been abandoned by them on a conscious or theoretical level. As for earth, I cannot so far present any additional evidence. But as far as plants are concerned, the *Sutta Pitaka* contains some interesting passages to be discussed in the following chapter (IV).

\(^{338}\) Āyārs p. 4,6ff (cp. also Āyārs p. 58, and Bhatt 1989, 136); Dasav 6.33-36; 10.2ed.
IV. Further Suttapiṭaka Material

19.1 Among the materials from the Suttapiṭaka the Kūta danta Sermon is of special interest because it is not concerned with monks' morals but with that of a layman. In this sermon, the sacrifice of a great king of the past is described. This sacrifice is characterized as superior to the traditional ones because the only offerings were things like butter, curds and molasses, but no cows, goats, sheep, etc., were killed (haṃṃīsu) [as sacrificial victims], no animate beings (pañā) suffered death (saṅghātaṃ āpajjīmśu), no trees were felled (chijjīmśu) for being used as sacrificial posts, and no darbha grass was cut (lūīṃsū) to strew it over the sacrificial ground. This clearly presupposes that felling trees and cutting grass are acts of himsā, of injuring or killing, and that plants, too, are living beings.

19.2 However, in this case one might argue that the text, dealing with the pre-Buddhist past, presupposes not the — in a sense "modern" — Buddhist point of view but rather the older, Vedic belief. Besides, one might argue that the divergence of the Buddhist view from this older belief is signalized by the fact that the text uses the word 'pañā', i.e., "animate beings", only with regard to animals (either summing up or supplementing the preceding statement), and hence virtually excludes plants from this category. On the other hand, as pointed out above (§ 6.2.2) the use of 'pañā' for animals only, or animals and men, is not specifically Buddhist; and although this use (as well as the use of different verbs for killing/destroying) may, to be sure, indicate an awareness of some difference between plants and animals, it does not necessarily imply an exclusion of plants from the realm of living or sentient beings.

20.1 On the other hand, 'pañā' is, both in Buddhist and Jaina sources, also used in a way which suggests comprehensiveness, e.g. in phrases like "a ll sattas, pāṇas, bhūtās" (Buddhist) or "a ll pāṇas, bhūtas, jīvas, sattas" (Jaina). There is no reason to accept the differentiating interpretation of later

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339 DN I 141. The corresponding passage in the Chinese Dīghāgama (T vol. 1, 100b5ff) lacks the reference to trees and plants, stating only that no cows and sheep nor any other sentient beings were killed, the only offerings being butter, etc.

340 Viz. haṃṃīsu and saṅghātaṃ āpajjīmśu in the case of animals but chijjīmśu and lūīṃsū in the case of plants. Cp. also § 6.2.2 (end) and n. 119, and the fact that ŠB 11.1.2.1 uses han in connection with both animals and plants and grains.

341 E.g. Vin II 110 = AN II 73: sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā. Cp. n. 7!

342 E.g., Āyār p. 5, 6: savvesim pāṇānam, savvesim bhūyānam, savvesim jīvānam, savvesim sattānām; Sōy II.7.13 and 15 (JĀS ed. §§ 852 and 854). Cp. also MN I 407 and DN I 53: sabbe sattā sabbe pāṇā sabbe bhūtā sabbe jīvā (in the description of Ažīvika doctrines; the Mū. version has omitted 'jīvā' even in this context: Vin.Mu., ce 241b3; che 236b7; ke 24b6 [cp. Vogel 1970,12 and 24; H. Eimer, Rab tu 'byun ba'i gzi, Wiesbaden 1983, pt. 2, 63]; T vol. 23, 1025a27f [at T vol. 23,
commentators. It is much more probable that originally in these phrases the terms are used as quasi-synonyms, with a tendency towards co-extensiveness, or at least no stress on specific delimitations. This would mean that for the Jainas in such a context 'pāṇa' would tend to include even the element-beings, and at any rate plants (and seeds). However, the crucial question for the problem under discussion is whether there are any materials proving or at least indicating that in earliest Buddhism, too, such comprehensive formulas may include even plants, and, what is more, that even the unambiguous term 'pāṇa' may comprise them. Actually, the Suttapiṭaka does contain some passages using 'pāṇa' in a broader sense which are of greater importance in this connection.

20.2 Especially in old verse texts, but occasionally also in prose suttas, we find references to the mobile (tasa) and stationary (thāvara), or to the mobile and stationary beings (bhūta). The context is always that a

693a2f, there are only two terms, and the Skt. at Saṅghabhūta II 222,7 has only sarve bhūtāḥ).

343 E.g., ĀyārViv 47,33ff (ad Āyār p. 5,6f); Ps III 120 (ad MN I 407); Sv I 161 (ad DN I 53). Cp. Schubring 1935, 133; Vogel 1970, 24 n. 25.

344 Cp. Dasav 6.10-11, where 'pāṇa' and 'jīva' are obviously used coextensively (jāvanī loe p ā ṇ ā ..., te ... na haṇe ...; savva-j i vā vi icchani jīvīṃ ...; tathā p ā ṇ a-vahāṃ ... vajjayaṃti ...).


346 SN IV 351 (see n. 347, d); SN V 393 (see ib., g); SHT V Kat.-Nr. 1103 (see ib., g).

347 g) Sn 967: mettāya phasse tasa-thāvarāni; h) SN I 141: nikkhitthanan-do tasa-thāvaresu; line seems to be missing in SĀ (T vol. 2, 27c); g) SN IV 117: kodhābhihūtā puthu-attaṇḍā virājhamāṇā tasa-thāvaresu (Nāl.-ed.: virājjanāṃ satanāāhānesu); line seems to be missing in SĀ (T vol. 2, 63c); g) SN IV 351 (after mettā-bhāvanā): so (sc. ariyasāvaka) iti pātisamikkhātī ... na kīcchā viyābādhēmi tasāṃ vā thāvarām vā; cp. T vol. 1, 447b20f (MĀ [Sa.]): 我不犯世姿與不怖，常當悲愍一切世間; g) SN V 393 (so (sc. ariyasāvaka) evam pājānāti: avyāpajjhaparam (v.l. "bajjha") khvāhām deve suṇāmi; na ca kho panāham kīcchā viyābādhe mi tasāṃ vā thāvarām vā; cp. T vol. 2, 216b14f and 227f (SĀ, [Mū.]): 我 ... 於（於）世間若怖若安，不起憲志; f) MN II 105 = Th 876: na hi jātu so māmām himse aṁhaṃ vā pana kaṭṭīnaṃ, ... rakkheyya tasathāvare; g) SHT V, Kat.-Nr. 1103 R2+4: avyāvadīdhyārāmā viharataḥ (read "ta") ("delight always in [the attitude of] not doing harm!") ... < / > ... anena ... cil (restore to na kim/kaṭṭī?) loke vyāpādayisyathā trasāṃ vā thāverāṃ vā.

348 Sn 394 (see n. 428); Sn 629 = Dhp 405 (see n. 357, also for parallels). Needless to say that 'bhūta' is used in these passages in a wider sense than at Pāc. 11.

349 For an exception in a different genre see Jā V 221,7f (gāthā 527,91), where a person states that he is ready to accept (paccupadissāmi; 225,15f: = sangāṭhīchissāmi all suffering, etc., just as the earth [accepts, or endures, everything] from the mobile and stationary (pathāvī yathā thāvarānām
Buddhist — not only a monk but according to some passages also a pious layman — should not kill or injure or oppress, but should rather protect them and suffuse them with friendship and benevolence (mettā).

20.3 It would seem that at least oppressing and suffusing with benevolence do not make sense except with regard to living, nay sentient beings, and that hence both the mobile and the stationary beings must be living, sentient beings. But Prajñāvarman, in his commentary on one of the verses concerned, takes only the mobile beings to be the living beings, whereas the stationary beings are for him insentient things (*acetanā). And he adds a quotation according to which one should not harbour injurious thoughts even towards a burnt stump of a

\[\text{tasānam}; \text{ for the gen. — unless elliptic — cp. v. Hinüber 1968, § 262).}\]

350 Sn 967 (cp. Sn 964b and 975b: bhikkhu); Sn I 141 (cp. the 2nd and the 5th verse: bhikkhu); Sn 704 (cp. 703d: muni); SHT V, Kat.-Nr. 1103 (see n. 347) (instruction to monks, cp. R1: bhiksavo).

351 Sn 394 (see 393a: g a h a t h a -vattam pana vo vadāmi); at Sn IV 351 (see n. 347), the person to whom spiritual advise is given is a layman (viz. a gāmāni); cp. also IV 350 kāmesu micchācāraṃ pahāya (not abrahmacariyam, as in the case of monks).

352 Sn 394 (na hane, etc.: see n. 428); 629 (nidhāya daṇḍam, na hanti: see n. 357), Sn I 141 (nikkhiṭṭadaṇḍo: see n. 347); Sn IV 117 (virajjamānaṃ [reproved behaviour]: see n. 347).

353 Sn IV 351 and V 393 (vyābādhemi: see n. 347).

354 MN II 105 = Th 876 (see n. 347).

355 Sn 967 (see n. 347); 146f (see n. 362). Cp. also SN IV 351 (see n. 347).

356 Cp. Wezler 1986, 455 ("hiṃsā, taken to mean injury done to a living being ..." [spacing mine]); cp. also ib. 464. Cp. also Paramathamaṇṭīṣa on VisM IX.7, stating that mettā- or karunā-bhāvanā do not succeed if a d e a d person is taken as their object, because such a person cannot be procured well-being (na hi mata-puggalo hitūpasanārāhavo) nor be freed from suffering.

357 Viz. Uv, 33.47: 'gro ba dañ ni gnas pa yī/ 'byuḥ po chad pas mi gcod cih/ /gsod med (v.l. byed) gsod du mi 'jug de/ /bram ze yin par has gsuṅs so//. The Central Asian Skt. version reads (Uv 33.36): nikhīptadandaṃ bhūṭeṣu traseṣu sthāvareṣu ca/ yo na hanti hi bhūtāṃ bravīmi brāhmaṇam hi tam//. Cp. also Dh 405 = Sn 629 (nidhāya daṇḍam bhūṭesu tasesu thāvareṣu ca/ yo na hanti na ghāteti, tam aham brāmi brāhmaṇam?!) and Gandhārī Dharmapada (ed. Brough) I.18 (similar). Acc. to M. Balk, Untersuchungen zum Udānavarga, diss. Bonn 1988, 487, the Skt. on which Uv, is based read nidhāya in pāda a, and in pāda c, like Bernhard's old ms. NF, na hiṃsayati na ghātayati (though gsod is more likely to correspond to han than to hims).

358 UvViv II, 1020,18: gañ la že na / 'gro ba dañ (= traseṣu) žes bya ba smos te </> srog dahn bcas pa dag la'o // gnas pa'i (= sthāvareṣu) žes bya ba ni sems med pa'o //.
tree, let alone embodied beings endowed with mind (*savijñānaka-dehin). To be sure, this interpretation fits in quite well with the fact that in Buddhism malevolent thoughts are evil, it is true, because they may lead to injuring others, but no less because of their negative spiritual effect on the very person who nourishes feelings of hatred — poisoning his heart, so to speak —, and under this aspect it does not matter much whether the object of malevolent thoughts is sentient or insentient. Nevertheless, Prajñāvarman’s interpretation, though reasonable if the verse commented upon by him is seen in isolation, is not acceptable. For in the Pāli tradition, the mobile and stationary beings are, in similar contexts, occasionally expressly called “animate beings” (pāṇabhūta) or pāṇabhūta). Hence, not only the mobile but also the stationary beings must be understood as living, hence probably sentient beings. This is in fact supported by the commentators of the Pāli tradition, who take the tasa and thāvara to comprise all sentient beings (satta), and this is corroborated even by one of the occurrences in the Sanskrit tradition.

20.4 But then the problem arises how to characterize these two classes of animate beings, especially the stationary ones.

20.4.1 According to the Pāli commentaries, the tasa are those animate beings who are still under the sway of Thirst or Desire (tasinā, tanhā) and of fear (bhayabherava), i.e., ordinary beings, whereas the thāvara, the stationary ones, are those who are free from thirst and fear, i.e., the sainsts. This means that ‘tasa’ is either

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359 UvViv II, 1020,21ff: ji skad du / sdoñ dum tshig pa la yah sens kyis gnod par mi bya na rnam par sès pa dañ ldan pa’ti lus can la lta smos kyi ci dgos sès gsuhs pa lta bu’o //.

360 Cp., in this connection, MPSMah 460a15ff, expressing the idea that mowing grass or felling trees with an evil or hateful mind leads to hell because of the hatred involved, even though mowing grass or felling trees by itself is not bad karma (460b18f).

361 Sn 704: aviruddho asāratto pāñese tasathāvare; on the basis of this line, there is good reason to assume that in Sn 394 (see n. 428), too, the stationary and mobile beings (bhūta) of pādas cd may not have been felt to be different from the pāna in pāda a.

362 Sn 146f: ye keci pāñabhūt’ atti tasā vā thāvārā v’ anavasesā, ... sabbe te bhavantu sukhīnattā. On pāñabhūtpāñabhūta, to be derived from Skt. prāṇabhṛt, see K. R. Norman, Pāli Lexicographical Studies IV, in: Journal of the Pāli Text Society 11 (1987), 39f [When presenting my lecture in Kyoto, I had overlooked this article; it was kindly pointed out to me by F. Enomoto].

363 Th-a III 61 (ad Th 876): tasathāvare ti sabb’ eva satte.

364 Upasenasātra (E. Waldschmidt, Von Ceylon bis Turfan, Göttingen 1967, 342) v. 26cd: sarvasasateṣu me maitri ye trasāh sthāvarāḥ ca ye/ (Bower-ms.: ... ye satvā trasasthāvarāḥ jaṃgamā/); T vol. 2, 61b5 (SĀ,: ... 有畏及無畏 (with v.i.; text: 量 instead of 畏).

365 E.g., Nidd I 488; Nidd II 221; Th-a ad Th 876; Ps III 341 (ad MN II 105); Spk I 207 (ad SN
derived from the root trṣ "to be thirsty" or from tras in the sense of "to tremble with fear", taken in a metaphorical sense, and that 'ṭhavara' is also taken in a metaphorical sense, namely that of spiritual and emotional stability, and referred to human beings.

20.4.2 However, in a historical perspective I cannot help having problems with this interpretation of the expression "tasa and thāvara animate beings". For, this expression is quite frequent in Jaina sources, where it can hardly mean anything but "mobile and stationary animate beings" in a literal sense. As the term "mobile animate beings" occurs frequently in contexts where it definitely means, primarily, the animals -- including the tiniest ones -- in contrast to elements and plants, the term "stationary animate beings" (ṭhāvarā pāṇā) cannot but refer to non-animal life, i.e., perhaps, the elements, especially earth and water, but certainly and primarily to (seeds and) plants. The dichotomy

I 141) and II 398 (ad IV 117). Cp. also the reading of the Nāl.-ed. at SN IV 117 (see n. 347) which has cleared arisen under the influence of commentarial exegesis.

Cp. also the Chinese renderings of t(r)asa and s(th)āvara as "afraid and not afraid" (MĀ, 447b21: see n. 347; SĀ, 61b5: see n. 364) and "afraid and at ease" (SĀ, 216b15 and c25: see n. 347). Cp. also the Ch. rendering of Uv 33.36b (see n. 357) in T vol. 4, 772a27 and 798c15 ("causing [them] not to be afraid"); the commentary at 772b1 even shows the opposition "having fear" and "living in peace".

T vol. 4, 772a27 actually translates bhūta at Uv 33.36a (see n. 357) by "men" (ए), but 798c15 has "sentient beings" (有情).

E.g., Dasav 5.1.5 (ḥimsejja pāṇabhāyāim tase aduva thāvare); 6.10 (jāvanti loe pāṇā tasā aduva thāvarā, te ... na haqe ...); 6.24 (sant' ime suhumā pāṇā tasā aduva thāvarā); Utt 5.8b and 19.89d; Sūy I.1.4.8; I.5.1.4ab ( ... tase pāṇiṇo thāvare ya jye hiṃsati ...); I.6.4b; etc.

Cp., e.g., Jacobi's rendering at Utt 5.8b ("movable and immovable beings"), or Schubring's translation at Dasav 5.1.5 ("moving or immovable beings"). AyārViv 45,7 (ad AyārN 153) says trasanat sp a n d a n ā t trasāh. — At Ayār, 5.8f, the context suggests the nuance "getting frightened [very often]" (cp. Bhatt 1989, 137), but this would seem to be a secondary one. Both meanings at SūyViv 277,11 (ad Sūy II.7.11): bhaya-calanābhīyām upapetās trasā(h).

Since men, let alone heavenly beings and hell-beings, are not in the foreground of ahimsā contexts, the ascetic being mainly confronted with the problem to avoid killing animals, and especially tiny ones at that.

E.g. Dasav 4 (p. 5f, esp. 6.9ff); 8.2 (see n. 106; cp. also 8.12); Sūy I.7.1 (pudhavi ya aū agani ya vū tuṇa-rukkha-biyā ya tasā ya p a ṇ ā ṇ ā ); cp. also Sūy II.2.6 (JĀS § 696[1]), presupposing that the taśa pāṇā are usually killed because one wants their skin, flesh, blood, heart, bile, feathers, tail, horns, teeth, etc.

Cp. Schubring 1935, 96 and 143 (+ n. 5, pointing out disagreement concerning fire and wind;
(though not the terminology) goes back to Vedic times,\textsuperscript{374} and is common also in Hindu sources.\textsuperscript{375} And not only in Hindu\textsuperscript{376} but even in later Buddhist\textsuperscript{377} sources 'sthāvara' occurs in the sense of "plant". It is difficult to imagine that any listener at the time of earliest Buddhism would have understood the fairly common expression "tasa and thāvara" (or "tasa and thāvarā beings, or animate beings") in a different sense,\textsuperscript{378} and hence I for one do not find it probable that they were used differently without any explicit warning. It is much more probable that they were used in the same sense,\textsuperscript{379} and that it was only at a somewhat later date that the notion of stationary animate beings was found to be at variance with the Buddhist doctrine — consolidated in the meantime — that plants are not animate beings, and that therefore either this concept or even both were \textit{reinterpreted} in the commentaries.\textsuperscript{380} This was done in two entirely different ways by Prajñāvarman and by the

cp. also Śīlāṅka's explanation ad Sūy I 6.4 (SūyViv 96,32: \textit{thāvara} = earth, water, plants) against his comment on Sūy I 10.2 (SūyViv 126,10: \textit{tasa} restricted to beings with more than one sense-faculty, hence not comprising fire and wind), and his synthesizing remarks in his commentary on ĀyārN 153 (ĀyārViv 45,8).

\textsuperscript{373} Cp. Schubring 1935, 96 and 143. The \textit{thāvarā pānā} are unambiguously plants (in contrast to animals treated in the preceding paragraph: see n. 371) at Sūy II 2.7 (JĀŚ § 696[2]) where various kinds are enumerated. Cp. also Deleu 1970, p. 135.

\textsuperscript{374} Cp., e.g., RV 1.115.1d = AV 13.2.35d (\textit{jugatas tasthuṣaḥ ca}); RV 1.80.14 (\textit{sthā jagac ca}); 1.58.5 (\textit{sthātuḥ caratham bhayate ...}); 4.53.6 (\textit{jugataḥ sthātur ubhayasya}); cp. also Śvetāsvatara-Upaniṣad 3.18 (\textit{sthāvarasya carasya ca}). Bollée (1977, 126) refers to RV 1.72.6 \textit{paśuḥ ca sthāṁ caratham ca pāhi} (Geldner: "die Tiere und alles was steht und geh"; for the unusual pl. \textit{sthārṇ} see AiGr III, 204, and H. Oldenberg, \textit{Rgveda}, Textkritische und exegetische Noten, vol. 1 (Berlin 1909), 76). [Some of the passages were, some years ago, kindly communicated to me by Prof. A. Mette.]

\textsuperscript{375} In the Mahābhārata, even the terms 'trasa/sthāvara' themselves are found: 3.185.28 (\textit{trasānāṁ sthāvarānāṁ ca, yac cēhaṁ yac ca neṅgati}); 12.9.19 (gacchaṁ \textit{trasa-sthāvara-varjakah}); 13.26.24 (\textit{trasānāṁ sthāvarānāṁ ca ... bhayaṁ tyajet}). More frequent is the pair \textit{sthāvara/jaṅgama} (e.g. Manu I.41; MBh 14.94.18 (Alsdorf 1961, 595f: "Tiere und Pflanzen")), besides \textit{carācara} (e.g. Manu 5.44).

\textsuperscript{376} E.g. Manu I.46; PDhSzg p. 42,10f.

\textsuperscript{377} E.g., MHrd IX.139; TJv 361a3 (read \textit{britan pa}).

\textsuperscript{378} Cp. also the addition of \textit{jaṅgama} <\textit{h}> in the Bower ms. (see n. 364), which, exceeding the metre, is obviously a gloss on \textit{trasa} (miswritten as \textit{trāsa} in the ms.).


