The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukikamārga) in the Śrāvakabhūmi

A Trilingual Edition (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Annotated Translation, and Introductory Study

Florin Deleanu

Volume II


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CHAPTER FOUR

Critical edition of the Tibetan Translation

3.27. (P 197b2; G 235b3; N 175a6; D 164a2; C 170a2; ZT 405, 19)

Nyan thos kyi sa
Bam po bcu bdun pa

de ltar\(^4\) yid la byed pa thob pa’i mal ‘byor pa spong ba’i dge ba chung ngu la zhugs pa’i\(^5\) de’i gong\(^6\) du bgrod par (ZT 406, 1) bya ba\(^7\) ni gzhan med de gnyis\(^8\) kho nar zad do \| gnyis gang zhe\(^9\) na | ’di lta ste \| jig rten pa’i dang | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ’o | de la las dang po pa’i\(^11\) nyal ‘byor pa yid la byed pa dang bcas pa de ni | bdag ’jig rten pa ’am | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i bgrod pas ’gro bar bya’o snyam nas | yid la byed pa de nyid la lan mang du byed do | ji lta ji lta lan mang du byed pa de lta de ltar nyin mtshan de dang de dag ’das pas de’i lus shin tu sbyangs pa dang sems rtse geig pa\(^12\) nyid de\(^13\) ’phei zhing rgyas pa dang\(^14\) yangs par ’gyur ro | gang gi ishe de’i yid la byed pa dam zhing brtan la sra ba dang | dmigs\(^15\) pa yongs su dag pa la mos pa’i\(^16\) ‘jig par ’gyur ba dang | zhi gnas dang | lhag mthong gi phyogs kyi mtshan ma rnam\(^17\)

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2 Tib.: Śrāvakabhūmi, Bam po, X VII.
3 P, N, D, C, ZT: | | G: | |. The larger size of letters and spacing from the rest of the text are my own convention. In the traditional Canons, the only special layout feature marking a title and/or the beginning of a bam po is to leave slightly more space between it and the rest of the text than the usual interval between sentences. The modern edition of ZT begins a new paragraph. Cf. also the beginning of the next bam po below.
4 Tib. construes evam with labdha\(^a\) and has no equivalent for tatra. Cf. also Ch. ed.
5 D, C, ZT: pa.
6 D, C: grong.
7 G has extra pa (/ba?).
8 D, C, ZT: gnyis po. ZT has no note.
9 Between gang and zhe, G leaves a blank interval amounting to the space needed for about three letters.
10 ZT: ꙃ.
12 As usual, it is very difficult to distinguish between pa and ba in facsimile reproductions or microfilms, but as far as I can ascertain, N, G, D, ZT read gcig pa, and P, C have gcig ba. The standard spelling is sems rtse geig pa nyid.
13 Tib. de’i lus...de suggests: *tathā tathāsyā sā kāya*.
14 D, C, ZT: | |
15 N uses the abbreviation ꙃ for -gs in dmigs.
16 Tib. suggests a different wording: *parisuddhe cālambane ‘dhimokṣah* (or: *parisuddhālambādhimokṣah*).
17 Tib. suggests: *samatathavipāsyanāpaksyāni ca nimittāṇy.*
kyang yongs su zin par gyur pa de'i tshe na de’18 ‘jig rten’19 pa’i lam mam | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i lam gang gis ’gro bar ’dod pa de la sbyor ba brtson par byed do20 ||

3.28.1.1. (P 197b7; G 236a2; N 175b3; D 164a5; C 170a5; ZT 406, 12) de la gang dag tshe ’di la ’jig rten pa’i lam kho nas ’gro bar ’gyur zhing | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i lam gyis ma yin pa’i gang zag du yod ce na | smras pa21 bzhis ste | ’di lta ste | ’di las phyi rol pa thams kad dang | chos ’di pa yin yang sgon zhi gnas spyod spyod pa dbang po rtui ba dang |22 de bzhin du dbang po mo ba23 yang dge (P 198a1) ba’i rtsa ba yongs su ma smin pa dang | byan chub sems dpa’ phyi ma la byang chub thob par ’dod cing tshe ’di la ma yin te24 |25 gang zag de bzhis ni26 tshe ’di nyid la ’jig rten pa’i lam gyis ’gro bar ’gyur ba yin no ||

3.28.1.2. (P 198a2; G 236a4; N 175b5; D 164a7; C 170a7; ZT 406, 19) ’jig rten pa’i lam gyis ’gro ba de yang mam pa gnyis te | ’ching ba mtha’ dag yod pa so so’i skye bo rams dang | ’ching ba ma tshang ba’i slob (D 164b1) pa27 rams so || de dag kyang (ZT 407, 1) gang zhe na | ’dod pa rams la rags par lta zhing snyoms par ’jug pa dang | skye ba dang becas pa’i bsam gtan dang po la zhi bar lta bar ’dod pa’i ’dod chags dang bral bar ’gro ba gang yin pa dang | de bzhin du ci yang med pa’i skye mched kyi bar gyi ’dod chags dang bral bar bya ba dang | de bzhin du ’du shes med pa la snyoms par ’jug pa dang |28 bsam gtan la brten nas mngon par shes pa lnga mngon par bsgrub29 par byed pa rams yin par rig par bya’e ||30

3.28.2.1.1. (P 198a5; G 236b1; N 175b7; D 164b2; C 170b2; ZT 407, 7) de la ’dod pa’i ’dod chags dang bral bar bya’i phyir rab tu brtson pa’i rnal ’byor pa ni yid la byed pa mam pa bdun gyis ’dod pa’i ’dod chags dang bral ba rjes su thob31 po |32 (Choi 199, § 20.0) bdun po de dag kyang gang zhe na | smras pa | mtshan nyid so sor rig pa dang |33 mos pa la byang ba dang | rab tu dben pa dang | dga’ ba sdud pa dang | dpyod34 pa’i yid la byed pa dang | sbyor ba35 mthar thug pa dang | sbyor ba mthar thug

18 D, C, ZT: de la.
19 P omits: rten.
20 G uses the abbreviated spelling: §§.
22 N: ||.
23 D, C, ZT omit: ba.
25 N: ||.
26 In C, there appears to be a superfluous མ after ni.
27 D, C, ZT: ma. Usually, slob pa translates śāikṣa (MVyut # 1733 and # 2332; TSD, s.v.) and slob ma renders sīṣya (MVyut # 409 and # 8737; TSD, s.v.). Both slob pa and slob ma have, however, the sense of ‘student’, ‘practitioner’, etc. and can be used interchangeably.
28 N: ||; C omits: |.
29 D, C, ZT: sgrub.
30 P: |.
31 D, C, ZT: thob.
32 P: 法宝.
33 N: 法宝.
34 All Canons read: spyod. Choi reads: dpyod (without any note or emendation sigla). The paronym (and paragraph) spyod seems to be a frequent error for dpyod. The emendation is corroborated by the fact that in passage 3.28.2.1.6. below, which is dedicated to the
pa'i 'bras bu yid la byed pa'o ||

3.28.2.1.2.1. (P 198a7; G 236b3; N 176a2; D 164b4; C 170b4; ZT 407, 13; Choi 199, § 21.0.) de la mtschan nyid\textsuperscript{36} so sor rig pa'i yid la byed pa gang zhe na | smras pa| yid la byed pa gang gis 'dod pa rams la rags pa'i mtschan nyid du so sor rig par byed cing | bsam gtan dang po la zhi ba'i mtschan nyid du so sor rig par byed pa'o || ji ltar na 'dod pa rams la rags pa'i mtschan nyid du so sor rig par byed ce na | smras pa | 'dod (P 198b1) pa rams kyi gzhi drug po don dang | dagos po dang | mtschan nyid dang | phyogs dang | dus dang | riags pa yongs su tshol ba na rags pa'i mtschan nyid du so sor rig par byed de |

3.28.2.1.2.2. (P 198b1; G 236b5; N 176a4; D 164b4; C 170b5; ZT 407, 19; Choi 199, § 21.0.) de la re zhig rags pa'i don yongs su tshol ba ni | 'di ltar 'dod pa 'di dag ni nyes dmigs dang bcas pa'o || gnod pa mang ba'o || yams kyi nad lta bu mang ba'o | | 'go (ZT 408, 1) ba'i nad lta bu mang ba'o zhes |\textsuperscript{37} rags pa'i don\textsuperscript{38} yongs su\textsuperscript{49} tshol bar\textsuperscript{40} byed pa ste | 'dod pa de dag la nyes dmigs dang po dang | 'go ba'i nad lta bu mang po'i bar dag yod pa gang yin pa de dag ni rags pa'i don yin no ||

3.28.2.1.2.3. (P 198b3; G 237a1; N 176a6; D 164b7; C 170b7; ZT 408, 4; Choi 199, § 21.0.) de la dngos po yongs su tshol ba ni nang gi 'dod pa dag la 'dod pa la 'dun pa yod pa dang | phyi rol gyi 'dod pa dag la yang 'dod pa la 'dun pa yod do\textsuperscript{41} zhes yongs su tshol bar byed pa'o ||

3.28.2.1.2.4. (P 198b4; G 237a2; N 176a6; D 164b7; C 170b7; ZT 408, 7; Choi 199, § 22.0.) de la rang gi mtschan nyid yongs su tshol (D 165a1) ba ni 'di dag ni nyon mongs pa'i 'dod pa'o || 'di dag ni dngos po'i 'dod pa'o || de dag kyang bde ba'i gnas dang mthun pa dag dang | sdu gnsal gni gnas dang mthun pa dag dang | sdu gnsal yang ma yin | bde ba yang ma yin pa'i gnas dang mthun pa dag ste | de la bde ba'i gnas dang mthun pa de dag ni 'dod pa'i 'dod chags kyi gnas dang | 'du shes phyin ci log pa\textsuperscript{42} dang | sems phyin ci log gi gnas dag yin no || sdu gnsal gni gnas dang mthun pa dag ni | zhe sdo dang gi gnas dang | khrö ba dang khon tu\textsuperscript{44} 'dzin pa'i gnas dag yin no || sdu gnsal yang ma yin | bde ba yang ma yin pa'i gnas dang mthun pa dag ni | 'chab pa dang | 'thig pa dang | sguy dang | g.yo dang | ngo tsha med pa dang | khrö med pa'i gnas dang | ita ba phyin ci log gi gnas dag yin te | de ltar na 'dod pa 'di dag ni rab tu gnod pa'i tshor ba (P 199a1) dang ldan pa dang | rab tu gnod pa'i nyon mongs pa dang ldan pa yin no\textsuperscript{46} zhes de ltar 'dod pa rams kyi rang gi mtschan nyid yongs su tshol bar

\textsuperscript{35} D, C, ZT: ba'i.
\textsuperscript{36} D, C, ZT, Choi: mtschan nyid du.
\textsuperscript{37} P, G, N omit: ||
\textsuperscript{38} P, G, N: rags pa'i don du.
\textsuperscript{39} P, G, N omit: yongs su.
\textsuperscript{40} P, G, N: ba'i.
\textsuperscript{41} C reads yad do (or: yad de?).
\textsuperscript{42} D, C, ZT omit: pa.
\textsuperscript{43} ZT: \( \bar{\text{p}} \).
\textsuperscript{44} D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.
\textsuperscript{45} G: ||
\textsuperscript{46} P, G, N: ||.

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investigating contemplation, all Canons read: dpod pa'i yid la byed pa. Furthermore, semantically, spyod pa could hardly stand for mimāṁsā. See also note 98 to Chapter Six.
byed do ||

de la ji ltar na spyi’i mtshan nyid yongs su tshol bar byed ce na | ’dod pa ’di dag thams cad ni skye ba’i sdu g (ZT 409, 1) bsngal dang | rga ba’i sdu bsngal dang | ’dod pa ’phongs | pa’i sdu bsngal gyi bar dang | mnyam zhirg mtshung par rjes su ’brel zhing | gnas pa | yin te | gang dag ’dod pa la langs spyod la | ’dod pa’i ’byor pa chen po dang ldan pa de dag kyang skye ba la soqs pa’i chos nyid las mam par ma grol ba’2 | de dag gi ’byor pa de yang brnyan ma yin no zhes de ltar ’dod pa nams kyi spyi’i mtshan nyid yongs su tshol bar byed do ||

3.28.2.1.2.5. (P 199a4; G 237b3; N 176b5; D 165a6; C 171a6; ZT 409, 7; Choi 200, § 23.0.) ji ltar na phyogs yongs su tshol bar byed ce na | ’dod pa’i dag ni nag po’i phyogs kho nar gtogs pa te | rus pa’i keng rus lta bu dang | sha’i kham tshad lta bu dang | rtswa’i | sgron ma lta bu dang | me | mdag gi dong lta bu dang | sbrul gdug pa lta bu dang | rmi lam lta bu dang | brnyan po’i rgyan lta bu dang | shing kim pa ka’i | ‘bras bu’ | lta bu yin te | sms can nams ’dod pa yongs su tshol bar byed pa na yang ’dod pa yongs su tshol ba las byung ba’i sdu bsngal du ma’60 nyams su myong bar ’gyur ba dang | (D 165b1) kun tu brsung ba las byung ba dang | mdza | ba yong su nyams pa las byung ba dang | ngoms mi shes pa las byung ba dang | rang dbang med pa las byung ba dang | nyes par | spyad pa las byung ba’i sdu bsngal nyams su myong bar ’gyur te | de dag thams cad ni snga ma bzhrin du rig bar bya’o ||

bCom-ldan-’das kyis kyang’ d de ltar ’dod pa la brten pa’i’64 nyes dmigs lnga

\[47\] D, C, ZT: ’dod pa shungs.
\[48\] G omits: |.
\[49\] P, G, N: cing.
\[50\] Tib. gnas pa stands here for Skt. anuṣakta.
\[51\] D, C, ZT: pa’i.
\[53\] N: |
\[54\] N: ste.
\[55\] P, G, N: rtsa. Tib. rtsa appears to be often used as an alternative (albeit incorrect) spelling for rtswa ‘grass, hay’ (see TED, s.v.).
\[56\] P, G, N: med.
\[57\] P, G, N: omit: sbrul gdug pa lta bu dang |
\[58\] P, N: shing ka mi pa ka’i. Most likely, a mere typographical error.
\[59\] Neither Skt. nor Ch. contains any reference to the kim pa ka = Skt. *kimpāka ‘a Cucurbitaceous plant’ or its ‘fruit’. See note 54 to Engl tr.
\[60\] Tib. du ma ‘many, various’ suggests Skt. *duhkhiṇī.
\[61\] N: mje’ (?). (Is this a typographicai error due to mistaking the upper stroke of dza t for the vocalic mark ʰ, which resulted in ʔ ?)

\[62\] P, G, N have nye bar instead of nyes par. I follow the D-C-ZT reading nyes par spyad pa, which corresponds to Skt. āūṣcarita (cf. also Ch. 聲行). We find nyes par spyad pa for duścarita in, for example, the Tibetan translation of the SuPrabh (TSD, s.v.; cf. also MVyut #1682-1684, which has the form nyes pa(r) spyod pa = duścarita).
\[63\] P, G, N: |

\[64\] Here and in the next two occurrences in this paragraph, bsten pa would semantically be a more appropriate rendering, but we find instances of brten pa translating pratisevamāna, āsevita, etc. in other texts as well (see TSD, s.v.). See note 446 below.

362
gsungs te | 'dod pa rams ni mnog chung la sduug bsnagal mang zhing nyes (P 199b1)
dmigs mang ba dang | 'dod pa rams la brten pa na ngoms mi myong | chog mi shes
shing snying thshim pa'i mtha' med pa dang | dam pa rams dang | yang dag par song
ba rams dang | (ZT 410, 1) skyes bu dam pa rams kyiis 'dod pa rams mam grangs du
mas' smad pa dang | 'dod pa rams la brten pa na kun tu sbyor ba rams nye bar stsogs
par 'gyur ba dang | des sdiig pa mi dge ba'i chos mi bya ba cung zad kyang med do zhes
gsungs so 67 |

| 67 de lta bas na 'dod pa 'di68 dag ni mi ngoms par byed pa dang | mang po dang | mthun mongs | yin pa dang | chos ma yin pa dang | spyod pa ngan pa'i rgyur 'gyur ba' | dang | 'dod pa dang | sred pa 'phel bar byed pa dang | dam pa rams kyi | spang
ba'i 'os su gyur ba | dang | myur du 'jig par gyur pa dang | rkyen la brten pa dang | bag
med pa'i sa yin te | mi rtog pa dang | gsog dang | gsoh dang | gbsd dang | brdzun pa dang | slu ba'i
chos can dang | sgyu ma lta bu dang | byis pa 'drid pa yin pas | tshe 'di'i 'dod pa
gang dag yin pa dang | 'tshe phyi ma'i 'dod pa gang dag yin pa dang | lh'a'i 'dod pa gang
dag yin pa dang | mi'i 'dod pa gang dag yin pa de | dag ni bdud kyi spyod yul lo | |

65 Tib. does not contain the equivalent of Skt. buddhār buddhaśrāvakaś ca. Cf. also Ch. 諸佛
d及佛弟子.
66 This Tib. rendering as well as the Ch. 以無量門 suggest anekaparṇāyaṇa rather than anena
parāmyena found in the Skt. MS.
67 There is no direct equivalent for Skt. vādāmi. See also Choi 2001, p. 120, n. 358.
68 D, C, ZT: de.
69 N has three extra upper dots (tsheg) between dang and thun, though the sequence does not
occur at the end of the line.
70 D, C, ZT: mong. ZT has no note. Both mthun mongs and mthun mong are equivalents of
sādhārāṇa (see TSD, s.v.).
71 N: pa.
72 D, C, ZT: kyis.
73 N: pa.
74 The order in Tib. (as well as in Ch. 無常虛僞) is the reverse of Skt. rikti anityās.
75 P omits: | .
76 The Tib. seems to construe the sentence which starts with de lta bas na 'dod pa and ends
with byis pa 'drid pa yin pas as the reason for the next sentence (tshes 'di'i 'dod pa [...]). In Skt.
(as well as in Ch.) the latter is, however, understood as a separate grammatical and semantic unit.
The wording of the extant Skt. text is not ambiguous, and there is no compelling reason in
Tibetan to connect the two sentences. I hence assume that it is more likely that the Skt. MS used
by the Tibetan translators may have had a different reading here. (For the sake of convinience,
'Tibetan translators’ is used in the sense of the translation team consisting of Indian and Tibetan
scholars who rendered the YoBh; see Chapter Three, Part One above).
77 P: da. ZT has no note.
78 G: | .
79 P, G, N: de dag gis.
80 P, G, N: stsol. It is quite unlikely that stsol ba ‘to give, grant; restore’ stands for Skt. "rambha.
Though not the usual rendering for samrāmbha, the D, C, ZT reading nyes rtsom 'to undertake
[practise] [i.e., engage in] evil [acts]' is not an impossible rendering (cf. also YoBh-D, s.v. nyes
rtsom = samrāmbha). Let us also note that in the Dunhuang Glossary (pp. 305-306, entry #
zing phags pa nyan thos gang dag 'di la slob pa de dag gi\(^{83}\) bar Chad byed pa yin te
| 'dod pa 'di dag ni shas cher de ltar nam grangs du mar\(^{84}\) nag po'i phyogs kho nar
gtogs pa yin no zhes\(^{85}\) de ltar phyogs\(^{86}\) yongs su tshol bar byed do ||

3.28.2.1.2.6. (P 199b8; G 238b1; N 177a7; D 165b7; C 171b7; ZT 410, 19;
Choi 201, § 24.0.) ji ltar\(^{87}\) dus yongs su tshol bar byed ce na\(^{88}\) | 'dod pa de dag ni (D 166a1) 'das pa dang | na 'ongs pa dang | da ltar byung (P 200a1) ba'i dus rnam su
yang rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang ther zug ther zug gi dus su de ltar gnod pa mang ba (ZT 411, 1) dang | 'go ba'i nad lta bu\(^{89}\) mang ba dang | nyes dmigs mang ba yin no zhes de
ltar dus yong su tshol bar byed do |

3.28.2.1.2.7. (P 200a2; G 238b3; N 177b1; D 166a2; C 172a1; ZT 411, 3; Choi
202, § 25.0.) ji ltar na rig pa yongs su tshol bar byed pa ce na | 'dod pa rnam ni rtsol
ba\(^{90}\) chen po dang | yongs su rtsol ba\(^{91}\) chen po dang \(^{92}\) ngal ba chen po dang \(^{93}\) las

107), the reading here is also nyes rtsom (its Chinese equivalent being 始終 ‘to make evil
arise/happen’). In other places, the YoBh renders saïrambah (more aptly) as rtsod pa ‘to
dispute’ (see YoBh-I, s.v. 闐辯). It is true that rtsom and rtsod are phonetically and graphically
close and could have been easily mistaken in the process of serial transmission, but supposing
an original *nyes rtsod ‘evil dispute’ (?) does not make too much sense. Therefore, it seems
that nyes rtsom, though not frequent and a rather free rendering for saïrambah, is the original
reading.

\(^{81}\) P: f'.

\(^{82}\) D, C, ZT: dge ba'i las rnam. G has a blank amounting to the space taken by about three
letters. (Is this a trace of the erasure of rnam?). Choi reads: sems rnam, and notes: P om.
rmams (grammatische Korrektur ?) (p. 201, n. 550). He makes, however, no reference to the D
reading, i.e., las rnam.

\(^{83}\) P, G, N: gis.

\(^{84}\) P, G, N: mas.

\(^{85}\) G has a blank amounting to the space taken by about three letters. N has two upper dots after
zhes.

\(^{86}\) D, C, ZT: phyogs su. Cf. beginning of passage 3.28.2.1.2.5. above, where all Canons,
including D, C, and ZT read: phyogs yong su tshol bar byed.

\(^{87}\) D, C, ZT: ji ltar na.

\(^{88}\) ZT, in note 10 to p. 410, states that na is omitted in N. My photocopy of N, however, clearly
reads: ce na |.

\(^{89}\) D, C, ZT: lta bu'i bar. It is not excluded that bar stands here for *yâvat ‘up to’, indicating
thus an omission of one or more terms in the enumeration. The Ch. contains *bahiññikâñ 有 多 疫
which is not found in the extant Skt. text (see notes to Skt. and Ch. ed.). It is thus possible to
that the original Tib. translation (in this case, faithfully preserved in D-C-ZT stemma) relied on
a MS version which omitted *bahiññikâñ (or more compounds?). Choi similarly remarks:
möglicherweise durch das Fehlen von bahiññikâñ motivierte “bar” in D (p. 123, n. 393; see also
p. 201, 554). I follow, however, the P-G-N reading which agrees with the extant Skt. original.

\(^{90}\) D, C, ZT: brtsal ba.

\(^{91}\) D, C, ZT: brtsal ba. I have not found other examples of rtsol ba/ brtsal ba rendering
saiñrambah, which Tib. should presumably translate here. Both rtsol ba ‘to endeavour, to take
pains’ and brtsal ba ‘care and assiduity’ do not, however, raise any special problems as to their
suitability for rendering the Skt. term. Another possibility is that that the Tibetan translation
team read samârambah, which, in the YoBh, is sometimes rendered as rtsol ba or brtsal ba (cf.
YoBh-D, s.v. rtsol ba and YoBh-I, s.v. 事業). Cf. Ch. 資糧 as well as note 51 to Ch. ed.
dang bzo'i gnas⁹⁴ nam pa sna tshogs dag gis sdu par byed | sgrub par byed cing⁹⁵ nye bar stogs⁹⁶ par byed pa de dag legs par bsdu | legs par bsgrubs | nye bar bsags nas kyang 'di lta ste | pha ma dang | bu dang | chung ma dang | bran pho dang | bran mo dang |⁹⁷ las mi dang | zho shas 'tsho ba dang | mdza bshes dang | blon po dang | nye du dang | snag gi gnyen mtshams rnams kyi¹⁰⁸ phyi rol gyi yongs su bzung ba'i dngos po rnams dang |⁹⁹ nang gi lus gugs cau rags pa 'byung ba chen po'i rgyu las 'byung ba |¹⁰⁰ bras chan dang | zan don gyis nye bar gsos pa rtag tu bsku ba dang | bkru ba dang | mnye bas nye bar brten¹⁰¹ pa¹⁰² dang | 'bral ba dang | 'thor ba dang | 'jig pa'¹¹⁰ chos can 'di byung ngo cog ni¹⁰⁴ sdug bsngal sel ba tsam du 'gyur bar zad de | bkres pa'i sdu gbsngal sel ba ni kha das yin no | | grang ba'i sdu gbsngal sel ba dang | ngo tsha ba'i gnas pa ca¹⁰⁵ gyis g.yogs¹⁰⁶ pa ni gos yin no | | gnyid kyi snyom¹⁰⁷ pa'i sdu gbsngal sel¹⁰⁸ ba dang | 'chags¹⁰⁹ pa dang | sdo pa'i sdu gbsngal sel ba ni mal cha dang |¹¹⁰ stan yin no | |¹¹¹ nad kyi sdu bsngal sel ba ni ba'i gsos sman yin te | de ltar 'dod pa 'di dag ni sdu bsngal sel bar byed pa tsam du zad pas | 'di dag la chags pas yongs su longs spyad par (P 200b1) mi bya zhing zhen pas kyang ma yin te | nad kyi bstb pa'i (ZT 412, 1) nad pas nad zhi bar bya ba tsam gyi phyir sman bsten pa¹¹² lta bu yin pas | yid ches pa'i lung yang de nyid yin la | 'dod pa de dag ji lta ji ltar rags pa yin pa de lta de ltar bdag nyid la ye shes dang | mthong ba 'jug pa yang yod¹¹³ rjes su dpag pa'i

⁹² P, G, N omit: |
⁹³ P omits: |
⁹⁴ P, G, N: bzo'i gnas pa.
⁹⁵ P, G, N omit: |
⁹⁷ P, N, G: chung ma dang | bran dang |. The D-C-ZT stemma is obviously closer to the Skt. original. The P-G-N stemma may represent a mere omission or a later editorial emendation aiming at more conciseness. The Dunhuang Glossary (p. 306, # 108-109) reads: bran bran mo.
⁹⁸ P: mtshams kyiis; G, N: mtshams rnams kyiis.
⁹⁹ N: ||.
¹⁰⁰ D, C, ZT: byung. Tib. does not contain the equivalent of catur (= bzhī) of caturmahābhūtika.
¹⁰¹ P, G, N: brian. ZT has no note.
¹⁰² Tib.: 'served by' ['supported by']. Cf. Ch. 常須. The Skt. MS used by the Tibetan translation team must have contained a different reading here.
¹⁰³ Tib. contains only three terms (compared with four in Skt.) which describe the perishable nature of the body, apparently lacking the equivalent of Skt. chedana. Cf. also Ch. ed. and note 55.
¹⁰⁵ The usual word is car ras 'a small apron to cover the privy parts' (Das, s.v.), but pa car = kaupinam is also attested (e.g., MVyut # 5850).
¹⁰⁶ P, G, N: char gvi g.yogs.
¹⁰⁷ N, D, C, ZT: snyoms. ZT has no note.
¹⁰⁹ D, C, ZT: chags.
¹¹⁰ D, C, ZT omit: |
¹¹¹ C: |
¹¹² D, C, ZT: sman pa bsten pa.
¹¹³ C: ||. ZT: T.
bya ba yang de nyid yin (D 166b1) te | 'dod pa 'di dag gi rang bzhin ni thog ma med pa'i dus nas grags pa'i chos nyid dang | bsam gyiis mi kyab pa'i chos nyid yin pas | de dag ni bsam par mi bya zhiing | rnam par brtag par mi bya'o zhes de ltar rigs pa yongs su tshol bar byed do ||

3.2.8.1.2.8. (P 200b3; G 293a5; N 178a2; D 166b1; C 172b1; ZT 412, 8; Choi 203, § 260.) des 'di lta ste | gzhig drug po dag gis de ltar 'dod pa rams la rags pa'i mtshan nyid du so sor rtogs nas 'bsam gtan dang po la zhi ba'i mtshan nyid du so sor rtogs par byed de | bsam gtan dang po la ni 'dod pa'i khams kyi rags pa gang yin pa de lta bu rams pa thams cad kyi sgo nas med do zhes | des bsam gtan dang po ni rags pa ni yid dang bral ba'i phyir zhi ba yin no zhes de ltar bsam gtan dang po la zhi ba'i mtshan nyid du so sor rtog<ś> par byed do || mnyam par bzhag pa'i sa pa'i yid la byed pa gang gis 'dod pa rams la rags pa'i mtshan nyid dang | bsam gtan dang po la zhi ba'i mtshan nyid du so sor rtog<ś> par byed de ni | mtshan nyid so sor rig pa'i yid la byed pa zhes bya ste | yid la byed pa de yang thos pa dang |

114 Tib. seems to have read *'caisām kāmānām instead of extant Skt. caisā kāmānām and hence was forced to take anādikālikā [...] as predicate noun.
115 C microfiche is unclear but, apparently, it contains an extra pa'i. This occurs at the beginning of the folio verso and may be represent a dittography.
117 D, C, ZT: rtogs pa nas. G has a blank space amounting to the space of about one letter between rtogs and nas (trace of an erasure?). Grammatically, nas can be placed directly after the verbal root or after the pa/ba suffix, though the former case appears to be the most frequent (cf. Jäschke [1883] 1989, 56-57).
118 D, C, ZT: rtog. Although rtog pa and rtogs pa are semantically related, the change of the verb is not necessary, especially as both words translate Skt. prati-saṁ-√vid. Choi also reads: rtogs.
119 P, G, N: pa. The form 'dod pa'i khams seems to be more frequent (cf. MVyut # 3072; # 2153; TSD, s.v.).
120 D, C, ZT: rigs.
121 All Canons read: rtog pa. Skt., however, contains pratisaṁvedayate, and since the P-G-N stemma regularly uses rtogs pa for this verb here as well as in many other passages, the emendation above is preferable. Choi emends similarly.
122 P, G, N: byed de mnyam par. D: byed do | mnyam par. C, ZT: byed do | mnyam par. Choi: byed de | mnyam par. I follow the C, ZT reading and punctuation, which agree better with the Skt. text. In the latter, the sentence ends here (which is also marked by danda in the extant Skt. MS).
123 D, C, ZT: gzhag pa'i. P, G, N, Choi: bzhag pa'i. ZT and Choi have no note. Both mnyam par gzhag pa and mnyam par bzhag pa standing for Skt. samāhita are attested. In the Tibetan translation of the YoBh, it seems that the former spelling is preferred by P and the latter form by D (cf. Delhey 2002, 259ff.). Whenever attested by the canonical transmission, I prefer "bzhag pa because as a past form, it is grammatically closer to the Skt. past participle samāhita.
124 D, C, ZT, Choi: po la ni zhi. Given the preceding parallel construction 'dod pa rams la rags pa'i, the P-G-N stemma reading is preferable.
125 All traditional Canons read: rtog pa. However, this should be emended to rtogs pa (see note 121 above). Choi makes similar emendation.
126 P, G, N omit: de. In view of Skt. ayam ucyate, the D-C-ZT stemma reading is preferable.
bsam pa dang | 'dres pa yin\textsuperscript{127} par rig\textsuperscript{128} par bya’o ||

3.28.2.1.3. (P 200b7; G 239b2; N 178a5; D 166b4; C 172b4; ZT 412, 19; Choi 203, § 27.0.) des de litar ‘dod pa rams yongs su shes nas bsam gtan dang po la yongs su tshol ba’i rags pa dang | zhi ba’i\textsuperscript{129} mtshan nyid ji lta ba bzhin gyis thos (ZT 413, 1) pa dang bsam\textsuperscript{130} pa las yang dag par ‘das nas | geig tu bsgom pa’i rams pas mos par (P 201a1) byed\textsuperscript{131} cing | mtshan ma de nyid la dmigs pa’i zhi gnas dang | lhag mthong sgom par\textsuperscript{132} byed do || sgom par byed pa na\textsuperscript{133} ji litar yongs su tshol ba’i rags pa dang | zhi ba’i\textsuperscript{134} mtshan nyid de dag la yang dang yang du mos par byed de\textsuperscript{135} | de ni mos pa las byung ba’i\textsuperscript{136} yid la byed pa zhes bya’o ||

3.28.2.1.4. (P 201a2; G 239b5; N 178a7; D 166b6; C 172b6; ZT 413, 6; Choi 204, § 28.0.) de kun tu\textsuperscript{137} bsten cing goms par byas | lan mang du byas pa’i rgyus dang po kho nar\textsuperscript{138} nyon mongs pa spong ba’i lam skye bar ’gyur zhung | nyon mongs pa spong ba’i lam yang dag par skyes pa gang yin pa de dang ldan pa’i yid la byed pa de ni rab tu dben pa’i yid la byed pa zhes bya’o\textsuperscript{139} ||

3.28.2.1.5. (P 201a3; G 239b6; N 178b1; D 166b7; C 172b7; ZT 413, 10; Choi

\textsuperscript{127} In G, there is a space equivalent to the space of about one letter between \(ā\) and \(ā\).

\textsuperscript{128} C: rigs.

\textsuperscript{129} P, G, N, D, C, ZT: yongs su tshol ba dang | rags pa’i zhi ba’i. My emendation is purely conjectural, but I think it makes a better reading than the original transmitted by all traditional Canons. See aslo notes 131 and 134 below as well as note 94 to Engl. tr.

\textsuperscript{130} P, G, N: bsams.

\textsuperscript{131} The emended sentence reads: ‘After having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, he becomes convinced of the examined characteristic of coarseness and serenity with regard to the first of absorption as it really is, exclusively in the form of meditative cultivation, having transcended the [levels of] listening and reflection’. The emendation here is discussed in detail in note 94 to Engl. tr.

\textsuperscript{132} P, G, N: bsgom par.

\textsuperscript{133} D, C, ZT: byed pa la.

\textsuperscript{134} P, G, N, D, C, ZT: ji ltar yongs su tshol ba dang | rags pa zhi ba’i. This is the reading attested by all Canons, but the place of dang is awkward here and rags pa zhi ba’i would suggest a wrong way of construing audārīkaśāntatām (see note 94 to Engl. tr.). My emendation above is closely patterned on Skt. yathāparasyaṁ audārīkaśāntatām, the only difference being the fact that ‘tāṁ in audārīkaśāntatām is rendered by mtshan nyid (= lakṣaṇa), but this does not raise major semantical problems here. The end of this sentence also seems to be corrupt (see note below), and a series of early scribal mistakes may have affected its beginning, too. See also notes 129 and 131 above as well as note 94 to Engl. tr.

\textsuperscript{135} P, G, N, D, C, ZT, Choi: yang dang yang du zhi bar byed de |. This translates as ‘again and again [the ascetic] calms the characteristics of coarseness and serenity’. Semantically, this hardly makes sense. The Tibetan translation of the parallel passage in the AbhSimBh (Tatia ed., p. 80, 10; see also note 97 to Engl. tr.) has mos par byed de for adhimucyte (cf. also Choi p. 204, n. 581). My conjecture is that rather than being a mis-translation, zhi bar byed de is an early scribal error inherited by all Canons, and I emend accordingly.

\textsuperscript{136} Choi: pa’i.

\textsuperscript{137} D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.

\textsuperscript{138} Tib.: ‘for the very first time (*tatprathamata eva?)’.

\textsuperscript{139} Tib.: ‘this is called the contemplation engendering separation’.
204, § 29.0.) des dang por\textsuperscript{140} 'dod pa na spyod pa'i nyon mong pa spangs pa\textsuperscript{141} dang | de'i phyogs kyi\textsuperscript{142} gnas ngan len dang bral ba'i phyir \textsuperscript{143} de'i 'og tu spong ba\textsuperscript{144} la dga' ba dang | rab tu dben pa la dga' bar 'gyur zhing | (D 167a1) spong ba de la phan yon du mthong ba dang | rab tu dben pa las skyes pa'i dga' ba dang | bde ba\textsuperscript{145} chung ngu la reg nas 'di lta ste | rmugs pa dang | gnyid dang | rgod pa spang ba'i\textsuperscript{147} phyir dang | dus dus su rab tu dang bar 'gyur ba'i yid la byed pas yang dag par rab tu dga' bar byed cing | kun tu\textsuperscript{149} skyo bar 'gyur ba'i yid la byed pas kun tu\textsuperscript{150} skyo bar byed pa | de ni dga' ba sdud pa'i yid la byed pa zhes bya'o | |

3.28.2.1.6. (P 201a6; G 240a2; N 178b3; D 167a2; C 173a2; ZT 413, 18; Choi 204, § 30.0.) de ltar spong ba'i dga' ba dang | bsgom\textsuperscript{152} pa'i dga' ba la yang dag par\textsuperscript{153} (ZT 414, 1) rab tu brtson pa na rgyu 'am gnas kyang rung\textsuperscript{154} ste | de la dge ba'i phyogs la sbyor ba la |\textsuperscript{155} gegs\textsuperscript{156} byed par\textsuperscript{157} 'dod pa dang Idan pa'i nyon mongs pas kun nas

\textsuperscript{140} D, C: po.
\textsuperscript{141} Tib. has no equivalent for Skt. ādipraheya. Cf. Ch. 先所應.
\textsuperscript{142} P, G, N omit: kyi.
\textsuperscript{143} D, C, ZH, Choi omit: |. Choi (p. 204, n. 584) wrongly notes: D: phyir /.
\textsuperscript{144} P, G, N: spyod pa. Choi, too, notes this var. lec but reads it as: sbyod pa (p. 204, n. 585). In the P reproduction, the letter is very unclear (sbyod rather than spyod?), but N and (to a lesser degree) G show with more clarity that the original woodblock reading was sbyod pa. The collation note in ZT (p. 413, n. 6) also records this var. lec. as: spyod pa.
\textsuperscript{145} Tib. translation is explicit: ‘gladness and happiness born from separation’.
\textsuperscript{146} From bde ba to rmugs pa dang, the C microfiche is very unclear, and this makes my collation of the C readings rather uncertain.
\textsuperscript{147} P, G, N: spangs pa'i.
\textsuperscript{148} Tib. dang, for which there is no Skt. equivalent here, looks quite surprising. Its occurrence is described by Choi as unverständlich (p. 204, n. 586).
\textsuperscript{149} D, C, ZT: du.
\textsuperscript{150} D, C, ZT: du.
\textsuperscript{151} P, G, N, D, C, ZT, Choi: kun tu sbyor bar byed pa. This reading transmitted by all Canons suggests *sainyojayati rather than sainvejayati. (For kun tu sbyor ba translating saivyojana, see SādPuṣṭa Index, PrasPad Index, TSD, s.v.). Skt. saimvejāyati manaskāraṇa saimvejāyati and Ch. 異離作意而深厭患 plead, however, for regarding sbyor bar as a scribal error for sbyo bar, which must have occurred at an early stage in the MS transmission. I have therefore emended accordingly. Choi reads together with the traditional Canons but is aware of the problem (see p. 172, n. 264; p. 204, n. 587).
\textsuperscript{152} D, C, ZT, Choi: sgom.
\textsuperscript{153} P, G, N omit: dag par.
\textsuperscript{154} Tib. rung ba, usually meaning ‘(be) proper’, appears to be here employed in the sense of ‘although’. (All lexigraphical sources which I have consulted indicate, however, that this is a rather late usage of the word).
\textsuperscript{155} ZT: \textsuperscript{153}.
\textsuperscript{156} D, C, ZT: bgegs.
\textsuperscript{157} Tib. geqs or bgegs usually means ‘obstacle’. Here it should correspond to upastambha in the extant Skt. MS. Tib. geqs or bgegs is, however, a rather unlikely rendering for upastambha. The Sanskrit equivalents attested for geqs byed pa include pratibanda (YoBh-D, TSD, s.v.) and vibandha (YoBh-D, s.v.). Choi surmises upagāta (p. 205, n. 591). I would conjecture here stambha, which means, among others, 'stoppage', 'obstruction', etc. The Tibetan translators may have relied on a Skt. MS reading: *kusalapakṣapravayogastambhakāma* (which must have
been construed as *kuśalapaksaprayogasya stambhakāmaḥ*. Alternatively (but less likely), we could imagine that upastambha in a reading like: *kuśalapaksaprayogopastambhakāma-pratisānakātaśātārāṇī* (which is very close to the extant Skt. MS) might have been mis-construed as ‘obstacle’.

158 P: bkris. ZT has no note.
159 P, G, N omit: mi.
160 D, C, ZT: sdu.
161 G uses abbreviated spelling: ठ (for this abbreviation, see Scharlip and Back 1996, 62).
162 N: .
163 D, C, ZT: smon.
164 P, G, N: bzlog.
166 D, C, ZT: spangs pa'i. Choi reads spong ba'i, notes the var. lec. in D, and suggests emendation to spang ba'i. The latter is, however, the reading of the P-G-N stemma.
167 This corresponds to Skt. vārīvad dhyātām. On the meaning of this phrase, see note 111 to Engl. tr. Tib. construes dhyāta in the sense of '[water] drawn/scooped up'.
168 P: gyis. C microfiche is not so clear, but it seems to read kyis. ZT has no note.
169 I emend here the Skt. MS, which contains no negation, by adding <na>. No Tibetan Canon contains *mi. It is quite likely that the MS used by Tibetan translation team had no negation either. Anyway, since translational peculiarities reflecting other MS readings are not emended (see Editing Conventions), I have not added <mi> in my Tibetan edition. The reasons for my emendation of the Skt. text are explained in the note 111 to Engl. tr. Choi, too, does not emend Tib., though he conjectures na in his Skt. edition.
170 Tib: ‘therefore’. For this des, see also Choi p. 205, n. 599.
171 D, C, ZTomit: la.
172 G, N clearly read: par. C, too, most likely reads: par. The letter in P and D rather looks like bar, but, as usual, an absolutely certain decision concerning pa/ba is not easy. Choi notes only the D reading bar (p. 205, n. 600) and reads par in his text.
cher gnas shing zhi gnas dang | lhag mthong sgom pa la rab tu brtson par byed pa na | yang dang yang du dpyod par byed cing de’i gnyen po sgom par byed de | (ZT 415, 1) dus dus su (D 167b1) spangs pa dang | ma spangs pa nyid la dpyod par byed pa na | ’dod pa na spyd pa’i nyon mongs pa thams cad las re zhig tsam gyi tshul gyis sems ’bral bar byed cing | sa bon gta n bom pa ni ma yin pa te | de’i tshe bsam 180 gtan dang po la sbyor ba’i lam gyi mthar thug par nyan mongs pa thams cad kyi gnyen por gyur pa’i yid la byed pa yang dag par skyes pa de 181 ni sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i 182 yid la byed pa zhes bya’o’o ![ ]

3.28.2.1.8. (P 201b8; G 240b5; N 179a3; D 167b2; C 173b2; ZT 415, 7; Choi 206, § 32.1.) de’i mjug thogs kho nar rgyu de 183 dang rkyen des bsam gtan dang po’i dngos gzhi la snyoms par ’jug cing bsam gtan gyi dgnas gzhi dang ldan pa’i yid la byed pa skyes pa de ni | sbyor ba mthar mthug pa’i (P 202a1) ‘bras bu yid la byed pa zhes bya’o’o ![ ]

3.28.2.1.9.1. (P 202a1; G 240b6; N 179a4; D 167b3; C 173b3; ZT 415, 11) de la rab tu dben pa yid la byed pa dang | dga’ ba sdud pa yid la byed pa skyes par gyur pa de’i tshe 184 na 185 ni dben pa las skyes pa’i dga’ ba dang | bde bas lus yongs su tshim

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175 D, C, ZT: dga’ bar. Choi reads dga’ ba la but has no note.
177 Tib. would suggest here *samathivipasyanâbhâvanâprayuktâh rather than samatha-vipasyanâyuktâh which is found the extant Skt. MS. See also note 89 to Ch. ed.
178 P, G, N: spang ba. Choi notes that P and D read spang ba (p. 205, n. 603), and reads in his edition: spangs pa (is this an emendation?). D (as well as C and ZT) clearly has, however, spangs pa. In view of the Skt. past participle praâhîna, the past tense form spangs is preferable. Actually, in translating aprâhîna, all Canons agree in using ma spangs pa.
180 D: de’i tshe na gsam. C, ZT: de’i tshe na bsam. ZT notes the omission of na in P and N but makes no mention of the reading gsam in D.
181 P, G, N omit: de. As noted by Choi (p. 206, n. 606), ayam in the Skt. original makes de preferable here.
182 Tib. uses the same lexeme mthar thug pa for rendering two different (albeit quasi-synonymous) words: paryavasâna (= mthar thug pa, one line above) and niśtha.
184 P, G, N: gyur pa’i tshe. Beyer (1992, p. 186, n. 21) points out the following morphophonemic rule: ‘the morpheme P, found in the derivational affix -PA, becomes b after -n [i.e. -ng]. -r, -l and open syllables, and becomes p after -g, -d, -n, -b, -m, and final or post final -s’. It should be noted, however, that one exception to Beyer’s rule is the case of syllables which end in -r or -l and originally had a postsuffix (da drag) in the old spelling. If such a syllable is followed by the derivational affix -PA, the latter remains unchanged, i.e., -pa or -po, even if the da drag had disappeared in the reformed Tibetan spelling (see Hahn 1996, 31, § 5.5.). This phenomenon is clearly seen in the perfect form of the verb ‘gyur ba: instead of *gyur ba which one would expect according to Beyer’s rule, the standard form is gyur pa (see TED, s.v.; Jäschke [1881] 1990, s.v.; cf. also this as well as passage 3.28.3.2.0., etc. below which attest the same spelling), because the old gyur required pa and this was kept even after its disappearance from the phonemico-graphic surface structure. The same explains the form gyur to (see TED, s.v.; Jäschke [1881] 1990, s.v.).
185 D, C, ZT omit: na. Grammatically possible but for uniformity’s sake, I prefer na ni (see similar occurrences below). ZT has no note.
par byed do | sbyor ba mthar thug pa'i yid la byed pa de'i tshe na ni | lan 'ga' lan 'ga' ni bde ba'i dngos po chung ngu'i tshul gyis khyab par byed do | lan 'ga' lan 'ga' ni bde ba'i dngos po shin tu mang po dang | shia tu rgya chen po'i tshul gyis khyab par byed do | sbyor ba mthar thug pa'i 'bras bu'i yid la byed pa skyes pa'i tshe na ni | 'di tta ste | lus thams cad dben pa las skyes pa'i dga' ba dang | bde bas ma khyab pa dang | khyab par bya ba cung zad kyang med do | de de'i tshe na ni 'dod pa dag (ZT 416, 1) las dben pa 'i' sdig pa ni dge ba'i chos mams la dben pa | rtog pa dang bcas pa | spyod pa dang bcas pa | dben pa las skyes pa'i dga' ba dang bde ba can | bsam gtan dang po'i yan lag Inga bsgrubs te gnas pa dang | 'dod pa na spyod pa'i gnyen po'i lam bsgom pa'i 'bras bu la gnas pa dang | 'dod pa na mams la 'dod chags dang bral ba thob pa zhes bya'o

3.28.2.1.9.2. (P 202a6; G 241a5; N 179b1; D 167b6; C 173b6; ZT 416, 5) de la mthshon nyid so sor rig pa'i yid la byed pas ni spang bar bya ba gang yin pa de yang yongs su shes par byed thob par bya ba gang yin pa de yang yongs su

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186 P, G, N: tshol bar.
187 Tib. yongs su tshim par byed suggests *pariprīnayati. YoBh-I, s.v. yongs su tshim par byed pa, gives as its equivalents prati-√pri; pratiprīnayati (as well as Ch. 能適恰), but Tib. yongs su usually renders Skt. pari-. See also note 122 to Engl. tr.
188 Tib. suggests here *pratanukasukhībhavayogena, while the Skt. MS reads pratanukasamukhībhavayogena, which is also supported by Ch. 微薄現前. For more details, see note 123 to Engl. tr.
189 Tib. suggests here *ghanavipulatarasarukhībhavayogena, while the Skt. MS reads ghanavipulatarasarasmukhībhāvena, which is also supported by Ch. 深重現前. See note above. Furthermore, Skt. MS does not contain tshul gyis = *yogena. See note 128 to Skt. crit. ed.
190 Tib. apparently (mis-)construes the Sanskrit syntax by taking both kadācit kadācit pratanukasamukhībhāvayogena and kadācit kadācid ghanavipulatarasarasmukhībhāvena with spherati. This must have determined a rendering with two sentences each having the verb khyab par byed (= spherati).
191 C: mthur.
192 P, G, N: dga' ba'i dga' ba.
193 D, C, ZT omit: ni. Grammatically possible but na ni is preferable for uniformity's sake (see note 185 above).
194 All editions read dben pa'i but this should be emended to dben pa. See parallel passages below in 3.28.3.0 and also at ŚrBh P Wi 7a7 (= D Dzi 6b2): 'dod pa dag las dben pa (D reads dag la, which must be an error; see below D Dzi 6b2-3: chos rnams las dben pa) as well as at P Wi 118b7 (= D Dzi 9a4): 'dod pa dag las dben pa. See also MVyut # 1478: 'dod pa dag las dben pa (same in Körös's ed., vol. 2, p. 283) and LalVis (Rgya cher rol pa) D Kha 213a and 269b: 'dod pa rnam las dben pa.
195 P, ZT: \T\.
196 G looks rather like dphyod (?).
197 N: \T\.
198 P: gnyan. No note in ZT.
199 D, C, ZT: bsgoms.
201 All Canons have shad. I think that this shad is not necessary here. Actually, in the next two occurrences below (gang yin pa de yang and sems gtod par yang), yang is not followed by shad.
202 Here as well as in the next sentence, the Tib. has no equivalent for Skt. samyak (usually,
shes par byed\textsuperscript{205} cing \ spang bar bya ba spang ba dang \ thob par bya ba thob par bya ba’i phyir sems gchod par yang byed do \ mos pa las byung ba’i yid la byed (D 168a1) pas ni spang bar bya ba dang \ thob par bya ba’i phyir yang dag par sbyor ba rtsom par byed do \ rab tu dben pa’i yid la byed pas ni nyon mongs pa chen po spong bar byed do \ dga’ ba sduc pa’i\textsuperscript{206} yid la byed pas ni (P 202b1) nyon mongs pa’i rnam pa ‘bring po spong bar byed do \ dpyod pa’i yid la byed pas ni\textsuperscript{207} thob pa la mgon pa’i nga rgyal med pa la sems ‘jog par byed do \ sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i yid la byed pas ni\textsuperscript{208} nyon mongs pa’i rnam pa chung ngu spong bar byed do \ sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i ‘bras bu yid la byed pas ni\textsuperscript{209} yid la byed pa’i rnam pa de dag bsogs pa’i ‘bras bu nyams su myong bar byed do\textsuperscript{210} | |

\textbf{3.28.2.1.9.3. (P 202b2; G 241b3; N 179b5; D 168a3; C 174a2; ZT 416. 17)}

gzhan yang mthshan nyid so sor rig pa yid la byed pa gang yin pa dang \ mos pa las byung ba’i yid la byed pa gang yin pa de ni sun ‘byin pa’i gnyen po dang ldan pa ste | rjes su mthun pa’i yid la byed pa yin no |\textsuperscript{211} rab tu dben pa’i yid la byed pa gang yin pa dang | sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i yid la byed pa gang yin pa de ni (ZT 417, 1) spong ba’i gnyen po dang ldan pa ste | gnyen po yid la byed pa yin no | de la\textsuperscript{213} dga’ ba sduc pa’i yid la byed pa gang yin pa de ni | gnyen po yid la byed pa dang | dang bar ‘gyur ba’i yid la byed pa yin no | de la dpyod\textsuperscript{214} pa’i yid la byed pa gang yid pa de ni | so sor rtog pa’i yid la byed pa zhes bya ste\textsuperscript{215} de ltar na yid la byed pa drug po de dag du\textsuperscript{216}

rendered as \textit{yang dag par}). Cf. Ch. which has \textit{ɪ=t = samyak}.

\textsuperscript{203} P: ꜧ

\textsuperscript{204} D, C, ZT omit: yang.

\textsuperscript{205} Tib. and Ch. have the same verb as before. Extant Skt. MS reads pra\textit{jānāti}, which is usually rendered in the YoBh as mkhyen pa, rab tu mkhyen pa, rab tu shes pa, rab tu shes par byed pa (the last two are quite frequent), etc. (see YoBh-D, s.v. pra-\textit{√jñā}). See notes 138 and 139 in Skt. crit. ed.

\textsuperscript{206} P, G, N: pa.

\textsuperscript{207} D, C, ZT: ।

\textsuperscript{208} D, C, ZT: ।

\textsuperscript{209} All editions have shad, which appears rather inconsistent. Except for this occurrence, the P-G-N stemma has no shad after \textit{ni} in the similar constructions above. The D-C-ZT stemma is less consistent in this respect, but apart from the other two occurrences above, in all other cases, \textit{ni} is not followed by \textit{shad}. I assume that its usage may have been made necessary here by the occurrence of the same lexeme, i.e., \textit{yid la byed pa}, in close succession, which was probably deemed misleading without a punctuation mark.

\textsuperscript{210} Tib: ‘he enjoys the fruit of the cultivation of these types of contemplations.’ Tib. appears to presuppose: *esāṁ manaskāraprakārānāṁ bhāvanāphalaiṁ pratyānubhavati. Did the MS used by the Tibetan translators contain a lacuna here? Or is their rendering the reflection of a mere \textit{aberratio oculi}. See also note 146 to Skt. crit. ed.

\textsuperscript{211} P: ।

\textsuperscript{212} C omits: ।

\textsuperscript{213} P, G, N: \textit{de dag la}.

\textsuperscript{214} D, C, ZT: spyod.

\textsuperscript{215} P: ꜧ

\textsuperscript{216} All Canons read \textit{du}, but it must be noted that according to the standard morphophonemic rule, the particle should have read \textit{tu} (as usually required after \textit{g(a)}; see Jäschke [1883] 1989, 22).
ni | yid la byed pa bzhi po ‘di lta ste | rjes su mthun pa dang | gnyen po dang | dang bar ‘gyur ba dang | so sor rtog pa dag ‘dus par rig par bya’o |”

3.28.2.2.1. (P 202b7; G 242a1; N 180a1; D 168a5; C 174a5; ZT 417, 7; Choi 206, § 32.2.) ji ltar yid la byed pa bdun gyis bsam gtan dang po la snyoms par ‘jug pa de bzhi du | bsam gtan gnyis pa | dang | gsum pa dang | bzhi la snyoms par ‘jug pa dang | nam mkha’219 dang |220 nam shes dang | ci yang med pa dang | ‘du shes med221 min skye mchad la snyoms par ‘jug pa yang yid la byed pa bdun gyis yin222 par rig par bya’o223 |224

3.28.2.2.2. (P 202b8; G 242a2; N 180a2; D 168a7; C 174a7; ZT 417, 12) de la bsam gtan (P 203a1) gnyis pa la snyoms par ‘jug pa’i phyir | gang gis rtog pa dag la rags pa’i mtshan nyid du so sor rtog par byed cing | rtog pa med pa bsam gtan gnyis pa la zhi ba’i mtshan nyid du225 so sor rtog par byed pa de ni | (D 168b1) mtshan nyid du so sor rig pa’i226 yid la byed pa zhes bya’o | de la bsam gtan dang po227 la snyoms par zhung pa |228 bsam gtan dang po thob pa | rtog pa dag la rags pa lta zhih myan par bzhag |229 pa’i sa’i dmigs pa la mi brtan par spyod pa230 dang po skyes pas | dmigs pa yid la rjod |231 pa skye ba gang yin pa de232 ni rtog pa zhes bya’o | dmigs pa la mi brtan par spyod pa de dang ‘brel ba’i rjes su spyod pa’i yid la rjod233 pa shin tu phra

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217 P: TD TD (but in the facsimile reproduction, it is not clearly visible whether the first shad is simple shad or spungs shad).


219 G, N use abbreviated spelling: apsrt.

220 P: TD .

221 P: meg. Probably, a typographical mistake.

222 Choi omits: yin.

223 Tib.: ‘it should be known’ (*veditavyam). Ch. 當知 also suggests a similar reading. There is, however, no equivalent for this in the extant Skt. MS. Cf. parallel passage at AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 26-27) which contains yathāyogam yojayitavyāḥ ‘[the seven contemplations] should be applied properly’ as well as Ch. 當知 in the Xianyang lun (edited text at Choi, p. 85).

224 Choi: .

225 P: zhi bzhi pa’i [P clearly has pa’i] mtshan du. G reads zhi ba’i mtshan du, having a blank space amounting to about about two letters between zhi and ba’i (being a trace of the erasure of bzhi?). N reads (together with D, C, ZT?): zhi ba’i mtshan nyid du.

226 D, C, ZT: rtog pa’i. The usual rendering of laksanapratisaṃvedi manaskārah is mtshan nyid du so sor rig pa’i yid la byed pa, as found in the P-G-N stemma. Note, however, that so sor rtog par byed translates Skt. pratisaṃvedaye (see above).

227 Skt. omits prathama here. Ch. has 初, which like Tib., suggests prathama. Cf. note 156 to Skt. crit. ed.

228 C: || .

229 D, C (?), ZT: gzhog (C microfiche is unclear here). ZT has no note. See note 123 above.

230 Tib. suggests a wording like: *samāhitabhūmikālambane [*bhūmike + ālambane] vyagracāri. Cf. also notes to Ch. ed. and Engl. tr.

231 G, N, C: brjod. Quite exceptionally, these three Canons agree here. ZT has no note. See also note 233 below.

232 D-Tokyo: de; D-Taipei and D-TBRC: da (the latter obviously being a wrong reading). The difference is probably due to the slight modifications of the woodblocks which may have affected each impression. See note 105 to Chapter Three, Part One, above.

233 N: brjod. Here only N has this reading. See also note 231 above.

373
ba gang yin pa de ni dpyod pa zhes bya ste | rtop pa dang | dpyod pa de (ZT 418, 1) dag
kyang sems las byung ba ste | sems skyes na skye bar 'gyur zhing lhan cig 'byung ba mtshung par ldan pa dus geig tu 'jug pa 234 yin no || de ltar na de dag ni dang skyes pa dang | 235 phyi rol gyi skye mchê du gtoGS 236 pa yin te | de dag thams cad ni 'das pa dang | ma 'ong pa dang | da ltar byung ba'i dus 238 nams su yang | rgyu las byung ba rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba byung nas 'jig pa yun 239 mi ring ba | yun ring 240 du mi gnas pa | sems kun tu 241 'khrug par byed pa | g.yo bar byed pa | rab tu ma zhi ba'i nham pas 'jug pa yin no || sa de'i rang bzin ni sa gong ma la 242 llos na 243 | sdeG 244 bsgal bar gnas pa'i 245 phyir 246 nag po'i 247 phyogs yin la | 'dod pa dag 248 las dden pa las skyes pa'i bde ba'i 249 phan yon chung zad dang ldan pa yang yin te 250 | de la gnas pa la 251 rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang | ther zug ther zug gi dus su sems kyi spyod pa rtop pa dang bcas pa dang | (P 203b1) dpyod pa dang bcas pa 'byung bar 'gyur bas zhi bas 252 rab tu zhi ba la bu 253 ma 254 yin te | de ltar nham pa de dag gis rtop pa dag la rags pa'i

235 Rather than Skt. ekālambanavṛttayaḥ (cf. Ch. 同一緣轉), Tib. dus geig tu 'jug pa seems to suggest *ekakālavṛttayaḥ 'occurring at the same time'. However, *ekakālavṛttayaḥ after sahābhūvah would be largely redundant. The MS used by the Tibetan team may have been corrupt here.
237 D, C, ZT: rtoGS.
238 C: du.
239 D, C, ZT: kun.
241 D, ZT: du. ZT has no note. This is one of the rare cases when C agrees with the P-G-N stemma.
243 Literally, Tib. llos (na) means 'looking at', 'considering'. Here it translates Skt. ārabhya. See note 148 to Engl. tr.
244 In P reproduction, the upper side of (what should be) sdu and the following ga are completely unclear.
245 Tib. does not render Skt. anugata‘.
246 D, C, ZT omit: .
247 C has a blank covering the space of about three letters.
249 Skt. has *pritisukham, while in Tib. we find only the equivalent of sukha. It is not excluded that the compound was abbreviated and that dga’ ba = priti was supposed to be understood. Ch. renders both words: 喜樂.
250 Tib.: 'The nature of this level, when compared to the higher one, is [i.e., belongs to] the black category due to its abiding in suffering and is possessed of few advantages of pleasure born of the separation from sensual pleasures'. The Tibetan translators may have relied on a corrupt MS (or mis-construed the Skt. text?) by taking the fragment from upārīmāṁ bhūmin onwards as forming one sentence with bhūmiś caisā tādṛśī prakṛtyā. This is different from the syntax of the present MS, reads kṣṛṇapakṣyā and *anuśāṃsaṃgati as if being in feminine nominative singular agreeing with prakṛti, and does not render tādṛśī.
251 Skt. yatra sthitasya. Skt. and Ch. construe this phrase with the previous sentence.
252 D, C, ZT: zhi ba bas.
253 Tib. lta bu 'like' is rather surprising here and has no equivalent in Skt.
mtshan nyid du so sor rtog par byed do | rtog pa med pa'i bsam gtan gnyis pa la ni mam pa thams cad du rags pa'i mtshan nyid de lta bu med de | de'i phyir bsam gtan gnyis pa ni rags pa de

bsam gtan gnyis pa la snyoms par 'jug pa yid la byed pa lhag ma mams ni snga ma

bzhin du ci rigs par rig par bya ste |

3.28.2.2.3. (P 203b3; G 242b6; N 180b4; D 168b7; C 174b7; ZT 418, 18) yod min med min skye mched ky bar gyi sa dang sa dag la snyoms par 'jug pa'i yid la byed pa bdun po dag kyang de bzhin du ci rigs par rig par bya'o | | (Choi 206, § 32.3.) ci yang med pa'i skye mched man chad kyi sa 'og ma thams cad la rags (D 169a1) pa'i mtshan nyid ni mdor bsdu na mham pa (ZT 419, 1) gnyis su rig par bya ste | sa 'og ma rhaps ni ches sngag bshing bar gna shing ches rab tu ma zhi bar gnas pa dang | ches sgnah thun bar gna | pe st | (end of fragment edited by Choi) de ltar rags pa'i mtshan nyid gnyis po de dag gzhi drug po de dag gis ci rig par yongs su tshol bar byed do | sbyor ba mthar thug pa'i 'bras bu'i yid la byed pa man chad kyi<|> sa gang dang gang dag las 'dod chags dang bral bar 'dod pa'i sa gong ma mams la ni ci rig par zhi ba'i mtshan nyid du so sor rtog par byed do do

255 In P reproduction, de is completely unclear.
256 ZT: ־ ־
257 In C microfiche, ma is not clear.
258 P, G, N: rigs. This is probably a dittography under the influence of the preceding rigs par.
259 N: man. ZC has no note.
260 Skt. naivasaññānaññāññāyatanā. The usual Tibetan rendering is 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched (cf. MVut §1495).
261 C omits: rigs par. ZC has no note.
262 D, ZT omit: rig par. N reads like P and G, but it contains a blank equivalent to the space of about one or two letters between rig and par. This may be a trace of an editorial or typographical deletion (rigs was first written and then it was corrected to rig?).
263 To sum up the differences which occur at the end of this sentence, we have three readings:
(1) P, G, N: ci rigs par rig par bya'o (which is the correct reading adopted in my edition); (2) D, ZT: ci rigs par bya'o; and (3) C: ci rig par bya'o.
264 P, G, N: rigs. Choi (p. 206, n. 608) says that both P and D read: rigs par, but D (all reproductions: Tokyo, Taipei, TBRC) as well as C and ZT read: rig par.
265 G: gna (or gan?). Most likely, this is a scribal error. The word occurs at the end of the line and lack of space must have contributed to the scribe's omission (mistaken or deliberate?) of the final ལ་ |

266 P, G, N: ji. ZC has no note. According to Das, ci and ji have 'the same signification', but Tibetan grammarians distinguish between the two words as follows: dpe dang tshe gsal ba la ji thob | don la ci thob | (TED, s.v. ji) 'ji is used [lit., taken] for comparisons, measures, [and] weights; ci is used for [the rest of the?] the meaning'. In our text, ci rigs par for yathāyogam appears to be more frequent than ji rigs par. The latter does not, however, seem to be an incorrect form. Most likely, it represents a free variant with no semantic relevance and reflecting no phonotactical rule. For uniformity's sake, I have, however, unified the spelling to ci rigs par throughout my Tib. ed. of the SrBh.

267 Without this emendaion, the Tib. sentence would hardly make sense. See note 270 below.
268 P, G, N: ji. See note 266 above. ZC has no note.
269 In the extant Skt. original, the verb paryesate is followed by a few post-verbal elements. In Tib. (as well as in Ch.), these post-verbal elements appear as an independent sentence with its
3.28.3.1.0. (P 203b7; G 243a3; N 180b7; D 169a2; C 175a2; ZT 419, 7; Sakuma 66, § H.1.9) ‘dod pa dag las dben pa sdiq pa mi dge ba’i chos rnams las dben pa’272 rtog pa dang gcas pa | dpod pa dang gcas pa dben pa las skyes pa’i dga’ ba dang bde ba can bsam gtan dang po bsgrubs te273 gnas so zhes gsungs pa (Sakuma 66, § H.1.1)274 de la |

3.28.3.1.1. (P 203b7; G 243a4; N 180b7; D 169a3; C 175a3; ZT 419, 10; Sakuma 66, § H.1.1) ‘dod pa dag’275 ces bya ba ni rnam pa gnyis te | nyon mongs pa’i ‘dod pa dang | chogs po’i ‘dod pa’o || ‘dod pa dag las dben pa zhes bya ba yang rnam pa gnyis te | mthungs par ldan pa las276 dben pa dang | dmigs (P 204a1) pa las dben pa’o || |

3.28.3.1.2. (P 204a1; G 243a5; N 181a1; D 169a4; C 175a4; ZT 419, 13; Sakuma 66, § H.1.2.) sdiq pa mi dge ba’i chos rnams las dben pa zhes bya ba ni ‘dod pa’i rgyu las byung ba ste | nye ba’i nyon mongs pa mi dge ba’i chos ‘di lta ste277 | lus

own verb (see note 270 below). For some reason [different MS reading?, elegant variation?], in the Tib. rendering, this verb is not paryesate but so sor rtog par byed = *pratisainvedayate. Cf. also note 139 to Ch. ed.

270 Tib.: ‘By means of [the seven contemplations] up to the contemplation which represents the fruit of practice, [the ascetic] properly (ci rigs par = yathayogam) perceives the serene characteristic in the level above each of the levels from which he wishes to become detached’. (A more literal rendering of ci rigs par = yathayogam would be ‘according to what is suitable [in each case]’.) This misunderstanding (whether translational or coming from a corrupt MS) comes from wrongly taking yasya yasya with the following sentence instead of construing it with the preceding one.

271 There is no parallel for this passage in Skt. and Ch. We find an almost identical sentence at 3.28.2.1.9.1. above. This passage containing the canonical stock-phrase to be glossed upon appears to be an editorial addition of the Tibetan translators. Similarly, Tib. gives the canonical formulae at the beginning of each of the sections on all other meditative attainments below. Here and below, see corresponding notes to Eng. tr. for the equivalent Skt. canonical stock-phrases.

272 P, G, N omit: sdiq pa mi dge ba’i chos rnams las dben pa.

273 Here as well as in all the other similar citations of the canonical formulae below, the parallel passages in the MVyut (§§ 57-58) read: rdzogs par byas te.

274 Sakuma begins the passage here in order to start with the same word as the Skt. text. In Tibetan, this usage of de la seems to be a stylistic feature by which the preceding sentence(s) (independent in Sanskrit) is/are subordinated to this demonstrative pronoun. In the passage above and in the similar citations of canonical formulae below (passages 3.28.3.1.0, 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.5.0., 3.28.3.6.0., and 3.28.3.8.0.), all Canons consistently include this de la in the sentence ending with gsungs pa, its sense appearing to be: ‘in [concerning] this [stock-phrase]’. With the exception of passage 3.28.3.2.0. below, they also have shad after de la. Unlike Skt. and Ch., Tib. first glosses kama and then vivikta kama. As also noted by Sakuma (p. 28, n. 187), kama and vivikta kama are rendered as pratikas (i.e., constitutive part of a Sanskrit compound). This probably reflects a decision of the Tibetan translation team. Actually, this analytic manner of translating compounds is often adopted in the Tib. translation of our text (see passage 3.28.3.1.4., etc. below).

275 Tib. has the reverse of the order of the Skt. upakleth, kamaheketka. This means that the Tib. construes the sentence as the bad, unwholesome factors [refer to] those that have arisen from sensual pleasures, to wit (ste), the unwholesome factors [which are] secondary defilements, i.e.

376
kyis nyes par spyad pa dang | ngag\textsuperscript{278} gis nyes par spyad pa dang | yid kyis nyes par spyad pa dang | mtshon\textsuperscript{279} 'byin pa dang | dbug\textsuperscript{280} pa 'byin pa\textsuperscript{281} dang | 'thab mo dang | mtshang 'dru\textsuperscript{282} ba dang | rtsod pa dang | g.yed\textsuperscript{284} pa dang | g.yo byed pa dang | slu\textsuperscript{285} ba dang | snying rje med pa\textsuperscript{286} dang | brdzun du smra ba kun tu\textsuperscript{287} 'byung ba gang dag yin pa de\textsuperscript{288} dag ste\textsuperscript{289} | de dag spangs pa'i phyir sdig pa mi dge ba'i chos rnams\textsuperscript{290} las dben pa\textsuperscript{291} zhes bya'o

[...][see Skt. akuśalā dharmās tadyathā ...']. Such a reading seems to imply that the pāpakā akuśalā dharmās are not kāmās themselves but factors caused by them.

\textsuperscript{278} N looks rather like dag. It must be, however, noted that the length of the downward stroke of Helvetica often varies (even in the same woodblock print!) and may sometimes closely resemble Helvetica.

\textsuperscript{279} P: mchon (the word is not attested, and most likely represents a scribal or typographical error). G: mtshan (the obvious error in P, upon which the G editors supposedly relied, was probably replaced with a more familiar, albeit mistaken, reading.) ZT has no note.

\textsuperscript{280} D, C, ZT, Sakuma: dbyig. ZT has no note. According to TED (s.v.), dbyug pa is 'a stick, cudgel, staff', while dbyig pa is a 'walking staff, wand, stick'. The latter would thus appear to be a variety of the former. BThs (s.v.) defines dbyug pa as ber ka ste shing sogs kyi rgyug pa 'a staff', like a club, etc., [made of] wood, and so on' (Chinese equivalents: 棍, 拐杖) and dbyig pa as ber ka'am dbyug pa 'a club or staff' (Chinese equivalents: 棍, 杖). This is not very illuminating as to the differences (if any major ones exist at all) between the two lexemes, but it appears that the former is the most usual and semantically more comprehensive word, which fits better in our case of a staff employed as weapon. We should add that it is equally possible that the two words represented merely dialectal variants. See also note 162 to Engl. tr.

\textsuperscript{281} Tib.: ‘taking up the sword, and taking up the staff’. The words appear in reverse order from Skt. (as well as Ch.).

\textsuperscript{282} P, N read: mtshang 'bru (the words mtshang 'bru ba and mtshang 'dru ba are synonyms; see TED, s.v. 'bru ba). G reads: 'tshang 'bru. According to TED (s.v. 'tshang), mtshang and 'tshang are synonyms. Cf. MVyut # 2630, bhandanam = 'tshang (var. lec. mtshang) 'bru ba.

\textsuperscript{283} P: 따.

\textsuperscript{284} In P reproduction, the vocalic marker above the letter is not clear.

\textsuperscript{285} P, G, N: bslu.

\textsuperscript{286} This should be the equivalent of the Skt. nikiṛi, used here in the sense of ‘dishonesty’, ‘fraud’, etc. Tib. snying rje med pa means, however ‘merciless, cruel’. Together with its synonym snying rje bral, it often stands for the Skt. niśkaruṇa (see TSD, s.v.). It can be explained as rendering a different MS reading, which may have been niśkaruṇa (or niśkṛpa?), or, less likely, as a free (rather too free!) translation of nikiṛi construed as Gemeinheit, Beleidigung, etc. (PW, s.v. nikiṛi).

\textsuperscript{287} D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.

\textsuperscript{288} In P reproduction, de is unclear.

\textsuperscript{289} Tib. gang dag yin pa may suggest a relative pronoun: *ya upaklesāḥ [...?] (?). See note 181 to Skt. crit. ed. The pronoun de dag here (whith no equivalent in Skt.) represents the correlative of ye. Tib.: ‘they’ [i.e., ‘the bad and unwholesome factors’ in the canonical citation] are the unwholesome factors which are secondary defilements [...].

\textsuperscript{290} G: rnam. In G, this letter and the following las are of slightly smaller size than the other letters, which may point to a later correction, probably an addition (incomplete, however, for rnam which lacks *).

\textsuperscript{291} Here and below, the cited word or phrase is given at the beginning as well as at the end of the gloss. Cf. Ch.
3.28.3.1.3. (P 204a4; G 243b1; N 181a3; D 169a6; C 175a6; ZT 419, 20; Sakuma 67, § H.1.3.) rtog pa dang bcas pa | dpyod pa292 dang bcas pa zhes bya ba ni rtog pa dang dpyod pa (ZT 420, 1) dag la skyon du mi lta ba’i phyir |293 ‘dod pa’i gnyen po rang gi sa pa’i rtog pa dang | dpyod pa dge ba dag dang ldan pas na | rtog pa dang bcas pa dpyod pa dang bcas pa294 zhes bya’o | |

3.28.3.1.4. (P 204a5; G 243b2; N 181a4; D 169a7; C 175a7; ZT 420, 3; Sakuma 67, § H.1.4.) dben pa las295 zhes bya ba ni ’dod pa296 {gang297} dag las dben pa sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i yid la byed pa las so298 | | skyes pa zhes bya ba ni299 rgyu de dang rkyen des de’i mjug thogs300 kho nar301 yang dag par skyes pa302 la bya st303 de’i pyhir dben pa las skyes pa zhes (D 169b1) bya ba gsungs so304 | |

3.28.3.1.5. (P 204a6; G 243b4; N 181a5; D 169b1; C 175b1; ZT 420, 6; Sakuma 67, § H.1.5.) dga’ ba dang bde ba can zhes bya ba de ni305 ‘dod pa dang re ba’i don thob cing dga’ ba la skyon du mi lta ba’i phyir dang | gnas ngan len thams cad

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292 G omits: pa.
293 D, C, ZT omit: |.
294 C has a blank space containing eight upper dots (tsheg). It might be an erasure of erroneous word(s) from the woodblock.
295 In this passage, too (see 3.28.3.1.1. above), Tib. adopts a pratika-based manner of translation.
296 N: bya ba’i ’dod pa.
297 All Canons read: gang. The relative pronoun, which would actually give the sentence an altogether different meaning, is probably an early scribal error. Sakuma, too, deletes this gang.
298 Tib. makes the meaning of the Skt. sentence clearer: “from separation” [means that] separation from sensual pleasures is [achieved] through the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice.” Cf. also Ch.
299 All Canons as well as Sakuma have: | . Usually (at least in our text), the expression zhes bya ba ni is not followed by shad. See also closely similar passage 3.28.3.2.4. below which has no shad after zhes bya ba ni.
300 P, G: thog. N has: thog but under ै there is a small ू, which most likely is a typographical correction. The collation note in ZC gives thog as the reading of both P and N, without, however, mentioning this detail for N. It appears that mjug thogs is the usual form (see passage 3.28.3.2.4. below; BTsh, s.v.; YoBh-D, s.v. mjug thogs sa). The addition of ू by the N editors may also hint that this is the preferable form.
301 Tib. would rather suggest: eva (for which there is no equivalent in Skt.).
302 Tib. yang dag par skyes pa suggests here samuttannam rather than utpannam of the extant Skt. MS. Usually, in the YoBh, utpanna is rendered as skyes pa, bskyed pa, bdog pa, byung ba, or ‘byung ba (see YoBh-D, s.v.).
303 The Tib. expression ...zhes bya ba ni...la bya ste is used to gloss on a word or phrase. We find a similar occurrence in, for instance, the Tibetan translation of the AKBh: skyes ba zhes bya ba ni ris mthun pa la bya ste | (P, Vol. 115, Gu 150a4), corresponding to Skt. AKBh 258, 13: janmei nikāyasaḥbhāgasyākhyā “birth” is an appellation of group-similarity’ (= Ch. T29.92a25: 此一生言顯一同分).
304 N uses abbreviated spelling: न. ।
305 Tib. (as well as Ch.) has prūtisukhām at the beginning as well as at the end of the gloss. Tib. also seems to render the compound as a bahuvrihi, which is rather odd from the viewpoint of the Skt. compound.
dang brai⁶⁰⁶ zhing | sems dang lus las su rung ba rgya chen po⁶⁰⁷ dang ldan pas na⁶⁰⁸ |
dga’ ba dang bde ba can zhes bya’o ||

3.28.3.1.6. (P 204a7; G 243b5; N 181a6; D 169b1; C 175b1; ZT 420, 10;
Sakuma 67, § H.1.6.) bsam gtan⁶⁰⁹ zhes bya ba ni dmigs pa la yang dag par nye bar
gtod pa⁶¹⁰ dang | dran pa rtse gcig tu nye bar gtod pa’i phyir bsam gtan zhes bya’o ||
dang po zhes bya ba ni dang por ’dod pa’i khams nas bskyod pa’i go (P 204b1)
rims⁶¹² bzhin du bgrangs pa’i phyir dang po zhes bya’o ||

3.28.3.1.7. (P 204b1; G 243b6; N 181a7; D 169b2; C 175b2; ZT 420, 13;
Sakuma 68, § H.1.7.) bsgrubs te zhes bya ba ni sbyor ba mthar thugs pa’i ’bras bu yin
pa’i phyir bsgrubs te⁶¹³ zhes bya’o ||

3.28.3.1.8. (P 204b1; G 243b6; N 181b1; D 169b3; C 175b3; ZT 420, 14;
Sakuma 68, § H.1.8.) gnas so zhes bya ba ni phyis bsgom⁶¹⁴ pa lan mang du bsgrubs
pas⁶¹⁵ ci ’dod pa bzhin thob pa dang | dka’⁶¹⁷ ba med par thob pa dang | tshigs med

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⁶⁰⁶ Sakuma: brel.
⁶⁰⁷ Tib. lacks: praśrabdhi (usually rendered as shin tu sbyangs pa).
⁶⁰⁸ P, G, N omit na.
⁶⁰⁹ The order of glossing is the reverse of the Skt., but this is due to following the normal word
order in Tib., i.e., bsam gtan=dhyāna followed by dang po=prathama.
⁶¹⁰ Tib. uses here as well as in the next phrase nye bar gtod pa = upanibandha, but in the first
occurrence, it should correspond to Skt. upanidhyāna. Gtod pa usually means ‘to hand over; to
lean against, to put against; to direct, to turn’, and raises no problems as the equivalent of
‘bandha’ (in the YoBh, nye bar gtod pa also translates upanibaddha). The most likely
explanation is that the Skt. MS of the Tibetan team read *samyagālambanopanibandhā, but
the possibility of an early scribal mistake inherited in all Canons cannot be ruled out either.
In the YoBh (YoBh-D, s.v.), upanidhyāna is usually rendered nges pa sams pa, and upanidhyaii
is nges par rtog pa or nye bar sens pa. In the AKBh (see AKBh Index, vol. 1, s.v.),
upanidhyāna is similarly translated as nges par sams pa or nye bar rtog pa. A form like nye bar rtog pa might
have been mistaken by a Tibetan scribe (aberratio oculi due to the following phrase?) and
written nye bar gtod pa. There is a third possible explanation (less likely, however) that the MS
used by the Tibetan translators read the same as the extant Skt. text, but the Tibetan team chose
to unify the words glossing upon dhyāna. Actually, one of the senses given by BTsh, s.v., for
gtod pa is sams rte gcig du ’jog pa ‘to become mentally focused’. If this is a meaning found in
traditional Buddhist sources (no details are given in the BTsh), then nye bar gtod pa may
due to be deliberately chosen on as equivalent for upanidhyāna. The next word upanibandha was
also rendered as nye bar gtod pa, and this generated a symmetrical construction: dmigs pa la
yang dag par nye bar gtod pa dang | dran pa rtse gcig tu nye bar gtod pa.

³¹¹ ZT: .False

³¹² All Canons read: rims. Modern lexicographical sources invariably register rims as meaning
‘contagious disease’, without mentioning it to be a variant spelling for rim. The latter means
‘order, succession’, etc. In the parallel passage 3.28.3.2.6. below, P, G, N actually read: rim. Old
Buddhist translations seem, however, to use both *rim and *rims as free variants. In the YoBh,
we find both go rim bzhin du and go rims bzhin du for anupūrvam (cf. YoBh-D, s.v.). Similarly,
TSD s.v. records both go rim bzhin du = yathākramam (‘in due order’) and go rims bzhin =
yathākrama.

³¹³ P, G, N: ।.
³¹⁵ Tib.: ‘due to frequently achieving the cultivation’. Tib. appears to translates Skt.
bhāvanābahuśikārānispādanāt in a slightly abbreviated form. In Tib., *bahuśikāra* seems to be
par thob pa’i phyir | bsam gtan gyi snyoms par ‘jug pa des mtshan mo dang | nyin mo
dang | nyin mtshan dang | nyin mtshan bdun gyi bar ram | ji srid ’dod pa’i bar
du | ’da’ bar byed pas na gnas so zhes bya’o ||

3.28.3.2.0. (P 204b3; G 244a2; N 181b2; D 169b4; C 175b4; ZT 420, 19;
Sakuma 69, § H.2.0.))320 de rtog pa dang321 dpod pa dang bral zhing nang yongs
su dang ste | sms kyi rgyud gcig tu gyur pas | rtog pa med pa dang | dpod
pa med pa | ting nge | dzin las skyes pa’i dga’ ba dang | (ZT 421, 1) bde ba can
bsam gtan gnyis pa bsgrubs te gnas so zhes gsungs pa (Sakuma 69, § H.2.1.)327
de la < | >328

3.28.3.2.1. (P 204b4; G 244a3; N 181b3; D 169b5; C 175b5; ZT 421, 2;
Sakuma 69, § H.2.1.) rtog pa dang | dpod pa dang bral zhing nang yongs su dang
ste | zhes bya ba ni rtog pa dang bcas pa | dpod pa dang bcas pa’i ting nge | dzin gyi
mtshan ma dag las sms nram par bzlog nas | rtog pa med pa dang | dpod pa med pa’i
ting nge | dzin gyi mtshan ma dag la legs par gtod cing | dmigs pa la mi brtan par
spyd pa las rnam par phral te | dmigs pa la brtan par spyd pa la ngang333 geig

rendered ad sensum adverbially. Ch. also seems to translate in a similar manner (see note 158 to
Ch. ed.).

317 P: dga’. ZT has no note.
318 Tib.: ‘[one] day and night’.
319 Tib.: ‘up to seven days and nights or up to as much he wishes’. Tib. seems to have relied on
a different reading or may have misunderstood the original. The extant Skt. text states that the
yogi can keep his absorption as much as he wishes within the space of seven days and nights,
which is the longest possible limit (cf. Ji’s Commentary quoted in note 174 to Eng. tr.). Tib., on
the other hand, if my understanding is correct, implies that the ascetic can stay up to seven days
and nights or as much as he wishes, i.e., (indefinitely?) longer than one week.
320 There is no parallel for this passage in Skt. and Ch. Cf. also passage 3.28.3.1.0. above.
322 The reading in C seems closer to bar but, as usual, pa/ba is very difficult to distinguish
(especially in a microfiche photocopy). See note 184 above.
323 D, C, ZT omit: dang.
324 G uses abbreviated spelling: $g$.
325 D, C, ZT, Sakuma omit: | .
326 G omits so.
327 See note 274 above.
328 P, G, N, D, C, ZT, Sakuma omit: | . In all similar occurrences (3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.3.0.,
3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.5.0., 3.28.3.6.0., and 3.28.3.8.0.), all Canons use, however, shad, which I add
here for uniformity’s sake.
329 P, G, N omit: nang yongs su dang ste. This appears to be an early scribal error shared by the
whole stemma. The phrase glossed upon here is repeated at the end of the passage, where it is
complete in all Canons.
330 The shad (?) in G seems to be incompletely written and is reduced to two dots.
331 P, G, N: pa.
332 Tib. construes Skt. vyagracārīna ālambanād vivecyā as ‘having separated from unsteadily
operating on the meditative object’. Cf. my Engl. tr. of the Sanskrit original. Tib. renders in a
similar way avyagracārīnā ālambane (see below).
333 D, C, ZT: dang. ZT has no note.
gis sms zhi ba\textsuperscript{334} dang dang bar 'jug par byed cing mam par 'jog par byed pas\textsuperscript{335} na | de'i phyir\textsuperscript{336} rtog pa dang\textsuperscript{337} dpyod pa dang bral zhing nang yongs su dang ste zhes bya ba gsungs so \| 

3.28.3.2.2. (P 204b7; G 244a6; N 181b5; D 169b7; C 175b7; ZT 421, 9; Sakuma 69, § H.2.2.) sms kyi rgyud gcig tu gyur pas zhes bya ba ni | des bsgoms\textsuperscript{338} pa yongs su goms par bya ba'i phyir | rtog pa dang dpyod pa med pa'i ting nge 'dzin de nyid la rtog pa dang dpyod pas bar du gcod\textsuperscript{339} cing skabs su 'chad pa'i gnas (D 170a1) skabs las yang dag par 'das te\textsuperscript{340} bar du gcod pa med pa (P 205a1) dang | skabs su 'chad pa med pa'i gnas skabs thob pas na\textsuperscript{341} de'i phyir sms kyi rgyud gcig tu gyur pas zhes bya ba gsungs so \| 

3.28.3.2.3. (P 205a1; G 244b2; N 181b7; D 170a1; C 176a1; ZT 421, 14; Sakuma 69, § II.2.3.) rtog pa med pa dpyod pa med pa zhes bya ba ni\textsuperscript{342} rtog pa dang dpyod pa\textsuperscript{343} mam pa thams cad kyi thams cad du spangs pa'i phyir rtog pa med pa dang | dpyod pa med pa zhes bya'o \| \textsuperscript{344} 

3.28.3.2.4. (P 205a2; G 244b2; N 181b7; D 170a2; C 176a2; ZT 421, 17; Sakuma 70, § H.2.4.) ting nge 'dzin las zhes bya ba ni sbyor ba mthar thug pa yid la byed pa'i ting nge 'dzin las so |\textsuperscript{345} skyes pa zhes bya ba ni rgyu de dang\textsuperscript{346} rkyen des\textsuperscript{347} de'i mjug thogs kho nar\textsuperscript{348} yang dang par skyes pa\textsuperscript{349} la bya ste | de'i phyir ting nge 'dzin las skyes pa zhes bya ba gsungs so \| 

3.28.3.2.5. (P 205a2; G 244b2; N 182a1; D 170a3; C 176a3; ZT 421, 20; Sakuma 70, § H.2.5.) dga' ba dang | bde ba can zhes bya ba ni 'dod pa dang re ba'i don thob cing dga' ba la skyon du mi lta bas | (ZT 422, 1) yang dag par rab tu dga' ba dang ldan zhing | yid bde ba dang ldan pa'i phyir\textsuperscript{350} dang |\textsuperscript{351} bsam gtan dang po'i rtog

\textsuperscript{334} P: nga (?) The letter may have been intended to be ba, but as a result of faulty printing or a wrongly carved character it may have lost its right horizontal stroke and thus came to resemble nga.
\textsuperscript{335} P, G, N: pa.
\textsuperscript{336} D, C, ZT: de'i phyir de.
\textsuperscript{337} Only C has shad here. The other Canons and editions omit shad, though they all use it in the first occurrence of the quotation (see above). I follow C for uniformity's sake.
\textsuperscript{338} P, G, N: bsgoms.
\textsuperscript{339} P, G, N: dpyod pas rab tu dpyod.
\textsuperscript{340} Tib. suggests samatikrmya rather than atikramya.
\textsuperscript{341} ZT: ﾅ ．
\textsuperscript{342} P: ﾅ (rather unclear).
\textsuperscript{343} D, C, ZT, Sakuma: dpyod pa dag.
\textsuperscript{344} N: |.
\textsuperscript{345} P: ﾅ | (the second shad may also be ﾅ but its upper part is not clear).
\textsuperscript{346} C: гла. Most probably, a typographical error for dang.
\textsuperscript{347} P, G, N omit: des. See closely similar passage 3.28.3.1.4. in which all Canons contain: des.
\textsuperscript{348} Tib. rather suggests: eva (no equivalent in Skt.). See also passage 3.28.3.1.4. and note 301 above.
\textsuperscript{349} See note 302 to passage 3.28.3.1.4. above.
\textsuperscript{350} Tib. suggests: *sasaramprahasasasaunmanasyagatvāt. However, it is not excluded that the Tibetan translators understood the adjective(s) as having a predicative function with a causal nuance and translated them/it as if parallel members of a compound ending in *tvāt. See also
byed pa'i skyon rnam pa
gnyis po bsam gtan gnyis pa la rtog pa dang | dpyod pa
dang | da ltar (D 170b1) gyi
da dang bral bas na | de'i phyir btang snyoms la
gnas shing zhes bya ba gsungs te | sems kun tu
'khrug par byed pa'i chos de gnyis ni | sems
rgyud du btang snyoms su gzhag pa la glegs
byed pa yin pas na | sems kun tu
'khrug par byed pa zhes bya'o | | de la
bsam gtan dang po la ni
rtog pa dang | dpyod (ZT 423, 1) pa yod pas des na rgyud du
btang snyoms la 'jug
par mi 'gyur ro | | bsam gtan gnyis pa la ni dga' ya od pas | des na der yang rgyud du
btang snyoms la 'jug par mi 'gyur te | de lta
bas na bsam gtan dang po dang | bsam
gnyis pa de dag la btang snyoms shas cher med pas
de'i phyir | bsam gtan
gsum pa la snyoms par zhugs pa'i bsam gtan pa de ni
btang snyoms la gnas pa zhes bya'o

3.28.3.3.3. (P 205b6; G 245b1; N 182b3; D 170b3; C 176b3; ZT 423, 6;
Sakuma 72, § H.3.3.) dran pa dang shes bzhin can
zin te
zhes bya ba ni de
btang snyoms la gnas pa na
ji lta ji lkar dga' ba dang idan pa'i 'du shes yid
la byed
pa de dag kun tu
'byung bar mi 'gyur ba de lta de ltar dran pa nye bar bzhag ste

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373 P, G, N: gvis.
374 D, C, ZT, Sakuma: dga' ba dag. The corresponding Skt. reading prīthi is, however, singular.
375 D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.
377 G appears to use the abbreviated spelling of sems, with final ebile (shape rather unclear) written under ebile (cf. Bacot 1912, 72, # 656).

Here, sems has no Skt. equivalent and appears to have been added by the Tibetan translators because the rendering of upeskā by btang snyoms su gzhag pa required cittā as its object.
378 P: rgyan. ZT has no note.
379 P, G, N: bzhag. ZT has no note.
380 P: bgegs. ZT has no note.
381 D, C (?) (microfiche rather unclear), ZT: du. ZT has no note.
382 The Tib. wording is rather different from extant Skt.: 'As for these two factors which cause agitation to the mind, because they are an obstacle to putting the mind into constant equanimity [a phrase most probably rendering nirantarāyā upeskāyā], [they] are called 'causing agitation to the mind.'
384 N has a blank space containing only three upper dots between ni and rtog.
385 P, G, N: tu. ZT has no note.
386 P, G, N: tu. ZT has no note.
388 Tib.: 'because equanimity does not exist in great measure'. Tib. sha cher usually renders bakulam, bahula-, mahā-, etc (cf. YoBh-D).
391 P, G, N omit: can.
393 N: ni.
394 C (microfiche unclear) looks rather like: yod. ZT has no note.
395 D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.
396 P, G, N: gzhag. ZT has no note.
gnas par byed do || gal te bsam gtan gsum pa legs par \(^{397}\) goms par ma byas pas brjod \(^{308}\) ngas pa'i phyir | bryga la bryga lam na | dga’ ba dang ldan pa’i ‘du shes yid la byed pa de dag kun tu \(^{399}\) byung bar gyur na \(^{400}\) myur ba myur ba kho nar de dag la shes rab kyis so sor r
tog \(^{401}\) par byed | legs (P 206a1) pa kho nar rab tu shes par byed cing byung ngo cog dang du mi len par spong bar byed \(^{402}\) sel bar byed | byang bar byed cing sens btang snyoms su byed \(^{403}\) pas na \(^{404}\) de’i phyir dran pa dang shes bzhin can yin te zhes bya ba \(^{405}\) gsungs so \(^{406}\).

3.28.3.3.5. \(^{407}\) (P 206a2; G 245b4; N 182b6; D 170b6; C 176b6; ZT 423, 16; Sakuma 73, § H.3.4.a.) bde ba lus kyis myong ba zhes bya ba ni | de de’i tshe na gzugs kyi lus dang | yid kyi lus kyis ishor ba’i bde ba dang | shin tu sbyangs pa’i bde ba so sor myong bar byed pas \(^{408}\) na | de’i phyir bde ba lus kyis myong ba \(^{409}\) zhes bya ba gsungs so || \(^{416}\).

3.28.3.3.6. (P 206a3; G 245b6; N 182b6; D 170b6; C 176b6; ZT 423, 19; Sakuma 73, § H.3.5.a.) ’phags pa rnams kyis gang de \(^{411}\) dran pa dang ldan pa bde ba la gnas pa btang snyoms pa’o zhes brjod pa ste \(^{412}\) zhes bya ba \(^{413}\) ni bsam gtan gsum pa man chad la ni | bde ba de lta bu yang med la rgyun du \(^{414}\) btang snyoms la \(^{415}\) gnas pa \(^{416}\) yang (ZT 424, i) med do || bsam gstan gsum pa’i gong ma dag la \(^{417}\) ni btang

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\(^{397}\) Tib.: ‘correctly’ (*samayak?).

\(^{398}\) C: brjod. ZT has no note.

\(^{399}\) D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.

\(^{400}\) C: \(\checkmark\).

\(^{401}\) N writes r
tog with gs spelled as ??. ZT has no note.

\(^{402}\) ZT: \(\checkmark\).

\(^{403}\) Tib.: ‘make the mind equanimous’. See note 190 to Engl. tr.

\(^{404}\) ZT: \(\checkmark\).

\(^{405}\) P, G, N omit: bya ba.

\(^{406}\) D: \(\checkmark\) ||. C: \(\checkmark\) \(\checkmark\) \(\checkmark\) (the second spungs shad is not so clear and may actually be a regular shad).

\(^{407}\) In Tib., the order of this and the following two passages is different from Skt. and Ch. In order to keep the correspondence of all editions, I have adopted the same numeration, but in Tib., this has resulted in an arithmetically irregular order. This ‘anomaly’ as well as the addition of a further gloss (3.28.3.3.7. below) in Tib. may point in the direction of a different Skt. version. It is not excluded, however, that the Tibetan translators decided to put some order into the rather messy glosses of the Skt. original (see especially passage 3.28.3.3.4. and note 192 to Engl. tr.).

\(^{408}\) Tib. uses both myong ba and so sor myong bar byed pa to render (what in the extant MS is) the same word: pratisamvedayate. Strictly speaking, only so sor myong bar byed pa corresponds to pratisamvedayate.

\(^{409}\) P, G, N: la.

\(^{410}\) ZT: \(\checkmark\) ||.

\(^{411}\) D, C, ZT, Sakuma: gang de la. See passage 3.28.3.3.0. and note 366 above.

\(^{412}\) D, C, ZT, Sakuma omit: ||.

\(^{413}\) D, ZT omits ba. According to collation note 7 (p. 517) in ZT, P and N omit: bya. This is incorrect.

\(^{414}\) P, G, N, C: tu. ZT has no note.

\(^{415}\) G omits la. ZT has no note.

\(^{416}\) Tib.: ‘dwelling in [or: state of] continuous [/uninterrupted] equanimity’.

\(^{417}\) P, G, N omit: de dag.
snyoms yod⁴¹⁸ kyang bde ba de lta bu⁴¹⁹ med de | de ltar ’og ma (D 171a1) dag la bde ba dang btang snyoms med pa dang | gong ma dag la bde ba med pa’i phyir ’di lta ste | bsam gtan gsum pa ’di ni de dag gi⁴²⁰ gnas yin pas na | ’phags pas kyang⁴²¹ de la dmigs te gnas pa’i⁴²² gang zag gang yin pa de’i dbang du ndzad⁴²³ nas | gang de dran pa dang idan pa bde ba la gnas pa btang snyoms pa’o zhes brjod de⁴²⁴ | ’phags pa zhes bya ba ni sangs rgyas dang sangs rgyas kyi nyan thos rnams so so ||

3.28.3.3.4. (P 206a6; G 246a3; N 183a2; D 171a2; C 177a2; ZT 424, 8; Sakuma 74, § H.3.4.b.) dga’ ba med pa⁴²⁵ zhes bya ba ni de ltar btang snyoms la gnas pa des de’i tshe dran pa dang shes bzhi kun tu⁴²⁶ bsten cing goms par byas | lan mang du byas pa’i rgyus |⁴²⁷ dga’ ba dang⁴²⁸ idan pa’i tshor ba{s}⁴⁵⁹ sems dga’ bar byed pa de spong⁴³⁰ bar byed⁴³¹ cing | dga’ ba’i gnyen po dga’ med pa zhi⁴³² ba dang | rab tu zhi ba’i tshor ba³³ sems la{s}³⁴³ skye bar⁴³⁵ ’gyur bas na | de’i phyir dga’ ba med pa zhes bya ba bsungs so⁴³⁶ ⁴³⁷ ||

3.28.3.3.7. (P 206a8; G 246a5; N 183a4; D 171a3; C 177a3; ZT 424, 13; Sakuma 74, § H.3.5.b.) bsam gtan gsum pa bsgrubs (P 206b1) te gnas so zhes bya ba

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⁴¹⁹ Tib. seems to read tadṛūpaṇi here too (see preceding sentence).
⁴²⁰ P, G, N: gis.
⁴²¹ Tib. suggests: api.
⁴²² Tib. seems to construe pratilambhavihārinī as ‘having perceived and dwelling in’ (dmigs would rather suggest *upalambha*).
⁴²³ C: mjad. ZT has no note.
⁴²⁴ Skt. continues with tṛtiyāṃ dhyānam upasainpadya viharaṇī. Tib. has a separate gloss for it; see passage 3.28.3.3.7. below.
⁴²⁵ P, G, N: pa’i.
⁴²⁶ D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.
⁴²⁷ C, ZT: ༽. P, G, omit: |
⁴²⁸ P, G, N: |
⁴²⁹ All Canons read tshor bas but an instrumental makes no sense here. As the following direct object clearly shows, tshor ba needs no case marker. Sakuma reads with the traditional Canons in the main text but suggests similar emendation in his footnote (p. 74, n. 536). The traditional reading must be an early mistake inherited by all textual witnesses.
⁴³⁰ N: song.
⁴³¹ Tib. seems to prefer an active rendering of itasya [...] prahiyate by des [...] spong bar byed.
⁴³² Sakuma (p. 74, n. 538) notes that D reads: zhe. All reproductions of D (Tokyo, Taipei, and TBRC) read, however, zhi.
⁴³³ D, C, ZT: ba’i.
⁴³⁴ All Canons read: las. Skt. locative cetesi clearly requires, however, sems la. The sentence makes sense even with las: ‘feeling of [...] arises from [/originates from] mind’, but it is very likely that las is an early transmissional error inherited in all Canons. Sakuma also reads las in the main text but conjectures la in footnote (p. 74, n. 540).
⁴³⁵ D, C, ZT, Sakuma: skyes par. The verb here should correspond to Skt. utpadyate, and this makes skye bar ’gyur ba(s) a better reading.
⁴³⁶ In C microfiche, it is unclear whether so has its upper vocalic mark.
⁴³⁷ Tib. suggests: *tenāha nisprītikam (for which there is no Skt. equivalent). See also note 192 to Engl. tr.
ni snga ma bzhin du rig⁴³⁸ par bya’o || ⁴³⁹

3.28.3.4.0. (P 206b1; G 246a6; N 183a4; D 171a4; C 177a4; ZT 424, 14; Sakuma 74, § H.4.0.)⁴⁴⁰ de bde ba yang spangs te | saga nas sdu g bsnal yang spangs shing yid bde ba dang | yid mi bde ba yang nub pas bde ba yang ma yin | sdu g bsnal⁴⁴¹ yang ma yin | btang snyoms dang | dran pa yongs su dag pa bsam gtan bzhì pa bsgrubs⁴⁴² te gnas so zhes gsungs po de ña |

3.28.3.4.1. (P 206b2; G 246b1; N 183a6; D 171a5; C 177a5; ZT 424, 18; Sakuma 75, § H.4.1.) de bde ba yang spangs te zhes bya ba ni | bde ba’i gnyen po ni rigs ’dra ba’i phyir | spong ba’i⁴⁴³ gnyen po ma bstan par de’i gnyen pos byas pa bde ba spangs pa gang yin pa de nyid bstan⁴⁴⁴ te | de’i gnyen po yang gang zhe na |⁴⁴⁵ ’di lta ste | btang snyoms dang | dran pa dang | shes bzhin (ZT 425, 1) yin no | | de dag la brten⁴⁴⁶ cing goms par byas pas | bsam gtan gsum pa las bskyod cing | bsam gtan gsum pa’i sa pa’i bde ba gang yin pa de spong bar⁴⁴⁷ byed pas na | de’i phyir⁴⁴⁸ bde ba yang

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⁴³⁹ Tib.: “The He dwells having attained the third absorption” should be understood as [explained] before [i.e., in the case of the first absorption].’ The passage has no equivalent in Skt., though the citation from the canonical formula: tryaṁ dhyānaṁ upasampadya viharatīti appears in passage 3.28.3.3.6. For a similar wording, see 3.28.3.2.6. above.

⁴⁴⁰ There is no parallel for this passage in Skt. and Ch. Cf. also passages 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., and 3.28.3.3.0. above.

⁴⁴¹ C has blank space containing only three upper dots.

⁴⁴² C: prefixed ཀ in bsgrubs is incompletely printed. The letter is barely legible, and Sakuma actually records the C reading as: sgrubs ? ? (p. 74, n. 542). ZT has no note.

⁴⁴³ P, G, N: sponds pa’i.

⁴⁴⁴ D, C, ZT: brten.

⁴⁴⁵ N: མ .

⁴⁴⁶ The reading is rather problematic. Usually, brten renders āśraya, āśritya, pratītya, upādāya, etc. (cf. TSD, s.v.; YoBh-D, s.v.). In view of this, de dag la brten should be rendered as: ‘being based on these [factors enumerated above]’. It should also be noted that we have a plural form, de dag, for Skt. singular tasya. In this sentence, however, brten should correspond to Skt. niṣevaṇa (see also Ch. 修習). One of the most frequent translations for niṣevaṇa is bsten pa, and an early scribal mistake, inherited in all Canons, is a strong possibility. Sakuma (p. 75, n. 545) similarly surmises here: Lies bsten?. But there is another possibility, too: the phonetic and graphic similarity may have led to contamination in the usage of the two words. We find brten where one would expect to see bsten not only in our text but also in other sources, too. Thus, the Tibetan translation of the AKBh in the Peking Canon contains brten pa ’thob pa (Ngu 63a7) for niṣevaṇabhāvānā (Skt. AKBh 410, 18), rnyed pa brten ces bya ba (Ngu 63a7) for pratilambhanisvākhye (Skt. AKBh 410, 19), and rnyed pa dang | brten pa ’thob pa (Ngu 63a8) for pratilambhanisvābhavāne (Skt. AKBh 411, 1). The sDe-dge Canon (Khu 55a), on the other hand, consistently reads bsten instead of brten in all these occurrences. YoBh-D (s.v., p. 160) records niṣevaṇa = rten pa and brten pa and niṣevāṇya = brten par bya ba as well as niṣevamāṇa, niṣevini = bsten pa and niṣevamāṇa = bsten na. It is not excluded that brten and bsten may have functioned as alternative spellings (at least in some textual traditions). I have, therefore, kept the brten reading as such in the Šrībh passage above, but if my conjecture is wrong, then it should be emended to bsten. See also note 64 above.


⁴⁴⁸ D, C, N, Sakuma: de’i phyir de. Skt. contains, however, no pronoun, and this makes the P, G,
spangs te zhes bya ba gsungs so |

3.28.3.4.2. (P 206b5; G 246b3; N 183b1; D 171a7; C 177a6; ZT 425, 4; Sakuma 75, § H.4.2.) § 449 snga nas sdbg bsngal yang spangs shing yid bde ba dang | yid mi bde ba yang nub pas zhes bya ba ni | de’i tshe na 450 bsam gtan pa des bde ba dang | sdbg bsngal las yang dag par ’das pa {‘i} 451 rjes su thob cing | des sngon spangs pa gang yin pa dang | da ltar spong (D 171b1) bar byed pa gang yin pa de dag gcig tu bsdu pas na 452 | de’i phyir 453 snga nas sdbg bsngal yang spangs shing yid bde ba dang | yid mi bde ba yang nub pas zhes bya ba gsungs so ||

3.28.3.4.3. (P 206b7; G 246b5; N 183b2; D 171b1; C 177b7; ZT 425, 9; Sakuma 75, § H.4.2.) de la bsam gtan bzhi pa la snyoms par ’jug pa’i tshe na ni 454 bde ba yang 455 spangs so || bsam gtan gnyis pa la snyoms par ’jug pa‘i 456 tshe na ni 457 sdbg bsngal spangs so || bsam gtan gsum pa la snyoms par ’jug pa’i tshe na ni < | > 458 yid bde ba nub bo || bsam gtan dang po la snyoms par ’jug pa’i tshe na ni | 459 yid (P 207a1) mi bde ba nub bo || bde ba yang ma yin sdbg bsngal yang ma yin pa 460 zhes bya ba ni | des re zhih bde ba dang sdbg sngal spangs pa’i phyir de la tshor ba‘i lhag ma bde ba yang ma yin | sdbg bsngal yang ma yin pa nyi tshe 461 yod pas na | de’i phyir bde ba yang ma yin | sdbg bsngal yang ma yin pa zhes bya ba gsungs so ||

3.28.3.4.4. (P 207a2; G 247a2; N 183b5; D 171b3; C 177b3; ZT 425, 17; Sakuma 76, § H.4.3.) bstang snyoms dang dran pa yongs su dag pa 462 zhes bya ba ni | des de’i tshe na bsam gtan dang po yan chad kyi sa 463 ‘og ma’i skyon ‘di lta ste | rtog pa dang | dpyod pa dang | dga’ ba dang | dbugs rngub pa dang | dbugs ‘byung ba thams

N omission of de preferable.

449 Tib. omits here and in the next citation below the equivalent of the Skt. sukhasya ca prahāṇād (also found in Ch.). This may reflect a different reading but might also be an editorial decision since sukhasya ca prahāṇād has already been glossed upon in the previous passage.

450 P, G, N, Sakuma (without any note or sigla) omit: na.

451 This should correspond to Skt. "syaṭṭhramam anuprāṇoti. The genitive in Tib. hardly makes any sense here and is grammatically problematic. Sakuma (p. 75, n. 548) similarly conjectures: Lies pa[hi] ??, We should note that yang dag par ‘das pa rather suggests samatikromā, samatikrānta, samatikrāntatva (cf. TSD, YoBh-D, s.v.); usually, yang dag par is sam-.

452 P, N, G: pa nas.

453 See note 449 above.

454 D, C, ZT, Sakuma omit: .

455 D, C, ZT omit: yang. This may represent a rendering of ca in Skt. Sakuma omits yang in the main text but notes: yan entspricht viell. ca (??) (p. 75, n. 551).

456 G: a is written in small size at the bottom right of a” (the vocalic mark is placed slightly to the right of pa) probably because of lack of space (the letter occurs at the end of the line in G).


460 P, G, N: ba.

461 The word usually means ‘a little, a fragment’, etc. (see BTsh, s.v.). In our passage above, it has no direct Skt. equivalent, but it seems to stress the idea that what remains at this meditative stage is ‘a little’ or ‘a limited amount’ of sensation which is neither-pleasure-nor-pain. It thus could represent a rather free rendering of eva (for which there is no other Tib. equivalent).

462 In N and C, the photocopy is not clear enough to determine whether there is a ihseg after kyi. It is not excluded that reading in these two Canons is kyis (?). ZT has no note.
cad spangs par gyur cing | de dag spangs pa'i phyir de la btang snyoms dang dran pa gang yod pa (ZT 426, 1) de yongs su dag pa dang | yongs su byang bar 'gyur te | des na bsam gtan bzhi pa la snyoms par zhugs pa de'i sems mi g.yo bar gnas shing g.yo ba thams cad dang bral bas na | de'i phyir bstang snyoms dang dran pa yongs su dag pa zhes bya ba gsungs so ||

3.28.3.4.5. (P 207a5; G 247a4; N 183b7; D 171b5; C 177b5; ZT 426, 4; Sakuma 76, § H.4.4.) de la bsam gtan bzhi pa bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba ni bsam gtan dang po la sogs pa snga ma dag la ji lta ba bzhin du rig par bya'o ||

3.28.3.5.8. (P 207a6; G 247a5; N 184a1; D 171b6; C 177b6; ZT 426, 7)

Nyan thos kyi sa

Bam po bceu brgyad pa de

de rnam pa thams cad du gzugs kyi 'du shes rnam las yang dag par 'das te | thogs pa'i 'du shes rnam nub par gyur cing | sna tshogs kyi 'du shes rnam yid la mi byed pas | nam mkha’ mtha’ yas so snyam nas | nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mcheds bsgrubs te gnas so zhes gsungs pa de la |

3.28.3.5.1. (P 207a7; G 247b1; N 184a2; D 171b7; C 177b7; ZT 426, 12) de rnam pa thmas cad du gzugs kyi 'du shes rnam las yang dag par 'das te zhes bya ba (D 172a1) ni nam kha’ mos par byed pa'i phyin | kha dog sgon po dang | ser po dang | dmar po dang | dkar po dang ldan pa'i 'du shes de dag ni snang zhing | skyo la 'dod chags dang (P 207b1) bral bas yang dag par 'das pas na | de'i

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463 G uses the abbreviated spelling: ཡན

464 P: ཨ G, N: ཀ


466 Sakuma notes: PN: ii'ii (p. 76, n. 557), thus apparently implying that the other Canons which he collates (i.e., D, and C) have no sklad here. All tradional Canons as well as ZT have, however, sklad.

467 Tib. cites the whole of the rest of the Skt. stock-phrase: *caturtham dhyānam upasaṁpadya viharoti. Skt. has only caturtham. Cf. Ch. 第四等.

468 G: ཨ (rem) (reproduction unclear).

469 P, G, N: ji lta ba de.

470 N: ག. In N, this also coincides with the end of the folio.

471 There is no parallel for this passage in Skt. and Ch. Cf. also passages 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., and 3.28.3.4.0. above.


473 Tib.: Śrāvakabhūmi, Bam po. X VII.


475 D: ཨ

476 D, C, ZT omit: ཀ


478 Tib.: 'because of generating the conviction [with regard to] [infinite] space. See also note 277 to Skt. crit. ed.

479 N omits: མ. It must be noted, however, that in N, dang is at the end of the line.

phyir de rnam pa thams cad du gzugs kyi 'du shes rnam las yang dag par 'das te zhes bya ba ba gsungs so

3.28.3.5.2. (P 207b1; G 247b2; N 184a3; D 172a2; C 178a2; ZT 426, 17) thugs pa'i 'du shes rnam nub par gyur cing zhes bya ba ni de dag las yang dag par 'das shing mi snang bar 'gyur ba'i' rgyus kha dog bsags pa'i rgyus gyur pa'i sgrin pa'i 'du shes rnam pa du ma rnam pa sna tshogs mang po dag dang bral bas na de'i phyir thugs pa'i 'du shes <rnams> nub par gyur cing zhes bya ba gsungs so

3.28.3.5.3. (P 207b3; G 247b4; N 184a5; D 172a3; C 178a3; ZT 427, 1) sna tshogs kyi 'du shes rnam yid la mi byed pas zhes bya ba ni de dag dang bral bas thugs pa khyad par can rnam pa sna tshogs pa de dag nyid la 'di lta ste zas dang skom dang | bzhon pa dang | gos dang | rgyan dang gnas dang | skyed mos tshal dang | nags tshal dang | dmag dang | ri la sogs par nye bar 'dogs pa'i 'du shes 'jug pa gang yin pa'i 'du shes de dag de rnam la giad kyng rnam pa thams cad kyi thams cad du de la 'byung bar mi 'gyur bas na de'i phyir sna tshogs kyi 'du shes rnam yid la mi byed pa<ś> zhes bya ba gsungs so

481 G uses the abbreviated spelling: རྣམ།
482 P: ।
483 D, C, ZT: de de dag. There is no equivalent for the first de in Skt. See also next passage and note 490 below.
484 D, C, ZT: gyur pa'i.
486 G writes dag dang in smaller size. Later correction?
487 ZT: ।
488 Unlike the quotation at the beginning of the passage and the stock-phrase cited at 3.28.3.5.0., all Canons omit here rnam. I have added it for uniformity's sake.
490 P, N, D, C, ZT: de de dag. Only G omits de, but since there is no equivalent in Sanskrit, this is the preferable reading. See previous passage and note 483 above.
491 D, C, ZT omit: |.
492 Tib.: 'to the [lit., those] very (*eva) resistance which is differentiated [and has] variety'. See note 215 to Engl. tr.
493 P: ।
494 G: gzhon.
495 D: ।
496 ZT notes in collation note 1 (p. 517) that N reads: rigs. But N (at least, my photocopy) clearly reads: ri.
497 C: pa.
498 Tib. suggests: *upacāra. On the other hand, Tib. has no equivalent of Skt. aupaciyikā. In Tib. aupacayika is usually rendered as rgyas pa las byung ba (cf. YoBh-D, s.v.; MVyut # 7089). It would appear that the Skt. MS used by the Tibetan team read: aupacārika (or: aupacārika.)
499 G: de dag da dag.
500 P, G, N: bstad.
502 Tib. seems to suggest: *tās tesa [...] abhoge 'py asya na pravartante. See also notes 288 and 289 to Skt. crit. ed.
3.28.3.5.4. (P 207b5; G 247b6; N 184a7; D 172a5; C 178a5; ZT 427, 8) nam mkha’505 mtha’ yas so snyam nas506 zhes bya ba ni des de ltar gzugs dang507 thogs pa dang sna tshogs kyi ’du shes dag nam par bshig508 nas | nam mkha’509 mtha’ yas pa’i mam pas mos par byed pas na | de’i phyir nam mkha’ mtha’ yas so snyam510 nas zhes bya ba gsungs so | |

3.28.3.5.5. (P 207b7; G 248a2; N 184b1; D 172a6; C 178a6; ZT 427, 11) nam mkha’511 mtha’ yas skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba ni | de nyer512 bsdogg las yang dag par ’das,513 shing | sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i yid la byed pas,514 gong ma515 sbyor ba mthar,516 thug517 pa’i ’bras bu’i dngos gzhi la snyoms par ’jug

504 All Canons read here pa, although in the citation at the beginning of the passage as well as in passage 3.28.3.5.0., they have: pas (rightly so since it renders Skt. ablative).
505 N uses abbreviated spelling: སུ.
506 D, C, ZT omit: !.
507 G: བ། .
509 G uses abbreviated spelling here and in the next occurrence in this passage: སུ.
511 G: ཡན. I do not understand the sign between ན and མ. It does not appear to be an abbreviation mark or a dbu med letter. Neither is it a simple blot or stain since there is a space between ན and མ (as if intentionally left by the scribe). Nor is it a letter belonging to the line above. Actually, what we have above is the ornamental sign ས which is placed at the beginning of a new folio, and its shape is regular and complete (therefore, there is no chance that the ‘mysterious’ sign is a part of it).
512 P, G, N: nye bar.
513 N: ’dam. ZT has no note. Tib. yang dag par ’das shing suggests rather: *samatikramya.
514 P, G, N omit: sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i yid la byed pas.
515 This corresponds to Skt. ārddhva(n). In Skt., I surmise that the original form must have been ārddhva(m) (instead of MS ārddhva’) used as a postposition governing prayoganiṣṭhān manaskārād. Tib. seems to presuppose ārddhva(m) but construes it with maula(m) rather with prayoganiṣṭhān manaskārād. When gong ma (= ārddhva(m)) is construed with the preceding word, the tendency seems to link it attributively to it. E.g., bṣam gtsan gsum pa’i gong ma in passage 3.28.3.3.6. above; AKbh P Gu 56b8: mna ba’i gong ma i sgra ma yin (corresponding to Skt. ārddhvaḥ śabda na ca); AKbh P Ngu 61a4: de yi gong ma; etc. As far as the Śrābh passage here is concerned, the MS used by the Tibetan translators may have contained an instrumental instead of the ablative in the extant Skt. MS (?). Or if the MS was the same, Tib. may have construed the Skt. ablative in a causal sense and rendered it as yid la byed pas. Then it may have followed the Skt. syntax more or less mechanically rendering ārddhva(m) (or: ārddhva??) immediately after it. Let us also note that out of the 21 occurrences of gong ma = ārddhva in the AKbh which I have checked, none follows a noun in instrumental.
516 P lacks the lower part of the left stroke of tha which makes the letter appear rather like bra (typographical error?).
517 G lacks the lower part of the left stroke of tha which makes the letter appear rather like bra (scribal mistake?).
par byed pas na | de’i phyir nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba gsungs so | de ji srid du dngos gzhi la snyoms par mi ’jug (P 208a1) pa’i bar du ni | de nam mkha’ kho na la dming par byed do | snyoms par zhugs nas kyang nam mkha’ de nyid dang de las gzhan pa rang gi sa pa’i (D 172b1) phung po rnam la dming par byed do | nyer bsogs kyi tshe na ni sa ’og ma’i phung po rnam la yang dming par byed do |

3.28.3.6.0. (P 208a2; G 248a4; N 184b3; D 172b1; C 178b1; ZT 427, 20) de rnam pa thams cad du nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched las yang dag par ’das te | rnam par shes pa mtha’ yas so snyam (ZT 428, 1) nas | rnam shes mtha’ yas skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes gsungs pa de la |

3.28.3.6.1. (P 208a3; G 248a5; N 184b4; D 172b2; C 178b2; ZT 428, 2) de rnam pa thams cad du nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched las yang dag par ’das te | rnam par shes pa mtha’ yas so | zhes bya ba ni | de rnam par shes pa gang (?) gis nam mkha’ mtha’ yas par mos par byed pa’i mchad la mtha’ yas pa’i rnam par mos par byed pa’i rnam par shes pa de nyid kyis | rnam shes mtha’ yas skye mched la snyoms par ’jug par ’dod pas | nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched kyi ‘du

518 In C (end of line), Helvetica is placed under औ. This probably happened because of lack of space.
519 G uses abbreviated spelling here and in the next two occurrences of the word in this passage: अन्तर.
520 Tib.: ‘only the [infinite] space’. Cf. Ch. वी.
521 Tib.: ‘this very [infinite] space’.
522 P reproduction is unclear, and the postsuffixed औ is illegible.
523 G omits: la.
524 There is no parallel for this passage in Skt. and Ch. Cf. also passages 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., and 3.28.3.5.0. above.
525 G and N use abbreviated spelling: अन्तर.
526 P omits: mtha’. ZT has no note.
527 N omits: .
528 ZT: ☐
529 ZT: ☐
530 G uses here and in all other occurrences of the word in this passage the abbreviated spelling: अन्तर.
531 The citation of the canonical formula at the end of this passage also contains (in all Canons): snyam nas. See below.
532 P: ☐
533 All Canons read: dag. This plural (or dual?) marker for vijñāna has, however, no equivalent in Skt. and is not required grammatically or doctrinally. It actually brings more confusion to the passage here. If we surmise, however, that this dag represents a corruption of an original *gang, the sentence matches Skt. very well and makes good sense. If this is true, the fact that dag is attested in all Canons suggests that the corruption must have taken place at an early date.
534 N uses abbreviated spelling: अन्तर.
536 N uses abbreviated spelling: अन्तर.
shes las\(^{337}\) bzlog ste | rnam par shes pa de nyid la mtha’ yas\(^{338}\) pa’i rnam\(^{339}\) pas mos par\(^{40}\) byed cing\(^ {41}\) \(^{42}\) nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched kyi dngos gzhi nyer bsdogs dang bcas pa\(^{43}\) las\(^{44}\) yang dag par ’das pas na | de’i phyir de rnam pa thams cad du nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched las yang dag par ’das te | rnam par shes pa mtha’ yas so snyam nas zhes bya ba gsungs so ||

3.28.3.6.2. (P 208a7; G 248b2; N 184b7; D 172b5; C 178b4; ZT 428, 12) rnam par shes pa mtha’ yas so snyam nas\(^{45}\) \(^{46}\) rnam shes mtha’ yas skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba ni | rnam shes mtha’ yas skye mched kyi nyer bsdogs\(^ {47}\) las yang dag par ’das shing | sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i bar du yid la byed pas\(^ {48}\) | sbyor ba mthar thug pa’i ’bras bu’i dngos gzhi la snyoms par ’jug par byed pas\(^ {49}\) na < | >\(^ {50}\) de’i phyir rnam shes mtha’ yas skye (P 208b1) mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba gsungs so ||

3.28.3.7.1. (P 208b1; G 248b4; N 185a2; D 172b6; C 178b6; ZT 428, 17)\(^{51}\) de rnam pa thams cad du rnam shes\(^ {52}\) mtha’ yas skye mched las\(^ {53}\) yang dag

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\(^{337}\) In P reproduction, shes las is illegible.