\textsuperscript{380} At Jā V 225,16f, this reinterpretation is even applied to Jā 221,8 (see n. 349) where it looks still more far-fetched than in the other contexts, the natural meaning being that the earth patiently
Pāli commentators: The former has (even though he does not specifically mention plants) basically preserved the original content of the expression "stationary beings" but denies their sentience, whereas the latter (as well as some Chinese translators) have kept the aspect of sentience but abandoned the original meaning of "stationary". It is, by the way, interesting that even among contemporary Asian Buddhists their reinterpretation has not remained undisputed, a Sri Lankan monk suggesting that the stationary animate beings are special oceanic animals like sea-anemones.

21.1 Anyway, there is yet another passage where plants are — I should say: unequivocally — included in the category "animate beings" (pāṇa): In Sn 600ff, a series of verses is introduced by the remark that what follows is an explication of how species of animate beings (pāṇa) are distinguished from one another, namely by specific biological characteristics (liṅgam jātimayaṃ), in contrast to the social (i.e. caste) distinctions established in human society (more precisely: in Brahmanical Indian society). The explication then starts with p l a n t s , which are quite obviously regarded as part of the animate beings (pāṇa), just like the animals treated subsequently.

21.2 The commentary wonders why the text starts with plants when it should, according to its introductory verse, explicate the distinctive marks of

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381 See n. 366.
382 Maithri Murthi 1986, 5 (slightly modified on the basis of additional oral information from M. Maithri Murthi).
383 = MN II 196.
384 Sn 600: tesam vo ahāṃ vyakkhissam ... jātivibhaṅgam pāṇānāṃ ... Sn 607ff. The main purport of the sutta is not, of course, to point out the different species of animate beings but to dispute the legitimacy of the artificial caste hierarchy based on birth and not on specific biological characteristics, and to advocate, instead, a moral "hierarchy" based on what a person does.
385 Sn 601: tiṇarukkhe pi jānātha; ... liṅgam jātimayaṃ tesam, aṅkha-m-aṅkha hi jātayo.
386 Sn 602-606.
388 Sn-a II 464: «... pāṇānāṃ jātivibhaṅge kathetabbe "tiṇarukkhe pi jānāthā" ti anupādiṇṇakānāṃ tāvā kathetum āraddho; tam kimattam» iti ce: upādiṇṇesu sukhaṁpanatham; anupādiṇṇesu hi jātibhede gahite upādiṇṇesu so pākaṭataro hoti. The term "appropriated" (upādiṇṇa) refers to "biological" appropriation of matter by mind, an act by which matter is constituted as the living body of a sentient being. Accordingly, "unappropriated" material phenomena (among which the text, as a matter of course, includes plants) are insentient.
animate beings, i.e., animals, and suggests that this is a propaedeutical device, facilitating instruction with regard to the animals. But this is surely not the natural way of understanding the situation. It is the understanding of one who presupposes the view that plants are definitely not animate beings, and who hence thinks that the text cannot by any means have intendend them to be included among the latter. The only natural, unbiased way of understanding the text is to accept that it does precisely this, namely, that it takes for granted that plants form a group among animate beings (pāṇa).

21.3 In the light of this passage, then, in all probability, the above-mentioned expression 'tasa-thāvarā pāṇa', too, was, also in earliest Buddhism, understood as "mobile and stationary animate beings", the stationary animate beings being the plants.
V. Evaluation of the Evidence

22.1 In order to evaluate the evidence adduced and discussed in the preceding chapters (II-IV), it may be useful to recapitulate the main results concerning plants:

22.1.1 In the Pāṭimokkhasutta (Pāc. 11) as well as in the Suttapiṭaka, monks (and nuns) are expressly enjoined to abstain from destroying or injuring (seeds and) plants (§§ 4.1-4.3).

22.1.2 The original introductory story to Pāc. 11 in the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga states that this rule is motivated by the fact that people would mind the monks destroying plants since they (i.e. the people) regard them as living beings (§ 5.4).

22.1.3 This seems to imply that the monks themselves did not share this belief, but we cannot be sure that this was the case from the outset since the Sutta- or Vinayavibhaṅga belongs to a somewhat later period than the Pāṭimokkhasutta itself (§ 5.5).

22.1.4 The investigation of further Vinaya materials (ch. III) does not carry beyond these results but it confirms them. Besides, it yields similar results with regard to earth, but shows that in the case of water the situation is different (practically no "water ahimsā", and no mention of people regarding water as a living being).

22.1.5 In the Kūṭadantsasutta the ideal religious activity of a pre-Buddhist king (a transformation of the Vedic ritual in terms of Buddhist ethical standards, so to speak) is stated to have dispensed not only with slaughtering animals but even with destroying plants (§ 19.1).

22.1.6 Yet, in this text as well as in Pāc. 11 and its Suttapiṭaka parallel (§ 22.1.1), plants are, in contrast to animals, not called "animate beings" (pāṇa), nor is any other word indicating life or sentience used. Besides, it should be noted that the expressions used in these passages to denote the act of destroying plants (chid/lū, pāṭavatā, samārambha) are different from those used, in the corresponding passages, for the killing of animals (and men) (cp. § 6.2.2, n. 119 and § 19.2 + n. 340), and are, in contrast to the latter, at least ambiguous as far as reference or non-reference to living beings is concerned (see §§ 6.1 and 7.1).

22.1.7 On the other hand, especially in old verse texts, a few passages mention, as the object of abstention from killing or injuring as well as of spiritual attitudes like benevolence, the mobile (t(r)asa) and stationary (s)thāvara animate beings (pāṇa) (§§ 20.2ff). According to the common understanding of the pair 'tasa'/-'thāvara' at that time, the stationary animate beings cannot but be the plants (§ 20.4.2). This is confirmed by another old verse text where the plants are in fact enumerated among the different species of animate beings (pāṇa) (§§ 21.1f).

22.2.1 In evaluating this evidence we should not lose sight of the fact that the passages including plants in the category of animate beings (pāṇa) are not many, and that they do so only de facto, as a matter of course, while there seems to be no passage expressly stating that plants are
living, sentient beings. It is also noteworthy that, in contrast to early Jaina texts, where — especially in passages where 'pāṇa' means (men, etc., and) animals only (see § 6.2.2) — the term 'jīva' for "living beings" is fairly common in a broader sense including plants and even the elements, in the canonical Buddhist sources the use of this term for "living beings" is restricted to passages where non-Buddhist views are reported (See n. 7).

22.2.2 However, as far as I can see there are, in the earlier parts of the canon,\textsuperscript{389} no passages either that expressly deny plants sentience.\textsuperscript{390} Even the Suttavibhāṅga and Khandhaka passages that seem to imply such a denial do not belong to the earliest period (see § 22.1.3). The same seems to be true of the schemes of the four yonis (see §§ 29.1.1f) and the five gatis (see § 29.2).

23 As long as the question of the historical authenticity and chronological stratification of the older parts of the canon remains controversial, the evidence concerning plants would seem to admit of different interpretations. But whichever one chooses, it seems that the evidence excludes the existence of a dogmatic denial of the sentience of plants in earliest Buddhism.

23.1 If one starts from the presupposition that the old verse collections, and particularly the Suttaniyāpāta, contain the oldest layer of the Suttapitāka materials, it would be reasonable to take the evidence gathered from these texts to be most likely to represent the view of earliest Buddhism. This would mean that originally Buddhism, too, regarded, as a matter of course, plants as living, animate beings (pāṇa). Destroying or injuring plants (and seeds), prohibited by Pāc. 11 and its Suttapitāka parallel as well as by some other Vinaya rules, would in this case originally have been a violation of the moral standard of an ascetic not only from the point of view of people but also from that of the Buddhist monks (and nuns) themselves. The problem one has to face in advocating this hypothesis is why and how such an originally positive attitude towards the sentience of plants was, later on, converted into its opposite.

23.2 On the other hand, one may presuppose that authentic information on the typical features of the earliest Buddhist doctrine has to be gathered, primarily, from the (oldest layers of the) prose suttas, and that archaic but divergent utterances in the old verse suttas may be borrowings or adaptations from a pre-Buddhist stock of ascetic

\textsuperscript{389} I.e., in this connection, the four Nikāyas/Āgamas and the earlier verse collections, viz. Sn, Dhp, Ud, It and (probably) Th/Thî, and of course the Prātimokṣasūtra and, with the reserves stated in §§ 22.1.3 and 5.5, the Vinayavibhāṅga and the Khandhaka/Skandhaka.

\textsuperscript{390} A passage like T vol. 22, 339a13 [Vi.Mā.] (see n. 92) does not really constitute an exception since it has no parallel in the other versions of the Vinayavibhāṅga and since some of the Vinayavibhāṅgas, among them Vin.Mā., contain materials which, if compared with the Pāli tradition, represent, roughly speaking, a stage of development half-way between the Suttavibhāṅga and Buddhaghosa’s Sp.
poetry or even from the traditions of non-Buddhist (or originally non-Buddhist)\footnote{Cp. T. Vetter, Some remarks on the older parts of the Suttanipāta, in: Seyfort Ruegg and Schmithausen 1990, 42f and 50-52.} groups. One may, furthermore, assume that a positive view not only in the Vinaya materials but also in the prose suttas with regard to the sentience of plants is precluded by the fact that they consistently\footnote{The two prose passages mentioning stationary [beings] (see n. 346) may be disregarded as not being sufficiently explicit or/and as depending upon the verse tradition.} avoid designating plants as sentient, animate or living beings (satta, pāṇa, jīva) and even tend to use, in one and the same context, different terms for killing animals (and men) on the one hand and plants on the other (see § 22.1.6). From this, one may conclude that the motivation of Pāc. 11, etc., by the Suttavibhaṅga (see §§ 22.1.2-22.1.3) is, by and large, correct, and that the verses treating plants as part of animate beings (pāṇa) (see § 22.1.7) must therefore belong to the materials received or inspired from outside. But even in this case it is hardly conceivable that these verses would have been accepted and kept unmodified if the idea that plants are animate, sentient beings had already been categorically rejected in earliest Buddhism. To be sure, it may well be that the expression "mobile (tasa) and stationary (ṭhāvara) animate beings" had become a kind of stock phrase for "all living beings", which one could use even without being explicitly aware of the fact that the stationary living beings cannot but be the plants; but even this would hardly have happened if the dogmatic denial of the sentience of the latter had already formed part of Buddhist thought at that time. Likewise, in case the verses Suttanipāta 600ff, on the different species of animate beings (see § 21.1), were, in substance, adapted from outside, one could imagine that the doctrinal implication of the verse mentioning plants was passed unnoticed, so to speak. But this too would hardly have happened if Buddhists had dogmatically denied the sentience of plants from the outset.

23.3 If, however, the prose and verse materials (or at least some of both, if stratification could demonstrate others to be of later origin) are treated as being of equal evidential value, there are several possibilities. One is to concede that the passages speaking of stationary animate beings (pāṇa) or enumerating plants among animate beings do not limit themselves to merely expressing this in so many words, but also indicate a corresponding belief on the part of their Buddhist authors or adaptors — adding at the same time, however, that this belief is alien to the reticence of the other canonical sources which seem to avoid an inclusion of plants in the pāṇa (and do not apply to them any other word implying life or sentience either). This would suggest — unless chronological sequence is introduced, which would, however, amount to one or the other of the positions sketched in §§ 23.1 and 23.2\footnote{This would, basically, also hold good in case the Buddha himself had changed his view with regard to the sentience of plants.} — the existence of two disagreeing groups. Yet, for want of explicit statements clearly thematizing the issue of the sentience of plants it would seem that such a disagreement could at best have been a latent one, a mere tendency towards different
views. Besides, it may, to be sure, have emerged at a somewhat later date, but hardly in the very earliest period, which would mean: in the teaching of the Buddha himself. Hence, the starting point should rather be a single view. At a first glance, only two alternatives seem to present themselves: either to take the passages which treat plants as living beings as expressing the actual belief of earliest Buddhism, or to take reticence as the proper position of earliest Buddhism and the positive passages as not really meaning what they say, which would, once again, amount to positions, and problems, similar to those of § 23.1 and § 23.2, respectively.

24.1 However, there is yet another, and to my mind more satisfactory possibility, which is not only compatible with a synchronic interpretation of most of the canonical evidence but would also be applicable to, and even facilitate, diachronic approaches like those discussed in §§ 23.1 and 23.2.\textsuperscript{394} What I suggest is to start from the assumption that the scantiness and evasiveness of the evidence the earliest Buddhist sources yield with regard to the question of whether plants were regarded as living, sentient beings or not is due to the fact that they were felt to be a kind of border-line case, and that earliest Buddhism either was not sufficiently interested in a clear-cut and explicit theoretical determination of their status, or even more or less deliberately refrained from it.

24.2.1 In certain contexts, there was reason for, or at least no serious objection to, including even such a border-line case: In the context of Suttaṅgāṭa 600ff, envisaging a kind of rough but comprehensive outline of taxonomy of biological species, it was reasonable to mention plants, too. Likewise, in ethical spirituality, in the context of developing an all-encompassing attitude of universal peaceableness or benevolence, it would seem to be quite natural that even a border-line case, like plants, was, as a matter of course, included. The same holds good when ideal behaviour is described.

24.2.2 Of course, it may well be that such readiness to include plants in the realm of sentient beings was favoured by the less dogmatic genre of the verse suttas.\textsuperscript{395} But even so the contexts in which the usual reticence is abandoned are probably significant. And even in case we take the verses concerned to have been borrowed or adapted from or inspired by a pre- or non-Buddhist tradition, it may still be the specific context of the verses that allowed to retain stock phrases like "mobile and stationary animate beings" unmodified, no need for excluding a border-line case like plants being felt.

\textsuperscript{394} In the case of the approach of § 23.1, the "border-line case assumption" would explain why the practicability aspect (see §§ 25ff) could gradually lead to increasing reticence with regard to the sentence of plants and finally to its denial. In the case of the approach of § 23.2, it would explain why there was no problem in retaining the expression "stationary (animate) beings" in verses borrowed or adapted from other traditions.

\textsuperscript{395} For the prose passages, see n. 392.
24.3 In the Pātimokkhasutta, on the other hand, the context in which plants have to be taken into consideration is one of e v e r y d a y behaviour, regulated by rules of conduct that must be p r a c t i c a b l e. But even at this level the border-line case is not ignored, destroying or injuring of (seeds and) plants being declared a pācittiya offence. But as we have seen (§§ 6.2.1f), the Pātimokkhasutta clearly d i s t i n g u i s h e s between (seeds and) plants on the one hand and pāna, restricted to animals, on the other. This may indicate that at least in some spheres of everyday life this distinction is, in fact, important.

25 It is, to be sure, comparatively easy to practice a h i m s ā with regard to plants as long as wanton destruction of plants without any need or purpose is concerned. But there are limits in connection with the utilization of plants for f o o d as well as other daily needs.

25.1 To be sure, in this regard m o n k s and nuns are in a much better position than most if not all lay people. They need not destroy or injure plants by harvesting since they live on alms. Besides, they can also avoid destroying plants, seeds and even fruits by preparation (cooking, cutting, pounding) and even by chewing them without preparation if they accept, as they are in fact enjoined to, only such food as has already been made "suitable" for ascetics by a lay person (see § 12.3). But even for monks or nuns a problem arises when they accept food prepared expressly for them (uddissa-kata) or invitations (nimantana). For in such cases, the killing involved, at any rate of plants, would, in many cases at least, have been done expressly for feeding them, which means that one may charge them with being, albeit indirectly, responsible for it. Now, as is well known, this is one of the points in which Jainism and Buddhism have adopted different positions. Jainism strictly prohibits monks and nuns from accepting food expressly prepared for them (uddesya) — and, so it seems, a f o r t i o r i from accepting invitations. Buddhism, on the other hand, has no objections to this, though with an important exception: m e a t and f i s h.

396 I.e., if living plants, grains or fruits are harvested or pounded, cut, cooked, etc., with the intention of preparing food for monks.

397 E.g., Dasav 3.2; 5.1.55; 10.4c; Sūy II.6.40 (JĀS § 826); cp. Schubring 1935, 172. Perhaps a still more pertinent concept in this connection is d hākamma, which according to Jain 1983, 70ff, originally means "making [food] lifeless [for the sake of a monk]", and is one of the reasons by which food becomes unacceptable for a Jain ascetic, besides uddesiya, which according to Jain (loc.cit.) means food which is expressly prepared for the monk but not [or at least not necessarily? cp. n. 401f], killed expressly for him.


399 E.g., Vin I 58 and 96 (nimantana; cp. also uddesa-bhatta); II 197 = III 171f (nimantana); M I 77 (rejection of uddissa-kata and nimantana as features of exaggerated asceticism).

400 In the story of Sīha (Vin I 237, etc.: see n. 402) and in the tikōṭiparisuddha formula, "fish"
a monk should not accept if he knows or supposes that the animal was killed expressly for him (uddissa-kata, paticca-kamma). The fact, however, that there is no such restriction with regard to vegetable food indicates that in Buddhism, compared with Jainism, "killing" plants is taken less seriously than killing animals. There are other features pointing to the same direction, viz. that Buddhist monks and nuns are, to be sure, prohibited from directly asking a lay person to fell a tree or cut a fruit, but are allowed to ask for the same thing in an indirect way, e.g., by telling lay persons that they need a tree or a fruit, etc., or by asking them to give it to them or to render it suitable [for ascetics] (kappiya). For a Jain monk, however, all verbal references to possible

appears to be an addition of the Pāli tradition since the other versions have only "meat" (Jaworski 1931, 107; cp. also T vol. 23, 264c27ff[Vin.Sa.]). But in the five ascetic practices proclaimed by Devadatta (Vin II 196ff: see n. 402) "fish" is missing only at Sanghābha 259,12 (Mū.), whereas in all other versions we find both meat and fish: see, besides the Pāli version, T vol. 22, 164a24 (Vin.Mī.), 594b3f (Vin.Dh.) and vol. 23, 264c1 (Vin.Sa.). Cp. also passages mentioning complete abstinence from meat and fish as an element of exaggerated asceticism disapproved by the Buddha (e.g., MN I 77; T vol. 1, 441c23; AKTU tu 177b7: sa mi za ba dato/ na ... mi za bā; cp. Bollée 1971, 72 and 81).

401 Cp. Alsdorf 1961, 563 n. 2. — In contrast to this, uddesiya in Jain sources (and probably also uddissa-kata in passages like MN I 77 (see n. 399)) seems to focus on preparation expressly for the monk, which need not necessarily involve killing expressly for the monk, though it certainly does so in many cases (cp. n. 397; cp. also Sūy II.6.40f [JĀS §§ 826ff], stating that Jain monks avoid uddissa-bhāttā on account of pity with all living beings (savesī jīvāṇa dayāṭhayā), and because they are afraid that beings [might have been killed for them] (bhūtabhīsaṃkāṇe)).

402 Vin I 237ff (cp. T vol. 22, 149c19ff; 486a11ff; 872b4ff; vol. 23, 190b9ff; GM III.1, 236f; MN I 368; cp. Vin II 197 = III 172. Cp. Alsdorf 1961, 563f; Ch. Sh. Prasad, Meat-Eating and the Rule of Tikotiparisuddha, in: A. K. Narain (ed.), Studies in Pali & Buddhism, Delhi 1979, 29ff; Masahiro Shimoda, «Sanshu no jōniku» saikō, in: Bukkyō Bunka 22/1989, 1ff, esp. 7ff. — It is noteworthy that the prohibition is found only in the Skandhaka and that transgression is only a dukkata offence. What we do find in the Prātimokṣasūtra is the statement that it is a pācittiya offence when a monk eats fish or meat he has expressly begged for himself (Pāc. 39 = Vin IV.88), but the motive is clearly not ahimsā but ascetic decorum since in this rule fish and meat are part of a list of delicious food (pañīta-bhojana), along with butter, honey, milk, etc.

403 This is clear from the fact that in the Suttavibhanga (Vin IV 34: . . . rukkhaṃ chindanti pi chedāpenti pi; IV 35: bije bijasanihi chindati va chedāpeti va, . . . bhedāpeti va, . . . pacāpeti va; cp. also T vol. 22, 642a2f; vol. 23, 75a27f; b9f, etc.) and even in some versions of the Prātimokṣa rule itself (see n. 21: T 1464, Mū; cp. also Vin.Mī: T vol 22, 41c23f, and esp. 42a6: "if he has another person [cut a plant] by saying 'cut [it]!' this is a pācittiya offence") not only cutting plants or felling a tree with one's own hands but also ordering others to do so is prohibited. Cp. also Sp 766, expressly declaring orders like "cut this tree!" to be a pācittiya offence (whereas unspecified orders like "cut a tree!" are allowed(!)).

404 Vin IV 35 (anāpatti formula); T vol. 22, 42a3-5 (Vin.Mī.); 642a12 (Vin.Dh.). — Even if the
utilization of trees or fruits are as blameworthy as references to the utilization of animals.⁴⁰⁵ All this would seem to indicate that in Buddhism the life or sentence of plants was felt to be, at least, significantly inferior to, or less intense than, that of animals, to a degree justifying, even for monks and nuns, a conspicuous difference of behaviour in connection with their use.

25.2 On the other hand, there is also a significant distinction between plants and water which throws light on the border-line status of plants from the other side: Whereas a Jaina monk must receive both vegetables and water from a lay person who has made them "suitable" (i.e. lifeless, which in the case of water means cooking; see § 16.3), for Buddhist monks this holds good for vegetables only (see § 12.3), whereas they are allowed to drink fresh water (provided that it is free from tiny animals; see § 16.3) and may even draw water themselves, without having it offered to them.⁴⁰⁶ This means that in the case of water, unlike plants, the old belief that it, too, is living and even sentient is disregarded completely.⁴⁰⁷

25.3 This is hardly accidental. For in a tropical country being prohibited from drinking fresh water doubtless causes much more inconvenience than having to depend on alms for food. Thus it would seem that in the case of water, too, it is practicality that determined Buddhism to ignore the old belief in its animateness and sentience. For whereas in Jainism liberation seems to depend on a punctilious avoidance of injuring even the most minute living beings and on severe austerity, in Buddhism, the decisive point is the spiritual process of the eradication of Desire. Abstention from killing living beings is an essential presupposition for spiritual progress, but had to be kept within practicable limits in order not to become a handicap to the main aim. To include even water in the sentient beings would pass beyond these limits, as is also supported by the passage from the Mahāsihanādasutta discussed in § 16.4.

25.4 It would seem that also in the case of plants it is this sense of practicability of the precepts that made the Buddha, or earliest Buddhism, tend to disregard, in a sense, the sentience of plants in certain contexts where the practical difficulties it involved appeared disproportionate. Besides, if monks rejected food expressly prepared for them, this may even have annoyed lay people striving for merit; and to prohibit monks from accepting invitations would have deprived the Saṅgha from an excellent opportunity for religious instruction.

⁴⁰⁵ Dasav 7.26-35.

⁴⁰⁶ Pāc. 40 (Vin IV 90): see n. 314.

⁴⁰⁷ Cp. also § 38.3.
26.1 The problem of practicability would seem to be even more urgent in the case of lay people. To be sure, for peasants it may even be difficult to avoid killing animals, at least small animals like dew-worms living in the soil. But if such unintentional killing is disregarded, even peasants confining themselves to agriculture, let alone people living in the cities, have a chance to keep the precept not to kill as long as one thinks of animals only. But as soon as seeds and plants come in, matters become very difficult. Peasants can hardly do without harvesting, and even townspeople (except perhaps wealthy persons who have all preparation of food done by servants), when preparing food, will have to cut, pound, cook, etc., vegetables, grain and fruits. Besides, they need wood for construction, etc. Hence, also in connection with the everyday life of lay people there is good reason for a discretion between animals and plants, and the monks could not remain indifferent to the matter since some of the "killing" of plants by lay people was done expressly for the monks or even suggested by them (see § 25.1).

26.2 This requirement has been recognized not only in Buddhism but also in Jainism. For even there, the basic commandments are, at least from a certain time onward, confined to the prohibition of gross killing or injuring (thīlaga pāñāvāyo, sthīlā himśā), i.e., killing animals, whereas destruction of plants forms part of subtle injuring abstention from which is obligatory for the ascetic only. But since Jainism does not in any form weaken or ignore the idea that plants, too, are living, sentient beings, all forms of injuring or killing them cannot but be bad karma. Hence, the Jaina layman also is expressly enjoined to avoid destruction, particularly pointless destruction, of plants, too, as far as possible, and for this reason Jainas try to refrain from professions like agriculture and tend to be businessmen. But, on the other hand, not only came to achieve vast diffusion in cities but it also spread to country people, i.e., in the Indian context, mainly peasants. In accordance with this, its position with regard to the destruction or injuring of plants by lay people is (or has at least come to be) much more reserved. To be sure, unnecessary destruction of plants is occasionally disapproved even in the case of lay people. But on the whole, Buddhism appears

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410 Williams 1983, 118; 122.

411 V. Glasenapp 1925, 321ff.

412 Cp. the passage from the Kūtabadantasutta (§ 19.1), destroying plant life for ritual purposes obviously being, in this text, regarded as unnecessary. Cp. also the passage from Aris 1990 referred to in n. 420. Cp. also n. 418.
to deliberately void arousing, in lay people, qualms in connection with a moderate utilization of plants for food and other basic needs. Though lay people, in a sense, save the monk the trouble to "kill" plants and seeds, this "killing" is obviously played down. To be sure, Buddhism has by no means abolished inhibition altogether. E.g., there are several passages blaming the felling or injuring of a tree whose shade or fruits one has benefited from, as an act of illoyalty or ingratitude. Besides, as already mentioned in § 5.3, Buddhism has kept the popular belief that trees, especially large ones, are inhabited by tree deities commonly believed to resent and avenge the felling of their abode. But on the other hand Buddhism also seems to have contributed to a weakening of inhibition by contriving, or adapting, pacificatory ceremonies asking the tree deity to consent to the felling of the tree or to shift to another tree, and by advocating the idea that it is the "moral norm of a tree" (rukkhadhamma) that the deity inhabiting it does not get angry when people fell its tree or injure it in order to use it. And, as Maithri Murthi

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413 R u t h l e s s exploitation would seem to be stigmatized at Jā IV 351f, where merchants are punished because they are not content with cutting the branches of a tree in order to obtain various useful things but finally even cut its roots.

414 E.g., Pv II.9.1ff, where a person who, pretending to need the stem, fells a tree the shade of which he has enjoyed is called an evil person breaking friendship (mittadubho pāpakā; cp. also Jā IV 352 [see n. 413], esp. verse 196) and ungrateful (cp. verse 7: kataḥnūtā); cp. also AN III 369 (see n. 420). Cp. BN n. 38. — The idea that a useful tree has to be treated as a friend or partner (as long as it is not re-interpreted in terms of tree deities different from the tree) would no doubt fit in with the belief that plants, too, are sentient, at least as a border-line case. But it may as well be explained as an ad hoc adoption of a popular view or as an ad hoc personification, with little if any significance for the general view of earliest Buddhism on the question of the sentience of plants.

415 Jā IV 153f.

416 T vol. 23, 776a13ff; vol. 24, 576c23ff.

417 This expression may indicate that originally the idea stems from a period or ambiance where trees themselves, and not only the deities inhabiting them, were still regarded as sentient beings.

418 AN III 370; Sp 759. Though at AN III 370 the rukkhadhamma is stated to demand, of a tree deity, not to become displeased when people utilize parts of the tree for fulfilling their needs, yet in the context what the tree deity had become upset by was an act of wanton injuring of its tree (though only a minor one). Not to become angry even at wanton injury is, of course, in line with the Buddhist ethics of patience, but explicitly stating that even trees or tree deities have to behave in this way surely considerably weakens people's inhibitions to destroy or injure them. To be sure, the text only blames the tree deity's reaction but does not, thereby, automatically sanction the wanton injury inflicted on the tree; but it does not explicitly stigmatize it either; it is only the tree deity that calls the perpetrator a wicked (pāpa) person.

419 Maithri Murthi 1986, 62.
states, villagers in Sri Lanka, though regarding plants to be, somehow, living beings, yet do not consider cutting them to be bad karma. Actually, I for one do not know of any passage in a classical Buddhist text where cutting plants in general, and especially in the context of food and other daily needs, is explicitly stated to be bad karma. In somewhat later texts, it is, occasionally, even expressly confirmed that destroying or damaging plants, though an offence in the case of monks, is none for ordinary people (lokassa anavajjām) or that mowing grass or felling trees is not bad karma. This presupposes that the sentience of plants is denied or at least completely disregarded, once again for the sake of practicability.

26.3 In view of the vital significance the problem has for lay people, especially those living on agriculture, one might even consider the possibility that it was primarily for their sake that even the early Buddhist texts are, on the whole, so conspicuously reticent with regard to the animateness or sentience of plants. Such an assumption would seem to be supported by the fact that abstention from injuring seeds and plants is not even included among the additional, rather ascetic than moral restrictions lay people have to observe on uposatha days. On the other hand, it may be important to note that among the passages speaking of "mobile (tasa) and stationary (thāvara) (animate) beings" (§ 20.2ff) — of which most deal, to be sure, with the spiritual attitude or behaviour of monks or are at least unspecified — two or three refer to laymen and, what is more, not merely to their spiritual attitude but to their behaviour. The most explicit one is Sn 394, which is of foremost importance in our context since it formulates the first Precept for householders (gāvattha, see Sn 393), stating that, abstaining from violence with regard to all beings, mobile and stationary ones, he should not

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420 Cp. also T vol. 51, 438b4, stating that it is not heard [in any authoritative Buddhist text] that in the case of insentient beings [like plants, destroying them is an act which] has a [karmic] result. However, M. Aris (1990, 99) reports a passage from a Bhutanese school textbook where a less injury inflicted upon a tree is described as 'sinful'. Cp. also AN III 369 where a person who has wantonly injured a tree after having benefited by its fruits is called "wicked" (pāpa) by the tree deity (cp. n. 418). As for Sn 394, see § 26.3.

421 Cp. n. 93.

422 Mil 266f.

423 T vol. 12, 460b17-19 (MPSMah).

424 E.g., AN IV 250; Sn 400f = AN IV 254, etc.

425 See § 20.2 + n. 350.

426 E.g., Sn 629 = Dhp 405 (see n. 357): the true brahmin.

427 See § 20.2 + n. 351.
kill any animate being, nor have them killed, nor consent to others killing them.\textsuperscript{428} If my interpretation of the stationary animate beings as plants (§ 20.4.2) is correct, the verse would seem to express the view that even in the case of Buddhist lay followers the precept not to kill or injure is not confined to (men and) animals but includes plants as well. To be sure, the text does not formulate the precepts in terms of good or bad karma, but rather as an ethical ideal,\textsuperscript{429} conceived on the model of ascetic morality, as becomes especially clear in the case of the third Precept, the text exhorting even the layman to practise continence (brahma\textit{macariya}: Sn 396ab). At the same time, however, the text expressly states that a householder is not in a position to come up to the moral standard of a monk in its entirety (Sn 393cd).\textsuperscript{430} Accordingly, in the case of the third Precept the text adds that if the layman is unable to practise continence, he should at any rate not violate others’ wives (Sn 396cd), which is the usual form of this Precept. In view of the considerable problems involved, for lay followers, in not killing or injuring even plants, one would expect a similar alleviation in the case of the first Precept. But the text does not express any; it does not say, as one might expect, that a layman should not kill mobile living beings, i.e., animals.

26.4 The question is how to interpret this fact.

26.4.1 One possibility is to assume that the text reflects an early situation and to conclude from it that in the beginning the specific problems lay people may have with plant ahimsā were either not realized or disregarded by Buddhism. This would perhaps be easier to understand if we presuppose that the lay people addressed were primarily wealthy townsmen (with servants to prepare their meals), not poor people or peasants.

\textsuperscript{428} Sn 394: \textit{pānaṃ na hane na ca ghātayeyya, na cānujaṃ na hanatam paresam / sabbesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍam: ye thāvarā ye ca tasanti loke /}; cp. Dhp 405 = Sn 629 (see n. 357) and, for pādas cd, SN I 141 (see n. 347).

\textsuperscript{429} This would seem to be true also of SN IV 351 (see ns. 347 and 351) — and V 393 (see n. 347), in case it too refers to a layman —, where, however, the layman declares that he accepts the layman as such and exhorts him to emulate the moral standard of the monk as much as possible (cp. also the uposatha rules Sn 400f). It may be merely due to this difference of purpose that Sn 220f suggests the idea that a lay person has little chance to practise complete ahimsā, whereas Sn 394, in this regard, ignores the limitations and exhorts the layman to try his very best. There is hence no need to assume (though one can hardly exclude the possibility either) that the two passages also envisage different social situations (e.g., rural versus urban) or reflect a different degree of awareness with regard to the problems involved in plant ahimsā (in which latter case the text mentioning plants (thāvara) would, oddly enough, be the one which is less aware of the problems involved in their inclusion).
26.4.2 Another possibility is to assume that at least in the text under consideration the use of the phrase "mobile and stationary beings" is a stereotype, or borrowed from another source or tradition — just like the tripartite formula "not to kill, nor to have others kill, nor to consent to others killing" which is atypical of Buddhist texts but common in Jaina sources\(^{431}\) —, and hardly purporting anything but the notion of "all living, animate beings" (cp. § 23.2). In this case, the person who composed or adapted the text need not actually have thought of plants. But he would hardly have used or retained the phrase "mobile and stationary beings" had he clearly intended to exclude plants, unless we assume that the text is so late that the original meaning of 'tasa' and 'thāvara' was no longer known.

26.5 Hence, although problems of the practicability of the first precept for lay followers may well have played an important role in the development of the Buddhist denial of the sentience of plants, we cannot be sure that this was the starting point. The primary motive may rather have been problems of practicability, especially in connection with food, for monks and nuns (§ 25.1).

27 It is, however, possible that the tendency towards weakening the view that plants, let alone earth and water, are sentient beings was not initiated by Buddhism. For in this case I for one would expect more explicit statements. It may rather already have begun to fade in the course of the gradual development of an overall process of rationalization which may be taken to have started, in a sense, already in the ritualism of the Brāhmaṇa period\(^{432}\) and to have developed further in Upaniṣadic thought and in the śrāmanic movements.\(^{433}\) It may be worth investigating whether such fading of the belief in the sentience of plants, earth and water may have originated in connection with the extension of agriculture,\(^{434}\) or with the emergence or full-fledged development of urbanization,\(^{435}\) or with any other

\(^{431}\) E.g., Dasav 4.VII ff (p. 10ff).


\(^{433}\) Cp. Obeyesekere 1980, 157ff, esp. 159.

\(^{434}\) As, e.g., Christian polemics against the Manichaeans (cp. Henrichs 1979, 92 fn. 22) may suggest.

\(^{435}\) For the connection of earliest Buddhism with the urban milieu, cp. Weber 61978, 217; B.G. Gokhale in: JIABS 5.2/1982, 7ff; Gombrich 1988, 50; G. v. Simson, Der zeitgeschichtliche Hintergrund der Entstehung des Buddhismus und seine Bedeutung für die Datierungsfrage,in: H. Bechert (ed.), The Dating of the Historical Buddha, Pt. 1, Göttingen 1991, 92ff. — In this connection, it is interesting that in the inscriptions of Aśoka, which surely reflect the ambiance of the capital, the words for animate or living beings — not only 'pāna' but also 'jīva' (RE I.B; III.D
change of the period, but this would by far exceed the limits of this paper. At any rate, if it is true that the tendency towards weakening belief in universal sentience was already there, Buddhism (in contrast to the more archaic or conservative Jainism) would have accepted it because it facilitated practicability — practicability, to be sure, for the monks and nuns who could concentrate their effort on their spiritual task of eradicating Desire, but, at least in the long run, no less for lay people, especially the peasants who were thus not obliged to remorse for tilling the soil, using water or harvesting plants, and hence could be integrated by Buddhism much better than by Jainism.

[Dhau.]; PE V.G) — clearly refer to animals only, not to plants. On the other hand, in Sri Lanka it is, as M. Maithri Murthi told me, rural people who still consider plants to be, somehow, living beings (see § 5.4 with n. 87).
VI. Later Developments

28 Later on, however, the pragmatic flexibility and reticence of earliest Buddhism fell a prey to the desire for an unambiguous theoretical position, which amounted to plants being virtually, and in the end, at least on the doctrinal level, explicitly, excluded from the range of sentient beings, which means that in the long run the point of view of practicability in connection with food, etc., came to prevail over the other aspects.

29 As stated before (§§ 5.5, 8, 9.1f, 10.1, 12.4 and 22.1.3), such an exclusion of plants from the range of living, sentient beings seems to be implied already in a number of passages from strata of the Vinaya Pitaka which do not belong to the oldest period since they are at any rate significantly later than the Prātimokṣasūtra. One would hence not be surprised to find traces of such a development also in the Suttapiṭaka.

29.1.1 An example is perhaps the scheme of the four "many species", i.e. classes of living beings according to the way they are born: 1. chorion-born (jarāyū-ja, i.e. viviparous), 2. egg-born (anda-ja), 3. moisture-born (samśeda-ja), and 4. spontaneously born (opapāṭika). The third group is explained as comprising beings originating, e.g., in putrid fish, carrion, putrid porridge, or in a stagnant or dirty pool, i.e. worms and insects. The fourth group is stated to contain gods, hell-beings, some human beings and some underworld-beings (vinipāṭika). Thus, it would seem that there is no place in this scheme for plants.

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436 For popular belief, see § 5.4.

437 Acc. to T vol. 2, 632a12f (EĀ): men, cattle, and "biped 'insects'" (二足蟲), i.e., probably, bats (Ch. 鳳凰, hence grouped with 虫, i.e. insects, worms and other small animals like frogs, snakes, etc.; cp. also Sp 363: vāguli ("bats") as a kind of biped animals (viz. such as have wings consisting of skin).

438 T vol. 2, 632a10f (EĀ) enumerates various kind of birds as well as snakes (/reptiles), fishes and ants.

439 MN I 73; cp. T vol. 2, 632a14.

440 Cp. T vol. 2, 632a14 (EĀ): 虫 (cp. also AKBh 118,25f; Stache-Rosen 1968, 110; Y 46,2). This version speaks, strangely enough, of "condition-born" animals, but has "moisture-born" instead at a9.

441 Acc. to AKBh 119,7f those belonging to the first world-age (prāthamakalpika).

442 MN I 73; Ps II 36,17t takes the vinipāṭika beings as petas (cp. AKBh 119,14f; Y 46,5); T vol. 2, 632a16 seems to have "animals" instead (cp. AKBh 119,9f; Y 46,5) but at the same time adds the petas after the hell-beings.

443 Cp. MHRd IX.140ab: sacetanā hi taravo na, caturony-asamgrahāt; VinMaṭ 200f:
appears to be confirmed by the usual Brahmanical version of the yoni scheme, which omits the "spontaneously born" and has beings "born by splitting" (udbhijja) instead.\textsuperscript{444} This group is normally\textsuperscript{445} said to contain the plants,\textsuperscript{446} and "splitting" is explained as splitting the earth or — perhaps more likely — the seed.\textsuperscript{447}

29.1.2 On the other hand, we cannot perhaps be altogether sure that the scheme was in fact, from the outset, meant to comprise all living beings, including a border-line case like plants; for even in the earliest Jaina sources\textsuperscript{446} it is only the mōbile living beings (tasā pāṇā) that are subdivided into a similar set of classes, and in contexts at that where it is stressed that at least plants, too, are living beings. In the Buddhist canon, too, the scheme is, apart from its general function, also used for the special purpose of subdividing the Nāgas\textsuperscript{449} (mythic beings, but at the same time snakes) and their mythical bird-like enemies, the Garuḍas.\textsuperscript{450} I for one cannot exclude the possibility that this special use of the scheme is, in Buddhism, the older one, and that it was generalized only later. At any rate, as far as I can see the general version of the scheme is quite rare in the canonical texts, occurring, apart from the

\textit{rukkhādayo ... na jivā, ... caturuyoniyam apartāyāpannato.}

\textsuperscript{444} Cp., e.g., Aitareya-Upaniṣad 3.3; MBh 14.42.19ff; Manu I.43-46; Śaṅkara ad Brahmasūtra III.1.20; cp. also ChU 6.3.1 (āṇḍaja, jivaja, udbhijja).

\textsuperscript{445} In the Jaina sources mentioned below (see n. 448), where the scheme refers to animals only, the ubbhīya (i.e. udbhijja) beings cannot mean plants but are explained as referring to animals coming from larvae, like butterflies (cp. Halbfass 1980, 293; 1991, 318). Cp. also Suśruta, quoted by Bh. Jhalakīkar, Nyāyakośa, 871 (udbhijjaḥ = fire-flies, frogs, etc. (indrīgopa-maṇḍīka-prabhṛtayāḥ)).

\textsuperscript{446} E.g. Manu I.46; Śaṅkara ad Aitareya-Upaniṣad 3.3 (udbhijjāni ... vrśādīni). Cp. also TĪv 356b1 where an objecting, opposing the Buddhist argument that plants are not comprised in the four yonis, states that they constitute a fifth one, viz. udbhijja (yai (D) gal te brtol nas steñ du skye ės bya ba skye gnas lha pa yin no ze na ...). The Buddhist rejects such a fifth yoni as pure fancy (text as in D (312b1)), and he adds that even if it were accepted plants would nevertheless not be living, sentient beings because they do not feel pain (see § 34, h).

\textsuperscript{447} MBh 14.42.22 (bhītvā tu prthivīm ...); Medhātithi ad Manu I.46 (... bijām bhūmim ca bhītvā ...); similarly Kullūka et al., while Sarvādānārāyaṇa and Govindarāja mention splitting the earth only. Cp. Āyār II.3.1 (JĀS ed. § 464): bīyā ... ubbhīpayā.