\(^{338}\) G: ya (?). Under ya there is a small sign which may stand for the postsuffixed \(\equiv\) (?). From yas to bsdogs below, G writes all words in smaller size (about half the size of the usual script). This could reflect an initial omission of some letters which was discovered after the completion of the folio and resulted in the passage being re-written in small size, with some letters abbreviated or incomplete. See also notes 613 and 635 below.

\(^{339}\) G: rna, rnam or nam? There is a dot above (r)na which could stand for superscribed \(\equiv\) or an anusvāra (probably equivalent to \(\equiv\) ?).

\(^{40}\) G: pa or ra (?).

\(^{41}\) Tib.: ‘he becomes convinced through the infinite aspects in this very consciousness’.

\(^{42}\) D: \(\equiv\).

\(^{43}\) Tib. suggests: sasāmantakāmaulam or sasāmantakaṃ maulam. See note 301 to Skt. crit. ed. and note 231 to Ch. ed.

\(^{44}\) G: bcas pa la las.

\(^{45}\) Unlike Skt. and Ch. as well as the citation of the canonical formula at the end of this passage, Tib. (all Canons) repeats here *ananām vijñānam iti, which has already been glossed upon in the preceding passage (3.28.3.6.1.).

\(^{46}\) D, C, ZT omit: | .

\(^{47}\) See note 302 to Skt. crit. ed.

\(^{48}\) Tib.: ‘by means of the contemplation[s] up to the culmination of the practice’.

\(^{49}\) D, C, ZT: pa.

\(^{50}\) P, G, N, D, C, ZT omit: | . This is one of the constructions in which all Canons consistently employ shad. I have added it for uniformity’s sake.

\(^{51}\) Here the Skt. text itself contains the almost complete canonical formula (omitting only the pronoun sa). Therefore, the situation is different from passages 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.3.5.0., and 3.28.3.6.0. above. Formally, this may also be marked by the fact that while all other citations of the canonical formulae end in zhes gsungs pa de la |, here we have: zhes bya ba gsungs pa ni |.

\(^{52}\) In the parallel passage at MVyut # 1494, the reading is: rnam par shes.

\(^{53}\) G reads la but seems to have \(\equiv\) below \(\equiv\) written in much smaller size. This makes it quite difficult to decipher. If this is the case, it may represent a later correction.
par 'das te | ci yang med do snyam nas | ci yang med pa'i skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba gsungs pa ni | de nram shes mtha' yas skye mched las bskyod cing nram par shes pa las gzhan pa'i | dmigs pa ci dang yang ldan pa | gzugs can ma yin pa' | yongs su tshol bar (ZT 429, 1) byed pa na | ma rnyed | de | des dmigs pa de ma rnyed pa | nram (D 173a1) shes mtha' yas skye mched kyi dgnos gzhi nyer bsdogs dang bcas pa las yang dag par 'das te | dmigs pa gzhani ci yang med do zhes | mos par byed cing | de ci yang med pa'i 'du shes kho na la mos par 'gyur te | des 'du shes la mos pa de lan mngan du byas pa'i rgyus | ci yang med pa'i skye mched kyi nyer bsdogs las yang dag par 'das te | sbyor ba mthar thug pa'i bar du yid la byas | pas | sbyor ba mthar thug pa'i 'bras bu' | dngos gzai la | snyoms par 'jug par byed pas na | de'i phyir de nram pa thams cad du nram shes mtha' yas skye mched las yang dag par 'das te | ci yang med do snyam nas | ci yang med pa'i skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba gsungs so |

3.28.3.8.0. (P 208b6; G 249a3; N 185a6; D 173a3; C 179a3; ZT 429, 10) de nram pa tham cad du ci yang med pa'i skye mched las yang dag par 'das nas | 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes bya ba gsungs

554 In the parallel passage at MVyut # 1494, the reading is: ci yang med do zhes.
556 The shape of ད in D-Taipei is rather irregular (because of faulty printing or copy?). In D-Tokyo and D-TBRC, its is regular and clearly legible.
557 Cf. note 226 to Engl. tr.
558 C: chol. ZT has no note.
559 If the Skt. MS used by the Tibetan translators team was identical with the extant one, yong su tshol bar byed pa na must stand for Skt. samanvesamāṇo. In passage 3.28.2.1.2.6. above, yong su tshol bar byed do translates paryēsate. Cf. also YoBh-D, s.v., yong su tshol bar byed pa (given as equivalent of pari-ā-śī: paryēsate and paryēṣṭi).
560 G: rnye (or: rnya—the vocalic marker is barely visible partly due to the subscript of the letter on the line above).
562 Tib. zhes suggests iti. See note 309 to Skt. crit. ed.
563 D, C, ZT omit: |.
564 D, C: byes (probably an error for byed or byas). ZT has no note, though it reads: byas (tacit emendation?). The usual term in the YoBh for both manaskāra and manasikāra is yid la byed pa (cf. YoBh-D, s.v.), but here as well as in passage 3.28.3.8.3. below, we find: yid la byas pa. Cf. TSD, s.v., which records byas as equivalent for 'kāra (in the Bodhicaryāvatāra).
565 Tib.: 'by means of the contemplation[s] up to the culmination of the practice'. See passage 3.28.3.6.2. and note 548 above.
566 Tib. (as well as Ch.) appears to presuppose: prayoganiṣṭhāphalam. Cf. note 312 to Skt. crit. ed.
569 D, C, ZT omit: |.
570 G uses abbreviated spelling: རི (vocalic marker above do is not clear).
571 There is no direct parallel for this passage in Skt. and Ch., though the entire citation (omitting only sa) is found at the end of passage 3.28.3.8.3. below. Cf. also passages 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.3.5.0., and 3.28.3.6.0. above.
572 G: na.
pa de la |

3.28.3.8.1a.⁵⁷³ (P 208b7; G 249a4; N 185a7; D 173a4; C 179a4; ZT 429, 12) de rnam pa thams cad du ci yang med pa'i skye meghed las yang dag par 'das nas⁵⁷⁵ zhes bya ba ni | de ci yang med pa'i skye meghed las bskyod cing | ci yang med pa'i skye meghed kyi 'du shes la rags par 'du shes shing | nyes dmigs su 'du shes pas ci yang med pa'i skye meghed kyi 'du shes las zlog⁵⁷⁶ par byed pas na | de'i phyir de rnam pa thams cad du ci yang med pa'i skye meghed (P 209a1) las yang dag par 'das nas zhes bya ba gsungs so ||

3.28.3.8.1b. (P 209a1; G 249a6; N 185b2; D 173a5; C 179a5; ZT 429, 18) 'du shes med ces bya ba ni | de sngon ci yang med pa'i skye meghed la⁵⁷⁷ snyoms par 'jug pa'i tshe na ni⁵⁷⁸ ci yang gi 'du shes las yang dag par 'das la | da⁵⁷⁹ ltar ni ci yang med pa'i 'du shes las yang dag par 'das pas na |⁵⁸⁰ de'i phyir 'du shes med ces bya ba gsungs te⁵⁸¹ | 'di lta ste | ci yang (ZT 430, 1) gi 'du shes dang | ci yang med pa'i 'du shes med pa la bya'o ||⁵⁸²

3.28.3.8.2. (P 209a3; G 249b1; N 185b3; D 173a7; C 179a6; ZT 430, 1) 'du shes med min zhes bya ba ni | de'i 'du shes 'di lta ste | dper na |⁵⁸³ 'du shes med pa 'am |⁵⁸⁴ 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa dag gi ltar mam pa thams cad kyi thams cad du 'gags pa ma yin te | 'du shes de phra zing dmigs pa la mtshan ma med par 'jug pa kho (D 173b1) na yin pas na | de'i phyir 'du shes med min zhes bya ba⁵⁸⁵ gsungs so ||

3.28.3.8.3. (P 209a4; G 249b3; N 185b4; D 173b1; C 179b1; ZT 430, 6) skye meghed bsgrubs te gnas so⁵⁸⁶ zhes bya ba ni | de de ltar skye meghed de la⁵⁸⁷ mos par byed pa na | ci yang med pa'i skye meghed kyi⁵⁸⁸ dngos⁵⁸⁹ gzhi nyer bsdogs⁵⁹⁰ dang

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⁵⁷³ In Skt. and Ch. there seems to be only one gloss (at least judging from the occurrence of tenāha and is hence respectively) of what in Tib. clearly represents two glosses. For convenience's sake, I have divided the Skt. and Ch. gloss into two paragraphs, the first one corresponding to Tib. 3.28.3.8.1a. and the second to 3.28.3.8.1b. A different Skt. MS reading cannot be ruled out, but is also possible that the Tib. team decided to do a more assertive editorial intervention here.

⁵⁷⁴ P, G, N omit: pa'i.

⁵⁷⁵ This corresponds to sa sarvaśa ākiścanyāyatanam samatikramya, which Skt. and Ch. do not quote in this gloss.

⁵⁷⁶ P, G, N: bzlog.


⁵⁷⁸ D, C, ZT omit: .

⁵⁷⁹ N: de. ZT has no note.

⁵⁸⁰ ZT: T .

⁵⁸¹ N: to. ZT has no note.

⁵⁸² D: T .

⁵⁸³ D, C, ZT omit: .

⁵⁸⁴ ZT: T .


⁵⁸⁶ At the end of this passage, Tib., like the original Skt., contains the entire canonical formula. Here, however, only āyatanam upasampadya viharati (which is the part actually commented upon in this gloss) is cited. This probably represents an editorial attempt of the Tibetan team to bring more coherence to the passage.


bcas pa las yang dag par 'das shing | 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched nyer bsdogs'\footnote{591} | dang bcas pas'\footnote{592} | sbyor ba mthar thug pa'i bar du yid la byas pas'\footnote{593} | sbyor ba mthar thug pa'i 'bras bu'i dgnos gzhi la snyoms par 'jug par byed pas na | de'j phyir de'\footnote{595} rum pa tham cad du ci yang med pa'i skye mched las'\footnote{596} yang dag par 'das nas | 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so zhes'\footnote{597} bya ba gsungs so \|}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{3.28.3.9. (P 209a7; G 249b5; N 185b6; D 173b3; C 179b3; ZT 430, 14\footnote{598})} de la bsam gtan rams'\footnote{599} la snyoms par 'jug pa'i tshe na ni | lus Sa'i-'og-tu 'bying\footnote{600} bar snang ba lta bu'i rtags 'byung ngo\footnote{601} | | gzugs med pa dag la snyoms par 'jug pa'i tshe na ni | lus nam mkha'\footnote{602} la 'pha'\footnote{603} ba ltar snang ba'i\footnote{604} rtags 'byung te | de dag la\footnote{605} zhi gnas kyi mam pas btang snyoms su gzhag na\footnote{606} yang dag pa'i rab (P 209b1) tu sbyor ba yin no \| \end{itemize}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textbf{3.28.4.1. (P 209b1; G 250a1; N 186a1; D 173b4; C 179b4; ZT 430, 18) de la}
\end{itemize}

\footnote{589}{In C microfiche, \textcircled{?} (?) is barely visible.}

\footnote{590}{P: *nyer bsdogs pa. ZT collation note 4 (p. 517) records the extra \textit{pa} as being the reading of both P and N. My copy of N, however, clearly omits it, and so does G.}

\footnote{591}{P, G, N: *nyer bsdogs pa.}

\footnote{592}{P, G, N: \textit{pa}. Tib. suggests: \textit{naivasanīñānāśanīñāyatanāṁ sasāmantakāṁ}. See also note 594 below.}

\footnote{593}{P: \textcircled{T}. D, C, ZT: | .}

\footnote{594}{Tib.: ‘by means of the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation with [its] liminal attainment, by means of the contemplation[s] up to the culmination of the practice’. Both phrases seem to modify the main verb of the following sentence. In Skt., \textit{naivasanīñānāśanīñāyatanasāmantakāṁ} is in accusative and functions as a direct object of \textit{samatikramya}. Cf. Ch. which also suggests a structure similar to Skt.}

\footnote{595}{Tib. \textit{de} has no equivalent in Skt.}

\footnote{596}{D, C, ZT: \textit{la}.}

\footnote{597}{The vocalic mark \textcircled{?} of \textit{śiv} in P seems to lack (or is unclear in the reproduction?).}

\footnote{598}{The editors of ZT begin a paragraph here and continue into (what I consider to be) the next two sections without opening new paragraphs for them. The implication is, I believe, that they consider this passage as belonging to the section on the two attainments without mental activity. Cf. also note 329 in Skt. crit. ed. as well as note 233 to Engl. ed.}

\footnote{599}{P, G, N omit: \textit{rnams}.}

\footnote{600}{C: *'og tu *'bying \textit{sa}. ZT has no note.}

\footnote{601}{Tib.: ‘there arises a mark as if the body appears to sink into Rāṣātala’. Tib. \textit{sa'i *'og tu} seems to be an explicative rendering for \textit{Rasātala = ‘the underground [world]’}, which also covers the meaning of \textit{adho}. Tib. \textit{snang ba} most likely translates *\textit{saniḥprakhyāṇa}, though its syntactic position in Skt. is slightly different. (A rendering perfectly corresponding the Skt. syntax would have been: *\textit{lус Sa'i-'og-tu *'bying ba lta bur snang ba'i rtags byung ngo}. The overall meaning of the original is, however, well conveyed. See also the parallel construction below.}

\footnote{602}{G, N use abbreviated spelling: र्म.}

\footnote{603}{C: \textit{phar}. The word, which occurs at the beginning of the line, is preceded by five upper dots (quite unusual in this position— is this a trace of the omission of the prefixed \textcircled{?}?).}

\footnote{604}{See note 601 above.}

\footnote{605}{Tib. has plural marker: ‘in these [i.e. in the absorptions and immaterial attainments]’.}

\footnote{606}{Tib. seems to presuppose *\textit{adhyupekṣaṇe} rather than extant Skt. *\textit{adhyupekṣaṇā}.}
sems med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa ni 607 nam pa gnyis te | 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa dang | 608 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa'o | de la 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par (ZT 431, 1) 'jug pa la ni < | > 609 so so'i skye bo kho na snyoms par 'jug par byed do | 'gog 610 pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa la ni | 'phags pa kho na snyoms par 'jug par mdzad do | 611 de la yid la byed pa mam pa gnyis kyis na 612 snyoms 613 par 'jug pa de gnyis la snyoms 614 par 615 'jug par 616 gyur te | 'di ita ste 617 'du shes la mi phyogs pa'i yid la 618 byed pas ni | 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa la 619 snyoms par 'jug par byed do | 'du shes med 'du shes med min skyed meched 620 las bskyod cing dmigs pa yang dag par 'gags pa'i yid la byed pas ni 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa la snyoms pa 621 'jug par byed do | 622

3.28.4.2. (P 209b4; G 250a5; N 186a4; D 173b7; G 179b7; ZT 431, 8) de la 'du shes ni nad do | 'du shes ni 'bras so | 'du shes ni zug rnu'o 623 | 'di ita ste 624 'du shes med pa 'di ni zhi ba'o | 'di ni gya nom pa'o zhes bya ba ni | 'du shes la mi (D 174a1) phyogs pa'i yid la byed pa yongs su bzung nas | 'du shes byung ngo cog la dran pa med pa dang | yid la byed pa med par byed pa ste 625 des de bsgoms pa'i rgyus na | sbyor pa'i lam la ni sms dang bcas pa'i gnas skabs su 'gyur la | snyoms par zhugs ma thag tu ni sms 'byung bar mi 'gyur bas 626 | 627 de ltar nges par 'byung ba'i 'du shes

607 N: na. ZT has no note.
608 D: ⚜.
609 No Canon has shad here. I make the addition in view of the usage of shad by all Canons in the parallel sentence below.
610 In N, the right side of the vocalic mark ـ is unclear looking rather like ـ (which would make the word here: 'geg?'). ZT has no note.
611 In Tib. there is no equivalent for Skt. sanjñāvimukhena manaskāreṇa.
612 D, C, ZT: kyi ni.
613 G seems to write final ㊣ in very small size (looking like a horizontal stroke) under ㊣.
614 Actually, starting with this word up to 'di below, the text of G is written in smaller size (about half the size of the usual letters), probably reflecting an initial omission and later correction (similar to the cases described in notes 538 and 635).
615 G seems to write the postsuffixed ㊣ in very small size under ㊣.
616 G writes ㊣ in very small size under ㊣.
617 N: |. 618 G: final ㊣ of yid and ㊣ are written in much smaller size (later correction?).
619 P, G, N omit: snyoms par 'jug pa la.
620 Tib.: station of neither ideation nor non-ideation'. Skt. does not contain āyatana (though it most probably presupposes it). Cf. Ch. 處, too.
621 P, G, N omit: snyoms par.
622 G: | (the end of the this sentence coincides with the end of the line).
623 The word zug rnu means ‘pain, aching, uneasiness’. In this figurative sense, it frequently renders Skt. sāla (see TSD, s.v.; BTsh, s.v.).
624 P: ⚞.
625 N: |.
626 Tib. seems to take Skt. iti in a causal sense here (*iti hetoh). Cf. next passage. See note 644 below as well as note 342 to Skt. crit. ed.

396
sngon du btang ba yid la byed pas | dge rgyas kyi 'dod chags dang bral la 628 | 'bras bu che ba dag gi 'dod chags dang ma 629 bral ba'i sems dang | sems las byung ba'i chos rnams 630 'gog 631 pa gang yin pa de ni 632 | 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa zhes bya ste | de ni de ltar 'thob par 'gyur ro ||

3.28.4.3. (P 209b8; G 250b2; N 186a7; D 174a3; C 180a3; ZT 431, 19) de la 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched thob 633 pa'i 'phags pa mchog tu zhi ba'i gnas pas gnas par 'dod pa | 'du (P 210a1) shes med 'du shes med min skye mched las sems bskyod 634 par 635 byed cing 636 de'i (ZT 432, 1) sems 637 de de las 638 bskyod pa na dmigs 639 pa mi rnyed de 640 641 ma rnyed na 642 'gag 643 cing 'byung bar mi 'gyur ro snyam nas 644 645 de ltar ci yang med pa'i skye mched kyi 'dod chags dang bral ba'i slob pa'am 646 647 dgra bcom pa yang rung ste | gnas pa'i 'du shes sngon du btang ba'i yid la byed pas sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos 648 rnams 'gog pa gang yin pa de ni 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa zhes bya ste | de ni 'di ltar thob par 'gyur ro ||

3.28.5.1. (P 210a3; G 250b5; N 186b3; D 174a5; C 180a5; ZT 432, 7) de la bsam gtan la brten nas mngon par shes pa lnga mngon par 'grub par 'gyur te 649 ji

627 N: || .
629 P, G, N omit: ma. ZT has no note.
630 D, C, ZT: chos rnams su.
631 N: dgeg. ZT has no note.
632 D-Taipei and D-TBRC read: na. All other Canons (including D-Tokyo) have: ni. ZT has no note.
634 C: bskyed. ZT has no note.
635 Starting with this word up to rnyed na below, the text of G is written in smaller size (about half the size of the usual letters), probably reflecting an initial omission and later correction (similar to the cases described in notes 538 and 613 above).
636 D: 焘 .
637 G uses the abbreviated spelling: "𦉊" (cf. Scharlipp and Back 1996, 62).
638 G apparently writes 𦉊 (very indistinct) under 𦉊.
639 G apparently writes 𦉊 (very indistinct) under 𦉊.
641 P, N: || . G is not clear (see note below).
642 In G microfiche, rnyed de do [followed by single or double shad?] ma rnyed na is hardly legible.
643 G: gag 'or: 'gag '?; microfiche does not show clearly whether there is an prefixed 𦉊).
644 Tib. seems to take Skt. ernaut here as closing a quotation. Cf. previous passage. See note 626 above as well as note 342 to Skt. crit. ed.
645 G, N: || . (P has single shad but this coincides with the end of the line.)
646 P, G, N, C spell: ><![ retained with ishG after pa]. I shall not mention this detail for every occurrence below, but the tendency seems to be that P, G, N, and C use the upper dot (ishG) before (a)m, while D and ZT spell without it.
647 D, C, ZT omit: || .
648 G: ba'i chos, written in much smaller size.
649 C: 焘 .
ltar 'grub ce na | 'di lta ste \( ^{650} \) bsam gtan pa bsam gtan yongs su dag pa thob pa de \( ^{651} \) bsam gtan yongs su dag pa de la brten nas \( ^{652} \) des 'di lta ste | rdzu 'phrul gyi yul lam | sngon gyi gnas rjes su dran pa' \( ^{653} \) am \( ^{654} \) lha'i rna \( ^{655} \) ba' \( ^{656} \) 'chi \( ^{656} \) 'pho dang skye ba shes pa' \( ^{656} \) am | sems kyi rnam grangs shes pa las brtsams \( ^{657} \) te \( ^{658} \) mngon par shes pa' \( ^{659} \) i dbang du byas pa' \( ^{659} \) i chos thos \( ^{659} \) pa dang | bzung ba dang | kun chub par byas pa gang yin pa de nyid mnayam par gzhag pa' \( ^{660} \) i sa pa' \( ^{660} \) i yid la byed pas \( ^{660} \) yid la byed pa \( ^{661} \) na \( ^{662} \) | don so so \( ^{663} \) yang dag par rig pa dang | chos so so yang dag par rig par 'gyur te | don so so yang (D 174b1) dag par rig pa dang | chos so so yang dag par rig par gyur pa des \( ^{664} \) | de lta de ltar sems mngon par 'dus byas shing 'jan mang \( ^{665} \) du byas pa' \( ^{665} \) i rgyus na | de' \( ^{666} \) i bsgom \( ^{666} \) pa' \( ^{666} \) i 'bras bu mngon par shes pa lnga 'byung bar 'gyur ba' \( ^{666} \) i dus kyang yod \( ^{666} \) skabs kyang yod par 'gyur ro | | 3.28.5.2.1. (P 210a8; G 251a3; N 186b7; D 174b1; C 180b2; ZT 432, 19) gzhan yang de ltar don so so yang dag par rig pa dang | chos so so yang dag par (ZT 433, 1) rig par gyur pa de \( ^{668} \) mngon par shes pa thams cad mngon bsgrub \( ^{669} \) pa' \( ^{669} \) i phyir 'du shes rnam pa bcu gnyis (P 210b1) bsgom \( ^{670} \) par byed de | 'di lta ste | yang ba' \( ^{671} \) i 'du shes dang | 'jam pa' \( ^{672} \) i 'du shes dang | nam mkha' \( ^{672} \) i khams kyi 'du shes dang | sems dang lus \( ^{672} \) phrad pa' \( ^{672} \) i 'du shes dang | mos pa' \( ^{672} \) i 'du shes dang | sngon spyad pa nyams su

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\( ^{650} \) P: ⊥ .

\( ^{651} \) P, G, N: dag pa thob ste.

\( ^{652} \) D, C, ZT omit: .

\( ^{653} \) D, C, ZT omit: .

\( ^{654} \) ZT: ⊥ .

\( ^{655} \) P, G, N: snang.

\( ^{656} \) C microfiche is not clear. It looks rather like: 'ci (?).

\( ^{657} \) In G, final « seems to be written as a tiny horizontal stroke (barely distinct) under , apparently for lack of space since the word occurs at end of the line.

\( ^{658} \) G, D: ⊥ .

\( ^{659} \) P, G, N: thob.

\( ^{660} \) N: pa.

\( ^{661} \) P, G, N: pas.

\( ^{662} \) In C, na seems to be incompletely printed. Its shape can hardly be ascertain, though there is space between pa and the shad, and some trace of ink can be seen.

\( ^{663} \) G, N: sor.

\( ^{664} \) Tib. seems to take Skt. tasya as subjective genitive with bahuli kāra, and abhisamkavyaḥ appears to be construed as implying a causal nuance and rendered accordingly.

\( ^{665} \) G omits: mang.

\( ^{666} \) D, C, ZT: bsgoms.

\( ^{667} \) N, D, C, ZT omit: .

\( ^{668} \) Tib. suggests here the presence of an extra sa, i.e., Skt. * api ca sa tathārthapratisamvedi dharmapratisamvedi.

\( ^{669} \) P, G, N: bsgrubs.

\( ^{670} \) D, C, ZT: sgom.

\( ^{671} \) G and N use the abbreviated spelling: ོ.

\( ^{672} \) The order in Tib. is the reverse of the Skt. kāyacittasamavadhānasamjñāṃ, but it should be noted that the latter also reads cittakāyacittasamavadhānasamjñāṃ in passage 3.28.5.2.5. below.

398
myong ba'i go rim⁶⁷³ rjes su dran pa'i 'du shes dang | rnam pa sna tshogs⁶⁷⁴ 'dus pa'i sgra skad kyi 'du shes dang | snang ba'i gzugs kyi mtshan ma'i 'du shes⁶⁷⁵ dang | nyon mongs pas byas pa'i gzugs rnam par 'gyur ba'i 'du shes dang | rnam par thar pa'i 'du shes dang | zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched kyi 'du shes dang | zad par gyi skye mched kyi 'du shes so ||

3.28.5.2.2. (P 210b3; G 251a6; N 187a3; D 174b4; C 180b4; ZT 433, 9) de la yang ba'i 'du shes ni ⁿ⁶⁷⁶ 'du shes gang⁶⁷⁷ gis bdag nyid kyi lus⁶⁷⁸ 'di lta ste |⁶⁷⁹ dper na shing bal gyi 'dab bam⁶⁸⁰ | ras bal gyi 'dab bam | rlung gi dkyil 'khor ltar yang bar mos par byed pa ste | de de ltar⁶⁸² mos par byed pa na | mos pa las byung ba kho na'i yid la byed pas bdag nyid kyi lus 'di lta ste | khri'i steng nas khri'u'î⁶⁸³ steng du'am | khri'u'î⁶⁸⁴ steng nas khri'i steng du'am | de bzhin du khri'i steng nas rtsva⁶⁸⁵ bting ba'i steng du'am | rtsva⁶⁸⁶ bting ba'i steng nas khri'i steng⁶⁸⁷ de dang de dag tu⁶⁸⁸ 'dong⁶⁸⁹ bar byed do ||

3.28.5.2.3. (P 210b6; G 251b3; N 187a5; D 174b6; C 180b6; ZT 433, 16) de la 'jam pa'i 'du shes ni⁶⁹⁰ | 'du shes gang gis bdag nyid kyi lus⁶⁹¹ 'di lta ste | dper na⁶⁹² shing bal lam | srin bal lam | dar⁶⁹³ ltar 'jam par mos par byed pa ste | de ltar na⁶⁹⁴ 'jam⁶⁹⁵ pa'i 'du shes 'di ni |⁶⁹⁶ yang ba'i 'du shes gso bar byed pa dang | rjes

⁶⁷³ D, C, ZT: rims. ZT has no note. For, rim/rims, see also note 312 above.
⁶⁷⁴ N: chogs. ZT has no note.
⁶⁷⁵ G apparently abbreviates shes (which occurs at end of the line) by writing ३ as a horizontal stroke under " (making the letter look rather like झ ).
⁶⁷⁶ D, C, ZT omit: |.
⁶⁷⁸ Tib.: 'his own body'. See note 262 to Engl. tr. Cf. also note 691 below.
⁶⁷⁹ D, C, ZT omit: |.
⁶⁸⁰ D, C, ZT: 'da' ba'am. The latter reading is also a possibility. According to the BTsh (s.v.), 'da' ba (actually homnym with the verb 'to go beyond', etc.) is defined as shing bal dang bal sogs zhib mor bsed pa'i leb mo 'balls of cotton, wool, etc. minutey sorted out [/plucked?]' (cf. बल, the Ch. rendering for 'balls' in the BTsh entry).
⁶⁸¹ D, C, ZT: 'da' ba'am.
⁶⁸² In G, there is a blank with a stain (trace of an erasure?) between this and the following letter.
⁶⁸³ P, G, N: khri'u.
⁶⁸⁴ P: khri'i'u (spelling with tsheg between 'i and 'u). N, G: khri'u. In G, between khri and 'u, there is a space larger than the usual distance between the letters of the same word, but there appears to be no trace of ink or erasure.
⁶⁸⁵ P, G, N: rtsa. ZT has no note.
⁶⁸⁶ P, G, N: rtsa. ZT has no note.
⁶⁸⁷ In C, there is a blank containing 13 upper dots between khri'i steng.
⁶⁸⁸ See note 373 to Skt. crit. ed.
⁶⁹⁰ P, G, N: dang.
⁶⁹¹ Here, the compound bdag nyid kyi lus translates käyam. The same bdag nyid kyi lus renders above ätminam (see also note 678 above as well as note 262 to Engl. tr.).
su ’dzin par byed pa yin pas des rjes su zin na yang ba’i ’du shes kyang’697 ’phe’698 zhing rgyas pa dang’699 yangs par ’gyur ro’ ||

3.28.5.2.4. (P 210b7; G 251b4; N 187a6; D 174b7; C 180b7; ZT 433, 21) de la nam mkha’i700 kham kyi ’du shes ni | (D 175a1; ZT 434, 1) ’du shes gang gis bdag nyid kyi lus yang ba nyid dang | ’jam pa nyid du mos par byas nas | gal te’701 gang du ’gro ’dod pa’i bar de na’702 ’gro ba la bar chad byed’703 pa’i gzugs kyi nang pas (P 211a1) chod’704 pa de la’705 mos pa las byung ba kho na’i’706 yid la byed pas nam mkhar’707 mos par’708 byed pa’o’ ||

3.28.5.2.5. (P 211a1; G 251b6; N 187a7; D 175a2; C 181a2; ZT 434, 4) de la sems dang lus phrad pa’i ’du shes ni | ’du shes gang gis’709 sems la lus gnas par gtod pa dang | lus la sems gnas par gtod par byed pa ste’710 | des ni de’i lus shin tu yang ba dang | shin tu ’jam pa dang | shin tu las su rung ba dang | shin tu ’od gsal ba dang | sems kyi rjes su ’gro ba dang’711 sems dang ’brel ba dang | sems la rten’712 cing ’jug par ’gyur ro’ ||

3.28.5.2.6.1. (P 211a3; G 252a2; N 187b2; D 175a3; C 183a3; ZT 434, 9) de la mos pa’i ’du shes ni | ’du shes gang gis rgyang ring po la thag nye ba dang | thag nye ba la rgyang ring po dang | phra mo la rags pa dang’713 rags pa la phra mo dang | sa la chu dang’714 | chu la sa dang | de bzhin du ’byung ba chen po re re zhing’715 geig la geig ’khrul’716 bar rgya cher mos par byed pa dang’717 | de bzhin du sprul pa gzugs sprul pa dang | sgra sprul pa {dang’718 sprul pa’i sgra’719 la mos par byed pa ste |

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695 D (Tokyo, Taipei, and TBRC): ’dzam. ZT (which reads: ’jam) has no note.
696 D, C, ZT omit: |.
697 Tib. suggests: *api.
698 G seems to read: ’pel (but G often writes the inner stroke of a very thin, which is quite
difficult to distinguish in a facsimile reproduction).
700 G and N use abbreviated spelling: ཇོ་ཁ མ.
701 P, G, N read gang ste instead of gal te.
706 Tib. suggests: *ewa. See note 387 to Skt. crit. ed.
707 G and N use abbreviated spelling: ཇོ་ཁ མ.
709 P, G, N: gi.
710 In Tib. the order is different from Skt. and Ch.: first the body is made to fuse into the mind,
and then the mind into the body.
711 P: ད་.
713 P: ད་.
714 N: da nga. ZT has no note.
715 D, C, ZT: yang.
716 N has two upper dots after khrul.
717 For the Tib. rendering of this sentence, see note 269 to Engl. tr.
718 P: ད་.
3.28.5.2.6.2. (P 211a5; G 252a3; N 187b3; D 175a4; C 181a4; ZT 434, 15) 'du shes rnam pa lnga po de dag bsgoms\textsuperscript{720} shing yongs su grub pa dag gis\textsuperscript{721} rdu du 'phrut\textsuperscript{723} gyi yul rnam\textsuperscript{724} pa du ma nyams su myong bar 'gyur te | 'di ita ste | sprul ba la mos pa'i 'du shes khyi\textsuperscript{725} ni\textsuperscript{726} bdag nyid gcig tu 'gyur nas |\textsuperscript{727} mang por 'gyur bar\textsuperscript{728} ston par byed do | | 'di ita ste | sprul pa la\textsuperscript{729} sdud pa la mos par byed\textsuperscript{730} pa'i 'du shes khyi ni bdag nyid mang por bstan\textsuperscript{731} nas\textsuperscript{732} gcig tu 'gyur bar ston par byed do | | 'di ita ste | yang ba dang |\textsuperscript{734} 'jam pa dang | nam mkha'i\textsuperscript{735} khams dang | sems dang lus phrad pa'i 'du shes khyi yongs su zin par mos pa'ai (ZT 435, 1) 'du shes khyi ni | lus khyi thogs pa med par rtsig pa la yang thad kar 'gro ba dang | ri\textsuperscript{738} la yang thad\textsuperscript{739} kar 'gro ba\textsuperscript{740} dang | sa la yang 'di ita ste | dper na chu la bya ba bzhin du steng du 'byung\textsuperscript{742} ba dang | bye'u zul\textsuperscript{743} byed pa dang |

\textsuperscript{719} The repetition, which has no Skt. equivalent and is semantically unnecessary, seems to point to an early corrupt transmission inherited in all Canons.

\textsuperscript{720} G spells bsgoms with the postsuffixed \textcircled{n} written as a horizontal stroke under \textcircled{n}. The letter occurs at the end of the line and lack of space may be the main cause for such a spelling.

\textsuperscript{721} Tib. seems to construe: *bhāvitābhiḥ parinīspannābhīr. See note 394 to Skt. crit. ed.

\textsuperscript{722} P, G, N: | .

\textsuperscript{723} G: 'prul.

\textsuperscript{724} In C, the lower part of \textcircled{a} in rnam is not legible (due to faulty printing or wrongly carved character?).

\textsuperscript{725} P, G, N: kyi.

\textsuperscript{726} P, G, N omit: ni.

\textsuperscript{727} D, C, ZT omit: | .

\textsuperscript{728} N: ba.

\textsuperscript{729} D, C, ZT omit: la.

\textsuperscript{730} P: byad (it is, however, possible that the vocalic marker ` is illegible in the modern reproduction). ZT has no note.

\textsuperscript{731} D, C, ZT: bsten.

\textsuperscript{732} D, C, ZT omit: | .

\textsuperscript{733} ZT: T .

\textsuperscript{734} P, G, N omit: yang ba dang |.

\textsuperscript{735} G and N use the abbreviated spelling: Г.\textsuperscript{744}

\textsuperscript{736} P, G, N omit: ba dang. In N, there is a blank space (unmarked by upper dots) amounting to almost two letters between 'gro and | .

\textsuperscript{737} G: | | .

\textsuperscript{738} P reproduction does not show ri clearly.

\textsuperscript{739} P reproduction does not show thad clearly.

\textsuperscript{740} Tib. repeats 'gro ba = gacchati after each item.

\textsuperscript{741} The order of the last two items in Tib. is the reverse of Skt.

\textsuperscript{742} P, G, N: byung.

\textsuperscript{743} Tib. bye'u zul appears to stand here for nimajjana. We see the same form at MVyut # 222 (= Körös ed. vol. 2, p. 260, # 12). However, the parallel passage in the Tib. translation of the Saṅghṣṭhā (D Dal ba vol. Nga 31b2, corresponding to Skt. Saṅghṣṭhā vol. 2, p. 246, l. 19) reads byi'u zul. BTsh, s.v., defines byi'u zul as the old word for thim nyams dang | 'dzul nyams 'to sink [/diassapearl and dive [/glide](Ch. equivalents: 没入，沉入，陷入). Apart from this SrBh passage, the Mvyut entry, and YoBh-D s.vv. nimajjana and bye'u zul (the YoBh-D could,
(P 211b1) chu la yang 'di lta ste | dper na⁷⁴⁴ sa la bya ba⁷⁴⁵ bzhin du mi nub par rgyun phyogs⁷⁴⁶ su 'gro ba⁷⁴⁷ dang | nam mkha⁷⁴⁸ la (D 175b1) 'di lta ste | dper na⁷⁴⁹ 'dab chags bya⁷⁵⁰ bzhin du skyil mo krong⁷⁵¹ giš⁷⁵² 'gro ba⁷⁵³ dang | nyt ma dang zla 'di ltar rdzu 'phrub⁷⁵⁴ che ba | 'di ltar mthu che ba⁷⁵⁵ | 'di ltar gzi brjids che ba⁷⁵⁶ 'di gnyis la yang lag pas 'dzin⁷⁵⁷ cing | kun tu nyug par byed pa dang | tshangs pa'i 'jig rten gyi bar du lus kyi⁷⁵⁸ dbang sgyur⁷⁵⁹ bar byed pa de dag thams cad ci rigs par byed par rig par bya'o ||

de la tshangs pa'i 'jig rten gyi⁷⁶⁰ bar du⁷⁶¹ lus kyi⁷⁶² dbang⁷⁶³ sgyur⁷⁶⁴ ba ni rnam pa gnyis te | 'gro bas dbang sgyur⁷⁶⁵ bar byed pa dang | tshangs pa'i 'jig rten man chad kyi 'byung ba chen po bzhi dang | rgyur byas pa'i gzugs rnam la⁷⁶⁶ ji ltar 'dod pa

however, be based only on our ŠrīBh occurrence!), I could not find the compound bye'u zul with this sense in other texts or lexicographical sources. I hesitate whether to take bye'u zul as a (rare?) variant for byi'u zul or simply a mistaken form.

⁷⁴⁵ C has a vertical stroke (a shad?) after ba.
⁷⁴⁶ G: pyogr.
⁷⁴⁷ Tib. suggests: srotos (acc.) gacchati (or: srotas (loc.) gacchati). Cf. Tib. rgu phyogs su 'gro ba rendering Skt. anusrota gāminīnām (see AKBh Index, vol. 3, p.42).
⁷⁴⁸ G and N use abbreviated spelling: ལུ།.
⁷⁵¹ G: dkrung.
⁷⁵³ Tib. suggests: gacchati (or krāmata?) rather than Skt. ākramati. Cf. also Ch. 驚懼.
⁷⁵⁴ G: 'prul.
⁷⁵⁶ Tib.: 'of such glory [brightness/beauty].' MVyut (# 227) (=Körös ed. vol. 2, p. 260, # 17) also contains the same three attributes, the last one corresponding to Skt. mahaujaskau. It is quite possible the MS used by the Tibetan translation team contained an extra word. This may have been mahaujaskau, but it should be noted that gzi brjids also renders tejas (therefore, here: *mahātejasau). Furthermore, evam mahardhikāv evam mahānubhāvau at SaṅghBB vol. 2, p. 246, l. 22 (I follow Gnoili’s spelling), is rendered into Tib. as 'di ltar rdzu 'phrub che ba | 'di ltar gzi brjids che ba (D Dul ba vol. Nga 31b3). Cf. Ch. tr. of our ŠrīBh passage which, like Skt., contains only two attributes.
⁷⁵⁷ The nuance suggested by Tib. is that of ‘grabbing’ rather than ‘rubbing’ or ‘touching’. See Engl. tr. of this passage.
⁷⁵⁸ P, G, N: kyi.
⁷⁶⁰ P, G, N: gvis.
⁷⁶¹ In P reproduction, du is not legible. G omits: du.
⁷⁶³ P: dbang bu.
⁷⁶⁶ D (all reproductions) and ZT read: pa. Here, C reads: la, together with P, G, N. The collation note in ZT does not, however, mention this reading in C.

Tib. does not appear to contain the equivalent of Skt. tadekatasva. In the YoBh, ekatava is translated as kha cig or la la (YoBh-D, s.v.; cf. also TSD, s.v. and AKBh which uses la la for

402
bzhiṅ du mōs dbang šgyur bar byed pa’o\textsuperscript{767}  

3.28.5.2.7. (P 211b4; G 252b4; N 188a2; D 175b3; C 181b3; ZT 435, 14) de la sngon spyad pa nyams su myong ba’i go rim\textsuperscript{768} rjes su dran pa’i ’du shes ni | ’du shes\textsuperscript{769} gang gis gzhon nu’i gnas skaṅs nas bzung ste | de la de’i dran pa\textsuperscript{770} ’jug cing mi brjed par byed pa dang | gang du de song ba dang | ’grem ba dang | ’dug pa dang | nyal ba dang | sngon nyams su myong ba’i spyod pa rags pa rags pa go rim\textsuperscript{771} ma’i khrugs shing thod rgal ma du gyur pa\textsuperscript{772} thams cad rgya cher yang dag par rjes su dran zhing yang dag par rab tu shes pa\textsuperscript{773} ste | de\textsuperscript{774} goms par byas pa’i\textsuperscript{775} rgyus bsgoms\textsuperscript{776} pa’i ’bras bu sngon gyi gnas mam pa du ma rnam pa dang bcas\textsuperscript{777} yul phyogs dang (ZT 436, 1) bcas pa’i\textsuperscript{778} bar du rgya cher\textsuperscript{779} dag par rjes su dran no  

3.28.5.2.8. (P 211b7; G 253a1; N 188a5; D 175b5; C 181b5; ZT 436, 1) de la rnam pa sna tshogs ’dus pa’i sgra skad kyi ’du shes ni grong ngam | grong rjal lam | bzo sbyangs kyi gnas\textsuperscript{781} sam | ’dren ma’i\textsuperscript{782} nang ngam | ’khor gyi rang ngam | khang khyim chu zheng gab pa’am | gnas khang dang gu skye bo’i tshogs mam pa sna tshogs ’dus te | ’khod pa de dang gi\textsuperscript{783} sgra skad ’dren ma’i\textsuperscript{785} sna tshogs (P 212a1) ’byung ba gang yin pa ste | de\textsuperscript{786} ni klag cor\textsuperscript{787} gyi sgra zhes kyang bya’o  

\textit{ekatya}). It is conceivable that an extra \textit{la} was omitted at an early stage in the MS transmission and the original Tib. rendering was *rnams la la.\textsuperscript{767} Tib. repeats the equivalent of Skt. \textit{vaśe vartayati}.\textsuperscript{768} D, C, ZT: \textit{rims}. ZT has no note. For, \textit{rim/rims}, see also note 312 above.\textsuperscript{769} P, G, N. de’du shes.\textsuperscript{770} D, C, ZT: \textit{pas}. One would rather expect \textit{par} here, but this is not attested in any Canon.\textsuperscript{771} D, C, ZT: \textit{ris}. ZT has no note. For, \textit{rim/rims}, see also note 312 above.\textsuperscript{772} Tib. takes the adverbial expressions \textit{audārikaudārikatayānuparipatiṅkāya avyutkramaniṅkāya} (abstract nouns in instrumental) as appositions to \textit{spyod pa = caryām}. See also note 417 to Skt. crit. ed.\textsuperscript{773} Tib. suggests: samprajānati (or: samyak prajānati?).\textsuperscript{774} Tib. suggests *sā rather than tasyā.\textsuperscript{775} Tib. rather suggests: *bhāvita (cf. TSD, s.v.). Note also that Tib. \textit{goms pa} usually renders Skt. \textit{abhyaśā}.\textsuperscript{776} P, G, N: bsgom.\textsuperscript{777} P, G, N: |.\textsuperscript{778} Tib. yul phyogs dang bcas pa suggests *sa-desām ‘with the place’ rather than Skt. soddeśām. The latter is confirmed by Ch. and attested in the canonical formula (see also Buddhagoha’s gloss, which is quoted in note 283 to Engl. tr.) and its later citations in Skt. sources. The same yul phyogs dang bcas pa appears, however, at MVyut # 229 (= Körös ed. § CLXXX, # 19) also as equivalent of soddeśām. (Was YoBh, including our ŠrBh, one of the source of the MVyut?)\textsuperscript{779} In P reproduction, \textit{ra} is not legible.\textsuperscript{780} P, G, N omit: |.\textsuperscript{781} Tib. bzo sbyangs kyi gnas translates Skt. śrenyām (probably construed in the sense of ‘guild’) as ‘places of [people] trained [in] crafts’. For bzo sbyangs rendering śreni or śrenya, see TSD, s.v.\textsuperscript{782} P, G, N: pa’i.\textsuperscript{783} D, C, ZT omit: |.\textsuperscript{784} P, G, N omit: gi.\textsuperscript{785} P, G, N: pa.\textsuperscript{786} G, ZT: T |.\textsuperscript{787} P, G, N has blag chor instead of klag cor. P reproduction does not show clearly the
yang na chu klung chen po 'bab pa'i sgra yang rung ste | de la 'du shes bsgom pa gang
yin pa'i mtshan ma bzung nas | mynam par bzhag | pa'i sa pa'i yid la byed pa
des | dbus dang | mtha' 'khob pa dang | lha dang | mi'i sgra rgyang ring
po dang | thag nye ba dag la sems gsd par byed do | lan mang du byas
pa'i rgyus bsgoms | pa'i 'bras bu lha'i rna ba thob par 'gyur | (D 176a1) te
| des ni lha dang < | > mi'i sgra rgyang ring po gang yin pa dang | thag nye ba gang
dag yin pa mams kyang thos par 'gyur ro |

3.28.5.2.9. (P 212a3; G 253a5; N 188b1; D 176a1; C 182a1; ZT 436, 13) de la
snang ba'i gzugs kyi mtshan ma'i 'du shes ni snga ma bzhin du snang ba'i mtshan
ma bzung nas | mthsan ma de nyid yid la byed pa dang | dge ba dang mi dge ba'i las
byed pa la sogs pa bye brag gis sems can sna tshogs su gyur pa dag
las mtshan ma bzung nas | mthsan ma de nyid yid la byed pa gang yin pa de ni snang ba'i gzugs kyi
mtshan ma'i 'du shes zhes bya ste | de goms par byas pa'i rgyus bsgoms

subscribed ^= C (microfiche not very clear) looks rather like: glag cor (?).

788 Tib.: 'having grasped the characteristic of [that] which is the ideation cultivation'. See note
791 below.

790 N, D, C, ZT: gzhag. ZT has no note. Here, quite unusually, the N reading is similar with the
D-C-ZT stemma.

791 Tib. des stands most probably for yayā, but syntactically it appears construed with yid la
byed pa, i.e., quite differently from Skt. I would conjecture that the phrase stating with de la 'du shes
is based upon a corrupt MS (or was misconstrued?). Looking at the extant Skt. text, one
would expect something like: *de la mtshan ma bzung nas | 'du shes bsgom pa gang yin pa des
nyam par gzhag pa'i sa pa'i yid la byed pas dbus dang | [...].

792 P (not very clear), G, N: |.

793 P, G, N: khob. ZT has no note.

794 Tib. dbus dang | mtha' 'khob pa 'central and border [areas]', which seems to be an
explanatory rendering of āryānāryeṣu. See note 286 to Engl. tr.


796 D, C, ZT: ring po dag.

797 Tib.: 'turns [/directs] [his] mind'. See also note 425 to Skt. crit. ed.

798 P, G, N has de | de la instead of do | de.

799 Tib. lacks equivalent of Skt. asyā.


801 P, G, N: gyur.

802 D: |.

803 P, G, N, D, C, ZT omit: |. Though all Caoms omit the shad, this is a typical case requiring
its usage. Cf. the similar occurrence above which is punctuated in D, C, ZT.

804 N: |. ZT: |.

805 G omits: |.

806 C: byed. ZT has no note.

807 D, C, ZT: gi.

808 Tib. translates Skt. sattvavaićitṛya as: 'diversified sentient beings'.

809 Tib. suggests here: *ucyate. Cf. also Ch. 名.


811 P (not very clear), G, N: bsgoms.

pa'i 'bras bu 'chi 'pho dang skye ba shes pa thob par 'gyur te | lha'i mig mam par dag pa des ni lus zhig ste | 813 shi ba'i 'og tu bde 'gro mtho ris kyi 'jig rten du lha mams kyi nang du skye bar 'gyur ro zhes | 814 bya ba'i bar du rgya cher mthong bar 'gyur ro | 815

3.28.5.2.10. (P 212a6; G 253b2; N 188b4; D 176a3; C 182a3; ZT 436, 21) de la nyon | 816 mongs pas byas pa'i gzugs (ZT 437, 1) nam par 'gyur ba'i 'du shes ni | 817 'du shes gang gis chags pa dang | zhe sdang dang | 818 rmongs pa dang | khro ba dang | khon du 'dzin pa dang | 819 'chab pa dang | yongs su g dang ba dang | sgyu | 820 dang | g.yo dang | ngo tsha med pa dang | khrel med pa la so gs pa nyon | 821 mongs pa dang | nye ba'i nyon mongs pa kun nas dkris pa'i sems dang ldan pa'i sems can mams kyi gzugs kyi gnas skabs la | 822 nye bar rtog par byed cing yongs su gcod par byed (P 212b1) pa ste | chags par 'gyur ba'i | 823 gzugs mam par gyur pa'i gzugs kyi gna skabs | 824 ni | 825 'di lta bu yin te | 'di lta ste | dbang po rgod pa dang | dbang po 'dam bu ltar mtho | 826 ba dang | bzhin 'dzum par byed pa yin no | | zhe sdang bar gyur pa'i gzugs mam par gyur pa'i gzugs kyi gnas skabs ni 'di lta bu yin te | 827 | 828 'di lta ste | bzhin gyi mdog gyur pa dang | skad | 829 'dar 'dar par gyur pa dang | khro gnyer 'dus par gyur pa yin no | | rmongs par gyur pa'i | 830 gzugs mam pa gyur pa'i | 831 gzugs kyi gna skabs ni 'di lta bu yin te | 'di lta ste | lbugs | 832 pa dang | don nges par brtags pa brda | 833 mi phrad pa dang | phal pa'i tshig

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813 D, C, ZT omit: |.
814 P reproduction does not show redential.
815 Tib.: ‘[the ascetic] sees’. The verb is omitted in Skt. but appears in the canonical formula: (Pali) passati (DN I 82, 26) / (Skt.) paśyati (SaṅghBh 250, 6) (for more sources, see note 289 to Engl. tr.). Tib. includes this * paśyati in its citation. Cf. Ch. tr., too.
816 P reproduction does not show nyon clearly.
817 D: \[.\]
819 P: nang, ZT has no note.
820 P reproduction does not show sgyu clearly.
821 P reproduction does not show redential.
823 D, C, ZT have byed pa'i instead of 'gyur ba'i. Cf., however, zhe sdang bar gyur pa' / gyur ba' and rmongs par gyur pa' / gyur ba' below.
824 P, G, N: gnas skabs 'di
825 P, G, N: gnas skabs 'di
826 Tib. gzugs rnam par gyur pa'i gzugs kyi gnas skabs renders Skt. rūpāvasthā rūpavikṛtih as 'peculiar physical condition of [consisting in a] specific change in physical appearance'.
827 D, C, ZT: mthong.
831 P, G, N have 'gyur ba'i instead of gyur pa'i.
832 P, G, N have 'gyur ba'i instead of gyur pa'i.
833 P, G: lbugs. N seems to write the postsuffix ed subscribed under redential. ZT has no note.
834 P has: rtag pa rda [or: rtag brda?] instead brtags pa brda (it is not clear in the P reproduction whether there is a tseg after pa/ba). G reads: rtag pa rda instead brtags pa brda. N has: rtag pa brda instead brtags pa brda. According to the collation note of ZT, both P and N would appear to read: rtag brda instead brtags pa brda (?).
rjod\textsuperscript{834} par byed pa yin no zhes de litar de lta bu dang mthun pa'i mam pa dag dang | ngo tsha med pa (D 176b1) dang |\textsuperscript{835} khrel med pa'i bar.\textsuperscript{836} kyiis kun nas dkris par gurum pa'i gzugs mam par gyur pa | gzugs kyi gua skabs gang dag yin pa de dag las mtshan ma bzung nas | mtshan ma de nyid\textsuperscript{837} yid la byed cing | de la lan mang du byas pa'i rgyus bsgoms\textsuperscript{838} pa'i 'bras bu sems kyi nram grangs shes pa 'byung bar\textsuperscript{839} 'gyur te | des ni sems can pha rol dang gang zag pha rol nams kyi mam par rtog pa dang | nram par dpyod pa'i <yid>\textsuperscript{840} yid kyiis yang dag pa ji (ZT 438, 1) lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes so ///

3.28.5.2.11. (P 212b6; G 254a4; N 189a3; D 176b2; C 182b2; ZT 438, 1) de la nram par thar pa dang | zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mchad dang | zad par gyi skye mchad kyi 'du shes bsgom pa ni | 'di lta ste | sngar mNyam par bzhag\textsuperscript{841} pa'i sa'\textsuperscript{842} skabs su\textsuperscript{843} bstan pa bzhin du rig par bya ste\textsuperscript{844} |\textsuperscript{845} de dag bsgoms\textsuperscript{846} pas ni | 'phags pa'i rdzu 'phrul dngos po sgyur ba dang | sprul pa dang | mos pa dang | 'di lta ste | nyon mongs pa med pa dang | smon nas shes pa dang | so so yang dag par rig pa bzhi po 'di lta ste | chos so so yang dag par rig pa dang | don so so yang dag (P 213a1) par rig\textsuperscript{847} pa dang | nges pa'i tshig so so\textsuperscript{848} yang dag par rig pa dang | spobs pa so so\textsuperscript{849} yang dag par rig pa dag mngon par 'grub par 'gyur ro ///

3.28.5.3. (P 213a1; G 254b1; N 189a6; 176b5; C 182b4; ZT 438, 9) de la 'phags pa dang | 'phags pa ma yin pa'i rdzu 'phrul la bye brag ni 'di yod do /// 'phags pa'i

\textsuperscript{834} P, G, N: brjod.
\textsuperscript{835} D: \textsuperscript{836} P, G, N: med pa i bar bar.
\textsuperscript{837} Tib. suggests: *tad eva (as in the parallel constructions above). Cf. also Ch.ed.
\textsuperscript{838} P, G, N: bsgom.
\textsuperscript{839} D, C, ZT: ba.
\textsuperscript{840} No Canon contains: yid. A comparison with Skt. (as well as Ch.) shows, however, that in the Tib. text we may have to deal with a haplography and an equivalent for mano is necessary (the following yid kyiis renders manasa). Actually, the Tib. translation of parallel passages in other sources contain yid = mano, corroborating thus the emendation above. E.g., SaṅghBh: de'i thugs kyiis sems can gshen dag dang gang zag gshen kyi nram par rtog pa dang | nram par dpyod pa'i yid ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu mkhyen te | (D Dul ba vol. Nga 32a2) (here the subject is the Bodhisattva and therefore the honorific thugs is used for manasa) (this corresponds to SaṅghBh vol. 2, p. 248, ll. 18-20); AKVy: gshen dag gi yid kyi rtog pa dang | dpyod pa yid kyiis [...] rab tu shes na [...] (P Chu 330a8); etc. The haplography in this SrBh passage must have occurred early and was probably inherited in all Canons.
\textsuperscript{841} P, G, N: gzhag. ZT has no note.
\textsuperscript{842} D, C, ZT: bzhag pa'i sa pa'i.
\textsuperscript{843} G spells: ggos . This most probably represents an abbreviation of skabs su. The word occurs at the end of the line, and the scribe may have lacked sufficient space for su.
\textsuperscript{844} D, C, ZT omit: |.
\textsuperscript{845} P, G, N: bsgom.
\textsuperscript{846} G: riggs.
\textsuperscript{847} P, G, N: sor.
\textsuperscript{848} P, G, N: sor.
\textsuperscript{849} D: \textsuperscript{850}
rdzu 'phrul ni’\(^{851}\) ’di lta ste | dngos po gang dang gang sgyur\(^{852}\) par mzdad pa dang | sprul pa gang dang \{ \}\(^{853}\) gang sprul par mzdad pa dang | gang dang\(^{854}\) gang la mos par mzdad pa de dang | de dag thams cad\(^{856}\) ghzan du mi ’gyur zhing de lta bu kho na yin te | de dag gi\(^{857}\) bya ba byed nus pa yin no | ’phags pa ma yin pa’i rdzu ’phrul ni’\(^{858}\) de lta ma yin te | sgyu ma mkhan gyi\(^{859}\) sprul pa bzhin du snang ba tsam du ston par zad do | de lta ’du shes bcu gnyis po de dag kun tu\(^{860}\) brten’\(^{861}\) cing goms par byas \(^{862}\) lan mang du byas na\(^{863}\) ’di lta ste\(^{864}\) mngon par shes pa lnga po dag ci rigs par ’thob pa’\(^{866}\) dang | ’phags pa nams kyi yon tan so\(^{867}\) skye bo dang thun mong ma yin pa dag kyang ci rigs pa mngon par ’grub par rig par bya’o | 

3.28.6.1. (P 213a5; G 254b4; N 189b2; D 176b7; C 182b7; ZT 439, 1) de la bsam gtan dang po dang chung ngu dang | (D 177a1) ’bring dang\(^{868}\) chen por bsgoms na | Tshangs-rigs dang | Thsangs-pa’i-mdun-na’-’don dang | Tshangs-chen gyi lha nams dang\(^{869}\) ci rigs par skal ba’\(^{870}\) mnyam par skye’o\(^{871}\) | |

\(^{851}\) Unlike Skt., Tib. ’phags pa’i rdzu ’phrul is not marked for instrumental. See also below.  
\(^{852}\) P, G, N: bsgyur.  
\(^{853}\) P, G, N, D, C, ZT: | . All Canons have shad here but it seems more appropriate to adopt the punctuation of the other occurrences of gang dang gang in this passage.  
\(^{854}\) P, G, N, D, C, ZT: dag. Extant Skt. MS omits this phrase, but in view of the preceding phrases, emending here to dang appears more appropriate than the reading transmitted by all Canons, which probably represents an early scribal error.  
\(^{855}\) P, G, N omit: de dang.  
\(^{856}\) Tib.: ‘all these’. Tib. construes sarvena with this sentence. De dang de dag often renders tams tams or tāsu tāsu (see YoBh Index, s.v.), but here it probably stresses the nuance ‘each of these [things, etc.]’, which is further reinforced by thams cad.  
\(^{857}\) P, G, N: gi.  
\(^{858}\) Tib. ’the ignoble miraculous power’. Unlike Skt., Tib. ’phags pa ma yin pa’i rdzu ’phrul is not marked for instrumental. See also above.  
\(^{859}\) D, C, ZT: gis.  
\(^{860}\) D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.  
\(^{861}\) On brten/bsten, see notes 64 and 446 above.  
\(^{862}\) P, G, N omit: | . 
\(^{863}\) Tib. suggests: *āsavitavād bhāvāvitavād bahuniktavāt. Cf. also Ch. 
\(^{864}\) Tib. suggests: *tadyathā (?). 
\(^{865}\) D, C, ZT omit: | . 
\(^{866}\) Tib.: ’properly obtaining the five supernatural faculties’.  
\(^{867}\) G uses: ṭ, the abbreviated spelling for so so. Cf. Bacot 1912, 74 (#664, #665).  
\(^{868}\) P, G, N: ’bring dang chen po dang | . P (reproduction is not very clear) seems to have: ṭ.  
\(^{870}\) P(?), N, ZT read: ba. G, D: pa. C: ba/pa (?). It is well too known that distinguishing between pa and ba, especially in reproductions of woodblock prints, is far from easy. The situation is further complicated here by the fact that both skal pa and skal ba are attested as different words, though having partly overlapping semantic spheres (TED, s.vv.). According to TED, skal ba corresponds to bhāga ‘portion, share’. But the same dictionary, records skal pa mnyam pa (translated as ‘uniformly fortunate or always lucky’) without any variant spelling. In TSD, s.vv., we find both skal pa mnyam par skyes (mi dang?) = mānuṣāṇām sabhāgatavyābhī upapannah and skal ba mnyam pa = sabhāga, sabhāgata (on the basis of more than one source). The edited text of the Dunhuang Glossary (p. 313) registers the compound as: skal ba mnyam bar skye’o (=
3.28.6.2. (P 213a6; G 254b5; N 189b3; D 177a1; C 183a1; ZT 439, 3) bsam gtan gnyis pa chung ngu dang | 'bring dang < | >872 chen por bsngoms na | 'Od-chung873 dang | Tshad-med-'od dang | 'Od-gsal gyi lha rams dang ci rigs par skal ba mnyam par skye'o. ||

3.28.6.3. (P 213a7; G 254b6; N 189b3; D 177a2; C 183a2; ZT 439, 6) bsam gtan gsum pa chung ngu dang |874 'bring dang |875 chen por bsngoms na | dGe-chung dang | Tshad-med-dge dang | dGe-rgyas kyi lha rams dang ci rigs par skal ba mnyam par skye'o. ||

3.28.6.4. (P 213a8; G 255a1; N 189b4; D 177a2; C 183a2; ZT 439, 8) bsam gtan bzhi pa chung ngu | 'bring dang | chen por bsngoms na | (P 213b1) sPrin-med dang | bSod-nams-skyes dang | 'Bras-bu-che-ba'1881 lha rams dang877 ci rigs par skal ba mnyam par skye'o. || gal te 'phags878 pa'i phyir mi 'ong bas879 zag pa med pa'i bsam gtan bzhi dang | zag pa dang bcas pa spel mar bsgom zhi880 de la yang | chung ngu dang | 'bring dang | chen po881 dang | ches che ba dang882 shin tu che bar bsngoms na

生衆同分), but its reproduction of the MS (Plate IX, line 123) seems to read skal pa". On the other hand, YoBh-D, s.v., and MVyut # 2265 (s.v. sabhāgahetuh) record only skal ba mnyam pa (similarly in MVyut Ishihama and Fukuda ed. # 6434). Modern lexical sources like BTsh, Jäschcke [1881] 1990, Goldstein 1994, s.v., register only skal ba. The form skal ba is in tune with Beyer's morphophonemic rule, but if pa was conceived as a suffix free from these rules (like rta pa 'horseman') or if the original spelling of the word was *skald (?), then skal pa is perfectly possible (see note 184 above). It is not excluded that in in older sources, both forms may have been considered as alternative spellings (at least in some contexts?). As far as the occurrences in this SrBh sub-chapter (3.28.6.) are concerned, N seems to read ba in most of the occurrences below, but there are instances (as N 189b3) where it also appears to read pa. D clearly reads here (and apparently in most of the occurrences below): pa. ZT consistently reads: ba (diverging thus from D). The ascertainment of the exact reading in the P, G, C reproductions is far from easy. ZT has no notes concerning these differences. For uniformity's sake, I shall adopt here skal ba, which may have been a more frequent (albeit not unique) spelling. (I do not mention below the different readings of skal pa/ba mainly because of the difficulty raised by distinguishing them with accuracy.).