\textsuperscript{448} Āyār p. 5,1f; Dasav 4 (p. 6,9-11); Sūy I.7.1 (JĀS § 381).

\textsuperscript{449} SN III 240(fff); cp. AKṬU tu 125b3f (ad AKBh 120,1; cp. AKVy 266,18ff); T vol. 1, 127a28f = 288a22-24 = 332b13f = 387b10-12 (Lokaprajñāpatiśūtra: cp. S. Dietz in: E. v. Schuler (ed.), XXIII. Deutscher Orientalistentag, ausgewählte Vorträge, Stuttgart 1989, 492f); T vol. 2, 646a12f; 704a17.

\textsuperscript{450} SN III 246(fff); AKṬU tu 125b4f; T vol. 1, 127a29ff = 288a24-26 = 332b15f = 387b12-14 (Lokaprajñāpatiśūtra); T vol. 2, 646a8-10.
abhidharma-like Saṅgītasutta, only in one Sutta of the Majjhimanikāya (where it has no close connection with the context) and, as a sermon on its own, in the Chinese Ekottar(ik)āgama. This could, of course, mean that it is an old element that had become obsolete, but since it fits in quite well with later developments and has in fact found remarkable interest in the later tradition it would seem to me more likely that its scarcity in the canon signalizes later origin, and perhaps it was actually contrived, or at least given a general application, with the intention to contrast with the Brahmanical scheme by not including plants.

29.2 Another scheme which at least in later dogmatics clearly implies that plants are not sentient beings is that of the five gatis, i.e. destinies [where one may go after death], viz. gods, men, realm of the forefathers (petti-visaya), animals (tiracchāna-yoni), and hell (niraya). I admit that closer investigation is required, but for the time being I should say that this scheme, though not infrequently used or presupposed in the canon, represents the final stage of a considerable process of clarification and innovation (cp. §§ 36.5.1f). Even if it were early, we cannot be sure that the sphere of possible forms of rebirth was, from the outset, coextensive with the sphere of living beings (see § 36.2.2). Besides, it may be worth noting that the Jainas accept only four of the above-mentioned five gatis, omitting pettivisaya, though not of course denying the sentience of plants (which are, at least in later canonical sources, subsumed under "animals").

451 DN III 230; T vol. 1, 229a2 (DĀ); Saṅgītisūtra IV.29 (cp. Stache-Rosen 1968, 110).

452 MN I 73. As far as I can see, there is no corresponding section in any of the Ch. parallels listed by Akanuma.

453 T vol. 2, 632a7-19.

454 Cp., e.g., Y 45,16ff; Vi 626b2ff; AKBh 118,20ff.

455 In later texts and in the Sanskrit tradition (e.g. Divyāvadāna [ed. Vaidya] 185,27f; Y 44,16f; AKBh 114,5f): p(r)etas, conceived as hungry ghosts.

456 E.g. MN I 73ff; DN III 234; AN IV 459; cp. also MN II 193; SN V 474ff; AN I 37; V 269f; etc.; SN I 34 has yamaloka instead of pettivisaya. Sometimes (e.g. MN III 22+24; AN I 60) pettivisaya is missing. On the other hand, many sources (cp., e.g. BHSD s.v. gati) add the Asuras as a sixth gati, and there are traces of this even in the Pāli Nikāyas (e.g. DN III 264); cp. also Y 90,9-12 for a summary reference to the existence of canonical texts counting the Asuras as a separate gati. AN V 266+268 refers to the five gatis but includes "whatever other bad, or good, destinies there are".

457 Cp., e.g., Thāna (JĀS ed.) § 442 (adding the siddhi-gati, which would, however, correspond, in Buddhism, to Nirvāṇa); Jaini 1980, 222.

458 Cp., e.g., Schubring 1935, 133; Jaini 1980, 223f.
However, statements expressly denying plants the status of living, sentient beings are, as far as I can see, found only in comparatively late, at any rate post-Nikāyic texts. But it seems that even in later Theravāda dogmatics a trace of their original border-line position appears to have been preserved; for, at any rate according to Nārada, plants are, to be sure, devoid of mental life-force (nāma-jīvitindriya), but they do have material life-force (rūpa-jīvitindriya), though only one different from the karma-conditioned one of men and animals. They are thus, it is true, not sentient, but, in a sense, living beings. In other currents of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, however, plants are viewed as being entirely on the same level as inorganic things like a clod or a crystal.

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459 E.g., MPSMah 406a24ff (cp. F. Sueki in: Tōhōgaku 80/1990, 98); Y 171,12ff; T vol. 32, 313a25ff (*Tattvasiddhi); MPPU 433b6ff; cp. also Mil 271,9ff (sentient beings (saceterminā sattā) are kammajā, in contrast to fire and all kinds of seeds (/plants: cp. n. 30) which are hetuja); cp. also the Lokaprajñaptisūtra [see n. 449] (T vol. 1, 137b17ff; 354c15ff; 409c21ff) where plants (137c11; 355a2; 410a8) are clearly regarded as not forming part of sentient beings (生: 354c25; 410a2; cp. 137c3ff) involved in sāṃsāra. — A passage like Jā III 24 (gāthā: acetenām ... assuṇantam ... ajānantam imām palāsām ... pucchasi kīsa hetu) is hardly conclusive evidence for the insentience of plants, since what is meant in the narrative context is merely that the tree lacks higher cognitive faculties (like understanding human speech; cp. Thieme’s remarks on (a)cetana in KISchr, 377); but this does not necessarily exclude its being animate and even sentient (by possessing, e.g., the sense of touch). Insentience of trees is not unambiguously expressed or implied (though probably intended, cp. Mil 271,9ff referred to above) in the discussion of this Jā passage at Mil 172-174, where the passage is contrasted with another Jātaka passage (Jā IV 210) according to which a phandana tree a d r e s s e s a person, and where the latter passage is rationalized by stating that it is the tree d e i t y who speaks.

460 Nārada, A Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Sangaha), Colombo 1975, 88. [This reference I owe to Dr. Payer (Tübingen).]

461 Cp., e.g., MHṛd IX.140 (loṣṭava); 147 (svargaloke ... ratnadrūmā yathā).
VII. Later Arguments against Plant Sentience

31.1 In view of the comparatively late appearance of express denials of the sentience of plants, it is natural that also formal arguments to prove this position or to disprove the opposite view are, as far as I can see, found only in comparatively late sources.

31.2 I have found arguments in the following sources: the Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi (4th century A.D. (?));[462] Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya's (6th century) Madhyamakahāḍaya and its commentary, the Tarkajvālā[463] (which also contains a verse quotation from an unknown earlier source);[464] Dharmakīrtī's (ca. 600-660) Nyāyabindu and Dharmottara's (ca. 750-810) commentary on it;[465] and the Vinaya-thamāṇjūsā,[466] a subcommentary on the Pātimokkhasutta. In the Yogācārabhūmi and the Nyāyabindu, the opponents are the Jainas, whereas in the Madhyamakahāḍaya and in the Tarkajvālā the arguments are found in the chapter against the Mīmāṃsā.[467]

462 Y, zi 211a5-b6 (D: zi 202a4-b4) = Y,660a21-b12.

463 Also ascribed to Bhāvaviveka, but the question whether this text (as we have it) is actually by the same Bhāvaviveka as MHṛd is debated among scholars: cp., most recently, D. Seyfort Ruegg, On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya, in: Seyfort Ruegg and Schmithausen 1990, 59ff, esp. 63ff.

464 MHṛd IX.139-147 and TJv 354b4-361a5 (D: dza 311a3-316a1). Ed. of the MHṛd verses in Kawasaki 1988, 31ff. Cp. also Kawasaki 1986 (containing the Skt. text of MHṛd IX.139-147 and a Japanese translation also of TJv) and Kawasaki 1990.

465 See § 32.1f.

466 VinMañj 200f. This passage I owe to M. Maithri Murthi, who also informed me that Malalasekera (The Pali Literature of Ceylon, London 1928, 201) ascribes the text to Buddhānāga who is dated around 1200 A.D.

467 I for one do not know of a pertinent discussion in an early (Pūrva-)Mīmāṃsā text. Mīmāṃsābāhāṣya and Tantravārttika ad Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.2.35 (acetane 'rthabandhanā') and 40 seem to presuppose that plants are n o t sentient. Śālikanātha (Prakaraṇapāṇcikā, ed. A. Subrahmanya Sastri, Benares 1961, 330,16ff) even explicitly excludes plants from the range of sentient beings and possible states of rebirth (cp. also Rāmānujācārya, Tantrarājasya (GOS no. 24), 17,14ff). On the other hand, the (rather late) Bhāṭṭa author Nārāyaṇa (Māṇameyodaya [ed. C. Kunhan Raja and S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras 1933], 152,1-155,3) favours the sentience of plants, though not uncompromisingly (ibid. 154,8ff), and takes pains to restrict the purport of the afore-mentioned passages to the fact that plants do not react when being addressed (ibid. 154,3ff). But there is no argumentation comparable to Bhavya's.— In the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā ("Vedānta") schools, on the other hand, the sentience of plants and their being a possible state of rebirth appears to be a matter of course already at Śaṅkara's time (cp., e.g., Śaṅkara on ChU V.10.6 [Gorakhpur ed., p. 525,1ff]; cp. also Halbfass 1980, 300f; id. 1991, 326f; K. H. Potter, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. III [Delhi 1980]: Advaita Vedānta, 260); but this school is treated by Bhavya in a separate chapter.
— the Brahmanic school of the methods of exegesis of Vedic ritual texts; but actually they are, perhaps, rather directed against the Vedic texts (Śruti)\(^{468}\) and the authoritative Brahmanic tradition (Smṛti) themselves.\(^{469}\)

### 31.3

There may be more such passages even in Indian Buddhist texts,\(^{470}\) and the material has to be supplemented by pertinent discussions in Hindu\(^{471}\) and Jaina\(^{472}\) sources, about which my information is, however, rather casual.\(^{473}\) Even

\(^{468}\) Cp. MHṛd IX.139: *acetanēsū caitanyāṁ sthāvareśu prakalpitam/ drśyā (ms. is said to read drśyā, but cp. IX.59c; 120c; 127c) ċurvihitam t r a y y ā < m > (cp. IX.120d; 127d) yuktāṁ yat tyajyate t r a y i //. Cp. § 2.1 + n. 14.

\(^{469}\) As Kawasaki 1986, (14)f, rightly points out, the sentience of plants is advocated, e.g., at Manu I.46-49; cp. also XII.58, and Yājñavalkya III.208. Cp. also the close relation of the pūrvapakṣa at TJv 354b5ff to MBh 12.177.10ff (see n. 493). On the other hand, in view of the striking number of agreements between the pro-sentience arguments in the Nīlakaṇṭha and other Jaina sources (see n. 472) and those referred to by Bhavya the possibility has to be taken into account that the latter may have integrated, into his treatment of the matter, also arguments of the Jainaś (with whom the very same arguments are actually connected at GrCh 267,1ff and 278,3f, the Tibetan author stating that Jainas and Mīmāṃsakas agree on this point). On the other hand, it should be noted that in so far as Bhavya’s arguments try to refute the sentience of plants merely by pointing out similarities with inorganic things, they would hold good only for such Jainas as do not advocate the sentience of the elements (like Nīl), but not for those who do (like Jnabhadra (VĀbh 1751ff, esp. 1756ff), Abhayadevasūri (TBV 651,34ff) or Guṇaratna (TRD 153,8if)).

\(^{470}\) As for autochthonous Tibetan sources, I have only used GrCh, which is, however, in this point entirely dependent on MHṛd and TJv, apart from placing the discussion into the Jaina instead of the Mīmāṃsā chapter (see n. 469).


\(^{472}\) Cp., for an archaic attempt, Āyār\(_3\) p. 4,28-31. A more developed stage of argumentation is found in Jnabhadra’s (7th century [?]; Schubring 1935, 43) VĀbh, vss. 1753-1756; cp. also vs. 103. His arguments are further explicated and expanded in Maladhāri-Hemacandra’s (12th-13th cent.: Potter, Encycl. of Indian Philos., I [Delhi 1970], 181) Śiṣyāhitā on these passages. Cp. also Śilāṭaka (9th cent.: cp. Schubring 1935, 43), ĀyārViv 44,1ff (ad Āyār\(_3\) p. 4,28-31); Abhayadevasūri (11th cent.: Potter), TBV 652,1ff; Gunaratna (ca. 1400, acc. to v. Glasenapp 1925, 108), TRD 157,7ff. There is, moreover, an interesting and detailed rejection of the Buddhist attacks against the sentience of plants in the anonymous Tamil Jaina text Nīlakaṇṭha (8th or 9th cent. A.D., according to A. L. Basham, History and Doctrine of the Ājīvikas, repr. Delhi 1981, 200f), with its commentary by Samayadīvākara (end of the 13th c., it seems), which are being investigated by my colleague S. A. Srinivasan who kindly put a draft of his translation at my disposal.

\(^{473}\) As my colleague A. Wezler informs me, there is also valuable material in certain medical texts an investigation into which by him is under preparation.
so, it may be interesting to have a closer look at these arguments (as will be done in §§ 32.1-37.3) since they may contain some clue to the original motive for excluding the plants from the range of living, sentient beings, and thus either confirm, or supplement, my conclusions concerning this issue, or suggest some other possibility.

31.4 To be sure, such formal arguments are mostly developed only afterwards, when the matter had already been decided.\textsuperscript{474} They need not necessarily have preserved the original motive (or motives), especially if the sources presenting them are comparatively late, as in the present case. Still, they may yield some useful information.

32.1 In the \textit{Nyāya bindu},\textsuperscript{475} an epistemological work mainly dealing with the theory of inference and proof, the treatment of the matter is marginal. In the context of dealing with faulty arguments, Dharmakīrti adduces the argument of the Jainas that trees are sentient beings\textsuperscript{476} because they die when their bark is peeled off completely.\textsuperscript{477} For Dharmakīrti, the reason of this argument is unpaved; for a Buddhist, he says, dying, in the strict sense required for the conclusiveness of the argument,\textsuperscript{478} means cessation of consciousness, sense-faculties and life-force;\textsuperscript{479} this, however, can not be predicated of plants since they lack these properties from the Buddhist point of view.\textsuperscript{480} On the other hand — the commentator Dharmottara\textsuperscript{481} — the kind of "dying" which can be ascribed also to plants, namely drying up, withering (śoṣa), does not imply sentience; for (so one

\textsuperscript{474} Frauwallner 1953, 385.

\textsuperscript{475} NBi III.59: \textit{cetoṇās tarava iti sādhye sarva-tvag-apaharane maraṇaṃ prativādy-asiddham, vijñāṇendriyādur-nirodha-lakṣāṇasya maraṇasyāmenābhhyupaṃamāt, tasya ca taruṣy asambhaṭva.}

\textsuperscript{476} My use of "sentient being", here and elsewhere, ignores, for the sake of simplicity, the problem, controversial between the schools, whether a soul (jīva, ātman) inhabiting or controlling the vegetable body (cp., e.g., TRD 157,7f and 10; Kir 39,21) is involved or not.


\textsuperscript{478} Cp. NBiṬ 191,7f: \textit{kevalam vijñānasattayā vyāptam yan maraṇam, tad iha hetuḥ.}

\textsuperscript{479} Acc. to Durvekamīśra (DhPr 192,17), dying in the strict sense is characterized by the cessation of breathing, body heat, movement, etc.: tac (viz. vijñānasattayā vyāptam maraṇaṃ) ca śvāṣṭyaparispandādi-vigama-lakṣānaṃ.

\textsuperscript{480} Cp. NBiṬ 191,5f: \textit{... yo vijñānanirodham taruṣy icheṭ, sa kathāṃ vijñānām necchet? tasmād vijñānāniśte nirodho 'pi neṣṭas taruṣu.}

\textsuperscript{481} NBiṬ 191,7-9.
may supply) drying up or becoming dry occurs also in the inorganic, e.g., water or earth, the insentience of which was, at Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s time. surely a matter of course for most people except the (or some) Jainas.

32.2 Similarly, Dharmottara criticizes the argument that trees are sentient because they sleep as logically faulty because the reason, viz. sleeping characterized by contraction of the leaves at night, is not a property of all trees but only of some. The sub-commentator Durvekamiśra adds that strictly speaking [for the Buddhist] the reason is not even a property of the latter because sleep in the usual sense, which alone implies sentience, consists in a special state counteracting the function of the sense-faculties (indriya-vyāpāra-virodhya avasthā-viśeṣah), which cannot be ascribed to trees [since they lack sense-faculties], while “sleeping” in a metaphorical sense, though ascribable to trees, is inconclusive.

33 In the other sources, too, especially in the Madhyamakahrdaya, a considerable number of arguments serve to refute the arguments of the opponents, by showing that the reasons adduced are unproved or inconclusive.

33.1 E.g., properties like sleeping (attributed to a tamarind tree [folding its leaves during the night], or to trees in winter), being intoxicated or ruttish (smyo ba, i.e. bursting into vitality in the rainy season), having specific

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482 See n. 19. Cp. also Niī 371 where the ascription, to the Jainas, of the view that the elements are themselves living beings is rejected by the Jaina nun as unjustified.


484 See also § 33.1 + n. 487.

485 Acc. to Durvekamiśra (DhPr 92,24f): tintidikā-prabhīrtayah (see § 33.1 + n. 488).

486 DhPr 93,16ff.

487 VinMaṇj 201 (see n. 488); MHRd IX.144c (svāpā; see n. 490). Cp. VĀvBh 1755ab + Vṛttī; ĀyārViv 44,15f; TRD 159,8 (read svāpa-vibodha-sadbhāvaḥ; cp. ĀyārViv 44,16); Kir 39,21. Cp. also T vol 77, 313a22 (Kākai), and vol. 75, 487a1-3 (Annen).

488 VinMaṇj 201 (supinām viya cīncādinām); Niī 363; cp. also TRD 157,16-18.

489 Tīv 358a7 (dgun [D] gyi dus su ni gḥid log go) and b5 (ljon śīn rṇams dgun gyi dus su gḥid log pa).

490 MHRd IX.144cd (Tib.) and Tīv 358a7 and b7f. The Skt. ms. of MHRd IX.144cd (acc. to Kawasaki 1988: rituṇaṭā tathā svāpānapiṣṭā turagādāvata) does not seem to contain an equivalent for smyo ba; Kawasaki’s emendation (rituṇā tathā svāpomattad apiṣṭāḥ ...) is unmetrical; I suggest rituṇāvāt tathā svāpāc apiṣṭās ..., presupposing that smyo ba was introduced by the Tib. translator
longings or enmity (*doḥada*), or perception of objects and time, adduced by
in accordance with TJv 358a6f, where it may have been stimulated by what seems to be a quotation from a Vṛksāyurveda text (*Vṛksāyurśvibhāga?* Or *śheda instead of *veda?*) (ljon śiṅ gi tshe’i dbyes ba las ’di ltar / *gṇīṣ ṭug pa’ a m y o s p a ’i dus su bskyed do* ‘ész *byuḥ ste*). That the original *kārikā* did not contain an equivalent for *smyo ba* is corroborated also by the explanation of the *dṛṣṭānta* in TJv which covers only sleep but ignores *smyo ba* (TJv 358a7: *ji ltar rkyâh la sogs pa gṇīṣ ṭug pa bzin no*), and by TJv 359a8f+b3 where the reasons adduced at MHrd IX.144 are divided into two groups of 2 and 3 items, respectively, in which *smyo ba* is not contained, viz. *saṅ ba’i sems don gṇīṣ ṭug pa ’esz bya ba’i gan tshigs g h i s* and *mthun pa las skye ba la sogs pa’i gan tshigs gzan g s u m*.