On this rendering for upasampadaye, see note 310 to Engl. tr.

P, G, N, D, C, ZT omit: ||. I have added shad in view of its consistent usage by the D-C-ZT stemma in other parallel constructions (see above and below).

P: 'od chung ngu. According to the collation note in ZT (n. 2, p. 518), this is the reading of both P and N, but at least my copy of N (as well as G, D, C and ZT) clearly reads: 'od chung.

N looks rather like ṣ which may, however, represent a short shad placed immediately after ु (or a typographical error based on such a transmissional peculiarity?).


In the P reproduction, the vocalic sign of ॻ appears only as a tiny slant stroke above the letter (incomplete printing?; wrongly carved woodblock?; or imperfect reproduction?).


In G, 'phags occurs at the end of the line and the potsuffixed ु is written in smaller size under ॻ, probably because of lack of space.

Tib. suggests: *ṭrāvanāgāmy.

Tib.: 'meditates [/cultivates] in a mixed way'.

P, G, N: por. G writes ॻ in smaller size under ॻ (later correction?).
| tdi lta ste gNas-gtsang-ma lnga po Mi-che-ba dang | Mi-gdung-ba dang | Shin-tu-mthong dang | Gya-nom-snang dang | 'Og-min gyi lha rams dang ci rigs par skal ba mnyam par skye'o |

3.28.6.5. (P 213b3; G 255a3; N 189b6; D 177a4; C 183a5; ZT 439, 16) nam mkha dang | rams shes dang | ci yang med dang | 'du shes med 'du shes min skye mched chung ngu dang | 'bring dang | chen por bsgom na yang nam mkha dang | rams shes dang | ci yang med dang | 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched nye bar 'gro ba'i lha rams dang skal ba mnyam par skye ste lha de dag ni gzugs med pas na de'i phyir de dag la gnas gzhon. Byea brag tu (ZT 440, 1) dbyer ba ni med kyi | gnas pa'i bye brag ni yod do |

3.28.6.6. (P 213b5; G 255a5; N 190a1; D 177a6; C 183a6; ZT 440, 1) 'du shes med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa bsgom na ni 'du shes med pa'i sems can lha rams dang skal ba mnyam par skye'o |

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882 N: .getTag:.
883 On the name of this Heaven, see note 313 to Engl. tr.
884 P: WithTag:.
885 Tib. has: Sudarṣāṇeṣu, Sūdrāṣeṣu, which is the reverse of the extant Skt. (the latter representing the usual order, as also seen at AKBh 111, 24; MVyut #1 3104, 3105; etc.).
886 P, G, N: | |
887 P: nyams. Collation note in ZT (n. 4, p. 518) records this var. lec. in P as mnyams. G has a small horizontal stroke under .getTag: which seems to abbreviate the postsuffixed .getTag: . Cf. also note 720 above for a similar abbreviated spelling in G for bsgom (passage 3.28.5.2.6.2.)
888 G and N use the abbreviated spelling: .getTag: .
889 P, G: | . In N, there is no shad, but this Canon has a blank space larger than usual between min and skye. Could this be a trace of a correction, i.e., the erasure of the shad ?.
890 D, C, ZT omit: | |
891 G uses the abbreviated spelling: .getTag: . Here, N employs the usual spelling of the word.
892 P omits: mchek.
893 In G, skye mchek du is written in much smaller size than the rest of the letters.
895 D, C, ZT omit: |
896 Tib. bye brag tu dbyebu ba literally means: 'making' distinction as to the difference' or 'distinguishing as different' (?), dbyebu ba itself being used to render bheda, prabheda, etc. (cf. YoBh Index, s.v.; TSD, s.v.). Here, however, the entire compound bye brag tu dbyebu ba appears to translate bheda, which was probably necessary to distinguish it from bye brag, the latter rendering viṣeṣa in the next sentence. Bye brag tu dbyebu ba as a compound is far from frequent, and the only other occurrence which I know is found in the AKBh, where it renders viṣeṣaṇa (Tib. P Gu 57a2: bye brag tu dbyebu ba'i phyir 'in order to distinguish as different' = Skt. AKBh 8, 6: viṣeṣanārtham) (This occurrence also seems to be recorded in AKBh Index III, p. 184; the AKBh Index, however, appears to give a wrong folio for Tibetan and lists bye brag tu dbyebu ba as corresponding to viṣeṣanārtha-, which is rather misleading since artha is conveyed by ('i) phyir).
897 P, G, N omit: do | | . The text of these Canons continues without any punctuation mark into the next sentence.
898 In G, .tagName: is written under .tagName: and the vocalic mark tagName: is placed above the .tagName: (later correction?).
899 P, G, N: bar. ZT has no note.
3.28.7. (P 213b6; G 255a6; N 190a2; D 177a6; C 183a6; ZT 440, 4) de la ’dod chags dang bral ba’i rtags gang zhe na 900 smras pa | lus kyi las kyi mtha’ brtan pa dang | dbang po mi g.yo ba dang | de’i spyod lam myur du mi ’jig pa 901 dang | spyod lam gcig gis kyang yongs su sKyO ba med cing | dus yun ring du ’da’ bar byed pa dang | spyod lam gzhan la myur du 902 dga’ bar mi (D 177b1) byed pa dang |903 tshig nyung ngu smra ba 904 dang | rab tu zhi bar smra ba dang | bre 905 mo gm lam la mi dga’ ba dang | ’du ’dzi 906 la mi dga’ ba dang | de’i tshig brtan par 907 ’byung ba dang 908 | mig gis 909 gzugs rnam mthong nas 910 |911 (P 214a1) gzugs so sor yang dag par rig par byed cing 912 gzugs la ’dod chags kun tu 913 mi ’byung ba 914 dang | de bzhin du sgra dang | dri dang | ro dang | reg bya so sor yang dag par rig par byed cing | reg bya’i bar 915 la ’dod chags kun tu 916 mi ’byung ba dang | ’jigs pa med pa dang | blo 917 zab pa dang | shin tu sbyangs pa chen pos lus dang sems nye bar bskor 918 ba dang | brnab sems med pa dang | ’khrug pa med pa dang | bzod pa dang ldan pa dang | de’i sems la 919 ’dod pa’i rnam par rtog pa la sogs pas kun nas 920 ’khrug pa med pa dang | de lta bu dang mthun pa dag ni ’dod chags dang bral ba’i rtags rnam 921 yin par rig par bya ste 922 de ni re zhig ’jig rten pa’i lam gyis 922 ’gro ba’i 923 rnam par 924 dbye ba yin no ||

900 D, C, ZT omit: |
901 On the meaning of this phrase, see note 318 to Engl. tr.
902 P, G, N: ba.
903 P: .Setup.
904 P, G, N read smras pa instead of smra ba.
905 N: bri. ZT has no note.
906 In P reproduction, the vocalic mark * is not clear.
907 Tib. brtan pa(r) renders Skt. dhīrā here; the same word is employed at the beginning of this passage to translate Skt. sthūra<sup>8</sup>.
908 In C microfiche, brtan par ’byung ba dang is faint and unclear.
911 D, C, ZT omit: |
912 D, C, ZT omit: |
913 D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.
914 Tib. seems to translate rūparāgapratisamvedi in a rather free way and by a turn of phrase more emphaticai than Skt.: ‘passion for visible forms does not arise at all (kun tu)’. See also similar wording below as well as note 920.
915 In G, <sup>x</sup> is written in smaller size under <sup>x</sup> (later correction?).
916 D, C, ZT: du. ZT has no note.
917 In P reproduction, there is a stain on blo making the letter practically illegible (except for its vocalic mark).
918 D (D-Tokyo, D-Taipie, D-TBRC): bskar. ZT reads bskor (as the other Canons) but has no note. In C microfiche, the lower part of <sup>x</sup> is not clear.
920 Tib.: kun nas […] med pa ‘absolutely […] no’. Cf. also note 914 above.
921 In C microfiche, superscribed <sup>x</sup> is unclear.
922 P, G, N: gvi.
923 P, G, N: ba.
924 D, C, ZT: pa.
CHAPTER FIVE

Critical Edition
of the Chinese Translation

3.27. (T 465a24; ZC 663b1; Fangshan 279a1; Koryō 736c1; Qisha 339c1)

《瑜伽師地論》 卷第三十三

彌勒菩薩說
三藏法師2玄奘 奉詔譯
《本地分中聲聞地第十三》 第四瑜伽處之一

復次此喻喻南日：

七作意離欲 及諸定廣辯
二定五神通 生差別諸相
觀察於諸諦 如實而通達
廣分別於修 究竟為其後

(T 465b1)

1 The traditional Canons contain the numeration character of the text at the bottom of this line. (For the system of traditional numeration, see Part One, Chapter Four above.) ZC (Jin), Koryō: 禍. Fangshan: 惡 (written in a simplified manner similar to the second allograph of 惡 in Li ed., p. 104, s.v.). Fangshan also has the name of the calligrapher of the stone slab: Gao Cong 高琮, written at the bottom of the margin before the title. Qisha, Hongwu: 因三. Yongle-bei: 兄三.

2 Shōsō-in, Fangshan, Chongning, Zifu, Puning, Qisha, Hongwu have 沙門 ‘Śramaṇa’ instead of 三藏法師. Yongle-bei, Jingshan read: 唐三藏沙門 ‘Tripitaka Śramaṇa of the Tang [Dynasty]’. ZC has no note, and this makes it difficult to know the actual reading of Yongle-nan and Qing here.

3 Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing omit: 第十三. T (which should have been aware of Jingshan) has no note.

4 Ch: ‘Yogācārabhūmi, Scroll 33, expounded by Bodhisattva Maitreya, respectfully translated by Tripitaka Dharmācārya Xuanzang by Imperial Order, Śrāvakabhūmi, [Book] X III of the Mahāyāna bhūmīyāhaḥ, [Chapter] One of Yogasthāna IV’. All Chinese Canons write the title, etc. at the beginning of each scroll. On the title in the Sanskrit MS, see note 1 to Skt. crit. ed.

5 T, ZT (Jin), Fangshan, Koryō, Qisha, Hongwu, Yongle-bei begin new column after 日 in order to introduce the uddāna.

6 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, the uddāna [of Yogasthāna IV] says:
Detachment from sensual pleasures [by means of] the seven contemplations
And the extensive discussion of the attainments;
The two attainments [without mental activity] [and] the five supernatural powers;
The differences in rebirth [and] the characteristics [of the detached person];
Observing the [Noble] Truths
[And] realising [them] as [they] are;
Extensively examining cultivation;
The culmination [of the path] follows this.’
已得作意諸瑜伽師已入如是分樂斷。從此已後唯有二趣、更無所餘。何等為二？一者、世間、二、出世間。彼初修業諸瑜伽師由此作意或念：‘我當往世間趣’，或念：‘我當往出世趣’。復多修習如是作意。如是於此極多修習、如是如是所有輕安心一境性。經歷彼日夜等位，轉復增廣。若此作意堅固、相續、強盛而轉，發起清淨所緣勝解，於奢摩他品及毘鉾舍那品善取相，彼於爾時或樂往世間道發起加行，或樂往出世道發起加行。

3.28.1.1. (T 465b14; ZC 663b22; Fangshan 279a17; Koryô 736c21; Qisha 339c18) 問：此中幾種補特伽羅，即於現法樂往世間道發起加行？非出世道？答：

The uddāna (which summarises the Mundane Path in the first four verses and the Supramundane Path in the last four ones) usually appears in Chinese at the beginning of a chapter or section, which is the reverse of the Sanskrit and Tibetan convention of having it at the end of the respective textual unit. For the Skt. edition and Tib. translation, see Schmithausen ed., 474-475 (also containing annotations concerning the Chinese rendering). T, ZT (Jin), Koryô, Qisha, Hongwu, and Yongle-bei print the uddāna in a layout which sets it apart from the rest of the prose text. Only Fangshan continues with prose text immediately after the uddāna.

7 Ch. does not translate Skt. tatra. Cf. also Tib. ed.
8 Ch.: ‘various’. 諸 (which is often used to render the plural in the Sanskrit original) appears to stress here the generality of the statement. The equivalent Skt. noun here is in singular but, admittedly, has a generic meaning. Besides, 諸 may also have the additional function of producing a four-syllable phrase, the most favoured rhythmical unit in Classical Chinese prose.
9 者 appears to be used here for rhythmical reasons, i.e., to ensure a four-syllable phrase parallel to following 二出世間 (see also note above).
10 Ch.: ‘passing through a stage of days and nights one after another’. 等 can be interpreted as ādi or a plural marker (used here in conjunction with 彼彼 and thus stressing the idea of plurality). There is no Skt. and Tib. equivalent for 位, which in the Śrībh usually translates avasthā ‘state’ or ‘stage’ (see passage 3.28.3.2.2. below). We also find it in other Books of the YoBh in the concrete sense of ‘state’. For example, YoBh 100, 5: *kalalādigatānām sattvānām = 住羯羅藍有情 (T30.300a20), YoBh 199, 4-5: kalalavādibhir avasthāviseṣair = 營羅藍等位差別 (T30.321a27) (note in the latter example, its usage together). The meaning in our Śrībh passage above appears, however, rather different. Here 位 refers to a ‘state’ or ‘stage’ attained by the yogi after ‘[many] days and nights’ of strenuous practice (cf. KDK, 134: 彼彼之日夜等位 (くらも) を経てして; see also KIK, 232, for a similar reading). Classical Chinese also knows the binome 等位, usually meaning ‘rank’ (cf. DKWJ s.v.; HDC s.v.), but regarding 等位 here as a binomic compound in the sense of ‘state’ or ‘stage’ is less likely. 位 employed with a time expression is not frequent, but similar expressions can be found in, for instance, the CintBh (YoBh MS folio 135b3): cittaṁ hi teṣāṁ teṣāṁ ratriṇādīvāsānāṁ kṣaṇālavaṁuḥbūtānāṁ atayād anekavādhānām [...] utpadaye [...] = 心經彼彼日夜刹那薩縛等位非一衆種品類 (T30.386b2-3) (cf. KDK, vol. 6, p. 559, and KIK, vol.1, p. 392, with kundoku translation identical with that of the Śrībh passage above). (I am indebted to Prof Schmithausen who has kindly checked the corresponding Skt. passage in the YoBh MS.). Here, 等 seems to replace mūhīrta, and 位 (‘phases’?) most probably represents Xuanzang’s editorial addition. (In what follows, I shall refer to such editorial interventions as being Xuanzang’s decisions, but strictly speaking, the Chinese master worked with a large team of scholars, and some of these decisions may originate with other assistants; see Chapter Four, Part One above.)
11 ZC (Jin), Koryô, Qisha begin new paragraph.
12 發起加行 appears to be Xuanzang’s editorial addition (cf. the occurrence of the phrase in the
略 (ZC 663c1) 有四種補特伽羅。何等為四？一、一切外道。二、於正法中根性羸劣先修正行。三、根性雖利根未熟。四、一切菩薩攝當世證大菩提。非於現法。如是四種補特伽羅於現法中樂往世間道發起行。

3.28.1.2. (T 465b20; ZC 663c6; Fangshang 279a24; Koryō 737a6; Qisha 339c24) 此樂往世間道發起行者復有二種：一者、具縛，謂：諸異生；二者、不具縛，謂：諸有學。此復云何？謂：先於欲界觀為龜性，於初靜慮若定若等觀為鈍性，發起行離欲界欲，如是乃至發起行離無所有處欲當知亦爾。又依靜慮等能引無想定及發五神通等。又即依此，若生若相，皆當廣說。

3.28.2.1.1. (T 465b27; ZC 663c15; Fangshang 279b2; Koryō 737a15; Qisha 340a1)② 爲離欲界欲勤修觀行②諸瑜伽師由七作意方能②獲得離欲界欲。何等名為

preceding passage).

13 Skt. tadyāthā (cf. Tib. ‘di lta ste) is rendered into Chinese as a question: ‘Which are these four [categories]?’

14 The numeration 一 […] 二 […] 三 […] 四 […] is most likely Xuanzang’s editorial addition.

15 Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 正. KDK, p. 134, also has 正 but gives no details concerning its reading.

16 Ch.: ‘all’. See also note 22 to Engl. tr.

17 Ch.: ‘great’. Rather than suspecting *mahābodhi in Xuanzang’s MS, it is more likely that the Chinese translator added 大 for stylistic reasons (feelings of reverence, aesthetic embellishment, and/or four-syllable rhythm?).

18 Ch. brings a slight editorial clarification by giving numbers to the categories, which are then each explained by 謂 ‘say’, ‘that is’.

19 Ch.: ‘either attainment or birth’. See also 若生若相 below.

20 Here starts the second stone slab of juan 35 in the Fangshang Canon. The first line of all stone slabs, starting with the second one, contains the title of the text, its juan number, the stone slab number in the respective juan, and the traditional numeration character of the text. Thus, the second stone slab of our juan reads: 瑜伽論三十三 二 應 (written with a simplified allograph; see note 1 above). Occasionally, the stone slab may also contain additional information. Thus, stone slab number five 五 (p. 281a in the modern reproduction) has the name of the calligrapher, i.e., Gao Cong (see note 1 above), written at the bottom of the margin before the title, as well as the name of the carver, i.e., Wu Zhiquan 吳志全, appearing at the middle of the left margin of the stone slab (after the last column of the text). In what follows, I shall omit such information which has only codicological relevance. In my counting of the Fangshang Canon columns, I do not include this line and start with the first line of the text proper.

21 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, based upon the attainments, [the ascetic] can trigger the attainment of non-ideation, etc., and generates the five supernatural faculties’. See note 33 to Engl. tr.

22 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, based upon this, whether birth or sign, all these are to be explained in detail’. The exact meaning of phrase 若生若相 is unclear to me, but the similarity with 若定若生 suggests a close meaning. Another possibility is to see the whole phrase as a corruption of 若定若生 and emend it accordingly. No edition, however, records such a reading.

23 ZC (Jin), Koryō, Qisha begin new paragraph.

24 KDK, p. 135, has 諸行 instead of 觀行 but gives no explanation for its reading (typographical error?)

25 Zifu, Puning, Qisha, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 使.
七種作意？謂：(T 465e1) 于作意中、勝解作意、遠離作意、攝樂作意、觀察作意、加行究竟作意、加行究竟果作意。

3.28.2.1.2.1. (T 465c3; ZC 663a19; Fangshan 279b6; Koryo 737a19; Qisha 340a4) 云何名于作意？謂：若作意能正覺于欲界受想，初静虑静处。云何觉了欲界受想？謂：正尋思欲界六事。何等为六？26-義、二、事、三、相、四、品、五、時、六、理。

3.28.2.1.2.2. (T 465c6; ZC 663c23; Fangshan 279b10; Koryo 737a23; Qisha 340a8) 云何(ZC 664a1) 尋思諸欲受想義？28 謂：正尋思如是諸欲受想有過患，有多損悩，有多病痛，多災害。於諸欲中多過患義，廣説乃至30多災害義，名為麴義。

3.28.2.1.2.3. (T 465c9; ZC 664a4; Fangshan 279b13; Koryo 737b4; Qisha 340a11) 云何尋思諸欲受想事？31 謂：正尋思於諸欲中有內食欲，於諸欲中有外食欲。

3.28.2.1.2.4. (T 465c11; ZC 664a6; Fangshan 279b15; Koryo 737b6; Qisha 340a13) 云何尋思諸欲自相？謂：正尋思此等為煩惱欲，此為事欲。此復三種33 謂：順樂受處、順苦受處、順不苦不樂受處。順樂受處為食欲依34處，是想心倒依處。順苦受處為瞋恚依處，是忿恨依處。順不苦不樂受處是愚癡依處35，是覆、惱、詛、詭、無慚、無愧依處。即正尋思如是諸欲惡諸受之所隨逐，愚癡煩惱之所隨逐。是名尋思諸欲自相。36

云何尋思諸欲共相？謂：正尋思一切欲生苦老苦劣説乃至求不得苦等所随逐等所隨縛。諸受欲者於圓滿欲驅迫37而轉，亦未解脱生等法故，雖彼諸欲勝妙圓

26 Ch.: ‘what are [these] six?’.
27 Part of the character 尋 is lacking in Koryo (due to worn-out blockprint; imperfect imprint).
28 Ch. translates here and below with an interrogative sentence. Skt. and Tib. have affirmative sentences.
29 Ch. 多 ‘many’ has no direct equivalent in Skt. sādināvā. Its presence could be attributed to stylistic reasons (uniformity and/or cumulative effect) or might suggest a different compound in the original used by the Chinese translators: *bhaṭṭādaṇnavā. Cf. passage 3.28.2.1.2.6. below where 諸多過患 renders Skt. bhaṭṭādaṇnavā.
30 廣説乃至 translates here yāvad. The phrase often renders iti vistarāḥ or iti vistarśa meaning ‘and so on, as expounded in detail [above or in (a) canonical source(s)]’ or simply ‘and so forth’.
31 Ch.: ‘How does [the ascetic] examine the thing[s which make up] the coarseness of the sensual pleasures’.
32 Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] properly examines [that]’.
33 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, there are three types’.
34 ZC (Jin): 依欲。All other Canons, including Hongwu and Yongle-bei, read: 欲依。
35 Ch.: ‘The [sensual pleasures] related to feelings which are neither suffering nor pleasure are the basis of confusion’. This clearly represents a divergence from the Skt. and Tib., which mention rūga and dveṣa but not mohā. The additional element seems to reflect a different MS version. See also note 49 to Engl. tr.
36 Ch. ‘This is called the examination of the characteristic of sensual pleasures’.
37 Ch. 驅迫 ‘drive away’, ‘hurry [someone]’, ‘be hot on the traces of someone’, etc. seems to be an interpretative lexical element added by Xuanzang. The meaning of the phrase appears to be: ‘Those who rejoice in sensual pleasures are urged [promoted] by the wish to fulfill [them]’.

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满，而暂时有。是名寻思诸欲共相。

3.2.1.2.5. (T 465c24; ZC 664a21; Fangshan 279b27; Koryo 737b21; Qisha 340a25) 云何寻思诸欲兽品？谓：正寻思如是诸欲皆堕黑品。犹如骨髓，如凝血肉
38，如草炬火，如一分炭火39，如 (ZC 664b1) 大毒蛇40，如梦所见，如假借得诸庄严具，如树端果41。追求诸欲，诸有情类於诸欲中受42追求所作苦，受於护作苦，受亲爱失坏所作苦，受无厌足所 (T 466a1) 作苦，受不自在所作苦，受恶行所作苦。如是一切如前应知。

如世尊说："习近诸欲有五过患。谓：彼诸欲极散滋滋，多诸苦恼，多诸过患。又彼诸欲於习近时，能令无厌，能令无足，能令无满。又彼诸欲常为诸佛及佛弟子、贤善、正行正至、善士以无量门43呵责毁呰。又彼诸欲於习近时，能令诸结集增长。又彼诸欲於习近时44，我说：无有恶不善业而不作者。"

如是诸欲令无厌足，多所共有，是非法行恶行之因，增长欲爱，智者所离，速趣消减，依託众缘，是诸放逸危亡之地45，无常虚伪46，妄失之法，犹如幻化甄

38 凝血肉 literally means ‘blood and flesh forming a lump together’ or ‘clotted blood and flesh’. Skt. peśi means ‘clot’, but here it is used in fine compositi with meaning of ‘lump of’.
39 一分炭火 literally means ‘one fragment [1/3] of charcoal fire’. I surmise that Xuanzang’s MS must have read *aṅgāra-karṣṇa instead of *karṣu. Skt. karṣa means ‘anything scratched off’ or, in a more technical sense, a ‘grain’ or ‘weight of gold or silver’, which according to MW, s.v., amounted to 176 grains troy or 280 grains troy (roughly the equivalent of 11.4 grams or 18.14 grams respectively). On the other hand, fen 分 was a traditional Chinese weight unit, which represented the 100th of a liang 两 (see DKWJ, s.v. 分). Like all units of measure in premodern China, it differed from dynasty to dynasty, and in the Tang Period, it weighed circa 0.37 grams (see Shin jigen, pp. 1228-1229). It is difficult to determine whether Xuanzang used fen 分 here in a more general sense of ‘fragment’ or he had in mind a precise weight unit, be it the Indian karṣa or the Chinese fen.
40 Ch.: ‘large venomous snake’. ‘Large’ seems be a figure of speech with intensifying effects or a rhythm-filler. It is not excluded that this qualification was based on actual observation (Xuanzang’s own?), but none of the Sanskrit and Pali lexicographical works which I have consulted give any details concerning the size or species of the snake denoted by Skt. aśīvīṣa.
41 Literally, ‘treetop fruit’. It is hard to ascertain whether this is a rhythm-filler or Xuanzang’s MS contained something like: *vrksāgraphala. The Ābhijñākārthagāthānirdeśa, which comments upon a similar list of eight similes occurring in the gāthā part, contains the compound vrksāgrafalapamatayā (Maeda 1991, 90). This is rendered into Chinese as 如樹端爛熟果 (T30.369c21-22). However, the Ābhijñākārthagāthā verse itself reads vrksaphalomaḥ (Maeda 1991, 89), and the latter, too, is translated by Xuanzang as 如樹端熟果 (T30.366c26). The MS used by Xuanzang may have contained vrksāgraphala in all occurrences, but it is also possible that the Chinese master may have been influenced by the Ābhijñākārthagāthānirdeśa and decided to unify all other renderings.
42 Shōsō-in, Fangshan read: 故受 instead of 受, which is the reading in all the other Canons (including Hongwu and Yongle-bei).
43 Ch.: ‘in countless ways [lit., gates]’. Like Tib. rnam grangs du ma, the Chinese rendering suggests *anekaparyāyena rather than the extant Skt. anena paryāyena.
44 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, these sensual pleasures when indulged upon’. There is no equivalent for this in Skt. as well as Tib.
45 The phrase translates pramādabhbhūya. The Skt. pramāda is usually rendered into Chinese
惑愚夫。若現法欲，若後法欲，若天上欲，若人中欲，一切皆是魔之所行，魔之所住。46於是處所能生無量依意所起惡不善法，所謂貪、嗔及懈怠等，於聖弟子正修學時能為障礙。由如是等差別因 (ZC 664c1) 綱，如是諸欲多分墮在黑品所攝。是名尋思諸欲麤品。

3.28.2.1.2.6. (T 466a18; ZC 664c2; Fangshan 280a22; Koryó 738a2; Qisha 340b17) 云何尋思諸欲麤時？謂：正尋思如是諸欲生來今世，於常常時，於恒恒時，多諸過患，多諸損傷，多諸疲勞，多諸災害。49是名尋思諸欲麤時。

3.28.2.1.2.7. (T 466a22; ZC 664c6; Fangshan 280a25; Koryó 738a6; Qisha 340b20) 云何尋思諸欲麤理？謂：正尋思如是諸欲由大資糧，由大追求，由大勤勞，及由種種無量差別工巧業處，方能招集、生起、增長。又彼諸欲雖善生起，雖善增長，一切多為外攝受事，謂：父母、妻子、奴婢、作使、親友、眷屬。52或為對治自內有餘麤重四大，糜飯長養常須53覆蔽，54沐浴、按摩、壞、斷、離散、消

as 放逸. Here we find a four-character phrase: 放逸危亡, with the last two characters literally meaning ‘to endanger’ (危) and ‘to cease to exist; to go to ruin’ (亡). As a binomic lexeme, 危亡 is known from Chinese classical texts, where it is often used in relation to war, social chaos, etc. E.g., Records of the Historian 史記, ‘Biography of Zhang Yi’ 張儀傳: 國貧而數舉兵, 危亡之術也. ‘A country being poor but relentlessly waging war, this [certainly] is the way to perish’. In our passage here, 危亡 ‘peril and ruin’ seems to emphasise the effect of falling into moral and spiritual degradation as a result of ‘carelessness’ 放逸, and, at the same time, ensures the four-syllable rhythm.

46 The order in Ch. (as well as in Tib.) is the reverse of the Skt. riktā anytiṇās.
47 Ch.: ‘The dwelling of Mára’. Xuanzang seems to have read or relied on a MS which read nivāsā rather nivāpo. The extant MS as well as the Tib. translation plead for the latter. Let us also notice that the po and so are rather similar aksaras in our script. For more details, see note 68 to Engl. tr.
48 Ch.: ‘How does he examine the time of the coarseness of sensual pleasures?’
49 Ch. suggests an additional compound and a different word order (see also notes to Skt. ed. and Tib. ed.). A similar phrase occurs at passage 3.28.2.1.2.2.: sādinnāvāh, bahūpadravāh, bahūvitikāh, bahūpasargāh = 有多過患，有多損傷，有多疲勞，有多災害. This can be reconstructed as: *bahvādināvāh, bahūpadravāh, bahvītikāh, bahūpasargāh. ‘fraught with much disadvantage, much misfortune, much calamity, much plague’. Neither the extant Skt. nor the Tib. translation contains, however, bahūvitikāh 有多疲勞 (cf. Choi, p. 169, n. 227; also p. 123, n. 393).
50 Ch.: ‘This is called the examination of the time of the coarseness of sensual pleasures.’
51 Ch. 資糧 means ‘provision’. It probably reflects a wrong reading: *sāṁbhāra, instead of samrambha in the extant Skt. MS. Cf. also Tib. rtṣol ba (var. lec. brtsal ba). See also note 91 to Tib. ed.
52 The punctuation adopted here is, I think, the most natural when reading the sentence in Chinese. It raises, however, the problem of agreement between the number of Chinese lexemes and the members of the compound in the Skt. original. Xuanzang appears to have opted for an abridged rendering. See note 78 to Engl. tr.
53 Ch: ‘always requiring’. See also note 85 to Engl. tr.
54 覆蔽 ‘covering’ seems to reflect another reading: *ācchādana (for more details, see note 81 to Engl. tr.). Cf. also 覆蔽 rendering praticchādana below.

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Regarding these six characters as three binomes is the most natural way of reading the phrase in Chinese (cf. the kunen 訓點 marks in T as well as KIK 235, KDK 138, and YoBh-I, s.vv.), but though resulting into lack of stylistic parallelism (two monomorphic words and two binomes), it seems that we should read: 壊 断 (= bhedana-ccchedana), which perfectly corresponds to the Skt. text. The reason for this turn of phrase may have been the desire to keep the four-syllable rhythm of the sentence: 壊斷離散 消滅法身.

56 **法身** renders Skt. kāyasya [...] dharamanah ‘body bound to/subj ect to the law of [...]’ (cf. the similar passage in the Xiangyang lun: 壊滅之法, ed. in Choi, p. 81). For a reader relying only upon the Chinese translation, **法身** may, however, be misleading and easily mistaken for dharmakāya. For instance, KDK 138 correctly construes the phrase: 消滅法身的身, but KIK 235 appears to misunderstand: 法身を壊断する ‘destroys the Dharma-body’.

57 Ch. repeats the phrase corresponding to utpamotpavannaḥkuḥa: ‘Therefore, sensual pleasures can only remedy the various sufferings thus arisen.’

58 Ch. appears to have omitted na saktena and contains instead: ‘[Sensual pleasures] must only be correctly thought of’.

59 Ch.: ‘mixed [various] [and] foul medicine’. Any reference or hint to pitītimuktabhāsajaya?

60 Ch: ‘Furthermore, [regarding] these sensual pleasures, there is the means [of valid knowledge (pramāṇa)] of the Supreme Teaching, [by which one] realises [their] coarse aspect.’

61 Ch: 現 ‘directly’ or ‘actually’ (for this understanding of 現, cf. also KDK 138 and KIK 236: 現に). Rather than a different MS reading, 現 probably represents Xuanzang’s addition in order to emphasise the criterion of direct perception, as distinct from scriptural authority and inference.

62 Ch: ‘Furthermore, [regarding] these sensual pleasures, there is the means [of valid knowledge (pramāṇa)] of inference, [by which one] knows [that sensual pleasures] have a coarse aspect.’

63 Ch. contains some additional elements and partially departs from the Skt. syntax: ‘Furthermore, from beginningless [time], the original nature [of] the sensual pleasures is coarse and foul. [Their] established true nature, their true nature [which is] difficult to conceive of, should not be thought over, should not be conceptualised.’

64 Shōsō-in: 道.

65 Ch: ‘This is called the examination of the reasoning of the coarseness of sensual pleasures.’

66 ZC (Jin): 思. Obviously, the compound should be 欲界 ‘realm of sensual pleasures’ (kāmadhātu). However, it should be noted that the Chinese rendering has no Skt. equivalent here.

67 Ch: ‘since it is free from the various [kinds of] coarseness of the realm of sensual pleasures’.

68 Ch: ‘in the first trance, it is said that there is serenity’. 靜性 suggests sāntatva or sāntatā rather than extant Skt. ānta (cf. also Tib. zhi ba, not zhi nyid), but the presence of 性 as well
是名覺了初靜慮中所有靜相。即由如是定地作意，於欲界中了為靜相，於初靜慮了為靜相，故名為相作意，即此作意當言猶為聞思之餘。

3.28.2.1.3. (T 466b18; ZC 665a12; Fangshan 280b21; Koryô 738b16; Qisha 340c14) 彼既如是如理尋思，了知诸相是其靜相，知初靜慮是其靜相。從此已後，超過聞思，唯用修行，於所緣相發起勝解，修奢摩他毘鉢舍那。既修習已如所尋思靜相靜相，數起勝解。如名為勝解作意。

3.28.2.1.4. (T 466b22; ZC 665a17; Fangshan 280b26; Koryô 738b16; Qisha 340c19) 即此勝解善修，善習，善多修習為因緣故，最初生起斷煩惱道。即所生

as 說 can also be explained as stylistic requirements for the Chinese wording of the sentence.

69 Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 净。

70 Ch. 'Thus, this contemplation should be said to be still a mixture of listening and reflection'. Usually, veditavāya is rendered as 當知 or 應知. In the parallel passage in the Xianyang lun (T31.515a6; cf. Choi, p. 82), Xuanzang employs 應知. Actually, 當言 rather suggests vaktavāya (cf. also Choi p. 127, n. 432). Skt. vaktavāya is frequently used in, for example, the AKBh, being variously rendered as 當說, 當辯, 應說, 應言, 應辯, 須說, etc. (see AKBh Index, s.v.v.).

71 He has thus already examined properly, has realised that sensual pleasures represent the coarse aspect and understood that the first trance represents the serene aspect'. The Skt. sentence as well as the Tib. rendering seems quite problematic. Although it contains some explanatory parts which do not appear as in Skt., the Chinese translation is the most reliable version and certainly does not depart from the basic purport of the passage. See note 94 to Engl.tr.

72 Ch.: 'From this afterwards'.

73 The Ch. translation suggests *ālambanimitta rather than nimittālambana. Cf. 取所緣相義 (T30.295c25) rendering  ālambanimittagrahanārtha (Manobhāmi, in YoBh Bhattacharya ed. 69,17-18); 解脫所緣相 (T30.332a9) = ālambanimittavimokṣa (Samākṣa bhumī, Delhe ed. and tr. 2002, 111, 10); 所緣相 (T30.333c26; 27) = ālambananimitta (ibid. 121, 8; 9; the last line actually defines the concept); 所緣相 (T30.438c11, 12-13) = ālambananimitta (SrBh, Shukla ed. 280, 6; 7-9, the last two lines containing a definition of the term; 所緣相 (T30.456a17ff) = ālambananimitta (ibid. 391, 18ff.); etc. The Chinese translation of the YoBh contains a total of 28 occurrences of the compound. See also note 95 to Engl. tr.

74 Ch.: 'He generates conviction with regard to the characteristic of the meditative object, and practises samatha and vipaśyanā'. Ch. seems to construe adhimucyate with *ālambananimitta (see also previous note above). A possible explanation is that the Skt. MS used by Xuanzang may have read: *adhimucyate tad ālambananimittam eva (with danda after eva and ālambananimittam instead of extant Skt. tannimittālambanām).

Fangshan: 即。

76 The Chinese sentence can be construed in two ways: 'Thereupon, because [he] intensely [/skilfully] cultivates this [very] conviction, intensely [/skilfully] exercises [it], intensely [/skilfully] practises [it], [he] generates the path of the elimination of defilements for the first time'. According to this reading, 此勝解 would be a direct object placed before the verb, most likely the nuance being that of emphasis (see also the KDK 139: 此の勝解を, in classical Japanese, 乃至 being a modality to stress the direct object; cf. also KIK 236 此の勝解を). The subject of the main clause would be 彼, i.e., the ascetic, which, however, is not expressed in the surface structure.

Another way of interpreting the sentence is: 'Thereupon, this conviction, on account of
起斷煩惱道俱行作意，此中說名遠離作意。77

3.28.2.1.5. (T 466b25; ZC 665a21; Fangshan 281a1; Koryô 738b20; Qisha 340c21) 由能最初斷於欲界先所應斷諸煩惱故，及能除彼煩惱品佰重性故，從是已後，愛樂於斷，愛樂遠離。於諸（ZC 665b1）斷中見勝功德，觸證少分遠離喜樂。78 於時時間，欣樂作意而深慶悦。於時時（T 466c1）聞，厭離作意而深厭患。思欲除障憶睡頣舉事等。如是名爲敘樂作意。

3.28.2.1.6. (T 466c2; ZC 665b5; Fangshan 281a6; Koryô 738c6; Qisha 340c27) 彼由如是樂斷，樂修，正修加行，善品79任持，80欲界所繫諸煩惱緣，若行若住，不復現行。便作是念：‘我今何有於諸欲中貪欲煩惱不覺知耶？為無有耶？’ 為審觀察如是事故，隨於一種可愛淨相作意惟。猶未永斷諸緣見時，便復思索隨習近心，趣習近心，臨習近心。不能住捨，不能厭毁，制伏、違逆。彼作是念：‘我於諸欲猶未解脫其心，猶未正得解脫。我心仍為諸行制伏，

intense [/'skɪflʃul] cultivation, intense [/'skɪflʃul] exercise, intense [/'skɪflʃul] practice, generates the path of the elimination of defilements for the first time’. Such a reading would have the subject expressed in the surface structure but separated from the verb of the main clause by a rather long causal construction.

As for 賢, I assume that it was employed to stress the intensity of the practice, reflecting thus stylistic preferences of the Chinese translator rather than conjecturing that it renders here *sw-, etc. (which has no equivalent in the extant Skt. MS). I have rendered 賢 here as ‘intense(ly)’ or ‘skiful(ly)’, but the construction can also be understood as ‘he becomes well versed in cultivating this conviction’ or, simply, ‘can cultivate this conviction’. The latter sense (i.e., ‘can’) might have the additional function of indicating the active voice of the main verb (much like the usage of 能 in Buddhist translations; see note 102 below).

Slightly unusual in this context is the rendering of (apparently) Skt. āsevana as 修 (which quite often stands for bhāvayati, etc.) and of bhāvanā as 訓, but semantically these raise no special problems. Let also note that anayāśā is translated as a clause but this is rather a matter of wording and stylistic preferences in Chinese.

77 Ch.: ‘This is here [i.e., in this context] called the contemplation engendering separation’.

78 Unlike Skt., the Ch. construction is active, containing two sentences: ‘he sees the benefit…, and he experiences [lit., touches and realises] a small [degree of] delight at separation.’ This turn of phrase is much more natural in Chinese.

79 Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 見.

80 The correct punctuation is a rather delicate matter. The most natural way of reading the text in Chinese is the one adopted above, but in the light of the Skt. text, the punctuation should rather be... 正修，加行善品任持。

81 Ch.: ‘being enwrapped by the defilements connected with the realm of sensual pleasures’.

82 Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 求.

83 This corresponds to Skt. nirvi<d>,jugupsā, pratīvāniḥ, pratikūlataḥ. The most natural way to read the sentence in Chinese is to see here three binomic compounds, and this is how I punctuate the phrase. It is possible, however, that we have here two binomes and two monomorphemic words, which would thus correspond perfectly to Skt. The characters 彌毁 could actually be seen as rendering nirvid and jugupsā. Or, alternatively, 追毁 could stand for pratīvāni and pratikūlataḥ. If we opt for the idea of a perfect Skt.-Ch. parallel, I would rather prefer the former alternative, but this would not solve our dilemma here. Both 彌 and 毁 can stand alone as equivalents for a variety of Skt. words, and equally true is that 彌毁 functions as a binomic compound. For example, in Xuanzang’s translation of the AKbh at T29.149a20, 彌
如水被持，未^{48} 為法性之所制伏。我今復應為欲永斷餘隨眠故，正^{49} 動^{50} 安住樂斷、樂修。’如是名為觀察作意。

3.28.2.1.7. (T 466c14; ZC 665b18; Fangshan 281a18; Koryó 738c19; Qisha 341a8) 從此^{48} 倍更樂斷。樂修^{48}，修奢摩他毘鉾舍那^{89}，鄭重觀察。修習對治，時時
觀察先所已斷^{90}，由是因緣^{91}，從欲界繫一切煩惱心得離顛。此由暫時伏斷方便，
非是畢竟永害種子。^{92} 當於爾時初靜慮地前加行道 (ZC 665c1) 已得究竟，一切煩
惱對治作意已得生起。^{93} 是名加行究竟作意。

3.28.2.1.8. (T 466c21; ZC 665c2; Fangshan 281a22; Koryó 739a2; Qisha 341a14) 從此無間，由是因緣，證入根本初靜慮定。即此根本初靜慮定俱行作意名
加行究竟果作意。

3.28.2.1.9.1. (T 466c23; ZC 665c5; Fangshan 281a24; Koryó 739a5; Qisha

毁 is most likely a binome, though unfortunately here we have no Skt. parallel. (The compound
occurs in the commentary ad VII.19d; cf. Skt. text at ABdh, 446).

^{84} See note 111 to Eng. tr.
^{85} Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 心.
^{86} Shōsō-in, Fangshan, Chongning, Koryō, Qi, Hongwu, Yongle-bei read: 動 (in this form or
or allographs of it; see below). Taishō reads: 動, and notes that Chongning and Shōsō-in have the
reading: 動 (T, vol. 30, p. 466, n. 6). The implication is that the other texts, i.e., Koryō, Zifu,
Puning, Jingshan, and Tenna read: 動. Koryō, however, also reads: 動. ZC (Jin) reads 動, for
which it uses the allograph: . The same allograph is employed in Yongle-bei. ZC
contains no note, and this makes it difficult to judge whether we should take its silence as
meaning that Zifu, Puning, Jingshan, Yongle-nan, and Qing have the same reading (in which
case the annotation in Taishō is partially wrong or incomplete) or whether the ZC editors have
failed to notice the var. lec. here. Both KDK and KIK read 動 but have no notes.

^{87} Ch.: ‘From this [afterwards]’.
^{88} Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan and Qing omit:
修. The Southern stemma seems to have considered this 修 a ditography (see next 修) and
accordingly deleted it. In view of the Skt. bhāvanārāmaḥ, it is clear, however, that both 修 in
樂修, 修奢摩他毘鉾舍那 are necessary. KIK 237 omits one 修. KDK 140 correctly reads
both of them.
^{89} Skt. samathāvipaṭṭyanāyuktaḥ. It is difficult to say whether the Ch. 修 renders yuktia or it is
related to bhāvanā as suggested by the Tib. gnas dang lhaṅ mthong sgom pa. See also note 177
to Tib. ed.
^{90} The Chinese translation mentions only the investigation of the ‘already abandoned [sensual
pleasures]’. Skt. and Tib. have both the ‘abandoned and not [yet] abandoned’. Xuanzang’s MS
may have been corrupt (*prahīnatām).
^{91} Ch.: ‘because of this reason’. Probably a turn of phrase used for rendering and stressing
the causal link between the genitive absolute and the main clause in Skt.
^{92} Ch.: ‘Since it is [only] a method of temporary subduing [the defilements], this is not the
complete destruction of the seeds for ever’. Here and below (see note 93), Xuanzang departs
from the Skt. syntax and adds a few extra elements probably in an editorial effort to bring more
clarity.
^{93} Ch.: ‘Precisely at this point, the afore-mentioned [?] preparatory path of first absorption has
reached completion, [and] the contemplation which counteracts all defilements has arisen.’

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341a16) 又於遠離、攝樂作意現在轉時，能適悅身離生喜樂，於時時間微薄現前94。加行究竟作意轉時95，即彼喜樂轉復增廣96，於時時間深重現前97。加行究竟果作意轉98時，離生喜樂遍諸身分，無不充滿，無有間隙99。彼於爾時遠離諸欲，遠離一切惡不善法，有尋有伺，離生喜樂，於初靜慮，圓滿五支，100 具 (T 467a1) 足安住。名住欲界對治修果101，名隨證得離欲界欲。

3.28.2.1.9.2. (T 467a2; ZC 665c14; Fangshan 281b5; Koryó 739a14; Qisha 341a24) 又了相作意於所應斷能102了正知，於所應得能正知，為斷應斷，為得應得，心生希願103。勝解作意為斷、為得正發加行。遠離作意能捨所有104上品105煩

94 Ch. translates Skt. pratanukasaṁmukhibhāvayogena, but Tib. bde ba'i dngos po chung ngu'i tshul gyis suggests *pratanukasaṁmukhibhāvayogena. For more details, see note 123 to Engl. tr.
95 Ch. may suggest prayoganiṣṭhāmanaskāra vartāmane (= 轉) rather than the Skt. prayoganiṣṭhāmanaskārakāle, but it is equally possible that the Ch. added 轉 for the sake of uniformity (see other sentences below) and clarity.
96 Ch.: ‘the joy and pleasure is increasingly amplified’. Did Xuanzang translate freely and split the Skt. compound ghanavipulatarasāṁmukhibhāvena, keeping vipulatara here and placing ghanasāṁmukhibhāvena in the next sentence?
97 Ch. translates Skt. ghanavipulatarasāṁmukhibhāvena, but Tib. ba'i dngos po shin tu mang po dang | shin tu rgya chen po'i tshul gyis suggests *ghanavipulatarasāṁmukhibhāvayogena. See note 94 above.
98 Note that while at the beginning of this passage vartāmane is rendered as 現在轉, here we have only 轉.
99 Ch.: ‘there is no opening [which is not filled with joy and pleasure]’.
100 Another possibility of construing the Ch. syntax is: 異喜於初靜慮圓滿，五支具足: ‘the joy and pleasure born of separation is complete [perfect] [and] possessed of five limbs in the first absorption’. This is apparently how KDK 140 and KIK 237 understand the Chinese translation. Such a reading would, however, represent a clear departure from our Skt. original as well as from the canonical formula in general. I think that my punctuation above has the advantage of keeping closer to the original. 圓滿五支 is probably a rendering of pañcānga. 圓滿 is not probably the most faithful rendering, but Xuanzang may have wished to stress the ‘completeness’ of the five limbs which characterises the first absorption. Anyway, even if semantically stressing a nuance which is not present in (at least the surface structure of) the Skt. compound, construing 圓滿五支 as a rendering of pañcānga does not depart from the basic sense of the word as well as from the Skt. sentence syntax. 具足安住 is, most likely, a rendering of upasāṃpadya viharati. Let us also note that in the parallel passages at Śrībh-Gra 20, 23-24, and Śrībh-Gra (17) 8, 6-9, Xuanzang renders differently: 異喜喜樂，入初靜慮，具足安住 (T30.397c4-5 and 435c29-436a1 respectively).
101 Ch. has no equivalent for Skt. mārga (cf. also Tib. lam).
102 Here and in many sentences below, Ch. uses 能 ‘can, be able’, for which there is no direct Skt. equivalent. In Buddhist Chinese, 能, probably preserving its basic semantic value, seems to also serve as a secondary marker or ‘enhancer’ of the active voice of the main verb (contrasted, when necessary, with passive markers like 所, the latter most frequently employed for past participle constructions).
103 Ch.: ‘he generates in his mind the wish for the elimination of what should be eliminated and the gaining of what should be gained’. 心生希願 most likely renders Skt. cittām prāṇidhatte (cf. 希願發起 rendering the same Skt. phrase at T30.442c19 = Śrībh Sh. ed. 310, 14). It thus appears that Ch. construes prāṇidhatte as ‘wishes’ rather than ‘directs’ (see Engl. tr.).
惱。攝樂作意能捨所有中品煩惱。觀察作意能於所得離增上慢安住其心。加行究竟作意能捨所有下品煩惱。加行究竟果作意能正領受彼諸作意善修習果。《

3.28.1.2.1.9.3. (T 467a9; ZC 665c22; Fangshan 281b12; Koryō 739a23; Qisha 341b1) 又若了相作意，若勝解作意，總名《隨順 (ZC 666a1) 作意，厭惡對治俱行。若遠離作意，若加行究竟作意，總名對治作意，斷對治俱行。若攝樂作意名對治作意及順清淨作意。若觀察作意名順觀察作意。如是其餘四種作意《當知攝入六作意中，謂：隨順作意，對治作意，順清淨作意，順觀察作意。

3.28.2.2.1. (T 467a16; ZC 666a7; Fangshan 281b19; Koryō 739b7; Qisha 341b7) 如初靜慮定有七種作意，如是第二、第三、第四靜慮定及空無邊處、識無邊處、無所有處、非想非非想處定，當知各有七種作意。

3.28.2.2.2. (T 467a19; ZC 666a11; Fangshan 281b22; Koryō 739b11; Qisha 341b10) 若於有尋有伺初靜慮地見了體相，於無尋無伺第二靜慮地見了靜相，為欲證入第二靜慮，應知是名了相作意。謂：已證入初靜慮定，已得初靜慮者於諸尋伺觀為體性，能正了知。“若在定中，於緣最初率爾而起，忽《務行境’，《

104 Here and below, we have ‘所有’ which usually means ‘all’ or ‘what[ever] exists’ but can also be used as an expression for stressing plurality.

105 Unlike below, where 《translates prakīra, we have no Skt. equivalent. Here the word was probably used for uniformity’s sake.

106 Shōsō-in: 今.

107 Ch.: ‘The contemplation which represents the fruit of the culmination of the practice can rightly [indeed] receive [experience] the fruit of these contemplations well cultivated’. The Ch. rendering seems to presuppose: *eśām manaskārāṇāṁ subhāvītānāṁ phalaṁ pratyanubhavati. See also note 146 to Skt. crit. ed.

108 Here and in the sentence below, Ch. adds 總名 ‘are together called’.

109 Ch.: ‘these other four kinds of contemplations’.

110 Ch.: ‘like there are seven contemplations in [i.e., for the attainment of] the first absorption’.

111 Cf. Skt. and Tib., where the seven contemplations are the instrument through which absorptions are attained.

112 Ch.: ‘it should be known that there are seven contemplations in [i.e., for the attainment of] each [of the above absorptions and attainments]’. Skt. has no equivalent for ‘it should be known’, but Tib. rig pa bya’o also suggests *veditavyāḥ. The parallel passage in the AbbSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 27) similarly has yojavitavyāḥ. Cf. also 當知 in parallel passage in the Xiyan Yang lun (Choi ed., p. 85).

113 Ch.: ‘[when the ascetic] perceives the coarse characteristic in [i.e., pertaining to] the level of the first absorption which is possessed of rough examination [and] subtle investigation’. This probably represents Xuanzang’s editorial clarification. In Skt. and Tib., vitarka appears here and below in locative plural (see note 141 to Engl.tr.).

114 Ch.: ‘[and when the ascetic] perceives the serene characteristic in the level of the second absorption which is not possessed of rough examination [and] subtle examination.’

115 Ch.: ‘it should be known that it is named’.

116 Ch., like Tib., suggests: prathama’, for which there is no equivalent in Skt. Cf. note 156 to Skt. crit. ed.

117 Ch.: ‘various rough examinations [and] subtle investigations’. See note 141 to Engl. tr.

118 Ch: ‘the ascetic can correctly know [or: correctly knows]’ (for 能, see note 102 above). The sentence lacks both in Skt. and Tib. It does not appear to be an editorial clarification (semantically, it does not bring any important information). It might reflect a different MS
為意言性，是名為尋。即於彼緣隨彼而起，隨彼而行，行歷行境１２０，細意言性是名為伺。又正了知１２１如是尋伺是心法性，心生時生，共有、相應、同一緣轉。又正了知如是尋伺依內而生，外處所攝。又正了知如是１２２一切過去、未來、現在所（T 467b1）懸，從因而生，從緣（ZC 666b1）而生，或增或減，不久住，１２４暫時而有，率爾現前，令心躁擾，令心散動，不靜行轉。求上地時１２５，苦住隨逐，是故皆是黑品所攝。隨逐諸欲離生喜樂少分勝利，隨所在地自性能令有如是相。於常常

transmission. Cf. similar phrase 又正了知 in the next paragraph and note 121 below.

１１８ Puning, Jingshan read: 忽 ‘all at once’, etc. Semantically (as well as graphically), this is very close to 忽 ‘sudden(ly)’, ‘be in hurry’, etc., and both often render Skt. sahasā (cf. BCSD, s.v.) The latter character is actually a vulgar or simplified non-standard allograph (俗字) of 意 (Shinjigen, s.v.). ZC reads: 意 (which is another vulgar allograph of 意) but has no note.

１１９ Ch.: ‘acting on the object hurriedly [/abruptly/busily]’. This phrase as well as the parallel expression 從歷行境 below departs considerably from both Skt. and Tib. If we compare the extant Skt. MS and the Ch., the equivalent of 息勿行境 should be vyāgrālambanacāri, while 從歷行境 should stand for vyāgracāri. Even if we suppose a free translation, the Chinese phrases (especially the latter—see note below), can hardly be renderings of the two compounds as they appear in the extant Skt. text. See also note 143 to Engl. tr.

１２０ Ch.: ‘acting on the object slowly [/quietly/gradually]’. The discrepancy is even more conspicuous here. On the whole, the Ch. refers to two distinct processes: the first one is the abrupt approach to the meditative object presupposed by vitarka, while the second one is the gradual and subter investigation implied by vicāra. Doctrinally, there is no problem with this description, but philologically, we have to deal with an obvious difference which probably reflects a different MS reading. See also note 143 to Engl. tr.

１２１ Here and in the next two sentences, Ch. reads: ‘[the ascetic] can correctly know [or: correctly knows]’. The phrases lack both in Skt. and Tib. Cf. the similar phrase 能正了知 in the preceding paragraph which is discussed in note 117 above.

１２２ Shōsō-in adds two superfluous characters: 勤思 after 是. The whole sentence in Shōsō-in reads: 又正了知如是勤思一切過去、未來、現在所攝.

１２３ Ch.: ‘are comprised in the past, future, and present’.

１２４ Ch.: ‘does not last long’. This may represent an additional element in Xuanzang’s MS (*aciraśhiṭitikāḥ?—see BCSD, p. 34, 不久住 = aciraśhiṭitika) or an editorial gloss added by the Chinese master in order to explain or enhance the stylistic effect of āyāpāyikāḥ = 或增或減.

１２５ Ch.: ‘[when] seek[ing] [to attain] the upper level’. See note 148 to Engl. tr.

１２６ ZC (Jin), Koryō, Fangshan, Chongning, Qisha, Hongwu, Yongle-bei: 苦. T reads: 若, and its note 4, p. 467, mentions that 若 (= Chongning) reads: 苦. This would mean that all the other editions collated by the Taishō editors, i.e., Shōsō-in, Koryō, Zifu, Puning, Jingshan, and Tenna, read: 若. Koryō, however, clearly reads: 苦. ZC has no note, and this implies that Zifu, Puning, and Jingshan read the same as the Jin text, i.e., 苦. Without directly checking Shōsō-in, Zifu, Puning, Jingshan, Yongle-ran, Qing and Tenna, it is very difficult to decide whether we should follow the Taishō annotation (which is at least partially wrong here) or we should infer along the lines suggested by the lack of a note in ZC, which fairly often fails to register variant readings. Both KDK 142 and KIK 239 read: 苦 but have no note. Skt. duḥkhavihārānumgatovat guarantees that 苦 was the original reading.

１２７ Ch.: ‘in accordance with the level where [the ascetic] is, its nature makes it have such a characteristic’.
時，於恒恆時，有尋有伺心行所緣，躁擾而轉，不得寂靜。以如是等種種行相，於諸尋伺覺了僧相。又正了知第二靜慮無尋無伺如何如是一切所說僧相皆無所有。是故言眼第二靜慮有其靜相，彼諸僧相皆遠離故。

為欲證入第二靜慮，隨其所應其餘作意如前應知。

3.28.2.2.3. (T 467b12; ZC 666c13; Fangshan 282a15; Koryō 739c13; Qisha 341c1) 如是乃至爲欲證入非想非非想處定，於地地中隨其所應當知皆有七種作意。又彼僧相遍在一切下地皆有，下從欲界展轉上至無所有處。當知僧相略有二種，謂：諸下地苦住增上，望所住不寂靜故，及諸壽量時分短促，望上壽量轉減少故。此二僧相由前六事如其所應當正尋思。隨彼彼地樂離欲時，如其所應於次上地尋思靜相，漸次乃至證得加行究竟果作意。

3.28.3.1.1. (T 467b22; ZC 666c1; Fangshan 282a23; Koryō 740a1; Qisha 341c10; Sakuma 87, § H.1.1.) 復次此中“離欲”者：欲有二種，一者，煩惱欲，二

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128 Ch.: ‘possessed of rough examination, possessed of subtle investigation, the mind approaches [its] meditative object, operates in an agitated way, [and] does not attain serenity’. Ch. does not seem to render prasānta. On the other hand, there are no Skt. equivalents for Ch.所緣 [meditative object] and 躁擾 [disquieting], ‘causing agitation’. Concerning the latter, we should note that a few lines above, 心躁擾 renders cittasamāksobhakarāḥ. We actually find this binome quite often in the ŚrīBh, but it does not have a fixed Skt. equivalent. At T30.461a15-16, 躁擾處法 translates saṁsobhasthānīyānā dharamānām (Sh 418, 21-22), which is similar to the occurrence above, but at T30.409c1, 躁擾 appears to correspond to plutamānasah (ŚrīBh-Gr 132, 2) (or drutamānasah) — the Chinese translation contains one word less than the extant Skt. MS; semantically, 躁擾 could render either of the words or, if Xuanzang deemed them synonymous, both) and at T30.436c25, 躁擾 renders utpāvitatvam (ŚrīBh-Gr (17) 20, 1).

129 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, [he] correctly [precisely] understands [that]’.

130 T (without any note): 弟. Most likely, this is a mere typographical error.

131 KDK 142 omits: 定.

132 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, the coarse characteristic pervades and exists in all inferior levels, [starting] below from the sphere of sensual pleasures [and going] successively up to the sphere of nothing [whatsoever].’

133 Because of the additions in the previous sentence, the subject, i.e., ‘coarse characteristic’, is repeated here.

134 Ch.: ‘due to looking at [i.e., comparing] the superior dwellings [i.e., levels], [the inferior levels] are not serene.’ Here and below (see note 135), 望, literally meaning ‘to look at’, might be a rendering of *apekṣya ‘with regard to’, in the sense of ‘compared with’.

135 Ch.: ‘due to looking at [i.e., comparing] the lifespan of the superior [levels], [the ascetic realises that the lifespan in the inferior levels] gradually decreases.’


137 Ch.: ‘must be correctly examined’.

138 Ch.: ‘the next superior level’. Skt. has only upariṣṭāt ‘above, further on, afterwards’.

139 In Ch. (as well as in Tib.), the post-verbal elements after paryēṣate form an independent sentence. Therefore, Ch. had to use the verb 尋思 = paryēṣate in this sentence, too. Cf. also note 269 to Tib. ed.

140 Ch.: ‘until gradually realising’.

141 T, ZC (Jin), Koryō, and Qisha begin new paragraph.
者、事欲。離有二種：一者、相應離，二者、境界離。

3.28.3.1.2. (T 467b24; ZC 666c3; Fangshan 282a25; Koryō 740a3; Qisha 341c12; Sakuma 88, § H.1.2.) “離惡不善法”者：煩惱欲因所生種種惡不善法，即身惡行、語惡行等，持杖、持刀、闢訟、鬨競、詡詡、詐僞、起妄語等。由斷彼故，說名為：“離惡不善法”。

3.28.3.1.3. (T 467b27; ZC 666c7; Fangshan 282a28; Koryō 740a7; Qisha 341c15; Sakuma 88, § H.1.3.) “有尋有伺”者：由於尋伺未見過失，自地猶有對治欲界諸善善伺。是故說名：“有尋有伺”。

3.28.3.1.4. (T 467b29; ZC 666c9; Fangshan 282b2; Koryō 740a9; Qisha 341c17; Sakuma 88, § H.1.4.) 所言“離”者：已獲得（T 467c1）加行究竟作意故。所言“生”者：由此為因，由此為緣，無間所生，故名：“離生”。

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142 Ch. has no equivalent for kāma (cf. Skt. kāmaviveka and Tib. 'dod pa dag las dben pa).
143 Skt. has here upaklesā (cf. also Tib. nye ba'i nyon mongs pa). Usually, upaklesā is rendered as 隨煩惱，少分煩惱，隨慈悲 (see YoBh-D, s.v.; etc.). It is not impossible that Xuanzang overlooked upa-, but I would rather suspect that his MS had a different reading here. Anyway, Ch. 煩惱欲 seems to presuppose klesakāma. See note 144 below.
144 Ch.: ‘various bad [and] unwholesome factors engendered because of the defilement sensual pleasures (*klesakāmāhektukā).’ Sakuma (p. 28, n. 189) thinks that 生 is not simply the rendering of *hetukā and that 生 appears to be the translation of samabhavanti. A kind of ‘various’ is probably used in order to express the idea of plurality.
145 Ch.: ‘and so on’. Ch. lacks the equivalent of Skt. manoduścaritam (cf. also Tib. yid kyes nyes par spyad pa). Xuanzang may have relied on a different MS reading here. It is not, however, excluded that his MS also contained manoduścaritam but he may have felt it out of place in a list of otherwise exclusively corporal and verbal actions and omitted it (?).
146 Ch.: ‘is named [designated as] “separation from bad and unwholesome factors”.’ 習名 is a frequent compound in Buddhist translations, probably representing a full-fledged binomic lexeme. Quite often, it renders ucyate (cf. BCSD, s.v.; Karashima 2001, p. 432, s.v.; etc.), though it can also stand for ākhyā, ity, etc. (cf. BCSD, s.v.). The traditional Japanese kundoku, on the other hand, reads each character as an independent verb: X 說て名づけて Y と爲す ‘X is expounded [explained] and named (as) Y’. Whatever its exact grammatical nature may be, the lexeme/collocation reflects Chinese stylistic requirements rather than a different MS reading. (It quite frequently occurs below, but I shall no longer note its presence.)
147 Ch.: ‘Its own leveli still has various types of wholesome rough examination and subtle investigation [which can] counteract the sensual pleasures realm’.
148 Ch. (as well as Tib.) adopts here a pratīka-based method of translation. The constitutive parts of the compound are rendered and glossed upon separately. This probably reflects Xuanzang’s decision rather than a different MS reading.
149 Ch.: ‘the so-called [lit., what is called] separation’. The phrases 所言...者 and 言...者 are regular expressions of introducing the word or phrase which is glossed upon. (They regularly occur below, but their presence will not be noted any longer.)
150 T: 獄. Most likely, this a typographical error of Taishō. None of the traditional or modern Canons which I have consulted contains this reading. ZC has: 獄 (with no note indicating a var. lec.). Koryō, Fangshan, Qisha, Hongwu, Yongle-bei, Shukusatsu-zō (155a3), Manjū zōkyō (58a19), Manjū zōkyō (Taiwan) (011a3) as well as KDK (143) and KIK (239) read: 獄. Sakuma also adopts this reading. Actually, in the similar occurrences below, T, too, has: 獄.
151 Ch.: ‘The so-called “separation” means: because [the ascetic] has already obtained the
3.28.3.1.5. (T 467c2; ZC 666c12; Fangshan 282b4; Koryŏ 740a12; Qisha 341c19; Sakuma 88, § H.1.5.) 言 “喜樂” 者謂: 已獲得所希求義, 及於喜中未見過失, 一切塵重已除遣故, 及已獲得廣大輕安¹⁵³, 身心調暢, 有堪能故。¹⁴⁵ 説名：“喜樂”。

3.28.3.1.6. (T 467c5; ZC 666c15; Fangshan 282b7; Koryŏ 740a15; Qisha 341c22; Sakuma 88, § H.1.6.) 所言初者謂: 從欲界最初上進, 創首獲得¹⁵⁵, 依順次數, 說名為初。言 “靜慮” 者: 於一所緣縁念寂靜正審思慮¹⁵⁶, 故名: “靜慮”。

3.28.3.1.7. (T 467c8; ZC 666c18; Fangshan 282b10; Koryŏ 740a18; Qisha 341c24; Sakuma 88, § H.1.7.) 言 “具足” 者謂: 已獲得加行究竟果作意故。¹⁵⁷

3.28.3.1.8. (T 467c9; ZC 666c19; Fangshan 282b11; Koryŏ 740a19; Qisha

contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice.’ Skt. kāmavivekaḥ is not rendered into Ch.

¹⁵² Yongle-bei, Qing: 作。Shōsō-in, Koryó, Fangshan, ZC (Jin), Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Jingshan, Tenna: 所.

¹⁵³ Ch.: ’[since (故 at the end of the next phrase) the ascetic] has already obtained extensive ease.’ I assume that Xuanzang split the Skt. compound to make the sentence more explicit.

¹⁵⁴ Ch.: ’the body and the mind, being malleable, have ability’. The phrase appears to translate Skt. cittākāyakarmāntyāya. The presence of both 調暢 and 堪能 is somehow puzzling, because both words translate karmānta (see BCSD, s.v.). It is not excluded, however, that 調暢 renders another word, lost in both extant Skt. and Tib. Cf. 調柔自在有堪能心 (T30.537a20) translating karmānta-vaśya-citta at BoBh 170, 2. For a similar rendering in the YoBh, see T30.370b6-7: 遠離諸蓋，身心調暢有所堪能。

¹⁵⁵ Ch.: ’[it] is obtained for the first time’.

¹⁵⁶ Ch.: ’[the ascetic] binding [his] mindfulness to one meditative object [alone], is tranquil, and correctly reflects [on the meditative object]’. The equivalent in the extant Skt. text is samyagālambanopanidhiyānād ekāgrasmṛtyupanibandhā. The Ch. translation contains more words and appears to presuppose a different MS reading. In the YoBh, upaniḍhiyā is rendered into Chinese as 觀察, 思惟, 思察, etc. In our passage here, upaniḍhiyā is most likely translated with a similar binome: 思慮. Skt. samyak is rendered as 正審 (literally, ’correctly and minutely’). In the YoBh, we see such compounds as 正審觀察 = samyag upalakṣaṇā, 正審思惟 = samyag upaniḍhiyā, samyag evapanidhiyāti, 正審思察 = samyag upaniḍhiyā; cf. YoBh-D, s.vv.). The compound ekāgratopanibandhā is more problematic. We also meet with it at ŚrBh 416, 21, where it is translated into Ch. as 一所縁境 (T30.460c1-12). In our passage, too, 一所縁 may be a rendering of ekāgra, but this leaves ambāna untranslated. One of the most frequent translations for alambāna is 綴, and it is not excluded that Xuanzang decided to combine ‘one-pointed’ with ‘the meditative object’. Semantically, this is not impossible, but in terms of philological rigour, about which the Chinese master seems to have cared so much, such a decision would be rather puzzling: alambāna and ekāgra belong to two different compounds. The next word, 繫念, is, most probably, a rendering of smṛtyupanibandha and raises no particular problems. 寂靜, on the other hand, is without any Skt. correspondent. In the YoBh (as well as in many other Chinese translations), it renders upaśama, śānti, śānta, vyupāśama, etc. Its presence can be best explained by presupposing that Xuanzang relied on a different MS reading.

¹⁵⁷ Ch.: ‘because of having already attained the contemplation [which represents] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Xuanzang apparently translated the rather succinct Skt. sentence in a more explicit manner.

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341c25; Sakuma 88, § H.1.8.) 言“安住” 者謂：於後時時所修習多158常住故，得隨所樂，得無艱難，得無梗160染。於靜慮定，其心晝夜能正其順、趣向、臨入，161 隨所欲樂，乃至七日七夜能正安住162，(ZC 667a1) 故名：“安住”。

3.28.3.2.1. (T 467c13; ZC 667a1; Fangshan 282b14; Koryō 740b1; Qiṣṣa 341c30; Sakuma 89, § H.1.2.)163 復次於有尋有伺三摩地相心能棄捨，於無尋無伺三摩地相繫念安住164。於諸忽務所行境界能正遠離，於不忽務所行境界安住其心，一味、寂靜、極寂靜轉165。是故説言：「尋伺寂靜故，內等持故」。

3.28.3.2.2. (T 467c17; ZC 667a6; Fangshan 282b19; Koryō 740b6; Qiṣṣa 342a4; Sakuma 89, § H.2.2.) 又彼立於無尋無伺三摩地中167串習168故，超過尋

158 Ch. seems to render "bahuśīkāra" in a simplified way as 多 ‘frequently’ (suggesting rather bahulam). Tib. also appears to translate in a similar manner (see note 315 to Tib. ed.).
159 T and ZC correctly read 辛, but the CD-ROM has here 農. In spite of their close resemblance (the first character has 力 in the middle, while the second one has 刀), the two characters are different words (see DKWJ, vol. 10, p. 1084, s.v. 辛, 參考). Actually, only the first character means ‘to perform’ (ibid., vol. 10, p. 1083, s.v. 辛; see especially the citation from the Shuo wen xin fu 說文新附: 農致力也 ‘兩 is to exert [one’s] power [/efforts]'). The compound 成 農 is also recorded by Nakamura (BDJ, s.v.), who adds that ‘Mainly Xuanzang employed this translation’, giving its Sanskrit equivalent of abhinisīlapāda. Sakuma, whose edition of the Chinese text is for most part printed in modern Japanese simplified characters, reads: 辛. This character is a simplified form used for 農, 農, etc. but not for 農 (see DKWJ, vol. 4, p. 664, s.v. 辛). If it had been printed in traditional characters, Sakuma’s text would presumably have read: 農. This is actually an allograph of 農, which, as we have seen, is not the correct reading here. However, the reading in Sakuma’s text is, most probably, the result of a limitation imposed by the adoption of simplified Japanese characters rather than an error.
160 Fangshan, ZC (Jin): 鞭。
161 Ch.: ‘his mind, day and night, can correctly follow, is directed towards, [and] enter’. Xuanzang probably relied on a different MS reading here. If this is, however, an editorial addition, this should be the expansion of atināmyāti.
162 Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] can correctly dwell’.
163 Qiṣṣa begins a new paragraph.
164 Skt. upaniṣadānāti appears to be rendered by two verbs: ‘binds [his] thoughts [and] places [them].’
165 Chongning, ZC (Jin), Zifu, Qiṣṣa, Puining, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing read: 故 instead of 轉. KDK 144 reads: 轉するが故に，which seems to presuppose an original with both characters. KDK does not give any details for this particular reading, and this makes it difficult to assess whether it is based on a traditional source or is an editorial decision. KIK 240 omits 轉 and reads 故 only. Tib. “pas na suggests a reading or understanding close to 故, but this is not supported by Skt.
166 Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] concentrates [lit., puts his mind] on an object which is not acted upon hurriedly [abruptly/ busily] [so that it] functions in a homogenous [lit., ‘one-flavour’], serene, extremely serene [way]’. Though rather unusual, 所行 should correspond to Skt. -cārini (所 hardly fits, however, the suffix "in"). Cf. also the phrase 忽務行想  in passage 3.28.2.2.2. See note 119 above.
167 Of all traditional Canons, only Koryō contains 中 here. T and Sakuma also follow this reading. KDK 144 and KIK 240 also read: 三摩地の中. Though not bringing an important
何有間缺位，能正獲不無間缺位。是故說言：“心之趣故”。

3.28.3.2.3. (T 467c20; ZC 667a9; Fangshan 282b21; Koryō 740b9; Qisha 342a6; Sakuma 89, § H.2.3.) “無尋無伺”者：一切尋伺悉皆斷故。

3.28.3.2.4. (T 467c21; ZC 667a10; Fangshan 282b22; Koryō 740b10; Qisha 342a7; Sakuma 89, § H.2.4.) 所言“定”者謂：已獲得加行究竟作意故。所言“生”者：由此為因，由此為緣，無間所生，故名：“定生”。

3.28.3.2.5. (T 467c23; ZC 667a12; Fangshan 282b24; Koryō 740b12; Qisha 342a9; Sakuma 89, § H.2.5.) 言“喜樂”者謂：已獲得所希求義，又於喜中未見過失，有欣有喜，一切尋伺初靜處地諸煩惱品所有貪重皆遠離故，能對治彼廣大輕安，身心調柔有堪能樂所隨逐故，名：“有喜樂”。

3.28.3.2.6. (T 467c27; ZC 667a17; Fangshan 282b28; Koryō 740b17; Qisha 342a13; Sakuma 89, § H.2.6.) 依順次數此為“第二”。如是一切如前應知。

3.28.3.3.1. (T 467c28; ZC 667a18; Fangshan 283a1; Koryō 740b18; Qisha 342a15; Sakuma 89, § H.3.1.) 復次彼於喜相深見過失。是故說言：“於喜離欲”。

3.28.3.3.2. (T 467c29; ZC 667a20; Fangshan 283a2; Koryō 740b20; Qisha 342a16; Sakuma 90, § H.3.2.) 又於爾(468a1)時遠離二種亂心災患，能於離喜第三靜慮攝持其心，第二靜慮已離尋伺，今於此中復離於喜。是故說言：“安住於捨”。如是二法能擾亂心 (ZC 667b1) 皆無間捨。初靜慮中有尋伺故，令無間捨不自在轉。第二靜慮由有喜故，令無間捨不自在轉。是故此捨初静慮說名無

 semantic difference, the character 中 is necessary if we want to preserve the four-syllable rhythm which is so important for the Classical Chinese prose.

168 Usually, abhyāsa is rendered into Chinese as 串習 (see YoBh-I; BDJ, s.v.) and 修習 stands for bhāvanā (Yobh-i, s.v.). Here, it appears that Xuanzang translates abhyāsa as 串, which may actually be an abbreviation. We occasionally see abhyāsa rendered in the YoBh as 串修 (e.g., YoBh MS 140b5 = T30.389b7) or even as 串習 (e.g., SamBh 175, 12 = T30.343b15). The latter is identical with 串習 in our ŚrīBh passage above, but given the (extant) Skt. bhāvanābhāṣā, it is unlikely that all the three characters stand for abhyāsa here. I would rather surmise that a phrase like 串修 (abhyāsa) + 修習 (bhāvanā) was abridged to 串習. Another possibility is that the second character of the usual 串習 (abhyāsa) was deemed unnecessary in view of 修習 (bhāvanā), and this was abbreviated to 串習.

169 Ch.: ‘correctly/properly obtains’.

170 Ch. seems to construe the Skt. phrase ‘X (nominative) Y-hetukom upadhyate’ (intransitive)’ as ‘X is produced (passive) from Y as its cause’.

171 Ch: ‘the level of first absorption’.

172 Ch. suggests: “vipulapraśrabdhī” (like in the parallel passage 3.28.3.1.5.). Skt. (as well as Tib.) has only: “praśrabdhī”.

173 See note 154 to passage 3.28.3.1.5. above.

174 Chisha begins new paragraph.

175 Ch.: ‘furthermore’. Ch. often opens new sections and passages with 復次 (lit., ‘again, next’). Its presence below will be no longer noted.

176 Ch.: ‘profundly sees’.

177 Ch. seems to render pradadhātah as a finite verb: [the ascetic] can concentrate his mind to the third absorption which is free from joy’.

178 Here and in the next sentence, Ch. renders as follows: ‘makes the uninterrupted equanimity
function in a restricted way [lit., not freely].

179 Ch.: ‘For this reason, the third absorption of the meditator is called “having equanimity”.

Cf. Tib. ed.

180 Here and below, Ch. makes clear the meaning of the Skt. dvandva compound samjñāmanasikārāḥ: ‘ideations and acts of attention’.

181 Ch.: ‘get rid [by means of various] methods [*prajñā (??)].

182 Qisha, Puning, Hongwu: 遺. Fangshan, ZC (Jin), Koryō, Yongle-bei read: 遺. T also reads: 趋, and mentions in note 1, p. 467, that 元 (= Puning) has: 遺. If we are to trust Taishō, it would mean that Shōsō-in, Chonning, Zifu, Jingshan, and Tenna also read: 遺. ZC has no note, and we cannot determine how Yongle-nan and Qing read here.

183 Literally, 變吐 means ‘alter [and] spit out [/vomit]’. The second character suggests *vāntikaroti rather than vyantikaroti. The BHS term (from the past participle of √vam) means ‘to reject, throw out’ and appears to be patterned on a Middle Indic form corresponding to the Pali vanta+karoti (see BHSD, s.v.). In Pali, vanta means both ‘vomited’ and ‘renounced’ (PTSD, s.v.). Though 變吐 = *vāntikaroti seems a reasonable conjecture, the sense of 變 ‘alter’ in the binome is not very clear to me. (Could it refer to the digestive changes undergone by food before being vomited?) As far as I know, the only lexicographical source which records 變吐 is YoBh-I which gives it as an equivalent for Skt. charditaka, vāntāśāna, viriksa, and vyantikaroti (but not *vāntikaroti). The binome 變吐 occurs rather frequently in the YoBh: a total of 27 times.

184 Ch.: ‘the mind dwells in superior equanimity’. See note 190 to Engl. tr.

185 On the rather irregular form of this gloss, see note 192 to Engl. tr.

186 Ch.: 心受 suggests *cetasikam veditam (or is a free rendering?).

187 Ch.: ‘the levels below the third absorption’

188 Ch.: ‘the levels above the third absorption’

189 Ch.: ‘can again be obtained’. 復 may be regarded as a standing for apy, but yad apy is used here in the sense of ‘although’ (cf. BWDJ, s.v. yad), which is rendered in this sentence as 雖.

190 Ch.: ‘the level[s] below’

191 Ch.: ‘the level[s] above’

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樂故，是故說言，於是處所謂第三靜慮：“諸聖宣說謂（依於此已得安住補特伽羅）：‘具足捨心及以正知住（ZC 667c1）身受樂’，第三靜慮具足安住”。言“諸聖”者謂：佛世尊192及佛弟子。

3.28.3.4.1. (T 468a26; ZC 667c3; Fangshan 283a26; Koryō 741a3; Qisha 342b9; Sakuma 91, § H.4.1.)193 復次此中對治頗為相似故，略194不宣說樂斷對治，但說對治所作樂斷。何等名為此中對治？ 所謂捨念及以正知，由即於此數修習故，便能棄捨令不出離第三靜慮第三 (T 468b1) 靜慮地中勝樂。195 是故說言：“由樂斷故”。

3.28.3.4.2. (T 468b1; ZC 667c8; Fangshan 283b2; Koryō 741a8; Qisha 342b14; Sakuma 91, § H.4.2.) 修靜慮者即於爾時所有苦樂皆得超越196。由是因緣，若先所斷，若今所斷，總集説言：“樂斷，苦斷，先喜憂沒”。

3.28.3.4.3. (T 468b4; ZC 667c11; Fangshan 283b5; Koryō 741a11; Qisha 342b16; Sakuma 91, § H.4.2.) 謂：入第四靜慮定時樂受197斷故，入第二靜慮定時苦受斷故，入第三靜慮定時喜受沒故，入初靜慮定時憂受沒故，今於此中且約苦樂二受斷故198，說有所餘非苦樂受。是故説言：彼於爾時199 “不苦不樂”。

192 Ch.: ‘the Buddha, the World-Honoured One (*Bhagavat)’. Though difficult to determine, I would surmise that this addition represents Xuanzang’s stylistic embellishment rather than a different MS reading.

193 T, ZC (Jin), and Koryō begin new paragraph. Qisha continues the running text without a new paragraph.

194 Ch.: ‘for brevity’s sake [/abbreviating]’.

195 Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] can abandon the exquisite pleasure pertaining to the third absorption which causes the attachment to [lit., the non-detachment from] the third absorption’. It seems that Xuanzang’s MS read something like: *tṛṇyadhyānācalitāṃ [or: tṛṇyadhyānād acalitāṃ] yat tṛṇyadhyānābhāmikāṃ sukhām tat prajñāhāti, having thus acalitāṃ instead of extant MS calitā (see also Tib. ed.; cf. Sakuma p. 35, n. 237, too). The presence of 腦 ‘excellent, exquisite, superior’ might represent an editorial addition rather than an additional Skt. word (*pranītāṃ, etc.).

196 Ch.: ‘completely transcends all pain and pleasure’. Ch. 得 most likely renders here Skt. amuprāṇpnoti, and a more literal translation of 得超越 is ‘obtains [/attains] transcendence from [...].’

197 Ch. contains here and below 受 ‘sensation/feeling’.

198 Ch.: ‘Now, herein, it furthermore sums up that due to the abandonment of the two feelings of pain and pleasure’. 今於此中 且 is probably a rendering attempting to convey the emphasis which in Skt. is achieved by placing astī at the beginning of the sentence (see note 203 to Engl. tr.) as well as by tāvat (here rendered by 今?). 且, which is a polysemic word, may mean here ‘or’ ‘furthermore’ (but in this context, probably not しばらく ‘for a while’ as read by KDK 147 and KIK 242). 約, which usually means ‘to sum up’, has no direct Skt. equivalent, but it could also mean ‘to speak about something’, ‘to say something from the perspective of’ (see BDJ, s.v.). If this is its meaning here, then the rendering should be: ‘from the perspective of the fact that due to the abandonment of the two sensations of pain and pleasure, it can be said that...’. Then, 約 may also add to the emphatic tone of the gloss. The sense of ‘sum up’ remains, however, because Xuanzang must have felt the need to say that the canonical formula abbreviates the fact that it is not only the [bodily] pain and pleasure which are abandoned but also [mental] satisfaction and dissatisfaction (see note 202 to Engl. tr.).

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3.28.3.4.4. (T 468b9; ZC 667c17; Fangshan 283b9; Koryō 741a17; Qisha 342b21; Sakuma 91, § H.4.3.) 從初靜慮一切下地災患已斷，謂：尋、伺、喜、樂、入息、出息。由彼斷故，此中捨念清淨、鮮白。由是因緣，正入第四靜慮定時，心住無動，一切動亂皆悉遠離。是故說言：‘捨念清淨’。

3.28.3.4.5. (T 468b13; ZC 667c21; Fangshan 283b13; Koryō 741a21; Qisha 342b25; Sakuma 91, § H.4.4.) 第四等200言如前所說初靜慮等，應知其相201。

3.28.3.5.1. (T 468b14; ZC 667c22; Fangshan 283b14; Koryō 741a22; Qisha 342b26) 復次以於虛空起勝解故203，所有青黃赤白等 (ZC 668a1) 相應顯色想由不顯現故，及厭離欲204故，皆能超越。是故說言：‘色想205出過故’。

3.28.3.5.2. (T 468b16; ZC 668a3; Fangshan 283b17; Koryō 741b3; Qisha 342b28) 由不顯現，超越彼想206，207 以爲因故，所有種種衆多品類，因諸顯色和合積集208，有障礙想皆得遣除。是故說言：‘有對想滅沒故’。

3.28.3.5.3. (T 468b19; ZC 668a6; Fangshan 283b19; Koryō 741b6; Qisha 342c1) 由遠離彼想209，以爲因故，所有於彼種種中差別想轉，210 謂：飲、食、211 瓶212、衣、乘、莊嚴具、城舍213、軍、圍、山、林214等想。於是一切不作意215轉。

199 Ch. apparently reads ‘he at this time’ 彼於爾時 (= Skt. tasmān samaye) together with the canonical formula aduḥkhāsukham. If the MS used by Xuanzang was identical with our extant Skt. MS, then the Chinese master must have construed aduḥkhāsukhaṃ (?) tasmān samaye as ‘at this stage, [the ascetic] has neither-pain-nor-pleasure’ (extant MS reads: aduḥkhāsukhā without any punctuation mark after it) (see note 269 to Skt. crit. ed.). Tasmān samaye must be read, however, together with the next sentence. Cf. also Tib. de’i tshe na, which doubtless belongs to the next passage.

200 Ch.: “the fourth”, and so on. Cf. Tib. which cites the rest of the stock-phrase.

201 Ch.: ‘its aspect should be understood [...]’.

202 Qisha begins a new paragraph.

203 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, because [the ascetic] generates conviction with regard to [infinite] space’. See also note 277 to Skt. crit. ed.

204 Chengguan 澤觀, who cites this passage in his Subcommenatry on the Avataṁsakasūtra (T No. 1736), omits: 欲 (T36.489a3).

205 ZC (Jin): 相. All other textual witnesses (including Hongwu and Yongle-bei) read: 想.

206 Ch.: ‘surmounts this ideation’. Cf. note to Skt. crit. ed.

207 In Ch., the order of the phrases is different from Skt. (as well as Tib.). Skt. reads: samatikramād anābhāsagamanahetor.

208 Ch. appears to use a four-morpheme collocation to render Skt. pracaya = 和合積集, lit., ‘combined and accumulated’.

209 Ch.: ‘this ideation’. The Skt. plural samājñās is not marked, but this may be have more to do with the nature of the Chinese language which usually does not require it.

210 Ch.: ‘whatever diversified ideations with regard to the various accumulations function’. The Ch. sentence seems to presuppose a different Skt. reading here. If, however, the wording was (more or less) similar to the extant MS, 所有 might be construed as standing for yā(h) and 轉 for pravṛttās. See also note 215 to Engl. tr.

211 The order of 飲食 is the reverse of the Skt. bhojanapāna (as well as Tib. zas dang | skom dang). However, this may have been determined by the fact that 飲食 is a very old compound in Chinese (already attested in the Yījing 易經; e.g., Shisianjing, Zhou Yi 周易, p. 3, l. 16).

212 Ch: ‘jar [pitcher]’. No equivalent in Skt. (*ghata or *kumbha) and Tib.

213 Ch. (literally): ‘town dwelling’. In Buddhist translations, 城 usually renders nagara.
是故說言：‘種種想不作意故’。

3.28.3.5.4. (T 468b23; ZC 668a10; Fangshan 283b23; Koryō 741b10; Qisha 342c4) 除遣如是有色有對種種想已，起無邊相216 虛空勝解。217 是故說言：‘入無邊空’218。

3.28.3.5.5. (T 468b25; ZC 668a12; Fangshan 283b24; Koryō 741b12; Qisha 342c6) 由已超過近分加行究竟作意219，入上根本加行究竟果作意定。是故說言：‘空無邊處具足安住’。當知此中依於近分乃至未220入上根本定，唯緣虛空。221 若已得入上根本定，222 亦緣虛空，亦緣自地223所有諸蘊。224 又近分中亦 (T 468c1) 緣下地所有諸蘊。

3.28.3.6.1. (T 468c1; ZC 668a18; Fangshan 284a2; Koryō 741b18; Qisha 342c12) 225 復次若由此識於無邊空发起勝解，當知此識無邊空相勝解相應。226 若

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214 The place of 林 is different from the position of -vana- in the Skt. compound as well as in Tib. This is probably the result of an editorial arrangement of placing all ‘geographical’ ideations together. But the editorial ‘intervention’ is, however, misleading because in Chinese 山林 is more likely to be taken as tatpurusa compound, i.e., ‘forest of the mountain’ (as suggested by both KDK 147 and KIK 242 which read the two words together), rather than a dvandva.

215 Ch. renders ābhoga with the same lexeme 作意 as manaskāra and manasikāra, but this raises no semantic or doctrinal problems. See note 216 to Engl. tr.

216 Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 想。KDK 147 and KIK 242 also read: 想。

217 Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] generates the conviction of space with [its] infinite aspects’. Xuanzang seems to read: *anantākārākāśam adhimukto bhavati. Interpreting 無邊相 as an instrumental is unlikely for this syntactic position in Chinese. The attempt to find a better understanding of the sentence may have also lead to var. lec. 想 in quite a few Canons (see note 216 above).

218 Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] enters the infinite space’.

219 Ch.: ‘because of having already transcended the contemplation of the culmination of the practice [which takes place in] the liminal [attainment]’.

220 Qisha, Puning, Hongwu: 天。Fangshan, ZC (Jin), Koryō, Yongle-bei: 未。ZC has no note. (This makes it difficult to determine how Yongle-nan and Qing actually read.) Taishō reads: 未。If we rely on its critical apparatus (which only records Puning as reading: 天; see n. 3, p. 468), it should be concluded that Shōsō-in, Chongning, Zifu, Jingshan, Tenna also read: 未。

221 Ch.: ‘It should be known that herein, [when he] relies upon the liminal attainment, [that is] as long as [he] has not yet entered the attainment proper [which is] above [the liminal attainment], [he] takes only space as [his] object [/support]’. Here and below (see notes 222 and 226) different MS readings cannot be excluded, but it appears more likely that that we have to deal with editorial additions and clarifications brought by Xuanzang.

222 Ch.: ‘After [he] has managed to enter the attainment proper [which is] above [the liminal attainment]’.

223 Shōsō-in, ZC (Jin), Fangshan, Koryō, T read: 地。KDK 148 and KIK 243 also read: 地。Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing have: 他。

224 Ch.: ‘[he] takes both space and all the aggregates of his own level as [his] object [/support]’.

225 Qisha begins a new paragraph.

226 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, if through this consciousness [he] generates conviction with regard to the infinite space, it should be known that this consciousness agrees with the conviction of the aspects of infinite space’.
有欲入識無邊處，先舍虛空無邊處想，即於彼識次起無邊行相勝解。爾時超過近分根本空無邊處。是故（ZC 668b1）說言："超過一切空無邊處，入無邊識"。

3.28.3.6.2. (T 468c6; ZC 668b2; Fangshan 284a6; Koryŏ 741c2; Qisha 342c16) 由彼超過識無邊處所有近分乃至加行究竟作意，入上根本加行究竟果作意定。是故說言："識無邊處具足安住"。

3.28.3.7.1. (T 468c9; ZC 668b5; Fangshan 284a9; Koryŏ 741c5; Qisha 342c20) 復次從識無邊處求上進時，離其識外更求餘境都無所得，謂：諸所有或色非色相應境性。彼求境界，無所得時，超過近分及以根本識無邊處，發起都無邊勝解，此則名為於無所有假想勝解。即於如是假想勝解多修習故，

227 Ch. 先‘first’ and 次‘next’ most probably translate the Skt. absolutive followed by the finite verb.
228 Ch.: ‘then, with respect to this consciousness, [he] next generates the conviction of infinite aspects’.
229 T, ZC (Jin), and Koryŏ begin a new paragraph here. Usually (at least with our text), new paragraphs are coherently used by the editors of these witnesses and, more often than not, correctly mark the beginning of a new section. Here, however, the new paragraph here starts in the middle of a gloss. Similarly, other modern Canons like Shukusatsužū 156b11; Manji zōkyō (Taiwan) 0118b (but not the original Manji zōkyō 59a11, which has no paragraphs at all) as well as KDK (148) and KIK (243) similarly open a new paragraph here. On the other hand, Qisha 342c15, which has its own way of dividing the text into paragraphs, different from the other Canons mentioned above, does not begin a new paragraph here. (Neither does Fangshan, but usually, this Canon does not split the text into paragraphs.) The (wrong) opening of a new paragraph here may reflect an old editorial peculiarity. Since it is found in both ZC (Jin) and Koryŏ, it may be inherited from the Kaibao Canon. The modern Canons seem to have simply followed Koryŏ.
230 Ch.: ‘At that time’.
231 Ch. suggests: sasāmantakamaulam (see also passage 3.28.3.7.1. below). See note 301 to Skt. crit. ed. and note 543 to Tib. ed.
232 Ch.: ‘enters infinite consciousness’. Cf. Skt. and Tib. canonical formula: "[thinking] consciousness is infinite”. Cf. corresponding Ch. tr. at MVyut # 1493: 思識無邊。
233 Ch.: ‘due to surmounting the liminal [attainment] of [所有, lit., ‘which exists/is possessed by’] the station of infinite consciousness’. See note 302 to Skt. crit. ed.
234 Ch.: ‘[he] enters the attainment proper [which is] above [the liminal attainment] [and which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice.’ This probably represents Xuanzang’s editorial clarifications.
235 Qisha begins a new paragraph.
236 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, when seeking to proceed upwards from the station of infinite consciousness’. See note 224 to Engl. tr.
237 境 as well as 境性 and 境界, which are used below, renders Skt. ālambana. Usually (at least in our chapter), the term ālambana is translated as 緣. See note 225 to Engl. tr.
238 Ch.: ‘when he looks for [such an] object [and] there is nothing [which can be found’.
239 Ch.: ‘This is then called “the conviction of the ideation with regard to nothing”’. Here and below, Ch. apparently uses假想 (lit., ‘provisional ideation/thought’) for Skt. sanjñā. In most occurrences in our chapter, sanjñā is rendered as 想. The most likely explanation for the binome 假想 is the necessity to ensure the four-character rhythm of the sentence. For 假想 translating sanjñā, see BCSD, s.v.
便能超過無所有處一切近分\(^{240}\)乃至加行究竟作意，入彼根本加行究竟果作意定\(^{241}\)。是故說言：“超過一切識無邊處，無少所有\(^{242}\)，無所有處具足安住”。

328.3.8.1. \(^{243}\) (T 468c17; ZC 668b15; Fangshan 284a17; Koryô 741c15; Qisha 342c29)\(^{244}\) 復次從無所有處求上進時，\(^{245}\) 由於無所有處日起想想故\(^{246}\)，便能棄捨無所有處想。

由是因緣先入無所有處定時，超過一切\(^{247}\) 有所有想，今復超過無所有想。是故說言：“非有想\(^{248}\)” 謂：或有所有想，或無所有想。

328.3.8.2. (T 468c22; ZC 668b20; Fangshan 284a22; Koryô 741c20; Qisha 343a3) 非無想\(^{249}\) 謂：非如無想及滅盡定一切諸想皆悉滅盡，唯有微細想緣無相\(^{250}\) 轉。是故說言：“非想非非想” \(^{251}\)。

328.3.8.3. (T 468c25; ZC 668b23; Fangshan 284a24; Koryô 741c23; Qisha 343a5) 即於此處起 (ZC 668c1) 勝解時，超過一切\(^{252}\) 近分根本無所有處及非想非非想處近分乃至加行究竟作意，入彼根本加行究竟果作意定\(^{253}\)。是故說言：“超過一切無所有處，於非想非非想處具足安住”。

328.3.9. (T 468c29; ZC 668c5; Fangshan 284a28; Koryô 742a5; Qisha 343a10) 復次此中入靜慮定 (T469a1) 時，其身相質如處室\(^{254}\) 中。\(^{255}\) 入無色定時，

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\(^{240}\) Ch.: ‘[he] can surmount completely the liminal [attainment] of the station of nothing’.

\(^{241}\) Ch.: ‘[he] enters that attainment proper [which coincides with] the contemplation of the fruit of the culmination of the practice’. Ch. (as well as Tib.) seem to presuppose: *prayoganiṣṭhāpatalam*. See note 312 to Skt. crit. ed.

\(^{242}\) In Ch., there are no lexical or grammatical indications that this is a thought formulated by the ascetic. Cf. Skt. *nāsti kimcid’itya*; Tib. *ci yang med do snyam nas*; and MVyut # 1494: 思無所有處.

\(^{243}\) In Skt. and Ch., there seems to be only one gloss (at least judgining from the occurrence of *tenāha* and is故說言 respectively) of what in Tib. are clearly two glosses (cf. Tib. ed.). For convenience’s sake, I have divided this gloss into two paragraphs, the first one corresponding to Tib. 328.3.8.1a. and the second to 328.3.8.1b.

\(^{244}\) Qisha begins a new paragraph here.

\(^{245}\) Ch.: ‘Furthermore, when seeking to proceed upwards from the station of nothing whatsoever’. Cf. also note 236 above.

\(^{246}\) Ch. has no equivalent for Skt. *ādinavasaṃjñā*. Cf. Tib. *nyes dmigs su ‘du shes pas*.

\(^{247}\) Ch.: ‘all’.

\(^{248}\) Ch. 非有想 seems to suggest: *na saṃjñā* (or *naiva saṃjñā*). See note 320 to Skt. crit. ed.

\(^{249}\) Ch. 非無想 apparently reads at the beginning of this passage *nāsaṃjñā*. See note 321 to Skt. crit. ed.

\(^{250}\) Shōsō-in: 想。

\(^{251}\) Ch. presupposes here *naivasamjñānāsaṃjñā*, which is the reading of the extant Skt. MS. I surmise, however, that the correct reading should be: *nāsaṃjñā*. See note 326 to Skt. crit. ed.

\(^{252}\) Ch.: ‘all’.

\(^{253}\) Ch.: ‘[he] enters the attainment proper [which coincides with] the contemplation of the fruit of the culmination of the practice’.

\(^{254}\) ZC (Jin), Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-bei, Jingshan: 空. Fangshan has: (which is, most likely, an allograph of 密; cf. Li 1996, 75b). ZC, however, registers only 室 as the var. lec. in Koryô. (I am not sure whether we can safely conclude that Yongle-nan and Qing
also read: 空). T reads: 室, and records that Zifu, Puning, and Jingshan read: 空 (p. 469, n. 1). Other modern Canons like Shukusatsuzō (156a10); Manji zōkyō (59a20); Manji zōkyō, (Taiwan) (0118a10) also read: 室. KDK 143 and KIK 239, on the other hand, read: 空. A close paraphrase apparently of this sentence in Chenguan’s Da fangguan fo huayan jing shu (T35.785a24) has: 室 (with no var. lec. registered in Taishō). (Chenguan does not specify his source here, but a few lines above, he cites from juan 11 of the YoBh.)

255 Ch.: ‘the mark [shape] of his body is like staying in a room’. Skt. reads: adho Rasātalapraevasāvat. I suppose that Xuanzang’s MS must have been different, reading something like *śālāpraveśavat, *śālāpraveśavai (the BHS form sālā is used in the LaVid; see BWDJ, s.v.), *vesmapraveśavat, etc. (The former two words would better explain a scribal mistake of śālā or sālā for rasātala.) Whatever the reading or reason for Xuanzang’s translation may have been, adho is not rendered in Ch. See also next sentence and note 234 to Engl. tr.

256 Ch.: ‘the mark [shape] of his body is like staying in the sky’. Ch. uses the same verb like in the previous sentence: 處 ‘staying’. The verb here should correspond to Skt. *uttpatana ‘flying up’, ‘rising’, etc. (see note 330 to Skt. crit. ed.). 處處空 would rather suggest: *ākāśapraveśavat (?). It is not excluded, however, that for uniformity’s sake, Xuanzang may have rendered the sentence freely. After all, ‘staying in the sky’ amounts to ‘flying up in the sky’. Ch.: ‘It should be known that’.

257 T, ZC (Jin), Koryō, and Qisha begin a new paragraph.

259 Ch.: ‘Furthermore, on the basis of the absorptions, etc., it should be known that [the ascetic] can enter the two attainments without mental activity. The first one is the attainment of non-ideation, the second one is attainment of cessation.’ The additions in the latter part of the sentence seem to be editorial, but as to its first half, it is impossible to decide whether the divergences from Skt. stem from a different MS (依靜慮故 = *dhyanāsamānírayena?; cf. 依止靜慮 = dhyanāsamānírayena in passage 3.28.5.1. below) or represent Xuanzang’s editorial intervention.

260 Ch.: ‘As to the attainment of non-ideation, only ordinary people (can) enter [it] by means of the method of the contemplation which turns away from ideation.

261 Ch.: ‘As to the attainment of cessation, only the Noble Ones can enter [it] by means of the method of the contemplation which stops ideation and feeling’. In Skt., the specific contemplation through which nirodhasamāpatti is reached is mentioned in the next passage. Its name, however, is slightly different, though it probably refers to the same meditative technique.

262 Ch.: ‘by means of two methods of contemplation’. One could, however, also construe by [...] 方便 just as a way to express an instrumental sense: ‘by means of two contemplations’.

263 Ch.: ‘To wit, due to [by means of] taking the contemplation of turning away from ideation as the main factor, the preparatory practice (加行 pravara?) is assiduously cultivated [and thus] the attainment of ideation can be gradually entered. On the other hand, due to [by means of] seeking to proceed upwards from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [and to] taking the contemplation of temporarily suppressing the meditative object [support] as the main
factor, the [preparatory?] practice is assiduously cultivated and [thus] the attainment of cessation can be gradually entered. Starting with 講 to the end of the passage, Ch. appears more developed than Skt. and Tib. Once again, it is difficult to determine whether this is the result of a different MS or Xuanzang’s editorial clarifications.

Ch.: ‘As for ordinary people [practising this attainment], [they] formulate such a thought. 諸如是念 ‘formulate such a thought’ most probably renders here Skt. iti.

Here and below, Ch. 諸 conceives samjñā as plural or in a collective sense. If we judge from the extant Skt. MS, samjñā is in singular (otherwise, by regular sandhi operation, we should have had *samjñāḥ sālayaḥ in the third sentence; we should not forget, however, that the MS often departs from regular sandhi rules).

Ch.: ‘there is [the state of] non-ideation which is serene, exquisite’.

Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing: 位. KDK 130: 位; KIK 244: 位. The Skt. word supposedly translated here is sacittikāvasthā, for which 有位 is the most appropriate rendering (*avasthā = 位).

Ch. has no direct equivalent of Skt. iti. Cf. next passage. See note 279 below as well as note 342 to Skt. crit. ed.

Ch.: ‘By means of this method, [the ascetic] obtains [lit., realises and obtains] this attainment’.

Ch.: ‘As for the Saints’ (in plural, although both Skt. and Tib. have singular).

In Qisha, the upper part of 得 is lacking (worn-out blockprint?; imperfect imprint or photocopy?).

Ch.: ‘[The Saints] furthermore wish to dwell temporarily in the dwelling of serenity’. 暫時 should correspond to pārenta, but as far as I know, the Sanskrit word does not mean ‘temporarily’. Tib. construes it as ‘the best, the most excellent’ (= mchog tu), and this is also my understanding of the Skt. original. Xuanzang may have had a different MS reading here, but it is also possible that he wanted to stress that the attainment is only a temporary state (not to be confused with Nirvana). This explains why we have 暫時 here and 暫住 (also without Skt. and Tib. equivalent) at the end of this passage. See note 280 below.

This departs from the usual rendering 非想非非想 for naivasamjñānāsamjñā. Is it an
是有學已離無所有處貪，或阿羅漢求暫住想作意為先，諸心心法滅。是名滅盡定。由是方便證得此定。281

3.28.5.1. (T 469a25; ZC 669a11; Fangshan 284b22; Koryō 742b11; Qisha 343b3)282 復次依止靜慮發五通等。云何能發？謂：靜慮者已得根本清淨靜慮，即以如是清淨靜慮為所依止，於五通增上284正法聽聞、受持，令善究竟，謂：於神境通、宿住通、天耳通、死生智通、心差別通等作意惟發285。復由定地 (T 469b1) 所起作意286。了知於義，了知於法。由了知義，了知法故，如是如是修治其心。由此修習多修習故，有時、有分發生修果五神通等。

3.28.5.2.1. (T 469b4; ZC 669a20; Fangshan 285a2; Koryō 742b20; Qisha 343b10) 又如是了知於義，了知於法，為欲引發諸神通等修十二想。何等十二？289 一、290 輕舉想、二、柔軟想、三、空界想、四、身心符順想、五、勝解想、六、先所 (ZC 669b1) 受行次第隨念想、七、種種品類集會言聲想、八、光明色想、九、煩惱所作色變異想、十、解脫想、十一、勝解想、十二、遍處想。

3.28.5.2.2. (T 469b10; ZC 669b4; Fangshan 285a8; Koryō 742c4; Qisha 343b16) 輕舉想者謂：由此想於身發起輕舉勝解。如拓羅綿，或如疊絮，或如風輪。發起如是輕舉解已，由勝解作意於彼彼處飄轉其身，謂：從床上飄置九上，復從九上飄置床上，如是從床飄置草座，復從草座飄置於床。

detailed example of elegant variation?

278 Ch.: ‘he seeks the upper [level] meditative object [/support], but eventually, there is nothing [to be] obtained’.

279 Ch. has no direct equivalent of Skt. iti. Cf. preceding passage. See note 269 above as well as note 342 to Skt. crit. ed.

280 Ch.: ‘preceded by the contemplation of the ideation of seeking to dwell temporarily’. See notes 263 and 276 above.

281 Ch.: ‘By means of this method, the ascetic obtains [i.e., realises and obtains] this attainment’.

282 Qisha begins a new paragraph here.

283 Ch.: ‘the meditator has already obtained the pure meditation proper’. Xuanzang’s MS seems to have read something like: *maulaparisiṣudhadhyāna. The meaning of the compound is not very clear. This is actually the only occurrence of 根本清淨靜慮 all throughout vols. 1-55 and 85 of the Taishō Canon. According to the AKBh 436, 12-437, 14 (AK VIII 5-6), the first seven of the eight attainments proper (maulāni samāpattihṛdayāni) are of three types: associated with relish (āsvādana), pure (suddha), and non-contaminated (anāśrava). (On the meaning of the pure absorptions, see note 252 to Eng. tr.) If the reading in the Chinese translation of the SktH reflects a similar understanding, I would conjecture that 根本 *maula stresses the fact that meditative purity is experienced in the attainment proper in contrast to the liminal attainment.

284 On this rendering for ādhāpateyav, see note 253 to Eng. tr.

285 Ch. rendering of Skt. manasikurvan is amplified: ‘pays attention and reflects’.

286 Ch. construes samāhātākūmikena manaskāreyā with arthapratisārvedi cā bhavati, dharmapratisārvedi ca (clearly so, as indicated by the synaetic position of 復). This is a possible interpretation, though in my Engl. tr. I prefer to take it with manasikurvan, as also done by the Tibetan translators (see Tib. ed.).

287 Ch.: ‘because of wishing to generate [...]’, a turn of phrase rendering Skt. dative.

288 Ch. has 諸 (‘various’)…等 (plural marker) for Skt. sarva.

289 Ch.: ‘Which are these twelve ideations’.

290 The numeration of the ideations from 1 to 12 is most likely Xuanzang’s editorial addition.

437
3.28.5.2.3. (T 469b15; ZC 669b10; Fangshan 285a13; Koryō 742c10; Qisha 343b21) 柔軟想者謂：由此想於身發起柔軟勝解，或如綿囊，或如毛氈，或如熟練。此柔軟想長養，攝受前輕舉想291。於攝受時，令輕舉想增長廣大292。

3.28.5.2.4. (T 469b18; ZC 669b13; Fangshan 285a16; Koryō 742c14; Qisha 343b24) 空界想者謂：由此想於身發起輕舉、柔軟二勝解已293，隨所欲往，若於中間有諸色聚能為障礙，爾時便起勝解作意，於彼色中作空勝解，能無礙住294。

3.28.5.2.5. (T 469b22; ZC 669b17; Fangshan 285a19; Koryō 742c17; Qisha 343b27) 身心符順想者謂：由此想或以其心符順於身，或以其身符順於心。由此令身轉轉輕舉，轉轉柔軟，轉轉湛任，轉轉光潔。隨順於心，繫屬於心，依心而轉。

3.28.5.2.6.1. (T 469b25; ZC 669b22; Fangshan 285a23; Koryō 742c22; Qisha 343c1) 胜解想者謂：由此想遠作近解295，近作遠解，麤作細解，細作麤解，地作水（ZC 669c1）解，水作地解。如是一一差別大種展轉相作。296 廣如變化所作勝解，或色變化，或聲變化。297

3.28.5.2.6.2. (T 469b29; ZC 669c3; Fangshan 285a26; Koryō 743a3; Qisha 343c4) 由此五想修習成（T 469c1）滿298，領受種種妙禪境通。或299從一身示現多身，謂：由現化勝解想故。或從多身示現一身，謂：由隱化勝解想故。或以其身，於諸牆壁、垣堵等類厚障隔事，直過無礙300；或於其地出沒如水；或於其水斷流，

291 Ch.: ‘comprises the previous[ly mentioned] ideation of lightness’. Ch. appears to render anugráhikāh in a literal sense (anu-‘S grah ‘to follow in taking/seizing’). As far as I know, Ch. 被受 does not have, however, the nuance of ‘favourable, facilitating’ which Skt. anugrahika conveys here.

292 Ch. 增長廣大 ‘increases and expands’ seems to compress the Skt. three-word compound prthvrdhiqvipustām followed by the verb gacchati.

293 Ch.: ‘by means of this ideation, [the ascetic] has first generated with regard to himself [his own body] the two convictions of lightness and softness’.

294 Ch.: ‘at that time, [he] generates the contemplation of conviction, he produces the conviction of space upon that matter [which obstructs] so that he can go without obstacles’. The additions probably represent Xuanzang’s editorial clarifications.

295 Here and below, Ch. repeats 解 = adhimucyeate: ‘becomes convinced [lit., generates the conviction 作...解] that what is remote is near’.

296 Ch.: ‘In this way, the great elements, one by one separately, transform one into another [lit., create each other]’. Or: ‘in this way, [the ascetic] mutually transforms [lit. creates] [with regard to] each separate element’ (the latter reading is also suggested by the kundoku reading of KDK 152 and KIK 246). See also note 269 to Eng. tr.

297 For the Ch. rendering of this sentence, see note 269 to Eng. tr.

298 Ch. renders 修習 and 成滿 as juxtaposed verbs. See note 394 to Skt. crit. ed.

299 Here and below, Ch. introduces each miraculous feat by 或 ‘or [sometimes] [he can...].’

300 Ch.: ‘[He can] pass unhindered straight through thick, obstructing objects of [such] kinds [as] walls, ramparts, etc.’ Though the Chinese rendering is more developed than Skt., there appears to be no direct equivalent for saillam (different MS reading?). 直過 (correlated with 許) seems to be a (rather free) rendering for tirah [...] gacchati. Let us also note that there is no corresponding Skt. ādi for 等 and that the noun phrase is preceded by 許 (‘various’ or plural marker). The character 等 seems to be added for stylistic reasons in Ch., most probably, marking the fact that the enumeration is open for further examples.
往返、履上如地\(^\text{301}\); 或如飛鳥結跏\(^\text{302}\) 肃坐騰飄虚空; 或於廣大\(^\text{303}\) 威德勢力日月光輪\(^\text{304}\) 以手撫摩; 或以其身乃至梵世自在迴轉。當知如是種種神變皆\(^\text{305}\) 由輕舉、柔軟、空界、身心符順想所攝受勝解想故, 隨其所應, 一切能作。

此中以身於其梵世, 略有二種\(^\text{306}\) 在自回轉: 一者、往來自在回轉; 二者、於梵世\(^\text{307}\) 諸四大種一分造色, 如其所樂, 隨勝解力, 在自回轉。\(^\text{308}\)

3.28.5.2.7. (T 469c13; ZC 669c18; Fangshan 285b11; Koryô 743a19; Qisha 343c17) 先所受行次第隨念想者謂: 此所想從童子位迄至于今（隨憶念轉自於無礙）\(^\text{309}\), 隨彼彼位, 若行, 若住, 若坐, 若臥\(^\text{310}\), 廣說一切所受行, 隨其義略, 次第無越憶念、了知。於此\(^\text{311}\) 修習、多修習故\(^\text{312}\), 證得修果\(^\text{313}\), “於無量 (ZC 670a1)

\(^{301}\) Ch.: ‘Or on the water, [he can] cut the current, move to and fro, tread on [it] as if [on solid] ground’. The rendering may be based on a different MS, but it is also possible that Xuanzang may have simply read bhidyamāna ignoring the initial a- elided under the regular sandhi operation (cf. Tib. mi nub par; also Pali parallel abhijjāmāno at DN I 78, 6; etc.). This may have prompted him to add 往返 to show that the ascetic moves to and fro on the water. The ‘breaking of the current’ becomes thus clearly expressed as ‘horizontal’ rather than ‘vertical’ (i.e., sinking).

\(^{302}\) 轶 is the reading of Fangshan, Chongning, Zifu, Yongle-bei, and Jingshan. It is also adopted in modern Canons like Shukusatsu (156a15) and Manji zōkyō (Taiwan) (0120a15). On the other hand, ZC (Jin), Koryô, Qisha, Hongwu as well as (judging from the Taishō annotation) Shōsō-in, Puning and Tenna read: 加. T adopts: 加. Manji zōkyō (60a3) (also recording the var. lec. 轶) similarly reads: 加. ZC has no note. (It is thus difficult to know how Yongle-nan and Qing actually read.) KDK 153 has: 轶. KIK 246 reads: 加.

\(^{303}\) Ch. 大廣 modifies both 威德 and 勢力, most probably rendering mahā in mahārdhikau mahānubhāvau.

\(^{304}\) Ch.: ‘the halo of the Sun and the Moon’.

\(^{305}\) Ch.: ‘It should be known that all these various miraculous powers’.

\(^{306}\) Ch.: ‘For short, there are two types’.

\(^{307}\) Ch. does not contain a direct equivalent of adhas.

\(^{308}\) For the meaning of this sentence, see note 278 to Engl. tr.

\(^{309}\) Ch.: ‘in accordance with the memory operating freely, without obstruction’. Or: ‘as far as the memory operates freely, without obstruction’. This is the rendering of what in Skt. appears to be a parenthetical remark. 自在 ‘free(ly)’ probably reinforces the meaning of 無礙 ‘without obstruction’. 自在 and 無礙 seem to translate together na vyāhanyate. 隨 appears to stand here for yatra which is used here in the sense of ‘as far as’ (see also 隨 in next phrase, also rendering yatra). KDK 153 renders as: 憶念するに随って; KIK 246 reads: 憶念に随って. Both translations seem to construe the subject as the ascetic who ‘follows [his] memory’ or the ‘ideation of the recollection of the succession of acts previously experienced’ 先所受行次第随念想者 which ‘follows memory’. These are possible ways of construing the sentence in Chinese. My rendering above tries, however, to take into account both the wording of the Chinese sentence and the Skt. original.

\(^{310}\) Ch.: ‘following [/in accordance with] each state, whether going, or standing/[staying], or sitting, or lying’. Here, too, 隨 seems to stand for yatra (see previous note).

\(^{311}\) Ch. suggests tesu (or tend?). Similarly in the next two passages.

\(^{312}\) Ch.: ‘because of practising, much practising’. In Skt. (and Tib.), we only have one occurrence of bhāvani. See also next passage.

\(^{313}\) Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] obtains [/realises] the fruit of spiritual cultivation’. See next passages, too,
種314宿世所住” 廣說乃至 “所有行相、所有宣說” 能皆隨念。

3.28.5.2.8. (T 469c19; ZC 670a2; Fangshan 285b16; Koryô 743b2; Qisha 343c22) 種種品類集會音聲想者謂：由此想遍於彼彼村邑315、聚落316、或長者衆317、或邑義衆、或餘大衆、或廣長處318、或家、或室，種種品類諸衆集會所出種種雜類音聲，名詮譯319聲，或於大河、衆流、激渦、波浪音聲320，善取其相，以修所成定地作意321，於諸天、人、若遠、若近、聖、非聖聲力勵聽取322。於斯此習、多修習故323，證得修果清淨天耳324，由是能聞人間、天上，若遠、若近，一切音聲325。

3.28.5.2.9. (T 469c27; ZC 670a12; Fangshan 285b24; Koryô 743b12; Qisha 343c30) 光明色想者謂：於如前所說種種光明相極善取已326，即於彼相作意、

and note 281 to Engl. tr.

314 Ch. literally means ‘countless types’, but 無量 is also used with the meaning of ‘many’, ‘various’. E.g., Bobh Dutt ed. 160, 6 (= Wogihara ed. 232, 10-11): vipulā pūjā apramāṇapunyaphalalī nekabrāhmaṇapunyaparīghaḥ, corresponding to Ch. T30.533c7-8: [當獲]無量大福德果，攝受無量大廣福田，[於]無量 first renders apramāṇa and then [a]neka. Cf. Tib. (D Wi 124a2) which translates apramāṇa as tshad med pa'i and [a]neka as du ma'i.