491 TJv 358a7 (dbyar gyi dus su ni smyo ba yin te) and b7.

492 MHrd IX.144b (*doḥadāt ... sacittakāḥ ... iṣṭāḥ*) and 146b; VinMañj 201 (*doḥalādayo*: see n. 495). Cp. VĀvBhV(V) 1753b; TBV 653.2. — The word *doḥada* (for which see H. Lüders, Philologica Indica, Göttingena 1940, 44ff) refers to the sometimes morbid longings of a pregnant woman, but it is also used to designate a specific longing or desire of certain trees, or perhaps rather the sexual excitement experienced by them (cp. VĀvBhV p. 69,13 [ad vs. 103]: *maithuna-samjñā* and resulting in subsequent budding (cp. Das 1988, 248ff); e.g., the Aśoka tree (Saraca Asoca) is said to Flower when kicked by the foot of a lovely young woman (Das 1988, 246f), and the Bakula tree (Mimusops: Elengi) does so when sprinkled with a mouthful of spirituous liquor by a young lady (ibid., 242 and 247). TJv 355a3ff (ad MHrd IX.139; cp. Kawasaki 1986, (4)=215) has the opponent refer to this belief in order to prove that plants have sense faculties (and perceptions) (see n. 493) — in this case (if we follow the syntax of Tib. and GrCh 268,6 and 277,4f) the faculty of mental awareness (*mana-indriya*; cp. the ascription of *maithuna-samjñā* to them at VĀvBhV p. 69,13), but perhaps also the sense of touch and taste, respectively (cp. VĀvBhV p. 69,7-10) —, but does not seem to use the term *doḥada* in this connection. And when explaining *doḥada* at MHrd IX.144, TJv (358a4f) seems to associate it with *daurḥṛda* "enmity" (cp. Lüders, op. cit., 45), taking it to mean "(having the) intention to injure" (gnod par bya ba’i bsam pa gan la yod pa; cp. the Tib. transl. of *doḥada* at MHrd IX.144 by *saṅ na sems* "hateful thought"), to be inferred from the fact that poisonous trees destroy life (TJv 358a4f: dug gi śiṅ la sogs pa rnams kyis [D] srog ’joms par byed pa’i phyir ’di la saṅ [D] ba’i sems yod do). Gunnaralna, on the other hand, understands the *daurḥṛda* of plants from which their sentence can be inferred as certain specific *d e s i r e s* the fulfillment of which entails budding, etc. (TRD 159,6f; cp. ĀyārViv 44,28f), just as the fulfillment of a pregnant woman’s morbid longings guarantees birth of a son, etc. (TRD 159,5f). It is not clear what kind of desires Gunnaralna has in mind; since he mentions cases like the budding and flowering of the Aśoka tree due to being kicked by a young woman in the context of a n o t h e r argument (TRD 157,20ff), one may think, at least primarily, of desire for special (sometimes, from the human point of view, disgusting) nutritive substances; cp. Vyom 404,19f: *niyata-dravyāhīlāśaḥ ca vrksāyurveda* (cp. Das 1988, 206ff and 466ff) *paripatihārāḥ tēṣāṁ jñāyate, tadupabhoge puspādīdarśanār;* cp. also comm. ad NiL 364. At KIr 40,3 *doḥada* even appears to mean such substance itself (*mūle niṣiktānām apāṁ doḥadasya ca pāṛthivasya dhātor abhyāḍānāt*).

493 VinMañj 201 (*visayagahānaṁ*: see n. 495); TJv 354b5ff describes and refutes at length a view — similar to that of Mahābhārata 12.177.10-18 (see n. 15) — according to which plants are sentient
the opponent to prove that plants are sentient, are unproved to the Buddhist and nothing but fancy.

33.2 Or when the opponent concludes sentience from, e.g., the fact that a mimosa leaf reacts to touch by coiling up, like a millipede, the Buddhist rejoins that similar reactions can also be found in undisputedly in sentient things, as when a hair coils up under the influence of fire. To the argument that plants beings like men, etc., because they have all the six senses (and the corresponding perceptions) (354ab5f: liaon sin rnam ni smas dbang bcas pa yin te / dbang po yod pa'i phyir mi la sogs pa bzin no //); e.g., when a creeper spreads by taking a tree as its support this indicates its having the sense of sight (caksurindriya; cp. MBh 12.177.13), or the fact that trees flower and fruit in a specific season shows the presence of [perception or awareness of time, which is non-sensory, and hence the presence of] mana-indriya (355a6f: sin rnam kyang dus ji lta ba bzin du me tog dbang bras bu la sogs pa 'byin par byed pas yid kyi dbang po yod pa yin no). Cp. VāvBh 1755cd (baulādāo ya (sc. saceyanā), sādāi-visaya-kālōvalambhā); ĀyārViv 44,16-19; TRD 157,18-158,10. — Acc. to VāvBh 103 and esp. Maladhāri-Hemacandra’s explanation of this verse, the phenomena from which Bhavya’s opponent derives the presence of all the six senses (and perceptions) in plants are compatible also with the Jaina doctrine that plants belong to the ekendriyas, i.e. have only the sense of touch; for the perception and notions (samjñā) indicated by the above phenomena do not derive from the physical sense-organ (āravindriya), which is lacking in plants, but are a kind of exceptional awareness acquired immediately through the corresponding perceptive capacity of the soul (bhāvendriya, cp. Frauwallner 1956a, 270f) and by an analogous thinking capacity (cp. also Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Calcutta 1951, 52f).

494 MHrd IX.146ab: acittakatvād evaśām dohādāy-aprasiddhatā (ms. "teh", but Tib. ma grub thid); hence (146c): hetavaḥ syur asiddhārthāḥ ...; cp. TJv 359a8f, and 358b5ff for a mechanistic explanation of the rest period and the growth period of plants. — Acc. to MHrd IX.146d, these reasons (viz. dohada and sleep) are not only unproved (viz. if taken in their strict sense) but also inconclusive (viz. if one considers only the phenomena that can be observed, like contracting the leaves at night [cp. TJv 359b1ff, but with different examples; cp. also § 32.2]): gadaīs ca vyabhicārinā (sc. hetavaḥ; Tib. suggests "ritā (sc. hetinām)). The example ("diseases"; Tib. has, however, lhog pa, "ulcer" (gandaīs ca?)) would make good sense if dohada is understood, with Tib. and TJv, as "enmity" manifesting itself in destroying life (see n. 492); and many diseases may be said to "sleep" and "run riot" in the sense of being latent at one time and acute at another.

495 VinMañj 201: visayagahaṇaṃ ca tesāṃ parikappanāmattāṃ, supiṇaṃ viya cincāḍinaṃ; tathā dohālādayo.

496 Cp. Nil 365 + comm.; VāvBh(V) 1754ab; ĀyārViv 44,18f; TRD 158,6f and 159,9.

497 Tib. has rkaḥ brgya ("[having a] hundred feet") for mandalakārikā, which is more suitable to the present context than "eine Art Gyrinus, Taumelkäfer?" (Schmidt, Nachtr). Precisely speaking, it is millipedes (like the European Julius Terrestris) and not centipedes (like the European Lithobius Forficatus) that roll up when feeling threatened. The kuliṅga of VāvBh 1754b (the comm. says: kitādiḥ) may or may not be the same animal.

498 Insentience of hair in spite of its growing on a sentient body: TJv 357a2f (read ma yin te (D)).
that have fallen ill are treated medically just like animals or men — there is a special
discipline called tree medicine (vrksayurveda) —, the Buddhist replies that this
does not prove their sentence since also inanimate things like spoilt liquor or defiled
gold are "cured" by means of certain ingredients (*samskara-viśeṣa).*

Cp. also AyārViv 44,8ff.

MHr ÍX.14f: sparsāto yadi samkocād yathā manḍala-kārikā/ sacittake tathābhūṣṭe sa-
<maṅgāḥ> jālikāre (ms. "jāla"),// vahṇi-sansprṣṭa-keśāyai <h> syād dhetor vyabhicāritā,/
cūrṇa-pārata-samsrṣṭa-keśair vā ...; cp. also Tjv 355a2f and b8ff (with further examples like that
of a piece of skin shrinking when coming into contact with fire). Acc. to MW, anjalikārikā is Mimosa
nataras (PW: M. pudica, acc. to MW, EDS: M. pudica or nataras), on which W. Roxburgh (Flora
Indica, repr. 1874, 420) writes: "Leaves possessing much sensibility, I think next to M. pudica." The
present botanical name of M. nataras L.f. is Neptunia nataras (L.f.) Druce (= Neptunia oleracea
Lour.). [This information I owe to Prof. K. Kubitzki (Hamburg).] Samaṅga, too, is probably a
mimosa or related species (cp. Amarakoṣa 2.4.141) though, in a text like Tjv, hardly Mimosa
dudica (thus MW) which acc. to D. Brandis (Indian Trees, London 1921, 263) was introduced from
America.


VĀyBh 1753 (...-āmayo roga-tigicchāhi ya ... saceyanā taravo); TBV 653,1 (ausadha-
prayoga); AyārViv 44,26+28 (disease and specific horticultural treatment); TRD 158,19-22 (disease);
158,22ff (application of drugs and specific horticultural treatment); 159,11-13 (āyurvedodita-tat-tad-
roga-viśīṣṭauṣadhaprayoga); Nil 366 + comm; Kir 40,1. Cp. MBh 12.177.15.

MHr ÍX.143: cikṣyatevān na taravo yujante hi sacittakāḥ: / vinasṭasyāpi madyādeḥ
prayāpatti ca samśayaḥ //; Tjv 357a7ff: "If [the opponent says:] "Trees do have mind; for
instructions have been given [in the Vṛksayurveda (cp. TRD 159,10)] with regard to their different
life-spans and with regard to how to cure their diseases, etc. With regard to insentient [things] like
stones, on the other hand, no [application of] any means for curing [diseases] can be observed ... Hence,
trees are sentient, like men», one should reply as follows: Since what is called "curing
diseases" is a property of the bodies of sentient beings, it is not established in the case of insentient
ones [like trees]. Therefore, the [property] denoted by the reason itself is not established [as occurring
in the subject of the inference] (hetor asiddhārthata); for what is perceived in the present case (viz.
in trees) is merely the cessation of a modification (or disturbance) of the elements (*bhūta-parināma-
nivṛtti-mātra). Such a modification, however, is inconclusive (vyabhicārin) because [it occurs also in things] that are <not > regarded as sentient, like spiritual liq ur (madya), musk or a wea pon / sword (* s a t r a ) (cp. comm. ad Nil 370: a "scarred" sword repaired
by means of a magnet) "(gol te ljon šīn rnam ni sens daḥ bcas pa śid yin te/ tse'i dbye ba daḥ nad
gso ba la sogs pa'i bya ba'i man ňag ňe bor bstan pa'i phyir rol/ sens med pa (D) rdo la sogs pa
rnam la ni gso ba'i thabs gah du yah ma mthoḥ la/ ... de'i phyir/ sens daḥ bcas pa yin te/ mi (P.D:
me) bīṃ no že na/ 'di skad brjod par bya ste/ nad gso ba žes bya ba ni sens daḥ bcas pa'i lus kyi
chos yin pa'i phyir/ sens med pa rnam las de ma grub pas gran tshigs kyi don ma grub pa śid yin
te/ 'byun ba'i 'gyur ba ldog pa śid tsam 'dir mjon sum du gyur pa la/ de dag kyaḥ sens daḥ bcas
pa lta bur <ma> mthoḥ ba'i chaḥ daḥ/ gla (D) rtsi daḥ/ mtskön cha la sogs pa rnam kyi (D; P
the opponent adduces the fact that plants grow, beget homogeneous offspring or are born in specific seasons, like horses and other animals, the Buddhist points out that these properties are also found in sentient things: in skin diseases like ringworm or in ulcers, in ant-hills, corals, salt, crystals(?) jewels or "gold-sprouts", and in hair or finger-nails. Other characteristics which plants

maḥes pa ḥid kyis) maḥes pa ḥid yin no/). — G o l d : TJv 357b5f; comm. ad Nil 370.

505 TJv 357b5: chaṅ dag(?) nus pa āams par gyur pa las yiṅ 'dus byas pa'i khyad par gyis (D) nus pa daṅ idan par 'gyur ba ...

504 MHřd IX.144: samānaprasvad vrddheḥ ... sacittakāḥ/ rtujavāt ... cāpiśtās, turagādīvat// (em. as proposed in n. 490). — For "growing" (vrddhi) cp. TJv 358a2-4; Āyār, p. 4,29 (vuddhi-dhammayanā); ĀyārViv 44,13f and 44,25f; TRD 157,13-15 and 159,8, as well as 158,18, 159,1 and 159,11f (various aspects of growth; similarly TBV 652,1-3); Sv I 161.21f (= Ps III 120,11f): tesu (viz. sālī-adīsu) hi so (viz. Makkhali Gosālpatto) vi r u h a n n a - b h ā v e n a jiva- saṅhī (Sr-p 1 289,1f explains: jivanato pāṇaṁ dhārenta viya gati-jāti-vaddhanato jīvā); Nil 362 + comm.; Kir 40,3: vrddhi, at PDhSg 87,23 one of the arguments for the presence of a soul (in men and animals), but used by Udayana, besides "healing up" (see n. 520), also in connection with plants as a reason for proving that they consume water (cp. MBh 12.177.18; Wezler 1987a, 341f) and nutritive substances, which in its turn serves to prove the presence of internal wind (see n. 514); from this, in its turn, Udayana derives the occurrence, in plants, of living, dying, sleeping, etc., in the strict sense which implies that plants, too, are animate beings inhabited and controlled by an individual soul. — For "h o m o g e n e o u s p r o p a g a t i o n " (samānaprasava) cp. TJv 358a1f; VĀvBh 1756 (sāmaya-jāī-rūv-ānkurowalambhā tarugana-...ādāo (saceyanā)); Nil 368 + comm.; cp. Kir 40,1: bija-sajāṭīyānubandha (but differently explained by the comm.: Kir 40 n. 1). — For "b e i n g b o r n i n s p e c i f i c s e a s o n s " (rtujarva) cp. TJv 358a5f; cp. also TJv 355a6f (see n. 493) and perhaps comm. ad Nil 367.

505 " R i n g w o r m " (dadru): MHřd (see n. 508); s k i n d i s e a s e s (mdze nad (= kuṣṭha) la sogs pa): TJv 359b4 and 6; cp. ib. b4 za phrug (= g-yan pa [Bod-rgya tshig-mdzod chenmo], i.e. kanḍu [MVy 8516]); u l c e r (lhog pa, lhog rgyal): TJv 358b2 and 6-8. Cp. also Nil 368 + comm. (tumour or cancer). [Precise information on the meaning of dadru and mdze I owe to Prof. R. E. Emmerick.]

506 A n t - h i l l s : TJv 358b2 (grog mkhar gyi sa); comm. on Nil 362; c o r a l s : MHřd (see n. 508), TJv 358b2 (bhyu ru); VinMaṇḍ (see ib.: pavāla); cp. also VĀvBh and TRD (vidruma: see ib.); s a l t : VinMaṇḍ (see n. 508: lavana); TJv 358b2 (sen 'dab pa'i tsha = saṁdhava; cp. GrCh 278,4 sen da bha'i tshwa); cp. also VĀvBh and TRD (see n. 508: lavana); s t o n e s , i.e. c r y s t a l s (?): VinMaṇḍ (see n. 508: silā [cp. BHSD s.v. silā]); cp. also VĀvBh and TRD (see ib.: upaṭa); j e w e l s : MHřd (see n. 508), TJv 358b2 (vaṭḍūra); 358b4 (rin po che or rin po che...i myu gu (*ramānkura)): " g o l d - s p r o u t s " (hemānkura): MHřd (see n. 508); TJv 358b2 and 4). I do not know what, precisely, "gold-sprouts" and "jewel-sprouts") are, but cp. TJv 358b4f (see n. 508) and TRD 153,17f, referring to homogeneous "sprouts" of salt, corals and "stones". Cp. also MW s.v. ramānkura ("a young pearl"). — Cp. also Vyom 404,21f (sands).

507 H a i r : MHřd (see n. 508); TJv 358b1; Nil 362 + commentary; f i n g e r - n a i l s : TJv
share with animals, like ingestion of food,⁵⁰⁹ are simply passed over in silence.

34 Thus, the tendency of the Buddhist is to stress similarities of plants with undisputedly sentient, preferably inorganic things. The same is also true in many of the cases where the Buddhist does not refute the opponent’s view that plants are sentient beings but rather tries to prove his own view that they are not. Here, too, the Buddhist tries to point out either such properties as plants share with the in sentient, or properties which distinguish them from animals and men.⁵¹⁰ E.g.,

358b2; Nil 362 + comm. — TJV 358b2 adduces, as another example, a "fruit of Benicaca hispida or cerifera (kušmānda, a kind of pumpkin) that has been cut (i.e. killed) (?)" (ku sman da’i [D; P: kun da’i]; GrCh 278.4: skun sman da’i) 'bras bu bcad [GrCh; P: bcas; D: dañ bcas] pa), which requires further clarification.

⁵⁰⁸ MHrd IX.145: dadru <-vidruma- (or: -pravāla-, Tib. byu ru) ->-vaiḍūrya-keśa-hemāṅkurādi-bhiḥ/ vyabhicārār tariṇāṁ te (or: tair?) na sidhyanti sacitattāḥ/ (Tib. rin chen "jewel" instead of ‘keśa’, but cp. TJV 358b1 skra; 2nd line e. c.; ms. acc. to Kawasaki 1986, (15) n. 18: "rāttu rūpāṇāntena sidhyantī sacitattakaḥ; Kawasaki 1986, (9), suggests: "rāi tu taravo na sidhyantī sacitattakaḥ; Kawasaki 1988, 33: "rāi tu rūpāṇām ...; Tib. śīṃ rams supports taru, not rūpa, but does not help as regards te (i.e. rvan-mate) or tahi (sc. hetubhīḥ); VinMañj 201: vuddhi pana pavāja-silā-lavanānam api vijjatiti on tesam jivabhāve kāranaṁ; cp. also VĀbh 1756 (maṃsaṃkure vva sāmāṇajārīrūvaṃkurovalambhāḥ ...-viddumā-lavanāvalādaḥ ... (sc. saceyaṇa) + comm., and TRD 153,17 ( ... lavoṇa-vidrumo-paladīnām sāmāṇajāri-yūvaṃkuropatīmtavam arṣomāṃsānkarasaye cetanācīhnam asty eva). — Skin diseases like ringworm, spreading from one spot of the body to others, are clearly an example of homogeneous propagation (sāmāṇapravasava), as is confirmed by TJV 359b4-6 (similarly Nil 368 + comm. [tumour or cancer]), whereas ulcers exemplify growth (ṛddhi) (TJV 359b6-360a1 and 358b1-3; at b3f an opponent objects that ulcers are sentient [cp. the use of haemorrhoids as an example for sentience in VĀbh and TRD]); the Buddhist’s reply is that they are sentient in the sense that they have no sentience of their own. Growth is exemplified also by most of the other examples (TJV 358b1-3). Corals, salt and crystals(?) are used as examples of both growth (VinMañj [see above], TJV 358b1-3; 359a5f) and homogeneous propagation (VĀbh and TRD [see above], though these Jāna texts do not use this fact for proving the sentience of plants but, on the contrary, for proving that corals, etc., too are sentient, like haemorrhoids). Hair, too, is used to exemplify both growth (TJV 358b1f) and homogeneous propagation (TJV 358a8-b1, interjecting the growing again of hair that has been cut off as samāṇa-prasava). "Gold-sprouts" (hemāṅkura) and jewel-(sprouts) are taken as examples of both growth (TJV 358b1-3) and "being born (lārissing) in a specific season" (ṛtujaṇa), TJV 358b4f explaining that they arise "when the clouds make noise", which would seem to mean: in the monsoon season. (At TJV 260a1-3, however, the example for ṛtujaṇa is bile, wind and phlegm.)

⁵⁰⁹ E.g., Āyārs p. 4,30 (āhāragan); VĀbh 1753b; Āyārviv 44,21-23; TBV 653,3 (pratiniyata-pradeśāhāra-grahaṇa); TRD 158,12-15 and 159,10; Kir 40,2f (see n. 504).

⁵¹⁰ Cp. VinMañj 200: (rukhkādayo ... na jīva, ...) visadisaṣṭikabhāvato.
a) the fact that plants lack the capacity of (perceptible) autonomous motion or locomotion;\(^{511}\)
b) the fact that they lack bodily heat;\(^{512}\)
c) the fact that they do not breathe\(^{513}\) (at least not in the perceptible way animals and men do)\(^{514}\);

\(^{511}\) Y, zi 211b3 (rañi gis kyi mi g-yo ba) = Y, 660b5; TJv 361a1 (verse quotation): g-yo ba med nid; cp. 361a4 lus kyi phyi rol bya ba rnam/s brtan (P,D: bstan) pa rnam la ma mtho bas// des na sñ la sens pa med//, i.e. plants are insentient because they lack external(ly perceptible) activities; cp. also VinMaññ 200 pariphandabhāvata (which, however, may also refer to the lack of jerking or wincing when injured). Cp. also Nil 372 + comm. (accepting the absence of locomotion in plants), whereas some Jainā authors (VĀvBh 1754cd; TRD 158,5ff and 159,9) assert that some kind of movement does occur in plants, as when creepers creep towards a support (āśrayopasarpāna); cp. also Sv-pṭ I 289,1f (see n. 504); TJv 354b6f (based on MBh 12.177.13) and, for similar kinds of movement, TJv 354b7: heliotropism of sman shbrul mgo (MVy 8531: nāgaśirṣaka, but not as name of a plant) and ni ma'i rjes su 'brah ba ("suvacalā?; cp. Wezler 1987a, 323ff); VYom 404,18: extending the "feet" (= roots) towards nutritive substances when these are nearby; Kir 40,1: anukūlāpaga-pratikālāpaga, not concretized. According to TJv 355b1 these movements are in reality heteronomous like that of a piece of iron attracted by a loadstone. — For (autonomous) movement being a characteristic feature of life or living beings see TJv 360b8f (verse quotation): tshe dañ drod dañ rnam sles dañ// g - y o b a ... gān la dmiñgs gyur pāi// de la 'tʃo ba (= *jīva) zes bya'o//; cp. also DhPr 192,17 (see n. 479); Nyāyasūtra 1.1.11 + comm. (ceṣṭā, defined as a specific sāṁhā or paripāṇa). — It seems that the view of plants having consciousness confined within the limits of their "body" (antaḥsāṃjña) could easily be used to defend the sentience of plants in spite of the fact that they lack (autonomous) outward movement or activity and uttering of sounds (see § 34, g) (Medhātithi and Kullūka ad Manu I 49; Wezler 1987b, 114f, 123 and 130) and — hence (easily perceptible) reactions to injury (see § 34, h).

\(^{512}\) TJv 361a1 (verse quotation) drod med. Yet, MBh 12.177.18 (cp. Wezler 1987a, 341f) suggests that fire must be present in trees because the fact that they grow and discharge excretions proves that they digest food (which presupposes the presence of digestive fire). — For bodily heat (uṣman, drot) as constitutive of life see TJv 361b8f (see n. 511); MN I 296, AKBh 73,19f, etc. (cp. L. Schmithausen, Ālayavijñāna, Tokyo 1987, n. 165); DhPr 192,17 (see n. 479).

\(^{513}\) TJv 361a4 (verse quotation): srog ni 'byūn 'jug (= respiration) ... ma mthoñ bas// des na sñ la sens pa med//; I take srog to render Skt. prāṇa, and its coming out ('byūn) and entering ('jug) to mean "respiration". For breathing as a characteristic of life, see also DhPr 192,17 (see n. 479). Cp. also VSū 3.2.4 und PDbhSg 87,20. Critically: comm. ad Nil 375.

\(^{514}\) The discovery of the respiration of plants (in a sense justifying the inclusion of plants in the pānas/prāṇins in the sense of "breathing beings") took place in the 18th century only. But Udayana (Kir 40,2f) states that one can infer that plants are furnished with "internal wind" (ādhyātmika-vāyu) from the fact that they take up water and nutritive substances (see n. 504) — an idea expressed already at MBh 12.177.16. Yet, as the illustration, at MBh 12.177.16, of the matter by [someone] sucking up water through a [hollow] stalk (Wezler 1987a, 339f) shows, this "internal wind" in plants is not, or at least not primarily, conceived in analogy to respiration proper.
d) the fact that they do not [show signs of] get[ting] tired;

e) the fact that they do not close and open [any eyelids] (referring either to winking as a sign of being alive, or to closing and opening the lids as a sign of falling asleep and awaking);

f) the fact that branches or even parts of branches when cut off grow again in other places (whereas severed limbs of men and animals invariably die), or that when a tree is heavily pruned or even when it is cut at the root it may still grow again (whereas in men and in most animals severed limbs are not reproduced;

515 TJv 361a3 (verse quotation): lus la ṇal ba med pa.../šiṅ la sems pa med/.

516 TJv 361a4 (verse quotation): bye (D; P byed) btsums ... ma mthoṅ bas! ... šiṅ la sems pa med//; Tib. bye btsums (though the intrans. pf. bye is somewhat odd beside the trans. pf. btsums; perh. phyè?) would seem to represent Stkt. unmesa-nimesa: cp. NBiṬ 214,19 (Tib. 'byed and 'dzum), where this phenomenon is also used, though in a different argument, as a characteristic of living beings. Cp. VSû 3.2.4 and PDhSg 87,22.

517 For the latter alternative cp. Nil 363 + comm. In this case, the argument implies that the tamarind's folding its leaves during the night is (as the Buddhist opponent in the comm. ad Nil 363 actually states) either not accepted as equivalent to closing the eyelids or ignored as exceptional (see also § 32.2 + n. 483).

518 Y, zi 211b4 (yal ga daṅ yal ga gyes pa dag bcad na yah de las gzan pa dag tu skye bas) = Y, 660b6f (頒枝條已除處更生). — Tib. skye ba can correspond to Stkt. vi-ruh (cp. AKBh-I s.v. vi-ruh, virohana; Prasannapadā (ed. de La Vallette Poussin) 567, ns. 1 and 3; KP § 39 (see n. 520)). As for vi-ruh (used of seeds in the sense of "to sprout" [e.g. Já IV 322,15] and of plants in the sense of "to produce fresh growth" [cp. also n. 520] or simply "to grow") said of parts of plants separated from the mother-plant, cp. the (negative) instance at Sv I 120, where the non-Buddhist doctrine of annihilation of living beings after death uses, as an analogy, the fact that leaves fallen from a tree do not grow any more: yathā rukkha-paṅñāni patitāni na puna viññhanti, evam sattā.

519 The advocate of the sentience of plants can of course avail himself of the fact that in most cases severed parts of plants do not grow again but wither (as is, though ignored in the present context, of course also known to the Buddhists; cp., e.g., Já IV 396. nalo chinno va sussati, or Vin I 189 (cp. § 8): tāla-taruṇāni chinnavi miḷāyanti) and are hence just like severed limbs of animals and men: cp. Æyārs p. 4,30 (chinnavi miḷāi); ÆyārViv 44,20f; TRD 158,10-12 and 159,9 (chinnavayavayay净值).

520 This is probably what is meant by chinne virūhanato at Vīmāṇj 200 since the logical subject of the passage (which is most likely also the noun one has to supply, ad sensum, to the loc. chinne) is "trees, etc." (rūkhādaya), and not "branches" etc., and since the healing up of a wound (even if linguistically possible) would not of course support the difference of trees from animals, etc. The expression chinne virūhanato is reminiscent of MBh 12.177.17 chinnavi ... virohana, where the meaning is probably the same but where the argument is, on the contrary, used to prove that trees do have a soul or life principle (jivam paṣyāmi vrksaṇām). — As for vi-ruh or virohana/virūhana in the sense of "growing again (after having been cut)" see Já II 322,11 and 323,2 (see n. 521). As for a
what is reproduced is in sentient parts of the body like nails and hair!\(^{521}\); 
g) the fact that plants do not answer when addressed;\(^{522}\) 
h) the fact that plants do not jerk or wince even when suddenly and violently injured,\(^{523}\) which means, according to the Buddhist, that they do not feel pain, \(^{524}\) just as a clod.\(^{525}\)

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tree (or more precisely: many species of trees) growing again even when heavily pruned or even when cut at the root (as long as the root is unimpaired), cp., e.g., Dhp 338 (yathā ... mūle anupaddave ... chinno pi rukkho puna-r-eva rūhati), KP §39 (tad yathāpi nāma viṭṭapacchino vṛksomūle 'nupadrute punar evamāva irahatī), or BĀU 3.9.28 (yaḥ vṛkṣo vṛkṣo rohati mālān navataraḥ punah ...); cp. also Sp 763f. — In later demonstrations of the sentence of trees or plants, it is mostly the argument that just as in men and animals so also in plants wounds or broken parts heal up that is used: cp. VĀyb 1753b (roṇaḥ; comm.: kṣata-samrohaṇa); TBV 653,1 (kṣata-bhagna-samrohaṇa); TRD 158,2-159,2 and 159,12f (kṣata-bhagna- (read -bhagna?)-samrohaṇa); Nīl 370 + comm.; Kir 40,3 (bhagna-kṣata-samrohaṇa, for which cp. PĐhŚg 87,23; for the sequence of argumentation at Kir 39,21-40,3 see n. 504); cp. also VYom 404,16 + 403,29. Note that the term used is mostly samrohaṇa, though derivations from vi-rūh also occur in this sense (cp. PW s. v. ruh + vi-, virohaṇa and viropaṇa: viropita-vraṇa, vraṇa-virohaṇa, etc.). — At T vol. 77, 313a19ff, Kūkai mentions the argument of non-Buddhists that trees and plants possess life because they grow again after having been felled or cut, but he also has an objector point out that precisely this capacity distinguishes them from man who lacks it. — As for the argument that trees are sentient because they die when injured too much, and the Buddhist rejoinder, see § 32.1 + ns. 475 and 477.

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\(^{521}\) Cp. Já II 322,11ff, where a man whose nose had been cut off (chinnaṇāsa) is told by another man: yathā kesā ca massā ca chinnaṃ chinnaṃ virūhaṇi, evam rūhati te nāsā, whereas yet another one tells him the truth: nāthti nāsāya rūhanā (Já II 323,2: virūhanā).

\(^{522}\) Y, zi 211b3 (brjod na yaṅ mi brjod pa) = Y, 660b5f (殫典語言而不報答); cp. TJv 361alf (verse quotation): thos la sogs par mi ‘gyur dahi sgra la sogs pa rtsogs (D; P: rtsog) med m/ī sens can ma yin bstan (D; P; read bstan?) pa ṭid/; which I tentatively take to mean: "[As] they cannot be heard [to utter sounds], etc. (i.e.: and cannot be perceived to produce other forms of communication either), and [as] they lack understanding of speech, etc., plants are certainly not living beings (*asattvāḥ sthāyārāḥ khalu (?))." In the last pāda the Tibetan syntax would yield "[they] are not living beings [but] only stationary [things]" (Kawasaki 1990), but I presume that in the original *sthāyārāḥ was intended to be the subject of the sentence. — Cp. also Já III 24 (as against IV 210; see n. 459). — As for plants being regarded as sentient in spite of being unable to utter sounds, see n. 511 (end).

\(^{523}\) MHṛd IX.140: sacittakā na taravo, ... madhyacchede 'pi ... aspandā; cp. VinMañj 200 (pariphandābhāvato, though this expression may just as well refer to the lack of autonomous movement in general (see § 34, a)). Cp. also n. 511.

\(^{524}\) TJv 356b3: ljon sīṅ de dag ni dkyil du bcad kyaṅ g-yo ba med de/ t s h o r / b a m e d p a 'i p h y i r r o o /; cp. MHṛd IX.140d jādarve (ed. jādyate, ms. jātara) sati.

\(^{525}\) MHṛd IX.140d: loṣṭavat.
35.1 One may call these arguments "arguments of natural science (or proto-science)". Now, on the whole, Buddhism, and particularly early Buddhism, quite in contrast to Jainism, shows little interest in questions of "natural science". Hence, it seems rather improbable that considerations of this kind were the original motive for denying plants sentience.

35.2 The only exception is the last argument, namely that plants do not feel pain because when injured they do not show any signs of feeling pain, at least none comparable to those shown by men and animals. Pain, suffering, is, of course, not at all marginal in early Buddhism, and a fundamental characteristic of saṃsāric existence, at least on the earthly level. Hence, the inability of feeling pain, if taken as symptomatic for having no feeling at all, could easily be imagined to have been a strong reason for excluding plants from the range of sentient beings. However, in an ambiance where people naively believed in the sentience of plants it was not at all natural to conclude, from the lack of external reactions, that plants do not feel pain when injured. On the contrary, it was common conviction that they did. Thus, in this case, too, it is more likely that the argument presupposes the denial of the sentience of plants, and not the other way round.

35.3 Yet, this may not be the whole truth. If we take the afore-mentioned arguments not in their particulars but rather in their common purport of stressing the essential difference between plants on the one hand and animals or man on the other, they may in fact have some connection with the original cause for the denial: They may, after all, be a later, consolidated, self-conscious and concretely delineated expression of that rationalist tendency which I presume to have already started to penetrate the ambiance in which Buddhism originated, and to have entailed a weakening of the old belief in the animateness and sentience of almost everything. But even so these arguments would not answer the question why this tendency came up in Buddhism itself or, more probably, was assumed by it from its ambiance, nor the question why it was, later on, developed into a theoretical, dogmatic

526 Provided that we ignore, in this connection, the fact that (at least some) Buddhists have nevertheless come to advocate the existence of entirely unconscious heavenly beings (asaṁśita-sattā nāma devā, e.g. DN I 28). According to Theravādin dogmatism, the asaṁśita-satta consist of nothing but corporeal matter lacking mind (citta), consciousness (saṁśita), nay, all the four mental khandhas throughout their existence in that sphere, from the first to the last moment (Kv III.11 + Kv-a 71f; Kv-a 113,20-22; Vibhaṅga 419; Sammohavinodanī 521; Sv 118; VisM XVII.254f). As against this, other schools hold that these beings are, to be sure, unconscious on the whole but do have consciousness in the very beginning (Vi 784b18f; cp. Kv-a 113,14f) or even in the beginning and at the end (AKBh 68,20f; Kv 262: cutikāle upapattikāle athi, ṣhitikāle naththi), i.e., according to some, in the very first and the very last moment (Kv-a 71,23-28: Andhakas; Kv-a 113,20; Vi 784b20f and 24ff: Ghoṣaka), or, according to the position approved by the Vibhaṅga, even for a certain time-span in the beginning and at the end of this existence (Vi 784b22-24 and c7ff).

527 Cp. MBh 12.177.17a.

denial of the sentience of plants. In this connection, two more arguments are of considerable interest (§§ 36.1-37.3).

36.1 The first one, found in the Yogācārabhūmi and in the verses quoted in the Tarkajvālā, is the argument that plants are not living, sentient beings because they do not perform good and bad karma, and because they are never affected by desire or hatred.

36.2.1 This points to the context of the theory of rebirth, which according to Buddhism is kept going by emotions like desire, and determined by one's karma. It may hence be worth investigating whether the rejection of plants as sentient beings may be connected somehow with the theory of rebirth, more precisely with the attempt to establish as extensive the range of sentient beings on the one hand and the range of possible forms of rebirth on the other.

36.2.2 For contrary to what is often suggested, it seems to me quite improbable that these two areas coincided from the outset. It is more probable that we have to do with two different strands which originally were largely independent from each other. And it seems that originally the range of living, sentient beings killing or injuring which is dangerous or immoral, was much wider than the range of forms of rebirth, at least of such as were usually taken into account.

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529 Y, zi 211b3f (= Y, 660b6): legs par byas pa daññt ṅes par byas pa'i las la 'jug par yañ mi snañ ba...s mi ruñ ṇo (viz. the view that green trees have life: Y, zi 211a5f); TJu 361a2f: ḍe ba dañ ni mi dge'i las// sms yod rnams la 'byuñ 'gyur gyil// bṛtan (e.c.; D,P: bstan) pa rnams la de med pas (D; P: par) // des ni śīn rnams sms med yin/.

530 TJu 361a3f: 'dod dañ ūe sdañ dañ bral śīn// ... des na śīn la sms pa med//.

531 Cp., e.g., Schubring, Āyār, p. 51; Schmidt 1968, 650. - The thesis that "since its earliest occurrence the ahimsā-doctrine is connected with the belief in metempsychosis" (Schmidt) would be defendable only if the term "metempsychosis" is understood in an unusually imprecise sense, viz. as merely denoting some kind of after-life of both men and animals, etc. For what is presupposed in the so-called "story of Bhṛgu in the yonder world" (see § 36.3.2 + n. 539) is not transmigration or metempsychosis in the sense of rebirth of men as animals, etc., or animals, etc., as men in this world. What is presupposed is merely the fact that both men and animals have an after-life, that men after death go to the yonder world, and that animals, plants and (according to the ŚB version) even water take revenge upon man in the yonder world (or on the way to it: see a. 540) by inflicting upon him precisely the same tortures they have suffered from him in this world. It would seem that it is only for this purpose, i.e. for the sake of being able to wield axes and choppers, etc., that the animals, etc., assume human form, whereas men, though now the victims, remain men. This shows that the exchange of rōles does not involve an exchange of essence or nature. The assumption of human form by the animals, etc., is hence merely a functionally motivated metamorphosis into, not a metempsychosis as, a human being, and still less so in view of the fact that it does not include rebirth in this world but, on the contrary, takes place in the yonder world.
36.3.1 As stated above, in Vedic religion the range of living beings killing or injuring which is dangerous included not only animals but also plants, water and earth. The doctrine of rebirth, on the other hand, appears to have started, according to recent research by M. Witzel and Y. Ikari, from a man-centered concept. According to this concept (close parallels to which can be found also in Indian tribal belief), a man was, after a sojourn in heaven mainly due to ritual acts, again reborn as a human being, preferably in his old family. I call this the "zig-zag pattern".

36.3.2 To be sure, further ideas that have to do with destiny after death can be traced in our sources or may have to be presupposed. E.g., there are traces also of a dark, sombre place to go to after death; there is the idea that non-human beings, too, have an after-life in the yonder world: the sacrificial victim goes to heaven (remaining, even there, it seems, an animal), and the same seems to hold good for sacrificial plants, in the "story of Bhrigu in the yonder world", animals, plants and even water are at hand in the yonder world (or on the way to it).


533 Hodson 1921a, 1; 3f; 6; 9: 1921b, 204ff; 208; 211.

534 In using this expression I disregard the duration of stay in this as well as in the other world.


536 Schmidt 1968, 646; cp. also 631.

537 Cp. RV 1.162.7 and 21 (cp. Schmidt 1968, 646 + n. 4).


540 I.e. if the black man met by Bhrigu at the last station of his journey were to be understood as the guardian of the yonder world proper. Cp. perhaps also the fact that Bhrigu's journey seems to take place, in various directions, on a horizontal level. Cp., in this connection, also the interesting information in Höfer 1975, 50, that — obviously on his way to the Land of the Dead.
retaliate injury to the persons who had killed them in this world, and they even assume human form there, probably merely because otherwise they would not be able to wield axes and choppers.\textsuperscript{541} Likewise, deceased humans may, before being reborn, assume the form of animals and appear as such.\textsuperscript{542} There may have been the idea that when being reborn in this world the deceased passes through trees or plants,\textsuperscript{543} and/or rain or dew.\textsuperscript{544} And there must have existed, especially in the indigenous strata of the society, quite different views of afterlife, e.g., probably, the idea of rebirth as an insect\textsuperscript{545} and of a gradual fading away after rebirth(s?) as an insect, butterfly, caterpillar or the like,\textsuperscript{546} or after rebirth in ever remoter Lands of the Dead;\textsuperscript{547} or the idea of a special destiny of people who died an "evil death", and who may become animals, as, e.g., a tiger in case one had been eaten by a tiger.\textsuperscript{548}

36.3.3 Some of these more or less heterogeneous elements have been integrated into the "zig-zag pattern" in the famous Upaniṣadic locus classicus of the doctrine of rebirth:\textsuperscript{549} especially the return from the yonder world through atmosphere, rain, earth and plants, and the possibility of being reborn as a worm or insect, obviously

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\textsuperscript{541} See n. 531.

\textsuperscript{542} Baudhāyana-Dharmasūtra 2.14.10 (forefathers wandering about in the form of birds; from Witzel 1983 [see n. 532]); Hodson 1921a, 4 (spirit of the dead believed to reside in the bodies of crows (Kurubas)); ib., 6, speaks of repeated \texttt{rebIRTH} as butterflies in the time between death and rebirth as a human (Lushai), but it may be difficult in such cases to draw a sharp border-line between rebirth or metempsychosis on the one hand and metamorphosis on the other.

\textsuperscript{543} Hodson 1921a, 1f (Santals); 1921b, 205; 208; 212ff.

\textsuperscript{544} Hodson 1921a, 6 (Lushais).

\textsuperscript{545} Höfer 1975, 53 (Nagas). Cp also n. 542.

\textsuperscript{546} Cp. G. Prunner in: Höfer 1975, 195 (Nung: rebirth as an animal, then as an insect, finally turning into red earth); Bezacier, ib. 368 (Tal: rebirth as caterpillars, then turning into a kind of moss).

\textsuperscript{547} Höfer 1975, 53 (Nagas); 114 (Sre, Södang); Chr. v. Fürer-Haimendorf, The After-Life in Indian Tribal Belief, in: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 83.1/1953, 43 (Konyak Nagas).

\textsuperscript{548} Hodson 1921a, 7 (Garos); cp. also 1921b, 205 (no rebirth [i.e., probably, not rebirth as a human: cp. Hodson 1921a, 7] of men killed by tigers or snakes).

\textsuperscript{549} ChU V.10; BĀU VI.2.14ff.
as the destiny of those outside the Aryan cult of cremating the deceased, and obviously without any possibility of further rebirth as a human. But even this does not yet mean that all elements, plants and insects participate in the process of rebirth, or that they all consist of, or contain, what had formerly been a human being. And, at any rate, the passing through the elements and plants is automatic and not dependent on ritual karma, let alone moral karma, the latter coming in only in a paragraph which is obviously a later interpolation found in one version only.

36.4 The rebirth theory of earliest Jaina, if retrievable at all, would seem to require special investigation. In the full-fledged system, rebirth as an animal, plant or element-being has been fully integrated into the "zig-zag pattern", though the latter is still clearly discernible. But there exists, even in later times, the idea of certain minute vegetable beings (the nigodas) which have always been in this state and do not, or not yet, participate in karma-determined samsāra.

36.5.1 In Buddhism, too, as has been shown by Vetter, the old zig-zag pattern is well-preserved, and is probably the starting point of the development of the Buddhist rebirth theory. It is, in several passages, still close to the Vedic pattern, apart from having been ethicized, which means that one’s destiny after death is now dependent on one’s karma in the sense of moral acts, and that the yonder world is now clearly differentiated into heaven for the good and an unpleasant underworld for the bad.