315 Ch.: ‘by means of this ideation, far and wide, in [regarding] each village’. 由此想 is a turn of phrase employed above to render yayā, for which here, however, we have no Skt. (or Tib.) equivalent.

316 The word refers in classical Chinese (as it does in modern Chinese and Japanese) to a ‘village’ (see DKWJ, DHC, s.v.). Skt. nigama and Tib. grong rdal mean, however, a ‘town’ or ‘city’.

317 Ch. seems to construe śrenyāṁ as ‘assembly of elders’. Cf. also BSCD, s.v., which records 長者衆 as rendering grhapatipūṣad.

318 Ch.: ‘spacious place(s)’. Xuanzang reads āvataviśāle as an independent noun. It seems, however, that this an epithet of grhe (a reading which is also supported by Tib.). The meaning in Skt. is ‘spacious house/building’ (probably related to large gatherings of people) which is contrasted to an ‘inner chamber’ or ‘secret apartment’ (avavarake).

319 Shōsō-in: 聲. ZC (Jin), Fangshan Qisha, Hongwu, Yongle-bei: 声. ZC has no note. Taishō, which reads: 聲, only notes the Shōsō-in var. lec. (p. 469, n.6). If the collation of the Taishō is to be trusted, we may conclude that Chongning, Koryō, Zifu, Puning, Jingshan, Tenna read: 聲. Actually, Koryō does read: 聲. Without a note in ZC (Jin), the reading of Yongle-nan and Qing is unclear.

320 Ch.: ‘or the sound(s) of a large river, (many) streams, rapids [swift currents], [and] waves’ (or: ‘or the sound(s) of (many) stream(s), [...] of a large river’). This may reflect a different reading in Xuanzang’s MS.

321 Ch. suggests: bhāvanāmayena samāhitabhbhūmikena manasikārenā.

322 Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] exerts himself to hear [lit, listen and collect] the sound(s)’. See also note 425 to Skt. crit. ed.

323 Ch.: ‘because of practising, much practising’. Cf. also preceding passage.

324 Ch.: ‘pure divine ear’. See also next passage where viṣuddhaṇa appears in Skt., too. Cf. also canonical formula: dībhāya sotadhātuṣva viṣuddhāya (DN I 79, 9); divyena śrotreṇa viṣuddhena (SaṅghBh 2.248, 3-4). For other sources, see note 287 to Engl. tr.

325 Ch.: ‘all sounds’.

326 Ch: ‘having being extremely [?] able to grasp various characteristics of light’.
思惟喜。又於種種諸有情類善。（T 470a1）不善等業用差別善取其相，即於彼相作意、思惟。是名光明色相想。於此修習、多修習故，證得修果生死智通。由是清淨天眼通故，見諸有情廣説乃至身壞已後往生善趣天世間中。

3.28.5.2.10. (T 470a5; ZC 670a19; Fangshan 286a3; Koryŏ 743b19; Qisha 344a7) 煩惱所作色相異想者謂：由此想於貪、恚、癡、慢、悔、覆、惱、誹、詬、憎、嫉以及以憤、害、無慜、無愧、諸餘煩惱及煩悩烦恼繫縛其心，諸有情類種種色相異想（ZC 670b1）了、別。如是色類有貪欲者有色分位色相異想，謂：諸根躁擾，諸根掉舉，言常含笑。如是色類有瞋恚者有色分位色相異想，謂：面恆聲，言常變色。如是色類有愚癡者有色分位色相異想，謂：多分瘡瘍，事義闇昧，言不辯了，語多下俚。由如是等行相

327 Ch.: '[the ascetic] directs [his] attention [and] reflects'. Similarly in the next sentence.
328 Ch.: 'this is called the ideation […]'. Tib. zhes bya also suggests: *ucyate.
329 Ch.: '[the ascetic] sees various sentient beings'. This is not an addition proper but rather shows that the Ch. cites more than the extant Skt. from the canonical passage presupposed here. This corresponds to (Pali) satte passati (DN 1 82, 26) / (Skt.) sattvān paśyati (SaṅghīBh 250, 6) (for more sources, see note 289 to Engl. tr.). Cf. Tib. tr., too.
330 ZC (Jin) has an extra 世; it thus reads the phrase as: 趣天世世. According to collation note in ZC, all the other Canons which it collates contain only one 世. T has no note. Hongwu and Yongle-bei read with one 世, i.e., 趣天世世.
331 Ch. might suggest pradāsa instead of Skt. paridāha. In the similar enumeration of defilements in passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. above, 惱 renders pradāsa as it also does in Xuanzang’s translation of the AKBh. A definitive conclusion is not, however, possible since there are instances when paridāha is also rendered into Ch. as 惱 (see BWDJ, s.v. paridāha; cf. also 惡熟 and 熱惱 translating paridāha).
332 These four terms appear only in Ch. If Xuanzang used here the same renderings as in his translation of the AKBh, then they may be reconstructed as: mātsarya (Cavārice), īryā (‘envy’), mada (‘self-conceit’), and vihīmśā (‘actual intentions of violence’).
333 Ch.: '[and] the rest of the defilements and secondary defilements’.
334 Ch.: ‘various peculiar physical conditions [and] specific changes in physical appearance’. It is clear from the occurrences below that 色相異想 renders rūpavikṛti, but in Skt., this sentence does not contain rūpavikṛti.
335 Ch.: ‘Such types of matter’. Similarly in the two next sentences.
336 Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-bei, Qing: 相. T (which should have been aware of Puning) has no note.
337 Shōsō-in, Chongning, ZC (Jin), Zifu: 頻. ZC has no note. Hongwu, Yongle-bei: 無.
338 Ch. lists first krtaḥhratuṇā, which is the third term in Skt., and has mukhavivarṇatā as its last word of the enumeration, while in Skt. this is the first one.
339 Ch.: ‘he is ignorant [lit., in the dark] as to the meaning of [various] matters, [his] speech cannot be understood’. 闇昧 as a rendering for Skt. a-nidhyapiti is quite unusual, and this may indiate that Xuanzang’s MS was probably different (corrupt?)

Ch. 不辯了 frequently translates agamaka (see SruBh Yaita ed. 1992, 535 = Tib. D Tshi 197b7 (here, the Tib. equivalent is brda mi phrad pa) = Ch. T30.360a24-25; AbbSamBh 153, 20-21 = Tib. D Li 114b1 (whose equivalent is brda phrad du mi rung ba) = Ch. T31.772b12-13). As far as I know, there are no examples of 不辯了 rendering apratipadayatā. Furthermore, its collocation with 言 is quite difficult to explain from the viewpoint of the correspondence with the Skt. We have no Skt. equivalent for 言 in this position. One might assume that it translates
流類廣説乃至無慚愧等所繫縛者有色分位色相變異。善取其相，復於彼相作意、思惟。於斯修習、多修習故，發生修果心差別智。由此智故，於他有情、補特伽羅，隨所尋思，隨所伺察，心意識等皆如實知。

3.28.5.2.11. (T 470a19; ZC 670b13; Fangshan 286a17; Koryō 743c13; Qisha 344a21) 解脫、勝處、遍處想者（如前《三摩呬多地》應知修相）。由此想親近、修習、多修習故，能引最勝諸聖神通，若變事通，若化事通，若勝解通，及能引發無靜、願智、四無礙解，謂：法無礙解、義無礙解、辭無礙解、辯無礙解等種種功德。

3.28.5.3. (T 470a24; ZC 670b19; Fangshan 286a22; Koryō 743c19; Qisha 344a26) 又聖、非聖二神境通有差別者謂：聖神通隨所變事，隨所化事，隨所勝解，

"vāg" in the next phrase of the extant Skt. text, but the syntactical position of the latter is different and in Skt., it does not go together with apratipadyanāta. If this 言 is not an editorial addition of the Chinese text (T), then this may also suggest a different (corrupt?) reading in Xuanzang’s MS.

340 I follow here the reading of Jingshan, Yongle-bei, and Qing, which read: 俚. This is also the reading adopted in KDK and KIK. All other Canons (including Hongwu) read: 里. The Dunhuang Glossary (p. 312, # 121-122) also reads: 里.

The character 里 means here ‘countryside’, and most probably it must be read together with preceding 下. The binome 下里 has the same sense as 里. Basically, there are no problems with 下里 rendering prākṛta, but I think that 俚 offers a better reading. 俚 means ‘vulgar’, and this better conveys the connotation of prākṛta in our passage.

Ch.: ‘[the ascetic] furthermore directs [his] attention to [and] reflects on that sign’. Like Tib., Ch. also suggests: *tad eva (as in the parallel constructions above).

342 Ch.: ‘because of practising, much practising’. Cf. also preceding passage.

343 Ch. has a transitive equivalent for Skt. uppayate.

344 Ch.: ‘in accordance with what [other sentient beings] [roughly] think, in accordance with what [other sentient beings] [subtly] think’. See also note 295 to Eng. tr.

345 Ch. seems to suggest: *cittām mano viññānaḥ (three terms which in a number of Buddhist sources, including this layer of the YoBh, are quasi-synonymous). In the extant Skt. MS we have only mano. Furthermore, there is no Skt. equivalent for 等. (Was 等 used to hint at caitasikā dharmaḥ?)

346 Ch.: ‘the aspect of cultivation should be known’. Ch. seems to construe bhāvanā as part of the parenthetical sentence.

347 Puning, Hongwu: 遇. All other Canons (including Yongle-bei) read: 通. (which should have been aware of Puning) has no note.

348 Ch.: ‘because of assiduously practising, cultivating, intensely cultivating this ideation, [the ascetic] can generate the most excellent miraculous faculty of the Noble Ones’. Ch. 親近、修習、多修習故 suggests: *āsvītattvāḥ bhāvattvāḥ bhākulīkṛtattvāḥ. See also passage 3.28.5.3. below.

349 Here and after the next two compounds, Ch. has: 通 [penetrating] knowledge/faculty’. In Skt., rdhīm does not have to be repeated together with vastupariṇāminim nairmāṇikim ādhiṃsokṣikāṃ since these compounds are its attributive modifiers.

350 Ch. 及能引 [...] 種種功德: ‘and [he] can generate [...] various virtues [such as ...]’. Cf. vaiśeṣikagunāhīnārāja at SamBh 136, 13 (= Ch. 能引最勝功德, T30.336b23-24) in the passage to which the ŚrīBh explicitly refers here) and at BoBh Wogihara ed. 207, 22, *aranāprvanidhijñānādānām guṇānām śrāvakasādhaṇānām (= Ch. 無諱願智等共諸聲聞所有功德, T30.527c11-12).
一切皆能如實成辦，無有改異，堪任有用。非聖神通不能如是，猶如幻化①，唯可（ZC 670c1）觀見，不堪受用。② 當知如是十二種想親近、修習、多 (T 470b1) 修習故③，隨其所應便能引發五種神通，及能引發④不共異生如其所應諸聖功德。

3.28.6.1. (T 470b4; ZC 670c5; Fangshan 286a28; Koryō 744a5; Qisha 344b3) 復次此中於初靜慮下中上品善修習已⑤，隨其所應當生⑥梵天⑦、梵輔天、大梵天衆同分中。

3.28.6.2. (T 470b6; ZC 670c7; Fangshan 286b2; Koryō 744a7; Qisha 344b5) 於第二靜慮下中上品善修習已，隨其所應當生少光天、無量光天、極光淨天衆同分中。

3.28.6.3. (T 470b8; ZC 670c9; Fangshan 286b4; Koryō 744a9; Qisha 344b7) 於第三靜慮下中上品善修習已，隨其所應當生少淨天、無量淨天、遍淨天衆同分中。

3.28.6.4. (T 470b10; ZC 670c12; Fangshan 286b6; Koryō 744a12; Qisha 344b8) 於第四靜慮下中上品善修習已，隨其所應當生無雲天、福生天、廣果天衆同分中。若不還⑧者以無漏第四靜慮際難，熏習⑨有漏第四靜慮，即於此⑩中下品、中品、上品、上勝品、上極品善修習已，隨其所應當生五淨居天衆同分中，謂：無煩、無熱、善現、善見、色究竟天。

3.28.6.5. (T 470b16; ZC 670c19; Fangshan 286b12; Koryō 744a19; Qisha 344b14) 若於空處、識處、無所有處、非想⑪非非想處下中上品善修習已，當生空際，一切皆能如實成辦，無有改異，堪任有用。非聖神通不能如是，猶如幻化①，唯可（ZC 670c1）觀見，不堪受用。② 當知如是十二種想親近、修習、多 (T 470b1) 修習故③，隨其所應便能引發五種神通，及能引發④不共異生如其所應諸聖功德。

351 幻化 usually means the thing created or the act performed by the magician rather than the magician himself (for which a word like 幻師 is employed) (see BDJ, s.vv.). Cf. also 幻化 in Xuanzang’s translation of the AKBh (T29.44a21) rendering Skt. māyāpuruṣa (119, 21), i.e., ‘a man-like apparition’ created by means of magic.

352 Ch.: ‘it is] like a magic [/magically created object], [it] can only be seen [but] cannot be employed’.

353 Ch. suggests: *āsavitvatvād bhāvítatvād bahunirktatvāt. Cf. also Tib. ed. as well as passage 3.28.5.2.11. above.

354 Ch.: ‘and can generate’. Ch., which renders abhinirhāro with a verbal construction, repeats the verb. See also note 307 to Engl. tr.

355 T, ZC (Jin), Koryō, and Qisha begin a new paragraph.

356 Here and in the parallel constructions below, Ch. has: ‘having proficiently cultivated [or: having been capable to cultivate]’.

357 For this translation of upasaṃpadyate, see note 310 to Engl. tr.

358 Here and in all similar compounds below, Ch. has: 天, which basically means ‘Heaven’ but in a Buddhist context can also be used in the sense of ‘deity/deities’ (see BDJ, s.v.)

359 Koryō reads: 一 (which obviously must be a typographical error). All other Canons (including Hongwu and Yongle-bei) read: 二. T (which should have been aware of Koryō) has no note.

360 Shōsō-in, Chongning, Zifu, Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan, Yongle-bei, Jingshan and Qing omit: 極.

361 Tenna: 遠.

362 Ch. appears to render Skt. vyavākīrṇam bhāvayati by two binomes: ‘mixes [and] impregnates [in/by] practice’.

363 Shōsō-in omits: 此.

364 Shōsō-in: 相.
處、識處、無所有處、非想非非想處隨行天衆同分中。由彼諸天無有形色，是故
亦無處所差別。然住 (ZC 671a1) 所作有其差別。

3.28.6. (T 470b20; ZC 671a1; Fangshan 286b16; Koryō 744b1; Qisha 344b19) 於無想定善修習已，當生無想有情天衆同分中。

3.28.7. (T 470b22; ZC 671a3; Fangshan 286b17; Koryō 744b3; Qisha 344b21) 365 復次此中云何應知離欲者相？366 謂：離欲者身業安住，諸根無動，威儀
進止無有蕩擾，於一威儀能經時久，不多驚懼，終不數數易脫威儀367。言詞柔軟，
言語寂靜，不樂詆譭368，不樂衆集，言語安詳369。眼見色已，唯覺了色，不因覺
了而起色貪。如是耳聞聲已，鼻嗅香已，舌嘗味已，身覺觸已，唯覺了聲乃至其
觸，不因覺了而起覺貪乃至觸貪。370 (T 470c1) 能無所畏，覺慧幽深，輕安廣大
身心隱密，無有貪婪，無有憤發371，能有堪忍，不為種種欲尋思等諸惡尋思擾亂
其心372。如是等類當知名為離欲者相373。374

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365 T, ZC (Jin), Koryō, and Qisha begin a new paragraph.
366 Ch. ‘Furthermore, herein, how should one understand [know] the characteristics of one who

367 Ch.: ‘In [his] postures there is no agitation, the time [he] can spend in one posture is long,

368 Ch.: ‘Thus, having heard noise with [his] ears, having smelled fragrance with [his] nose, having experienced taste

369 Ch.: ‘His mind is not disturbed by bad thoughts [such as] various thoughts [directed at]
sensual pleasures, etc.’. I take 爲 as a passive marker. Cf. also KDK 157.

370 Ch.: ‘Such features should be known as being called the characteristics of one who is
detached from sensual pleasures’.

371 Ch. 無有憤發 rather suggests：*akopya (see BDJ, s.v. 慤發). BCSD, s.v. 慤發).

372 Ch.: ‘His mind is not disturbed by bad thoughts [such as] various thoughts [directed at]
sensual pleasures, etc.’. I take 爲 as a passive marker. Cf. also KDK 157.

373 Ch.: ‘Such features should be known as being called the characteristics of one who is
detached from sensual pleasures’.

374 Shōsō-in contains here Empress Kōmyō’s 光明皇后 dedication 御願 of the manuscript.

375 Ch.: ‘Yogācārabhūmi. [End of] Scroll 33.

Koryō contains the year of the carving of the woodblock, followed by the title of the work,
e.t.c. as well as the traditional numeration character: 乙巳歳高麗國大藏都督奉効雕造 瑜伽
師地論卷第三十三 第二十四章 禍 ‘Respectfully carved by Imperial Order by the
Supervisor of the Korean Canon in the Snake Year, [being] the second [in the 10-year cycle]
[i.e., most likely, 1245], Yogācārabhūmi, Scroll 33, Woodblock 24, Huo 禍’.

Fangshan also writes the numeration character: 悪.

Qisha and Hongwu have the numeration character at the bottom of the line: 因三. After this,
they contain 25 phonetic glosses on characters and binomes with difficult or rare pronunciations.
(Both gloss upon the same characters and binomes.)
Yongle-bei has the numeration character: 兄三, written in small characters on the next column after 瑜伽師地論卷第三十三. It also has 11 phonetic glosses under the heading of 音釋, which are only partially similar to those in Qisha and Hongwu.

\(^{376}\) *Juan* 34 in ZT actually reproduces the woodblock print of Koryō because the Jin Canon woodblock print for this scroll is not extant.

\(^{376}\) Qisha, Puning, Hongwu, Yongle-nan contain an interlinear remark which reads: 獨覺地附 ‘Pratyekabhūmi Appended’.

The numeration character is as follows. Fangshan: 惡 (written in a simplified manner similar to the second allograph of 惡 in Li ed., p. 104, s.v.) (see also note 1 above). Koryō: 禍. Qisha, Hongwu: 因四. Yongle-bei: 兄四.

\(^{377}\) Shōsō-in, Fangshan, Chongning, Zifu, Puning, Qisha, Hongwu: 沙門 ‘Śramaṇa’. Yongle-bei, Jingshan: 唐三藏沙門 ‘Tripitaka Śramaṇa of the Tang [Dynasty]’. ZC has no note. (This makes the exact reading of Yongle-nan and Qing difficult to know.)

\(^{377}\) Yongle-bei, Jingshan, Qing omit; 第十三. T (which should have been aware of Jingshan) has no note.

\(^{379}\) Ch.: ‘Yogācārabhūmi. Scroll 34, Expounded by Bodhisattva Maitreya. Translated by Tripitaka Dharmācārya Xuanzang by Imperial Order, Śrāvakabhūmi. [Book] X III of the Mahāyāna bhumayas, [Chapter] Two of Yogasthāna IV’.

\(^{380}\) This sentence, which is the equivalent of Skt. *ity ayam tāvat laukikamārgagamanasya vibhāgah*, is placed in the Chinese translation at the beginning of Scroll 34. It reads: ‘Thus [Bodhisattva Maitreya?/the text?] has expounded the proceeding [by] the mundane path’.

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Part Three

ANNOTATED ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE CHAPTER ON THE MUNDANE PATH (Laukikamārga)

Translation

[3.27. CHOOSING THE PATH]

There are no more than two ways that lie ahead of the yogi who has reached [the basic level of] contemplation and has thus experienced some delight in abandonment. Which are these two? They are the mundane [way] and the supramundane [way]. The novice ascetic who has reached [the basic level of] contemplation [thinks,] ‘I shall proceed by either the mundane way or the supramundane [way],’ [and further] cultivates this very contemplation. In as much as he intensely cultivates [it], as days and nights [of practice] pass one after another, the [above-mentioned] ease and focusing of the mind greatly increase. And when his contemplation has become fixed, steady, and firm, [when his] purified conviction with regard to the meditative object manifests itself, and [when] the characteristics are grasped from [the meditative object] in agreement with tranquillity and insight, then if willing to proceed by the mundane path, he undertakes [its] practice; or [if willing to proceed] by the supramundane path, he takes up its practice.

[3.28. THE MUNDANE PATH]

[3.28.1. Categories of persons proceeding by the mundane path]

[3.28.1.1. FOUR CATEGORIES]

How many are the persons who in the present life proceed by the very mundane path, not by the supramundane one? Answer: they are four, to wit, all the non-Buddhists; those who are Buddhist followers but who [se spiritual faculties] are weak and who have previously practised tranquillity; likewise, those who [se spiritual
faculties] are keen but whose roots of the wholesome [factors] are unripe;\textsuperscript{2,1} and bodhisattvas wishing to attain Awakening not in the present life but in the future.\textsuperscript{2,2} These are the four [categories of] persons who in this very life\textsuperscript{2,3} are able to take the mundane path.\textsuperscript{2,4}

**[3.28.1.2. TWO CATEGORIES]**

Moreover, proceeding by the mundane path is twofold: that of ordinary people with complete bondage and that of adepts\textsuperscript{2,5} with partial bondage. What does this refer to? [It refers to] proceeding by means of detachment from sensual pleasures\textsuperscript{2,6} upon seeing the coarseness of sensual pleasures and the serenity of the first absorption,\textsuperscript{2,7} [be it] attainment [or] birth;\textsuperscript{2,8} [the process] is to be understood similarly up to the detachment from the station of nothing whatsoever.\textsuperscript{2,9} [Furthermore,] the attainment of non-ideation\textsuperscript{3,0} as well as the generation\textsuperscript{3,1} of the five supernatural faculties\textsuperscript{3,2} on the basis of meditative attainments [is also to be understood] likewise.\textsuperscript{3,3}

**[3.28.2. The seven contemplations]**

**[3.28.2.1. THE PRACTICE OF THE SEVEN CONTEMPLATIONS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE FIRST ABSORPTION]**

**[3.28.2.1.1. Enumeration of the seven contemplations]**

The yogi intent upon [achieving] detachment from sensual pleasures attains it by means of the seven contemplations.\textsuperscript{3,4} Which are these seven contemplations? They are the [contemplation] perceiving characteristics, the [contemplation] leading to conviction, the [contemplation] engendering separation, the [contemplation] comprising delight, the investigating contemplation, the [contemplation] attaining the culmination of the practice, and the [contemplation which represents the] fruit of the culmination of the practice.\textsuperscript{3,5}

**[3.28.2.1.2. Contemplation perceiving characteristics]**

**[3.28.2.1.2.1. Definition]**

What is the contemplation perceiving characteristics? It is that contemplation by means of which [the ascetic] perceives the coarse characteristic of the sensual pleasures as well as the serene characteristic in the first absorption. And how does [the ascetic] perceive the coarse characteristic? By examining the six aspects of the sensual pleasures, [to wit.] meaning, thing, characteristic, category, time, and reasoning.\textsuperscript{3,6}

**[3.28.2.1.2.2. Meaning]**

To start with, he examines the meaning of coarseness. The sensual pleasures are detrimental, fraught with much misfortune, much calamity, much plague. The fact that the sensual pleasures are fraught with much detriment, and so on, up to being fraught with much plague, this is the meaning of coarseness.

**[3.28.2.1.2.3. Thing]**

He [also] examines the thing[s connected with sensual pleasures]. That is, [he examines that] there is lust for sensual pleasures inwards, [and] there is lust for sensual pleasures outwards.\textsuperscript{3,7}
[3.28.2.1.2.4. Characteristic]

He [also] examines the specific characteristic [as follows]. Those are defilement sensual pleasures, [and] those are object sensual pleasures. Furthermore, they are [sensual pleasures] giving rise to pleasure, giving rise to suffering, and giving rise to neither suffering nor pleasure. Those giving rise to pleasure are the basis of passion [as well as] the basis of the perversion of ideation and of mind. Those giving rise to suffering are the basis of hatred [as well as] the basis of wrath and enmity. Those giving rise to neither suffering nor pleasure are the basis of concealment [of one’s faults], stubborn adherence [to one’s views], deceit, dissimulation, lack of sense of shame, shameless behaviour as well as the basis of the perversion of view. These sensual pleasures are thus accompanied by [specific] depraved feelings and depraved defilements. In this way, he examines the specific characteristic of the sensual pleasures.

How does he examine the general characteristic? All these sensual pleasures are equally associated and connected with the suffering of birth, the suffering of old age, and so on, up to the suffering of [one’s] wishes [remaining] unfulfilled. Even those hedonists who achieve [the] great gratification of [their] sensual pleasures are not free from the law of birth, and so forth. Short-lived [indeed] is their achievement [of sensual gratification]. Thus he examines the general characteristic [of the sensual pleasures].

[3.28.2.1.2.5. Category]

How does he examine the category? These sensual pleasures fall into the black category. They are like a skeleton, like a chunk of meat, like a torch of hay, like a pit of embers, like a venomous snake, like a dream, like a borrowed ornament, and like a tree fruit. Even while striving [to gratify their] sensual pleasures, sentient beings experience the suffering generated by [the hardships associated with this] striving, [as they also] experience the suffering generated by [the effort required for the] protection [of their belongings], by disruption of affectionate relationships, by non-contentment, by servitude, and by wrong deeds. All these should be understood just as previously [explained].

Likewise, the Exalted One said that he who indulges in sensual pleasures [is bound to meet with] five detriments: Sensual pleasures have little flavour, [beget] much suffering, much detriment. Surely, when indulging in sensual pleasures, there is no sufficiency or satisfaction or satiation. In such a way have sensual pleasures been censured by the Buddhas and Buddha’s disciples, wise beings, rightly accomplished, true men. Surely, indulging in sensual pleasures leads [only] to accumulating fetters. I [therefore] declare that there is no evil and unwholesome act whatsoever which one will not commit [for the sake of sensual pleasures].

Thus these sensual pleasures cause non-satiation, are common to many, are the cause of unrighteous and wicked deeds, increase the thirst for sensual pleasures, are to be avoided by the wise, swiftly come to extinction, are dependent upon conditions [for coming into being], constitute the basis of carelessness, are hollow, impermanent [and] vain, their nature is falsehood and trickery, are like an illusion deceiving [only] the fools. Whether pertaining to this present life or to a future one, whether divine or human, sensual pleasures are the very domain of the Evil One,
the very crop [sown] by the Evil One,\textsuperscript{5,8} where divers bad, unwholesome mental factors arise, to wit, covetousness,\textsuperscript{6,9} malice,\textsuperscript{7,9} violence,\textsuperscript{7,1} or what[ever] further [factors] which constitute obstacles\textsuperscript{7,2} for the noble disciple practising [spiritual cultivation].\textsuperscript{7,3} In various ways do these sensual pleasures fall, for most part, into the black category. Thus he examines the category.

[3.28.2.1.2.6. Time]

How does he examine the time? [Whether] in the past, future, or present, these sensual pleasures are constantly and incessantly thus fraught with much misfortune, much plague, much detriment. Thus he examines the time.

[3.28.2.1.2.7. Reasoning]

How does he examine the reasoning?\textsuperscript{7,4} [The objects of] sensual pleasures are gathered, achieved, and accumulated with great struggle, great eagerness, great pains, by various and manifold skills. Furthermore, even when successfully accumulated and achieved, they merely serve to counteract only suffering whenever it arises, outwards, for the sake of [one's] household, [to wit, one's] mother and father, child and wife,\textsuperscript{7,5} female and male slaves,\textsuperscript{7,6} servants, day-labourers, friends, companions,\textsuperscript{7,7} kinsmen and relatives;\textsuperscript{7,8} or [inwards,] for the sake of one's own body, material, coarse, made of the four elements, growing upon boiled rice\textsuperscript{7,9} [or] coarse gruel,\textsuperscript{8,0} always requiring ointment,\textsuperscript{8,1} bathing,\textsuperscript{8,2} and massage,\textsuperscript{8,3} [yet] bound to\textsuperscript{8,4} breaking, splitting, scattering, and destruction.\textsuperscript{8,5} Food is [but] a remedy for the suffering of hunger. Clothes are [but] a prevention of the suffering of cold and heat as well as [being meant] to cover [one's] shameful private parts. A sleeping place or a seat is [but] a prevention of the suffering of drowsiness and fatigue or walking and standing [respectively]. The medicine needed by the sick is [but] a prevention of the suffering of disease. These sensual pleasures are thus [but] remedies for suffering. Therefore, they should be not enjoyed with passion or attachment but rather\textsuperscript{8,6} [be experienced] like a medicine [taken] by a sick [person] afflicted with disease only in order to alleviate the illness.\textsuperscript{8,7}

This is also [taught in] the Trustworthy Tradition [of Buddhist scriptures]\textsuperscript{8,8} [which say] that these sensual pleasures are coarse in this or that way. Inwardly, intuition\textsuperscript{8,9} also arises [confirming] me [this fact]. The inferential [type of reasoning] also shows the same.\textsuperscript{5,0} And the nature of these sensual pleasures [existing] from beginningless times, [their] generally accepted essence,\textsuperscript{9,1} the essence beyond thinking, is like this[ , too]. Neither should it be thought of nor reflected upon. In such a way should reasoning be examined.

[3.28.2.1.2.8. Concluding remarks]

Having perceived the characteristic of coarse[ness] of the sensual pleasures in this way, to wit, through the six aspects, he [then] perceives the characteristic of seren[ity] in the first absorption [in the following way]: in the first absorption, there is absolutely no such coarseness which exists in the realm of sensual pleasures; being free from this coarseness, the first absorption is serene. He perceives the characteristic of seren[ity] in the first absorption in this way. Thus, with his attention pertaining to the concentrated level [of thought], he perceives the coarse characteristic in sensual pleasures and the serene characteristic in the first absorption.\textsuperscript{9,2} This is called the contemplation
perceiving characteristics. Verily, this contemplation should be known as being mixed with listening and reflection.93

[3.28.2.1.3. Contemplation leading to conviction]
Having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures and the first absorption by means of [respectively] the coarse and the serene characteristic correctly examined,94 he transcends [the level of] listening and reflection and becomes convinced [of these two characteristics] exclusively in the form of [meditative] cultivation. He cultivates tranquility and insight, [each] having the characteristic [of coarseness and serenity] as [its] meditative object.95 And cultivating [in like manner], he repeatedly concentrates on and [consequently] becomes convinced of the coarseness and serenity examined in such a way.96 This is called the contemplation leading to conviction.97

[3.28.2.1.4. Contemplation engendering separation]
Because of assiduous practice, cultivation, [and] zealous exercise, for the first time is the path leading to the elimination of defilements generated by him. And upon kindling the path leading to the elimination of defilements, the contemplation which accompanies it is called [contemplation] engendering separation.98

[3.28.2.1.5. Contemplation comprising delight]
For the first time, because of the abandonment of the defilements belonging to [the realm of] sensual pleasures which should be abandoned in the beginning and [also] because of the elimination of the noxiousness corresponding to these [defilements], he thereupon becomes [able to] rejoice at [this] abandonment and separation.99 And seeing benefit in the abandonment [of defilements], he experiences some joy and pleasure [born of this]100 separation.101 Just for the purpose of eliminating torpor, drowsiness, [and] agitation,102 he repeatedly gladdens [encourages] [his mind] through the contemplation conducive to cheering up,103 [and] makes [his mind] loathe through the contemplation conducive to loathing.104 This is called the contemplation comprising delight.105 :06

[3.28.2.1.6. Investigating contemplation]
He who thus rejoices at abandonment [as well as] at spiritual cultivation [and] meditates correctly, due to being firmly grounded in the practice of wholesome categories, is not possessed [/ensnared] by107 the defilements associated with sensual pleasures, whether he wanders about or dwells [in one place].108 [At this moment,] it occurs to him: 'Could it be the case that] I do not experience lust109 for [the objects of] the sensual pleasures,110 [though it] actually [still] exists [within my mind]? Or can it be that [I do not experience it because] it does not exist [any more]?' Wishing to investigate [this], he directs his attention to this or that pleasing, agreeable image [/characteristic]. Since the latent proclivities have not been completely abandoned by him, as he directs his attention to this image [/characteristic], he experiences a mental state of fondness [for it], intenness [upon it], indulgence [in it]. [Thus his] equanimity does not stand firm, nor [does his] disgust, dislike, aversion, [and] repulsion [towards sensual pleasures function]. It [then] occurs to him: 'My mind is not properly freed, nor is it liberated from sensual pleasures; my mind is restrained by effort, as water is held

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[by a dam], it is not [yet] restrained by [its very] nature. Let me dwell even more in rejoicing at abandonment [and] spiritual cultivation for further [approaching] the complete abandonment of these latent proclivities.' This is called the investigating contemplation.  

[3.28.2.1.7. Contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice]

He dwells still more in rejoicing at abandonment [and] spiritual cultivation, intent upon [the practice of] tranquility and insight, and repeatedly investigates [the defilements]. And while he cultivates the antidote, and time after time investigates the [defilements which have been] abandoned and [those which have] not [been] abandoned [yet], his mind is temporarily freed from all the defilements of the realm of sensual pleasures. But this does not amount to a complete eradication of [their] seeds for ever. At this point, the contemplation at the end of the preparatory path of the first absorption, [which serves as an] antidote for all [these] defilements, is generated. This is called the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice. 

[3.28.2.1.8. Contemplation representing the fruit of the culmination of the practice]

Immediately following it, [the ascetic] reaches the first absorption proper having the [previous contemplation] as [its] condition [and] cause. [It is] the contemplation which accompanies the first absorption proper. This is called the contemplation [representing] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. 

[3.28.2.1.9. Additional clarifications]

[3.28.2.1.9.1. Experience of joy and pleasure in the contemplations]

[The ascetic] abiding in the contemplation engendering separation and in the [contemplation] comprising delight gladdens his body with joy and pleasure born of separation in such a way that they faintly manifest themselves from time to time. At the time of [abiding in] the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice, he suffuses [his body with them] in such a way that they profusely and amply manifest themselves from time to time. Furthermore, for [the ascetic] abiding in the contemplation which represents the fruit of the culmination of the practice, there is no [part] whatsoever of the entire body which is not suffused [or] could be still suffused with joy and pleasure born of separation. At this moment, the ascetic having attained the first absorption which is separated from sensual pleasures, is separated from bad and unwholesome factors, is possessed of rough examination, is possessed of subtle investigation, [has] joy and pleasure born of separation, [and is endowed] with five limbs. The ascetic is [now] called one who stands firm in the fruit of the practice of the path of the antidote for the realm of sensual pleasures [as well as] one who has reached detachment from sensual pleasures. 

[3.28.2.1.9.2. Elimination of the defilements through the practice of the contemplations]

By means of the contemplation perceiving characteristics, [the ascetic] correctly ascertains what is to be abandoned. He also correctly discerns what is to be attained. And he directs [his] mind towards the abandonment of what is to be abandoned and
towards the attainment of what is to be attained. And by means of the contemplation leading to conviction, he embarks upon the correct practice for abandonment and attainment. By means of the contemplation engendering separation, he eliminates the strong defilements. By means of the contemplation comprising delight, he eliminates the middling kind of defilements. By means of the investigating contemplation, he makes [his] mind abide in freedom from the conceit [vain misapprehension] of attainment. By means of the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice, he eliminates the weak kind of defilements. By means of the contemplation which represents the fruit of the culmination of the practice, he enjoys the [very] fruit of the cultivation of these types of contemplations which have [thus] been cultivated, [indeed] well cultivated.

[3.28.2.1.9.3. Relation with the set of four contemplations]
Furthermore, both the contemplation perceiving characteristics and the contemplation leading to conviction are called the suitable contemplation which accompanies the antidote of reviling [the defilements]. Both the contemplation engendering separation and the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice represent the antidote contemplation which accompanies the antidote of abandoning [the defilements]. Herein, the contemplation comprising delight constitutes both the antidote [contemplation] and the contemplation which engenders cheering up. Herein, the investigating contemplation is called the examining contemplation. It should thus be known that the four contemplations, to wit, the suitable [one], the [one which is] antidote, the [one which engenders] cheering up, and the examining [one], are included in the six contemplations [above, i.e., from the contemplation perceiving characteristics to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice].

[3.28.2.2. THE PRACTICE OF THE SEVEN CONTEMPLATIONS FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE REMAINING MEDITATIVE LEVELS]

[3.28.2.2.1. Introductory remarks]
Just as the attainment of the first absorption [is obtained] by means of the seven contemplations, so [is] the attainment of the second, third, and fourth absorptions [as well as] the attainment of the stations of [boundless] space, of [boundless] consciousness, of nothing whatsoever, and the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [obtained] by means of the same seven contemplations.

[3.28.2.2.2. The attainment of the second absorption]
The contemplation perceiving characteristics, [generated] for the attainment of the second absorption, is [that] by means of which [the ascetic] perceives the coarse characteristic in [the acts of] rough examination [and subtle investigation] as well as the serene characteristic in the second absorption, which has no rough examination [and subtle investigation]. He who has attained the first absorption, [and] has [indeed] obtained it, thus looks upon the coarseness in rough examination [and subtle investigation]: 'Rough examination is [the mental factor] which [although] pertaining to the level of concentrated [thought], operates on the meditative object unsteadily, and due to initially occurring, is coarse mental verbalisation with regard to the meditative object. Subtle investigation is [the mental factor] which is
connected to [and] follows this [rough examination] and is subtler mental verbalisation with regard to the meditative object [on which, however, it] similarly operates unsteadily. Furthermore, these [acts of] rough examination and subtle investigation are mental functions, arise when the mind arises, occur together [simultaneously] [with it], are united [with it], [and] operating on the same meditative object. Thus they arise internally [i.e., within the mental continuum], but are comprised in the external base. And all [these acts] verily [occur] in the past, future, and present, are produced from causes [and] conditions, are [characterised by] arising and decay, are temporary, appear for [only] a short while, cause agitation to the mind, are disturbing, manifest themselves as the absence of perfect serenity. If compared to the superior level, owing to the fact that [they are] associated with dwelling in suffering, they belong to the black [category] [and] are accompanied by only little joy and pleasure born from separation. And by its nature, this level is such that mental processes possessed of rough examination and subtle investigation constantly, ceaselessly operate for [one] dwelling in it, [and therefore, this level] is not serene, [not] completely serene. -- by such aspects and others, he should perceive the coarse characteristic in the [acts of] rough examination [and subtle investigation]. There is absolutely no coarse characteristic of this sort in the second absorption, which is not possessed of rough examination [and subtle investigation]. Therefore, the second absorption is serene due to the disappearance of this coarseness.

The remaining contemplations [generated] for the attainment of the second absorption should be properly understood as previous[ly explained for the first absorption].

[3.28.2.2.3. The attainment of the remaining absorptions and the immaterial stations]

The seven contemplations should properly be understood in the same way with respect to each level up to the attainment of the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation. Furthermore, the coarse characteristic with respect to all inferior levels up to the station of nothing whatsoever should, in brief, be understood as twofold: [it is characteristic] for the lower levels [1] that one dwells in more suffering and in less serenity and [2] that one has a shorter lifespan. [The ascetic] properly examines this twofold coarse characteristic by means of the six aspects with regard to whatever level he wishes to become detached from; and [regarding the levels] above, he properly examines the serene characteristic [through the seven contemplations] up to the contemplation representing the fruit of practice.

[3.28.3. Glosses upon the canonical formulae of the eight meditative attainments]

[3.28.3.1. FIRST ABSORPTION]
[3.28.3.1.1. Gloss upon 'separated from sensual pleasures']

'Separated from sensual pleasures': sensual pleasures are twofold, [i.e.,] defilement sensual pleasures and object sensual pleasures. Separation from sensual pleasures is also twofold, [i.e.,] separation from the union [with defilements] and separation from the object [of the sensual pleasures].
[3.28.3.1.2. Gloss upon ‘separated from bad and unwholesome factors’]

‘Separated from bad and unwholesome factors’: [bad and unwholesome factors] are secondary defilements, unwholesome factors which have their causes in sensual pleasures, to wit, [those factors which make] bodily misdeeds, verbal misdeeds, mental misdeeds, [such as] taking up a [stabbing] weapon, taking up a staff, strife, fight, quarrel, dispute, guile, deception, fraud, [and] untrue words occur. By abandoning these, [the ascetic becomes] separated from bad and unwholesome factors.

[3.28.3.1.3. Gloss upon ‘possessed of rough examination, possessed of subtle investigation’]

Due to not seeing [yet] the deficiency in rough examination and subtle investigation, [the first absorption is] ‘possessed of rough examination, possessed of subtle investigation’ in the form of [being accompanied by acts of] rough examination and subtle investigation pertaining to its own level, which are antidotes for sensual pleasures [and represent] wholesome [factors].

[3.28.3.1.4. Gloss upon ‘born of separation’]

Separation from sensual pleasures is [obtained with the achievement of] the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice. [Joy and pleasure] immediately arise from it, having it as its cause [and] condition. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘born of separation’.

[3.28.3.1.5. Gloss upon ‘joy and pleasure’]

Due to the achievement of the goal wished for [and] desired, due to not seeing [yet] the deficiency in joy, due to the disappearance of all noxiousness, [and] because of the [resulting] great mental and bodily malleability[, i.e.,] ease, [the first absorption is said to be characterised by] ‘joy and pleasure’. 

[3.28.3.1.6. Gloss upon ‘the first absorption’]

[It is called] ‘the first’ because one counts in regular order and because [by attaining it, the ascetic] rises up above the realm of sensual pleasures for the first time. [It is called] ‘absorption’ due to the correct reflection upon the meditative object as well as to being linked to [this object] by means of one-pointed mindfulness.

[3.28.3.1.7. Gloss upon ‘having attained’]

[In the canonical formula, it is said] ‘having attained’ because [the ascetic has reached] the state of [the contemplation which represents the] fruit of the culmination of the practice.

[3.28.3.1.8. Gloss upon ‘dwells’]

And subsequently, having completed the intense practice of meditative cultivation, [the ascetic is able to] obtain [the absorption at] will, [able to] obtain [it] without any labour, [able to] obtain [it] without any difficulty, and spends in this meditative attainment a whole night, a whole day, [or] when he wishes [so], as much as up to seven
nights and days. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘dwell’.\textsuperscript{174}

\textbf{[3.28.3.2. SECOND ABSORPTION]}

\textbf{[3.28.3.2.1. Gloss upon ‘due to the stilling of the rough examination and the subtle investigation, due to [achieving] inner clarity’]\textsuperscript{175}}

Having turned [his] mind away from the characteristics of the concentration possessed of rough examination and subtle investigation, [the ascetic] binds [his mind] to the characteristics of the concentration without rough examination and subtle investigation. Having discarded [withdrawn from] the meditative object unsteadily operating,\textsuperscript{176} owing to the [attainment of a] homogeneous [mental] state,\textsuperscript{177} [the ascetic] directs and fixes [his] mind, [which has become] serene and clear, to a meditative object steadily operating. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to the stilling of the rough examination and the subtle investigation, due to [achieving] inner clarity’.\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{[3.28.3.2.2. Gloss upon ‘due to the singleness of mind’]}

Because of the repeated cultivation of this very concentration without rough examination and subtle investigation, [the ascetic] transcends the stage [in which it is still] broken and interrupted by rough examination and subtle investigation\textsuperscript{179} and attains an unbroken and uninterrupted stage. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to the singleness of mind’.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{[3.28.3.2.3. Gloss upon ‘without rough examination, without subtle investigation’]}

[The second absorption is called] ‘without rough examination, without subtle investigation’ because of the complete abandonment of the rough examination [and] the subtle investigation.

\textbf{[3.28.3.2.4. Gloss upon ‘born of concentration’]}

Concentration is [obtained with the achievement of] the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice [at this meditative level]. Because it arises immediately after it, having it as its cause [and] condition, therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘born of concentration’.\textsuperscript{181}

\textbf{[3.28.3.2.5. Gloss upon ‘joy and pleasure’]}

Due to the achievement of the goal wished for and desired, due to not seeing [yet] the deficiency in joy, [the ascetic is] in [a state] accompanied by rejoicing and [mental] satisfaction, due to the disappearance of all noxiousness [which corresponds to] the category of the defilements of the first absorption [characterised by]\textsuperscript{182} rough examination and subtle investigation, due to being accompanied by pleasure [manifested as] mental and bodily malleability[, i.e.,] ease which counteracts this [noxiousness],\textsuperscript{183} [the canonical formula says,] ‘joy and pleasure’.\textsuperscript{184}

\textbf{[3.28.3.2.6. Gloss upon ‘the second’, etc.]}

[It is called ‘the second absorption’ because] it is ‘the second’ when counting in regular order. All [the remainder of the canonical formula] should be understood in the
same way as previously explained for the first absorption.

[3.28.3.3. THIRD ABSORPTION]

[3.28.3.3.1. Gloss upon 'due to detachment from joy']

[The ascetic] sees the deficiency in the characteristics of joy. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'due to detachment from joy'.

[3.28.3.3.2. Gloss upon 'dwell equanimous']

At this stage, for the ascetic exerting his mind on the third absorption, which is free from joy, the twofold defect causing agitation to the mind has disappeared, [to wit,] rough examination and subtle investigation [already] at [the level] the second absorption, and now joy. Therefore, it is said, 'dwell equanimous'. For these two factors are what causes agitation to the mind [and] acts as an impediment to uninterrupted equanimity. Concerning this point, in the first absorption, there are rough examination and subtle investigation, and therefore uninterrupted equanimity [can] not operate. In the second absorption, there is joy, and therefore uninterrupted equanimity [can] not operate here either. Therefore, this [kind of] equanimity does not exist in the first and second absorptions. Therefore, it is said that in the third absorption the meditator 'dwell equanimous'.

[3.28.3.3.3. Gloss upon 'mindful, discerning']

Being equanimous, he [can] dwell with his mindfulness fully manifested in such a way that those ideations and acts of attention accompanying joy do not appear. If, however, those ideations and acts of attention accompanying joy sometimes appear because of losing the mindfulness due to lack of [sufficient] practice, [the ascetic] quite swiftly comprehends them with his wisdom, quite correctly knows [them], and does not put up with [them] whenever they arise. [Instead,] he removes [them], brings [them] to an end, makes his mind indifferent [to them]. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'mindful, discerning'.

[3.28.3.3.4. Gloss upon 'free from joy']

At this stage, for the ascetic thus dwelling equanimous, mindful, [and] discerning, as a result of assiduous practice, of cultivation, of intense training, the feeling accompanied by joy, which has caused pleasurable excitement to the mind, is eliminated, and a feeling 'free from joy', serene, completely serene arises in his mind as remedy to joy.

[3.28.3.3.5. Gloss upon 'and he experiences pleasure with [his] body']

At this stage, he experiences pleasure as a feeling and pleasure as ease with his material body as well as his mental body. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'and he experiences pleasure with [his] body'.

[3.28.3.3.6. Gloss upon 'which the Noble Ones describe [with the words]"

"[he is] equanimous, mindful, dwelling in pleasure",

[he] dwells having attained the third absorption']

Below the third absorption, there is neither pleasure of this sort nor uninterrupted
equanimity. And above the third absorption, though equanimity is obtained, there is, however, no pleasure. Because below this [level both] pleasure and equanimity are absent and above [this level] pleasure is absent, it is this abode, i.e., the third absorption, 'which the Noble Ones describe (with reference to the person enjoying [dwell in] [its] obtainment) [with the words] "he is equanimous, mindful, dwelling in pleasure", [he] dwells having attained the third absorption'. Furthermore, 'Noble Ones' [refer to] the Buddhas and the Buddhas' disciples.

[3.28.3.4. FOURTH ABSORPTION]

[3.28.3.4.1. Gloss upon 'due to the abandonment of pleasure']

Due to the similarity of the antidote, the antidote [leading] to the abandonment of pleasure is not mentioned; only the abandonment of pleasure [to which] this antidote is applied is mentioned. But what is this antidote? It consists in equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment. Due to the repeated practice of this [antidote], [the ascetic who] has transcended the third absorption abandons pleasure, which pertains to the third absorption. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'due to the abandonment of pleasure'.

[3.28.3.4.2. Gloss upon 'due to the abandonment of pleasure and due to the abandonment of pain as well as due to the fact that [mental] satisfaction and dissatisfaction have already disappeared before']

At this stage, the meditator transcends [both] pleasure and pain. Therefore, summing up both what has been previously abandoned and what is now abandoned, [the canonical formula] thus says, 'due to the abandonment of pleasure and due to the abandonment of pain as well as due to the fact that [mental] satisfaction and dissatisfaction have already disappeared before'.

[3.28.3.4.3. Gloss upon 'neither painful nor pleasant']

Due to the abandonment of pleasure upon attaining the fourth absorption and of pain upon attaining the second absorption, due to the disappearance of [mental] satisfaction upon attaining the third absorption [and] of dissatisfaction upon attaining the first absorption, it is a fact that by now—due to the abandonment of pleasure and pain—only the feeling of neither-pain-nor-pleasure remains for him. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'neither painful nor pleasant'.

[3.28.3.4.4. Gloss upon 'pure with regard to equanimity and mindfulness']

At this stage, all defects pertaining to the lower levels beginning with the first absorption, to wit, rough examination, subtle investigation, joy, [and] breathing in and out have been abandoned. And due to their abandonment, the equanimity and mindfulness at this [level] are entirely pure, completely purified so that the mind of the [ascetic] who has attained the fourth absorption stands firm, immovable, with all unsteadiness vanished. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, 'pure with regard to equanimity and mindfulness'.
[3.28.3.4.5. Gloss upon ‘the fourth’, etc.]

‘The fourth’ should be understood as previous[ly explained] in the [case of the] first absorption, and so on.

[3.28.3.5. FIRST IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.5.1. Gloss upon ‘due to the surmounting of the ideation of matter’]

Due to the concentration upon the [infinity of] space, [the ascetic] has surmounted the ideation of colour linked with dark-blue, yellow, red, white, etc. in the sense that [in so far as] [these phenomena] do not manifest themselves [any longer] and in the sense of disgust [and] dispassion [towards matter]. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to the surmounting of the ideation of matter’.

[3.28.3.5.2. Gloss upon ‘due to the disappearance of the ideation of resistance’]

Due to the surmounting of these [ideations], owing to [their] lack of manifestation, the ideation of obstruction, which is of various sorts, of many, distinct kinds, [and] caused by the accumulation of [different] colour[s], has vanished, too. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to the disappearance of the ideation of resistance’.

[3.28.3.5.3. Gloss upon ‘due to not paying attention to the ideation of variety’]

And, furthermore, because of the vanishing of these, the ideations [based upon] accumulation which occur with respect to those differentiated combinations [still] remaining, to wit, ideations [such as] food, drink, carriage, clothes, ornament, house, park, forest, army, mountain, etc., to these, [he] gives absolutely no heed. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to not paying attention to the ideation of variety’.

[3.28.3.5.4. Gloss upon ‘infinite space’]

Having thus annihilated the ideations of matter, resistance, [and] variety, he concentrates upon space as being infinite. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘infinite space’.

[3.28.3.5.5. Gloss upon ‘dwells having attained the station of the infinity of space’]

Having transcended the liminal [attainment], after [the contemplation] attaining the culmination of the practice, he reaches the [attainment] proper which coincides with the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘[he] dwells having attained the station of the infinity of space’. As long as he does not reach [the attainment] proper, his meditative object [support] is the [infinite] space [only]. But when he has attained [it], [his meditative object] is this [infinite space] as well as the aggregates of his own level others than the [infinite space itself]. In [the case of] the liminal [attainment], however, [the meditative object] also [includes] the aggregates of lower levels.
[3.28.3.6. SECOND IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.6.1. Gloss upon ‘due to the complete surmounting of the station of infinite space, [thinking] “consciousness is infinite”’]

Wishing to attain the station of the infinity of consciousness [which corresponds] precisely [to] the consciousness focusing upon space as being infinite, by means of the consciousness through which he concentrated upon space [as being] infinite, he turns away [his mind] from the ideation of infinite space and concentrates upon that very consciousness as being infinite. He [then] surmounts the station of the infinity of space comprising both the liminal [attainment] [and] the [attainment] proper. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘due to the complete surmounting of the station of the infinity of space, [thinking] “consciousness is infinite”’.

[3.28.3.6.2. Gloss upon ‘dwells having attained the station of the infinity of consciousness’]

Having surmounted the liminal [attainment] of the station of the infinity of consciousness [which also coincides with the first six contemplations] up to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice, he reaches the [attainment] proper [which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘dwells having attained the station of the infinity of consciousness’.

[3.28.3.7. THIRD IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.7.1. Gloss upon the entire canonical formula]

[Prompted by the wish to] proceed upwards from the station of infinite consciousness, he seeks an object beyond consciousness, related to anything, whether material or not, but does not find [any]. Not finding such an object, he surmounts the station of infinite consciousness with its liminal [attainment] [as well as the attainment] proper and becomes convinced that there is no object whatsoever. Verily he [thus] becomes convinced of the ideation of nothing whatsoever. As a result of intensely practising the conviction of the ideation of nothing whatsoever, he surmounts the liminal [attainment] of the station of nothing whatsoever [which coincides with the six contemplations] up to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice and reaches the [attainment] proper [which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘Having completely surmounted the station of infinite consciousness, [thinking] “there is nothing whatsoever”, [he] dwells having attained the station of nothing whatsoever’.

[3.28.3.8. FOURTH IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENT]

[3.28.3.8.1. Gloss upon ‘neither ideation’]

[Prompted by the wish to] proceed upwards from the station of nothing whatsoever, [developing] the ideation of coarse[ness] [and] the ideation of detriment with regard to the ideation of the station of nothing whatsoever, he turns away [his mind] from the ideation of the station of nothing whatsoever.

Previously, at the time of the attainment of the station of nothing whatsoever, he surmounted the ideation of something; now he has surmounted the ideation of nothing whatsoever. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘neither ideation’, ['ideation’]
referring [here] to the ideation of something or the ideation of nothing whatsoever [both of which are now eliminated].

[3.28.3.8.2. Gloss upon ‘nor non-ideation’]

On the other hand, his ideation has not completely ceased as in the [attainment of] non-ideation or the attainment of cessation. It is nothing but [the fact that] this ideation is subtle [and] operates on [its] object without [grasping any] characteristic [/image]. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘nor non-ideation’.

[3.28.3.8.3. Gloss upon the entire canonical formula]

Having thus become convinced of this station, [he] surmounts the station of nothing whatsoever with [its] liminal [attainment] [and the attainment] proper as well as the liminal [attainment] of the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, [which coincides with the six contemplations] up to the contemplation attaining the culmination of the practice, and reaches [the attainment] proper [which coincides with] the fruit of the culmination of the practice. Therefore, [the canonical formula] says, ‘having completely surmounted the station of nothing whatsoever, [the ascetic] dwells having attained the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation’.

[3.28.3.9. CONCLUDING REMARKS]

At the time of the attainment of the absorptions, the sign [by which one knows that the absorptions take place] is that [his] body appears as if entering the lower [subterranean world of] Rasātāla; at the time of the immaterial attainments, [his body appears] as if flying up in the sky. In case [these signs appear], the right practice [is maintained] through looking [upon them] with indifference, by [keeping his mind in] a mode of tranquillity.

[3.28.4. The two attainments without mental activity]

[3.28.4.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS]

The two attainments without mental activity are the attainment of non-ideation and the attainment of cessation. Only ordinary people reach the attainment of non-ideation, [which is generated] by means of the contemplation which turns away from ideation; on the other hand, only the Noble Ones [can reach] the attainment of cessation. Entrance into these attainments is [brought about] by two contemplations, to wit, in the case of the attainment of non-ideation, by means of the contemplation which turns away from ideation; in the case of the attainment of cessation, by means of the contemplation which proceeds upwards from [the station of] neither ideation nor non-ideation and completely suppresses [any] object [from the mind].

[3.28.4.2. ATTAINMENT OF NON-IDEATION]

Having resorted to a contemplation which turns away from ideation [by thinking] that ‘ideation is [like] illness, ideation is [like] a boil, ideation is [like] an arrow; serene is this, exquisite is this, to wit, [the state of] non-ideation’ [the meditator] pursues [the practice of] non-mindfulness and non-attention with regard to whatever ideation arises. As a result of cultivation, [while] at [the stage of] the
preparatory path, the state connected with mental activity is still going on. But as soon as he has reached the attainment of non-ideation, his mind does not function any more. This cessation of all factors pertaining to the mind and the concomitant mental functions, thus generated in the meditator detached from the Heavenly World of the Splendid Perfection but not detached from the Heavenly World of the Great Reward by means of the contemplation preceded by the ideation of riddance, is called the attainment of non-ideation. And, furthermore, this is how he obtains this attainment.

**[3.28.4.3. ATTAINMENT OF CESSION]**

The Noble One who has attained the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, wishing to dweli in the supremely serene dwelling, makes his mind proceed upwards from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation. [His mind, driven to proceed upwards, does not find any object to support. Not finding any object, the mind ceases to operate], does not function any more. This cessation of all factors pertaining to the mind and mental concomitant functions, thus generated in the adept detached from the station of nothing whatsoever or in a Worthy One by means of the contemplation preceded by the ideation of dwelling temporarily in serenity, is called the attainment of cessation. And, furthermore, this is how he obtains this attainment.

**[3.28.5. The five supernatural faculties]**

**[3.28.5.1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS]**

The generation of the five supernatural faculties is achieved on the basis of the meditative attainments. And how is it achieved? It is achieved in the following way: the meditator first obtains the pure absorption. [Then] relying on this pure absorption, directing his mind by means of the attention pertaining to the level of concentrated thought precisely to a teaching whose chief topic is the achievement of the supernatural faculties [a teaching which he has listened to, grasped and mastered, to wit, a teaching with reference to the range of miraculous powers or the recollection of the previous lives, the divine ear, the knowledge of the deaths and births of all sentient beings, or the knowledge of the ways of thought of other sentient beings], he becomes thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning and thoroughly knowledgeable about the wording of the teaching. For the ascetic who is thus thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning, thoroughly knowledgeable about the wording of the teaching, who conditions his mind again and again in this way, as a result of intense training, there comes the time, there comes the right moment when the five supernatural faculties [which represent] the fruits of his cultivation, eventually arise.

**[3.28.5.2. THE TWELVE IDEATIONS]**

**[3.28.5.2.1. Enumeration of the ideations]**

Moreover, the ascetic thus thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning, thoroughly knowledgeable about the wording of the teaching, cultivates twelve ideations for the generation of all these supernatural faculties. The twelve ideations
are] as follows: the ideation of lightness, the ideation of softness, the ideation of the space realm [element], the ideation of the body-mind fusion, \(^{269}\) the ideation of conviction, \(^{260}\) the ideation [consisting in] the recollection of the succession of the acts previously experienced, the ideation of sound combinations and noises of different kinds, the ideation of the visible characteristic of light, the ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements, the ideation of the [eight] liberations, the ideation of the [eight] bases of mastery, and the ideation of the [ten] totalities. \(^{261}\)

**[3.28.5.2.2. Ideation of lightness]**

The ideation of lightness is that by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced of his own body \(^{262}\) being light as a \(\text{túla-cotton tuft}\) or a \(\text{karpāsa-cotton tuft}\) in the whirlwind. \(^{263}\) Becoming [completely] convinced [of this] in such a manner, he [can] make his own body move hither and thither by means of the same contemplation which has lead [him] to [attain] the conviction [of lightness]. Namely, [he can move his body] from the bed to the stool, [and then back] from the stool to the bed, [and in the same way, from the bed to the grass-seat, [and again back] from the grass-seat to the bed. \(^{264}\) \(^{265}\)

**[3.28.5.2.3. Ideation of softness]**

The ideation of softness is that by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced of [his] body being soft like silk or raw silk or woven silk. \(^{266}\) This ideation of softness thus [described] is [also] nourishing and facilitating for the ideation of lightness in such a way that being facilitated by it, the ideation of lightness becomes extensive, developed, and abundant.

**[3.28.5.2.4. Ideation of the space realm]**

The ideation of the space realm [element] is the ideation by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced of the lightness and softness of his own body. If he wishes to go somewhere, then by means of the contemplation leading to [this] conviction, he becomes convinced that any [kind of] matter \(^{267}\) which stands in-between [and] causes an obstruction to the movement is [just empty] space.

**[3.28.5.2.5. Ideation of the mind-body fusion]**

The ideation of the mind-body fusion is that by means of which the mind is fused into the body or the body into the mind, due to which [through which] his body becomes lighter, softer, more malleable, brighter, obedient to the mind, [perfectly] connected to the mind, [and] operates [entirely] depending upon the mind. \(^{268}\)

**[3.28.5.2.6. Ideation of conviction]**

[3.28.5.2.6.1. Definition]

The ideation of conviction is the ideation by means of which [the ascetic] becomes convinced that what is remote is near, what is near is remote, what is subtle is coarse, what is coarse is subtle, earth is water, water is earth. In the same way, it should be done with each element with regard to each other in full. \(^{269}\) Likewise, he also intensely envisages \(^{270}\) magical creations, be they magical creations of visible objects or magical creations of sounds. \(^{271}\)
3.28.5.2.6.2. Miraculous powers obtained through the mastery of the first five ideations

Thus, by means of these five ideations perfected through cultivation, [the ascetic] acquires a diverse range of miraculous powers: having been one, he manifests himself [his body] as many, to wit, by means of the ideation of conviction [with regard to magical] creations; then, having manifested himself [his body] as many, [he] becomes one, to wit, by means of the ideation of conviction which makes the [magical] creations disappear; with [his] body, [he can] pass unhindered through walls, mountains, ramparts, and so on; [he] emerges from and plunges into the ground as if into water; he walks on water without sinking as if on solid ground; [he] ascends into the sky cross-legged as if a winged bird; or [he] rubs and strokes with [his] hand the Sun and the Moon, which have such great majesty and potency; [he] wields power with his own body up to Brahma’s World. The ascetic does all this by means of the ideation of conviction assisted by the ideations of lightness, softness, space realm, and mind-body fusion—[this] should be understood in due order.

The wielding of power over Brahma’s World with [his own] body is of two sorts: [1] [he] wields power by [actually] going [there]; [2] and [he wields] power over the four elements and a part of the derived matter beneath the level of Brahma’s World by means of conviction [which works] according to [his] wish.

3.28.5.2.7. Ideation [consisting in] the recollection of the succession of the acts previously experienced

The ideation [consisting in] the recollection of the succession of the acts previously experienced is that by means of which [the ascetic] becomes aware of his whole life [lit., course of activity] which he has experienced so far from childhood onwards—as far as his memory can reach [back] and does not fail—to wit, where [he] has gone, stood, sat, lain, and so on in detail, recollecting each act clearly in due sequence and without omission. Due to the [assiduous] cultivation of this ideation, the fruit of the cultivation is [the ability to] ‘recollect [his] various previous lives [lit., habitations]’ [as described] in full detail in the canonical formula] up to ‘with [all their] aspects [and] particulars’.

3.28.5.2.8. Ideation of sound combinations and noises of different kinds

The ideation of sound combinations and noises of different kinds consists in the cultivation of [this] ideation after having grasped the characteristic of whatever noise arises, mixed or divers, of various groups of people sitting near meeting together in a village or a town or a guild or a townsmen’s assembly or [any other] gathering or a spacious house or an inner chamber (that which is called confused sound) or the noise of a flowing river. By means of this ideation, [the ascetic] keeps his mental focusing, through the attention pertaining to the concentrated level of thought, directed towards sounds noble, ignoble, divine, human, remote or near. Due to the assiduous practice of this ideation, he obtains the divine ear representing the fruit of the cultivation, through which [he can] hear sounds divine or human, whether they are remote or near.
[3.28.5.2.9. Ideation of the visible characteristic of light]

The ideation of the visible characteristic of light [is as follows]: having grasped the characteristic of light as previously explained, [the ascetic] directs [his] attention to this very characteristic. And having grasped the characteristic from a variety of sentient beings, [he] directs [his] attention to this very characteristic by distinguishing between the performance of wholesome and unwholesome acts, etc. This is the ideation of the visible characteristic of light. Due to the assiduous cultivation of this ideation, [he] obtains the knowledge of the deaths and births of all sentient beings [representing] the fruit of cultivation, through which [he can see] 'by means of the pure divine eye' [and so on, as described] in full detail [in the canonical formula] up to 'how sentient beings after the destruction of the body are born in a good destination, a heavenly world, amongst deities'.

[3.28.5.2.10. Ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements]

The ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements is that by means of which [the ascetic] observes and ascertains the peculiar physical condition of the sentient beings: of the impassioned, [of] the hateful, [of] the stupid, of those whose minds are enwrapped by defilements and secondary defilements such as wrath, enmity, concealing [one's faults], ardent desire, deceiving, dissimulation, lack of sense of shame and shameless behaviour. Such is the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of one who is passioned, to wit, [his] senses are agitated, [his] senses are excited, [and] he has a smiling face. Such is the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of one who is hateful, to wit, [his] face is pale, [he] speaks in convulsive utterances, [and] has a frown [on his face]. Such is the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of one who is stupid, to wit, [he is] tongue-tied, even if [he] ponders over the meaning, [he] is unable to understand [it], [and] he utters vulgar speech. Through these aspects thus described and the like, [the ascetic] directs his attention having grasped the characteristic from the peculiar physical condition, the specific change in the physical appearance of all types of persons up to one enwrapped by lack of sense of shame and shameless behaviour. Due to the assiduous practice of this ideation, there arises in him the knowledge of the others' ways of thought representing the fruit of cultivation, through which employing [his own] mind, [the ascetic] fully knows the mind, such as the rough thinking, the subtle thinking, and so on of other sentient beings, of other persons, as it is in reality.

[3.28.5.2.11. Ideation of the eight liberations, eight bases of mastery, and ten totalities]

The cultivation of the ideation of the eight liberations, eight bases of mastery, and ten totalities (which should be understood as previously explained), i.e., in the Level of Concentration, is the cultivation by which [the ascetic] generates noble miraculous power, such as that related to the transformation of things, that related to magical creations, that related to conviction [and further spiritual achievements] like freedom from impurity, cognition [arising from] the wish
[3.28.5.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS]
This is the difference between the noble and the ignoble miraculous powers: whatever thing [the ascetic] transforms, whatever magical creation [he] produces, of whatever [he] becomes convinced by means of the noble miraculous power, it actually becomes so, not otherwise. And all the [things thus created] can fulfil [their usual] function. On the other hand, [what is created] by means of the ignoble [miraculous power] verily does not become so but appears merely as a magician’s show. It should be known that in such a way [the ascetic] generates the five supernatural faculties by means of these twelve ideations, due to assiduous practice [and] according to what is suitable in each case, and [he also generates] according to what is suitable in each case the noble qualities not [held] in common with ordinary people.

[3.28.6. Rebirth in different heavenly worlds in accordance with the meditation level]

[3.28.6.1. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE FIRST ABSORPTION]
Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the first absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-born] in the community [category] of the Brahma’s Retinue deities, of the Brahma’s Ministers [deities], and of the Great Brahma [deities].

[3.28.6.2. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE SECOND ABSORPTION]
Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the second absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-born] in the community of the Small Light deities, of the Boundless Light [deities], and of the Radiant Brightness [deities].

[3.28.6.3. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE THIRD ABSORPTION]
Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the third absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-born] in the community of the Small Splendour deities, of the Boundless Splendour [deities], and of the Splendid Perfection [deities].

[3.28.6.4. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE FOURTH ABSORPTION]
Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised the fourth absorption slightly, intermediately, [or] intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-born] in the community of the...
Unclouded deities, of the Merit-Abundance [deities], and of the Great Reward [deities].
If, furthermore, a Non-Returner practises the contaminated [fourth absorption] [in such a way that it is] mixed with the non-contaminated fourth absorption, [then depending on whether he] has practised this [method], slightly, intermediately, intensely, more intensely [or] most intensely, [he] is accordingly [re-born] in the community of the deities of the five Pure Abodes, to wit, amongst the Not-[Ful]-ly-Prosperous ones, the Untormented ones, the Good-Looking ones, the Good- Appearing Ones, [and] the Highest Ones.

[3.28.6.5. HEAVENLY WORLDS CORRESPONDING TO THE IMMATERIAL ATTAINMENTS]
[Depending on whether the ascetic] has practised [the attainments of] the stations of [the infinity of] space, of [the infinity of] consciousness, of nothing whatsoever, [and] of neither ideation nor non-ideation slightly, intermediately [or] intensely, [he] is [re-born] in the community of the deities belonging to the stations of [the infinity of] space, of [the infinity of] consciousness, of nothing whatsoever, [and] of neither ideation nor non-ideation [respectively]. And [since] these deities are immaterial, there exists, therefore, no difference caused by dissimilarity in the [physical] place, but there is [only] specificity determined by the [nature of the] dwelling [itself].

[3.28.6.6. HEAVENLY WORLD CORRESPONDING TO THE ATTAINMENT OF NON-IDEATION]
[If the ascetic] has practised the attainment of non-ideation, [he] is [re-born] in the community of the deities [who are] beings without ideation.

[3.28.7. Characteristics of the person detached from sensual pleasures]

What are the characteristics of one who is detached from sensual pleasures? Answer: He has calm bodily actions, immovable senses, and his position [is kept as long as necessary and] does not quickly come to an end. He [can] spend a long time in the same position without being weary and does not eagerly desire [to shift it] quickly [to] another position. And he is soft-spoken, quiet-spoken, and does not delight in crowds, does not delight in associating [with people], and his way of speaking is firm. Having seen with [his] eyes visible objects, he perceives [them merely as] visible objects [and] does not experience [lit., perceive] [any] passion for [these] visible objects. In the same way, he perceives sounds, smells, tastes, [and] tangible objects but [experiences no passion at all for sounds, and so on.] up to no passion at all for tangible objects. And he is fearless, has profound understanding, is possessed of an all-embracing ease in [his] mind and body, is uncovetous, not agitated, patient, and no thoughts [directed at] sensual pleasures, etc. disturb his mind. The characteristics of one who is detached from sensual pleasures should thus be known as [comprising] such features.

* This first [chapter of Yogasthāna IV] thus [set forth] above is the detailed exposition of the proceeding by the mundane path.
NOTES

1 The English translation follows the text of the Sanskrit critical edition. Divergences in the Tibetan and Chinese renderings are recorded in the footnotes to the respective editions and, whenever relevant to the understanding of the original, are also discussed in the endnotes to the English translation. Textual unit digits and paragraphs correspond to the division adopted throughout the trilingual edition. (For the explanation of the text division and unit numeration, see Editing Conventions). The titles of the subchapters, sections, subsections, etc. belong to me and, like all other additions and clarifications in the English translation, are inserted within square brackets. If the literal sense of a word appears to be relevant for the context, I write it in square brackets and abbreviate it as: ‘[lit.,’’]’ or explain it in an endnote. Whenever the meaning of a term, phrase, or sentence can be construed in more than one way, I insert such semantic alternatives within square brackets preceded by a slash: ‘[/ ]’ or ‘(or: ).’ Difficult cases of interpretation of such semantic alternatives are discussed in the endnotes. For the basic principles underlying my translation style, see Part One, Introduction.

2 The Skt. sentence begins with tatra. Quite frequently, in philological treatises and exegetical works, this word has no other semantic and stylistic value than to announce the beginning of a passage, paragraph, or entry. Here as well as in most similar occurrences below, I do not translate it. Simply starting a new paragraph or passage in the English translation is sufficient to convey the semantico-stylistical functions of tatra. However, when required by the wording or when it has (what I perceive to be) a stronger sense, I render the word as ‘herein’, etc.

3 Skt. gati. The nuances of this word, alongside other lexemes of the same semantic family, are discussed in Gonda’s “Ways” in Indian Religions” (1975, 317-336; for gati, see pp. 331-334). Amongst the connotations relevant to our passage, the following should be mentioned: ‘way’, ‘journey’, ‘movement’, ‘course’, ‘going to’, or attainment of (a goal), and ‘the right way or course’. According to Gonda, the term also means ‘mode of existence’ (p. 331), ‘transmigration’, ‘goal’, ‘state’ (p. 333), etc. Its primary semantic field, however, is permeated by dynamism, which Gonda describes as the ‘force inherent in the nouns in -ti’ (ibid., p. 332). On the suffix -ti, see also Wackernagel and Debrunner [1954] 1987, vol. II, p. 622ff.

Gonda translates gati in its Buddhist sense of five or six destinations in the cycle of rebirths as ‘mode of existence’ (p. 331). However, it can be argued that here, too, the meaning of the term is rather that of ‘where one goes’ (or: may go), being similar in its morpho-semantic structure to nouns like vasati- which heij in der ältesten Sprache „Nest, Behausung” (Wackernagel and Debrunner [1954] 1987, vol. II, p. 635), kṣiti- “Wohnstätte” (ibid., p. 636), etc.

4 I translate the Sanskrit yogin as ‘yogi’, a word which has now become a well-established part of the modern English lexicon (albeit its frequent association with Hindu or calisthenics yoga). On the other hand, I render yogācāra as ‘ascetic’. Our text does not seem to make a doctrinally relevant distinction between the two words, but I found it useful to preserve a lexical difference in the translation. On the three classes of yogācāra, see SrBh Shukla ed., pp. 284-285 (= SrBh, Wayman, p. 95). We owe the best and most comprehensive survey of the word yogācāra in Buddhist literature to Jonathan Silk (2000).

The main hero of the spiritual saga depicted in the SrBh as well as the grammatical subject of many of its sentences is this yogācāra or yogin. When using a personal pronoun to refer to its main hero, the SrBh invariably employs the masculine form of sa (obviously, in various grammatical cases). By modern standards, this usage may be taken as betraying sexist prejudices. The authors of the SrBh do not express their views on the capability of female
meditators to practise and accomplish spiritual achievements, and this makes it difficult to determine with precision their position on this issue. Judging, however, from other sources, there is no doubt that female ascetics did exist and were active in the Buddhist community (for some examples of yogācārā or yogācārā bhikṣuṇī, see Silk 2000, 283-284). There are no cogent reasons to believe that they practiced a different system of spiritual cultivation. It is, therefore, quite possible, that in spite of their biased usage of the personal pronoun, the ŚrīBh authors may have conceived of their spiritual path as equally open to female ascetics. As to my own usage, I have consistently used ‘he’ throughout the translation. The reason is simple: my task here is, I believe, to offer a replica as faithful as possible of the original and not to impose my views on it. Needless to say that I am personally convinced that female ascetics are as capable as their male counterparts to practise spiritual cultivation and attain its highest fruits and that this ought to be stylistically reflected or at least clearly stated.

5 We find a similar expression at ŚrīBh-Gr (18) 8, 12-10, 2: yo labdhamanaskārasyordhvaṁ lauikikena mārgena gacchato lokottareṇa vā yo laksāṇapratisaiṇvedī manaskārāḥ.

6 Ski. manaskāra is a key concept in the ŚrīBh. The term is polysemic, and there are different types of manaskāra classified into various taxonomic sets (e.g., ŚrīBh Sh ed. 278-280 = W 94-95; see also my Synoptic Presentation). Here, the ŚrīBh seems to refer to the preceding passage in Yogāsthāna III which speaks of ‘the attention pertaining to the concentrated level of the material sphere’ rūpāvacāro […] samāhitabhūmiko manaskārāḥ (MS 113a3L; Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 28, ll. 5-6; cf. Sh 443, 16-17, who reads rūpārtha[ā]nuro—i t is true that ‘sa’ in rūpāvacāro has a longer (accidental?) upper stroke, but this has nothing to do with Shukla’s reading; rūpāvacāro is guaranteed by Tib. gzugs na spyod pa (text edited in Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 65, ll. 16-17) and Ch. 色界 (T30.465a4)).

The term manaskāra is usually translated in modern Buddhist studies as ‘attention’, ‘mental orientation’, etc. In Abhidharma literature, it represents an important psychological function and doctrinal category. The Kośa lists manaskāra as one of the eleven mahābhūmikas or functions omnipresent in all mental activity (sarvacetasī) (cf. AKBh 54, 17: kārikā II, 24). AKBh 54, 23 defines it as: manaskāraś cetasa ābhogaḥ, ‘manaskāra refers to the orientation of the mind’. The equivalent passage in Xuanzang’s translation reads: 作意謂能合心警覺 or ‘manaskāra means that by which the mind is made to be alert’ (T29.19a21). De la Vallée Poussin renders the sentence as ‘le manaskāra est l’inflexion (ābhoga) de la pensée (cetas)’ (Poussin vol. 1, p. 154). The basic meaning of ābhoga, which comes from √ bhuj, is ‘bending’, ‘curve’, or ‘winding’. In the above context, it refers to directing or applying the mind on a cognitive object. One could also say that ābhoga represents an ‘effort’ (which is actually one of the derived senses of the word!) made in order ‘to curve’ or ‘to bend’ the mind into the desired form.

An identical definition is found at Trim 29,11-12 (cf Tiwary ed. 1967, 40). Shrīramati continues: ābhujanam ābhogaḥ. ālimbhe yena cittam abhimukhiḥ. sa punar ālimbhe cittadhārāpanakarmā. ‘Orientation means being directed. It is that by which the mind is made to face the object. Furthermore, its function is to keep the mind fixed unto the object.’ The parallel passage in Xuanzang’s translation of the Viṃśaptīvatātāsidhī reads: 作意謂能警心為性。於所緣境引心為業。 (T31.11c6) ‘The nature of attention is its being able to alert the mind. Its function is to keep the mind fixed to the object’. (cf. Cook tr. 1999, 69, for a somewhat different rendering).

As far as the above sense is regarded, manaskāra can certainly be translated as ‘attention’ or ‘mental orientation’. When clearly referring to this psychological function, I also translate manaskāra as ‘attention’. However, rendering manaskāra in the sapta manaskārāḥ, the key conceptual and technical framework of Yogāsthāna IV in the ŚrīBh, as ‘attention’ or ‘mental orientation’ would not convey its full and exact meaning. Manaskāra is here more than what
'attention' usually means in English. It represents the very backbone of the spiritual practice leading the yogi to the mastery of the eight meditative attainments (the mundane path) or to the realisation of the Four Noble Truths and consequent Liberation (the supramundane path). Though not common in modern Buddhist studies, translating it as 'contemplation' does, I believe, more justice to this sense. Rendering one word in the source-language by means of two or more different terms in the target-language may upset our sense of balance and uniformity, but such an approach seems unavoidable in quite a few cases. To the extent translation can be said to represent an art, criticism for lack of perfect equivalence may be justifiable (though this is, admittedly, a classicist argument for uniformity, which a romantic would anyway repudiate!). To the extent translation can be declared to come closer to science, I think there are no a priori reasons which would invalidate the fact that different connotations of one word in the source-language may be reflected by different terms when the target-language has no lexeme sharing a similar or quasi-similar semantic sphere.

A similar rendering for manaskāra is actually used by Schmithausen (1987a). Other solutions include those put forward by Griffiths (1983, 426-432) and Choi (2001, 77-86). In his translation of a passage in the AbhSamBh parallel to the ŚrīBh (see below), Griffiths renders manaskāra as 'act of attention'. This seems to me rather weak to convey the sense of intense and repeated exercise which manaskāra implies. Choi’s translation of manaskāra in the Xianyang lun passages parallel to the ŚrīBh (see below) as Konzentrationsakt may be appropriate for the German language, but in English, 'concentration act' or even 'concentration' do not appear to convey the whole intensity of the Sanskrit term.

Rendering manaskāra as 'contemplation' cannot be said, however, to constitute a perfect solution. The English word 'contemplation' is itself full of connotations, and some of them are counterproductive to the meaning of manaskāra. Christian mystics and philosophers like Richard of St Victor, St Thomas Aquinas, St John of the Cross tend to speak of 'meditation' as a diligent investigation of an object or doctrine and 'contemplation' as an intuitive grasp of the truth accompanied by a state of spiritual bliss (for a discussion of the words 'meditation' and 'contemplation' as well as the way they are rendered in the context of Indian religion, see Bader 1990, 25-32). In Christian terminology, manaskāra would rather correspond (though not perfectly and not at all its stages) to 'meditation', but to me, the latter term seems too broad. I shall therefore reserve the word for a more general usage. Besides, leaning too much towards the traditional Christian vocabulary is not perhaps the most felicitous choice when dealing with Indian spirituality. Furthermore, nowadays Christian terminology may often sound abstruse and irrelevant, and many of us may feel more at home with modern psychological categories rather than with theological distinctions. After all, readers of Buddhist literature and studies do not necessarily share the same cultural background which would make Christian vocabulary an exclusive terminological standard.

Closely connected with manaskāra, both in terms of psychological function and manner of translation, is samādhi, itself far from being a monolithic word. Samādhi in Buddhist literature has witnessed a long and diverse history of denotations and connotations (for a discussion of samādhi in Buddhist sources, especially in early Prajñāpāramitā literature, see Deleanu 2000, 72-75). In the Kośa, samādhi is included together with manaskāra in the same group of eleven universal (or omnipresent) mental functions (mabhāhāmā). Its definition is: 'samādhi means focusing of the mind' samādhis cittasyaikāgratā. (AKBh 54,23-24). When speaking of samādhi as a universal mental function, I render it as 'concentration'. Samādhi in a more general sense of spiritual training will be translated as 'meditation' (see, for instance, 'right meditation' (samyaksamādhi) in the noble eightfold path (āryaṣṭāgamārga)). In a Mahāyāna context, especially in the Prajñāpāramitā mysticism, samādhi should be rendered as 'contemplation'. (This overlaps with one of the equivalents for manaskāra in the ŚrīBh, but in the present book,
there is no context which requires to distinguish between the two Sanskrit words used in this sense.)

For a study of the seven contemplations in the SamBh (also compared with the SrBh), see Gengitani 1994.

7 Cf. SrBh Sh, 433, 3-6; Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 27, ll. 6-9.

In the Lam rim chen mo (Kelsang and Odani 1991 ed., 109, 11-13), Tsong-kha-pa, making a direct reference to the sentence here (Rnyoi 'byor gyi gnas bzhis ba'i mgor ‘at the beginning of Yogasthāna IV’), states that after the (presentation of the) attainment of the (basic level of) contemplation, the mundane and the supramundane paths are expounded.

8 See the definition of the two paths in Yogasthāna I (SrBh-Gr 60-61). Cf. also T43.119c7ff. For general presentations of the two paths, see Poussin vol. 4, pp. 119-120; Griffiths 1983, 212ff; Gunaratana 1985, 175ff; etc. Many important aspects connected to the history of the two paths have been brilliantly analysed by Frawallner (1995, Chapter VII ‘The Abhismayāda’).

9 The levels of practitioners in the SrBh are defined as beginners (ādikarmika), adepts (kṛtaparicaya), and practitioners who have transcended the practice of contemplation (atikrāntamanaskāra) (SrBh-Gr (18) 22-26) (see also note 28 to Chapter One, Part One). The first category is subdivided into beginners in concentration (manaskārādikarmika), who cannot experience the focusing of the mind (cittākāgratām na sprāsati) (SrBh-Gr (18) 22, 6-7), and beginners in the purification of defilements (klāśavistuddhyādikarmika) (SrBh-Gr (18) 22, 8-11). The latter, though having attained concentration (adhigatae 'pi manaskāre) (SrBh-Gr (18) 22, 8), have not yet put into practice their meditative capabilities of eliminating mental defilements, which is the real aim of spiritual cultivation. Thus, they embark upon the purification of defilements by ‘generating, grasping, and training in the contemplation of perceiving characteristics of that [object meditated upon]’ (vyul laksanapratisāmyvedino manaskārasyārambhah pratigrahaḥ cābhyaśāh) (SrBh-Gr (18) 22, 9-10). According to this taxonomy, the novice ascetic in our passage seems to have already graduated, so to speak, from the first level of spiritual apprenticeship and, now able to focus his or her mind, will undertake the first of the seven contemplations (i.e., laksanapratisāmyvedi manaskāraḥ) either on the mundane or on the supramundane path.

10 ‘The novice yogi who has [attained] contemplation’ (ayaṁ yogi ādikārmikah samanaskāro) is defined in the preceding passage in Yogasthāna III (Sh 433, 14-18; Sakuma vol. 2, p. 28, ll. 4-7).

11 Skt. bahulikaroti ‘intensely practise’ (or: ‘to devote oneself’, as rendered in PED, s.v.). The compound often appears in the stock phrase āsavetabbaṁ bhāvetabbaṁ bahulikātabbaṁ (e.g., MN I 454, 24; etc.) usually describing meditative training. See PTS Concordance vol. 1, p. 350 (s.v. āsavati) and vol. 3, p. 361 (s.v. bahulikāta, bahulikaroti, etc.).

12 This, too, seems to refer to rūpāvacāro […] samāhīthāmiko manaskārah (see note 6 above).

13 For a similar expression in the SrBh, see Sh 410, 10ff.

14 The direct reference seems to be to the ‘small degree of bodily ease, mental ease, [and] focusing of the mind’ (parittā kāya-prasārabhaḥ cittra-prasārabhaḥ cittākāgratā) which is mentioned at Sh 443, 21 (=MS 113a3R-113a4L). These concepts are discussed in a passage in Yogasthāna III, immediately preceding the present chapter (MS 112b5R-113a1M; Sh 432, 8-433, 18; Sakuma vol. 2, p. 26, l. 2- p. 28, l. 7).

For the preparatory part of the yogi’s training, see Synoptic Presentation above.

15 For different types of adhimokṣa in our text, see Sh 281-283.

More than 70 years ago, de la Vallée Poussin remarked, ce terme fait difficulté (Poussin vol. 1, p. 154, n. 5). After a detailed examination of quite a few Buddhist sources, the Belgian scholar
opts for ‘approbation’. Adopted as such, an English rendering like ‘approbation’ does not seem, however, to fit very well, at least not in a context like ours (see below for other translations employed by de la Vallée Poussin).

AKBh 54, 23, defines the term as: adhimokṣa ‘dhimuktih. The latter word is glossed upon by Yaśomitra as follows: ‘ascertainment (adhimukti) means the accurate determination (avadhārana) of an object in terms of its qualities. According to other [schools or exegetes], it means delight (ruṣi); according to ascetics, it is meditating in conformity with one’s decision (niścaya) [as to how the object should be viewed]’ (adhimuktiś tadālambanasya guṇato ‘vadhāraṇam. ruṣir ity anye. yathāniścayam dhāraṇeti yogācāracittāḥ; AKVy 128, 2-4). (The compound yogācāracittāḥ is also seen at AKVy 126, 24, but though not impossible, it might be be corrupt reading to be emended to *yogācāracintāḥ ‘those whose reflection is upon spiritual practice’; cf. Tib. rna’i ‘byor spyod pa sens par byed pa dag D Gu 116a7 = AKVy 128, 4, and D Gu 115a1 = AKVy 126, 24.) Skt. avadhārana and niścaya are equally hard to render, but both words appear to convey the point of reaching ascertainment or cognitive decision as to what the object in question actually is. De la Vallée Poussin translates here avadhārana as ‘considération’ but, more precisely, the Sanskrit term represents the moment of attaining certainty rather than the whole process of consideration. Let us note, however, that in his translation of the Vijñaptimārtatāsiddhi, de la Vallée Poussin translates avadhārana as ‘determination’ (de la Vallé Poussin tr. 1928, vol. 1, p. 257), which is more precise. (In the same translation we find, however, the same term rendered ‘jugement’; see ibid., vol. 1, p. 310). As for ruṣi, which appears to be another sense of adhimukti, it probably refers in this context to the ‘delight’ or satisfaction of reaching ascertainment concerning the cognitive object.

In his commentary on the Trīṃśikā, Sthiramati says: ‘Ascertainment (adhimokṣa) means accurate determination (avadhārana) in perfect accordance [with the reality] (tathāyāvata) regarding an entity which is definitely known (niścīte vastūni). The word “definitely known” (niścīta) means the negation of “[that which is] not definitely known” (aniścīta). An entity which from the point view of reasoning (yuṣṭi) or of the Trustworthy Teaching (ātopadesa) [i.e., the Buddhist doctrine], admits of no doubt is [said to be] definitely known. The firm establishment (abhinivesāna) of the entity in the mind by exactly (eva) that aspect by which it has become definitely known, aspects such as impermanence, suffering, etc., is the precise determination (avadhārana) that “this is such and not otherwise”, [which is called] ascertainment (adhimokṣa). And its effect is to confer immutability (asamānātāyata). For the man who excels in ascertainment cannot be turned away from his own well-established doctrine by opponents [belonging to] other [schools].’ (adhimokṣa niścīte vastūni tathāvādāvadhāraṇam (Lévi: ॐavadhāraṇam). niścītāgraḥaṇam anisūcitapratiṣedhārtham (Lévi: ॐarthaṁ). yuktī ātopadesāto va yad vastu asamīdghān diam niścītam, yenaivākāraṇa tān niścītam anityaduḥkhāyākāreṇa tenaiyākāraṇa tasya vastunāṃ cetasy abhinivesānam ’evaṃ etan nāyathā’ ity (Lévi: nāyathety) avadhāraṇam adhimokṣaḥ. sa ca asamānātāyatañkarmakāh. adhimuktipradhāno hi svasiṣṭhānāt para-pravādibhir aparāhártaṁ na śākyate. (Trim 25, 25-30 = MS D10b1-b3, in Mimaki Katsumi, Tachikawa Musashi, and Yuyama Akira, eds. 1989) (the punctuation in the citation above belongs to me). Amongst the modern translations of adhimokṣa in this passage (Ui tr. 1952, 60; Tiwary tr.1967, 53; Aramaki tr. 1976, 90; Lévi 1932, 84-85), Lévi’s ‘conviction’ and Aramaki’s 確信 ‘ascertainment’ are worth mentioning. Here it may be of interest to have a look at a Hindi translation, too. The first sentence of the citation above reads in Tiwary’s rendering: ‘making an accurate determination of an object which is ascertained in exactly that manner is ascertainment’ (niścīt vastū kā usi prakāṛ avadhāraṇ karnā hi adhimokṣ hai). (McGregor 1993, s.v., renders the modern Hindi terms avadhāraṇ as ‘ascertainment, accurate determination’, and niścīt as ‘ascertained, not subject to doubt’.) It should not be noted that the key Sanskrit terms remain untranslated, a practice which reminds,
muatis mutandis, of the Japanese *kundoku* 訓讀 translation of Classical Chinese.

In Xuanzang’s translation of the *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論, we also find a long section dedicated to the explanation of the term. Let us quote here the most relevant part: ‘What is ascertainment (*adhimokṣa 背解)?’ Its nature is accurate determination (*avadhāraṇa 印持) regarding an object which is definitely known (*niścīte vastuni 於決定境). Its effect is [cognitive] immutability (*asamārāyatā 不可引轉). By virtue of the evidence 證 [coming from] the [transmitted] Teaching (*āgama 教) and reasoning (*yukti 理), be it correct or false, one judges and determines with regard to a cognition object. On this account, other reasons (異緣) cannot [intervene and cause any] change [in cognition]. In the case of an object of doubt, ascertainment (*adhimokṣa 背解) is completely absent, as it is also absent when the mind is uncertain.’ (云何勝解？於決定境，印持為性。不可引轉為業。謂邪正等教理論力。於所取境，審決印持。由此異緣不能引轉。故猶豫境，勝解全無，非審決心，亦無勝解。T31.28b10-13) (cf. de la Vallée Poussin 1928 tr., vol. 1, p. 310; Cook tr. 1999, 167). The characters 教理證 can be interpreted in two ways. In the *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記, Ji (T43.429b12-21) understands it as transmitted teaching (*āgama), reasoning (*yukti), and perception (*pratyākṣa). He defines 證 as the direct perception obtained through the cultivation of meditation or by means of the various cognitive faculties (證者即修禪定，或諸識現量等; T43.429b18-19). The traditional KIK rendering (*hīga-bu 瑜伽部 Section, vol. 7, p. 132) as well as modern translators like de la Vallée Poussin and Cook construe the compound similarly. This is, no doubt, a semantically and doctrinally viable alternative. I think, however, that it is also possible to take 證 as ‘evidence’ and regard it as the head of a genitive construction governing ‘teaching’ 教 and ‘reasoning’ 理. This reading is actually supported by Sthiramati’s text cited above, which I follow here. We should also take into account the fact that Xuanzang’s usual rendering of *pratyākṣa* is 現 or 現量. Another possibility, which practically amounts to a similar conclusion, is that 理證 is a binome rendering *yukti*. Such a usage is actually seen in Xuanzang’s translation of the *Kōsa* (e.g., T29.87c2). The latter possibility has, however, the disadvantage of presupposing for the passage here a stylistic asymmetry (a one-character word 教 vs a binomic lexeme 理證).

Systematical and detailed as they may be, these Abhidharmic definitions do not, however, exhaust the semantic sphere of *adhimukti*. The word is also used in the sense of ‘strong inclination’ or ‘zealous application’ (see Edgerton’s illuminating entries on *adhimukti*, *adhimuksa*, *adhimucaye*, *āśu*, etc. in BHSD, s.v.). Its usage in texts and passages dedicated to spiritual cultivation, the Śrībh included, seems to be too wide to be captured by only one term. *Adhimukti* seems to encompass here three closely connected mental processes: (1) the yogi’s effort to apply himself intently upon his meditative object; (2) the ability to represent the object mentally (frequently as prescribed by the Buddhist doctrine rather than as simply reflected by direct perception) (cf. Schmithausen 1982b, 67); and (3) the capacity to internalise it, i.e., to become convinced of this representation. A very good illustration on how actually *adhimokṣa* operates in meditation is found at AKBh 338, 2-18. In this passage, Vasubandhu describes how the ascetic (*yogācāra*) contemplates the impure (*asubhā*) first by concentrating on a certain spot (of his own choice) on his body and then visualising its flesh as undergoing putrefaction, falling off (in view of Tib. *myags zhiṅ pa zags* and Xuanzang’s Ch. 瘋堕, Pradhan’s *kledapitā* (MS reading is not certain; see p. 338, n. 3) should be emended to *kledapāṇa*; see also Silk 2000, p. 289, n. 87), and eventually the whole body becoming a skeleton. Then the yogi proceeds by becoming convinced (*adhimucaye*; or as Silk 2000, 289, renders, ‘zealeously applies his attention [to visualize...]’) that the monastery, the region where here lives, and finally the whole
earth surrounded by the ocean is filled with skeletons. Obviously, in such cases, the ascertainment is not that of a directly perceived reality but of an image induced by meditation.

In most (but not all) occurrences below, I shall render adhimokṣa as ‘conviction’ and adhimucyate as ‘becoming convinced’, but it should be borne in mind that the semantic sphere of the word is much wider. Unfortunately, the English term ‘conviction’ stresses more the result rather than the entire psychological process implied by adhimokṣa. See also notes 209, 246, and 270 below.

The term adhimokṣa is discussed in Sakurabe 1997, 34-39; Schmithausen 1982, 408-409; Odani 2000, 206-209; etc.

16 The meditative object (ālambana) basically refers to impurity (asubhā), friendliness (maitrī), dependent origination (idānypratyayatāpratityasamutpāda), analysis of the elements (dhātuṣprabheda), and mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmiti) which are discussed in Yogasthāna III, Subchapter 3.26.2., etc. (see Synoptic Presentation above) (Sh 411, 5 ff.).

17 Skt. nimitta. For different types of nimitta in our text, see Śrbh Sh 280-281; 411, 5 ff. and W 122. See also the typology in the SamBh (pp. 122-128), where 32 categories of nimitta are defined. For nimitta described in the context of the five categories (pañca vastūni) in the Viniścayaśāsanāgrahaṇi, see Kramer ed. and tr. 2005 (Tibetan text: pp. 75-76, etc.; German translation: pp. 112-115, etc.; and discussion: pp. 26-34). On the relation between nimitta and vastu in the YoBh, see Motomura 2005. More details and bibliographic information, see Section II, Chapter Five, Part One above. More generally on the meaning of nimitta in Buddhist literature, see Yokoyama 1976b.

The term has a wide range of meaning, and even in the particular context of meditation, its precise denotation and connotations are not easy to determine. A concise but very useful discussion of its usage in the Śrbh and related texts is found in Schmithausen 1982a, p. 63, n. 15a (also containing references to relevant modern studies). In its basic usage, nimitta refers to the characteristic(s)/mark(s)/sign(s) (as directly perceived but more often as defined a priori by the Buddhist doctrine) which is/are grasped and internalised through meditation or reflection. This ‘characteristic’ means, to use Schmithausen’s terminology (ibid.), sometimes the actual form in which the meditation object appears to the yogi (Erscheinungsform des Übungssubjektes) and sometimes the mental image grasped from the representation of this appearance (das in die Vorstellung aufgenommene Bild dieser Erscheinungsform). This mental image can pass through various stages of refinement. The locus classicus explaining them and how they are produced is the Vism (see especially, p. 101, § 27 - p.104, § 41).

In what follows, I shall usually translate nimitta as ‘characteristic’. This ‘characteristic’ is often handled by the meditator as a mental image (whether directly perceived or represented) or as a support for further reflection.

18 Skt. śamathavipāṣyanāpaksyāc ca is an ablative followed by ca and not a nominative plural with ca (i.e., śamathavipāṣyanāpaksyaś ca) as construed by Wayman (see also note 7 to Skt. crit. ed.). The ablative reading is guaranteed by other similar occurrences in the Śrbh. We have, for example, tatra maitrijhāvānāprayuktiṇdīkarīkena bahirdhā mitrapakṣād mitrapakṣād udāśinapakṣāc nimittmā udghṛtya […] (MS 111b2M; here I follow the edited text in Maithrimurthi 1999, 281, German tr., 301; cf. Sh 426,20-427,1). The Chinese rendering 於奢摩他品及毘鉾舎那品善取其相 may also suggest a similar reading (於 usually renders locative but is also used for ablative; cf. BDJ, s.v.). The Tibetan translators may have chosen a less literal rendering here: zhi gnas dang lhag mthong gi phyogs kyi mthsan ma rnam kyang yongs su zin par gyur pa ‘having also seized the characteristics of the category of tranquillity and insight’.

19 Skt. prayogam ārabhate ‘undertakes the practice’. The term prayoga often has the sense of ‘preparatory practice’, but as clearly stated at the beginning of this passage, our ascetic has
already reached a basic level in meditative training. A large part of Yogasthāna III actually details the preparatory exercises which the yogi is supposed to practise. Now it is time for him to embark upon the spiritual path proper, whether in its mundane or supramundane variety. It is true that the yogi has to practice his chosen path in a systematic way, therefore passing through an initial phase of training (pravāga?), but I think that the word pravāga is used here in a more general sense, referring to the whole set of exercises which characterise that course of cultivation. It actually seems that pravōgam ārabhate simply means in this context ‘starts practising’ or, to put it more colloquially, ‘gets down to practice’.

Skt. pūrvasamathacaritas seems to imply ascetics who have previously practised only or mainly tranquillity, i.e., meditative attainments without the insight (vipaśyanā), i.e., reflection upon impermanence, etc.

This seems to refer to those persons who have keen faculties (cf. Tib. and Ch.) but have not yet reached the four roots of the wholesome [factors] (catvāri kuśalamūlānī) and probably not even the aids to liberation (mokṣabhāgiya). On the catvāri kuśalamūlānī, see, for example, AKBh 274,18ff; 342,8ff; and especially, 345,20ff; on the mokṣabhāgiya, see AKBh 349, 2ff.

Wayman understands ‘likewise’ (tathā) as referring to śamatha (W 125). I think, however, that tathā implies here ‘Buddhist followers’ (ikadhārmika), who are still at a low spiritual level. Nothing is said in this passage about the exact stage of the ascetics in question, but most probably the authors of the Śṛbh had in mind the category of beginners (ādikarmika). At Śṛbh-Gr (18) 24, 5-7, a beginner is defined as one who ‘has not [yet] generated the roots of the wholesome [factors] [which constitute] the aids to penetration’ (nirvedhabhāgiyāṇi kuśalamūlānī notpādayati).

Saeki Jōin, the KDK translator of the YoBh, explains this category of persons as ‘those who have long cultivated meditation and subdued various manifest defilements only by the six practices 六行’ (p. 134, n. 9). ‘The roots of the wholesome [factors]’ 善根 are glossed upon by the same translator as referring to the catvāri kuśalamūlānī 四善根. The KDK note tells us that the practitioner is at a stage when due to unripe roots of wholesome [factors], he cannot contemplate Suchness 如 (p. 134, n. 10; see also the addition in the KDK text of 四 in square brackets before 善根). This probably refers to the fact that without ripe roots of the wholesome factors, the practitioner cannot enter the path of vision (darśanamārga). It is not clear, however, what these six practices 六行 actually mean in this context. According to the Kośa, the heat (ūṣṇagata), which is the first root of the wholesome [factors] (kuśalamūla), is born of the application of the mindfulness to phenomena (dharmasamtyapasthāna) (AKBh 343,11-12), but the latter, as far as I can see, contains nothing related to the ‘six practices’. The only occurrence of 六行 in the YoBh is in the Śrutamāyī bhūmiḥ (T31.353c19), where it appears to refer to the six recollections (śad anumṛtyayaḥ), i.e., recollection of the Buddha 佛, Dharma 法, Saṅgha 僧, the practice leading to Nirvana 趣涅槃行 (probably śīlānusmṛti or the recollection of virtue), the practice leading to charity 趣資財行 (tyāgaṇusmṛti), and the practice leading to birth in Heavens 趣生天行 (devatānusmṛti or the recollection of deities). These six recollections do not seem, however, to play any important role in the attainment of the four roots of the wholesome [factors]. The same six recollections are also described in detail in the Vism (pp. 162-197). In Śrāvakayāna Buddhism, these recollections are generally confined to lower levels of practice or regarded as collateral forms of spiritual training. In the Vism (101, § 27), for instance, the recollections of the virtues of the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha form only a part of the preparatory techniques for attaining the first absorption (jhāna).

See also the different classifications in the Gotrabhūmi and Avatārabhūmi of the Śṛbh, especially Śṛbh-Gr 58, 8.

An equally possible rendering is ‘a bodhisattva who wishes to attain Awakening in a future
life but is not yet able to reach it in the present life’. The exact interpretation of this category is not easy. In a Śrāvakāyāna context, which our text presumably reflects, it should refer to the previous lives of Śākyamuni or any of the former Buddhas. (For the Sarvāstivādin understanding of the term bodhisattva, see the Mahāvibhāṣāstra T27.886c-887b; on the concept of bodhisattva in Śrāvakāyāna Abhidharma, see also Nishi 1975, 165-217.) Another possibility is, however, to see here a Mahāyānist influence and understand ‘bodhisattva’ as denoting the Path-seekers who postpone their Awakening motivated by their messianic mission. The latter would better explain Xuanzang’s rendering 一切菩萨 ‘all bodhisattvas’ (no equivalent, however, for 一切 ‘all’ in Skt. and Tib). Of course, it is possible that the MS used by Xuanzang contained *sarva, but it is not excluded that 一切 is an editorial addition of the Chinese master. However, even if we take the Chinese rendering as representing the original reading, a Śrāvakāyānika interpretation is still possible: ‘all’ in the sense of every former Buddha in his life before Awakening. In passage 3.28.3.6. of the ŚrBh, we also find the plural buddhās, but this fragment, too, offers no clue as to how the authors of the ŚrBh conceived of these Buddhas.

Let us also note that in the Sanskrit text, all these four categories of persons appear in singular. Stylistically, however, it seemed to me that plural forms sound better in English. Semantically it appears that in spite of their grammatical number, the first three categories refer to more than one individual (see especially the first class which though in singular is accompanied by sarva, leaving thus no doubt that a plural sense was meant). The fourth category may have a singular reference, but even if we construe ‘bodhisattva’ within a Śrāvakāyānika framework, a plural meaning referring to the former lives of Śākyamuni and the previous Buddhas is not out of the question.

Skt. drṣṭa eva dharma. The phrase frequently occurs in Pali (diṭṭha dhamme, diṭṭhe va dhamme) and Sanskrit Buddhist literature. It basically means ‘in this present life’. In their seminal study on dhamma in the Pali Canon (1920, 99-101), Magdalene and Wilhelm Geiger discuss the term and translate it as im gegenwärtigen Leben or bei Lebzeiten. We owe a more detailed and helpful study on diṭṭhadhamma in the Pali canonical and commentarial literature to Kunihiko Tasaki (1989). In a very recent contribution, Rishō Hotori (2005) argues that in a compound like diṭṭhadharmasukhavihāra (Pali)/drṣṭadharmasukhavihāra (Skt.), the interpretation of diṭṭhadhama/drṣṭadharma should be that of an impersonal locative absolute construction: ‘as soon as a situation or condition (dhamma/dharma) is seen or appears’ (p. 153). It is true that impersonal locative absolute constructions are possible in Pali (see Hendriksen 1944, 43-44; cf. also von Hünber 1968, 296-304), but the interpretation proposed by Hotori is an unnecessary complication and all the occurrences examined by him can be better construed along the semantic lines discussed by Geiger and Tasaki (see above).

Skt. laukikamārgavājan (see note 16 to Skt. crit. ed.). The compound literally means ‘[one] travelling [proceeding] by the mundane path’.

See also T31.687c.

An adept or (advanced) learner (Skt., śākṣa; Pali, sekha) is in the Śrāvakāyāna tradition a holy or noble person (ārya) who has obtained any of the three fruits below Arhatship. The latter is called a ‘person who needs no more practice’ (lit., ‘non-learner’) (asaṅkṣa, asekha), i.e., See BDJ, s.v. 有學; Nyanatiloka, s.v. sekha. See also note 28 to Chapter One, Part One above.

It is difficult to find a proper word covering all the nuances of the Sanskrit kāma. It refers both to sensual pleasures and desires or longing for them. The German language, which allows for a much richer and subtler word-formation, makes it possible to translate kāma as [sinnlichen] Begierden-und-Genüsse or ‘sensual desires-and-pleasures’ (like, for instance, Sakuma 1990, vol. 2, p. 132). In English, I am afraid, such a compound would sound less natural. My choice for ‘sensual pleasures’ should, however, be understood as including both
their enjoyment and yearning for them.

The Śrībh is certainly aware of the semantic complexity of the term. This can be seen in passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. below which makes a distinction between kleśakāmāḥ (referring to desires) and vastukāmāḥ (meaning the objects of desire).

This is how I render Skt. dhyāna and Pali jhāna. There is no term in English capable of covering the whole semantic range of the word, and one solution is to leave it untranslated, an alternative of which I avail myself occasionally. Though unable to escape the pitfalls and limitations of the tradutore = traditore fate, I usually prefer, however, to render the word as ‘absorption’. In his detailed study on jhāna in Pali sources, Gunaratana (1985, 3) agrees that ‘absorption’ is the most appropriate translation for jhāna which one can find in the English language. However, he chooses to use this term for rendering appanā and leaves jhāna untranslated. It is hard to find decisive arguments concerning the ultimate lexical suitability of such difficult terms, but I think that ‘absorption’ for dhyāna/jhāna raises no special problems. As for appanā (though not occurring in this chapter of the Śrībh), I would prefer ‘complete concentration’, which is one of the renderings suggested by the editors of CPD, s.v., and PD, s.v.

Or a term like ‘fixation’ employed by Pe Maung Tin and Mrs Rhys Davids in The Expositor (Atthasālīni), p. 189 (translating Dhs-a 142), may represent an alternative worth considering.

Skt. <sa> samāpattiyapappatti (as clearly expressed by the prefix sa-) refers to the double aspect under which meditative states are understood in Buddhism. On the one hand, they are mental attainments (samāpatti) of different levels of consciousness obtained through meditation. On the other hand, they represent the birth (upapatti) in an cosmic sphere corresponding to the level of meditation attained. See AKbh 432, 4-5: dvividhā dhyānāni samāsato dvividhāni dhyānāny upapattisamāpattidhyānabhedāt. The correspondence between the meditative attainments and the different existential planes or Heavens is detailed in sections 3.28.6.-3.28.6.6. below.

We also find the compound samāpattiyapappatti at AKbh 36, 17-18, and the similar upapattisamāpattitā at AKbh 434, 1. A practically identical synonymous pair is in the AKbh is dhyānasamāpatti and dhyānopapatti. At AKbh 190, 21-22, we are told that there is an exact correspondence between the shortcomings (apaksāla) of the absorption levels (dhyāna) and those of their corresponding existential realms. These shortcomings refer to the psychological imperfections accompanying the first three absorption levels which, though clearly superior to the realm of sensual pleasure, hinder, nevertheless, the attainment of the complete mental serenity experienced in the fourth dhyāna. Early Buddhist sources actually describe the first three jhānas as unstable or agitated (iñijita) and declare only the fourth absorption to be stable or non-agitated (aniñjita) (MN I 454-455). AN V 134-135 uses the metaphorical term ‘thorn’ (kaṇṭaka) to denote the shortcomings hampering the meditative attainments (cf. also Poussin vol. 3, p. 107, n. 1; vol. 5, p. 161, n. 2). AKbh lists eight such shortcomings (AKbh 441, VIII.11). The AKbh also discusses three types of acts (karman), i.e., meritorious (puñya), non-meritorious (apuñya), and non-agitated or stable (ānejya or āneñjya; Tib. mi gyo ba; Ch. 不動). The latter refers to the retribution in the upper realms of material (rūpāvacara) and immaterial (ārūpyāvacara) existence (cf. AKbh 227ff). On the other hand, the AKbh admits that there are differences in the feelings (vedanā) experienced in the meditative attainments and the feelings (vedanā) experienced in the corresponding cosmic realms (ṣat kīm yā dhyānasamāpattisu vedanā iē eva dhyānopapattisu | netiye | AKbh 441, 20-21) (see also AKbh p. 442, VIII.12).

Skt. akiñcañyāyatana. This is the ‘station’ or ‘base’ (āyatana; see note 136 below) corresponding to the seventh absorption. The ascetic obtains detachment from a dhyāna- or ārūpya-level by observing its coarseness, i.e., its imperfections compared to the superior
contemplative state. For the ascetic proceeding by the mundane path, however, this cannot happen with regard to the eighth attainment of neither ideation nor non-ideation (naivasamjñānāsamjñānasamāpattī). Detachment from this level corresponds to Awakening, and this can be achieved only by practising the supramundane path. The AKBh 366, 10-12 makes this clear: lokottareṇa vairāgyam bhavāgra || 45c || na laukikena. kim kāraṇam? tata ārdhvam laukikābhāvat svabhāmikasya cāpratipakṣatvāt. (Both Pradhan and Shastri (p. 974, ll. 4-5) read: vā pratipakṣatvāt. The text must, however, be emended as suggested above. The Tibetan translation runs as: de i gong na jig rten pa med pa'i phyir dang rango sa pa'i gnyen po ma yin pa'i phyir ro | (P Nu 32a1). Cf. also T29.127a2s-6: 自地不能治自地故. The necessity to emend pratipakṣatvāt to apratipakṣatvāt is also pointed out by Hirakawa (Corrigenda in AKBh-I vol. 1, p. 435) and Griffiths (1983, 297, n. 199). Pradhan's reading can be explained as mis-deciphering vā instead of cā (ca+a⁴), the two ākṣaras being virtually identical. Tib. dang [...] gnyen po ma yin pa'i phyir ro clearly suggests that the original must have been cāpratipakṣatvā, a reading which actually fits the context better.) ‘[It is] by the supramundane [path that the ascetic obtains] detachment from the summit of existance || 45c || Not by the mundane [path]. Why? Because there is no higher mundane [realm] and because [one stage] is not a remedy [to the defilements] pertaining to its own stage.’ (cf. Griffiths’ s translation, p. 297; see also Griffiths 1983, pp. 292-294: bhāvāgra on the supramundane path, and pp. 296-302: translation of the whole passage; Lamotte tr. 1944-1980, vol. 1, p. 1035, n. 1; pp. 1035ff; Poussin, vol. 4, p. IX).


3.1 Skt. abhinirhāra. In the sense of ‘generation, accomplishment, production’, abhinirhāra, abhinirharati, etc. are often used in relation to abhijñā (e.g., SadPuṇḍ 141, 11ff), samādhī (e.g. BoBh 141, 23-24; 175, 10-11).

3.2 The pañca abhijañā or abhijañānāni (see note 22 to Skt. crit. ed.) are the first five in the standard set of six supernatural knowledges or faculties (sād abhijañā). The Kośa lists them as: miraculous powers (ṛddhi), divine ear (divyaśīrotra), knowledge of [others’] ways of thought (cetabhāvyāvajñāna), recollection of one’s own previous lives (pūrvanivāsānusmṛti), and knowledge of the death and birth [of all sentient beings] (cyutypapādajñāna) (also known as divyacaksu or ‘divine eye’). These five faculties can also be obtained by ordinary people (prthagjana). A sixth abhijañā called the ‘knowledge of the destruction of contaminants’ (āsravakṣayajñāna) is attainable only by the Noble Ones (ārya). Cf. AKBh 421, 6ff; Poussin vol. 5, p. 97ff; BoBh 58; MVyut §§ 14-15; Mochizuki 1933, vol. 2, 1261; vol. 3, 2080-1; vol. 5, 5060 (especially as it occurs in PPupad). See also passage 3.28.5.1. and relevant notes below.

3.3 MS reads here: tathā āsāṁjñāsamāpattīḥ ādhyānasamapattīsamāśrayena ca abhijañānāni pañcānāṁ abhinirhāraḥ. Wayman (p. 126) reads and emends as follows: tathā āsāṁjñāsamāpattīḥ ādhyānasamapattīḥ samāśrayenaḥbhijañānāṁ pañcānāṁ abhinirhāraḥ (my underlyng). His translation of this sentence is: ‘so also as the accomplishment of the five supernormal faculties (abhijañā) by taking recourse to non-ideational equipoise and to dhyāna equipoise’ (ibid.). Wayman’s understanding appears to be that the accomplishment of the five supernormal faculties is based on the ‘non-ideational equipoise’ and ‘dhyāna-equipoise’. While the latter is doctrinally correct and apparently implied by our text here, asāṁjñāsamāpattī does not appear to play any role in obtaining the five supernatural faculties. According to the AKBh (422, 2), ‘the five supernatural faculties depend on the level of the fourth dhyāna’ (pañcābhijañā

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caturthadhyānabhūmikāḥ) (= Ch. 前之五通依四靜慮。T29.143a3-4). The Kośa continues then with a passage explaining why their basis cannot be the four immaterial attainments. See also Śṛbh, passage 3.28.5.1. and note 251 below. It is true that the asaññjīsamāpatti is not an immaterial attainment, but neither can it be equated with a material dhyāna (though it is obtained on the basis of the fourth absorption). The interpretation ‘non-ideational equipoise’ and ‘dhyāna-equipoise’ is therefore doctrinally problematic.

Besides, there are linguistic reasons pleading against such an emendation. The Skt. MS clearly has the nominative singular form of asaññjīsamāpattiḥ and, equally important, it contains ca, which Wayman does not read. The syntactic position of ca actually renders Wayman’s reading quite unlikely. The Tib. version also appears to understand only the supernal faculties as being dependent upon dhyāna: bsam gtan la brten nas mgon par shes pa lnga. It is not impossible to construe the preceding de bzhin du ’du shes med pa la snyoms par 'jug pa dang as a juxtaposed phrase connected with bsam gtan by dang, but I find this reading improbable here. The whole sentence contains many noun phrases connected by dang, and de bzhin du ’du shes med pa la snyoms par ‘jug pa dang is only one of them.

The Ch. translation reads: 又依靜慮等能引無想定等及発五神通等 ‘Furthermore, based upon absorptions, [the ascetic] can trigger the attainment of non-ideation, etc. and generates the five supernal faculties’ The rendering contains some elements different from the Skt. First, we notice the presence of सा, which (probably) refers here to the nirodhasamāpatti (see section 3.28.4. below, where it forms a pair with the asaññjīsamāpatti). Second, Xuanzang seems to read dhyānasamapattisamnīsrayena as referring to both asaññjīsamāpatti and abhijnāna. It is true that the attainment of non-ideation is based on the fourth dhyāna (e.g., AKBh 69, 4-5:

**abhijnāna** nyi [42 ||: antyadhyānaṃ caturthāṃ tatparyāpannā ‘sau nānyabhubhūmikā), but though Xuanzang’s understanding is doctrinally possible, the extant Sanskrit original of our Śṛbh passage does not support such a reading. The position of ca excludes this reading, and the only way to make abhinirhāraḥ refer to asaññjīsamāpatti is to hypothesise that Xuanzang’s MS read: *tathā asaññjīsamāpater dhyānasamapattisamnīsrayena abhijnānānām ca pañcabām abhinirhāraḥ (with asaññjīsamāpatti in genitive and ca after abhijnānānām). Anyways, the extant Skt. text (as well as the Tib. version) makes perfect sense and require no emendation.

Literally, the sentence reads: ‘The yogi intent upon [achieving] detachment from sensual pleasures attains detachment from sensual pleasures by means of the seven contemplations.’

Furthermore, the prefix anu- of the verb anuprāpnoti (both are related to a prāpnoti) can be translated as something like ‘to get’, ‘to achieve’, ‘to attain’, or ‘to reach’. The connotational value of the verb is: ‘the yogi [...] gradually attains [...]’.

The seven contemplations are a praxis-related model peculiar to the Śṛbh (see also Śṛbh-Gr (18), 10). References to these contemplations in other parts of the YoBh or later Buddhist sources appear to rely, directly or indirectly, upon the Śṛbh. For instance, we find them alluded to in verses 48B-51 of the Ābhirājakāhā. The Nirūsa commenting upon these verses clearly identifies the practice with the seven contemplations: atra lakṣaṇapratisātmāvedādiḥ saptakāra manaskāraīn laukikoktaramārgavīṣuddhyā soppadhinirupadhinhinvānaphalādhiprajñāṃ śikṣāvīśuddhiḥ paridipitā (Maeda 1991, 91; for the whole context, see pp. 90-92; cf. also Wayman 1984, 357; translation and commentary, pp. 365-6). We also find the seven contemplation in the SamBh (115, 3-5; see also pp. 119-120) and also briefly discussed in the Viniś (T31.692b10-16).

The seven contemplations are also seen at AbhSan 68, 22-69, 1, and AbhSanBh 80, 4-30 (both passages are also edited and translated in Griffiths 1983, 426-434). In these texts, they are similarly described as being employed to obtain the four absorptions and the subsequent attainments: saptabhir manaskāraḥ prathamaṃ dhyānānū samāpadyate evam vyāvan naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatanāṃ ca (AbhSan, quoted after Griffiths 1983, 427). As Griffiths notes
(1983, p. 429, n. **; cf. also p. 359, n. 39), the corresponding AbhSamBh passage appears to summarise the main points related to the seven contemplations in the Śrābh and sometimes make use of some parts of it verbatim. Actually, Xuanzang’s translation of this passage is preceded by a short note (probably added by the Chinese master?) clearly stating the parallelism: ‘The detailed explanation [of the seven contemplations below] is like [in] the final Yogasthāna of the Śrāvakabhūmi’ (T31.736b26). The Xiānyàng lūn contains a parallel description of the seven contemplations, which is edited, translated, and annotated in Choi pp. 77-86. The direct source of this passage in the Xiānyàng lūn is, no doubt, the Śrābh. Tsong-kha-pa, making direct references to the Śrābh, also mentions the seven contemplations in his magnum opus, the Lam rim chen mo (Kelsang and Odani, ed., p. 111, II. 11-18; see also Wayman 1997, 165-170).

These six aspects are also expounded in detail in Yogasthāna III (MS 99a2M-99a7M; Sh 368,10-370.2; W 111-112).

The Śrābh often uses vāstu in such contexts to refer to the inner-outer distinction. See, for example, a similar pattern in the discussion of the category (pakṣa) of friendliness (maitrī) (Skt. passage edited at Maithrimurthi 1999, p. 278, II.2.B.; Tib. passage at ibid., p. 287; German translation at ibid., p. 297; see also ibid., p. 297, n. 5). Although our text is not clear about this, this distinction seems to be parallel to the dichotomy between defilement sensual pleasures (klesa-kāmāḥ) and object sensual pleasures (vastu-kāmāḥ), which is made in the next passage (see also note 38 below).