550 Cp. Halbfass 1980, 293 and 1991, 319 ("a form of soteriological failure"). I am not sure that the text allows to decide whether the idea is, as Halbfass suggests, an endless repetition of rebirth as an insect, etc., or merely an indefinite number of such rebirths ending in some kind of fading away, as tribal beliefs seem to suggest (see § 36.3.2 + n. 546).

551 Let alone other animals, some of which are only mentioned — as an alternative possibility to being reborn as a low caste human for people with bad karma — in what is obviously a later addition (cp. also Halbfass 1980, 299; 1991, 325), found in the Chândogya version only.

552 See n. 551

553 Rebirth of mobile (tasa) living beings as stationary (thāvara) ones and vice versa is already found at Āyāra p. 41,7.

554 Cp. Schurbing 1935, 123f: rebirth in heaven or hell is possible only from, and invariably followed by, a human (or higher animal) existence.


557 E.g., SN No. 3.21 (1 93ff), or in the formula of the "divine eye" (e.g. MN I 70f).

36.5.2 In these passages, rebirth as an animal is not mentioned.\(^{559}\) In one Sutta of the Majjhimanikāyā,\(^{560}\) however, it appears to have been secondarily integrated into the zig-zag pattern\(^{561}\) as an alternative to going to the underworld (now clearly described as hell). This fact suggests, as Vetter\(^ {562}\) rightly concludes, that animals were, at least in an explicit and systematical way,\(^ {563}\) integrated into the Buddhist theory of rebirth only at a somewhat later stage of development.

36.5.3 In my opinion, it is quite plausible to assume that earliest Buddhism, focussing on the path to Nirvāṇa, was not specifically interested in, and did not reflect on, the relation of animals, let alone plants, to rebirth. In the long run, however, this question could not be ignored, if — as was the case in Buddhism — at least animals were taken seriously as sentient beings, especially if their existence was regarded as particularly unhappy.\(^ {564}\) If existence is conceived as caused by Thirst or Desire, and if at least all such suffering as is the outflow of a certain form of existence is taken to be the effect of the prior karma of the living being concerned,\(^ {565}\) existence as an animal, too, and the suffering it involves, cannot but be traced back to Desire and prior karma. For, if the moral law of karma is expected to be both binding and reliable it must be not only infallible but also universal. It is not enough to exclude that a moral or immoral action may have no consequence for the doer (kṛta-vipraṇāśa); it must also be excluded that a consequence (like unhappy existence as an animal) may hit one who has not done the corresponding deed(s) (akṛtābhīyāgama).

\(^{559}\) It may, however, be difficult to exclude the possibility that some vague chance of being reborn as an animal is, somehow, included in the concept of vinipāta (which at MN III 169 seems, in fact, to refer to animals).


\(^{561}\) At the same time, the "zig-zag pattern" is, in connection with the possibility of being reborn as an animal, additionally modified by the assumption that to emerge from this state of existence is extremely difficult and will happen at best after a very long time, an assumption which in this case would seem to imply a succession of many animal existences before rebirth as a human. In contrast to this, in the case of hell and heaven the text merely states that rebirth as a human takes places after a very long time, without necessarily implying, in this case, a succession of existences since one single existence in these spheres may well be of an extremely long duration.

\(^{562}\) Vetter 1988, 78 (line 3 from below).

\(^{563}\) See n. 559.

\(^{564}\) Cp., e.g., MN I 74f; III 169. Cp. BN § 21.2.

\(^{565}\) Cp. MN No. 135.
36.5.4 But even so the question arises why the Buddhists, unlike Jainas and most Hindus, have not also included plants into the karmically determined rebirth system. Provided that we do not already suppose the later view that plants are not sentient beings but rather the earlier one that they are sentient and hence exposed to suffering through being cut, mutilated or the like, there is no reason why one should not — as the Jainas and many Hindus actually do — regard them, too, as owing their state to former karma, and hence as another possible form of rebirth.

36.5.5 It is here that one may advance the argument that plants are not sentient because they do not commit or accumulate good and bad karma. But in the early rebirth pattern it is only in human existence that karma is committed or accumulated, whereas in the other world karma is only consumed but not accumulated. Hence, the argument that plants do not commit good or bad karma would not have excluded them necessarily from the range of possible forms of rebirth.

36.5.6 To be sure, already in the Buddhist canonical texts we can sometimes observe a tendency to modify the ancient pattern. In this connection, the passage where rebirth as an animal appears to have been newly introduced as an alternative to rebirth in hell is of special interest; for in this passage animals, too, are regarded as not only consuming previous karma but as also committing new karma (especially bad karma, by devouring each other). But it is not clear whether the ability to commit good or bad karma has now become necessary feature of all possible forms of rebirth. And even if it had, it would not have been impossible to assume that, just like animals, so even plants do commit good and bad actions (like bearing fruits and giving shadow, or destroying life by dropping a

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566 E.g., SB 11.6.1.8 and 10; Medhatithi et al. ad Manu I.49 and I.50 (Medh.: asyaḥ sthāvarāmikāyā gater anyā nīkṛṣṭā duḥkhahabulā gatīr nāśīl!); Rāghavānanda ad Manu XII.9 (duḥkhāikayonīm tarugulmalatāvram). Cp. Wezler 1987b, 114 and 117. For the Jainas: v. Glasenapp 1925, 188.

567 Cp., e.g., Manu I.49 (Kullūka: vrksādayas tamoguṇena vicitraduḥkhahapalānādharma-karmahetukaṃ vyāptāḥ ...); XII.9: śarīrājāḥ karmadoṣāyāṃ yāti sthāvaratāṃ naraḥ (Kullūka: ... śarīra-karma-ja-pāpaḥ yuktāḥ sthāvaratvāṃ mānuṣaj prāpnoti); Rāmānuja ad BhG 14.18.

568 This is very clearly expressed in the verse quoted at BĀU (Kāṇva) IV.4.6.

569 MN III 169; cp. Vetter 1988, 94.

570 This is, in fact, hardly possible in the case of the "unconscious (heavenly) beings", at least as they have been understood in the Theravāda tradition (see n. 526).

571 Cp., in this connection, Pv II.9.3-5 (see n. 414).
branch or by poison\(^{572}\).

\textbf{36.5.7} Hence, the necessity to establish as co-extensive the range of sentient beings and that of karmically determined rebirth can hardly have been the motive proper for denying plants the status of sentient beings. At best, it may have somehow contributed to the rigid and explicit dogmatization of this denial. But the main motive must have been something else.

\textbf{37.1} This brings me to the last argument, found only in the 
\textit{Tarkajvāla}. Plants, it is said, are not sentient beings, because otherwise eating cereals, fruits or vegetables, and drinking oil or sugar-cane juice would be equivalent to eating meat and drinking blood,\(^{573}\) and this would amount to a gigantic mass of bad karma,\(^{574}\) since consumption presupposes killing.\(^{575}\)

\textbf{37.2} This is, to be sure, written from the later standpoint of vegetarianism, but the essence of the argument would hold good also for traditional Buddhism, for which eating meat is not prohibited, provided that one has no share in the killing. For, as already stated above, in the case of meat it was, at least in a country like India, possible, even for ordinary lay people, to restrict consumption to occasions on which one was able to buy meat without being involved in the killing, or even to abandon meat-eating altogether. In the case of vegetable food, however, complete abstention at least was impossible unless one was ready to starve.\(^{576}\) Any eating would, directly or indirectly, presuppose \textit{himsā}.\(^{577}\) And most lay people were definitely unable to avoid harvesting food-plants themselves, or at least preparing them, which mostly includes cutting to pieces, pounding, cooking or frying. If plants are sentient beings, this would mean, primarily for lay followers, but indirectly also for monks and nuns (see § 25.1), a tremendous amount of inevitable killing, hence bad karma.

\textbf{37.3} Thus, this argument ultimately points to a situation similar to the one derived above (§§ 24.3ff) from the canonical evidence, namely that the starting point and primary motive for the exclusion of plants (and seeds) from the range of living,

\(^{572}\) Cp. Tjv 358a4f (see n. 492).

\(^{573}\) Tjv 360b4f (D: dza 315b2f): \textit{yaṅ samsa daṅ bcas pa ŋīd [g]cig yin na ni 'bras chan (D: P: can) daṅ/ phyë ma (D: P om.) daṅ/ me tog daṅ/ 'bras bu daṅ/ lo ma la sogs pa zos na yaṅ sams can gyi sa zos par 'gyur ba yin la/ til gyi til mar daṅ/ hur śīṅ gi khu ba la sogs pa 'thuṅs(D: P: 'thuṅ) na yaṅ srog chags kyi lus las byaṅ bā'ī khrag 'thuṅs pa yin pas ...

\(^{574}\) Tjv 360b5f: \textit{des na 'jig rten thams cad kyis kyan sdig pa chen po byas par 'gyur rol/}.

\(^{575}\) Tjv 360b7f: \textit{zos na ni srog chags la gnod par 'gyur bas ...}

\(^{576}\) Cp. Tjv 360b7: \textit{thar pa 'dod pa rnams zas ma zos na ni 'chi bar 'gyur la ...}

\(^{577}\) Cp. Tjv 360b6f: \textit{kha zas kyi bya ba rtag tu spyod pa na 'tshe ba la 'jug pa ŋīd du 'gyur ba'i phyir ...}
sentient beings in Buddhism was the compulsions of practicability, i.e. of avoiding excessive cumbersomeness (for monks and nuns) and scruples (in lay people) in using plants in everyday life.

38.1 According to the canonical evidence, in the beginning this exclusion appears to have been only a pragmatic one, not connected with a theoretical denial but rather with an attitude of merely ignoring, in certain contexts of life, the sentience of plants.\textsuperscript{578}

38.2 But such a flexible, pragmatic position — typical of earliest Buddhism also in other contexts — is not easily maintained. It may be a general tendency of the human mind to dogmatize such attitudes, or, more precisely, to supply them with a corresponding theoretical foundation or ideology. The more so when there are attacks from outside, as we may in fact presume in the present case. Particularly the Jaina's certainly made scornful remarks on the comparatively relaxed behaviour of the Buddhists and accused them of carelessness and lack of morality.

38.3 It is not improbable that their first target was the fact that Buddhist monks drank fresh water. For in the Milindapaṇha it is only against the sentience of water that real arguments are adduced, and the occasion for presenting them is in fact that Buddhists were blamed by the Jaina for drinking fresh water, which the latter regarded as sentient.\textsuperscript{579} To this accusation, the Buddhist reacts by denying water sentience and by presenting a series of arguments for this.\textsuperscript{580}

38.4 It would seem that likewise the fact that the Buddhist monks and nuns had few scruples in letting lay people "kill" plants expressly for their — the monks' and nuns' — sake (§ 25.1), and accordingly seem to have played down the "killing" of plants by lay people by implicitly or explicitly not reckoning it as bad karma (cp. § 26.2), must, sooner or later, also have provoked accusations from the Jaina.\textsuperscript{581} At least in one passage of the Yogācārabhūmi\textsuperscript{582} it is in fact in the

\textsuperscript{578} Cp., as a kind of systematic parallel, Udayana's statement (Klr 39,14f) that Praśastapāda included plants, in spite of their animateness, not among living bodies (śarīra) but among objects (vīṣaya) because he wants to point out that they mostly serve the purposes of mobile beings (jāngamopakāratāya) and are subject to them (sadadhīnata).\textsuperscript{579}

\textsuperscript{579} Mil 259,5ff.

\textsuperscript{580} Mil 259,9ff.

\textsuperscript{581} Cp., in this connection, that in the Skandhaka and Vinayavibhaṅga the prohibitions, for monks and nuns, to injure plants are not infrequently motivated by the fact that people other-Buddhist ascetics — stated to regard plants as living beings, especially living beings with one sense-faculty (ekendriya-jiva, a term well documented in Jaina sources!) — blamed the Buddhist monks or nuns with lack of sympathy (T vol. 24, 817b19; vol. 22, 41c8-11; cp. 129a7+10f; cp. also 641b1 (earth)). — Cp. also Nil 374.

\textsuperscript{582} Y 171,12ff.
context of killing living beings that the Jaina view that plants are included among them is expressly rejected by the Buddhist.
VIII. Postface

39 By way of conclusion, let me link up the past with the present, and with the future. Our problem today is not so much: How can we use (and this means in most cases: injure or destroy) plants without becoming guilty? It is rather: How can we come to feel guilty again when exploiting, injuring and destroying plants to the point of extirpating many of them? How can we re-establish inhibition with regard to injuring them?

39.1 If the usual Buddhist view is presupposed, viz. that plants are not living beings, at least not in the sense of being sentient or at any rate somehow susceptible to injury, one may still recur to the reasons adduced or presupposed by the Suttavibhanga and the Khandhaka in order to prove that the precepts not to injure plants are nevertheless well-motivated.

39.1.1 One of these reasons was regard for the view of common people (or non-Buddhist ascetics) who did consider plants to be living, sentient beings (see §§ 5.4-5.5; 8; 9.1f; 10.1; 12.4). Unfortunately, this argument, apart from addressing monks only, will hardly work in our rationalistic modern societies, where most people seem to hold just the opposite view, or at least behave as if they did.

39.1.2 Another reason was the conviction that plants, at least trees, are inhabited by deities or spirits who are injured or damaged by the destruction of "their" plant/tree and may even punish the offender (see § 5.3 and n. 149). This argument would hold good for lay people, too, and at the same time allows cautious use of plants since some of them may, at least occasionally, be devoid of a deity or because the deity can be requested to please choose another abode. However, in modern societies, including Buddhist ones, belief in such deities is vanishing. No longer alive in people's hearts, these deities have little chance to protect their trees. One may, at best, substitute them by the modern concept of Nature, which, mistreated, takes revenge sooner or later.

39.1.3 We also found the argument that injuring plants often violates human interests, mostly those of the owner (see §§ 5.1; 11.3; 12.1; 13.3; 14.4). Since this argument does not aim at excluding exploitation but only damage to the owner, it offers little help to the plants themselves; from their point of view, it does not matter whether they are exploited by the owner or by somebody else. At least as long as the concept of owner and of his rights and duties is not fundamentally reconsidered, this kind of argument, though perhaps not identical with the modern

583 E.g., when a tree deity has died recently (Sp 760; T vol. 24, 823b19f).

584 T vol. 23, 776a13ff = Vin. Mū, je 259a7f (stä la na pa 'di la la gah gnas pa de gnas gzhan tshol cig). Cp. also T vol. 23, 775c20-22 = Vin. Mū, je 258b3f where a tree deity is ordered by the Buddha to offer shelter to another one whose tree had been felled by a monk. — In the Bha-ddasālajātaka (see § 5.4 + n. 88), where the deity is so closely connected with the tree that she is almost a kind of tree-soul, no such possibility seems to exist.
anthropocentric attitude of entirely unrestrained exploitation, is not opposed to it either.

39.1.4 But as stated above (§ 5.2 and n. 204) a few sources suggest yet another motivation, viz. that plants should not be injured or destroyed because they are the abode or habitat of animals (cp. also the analogous motivation not to pollute water in § 11.1). This ecological argument is fully valid today also, indeed more than ever before, and for both monks and lay people.

39.2 However, I for one should find it reasonable to combine this latter argument with a different view of the nature of plants — one that is perhaps not too far from what I hope I have been able to show to have been, with some probability, that of earliest Buddhism; the view that plants themselves, too, are living beings, in the sense of a border-line case. But contrary to the situation in earliest Buddhism where the border-line status of plants served to reduce inhibitions against injuring them, it should now be used to re-establish them. In this sense, we should rather stress the other aspect of the border-line status: Plants are, to be sure, not living beings like animals, and not at all living beings like men, with some secret anthropomorphic features and faculties, and hence perhaps not sentient beings in the usual sense of the word; but not entirely insentient either, not altogether insusceptible of being injured; living beings of a peculiar kind, which we can somehow explore from outside, but which we will probably never be able to "understand" from within; familiar beings, but at the same time utterly strange, and precisely for that reason to be treated with respect: because we simply do not know, and perhaps cannot even imagine, what it means for a plant itself to be injured. To be sure, unless we are ready to starve, we cannot avoid using plants, and this often means: injuring or even killing them. But we should do this as little as possible, carefully and with a sense of regret, not with the unnecessary brutality and relentlessness which has become habitual, and at the root of which is mostly not need but greed.
Abbreviations

[Note: Pāli texts are quoted according to the editions of the Pāli Text Society, though for the basic texts and Sp I have used the Nālandā edition; Upaniṣads are quoted according to the edition by Limaye and Vadekar (Poona 1958).]

[ ] in texts: to be deleted
< > in texts: to be added


AitU Aitareya-Upaniṣad


AKTU Upāyikā nāma Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā (Ṭamathadeva): Tj, mDo-'grel, vols. tu and thu.


AN Āṅguttaranikāya

As Atthasāliṁ (Buddhaghosa), ed. E. Müller, London 1897 (PTS).

AV Atharvaveda

Āyāra II Āyārāṇa/(Ācārāṇa), 2nd book (quotations acc. to H. Jacobi, Jaina Sutras: SBE vol. xxii, and JĀS ed.).

Āyār/Sūy Ācārāṅgasūtras and Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtras, with the Nirvyuki of Ācārya Bhadradhāva and the Commentary of Śīlāṅka-Śārya, orig. ed. by Ācārya Sāgarāṇandāsūriṇī Mahārāja, re-ed. by Muni Jambūvījaya (Lālā Sundarlāl Jain Āgamigranthamālā Vol. 1), Delhi 1978.

ĀyārN Āyārāṇa-nijjutti (Bhadradhāva); ed. see Āyār/Sūy.


ĀyārViv Ācārāṅga-vivarana (Śīlāṅka): ed. see Āyār/Sūy.

BĀU Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad

BhG Bhagavadgītā

Bhī Bhikkhuni/Bhikṣuṇī


BoBh  Bodhisattvabhūmi (ascribed to Asanga), ed. N. Dutt, Patna 1966.

Ch.  Chinese

ChU  Chândogya-Upaniṣad

CPD  V. Trenckner et al., Critical Pāli Dictionary, Copenhagen 1924ff.

D  Derge edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka

DĀ(₆)  Dīrgāhāgama (Chinese: T vol. 1, No. 1).


Dh.  Dharmaguptaka

Dhp  Dhammapada

DhPr  Dharmottarapradīpa: Paṇḍita Durvekamiśra's Dharmottarapradīpa (being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭṭikā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu), ed. Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Patna 1971.

DN  Dīghanikāya

EĀ(₆)  Ekottārāgama (Chinese: T vol. 2, No. 126)

EDS  An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles, ed. A. M. Ghatage, Poona 1976-.

GBM(FacEd)  Raghu Vira and Lokesh Chandra, Gilgit Buddhist Manuscripts (Facsimile Ed.), New Delhi 1959-1974.


GOS  Gaekwad's Oriental Series


IBK  Indo-gaku Bukkyō-gaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).

IIJ  Indo-Iranian Journal

Jā  Jātaka

JĀG  Jaina Āgama Granthamālā

JIABS  Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

Kā.  Kāśyapīya


KISchr Kleine Schriften

KP Kāśyapaparivarta, ed. Staël-Holstein, Shanghai 1926.

Kv Kathāvatthu

Kv-a Kathāvatthu-āṭṭhakathā


Mā Mahāsāṅghika

Mā.Lok. Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādin

MĀ(,) Madhyamāgama (Chinese: T vol. 1, No. 26).

MBh MBh Mahābhārata (crit. ed., unless specified otherwise).


Mf. Mahiśāsaka

Mil Milindapañha

MN Majjhimanikāya

Mp Manorathapūrṇī (AN-a)

MPPU Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Upadesa (ascribed to Nāgārjuna): T vol. 25, No. 1509.

MPSMah Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra: T vol. 12, No. 374.

Mū. Mūlasarvāstivādin


NBJ Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti): s. DhPr

NBīṬ Nyāyabinduṭikā (Dharmottara): s. DhPr

Nidd I Mahāniddesa

Nidd II Cullaniddesa

Nil Nīlakēci (see n. 472)

Pāc. Pācittiya

Pāc.Bhī. Pācittiyā section of the Bhikkhunī-Pātimokka (/Bhiṣṇuḥ-Prātimokṣa)

Patīs-a Paṭisambhidāmarga-āṭṭhakathā

PDhSg Padārthadharmasamgraha (Praśastapāda); ed.: s. Kir

Prát. Pratimokṣasūtra
Prát.Bhī. Bhikṣuṇī-pratimokṣasūtra
Prát.Sa. Tb Tunhuang ms. of Prat.Sa. (see n. 21).
Ps Papañcasūdana (MN-a)
Pv Petavatthu
R sTog Palace ed. of the Tibetan Kanjur
RE Rock Edict(s) (of Aśoka)
RV Rgveda
Sa. Sarvāstivādin
SĀ₁ Saṃyuktāgama (Chinese: Mū.): T vol. 2, No. 99.
SĀ₁ Saṃyuktāgama (Chinese: prob. also Mū.): T vol. 2, No. 100.
Saṅgh. Saṅghādīsesa/Saṅghāvāsesa
Śiks Śiksāsamuccaya (Śāntideva), ed. C. Bendall, repr. 's-Gravenhage 1957.
SN Saṃyuttanikāya
Sn Suttanipāta
Sn-a Suttanipāta-aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthajotikā II)
Sp Sāmantapāsādikā (Vin-a)
Spk Sāratthapakāsīni (SN-a)
StII Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
Sūy  Sūyagaḍa (quotations acc. to H. Jacobi, Jaina Sutras: SBE vol. xlv, and JĀS ed.).

SūyViv  Sūtrakṛtāṅga-Vivarana (Śīlāṅka): ed. s. Āyār/Sūy

Sv  Sumanāgalavilāsīnī (DN-a)


T  Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō


Th  Theragāthā

Th-a  Theragāthā-āṭṭhakathā


TRD  Tattvarahasyadipikā (Guṇaratna’s comm. on Haribhadra’s Saṃdarśanasamuccaya), ed. L. Suali, repr. Calcutta 1986.


VĀvBh  Viśeṣāvasyakabhāṣyam (Jinabhadra), Maladhāri-Śrī-Hemacandraśūrī-viracitāy Śisyahitänammyā bhūd-vṛttyā vibhūṣitam, ed. Pt. Haragovindadāsa, Benares, vīrasamvat 2441.

VĀvBhV  Viśeṣāvaśyaka-bhāṣya-(bhūd-vṛttyā)viśeṣāvadyaka-bhāṣya-(bhūd-vṛttyā): see VĀvBh

Vi  (Mahā-)Vibhāṣā(-sāstra): T vol. 27, No 1545.

Vin  Vinaya(piṭaka of the Pāli canon)

Vin.  Vinaya (of any school)


Vin.Mū,  Tibetan version of the Vinaya der Mülasarvāstivādins: Kj, 'Dul-ba, vols. kche (Vinaya-vastu), che-te (Vinaya-vibhangā), dē-ne (Vinaya-kṣudrakavastu) and pe (Vinaya-Utaragrantha).

Viyāh Viyāhapanṇatti (JĀS ed.)

VSū Vaiśeṣikaśūtra: Vaiśeṣikaśūtra of Kaṇāda, with the Comm. of Candrānandana, crit. ed. by Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, Baroda 1961 (GOS No. 136).

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WZKS(O) Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- (und Ost)asiens.

Y Yogācārabhūmi, ed. V. Bhattacharya, Calcutta 1957.

Yc Chinese version of the Yogācārabhūmi (T vol. 30, No. 1579).

Yt Tibetan version of the Yogācārabhūmi: Tj, Sems-tsam, vols. dzi-yi.

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Pātimokkhasutta: purpose of the P. 5.5; 24.3; structure 6.2.1; n. 118.
Saṅgh. 6 and 7: 10(ff) + n. 143; n. 75;
Pāc. 10: 15.1(ff) + n. 270; ns. 73, 174; cp. 6.2.1;
Pāc. 11: 4.1-6.2.2; 22.1.1; 22.1.6; 23.1-2; ns. 21, 118, 403;
Pāc. 19: ns. 152, 190;
Pāc. 20: 16.3 + n. 311; n. 118;
Pāc. 40: 16.3 + n. 314; 25.2 + n. 406;
Pāc. 53: 16.2 + n. 306;
Pāc. 56: 17.1(ff) + n. 320;
Pāc. 57: 16.2 + n. 305;
Pāc. 61: 6.2.1-2 + n. 100; n. 118;
Pāc. 62: 16.3 + n. 312; n. 118;
Pāc. 88: n. 121;
Sekhiya 74-75: 11.2 + n. 176;
Pāc.Bhī. 1: 14.1 + n. 250; 14.5;
Pāc.Bhī. 7: 13.1ff + n. 230;
Pāc.Bhī. 9: 11.2 + n. 176;
pātavya(tā) 4.1; 4.2.2; 6.1; 6.2.2; 22.1.6.
peasants 15.2; 26.1-2; 26.4.1; 27.
people’s belief 5.4-5; 8; 9.1-2; 10.1; 11.1-4; 12.4-5; 13.2.2; 13.3; 14.1; 15.2-3; 16.3 + n. 313; 17.1; 18; 22.1.2; 22.1.4; 23.1; 32.1; 35.2; 39.1.1; ns. 7, 435, 581.
perception of objects 33.1 + n. 493.
perception of time 33.1 + n. 493.
phlegm and snot 11.2.
pity: see compassion.
plants: passim; see bhūta(grāma), harita, (s)thāvāra;

included in pāṇa 20.1-21.3; 22.1.7; 23.1-3; 24.2.1-2;
as the abode of animals 5.2; 39.1.4; n. 204;
in the context of rebirth 29.2; 36.2.1-5.7; cp. 29.1.1;
in Vedic religion and Hinduism: 2.1; 20.4.2; 29.1.1; 31.2 + n. 467, 471; 36.3.2-3; n. 34; cp. 33.1-34;
in Jainism: 2.2; 4.2.1 + n. 29; 5.4; 14.2; 20.1; 20.4.2; 25.1; 26.2; 31.2 + n. 472; 36.4; 38.4; ns. 202, 469, 477; 31.4.

33.1-34;
unnecessary destruction of pl. 26.2;
utilization of pl. for food: esp. 12.1-14.5; 25.1; 25.4; 26.1-2; 37.1-3;
statements expressly denying their sentience 3.2; 22.2.2; 30;
arguments against their sentience 31.1ff.
poisonous trees n. 492.
potter 15.5; n. 37.
practicability 24.3-26.2; 26.5-28; 37.3.
prajñāvarman 20.3; 20.4.2.
prāṇa, prāṇin: see pāṇa.
prthivi, pathavi: see "earth".
pubbanṇa ns. 198, 231; see "cereals".
rationalization 27
raw grain 13.1-13.3; n. 228.
rebirth 29.2; 36.2.1-5.7; n. 467.
remnants of food: see "food".
respiration ns. 513, 514.
ringsworm: see dadru.
rūjana 33.2 + ns. 504, 508.
rakkha 5.4; 8; 10.1; ns. 18, 24, 30, 59, 106, 130, 133, 187, 371, 386, 388, 403, 443, 510, 518, 520; cp. vrksa, taru, "tree".
rukkhadhāmmana 26.2 + n. 418.
rukkha-jīva 5.4.
sacetana: see cetana.
saccittaka 1.2; ns. 492, etc.; cp. n. 233.
Śālikanātha n. 467.
salt 33.2 + ns. 506, 508; n. 289.
samaŋgā n. 499.
samānakappa 12.3 + ns. 211, 215.
samāna-prasava 33.2 + ns. 504, 508.
samārāmabha 4.3; 7.1; 22.1.6; ns. 109, 119, 274.
sampāhārā ḍ-pad 9.1-2; 16.4; 19.1; n. 340.
Śāñcaraka ns. 34, 467.
samrohana n. 520.
sampāsa see "rebirth".
Sānyuttanikāya:
I 141: 20.2 + n. 347;
I 169: 11.1 + n. 173;
IV 117: 20.2 + n. 347; n. 365;
IV 351 and V 393: 20.2 + ns. 347, 351; n. 429;
V 467-474: ns. 41 (470), 42.
sappānakam udakam 16.3
Sarvāstivadins: different versions of their
Prāt.: ns. 21, 55, 176, 270, 311, 314, 320.
satt(v)a 1.2; 20.1; 20.3; 23.2; ns. 7, 163.
schools: relationship between Buddhist s.s 4.4
+ ns. 54, 55.
sea-anemones 20.4.2.
seeds 2.1f; 3.1f; 4.2.1; 4.3; 4.4; 5.3ff; 12.3ff;
13.1; 13.3; 25.1; 26.1ff; 29.1.1; ns. 26, 30,
202, 459, 518; see bija.
sentient, sentience: passim; def. 1.2; n. 476;
see also cetana.
sentient being(s): 1.2, n. 7, etc.; cp. satt(v)a.
sīla/sīla 4.3; 7.2; n. 118.
silā/silā: see "crystal".
Śīlānka ns. 372, 472.
skin ns. 371, 437, 499; skin diseases 33.2 +
ns. 505, 508.
sleep(ing) 32.2; 33.1; ns. 490, 494, 504; cp.
34.e.
smyo ba 33.1 + ns. 490, 491.
snake 10.2; 17.1; 29.1.2, ns. 437, 438, 548.
spanda(na) ns. 369, 523; cp. "motion".
sprinkling water 16.3; n. 118.
stationary (animate beings): see (s)thāvara.
sthāvara 20.4.2; ns. 468, 522, 566, 567; cp.
n. 511; see "t(r)asa and (s)thāvara".
stone(s) 1.2; 2.1; 15.4; ns. 17, 166, 171, 202,
502, 506, 511 (loadst.).
strainer n. 312.
Suttanipāta 23.1;
p.i4: 11.1 + n. 173;
v.146f: 20.3 + n. 362;
220f: n. 430;
393ff, esp. 394: 26.3-4.2; n. 361;
600ff: 21.1-2, 24.2.1;
629 (= Dhp 405): 20.3 + n. 357;
704: 20.3 + n. 361;
967: 20.2 + n. 347.
Suttavibhanga: see Vinayavibhanga.
svacalā n. 511.
svāpa: see "sleep".
sword n. 502.
T 1464 n. 21 (etc.); cp. n. 55.
tasa: see t(r)asa.
tāla-tarunā 8; n. 519.
tamarind 33.1; n. 517; cp. 32.2.
Tarkajvālā 31.2; (33-34); 36.1; 37.1;
354b5ff: ns. 493, 511 (b7);
355a3ff: n. 492;
356b1: n. 446;
357a7ff: n. 502;
358a4ff: n. 492;
358a6ff: n. 490;
358b1ff: ns. 506-508;
360b4ff: ns. 573-577;
360b8ff (verse quotation): 31.2; 36.1; ns.
377, 511-513, 516, 522, 529.
taru ns. 33, 443, 475, 477, 480, 483, 501,
502, 504, 508, 523, 566.
tasa ns. 51, 106; see "t(r)asa and (s)thāvara".
thāvara: see sthāvara, "t(r)asa and (s)thāvara".
tiger 10.2; 36.3.2.
tiṇa: see trṇa.
tiryaṇyoni(gata) 6.2.2 + n. 100; see "animals".
t(r)asa and (s)thāvara 20.2-4.2; 21.3; 22.1.7;
23.2(3); 26.3; 26.4.2; cp. 24.2.2; ns. 409,
553; cp. sthāvara, tasa.
tree(s) 4.2.1; 5.3-4; 8; 10.1-2; 17.1; 19.1;
20.3; 25.1; 26.2; 32.1-2; 33.1; 34,f; 36.3.2; 39.1.2; ns. 14, 15, 31, 43, 45, 58, 187, 189, 403, 459, 492, 493, 502, 512, 518, 529, 584; cp. rukkha, taru, vanaspati, vrksa, "caitya tree".

tree deity 5.3-4; 26.2; 39.1.2; ns. 148, 149, 583, 584.

tree soul 5.4; n. 584.

tribal belief 36.3.1(-2); ns. 201, 279.

trna, tina: 9.1; ns. 30, 32, 59, 171, 174, 176, 179, 204, 311, 320, 386; cp. "grass".

udaka, daga: 11.1-3; 16.3; ns. 19, 106, 202, 301, 306, 319; cp. "water".

U(dana)v(artha)-[Viv(arana)] 33.36: 20.3 + ns. 357-359 and 366f.

Udayana ns. 504, 514, 578.

udbhija 29.1.1 + ns. 444-447.

uddesya 25.1

uddissaka-kata 25.1.

ulcer 33.2 + ns. 505, 508; n. 494.

unmesa-nimesa n. 516.

Upanisadic doctrine of rebirth 36.3.3

Upasenasutra 20.3 + n. 364.

uposatha 26.3; ns. 42, 430.

urbanization 27

urine: see "excrements".

usman see "heat".

Uttara-Mimamsa n. 467.

vanaspati ns. 32, 58.

Vedic (religion, ritual, texts, etc.) 2.1; 4.3; 19.2; 20.4.2; 22.1.5; 31.2; 36.3.1; 36.5.1; n. 279.

vegetable(s) 10.2; 11.3; 12.5; 14.2; 16.3; 25.1f; 26.1; 36.4; 37.1f; ns. 202, 215, 220, 231, 261, 476; cp. aparanna.

vegetarianism 37.2.

velu-taruna 8.

vighasa 11.2; see "food remnants".

vi-heath 8; 9.1; 10.1; 15.2; n. 333; cp. 5.4.

vikopana 7.1; n. 46.

Vin(aya):

I 137: 9-9.2;
I 157 (I 352; II 216): 11.1;
I 189: 8;
I 225: 11.1;
I 237f: ns. 400, 402;
II 108f: 12.1-5;
II 138: 17.1;
II 140: 14.1, 14.3; 14.5
II 169f: ns. 400, 402;
III 151: 10.2;

III 155f: 10.1;
IV 32f: 15.2-4;
IV 34f: 5.3-5.5; ns. 403, 404; cp. 5.2 (Sa., M.);
39.1-1.2.

IV 47: ns. 58, 190;
IV 115: 17.1;
IV 258f: 14.4;
IV 266f: 11.3;
IV 296: 9.1 + n. 128.

Vinayamarka 12.4 + n. 218; ns. 21, 126, 148, 150, 189, 215.

Vin(ayattha)-Maññ(ass) 31.2 + n. 466; ns. 95, 443, 488, 495, 508, 510, 511, 520, 523, 528.

Vinayavibhaṅga 5.5; see Vin(aya) III-IV.

vinipatika 29.1.1 + n. 442.

vi-ruh, viruhana: ns. 504, 518, 520, 521; see "growing again".

visaya-gahaṇa n. 493.

Viṣeṣaṣaśaṣyaṇa sa n. 469, 472, 493, 497, etc.

vṛddhi, vadhi: ns. 504, 508; see "growing".

vrksa ns. 446, 483, 520, 567.

Vṛksāyurveda 33.2; ns. 490; 492; 502.

wandering about during the rainy season 9-9.2.

water 1-2: 2.1-2; 11.1-4; 16.1-4; 20.4.2; 22.1.4; 25.2-3; 27; 32.1; 36.3.1-2; 38.3; 39.1.4; ns. 118, 504, 514; cp. udaka.

water-splashing 16.2.

wind 2.1-2; ns. 372, 504, 508, 514.

wine n. 42.

withering, (un)withered 5.2; 8; 15.4; 32.1; ns. 65, 130, 477, 519.

Yogacārabhumi 31.2; (34); 36.1; 38.4;

Y, zi 211a5-b6: 34 + ns. 511, 518, 522; 36.1 + n. 529.

yoni: four y.s 29.1.1-2.

"zig-zag pattern" (in the doctrine of rebirth) 36.3.1ff.
Addenda:

n. 477: Cp. also DaśavCū (= Daśavaikālika-cūrṇi, Indore 1933) 139,7: sacetanās taravaḥ, aśeṣa-tvag-apagame maraṇopalamabhād, devadattavat.

n. 487: As for the sleeping and awaking of the tamarind (?; text: citā, for ciṇcā?), cp. also DaśavCū 139,8.

n. 492: Just as in TJv and TRD, so also in DaśavCū daurhṛda (for dohada) is adduced as an argument for the sentience of plants because the reactions of the Aśoka and Bakula trees (which are said to prove the presence of the senses of hearing and touch and of the sense of taste, respectively: DaśavCū 139,7f and 8f). According to DaśavCū 139,9, melons, etc., manifest their animateness "by [the fact that they have certain] strange longings quenched by means of [repulsive things like] fumigation with manure and bones (cp. Das 1988, 258 and 310), just like a woman" (prāṇavatyo karkaṭikādayaḥ, paśukariṣṭahidhūpagandhena daurhṛdāpagamān, nārīvat).

n. 493: For examples proving that plants have sense-faculties see also DaśavCū 139,7-9.
This book, excluding covers, is printed on re-cycled paper.
Further Addenda et Corrigenda (dec. 2014)

There is quite a number of entries in my personal copy of this booklet, including additional references to primary sources as well as to secondary literature published in the meantime, and I hope that in the future I shall have a chance to integrate them into the present file. Still, for the time being I have to confine myself to a few minor corrections and additions. For a more detailed discussion of some issues, I may refer to Pt. I of my study "Plants in Early Buddhism and the Far Eastern Idea of the Buddha-Nature of Grasses and Trees", Lumbini: Lumbini International Research Institute 2009.


n. 198: Vin IV 267 → Vin IV 264,1f.

n. 231: aparāṇṇa = vegetables (CPD); cf. also Udo Heiner GRÄFE, Systematische Zusammenstellung kulturgeschichtlicher Informationen aus dem Vinayapitakam der Theravādin, Ph.d. diss. Göttingen 1974: 114.

n. 269: Cf. W.E. SOOTHILL and L. HODOUS, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms (London 1937), p. 128a, s.v. 五辛, remarking with regard to the five pungent roots (which include garlic): "...if eaten raw they are said to cause irritability of temper, and if eaten cooked, to act as an aphrodisiac." Cf. T vol. 39 No. 1791: 497a14f: ...五辛...生瞋生瞋,熟食發婬.


§ 29.1.1 with ns. 444–446: cf. also H.P. SCHMIDT in StII 5/6 (1980): 236 with n. 66.

§ 31.2: Bhāvaviveka → Bhāviveka.

n. 490: The ms. reading ritujanāt in MHRd IX.144cd is (apart from the orthographic ri instead of r) metrically faulty (the syllables 2 and 3 in a pathyā must not be both short) and has therefore been emended to ṛtujatvāt (cf. TJv P 360a2 dus su skye ba yin pa'i phyir). My suggestion to read svāpāc cāpīṣṭās tu° (instead of ms. svāpāmnāṣṭāh tu°) is based on the fact that there is no negation in the Tib. translation of the kārikā and on the fact that the TJv takes the whole verse IX.144 as an opponent's argument (introduced by ... gzhan smras pa: D 313b2) refuted only in the subsequent verse (introducted by 'di’i lan ni: D 313b6). To be sure, the reading of the ms., presenting verse 144 as negating the opponent's argument and verse 145 as supplying the appropriate argumentation, is by no means unacceptable. But in my opinion the structure as reflected in the Tib. translation and the TJv sounds more natural, the more so since we find the same structure in MHRd IX.141 (opponent) and 142 (proponent's counterarguments).
n. 494: Chr. Lindtner (in his edition of the Madhyamakahṛdaya, Chennai: The Adyar Library Research Centre 2001: 169) criticizes me for having emended the text of MHṛd IX. 146d (gadaiś ca vyahicārināḥ) to gaṇḍaiś ca vyahicāritā, but actually I have merely stated that this is what the Tibetan translation of the verse seems to presuppose, without expressing any preference for this reading, and my comment on the passage clearly suggests the opposite. — As for my emendation of dohadādyaprasiddhataḥ in IX.146b (kept by Lindtner) to ṣaprasiddhatā (with Tib. ma grub nyid), it may be doubtful, a causal phrase being preferable for the argument. But ṣaprasiddhatāḥ (suffix ṣtas after a participle instead of a noun or an abstract) sounds problematic, and I was unable to find another instance in the MHṛd. Perhaps we should emend to ṣaprasiddhītah. (cf. MHṛd V.30d).

n. 508: As regards MHṛd IX.145cd, Lindtner (op. cit. p. 108) follows Kawasaki's emendation of the ms. (vyahicārāt tu rūpāṇāntena sidhyantā sacittakāṁ, see KAWASAKI 1986: 204 n.18) to vyahicārāt tu taravo na sidhyantā sacittakāḥ. From the point of view of meaning, this is impeccable, but I still think that my own emendation (vyahicārāt tarūṇāṁ te [or tāi⟨ṛ⟩?] na sidhyati sacittatāḥ), amounting largely to the same as regards the purport, is somewhat closer to the ms.

n. 542 (forefathers wandering about in the form of birds): see also M. WITZEL in StII 10 (1984): 235.

Abbreviations:

Add. 
Additions to "Buddhism and Nature" (= BN §§ 35-65).

AitU 
Aitareya-Upāniṣad

BN 

Bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣasūtra of the Sarvāstivādins (see fn. 21).

Prāt.Sa. 
Prātimokṣasūtra of the Sarvāstivādins, transl. into Chinese by Kumārajīva (T vol. 23 No. 1436).

Sp 
Samantapāpasādikā (Vin-a)

TRD 
Tarkarahaśyadipikā ...

Vin.Dh. 
Vinaya of the Dharmaguptakas (T vol. 22 No. 1428)

Vin.Mā. 
Vinaya of the Mahāsāṅghikas (T vol. 22 No. 1425)

Vin.Mī. 
Vinaya of the Mahīśāsakas (T vol. 22 No. 1421)

Vin.Sa. 
Vinaya of the Sarvāstivādins (T vol. 23 No. 1435)

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Hirakawa 1970  Akira HIRAKAWA, Ritsuzō no kenkyū ...

Hodson 1921a  T.C. HODSON .... in: Man in India 1.2, 1-17 (wrong pagination instead of 89-105).