I construe ‘defilement sensual pleasures’ (klesa-kāmāḥ) and ‘object sensual pleasures’ (vastu-kāmāḥ) as karmadhāraya compounds. Rather than two types of sensual pleasures, klesa-kāma and vastu-kāma denote different aspects of kāma: the former stresses the defiling nature of the sensual pleasures, while the latter emphasises the external objects at which they are directed. A similar understanding is seen in the Mahānīddesa ad Sn 766 (Kāmasutta): kāma ti uddānato dve kāmā, vatthukāma ca kilesakāmā ca (Nid I 1). The commentary continues by defining the sensual pleasures [consisting in] objects (vatthukāma) as ‘pleasing visible objects, pleasing sounds, pleasing smells, pleasing tastes, pleasing tangible objects’ (manāpiṅkā rūpā, manāpiṅkā saddā, manāpiṅkā gandhā, manāpiṅkā rasā, manāpiṅkā poṭṭhabbā). It then enumerates concrete objects which could entice sensual pleasures, ranging from carpets (atttharaṇa) and clothes (pāpurana) to royal cities (rājadhānīyo) and kingdoms (raṭhām). To sum up, ‘sensual pleasures [consisting in] objects are whatever objects which may lead to lust’ (yāṁ kiṁci rajaṇiyaṁ vatthu, vatthukāma) (Nid I 1). As to the kilesa-kāma, they represent a long list of synonyms or quasi-synonyms of sensual pleasures: ‘the wish is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], the passion is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], the ardent passion is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], the [lustful] intention is a sensual pleasure [representing defilement], [...]’ chando kāmo, rāgo kāmo, chāndarāgo kāmo, samkappo kāmo, [...] (Nid I 2) (A similar definition is found at Vīh 256: chando kāmo, rāgo kāmo, chāndarāgo kāmo, samkappo kāmo, rāgo kāmo, samkapparāgo kāmo: ime vuccanti kāmā). The Nid I -a implies that the synonyms and quasi-synonyms are arranged in a series showing the growing intensity of sensual pleasures (chandoti dubbalarāgo. rāgoti tato balavataro. upari tayopi rāgā imehi balavatara; quoted from Cāṭha Śaṅgāyana).

The Cintamayi bhūmiḥ also discusses the two types of sensual pleasures in several passages. In the CintBh (Skt. text found in Śrābh MS 7b3M-5M; T30.370a20-29), the elimination of the object sensual pleasures (vastu-kāma) is defined as ‘clearly perceiving that the vicissitudes of the householder’s life are like a prison and seeking liberation [instead]’ (I follow the Chinese translation: 云何斷事欲？ [...] 了知居家追逐猶如牢獄，思求出離。T30.370a20-23). Renouncing lay life and entering the path of the homeless recluse do not mean, however, that
sensual pleasures can be eliminated for ever (Skt.: sa ca bhavaty avitarāgah kāmebhya(h) MS 27b4L; Ch.: 欲貪猶未遠 T30.370a24). The elimination of the defilement sensual pleasures (kleśakāma), on the other hand, refers to the eradication of all sensual pleasures without remainder (Skt.: aśeṣam kāmāraṇaprāhanāya MS 27b4M; Ch.: 爲令欲貪無餘斷 T30.370a26) by practising spiritual austerities in the wilderness (往趣曠野山林，安居邊際臥具，或住阿練若處乃至或在空閑靜室 T30.370a26-28). The text seems to imply that by renouncing lay life the mendicant is no longer in contact with objects enticing lust. Thus, many of the gross material temptations encountered in the secular life can be cut off merely by physically separating oneself from such an environment. The lure of sensual pleasures, however, continues to defile one’s mind, and this can be eradicated only by ascetic practices (see also T30.376a2-10).

We find in the same CintBh a more detailed definition of the object sensual pleasures (vastukāma) and the defilement sensual pleasures (kleśakāma). The text subdivides vastukāma in two subcategories: tatra vastukāma dhanayam yasyādhiṣṭhānāṃ kṣetrayastu, dhanāṃ ca yasyādhiṣṭhānāṃ hiranyavastu < | > (Yobh MS 137b5) (cf. Tib. D Tshi 259b7-260a1; Ch.: 事欲有二。一者穀彼所依處謂田事。二者財彼所依處謂金銀等事 T30.387c1-3). ‘Object sensual pleasures are [those consisting in] grain whose base is [such a] thing [as] the cultivated land and [those consisting in] wealth whose base is [such a] thing [as] gold.’ (Skt. kṣetrayastu is rendered into Tibetan as zhing gi dngos po, literally, ‘field-property’ or ‘field-action’, and into Chinese as 田事 ‘field-occupation’, i.e., ‘farming’. It should be noted that in Pali the compound khetta-vatthu can also mean ‘possession of land & goods’ (PEd, s.v.). It must be also noticed that in the second sentence, Tib. has only dbig gi dngos po, while Ch. adds ‘silver, etc.’ after ‘gold’.) These activities and the attachment to the things which they generate are further detailed. Then, the definition of the kleśakāma follows: kleśakāmabh | | katame < | > yā [MS reads kā, which hardly makes sense; Tib. gang yin pa suggests emendation to yā] vastukāmāsvadānusāriṇī [MS reads: anusārīni, but I emend in the light of Tib.: rjes su ’brang ba’i rnam par shes pa’i vijñāne < | >] bhigṛddhiḥ [visarga appears to have been added afterwards] yath (Tib. suggests that ca should be added here) samkalparāgah < | > tasya tesi tesi vastuṣu[sa]kāmeṣu kleśakāmena durbalikte cetasi tesiṃ vastukāmānāṃ vipariṇāmād anyathābhāvād upadanyate parisravāḥ sokaparidevadukhadaumasyopayāsaḥ | (Yobh MS 138a1) (cf. Tib. D Tshi 260a4-6; Ch.: 煩惱欲者謂，於事欲隨逐愛味依託著識發生種種妄分別食。又於事欲由煩惱欲令心沈沒成下劣性。若彼事欲變壞散失便生諸漏，愁歎憂悲種種苦惱縈繞其心。T30.380c13-18). (I am indebted to Prof. Schmithausen for having kindly checked the Skt. MS.) ‘What are defilement sensual pleasures? [Those sensual pleasures which are the greed representing the passion [born of] false discriminations [and arising] on the basis of the consciousness following the relish of the object sensual pleasures. In his mind, which has become feeble with respect to every object sensual pleasure [as well as] through the defilement sensual pleasures, because of the transformation and alteration of these object sensual pleasures, there arise troubles, sorrow, lamenting, suffering, dissatisfaction, [and] mental disturbances.’

In its discussion of the two aspects of kāma, the Viniś stresses the primacy of the kāmakleśa: it is the defiled sensual pleasures that generate the object sensual pleasures and thus give birth to much corruption and misfortune (安分貪名士夫欲。以何因緣唯煩惱欲説名為欲非事欲耶? 答: 以煩惱欲性染污故，又唯煩惱欲能欲事欲故。又煩惱欲發動事欲，令生種種染著過患。 T30.625b26-29; the discussion continues up to 625c13). The Tibetan translation of the passage is critically edited in Ahn 2003, 127ff, and its German translation is found at ibid., 309ff.

To-ryun 道倫 glosses upon the two aspects as follows: 貪名煩惱欲，五塵名事欲。 (T42.472c7) ‘The greed is called defilement sensual pleasure; the five dust[y sense-fields, i.e., visible objects, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects] are called object sensual pleasures’. In his subcommentary on the Avatamsakasūtra, Chengguan 慈觀, who quotes the Yobh, succinctly
describes the two aspects of kāma as 煩惱約內，事欲約外. (T36.486b22-23) ‘the defilement [sensual pleasures] sum up the interior [aspect]; the object sensual pleasures sum up the exterior [aspect]’. In his Commentary on the Avataṁsakasūtra (T35.783c27-28), Chengguan also refers at these two aspects, this time quoting juan 33 of the ŚrīBh. (What I refer to as the ‘subcommenary’ is the Da fangguang fo huayan bei shu yan yi chao 大方廣佛華厳經隨疏演義鈔, in which Chengguan expounds the meaning of the Avataṁsakasūtra following his own commentary 疏 on this sutra.)

See also passage 3.28.3.1.1. and respective notes below.

The noun qualified by sukhamsthānīyāḥ, duḥkhasthānīyāḥ, and aduḥkhasuṣṭhānīyāḥ must be ‘sensual pleasures’. Skt. sthāniyā means here ‘giving rise to’ (cf. Pali āsavasthāniyā ‘giving rise to asavas, CPD s.v.’). Xuangzang translates as: 順樂受處，順苦受處，順不苦不樂受處 or ‘suitable for [or: in accordance with] pleasant feelings’, etc. Ch. 受 ‘feeling’ is probably an editorial addition to make clear that ‘pleasant’, etc. refer to vedanā.

For the grammatical peculiarity of the compounds with -adhiṣṭhāna ‘basis of’ in fine compositi, see Choi 2001, p. 118, n. 336.

Skt. saṁjñā (Pali, saññā) is admittedly difficult to render into modern concepts, but I think that ‘ideation’ approximates a large part of the broad semantic sphere covered by the term.

The Kosā defines the term in the following way: saṁjñā nimittdōgāraṇamātikā || 14c-d || yāvan nilapitatādgārahasthānastraipuruṣamitrāmisudhādūkhādhānānìmīdōgārahān asau saṁjñā- skandhah. (AKBh 10, 15-16) saṁjñā has the nature of the grasping of characteristics || 14c-d ||. This aggregate of saṁjñā is the grasping of characteristics such as blue, yellow, long, short, woman, man, friend, foe, pleasant, suffering, etc.’ (cf. also AKBh 45, 20-21). Skt. udgāraṇa literally means ‘picking up’ or ‘extracting’ and refers here to selectively perceiving those essential characteristics which define an object or concept. In this sense, I think that it matches the basic understanding of perception (as opposed to sensation) in modern psychology. The term is explained in Britannica as: ‘perception, the process whereby sensory stimulation is translated into organized or meaningful experience’ (vol. 9, p. 279; cf. also ‘Human Perception’, vol. 25, pp. 481-502). For instance, the physiological reactions in the eye which respond to light, colour, etc. represent sensation. Integrating and organising these physiological reactions in such a way as to permit the recognition of the light, color, etc. as representing, say, a picture constitute perception (see Hockenbury & Hockenbury 2000, 88ff). Though ‘perception’ is often adopted by modern translators as a rendering for saṅkha/saṁjñā, the examples given by Vasubandhu show that the Buddhist tradition construed the term as more complex and comprehensive than the perception of qualia such as blue. Recognising someone as friend or foe supposes far more mental operations than a simple colour perception. The same holds true for pleasure and suffering. This is obviously not a mere reaction of attraction or rejection (which is usually covered by the concept of vedanā), and a saṁjñā of sukha or duḥkha seems to imply a certain degree of conscious judgement.

In this context, Seyfort Ruegg’s pertinent remarks (1998, 138) on the the unsuitable translation of saṁjñā as ‘perception’ can also be mentioned. Seyfort Ruegg suggests “‘notion, idea’, (or eventually, “apperception’”) (ibid.). Although not a technical term regularly employed in modern psychology, ‘ideation’ seems to me also capable to convey the wide range of meanings covered by saṅkha/saṁjñā. It may actually be the lack of its precise scientific definition that makes it possible for ‘ideation’ to accommodate a broad semantic spectrum.

Skt. krodha ‘wrath’ is often used in classical Sanskrit literature with the sense of manifested or outward anger which is preceded and determined by inner grudge (manyu) (see Harā 2001). AKBh, 312, 18, defines the term as: vyāpādāvahāṁśāvarjitaḥ satvāsattvavāy āghātaḥ krodhah krodha is anger towards beings or things without malice and without [actual] violence’ (see
AKV 494, 13-18, especially for the meaning of vyāpāda and vihīnāsā; for the sense of āghāsa, see BHDS, s.v.; cf. also Poussin vol. 4, p. 90, translating the term as ‘irritation’). According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, krodha has the function of serving as the basis of violent acts such as taking up the staff, taking up the sword, etc. (see AbhSam 8, 13-14: krodhaḥ katamaḥ | pratypupashthi apakāramanimite pratīṃ[ghāṁ]rikaś ceasaṇa āghātaḥ | sāstrādānadandaṇḍānādī- 
samṛambhasannisrayānakarmakaḥ ||; on samṛambha, see note 71 below; for sāstrādāna and 
dandaṇḍāna, see note 162 below) (cf. also AbhSamBh 7, 13-14). See also note 43 below.


44 Skt. mṛakaṣa ‘concealment’. The word is defined by the Kośa as follows: ‘mṛakaṣa refers to hiding [one’s] errors’ (avadyapracchādanam mṛakaṣaḥ) (AKBh 312, 20). TrimBh 30, 11ff (=Ms D14b4-b5), gives a longer explanation but the basic understanding remains the same: ‘mṛakaṣa refers to hiding one’s own errors’ (mṛakaṣa ātmano ‘vadyapracchādanaḥ). Interesting to note that like our ŚrīBh passage, the TrimBh also associates mṛakaṣa with bewilderment: ‘The fact that mṛakaṣa pertains to bewilderment is because of its aspect of hiding’ (mohāṃśikatvaṁ tu mṛakaṣasya pracchādanakārvatvā).

45 The word rendered here as ‘stubborn adherence’ is spelled pradāśa in ŚrīBh, AKBh, etc. and pradāśa in MYYut (# 1964), Dharmasamgraha. etc. BWDJ, s.v., and BHSD, s.v., record both forms as free variants. The edited text of the TrimBh (Lévi, 29,31 and 30,15; Tiwary, 64 and 66) reads pradāśa, but the original MS spelling appears to be pradāsa. The MSS used by Lévi (now catalogued as MSS No. 5-136VI and No. i-1697VI of the National Archives in Kathmandu) have been reproduced photographically by Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama (1989), who name them MS C and MS D. The word in question occurs in folio 14a, line 7 (Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama 1989, pp. 37-38, corresponding to Lévi, 29,31) and reads pradāśa. Folio 14b, line 7 (Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama 1989, p. 39 = Lévi, 30,15) also reads pradāśa. On the other hand, MS I (which is a modern copy of D) apparently emends the pradāśa reading of D to pradāśa. It seems that the scribe consistently writes here sa/si for what usually is spelled as sa/si (Folio 14b, line 7; see also, for instance, MS “dāśīa and dāśi, which is emended by Lévi (p. 30, n. 2) to “dāśīa and dāśi respectively). These occurrences may attest to a scribal tradition consistently spelling the word and other related terms with -s. This is not, however, the only tradition. The so-called MS J, which is now stored at the Cultural Palace of the Nationalities in Beijing and contains the Trimsikāviṇaptikārikāḥ, spells the word as pradāśa (folio 1a, line 6, Mimaki, Tachikawa, and Yuyama 1989, 159). (Let us note that this is a palm-leaf MS which is only one folio (recto and verso), and is written in a script very close to the ŚrīBh MS, being most probably earlier than the MSS C and D of the TrimBh.)

Both forms probably go back to a Prakrit form similar or identical to the Pali palāṣa/palāṣa ‘unmercifulness, malice, spite’ (PED, s.v.), a word which was considered by the traditional Pali commentators as a near synonym of yugaggāha (var. lec. yuddhadāsā) or ‘control, dominance, domineering, imperiousness’. Vbh-a glosses the word as samadhiragghanām or ‘taking the leadership altogether’ (PED, s.v. yugaggāha). We see that the Pali term already was used with two distinct senses: ‘spite’ and ‘dominance’, which appear to have been also inherited by the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition. It is hard to determine whether originally two different Middle Indic roots were at the basis of this word or whether the lexeme was first used with one sense and later acquired its other meaning. According to the PED, palāṣa/palāṣa was Sanskritised as pra+ dāsa (‘enemy’), which is a frequent phonemic change (on Pali l corresponding to the Sanskrit d, see also Mizuno 1989, 42). If this is the case, we should take into account the fact that dāsa also means ‘slave, servant’, and this may have reinforced the original Pali polysemy of the examples below, one usage evolved into the semantic sphere of
‘violence’ (linked with dāsa ‘enemy’?) and the other into the meaning of ‘adherence’ or ‘dependence’ (connected with dāsa ‘slave’?).

Now as for Abhidharmic definitions, let us first see the Kośa, which appears to be closer to the usage of pradāśa in the ŚrīBh. According to the AKBh 313, 14-15, the word is defined as: ‘pradāśa is stubborn adherence to culpable acts [/things]; because of it, one does not accept well-founded remonstrance’ (sāvadyavastuṣavaghaṭhāhītā pradāśa yena nyāyasamajjaptāṁ na grhnāti; Ch. 慘謂堅執諸有罪事。由此不取如律詫悔。T29.109c9-10). Vasubandhu considers that ‘pradāśa comes from attachment to wrong views’ (drṣṭyāmṛṣaḥ pradāśas tu (AKBh 314, 1); 慘從見取起 (T29.109c8). Drṣṭyāmṛṣa, more usually known as drṣṭiparāmṛṣa, is one of the five pernicious views (see below note 45).

On the other hand, we have the ‘classical’ Vijñānāvādin interpretation of the notion which is substantially different. TrimBh 30, 15ff (MS D14b7ff) describes the concept as: ‘pradāśa means hurting by harsh words’ (pradāśas caṇḍavacodāśītā) (in the MS spelling: dāśītā, which is read as dāśītā by Lévi and Tiwary; see above). (BWDJ lists both dāśītā as a feminine noun meaning ‘cursing, abusing’, citing MVyut as its source (cf. MVyut # 2109: caṇḍa-vaco-dāśītā: tshig brlang(s) pos zher 'debs pa; 動言，毒言罵)，and dāśīta as a Prakrit form of dāniṣṭa < √ dānīs ‘to bite’, etc.) The TrimBh continues as follows: ‘harsh words mean extreme insults by means of exceedingly violent attacks’ (caṇḍam vacaḥ pragrādhāṁ pārasyam marmaghaṭanayogena) (Lévi and Tiwary insert danaḥ after pārasyam). After a few more lines of lexical explanations, it adds: ‘and being based on anger and spite, its nature is mental resentment; it, therefore, is just a part of [the psychological factor of] hate and cannot be distinguished [from it] as a [separate] entity’ (aṁśa ca krodhopanāpāravakṣaḥ cetasa āघātavabhāva iti pratiḥāṁśika eva na dravyato bhidyate). In the terminology of the Kośa, this definition of pradāśa as a proclivity for violent insult would rather fall under the category of vihiṃśā. (cf. AKBh 313.16: viheṭhanam vihiṃsā yena prahāraparārayādibhiḥ parōn viheṭhayate ‘vihiṃsā means violence, by means of which one hurts others by blows, insults, and so on’; Ch.: 害謂於他為逼迫。由此能行打罵等事。T29.109c10-11). TrimBh 31, 13-17 has, nevertheless, its own concept of vihiṃsā which is understood as a mental state leading to physical violence ranging from killing to threatening.

To return to our ŚrīBh passage, its understanding of pradāśa seems to be closer to the Kośa. First, it is not associated with the sensual pleasures giving rise to suffering, like wrath and enmity. (A ‘classical’ Vijñānāvādin understanding would have implied a connection with like psychological factors.) Second, in the same context, the ŚrīBh speaks of the perversion of view, with which pradāśa is also linked in the AKBh. The latter actually establishes a causal relation: drṣṭyāmṛṣaḥ generates stubborn adherence. We do not know if the ŚrīBh authors shared a similar view. Apart from mentioning wrong views in the same context with pradāśa, the ŚrīBh does not elaborate upon the relation between the two factors.

The original meaning of the Tib. 'tshig pa is ‘to burn’, ‘to glow’, ‘to be in rut’, and was probably used as an equivalent for pradāśa because of the ‘biting’ effect of the fire. Modern dictionaries also give the sense of ‘anger’ or ‘spite’, but this might be a later derivation, probably due to Buddhist lexical influence. (Goldstein 1994, p. 938, s.v., translates 'tshig pa as ‘anger’.) BTSh (s.v.) renders the word into Chinese as 嚮躁 or ‘irritation’ and has a sub-entry on the Buddhist meaning of ‘tshig pa based on the Vijñānāvādin usage of 'tshig pa = pradāśa. The Ch. equivalent of pradāśa is 慘, which basically means ‘affliction, vexation’. This word likewise seems to imply a semantic sphere closer to ‘hurting’.

46 Skt. māya ‘deceit’. The term is explained at AKBh 313, 13 as: ‘māyā means deceiving others’ (paravaṇaṁ māyaḥ; Ch. 詭詐惑他。T29.109c13). TrBh 30, 29-31, 3 (cf. Tiwary tr., 67) defines the notion using partly similar words: ‘māyā is showing non-existent things [as if they
were really existent] in order to deceive others’ (māya paravañcanāya abhūtārtha-
śaṅkarāsanātā) (MS D 15a7-15b1; the MS contains a scribal error: paravacanā; Lévy and
Tiwary spell: paravañcana yābhuṣuṭhāra). The subsequent explanation centres upon the false
claims of special merits in religious practice made in order to obtain material profit and respect.
Māya is not different from the combined work of passion (rāga) and confusion (moha) (iyam ca
saḥitābhyām rāgomahābhyām abhūtān [...]), and is thus a mere designation rather than an entity
of its own (prāṇāptita eva na dravyata iti [...]).

47 Skt. sāthya ‘dissimulation’ is defined at AK Bh 313, 13-14 as follows: cittakauṭilyāṁ
śāthyaṁ yena yathābhūtāṁ nāvīkṣaroti, vikṣipaṭy aparispūṭaṁ u pratiṇādyate ‘śāthya is the
crookedness of the mind by means of which one does not reveal [things] as they actually are,
[and instead] distorts [facts] or answers in an unclear way’ (Ch.: 語謂心曲。由此不能如實自顯。
或誣方便令解不明。 T29.109c12-13). (I render kauṭilya as ‘crookedness’ in an
attempt to stay close to the Sanskrit word which has both the literal meaning of ‘curvature’ and
the derived sense of moral ‘dishonesty’; cf. also the Ch. 曲 which means both ‘to bend’ and
‘wicked, dishonest’).

The TrimBh 31, 3 (MS D15b1-b2) (Tiwary tr., 67-68) says: ‘śāthya is the crookedness of
mind comprised in the subterfuge [used] for hiding one’s own faults’ (śāthyaṁ svadosaprachāśānopañjasamgrhitām cetasaḥ kauṭilyāṁ). (MS D spells sāthyaṁ, which, as
already pointed out in note 45 above, is part of a series of occurrences of sa adopted instead of
śa; MS I emends to śāthyaṁ). The exact interpretation of ‘samgrhitām is admittedly not easy,
and this has led to various rendering in modern translations. Though I do not think that
Schelmeini ‘misceif’ for śāthya is the happiest choice, Jacobi’s translation is the most faithful:
Schelmeini (śāthya) ist die Unangradheit des Geistes, die in dem Mittel zur Verdeckung eigener
Fehler einbeschlossen ist (Jaco bi tr., 1932, 38). Śāthya is obviously similar to ‘concealing’
(mṛakṣa), and Sthiramati clarifies what distinguishes one from another. ‘This is why śāthya is
different from the mṛakṣa. This [i.e., the latter] is plainly hiding without resort to [misleading]
speech’ (ata eva śāthyaṁ mṛakṣād bhidyate. sa hi sphuṭaṁ eva pracchādayati na kākvā. TrimBh
31,5-6).

The AK Bh (314, 1-4) considers that śāthya is born of wrong views (dṛṣṭi). According to the
TrimBh 31,6-7, śāthya, like māya, is a mere designation of the combined work of passion (rāga)
and confusion (moha). Our Śr Bh passage does not elaborate upon these psychological categories,
and this precludes a conclusion on its exact understanding. From the little we can infer, it seems,
however, that the Śr Bh is, once again, somewhat closer to the Kośa tradition. First, it does not
place śāthya in the class of sensual pleasures giving rise to pleasure, in which rāga is included.
Second, śāthya appears in the same context with dṛṣṭiviparītyāsa. Things are, however, not so
simple, because the TrimBh associates śāthya with both passion and confusion. Besides,
the Śr Bh itself puts saṁjñācittaviparītyāsa in the same category with rāga.

48 ‘Lack of sense of shame’ (āhariya or ahrī) appears to refer here to shamelessness with
respect to oneself, often regarded as different from ‘shameless behaviour’ (anapatrāpya) or
shamelessness with respect to others. This is not, however, the only meaning of the pair in
Buddhist literature. Hrī-ot(t)aṇa, translated by PED as ‘shame and fear of sin’ (s.v. hiri) (cf.
also akirika, ahirika and anottappa), often appear together in the Pali Canon (MN i 171, SN
II 220, lt 34, AN II 78, Ja i 127, 206; etc.).

In the Kośa, Vasubandhu discusses two different definitions of the terms. The first one
reflects the traditional understanding of the term (also found in Pali canonical texts) and is
adopted in the AK Bh. This does not mean, however, that Vasubandhu rejects altogether the
second interpretation, presented as the opinion of ‘others’. Kārikā II.32a-b says: ‘Disrespect is
ahrī; aarapī is not seeing the fear of the blameworthy’ (ahrī agurutā; avadye bhavādarśitvam

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The Bhāṣya gives then a detailed explanation of the two terms: ‘āhrikyatā is disrespect, irreverence, lack of fear of and obedience to virtues and the virtuous, [it] is a factor which is the opposite of respect’ (gunaśu gunavatsu cāgauravatā apratiścāt abhayam avaśavrātītā āhrikyam, gauravapratīdvyadvo dharmah. AKBh 59, 19-20; Ch.: 於功德及有德者無敬無崇無所忌難非所隨屬誤名無齊。即於恭敬所敵對法。 T29.21a6-8). ‘Blameworthy’ refers to what is criticised by the virtuous. Not seeing the danger [of it] is called anapatrāpya. Fear [/danger] refers here to the undesired consequences [of one’s actions], in the sense of “being feared on this account”. (avadyam nāma yad vigarhiyam sadbhī. tatrābhayadarsanātī ‘anapatrāpyam. bhavyam atranistam, phalam, bhīyate ‘smād iti. AKBh 59, 22-23; Ch. 爲諸善士所詆譭法說名為罪。於此罪中不見怖畏誚名無齊。此中怖言顯非愛果能生怖故。 T29.21a8-10). Skt. bhaya means ‘danger’ as well the ‘fear’ resulting from seeing danger, and Vasubandhu apparently has both senses in mind. After a discussion concerning whether the compound bhayādarśita means ‘seeing of the lack of danger’ (abhayasya dasārāna) or ‘non-seeing of the danger’ (bhayāsādarsaṇa) (the latter being, of course, the correct solution here), Vasubandhu also notes another understanding of the two terms: ‘Others say, however, that āhrikyatā is shamelessness about [one’s] faults with respect to oneself, [while] anapatrāpya is [shamelessness] with respect to others’ (anye puram āhek: ātmāpekṣaya dosai alajjanānā āhrikyam, paripekṣayā ‘nāpatrāpyam iti. AKBh 59, 26-60,1; Ch. 有餘師說：於所造罪自觀無恥名曰無恥。觀他他恥誚名無齊。 T29.21a17-18). The term ‘others’ is linked by de la Vallée Poussin with the opinion expressed at Dhātupāṭha III. 3 and I. 399 (Poussin vol. 1, p. 171, n.1). Vasubandhu appears to consider both definitions of the terms, i.e., ‘disrespect’ and ‘lack of fear of undesirable consequences’ vs ‘shamelessness with respect to oneself’ and ‘shamelessness with respect to others’, as equally viable (AKBh 60, 1-6). Kārikā V.48 (AKBh 312-313; T29.109b18-19) says that āhrikyatā is derived from passion (rāga) and anapatrāpya is generated by ignorance (avidyā).

In later works, Vasubandhu seems to prefer the second definition of the terms. The Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa says: ‘What is lack of sense of shame? Its nature is not feeling shame with respect to oneself about one’s committed sins. What is shameless behaviour? Its nature is not feeling shame with respect to others about one’s own committed sins’ (translated from the Chinese: 云何無恥？謂：於所作罪不自羞恥為性。云何恥？謂：於所作罪不羞恥他為性。T31.849b15-16; cf. also Anacker’s translation from Tibetan, 1984, 69).

The pair also appears in the Trim. and (if Sthiramati’s explanation reflects Vasubandhu’s own understanding) the definition in the TrimBh is, once again, in conformity with the dichotomy of shamelessness inwardly or outwardly directed. TrimBh 31, 17 says: ‘shamelessness with respect to oneself on account of [one’s] blameworthy [acts] is āhrikyatā (āhrikyant sahayam avadyenālājījā). It then continues with ‘shameless behaviour’ defined as: ‘shamelessness with respect to others on account of [one’s] blameworthy [acts] is anapatrāpya (anapatrāpyam parato ‘vadyenālājījā.) (TrimBh 31, 18-19). Sthiramati also explains that the two proclivities are only designations for the manifestation of passion and ignorance (i.e., in the case of āhrikyatā), on the one hand, and hatred and ignorance (i.e., for anapatrāpya), on the other. ‘While [it is true that] all incorrect actions are caused by passion, hatred, or ignorance, the passion and the hatred not operating simultaneously, [āhrikyatā and anapatrāpya] are designated respectively [i.e., as manifestations of either passion and ignorance or hatred and ignorance]; they do not exist independently’ (rāgadvesoṣamoḥaprákāreoṣu sarvāsakāryaprabhavahetuṣu rāgadvesavaraya uṣyahgapatyād yathāsaṁbhavaṁ prāṇaḥpate, na tu svatantram aṣti. TrimBh 31, 21-22).

Amongst modern renderings of the terms, Bucknell’s (1984, 16ff.) translation of hiri as ‘sense
of shame’ and of ottappa as ‘fear of blame’ is worth mentioning here.

Skt. dṛṣṭiviparyāśa ‘perversion of view’ is an old Buddhist concept whose history is closely related to the four applications of mindfulness (Pali, cattāro satipaṭṭhānāni; Skt., catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni). We find the concept of view perversion expounded, for instance, at AN II 52, 1-7: ‘Mendicants, there are these four perverisions (vipallāsā) of ideation, of mind, and of view. Which are these four? Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] impermanent as permanent is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view. Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] suffering as non-suffering is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view. Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] non-self as self is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view. Mendicants, regarding what is [actually] impure as pure is a perversion of ideation, of mind, and of view’ (cattāro ‘me bhikkhave saṇṇāvipallāsā cittavipallāsā dīṭṭhivipallāsā, katame cattāro? anicce bhikkhave niccan ti saṇṇāvipallāso cittavipallāso dīṭṭhivipallāso, adukkhe bhikkhave dukkhan ti saṇṇāvipallāso cittavipallāso dīṭṭhivipallāso, anuṭhani bhikkhave atta ti saṇṇāvipallāso cittavipallāso dīṭṭhivipallāso, asubhe bhikkhave subhāni ti saṇṇāvipallāso cittavipallāso dīṭṭhivipallāso.)

Buddhist literature usually lists five pernicious views: the view of the existence of a self (satkāyadrṣṭi), the extreme views [of either nihilism or eternalism] (antaṛgrāhadrṣṭi), incorrect views [which deny the Buddhist Truths] (mithyādrṣṭi), attachment to incorrect views (dṛṣṭiparāmarṣa), and attachment to [non-Buddhist] rituals and vows [wrongly regarded as efficacious practices for the attainment of the Awakening] (śīlavrataparāmarṣa). We find these five views, for instance, in the Kośa (kārikās V.3 and V.7-8, followed by a detailed exposition in the Bhāṣya: AK Bh 281-283; see also Poussin, vol. 4, especially, notes to pp. 15-17 for sources and interpretation of satkāyadrṣṭi). It is in this context that the four perverisions are introduced. ‘The four perverisions are regarding what is [actually] impermanent as permanent, regarding what is [actually] suffering as happiness, regarding what is [actually] impure as pure, and, regarding what is [actually] non-self as self’ (catvāro viparyāśāh: aniyey nityam iti, duḥkkhe sukham iti, aśucay asocay, anātmany āteti. AK Bh 283, 5-7; cf. the AN passage quoted above). Kārikā V.9 and its commentary (AK Bh 283-284) elaborate upon the relation between the five views and the four perverisions. ‘The group of four perverisions [is actually derived] from three views’ (dṛṣṭiṣṭrayād viparyāśaccatuṣkāh.) (AK V.9a). AK Bh 283, 9-10, explains that the eternalist fallacy implied by the antaṛgrāhadrṣṭi can be considered a perversion; dṛṣṭiparāmarṣa includes the perverisions of mis-perceiving happiness and purity where such things do not actually exist; and satkāyadrṣṭi implies the perversion of believing in a self. The three causes or principles (kāraṇa) which define viparyāśa are ‘being perverted’ (viparīta; cf Tib. phyin ci log; Ch.倒), [wrong] reasoning (nītirāṇa; nges rtog; 推), and [erroneous] attribution (samāropa; sgro ‘dogs; 增). The last quarter of the verse reads: ‘but the ideation and the mind [are perverted] because of it [i.e., the view]’ (saṃjñācitte tu tadvāṣāh) (AK V.9d), which is commented upon as: ‘It is because of the perversion of view that the ideation and the mind associated with it are called perverisons’ (dṛṣṭiviparyāśāsavaśād eva tassamprayukte saṃjñācitte viparyāśāv ukte.) (AK Bh 284, 2).

On the other hand, the Savitarkāsvicārabhūmi of the Yo Bh appears to present a rather different view on the relation between these three perverisions. The text actually speaks of seven perverisions which represent the perverisions of ideation, view, and mind (saṃjñāviparyāśa, dṛṣṭīviparyāśa, and citta viparyāśa) plus the four distortions, i.e., regarding impermanence as permanence (aniyey nityam iti viparyāśa), suffering as happiness (duḥkkhe sukhom iti viparyāśa), impurity as purity (aśucay asocay viparyāśa), and non-self as self (anātmany āteti viparyāśa) (Yo Bh 166, 6ff; Skt. and Tib. texts critically edited in Ahn 2003, 74ff; cf. also German translation in ibid., 188ff). The central role, or at least the initial role in the generation
mechanism, is played here by the perversion of ideation, which is defined as being "the [false] imagination [with regard to] ideation (samjñāparikalpa), which takes impermanence as permanence, suffering as happiness, purity as impurity, and non-self as self" (yo 'nitye nityam iti, duhkhe sukham iti, aścau śucitā, anātmany ātmeti samjñāparikalpaḥ; Ahn 2003, p. 74, § 7.2.a; YoBh 166,9-10; Bhattacharya's ed. wrongly spells aścau for aścau). It is based upon this false imagination with regard to ideation that the perversion of view becomes established. "What is the perversion of view? It is that which [leads to] acceptance, consent, determining, [and] clinging with regard to precisely these [distortions, i.e., impermanence, etc.] thus [false] imagined [with regard to] ideation" (dṛṣṭiviparyāsaḥ katamah? yat tatraiva tathā samjñāparikalpite ksanti rucir vyavasthāpanābhinivesah; Ahn 2003, p. 74, § 7.2.b; YoBh 166, 11-12; cf. Ch.: 見倒者謂：即於彼妄想所分別中忍可欲樂建立執著。T30.314b9-11). This, in turn, serves as the foundation of the perversion of mind. "What is the perversion of mind? It is that which [leads to] defilements [consisting in] passion, etc. with regard to precisely these [distortions, i.e., impermanence, etc.] thus clung to" (cittaviparyāsaḥ katamah? yat tatraiva tathābhiniśte rāgadisaṃklesah; Ahn 2003, p. 74, § 7.2.c; YoBh 166, 13; cf. Ch.: 心倒者謂：即於彼所執著中貪等煩悩。T30.314b11-12). See also Ahn’s German translation (pp. 188-194) and his footnotes which contain excellent discussions concerning the historical background of viparyāsa in general as well as the philological problems related to this passage in particular. Cf. also Schmithausen 1987a, vol. 1 pp. 232-3 and vol. 2, pp. 542-3, notes 1445 and 1446.

To return to our Śrābh passage, it is hard to know with certainty what mechanism of viparyāsa the authors presupposed. The association of pleasure-engendering sensual pleasures, suffering-engendering sensual pleasures, and neither-suffering-nor-pleasure-engendering sensual pleasures with the three perversions seems peculiar to our text. As a matter of fact, sensual pleasures which give rise to suffering as well as those engendering neither suffering nor pleasure appear rather unusual unless qualified. I assume that the former refers to such sensual pleasures which eventually result in hatred and wrath because of not being fulfilled or creating antagonism with other living beings. The latter category is not very clear. I conjecture that it implies that mental states like concealing of one’s faults, etc. do not usually generate by themselves pleasure or suffering. Such states have only an indirect role in the gratification of sensual pleasures.

The association of the view perversion with the class of sensual pleasures engendering neither suffering nor pleasure is also difficult to understand. The reason behind it might be that dṛṣṭiviparyāsa was considered an intellectual category arising from sensual pleasures without the mediation of rāga or dveṣa. It may be relevant to remember here that the Chinese translation of the Śrābh contains an additional element: 是愚癡依處。*mohādhiṣṭānāḥ (see Ch. crit. ed.). This (especially if it reflects the original text) may point to the mechanism underlying the association of dṛṣṭiviparyāsa with the sensual pleasures engendering neither suffering nor pleasure. The perversion of view may have been regarded as originating in moha and consisting in the theoretical incorrect view that kāma represents true pleasure (sukha), is lasting (nītya), etc. On the other hand, citta- and samjñāviparyāsa may have been taken to include some emotional involvement and hence mediated by passion (kāmarāga). We cannot know whether this was indeed the understanding of the Śrābh authors, but this seems, at least, to be the interpretation hinted at by Hongjing 弘景. This Chinese scholar-monk, active in the generation following Xuanzang, wrote his commentary on the YoBh, the Yuqie shi di lun shu 瑜伽師地論疏, sometime during 648-712. The work is no longer extant, but it is frequently cited by To-ryun (see Yuki 1962) 1985, 261-262; cf. Chapter Six, Part One). Hongjing’s (and apparently other masters') comment upon this aspect reads as follows: 景師等云："大乘就貪義說：想倒及以心倒故貪依處，即是想倒、心倒依處也。故於苦樂受處是愚癡依處乃至是見倒依處者：故癡起見，故癡依處，即是見倒依處。" (T42.470c5-9) ‘Master [Hong]Jing and others say:
“Concerning the meaning of passion [/lust], the Great Vehicle [Ji] (?) expounds that since the perversion of ideation and the perversion of mind [take] passion as [their] basis, this is the basis of the perversion of ideation and the perversion of mind. Those giving rise to neither suffering nor pleasure are the basis of confusion up to are the basis of the perversion of view [refers to the fact that] [the wrong] views arise because of confusion, therefore the basis of confusion is the basis of the perversion of view.”’ (Dacheng 大乘 may refer here not to the ‘Great Vehicle’ teaching but to one of the reverential names used for Ji 基, also called 大乘基 (see note 34 to Chapter Six, Part One above). Furthermore, if the former is the case, then the meaning of ‘Great Vehicle’ may reflect the usage initiated by Xuanzang, who called his doctrinal position as ‘Great Vehicle’ 大乗 or ‘One Vehicle’ 一乗 rather than ‘Yogācāra-Vijnānavāda’; see Yoshimura 2003b, 218-220.)

Finally, let us also note that the ŚrīBh does not seem to presuppose the centrality of the perversion of ideation as the YoBh passage cited above does. Besides, it lists the perversion of mind together with samjñāviparyāśa, quite unlike the mechanism suggested by the YoBh. And though the YoBh associates rāga, etc. with the perversion of mind, this does not necessarily mean that its scheme is identical with the one presupposed in our ŚrīBh passage.

5 The set of eight forms of sufferings (aṣṭau duḥkkhatāḥ) consists of birth (jātīduḥkkham), old age (jarāduḥkkham), sickness (vyādhi-duḥkkham), death (maranāduḥkkham), being conjoined with what one likes (priyaviprayogaduḥkkham), being disjoined with what one dislikes (apriyasaṃprayogaduḥkkham), not obtaining what one wishes (yad api cchayā paryesāmaṇo na labhate tat api duḥkkham), or, in short, the suffering of the five aggregates to which one clings (samkheṣeṇa pañcápādaṇskandhaduḥkkhaḥ) (MVyut §112) (on the pañcápādaṇskandhā, see note 239 below). What the ŚrīBh calls icchāvighātaduḥkkhata and puts at the end of the list corresponds to the seventh type of suffering in the MVyut enumeration.

5 Skt. kāmopabhogin, which I render rather freely as ‘hedonist’, is often used as an attribute describing ordinary people (see, for example, BoBh 302, 14). A more literal rendering is ‘[those] enjoying sensual pleasures’ or ‘[those] having [at their disposal large amounts of] objects [for the gratification] of the sensual pleasures’. The purport of the passage is that even the happiest life of the most privileged human beings remains inexorably subject to impermanence and suffering.

5 Cf. Pali tāva-kālika ‘for the time being; temporary’ (PED, s.v.; PTS Concordance, s.v. vol. 2, p. 219) and kālika ‘temporal, vanishing’. See also BoBh 27, 1: tāvatkālikaavāhāra; and 63, 4-5: tāvatkālikayogena. Xuanzang renders the word as 暫時 ‘temporary’ (the same binome is used in his translation of the BoBh occurrences above). Tib. brnyan ma for tāvatkālika appears to be rare in the YoBh, the usual renderings being re zhir, dus de tsam zhir, etc. (cf. YoBh-I, s.v. 暫時). Actually, brnyan pa does not seem to be a very frequent term in Buddhist translations. Lokesh Chandra records only one occurrence: brnyan ma ’dra = yācittopama ‘like [something] borrowed’, found in the Rāṣṭrapālapariprcchā (see TSD Supplement, s.v.) (on yācita, which is a symbol impermanence, see BHSD, s.v.). Tib. brnyan pa means ‘to borrow’ as well as ‘reflection’, ‘appearance’, ‘image’, etc. It often occurs as an abbreviation of gzugs brnyan, translating words like chéyā, pratibimba, pratibhāsa, mūrti, etc. It is also used in sgra brnyan or ‘echo’. (Cf. also TED, ‘the twelve expressions illustrative of illusion’ s.v. sgyu ma.) BTsh (s.v. brnyan ma) also gives the meaning of tshab ma ‘a substitute’ (cf. the corresponding Chinese rendering 代替品). In our ŚrīBh passage, the literal meaning of brnyan ma seems to be: ‘even the accomplishment of these is borrowed [for a limited time, i.e., not really owned]’.

5-3 In Buddhist vocabulary, ‘black’ (kṛṣṇa) refers to what is negative or pernicious. ‘Black’ categories are often contrasted to ‘white’ (sukla) or positive ones. At ŚrīBh-Gr (18) 40, 6-13, in a passage listing different mental factors (dharma) in the context of the four applications of
mindfulness (śrītyupasthāna), the pernicious states of mind are described as ‘black categories’ and the wholesome ones are called ‘white categories’ (kṛṣṇaṇuklapaṇa) (Śrībh-G ṛ (18) 40, 11-12; MS omits pakṣa but Tib. phyogs and Ch. pb clearly suggest pakṣa; the editors of Śrībh-G ṛ (18) have pakṣya but pakṣa makes, I think, a better reading). ‘Black and white categories’ are explained as ‘corresponding to defilement and purification’ (sammāśāvyavādānapakṣayāḥ) (Śrībh-G ṛ (18) 40, 12-13).

These eight comparisons, phrases slightly differently, also appear as stanzas 46-47 of the Abhiprāyikārthāgāthā in the Cintāmāṇihūmi of the YoBh. For Skt. text and translation, see Maeda 1991, 89-90; Wayman 1984, 356 and 365. For Tib. see also P Yū 42a7ff; Ch. is found at Ts1.366c23-26 (verses); 369c10-23 (Nīrdeśa); 766c1-7 (commentary). Cf. also W 127 and KDK, p. 136, n. 14 and n. 15.

In the Abhiprāyikārthāgāthānirdeśa, it is explained that ‘the detrimental nature [of the sensual pleasures] is indicated by mentioning the [eight] similes [which are] well-known to the whole world’ (sarvalokaprasiddhān upamaparāmaśair ādīnāvatāvān ārāmaratvāt) (Maeda 1991, 89) (Maeda has sarvalokasiddhaṁ, but the YoBh MS 112a3 reads as above; cf. Tib. grags pa). (I am indebted to Prof. Schmithausen for checking the YoBh MS). The Nīrdeśa actually explains these similes as being concrete illustrations of the eight detriments (aṣṭāva ādīnāvāh) of the sensual pleasures which form the subject of gāthās 44-45 of the same text (Maeda 1991, 89). The Śrībh (see passage 3.28.21.22. above) also speaks of five detriments of pleasures, which are, however, only partly similar to the aṣṭāva ādīnāvāh and are not likened to the eight similes.

As far as canonical antecedents are concerned, Pali texts (e.g. Vin II 25-26, MN I 130, AN III 97) contain references to ten similes for pleasures. Seven of them are identical with the comparisons employed by Śrībh; one likens pleasures to the head of a snake (sappasirūpamā), which corresponds to the venomous snake in our text. The other two compare pleasures to a slaughter-house or, according to CPD (s.v.), a butcher’s knife and chopping block (asisiṇāpamā) and to an impaling-stake (sattisūlūpamā). (Cf. also Nidd II 71; Sa 61; Dhp 186; Th 2 and 358; Ja II 313; Vism 124; etc.).

The last simile in our Śrībh passage needs some further clarifications. The Tibetan rendering is shing km pa kā'i 'bras bu or 'kimpāka fruit', which corresponds to neither the Sanskrit MS nor the Chinese translation. Kimpāka or Trichosanthes palmata is explained by Monier-Williams as 'a Cucurbitaceous plant' or its 'fruit' (MW, s.v.; cf. also PW, s.v.; BWDJ, s.v.; TED, s.v. km pa kā, which gives the scientific name Cucumis colocythis alongside with Trichosanthes palmata). Kimpāka as a metaphor of the transience and deceivensensual pleasures is a well-known Buddhist image (cf. also TED, s.v. km pa kā). Monier-Williams describes the kimpāka fruit as being 'of a very bad taste', but the Buddhist canon seems to share a quite different view. The Kimpākka-jātaka (Ja I 367-369) gives a fairly detailed description of the fruit which the Buddhist author(s) had in mind. In Chalmers's translation (Ja I tr., pp. 212-213), which renders kimpākka literally as 'what-fruit', its description reads as follows: 'In form, smell and taste, its trunk, boughs, leaves and fruit resembled a mango' (p. 212). The text also says: 'Very fair to view is the What-tree, very fragrant and sweet; but when eaten, it racks the inwards and brings death' (p. 212). The Tibetan translation of the Śrībh would rather seem to presuppose such an image. This actually fits better kimpāka as a metaphor for pleasures, which may outwardly seem 'fragrant and sweet' but once enjoyed, 'rack the inwards and bring death.' Let us also notice that the word kimpāka also means 'childish' and 'stupid', which most probably added a paronomastic effect to the simile.

Concerning the Trichosanthes palmata (mentioned by Monier-Williams), it would seem rather unlikely that such a plant can grow in Tibet since no member of the family Cucurbitaceae 'tolerates frost or cold' (Britannica, vol. 3, p. 777). We could surmise that the addition of
kiṃpāka by the Tibetan translation team is rather improbable since the name of the plant would have brought no botanic familiarity to most of the local readers and audiences. It is hence more plausible to suppose that the MS used by the Tibetan translators contained an extra compound: *kiṃpāvakrāyakaṇphala.

Grammatically, paryēṣamāṇa and paryēṣanā ‘striving after’ are forms derived from the paryēṣate ‘examines’, a verb frequently used in our chapter (for a list of the verbal forms of es/k, see Gotō 1993, 124-128). The verb basically means ‘to seek’, and this leads to different connotations, as actually illustrated in our passage. On the one hand, we have seeking for pleasures, which is precisely the act which the ascetic wants to renounce. On the other hand, we have seeking for the very essence of these pleasures, i.e., examining them, which becomes the method of eliminating the sensual pleasures. The Ch. translation actually makes a distinction in this respect: it renders the former as 追求 and the latter as 尋思.

This refers to Śrī Bh MS 46a7M-47a2M; Sh 78, 2-81,5; Śrī Bh-Gr 120-125; W 141-143 (Engl. tr., pp. 151-153) (Tib.: P 36b4-38a6; D 30b5-32a3; Ch.: T31.40b8b14-409a6). (Cf. also T31.625b26ff). The passage in question belongs to the section on moderation in eating (bhōjane mātraṇatā), and the term used here is Skt. ādinava (Tib. nyes dmigs; Ch. 過慮) ‘detriment’, ‘disadvantage’, ‘evil consequence’, ‘danger’, ‘wretchedness’, etc. (cf. also CPD, s.v.; PD, s.v.). The types of detriment linked to striving after food are classified into the following six categories: (1) the detriment generated by hardships and adversities such as cold, heat, etc., which one has to go through for earning (samudānāna) one’s food; (2) the detriment generated by the efforts which one has to do for protecting (ārakṣa) one’s goods from robbers, etc.; (3) the detriment generated by the disruption of the affective relations (sneha-paribhrama) between man and his territory and the ensuing war with other lands; (5) the detriment generated by the state of servitude (asvātantra) of soldiers who have to risk their life for the king; and (6) the detriment generated at the time of death by one’s regret over one’s evil deeds (duṣkarita) and their actual karmic retribution which will result in rebirth in hell, amongst hungry ghosts, or as an animal. The detriment caused by earning or, to be more precise, accumulation (samudānāna) appears to correspond to the suffering generated by striving (paryēṣanākṛta) in our passage. For the rest, the terminological parallelism is evident.

Skt. kāmān pratiṣevatāḥ; see also kāmān […] pratiṣevamāṇasya below. The verb paṭisevati is often used in this sense and collocation in the Pali Canon (cf. PTS Concordance vol. 3, p. 102; especially, kāme paṭisevante, MN I 504, 34; see also kāmānān […] ādinava ca nissaraṇaḥ ca yathābhūtām viditā in the same passage at MN I 504, 28-30). Cf. also BHSD, s.v. pratiṣevati, ‘he, which also adds that the verb is ‘sometimes written “ṣev”’.

There are several sets of five detriments (paśca ādināvā) occurring in relation to different concepts in the Pali Canon (see PTS Concordance, vol. 1, p. 318). On the wisdom generated by observing the detriments (ādināvānapasaṇānāna), see Vism 555-558.

Cf. Vin II 25; 26; MN I 130; AN III 97: appassādā kāmā vuttā Bhagavatā bahudukkha bahūpāyāsā ādinavo ettha bhīyyo. This phrase occurs together with the ten similes for pleasures, out of which eight are identical or almost identical to the ones found in our passage. See also note 54 above.

I read the Sanskrit original as alamātā vā trpiṭā vā paryāpītā vā (see Skt. crit. ed.). This appears to be the best way of keeping the number of detriments to five, as announced by the Exalted One at the beginning of this paragraph, and it is also supported by a parallel passage in the Xiānyuáng lun (see note 63 below). The lack of ‘sufficiency or satisfaction or satiation’ forms, most likely, one class of ādinava. For the counting of the five detriments, see note 63 below.

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Skt. has: *anena paryāyeṇa, but Tib. and Ch. seem to read here: *anekaparyāyeṇa ‘in a variety of ways’. Literally, Ch. 以無量門 means ‘in an infinite number of ways’.

I take vadāmi as part of this sentence and not as referring to the whole statement by the Exalted One in this paragraph. See also Choi 2001, p. 120, n. 358 and pp. 120-1, n. 367.

The parallel passage in the Xianyang lun (T31.514b25-29; edited and translated in Choi 2001, 79-80) clearly shows how to count the five detriments: 又薄伽梵言：我說習近諸欲有五過患。一、習近欲者，多諸苦惱，多諸過患。二、習近欲者，無厭足，無依、無息。三、習近欲者，諸結增長。四、習近欲者，諸結增長。五、習近欲者，無惡不造。 In our Śrībh passage, this yields the following way of counting:

1. sensual pleasures have little flavour
2. [beget] much suffering, much detriment
3. there is no sufficiency or satisfaction or satisfaction
4. [lead to] accumulation of fetters
5. there is no evil and unwholesome act whatsoever which one will not commit [for them].

In the Skt. original, there are no formal devices marking each detriment, but the Tib. and Ch. offer good (albeit imperfect) clues regarding their counting. With the exception of the first detriment, the four other adināvas are connected by dāng in Tib. and introduced by 又 in Ch. (but it must be noticed that [...] smad pa dāng in Tib. and 又彼諸欲 [...] 呼聲毀告 in Ch. are misleading in this respect.)

The theme of the insatiable nature of sensual pleasures is very old in Buddhist literature. See, for instance, Kāmasutta (Sn 766-771); Kāmājātaka (Jā No. 467), especially Bodhisatta’s verses describing the human proclivity for never-ending craving (Ja IV 172-173); etc.

Skt. bahuḥsādharāṇa literally means ‘common to many’ (cf. MW, s.v.). Sādharāṇa placed in fine compositii means ‘common to’, ‘similar with’, etc. See, for instance, BoBh 152, 12: sravavakasādharāṇām [...] ādhim ‘supernatural power in common with the disciples’; 343, 1-2: sarvavāvāhāsādharāṇa ca bhavati ‘and it is common to [similar with] any blow of wind’ (MS: Sādharāṇa ca bhavati). Bahusādharāṇa in our passage obviously refers to pleasures, but it is hard to determine precisely to which aspect of pleasures it actually alludes. Probably, it refers to the fact that indulgence in pleasures is a common characteristic shared by many (most of the) sentient beings, with the connotation of ‘vulgarity’. Maeda (1991, 89-90) translates it as 多を共有すること ‘having many in common’. Wayman’s rendering is ‘having many cohabits’ (1984, 365). Both translation do not convey, however, what exactly pleasures have in common. The Nirdeva is not very helpful in this respect. It links this disadvantage with the simile of the chunk of meat: bahuḥsādharāṇā māmsapeśyupamatavat [pleasures] are common to many because of their being like a chunk of meat’ (Maeda ed. 1991, 89).

Wayman (1984, 365) translates this and the phrase immediately preceding as, ‘They should be avoided by illustrious persons and quickly brought to destruction’. Skt. kṣipraṁ vilayagāmināḥ appears to refer to the ephemeral nature of pleasures unable to bring a true-lasting state of satisfaction and happiness. Tib. and Ch. also point in the same direction of understanding.

The compound bālalāpana (on the various spellings of the word, see note 53 to Skt. crit. ed.) ‘deceiving fools’ as well as the adjective ullāpana (Pali, ullapana) ‘deceitful’ is often used in Buddhist literature to describe the nature of the sensual pleasures and worldly existence. For an almost identical passage at MN II 261, which also spells bālalāpana, see note 67 below. The term is also used at Thī 357: ummādanā ullāpanā kāmā ‘maddening, deceitful are pleasures’; LalVis Vaidya ed. 176, 23 (= Lefmann ed. 212, 14): kāmā [...] ullāpanā riktamaṣṭīvad asārāḥ ‘pleasures [...] are deceiving, with no value, like an empty fist’; LalVis Vaidya ed. 140, 25-141, 2 (ver. 98) (= Lefmann ed. 176, 4): saṁskāra [...] mayopama
cittamohanā / bāla-ullāpana riktamuṣṭivat (Mitra reads the last compound as ulka muṣṭivat, Lefmann and Vaidya, on the other hand, have utka muṣṭivat, but both readings are very unlikely; cf. the passage above as well as BHSD, s.v. ullāpana and riṭa-ṃuṣṭi) ‘the conditioned factors [...] are like an illusion deluding the mind, are like an empty fist deceiving the fools’; RāṣṭrāPar 39, 13: bāḷollāpāṇaṃ sansāraraṇitinirvāśvadāṃ rājyakusakhaṃ ‘royal happiness [which is] deceiving [only] fools, [containing] worldly delight without any [true] taste’; DasaBh Kondō ed. 82, 13 (= Rahder ed. 43, 6-7): sarvasaṃskṛtaṃ [...] bāḷollāpānāṃ iti yathābhūtām prajānāti ‘[the bodhisattva] knows all conditioned existence as it really is: [...] deceiving [only] fools.’ (Edgerton, who also refers to this occurrence in Rahder’s edition, suggests that here bāḷollāpānāṃ should be read instead of bāḷollāpānaṃ; see BHSD, s.v. ullāpana.)

6 7 There is a parallel passage in verses 44-45 of the Ābhīprāyikārthaṃā: atriṭikarakāḥ kāmA bahūsaṅdāranāṃ tathā / adharmaḥetavaḥ caiva tathā tṛṣṇāvivardhakāḥ // satām vivarjaniyāsa ca kṣipram vālayagamiṇāḥ / pratavyeyo aśritāḥ kāmāḥ pamādasya ca bhūṃayaḥ // (Maeda 1991, 89; Wayman 1984, 356; Engl. translation of the verses and commentary is found at p. 365); cf. Ch.: 諸欲令無常 衆多所共有 是非法因緣 能增長貪欲 賢聖所應離 速趣於煩滅 仗託於衆緣 能保世所依地。T30.366c19-22; commentary at T30.369c4-9).

We also find a close parallel of the final part of this passage at MN II 261, 25-26: aniccā, bhikkhave, kāmā tuccha musā mohadhammā; māyaṃ katam etam, bhikkhave, bāḷollāpanaṃ (According to the PTS editors (MN II 261, n. 6), the Mandalay MS and King of Siam’s printed edition read: mosadhhammā instead of mohadhammā; cf. also 安般法 in Ch. parallel below). The corresponding Chinese Madhyamāgama text reads: 欲者無常、虛偽、妄言、是妄言法，則是幻化，欺詐愚癡。（T1.542b6-7). Actually, this precedes the passage which appears to be quoted in the next sentence (see note 73 below), This suggests that SrBh authors probably cited or at least drew heavily on this canonical text.

6 8 Skt. nivāpa (same in Pali) is polysemic. It means ‘seed or sown field; offerings, especially oblations to the departed ones; throwing down, killing’, etc. In our passage, Buddhist intertextuality strongly suggests the sense of ‘crops or field sown by Māra’. The locus classicus is the Nivāpasutta (MN I 151-160), where the Exalted One makes use of the simile of four deer herds lured by the fodder found in crops (nivāpa) sown (nivapati) by a sower (nevāpika) (p. 151) (in the Chinese translation of the sutta, which is discussed below, the word appears to be understood as ‘hunter’ 獵師). Three herds cannot resist the temptation and end up being caught by the sower. The fourth one, however, manages to escape by making their lairs far from the sower’s fields and not encroaching upon his crop. The Exalted One explains, “Crop, mendicants, is a term for the five strands of pleasure. “Sower”, mendicants, is a term for Māra, the Evil One’ (nivāpa tī kho bhikkhave paṭiccar etam kāmagunānaṃ adhivacanam. nevipaṅko tī kho bhikkhave mārass’ etam pāpimato adhivacanam.) (MN I 155). Then he speaks of four types of recluse and brahmanas (samaṇabrāhmaṇā). The first three cannot resist the temptations of the worldly things’ (lokāmisa) (āmisa also meaning ‘food’) and become entrapped by Māra, the evil ‘sower’. The fourth type, however, succeeds in blinding Māra (andham akāsi māram) and transcending the attachment to the world (tinpa loke visattikam) by staying aloof from sensual pleasures. This is achieved by practising jhānas which culminate in the eradication of the contaminant (āśava) by wisdom (pañña) obtained after the attainment of the cessation of ideation and sensation (saññavedayātanirodha) (p. 160).

The Tibetan translators probably had this sense of nivāpa in mind, for which they chose gzhan ma (Tib. gzhan pa means ‘food, hay’ or ‘to devour, to consume’). Things seem to be different with the Ch. 住 ‘dwelling’, which suggests nivāsa or ‘dwelling’ rather than nivāpa. One cannot rule out that the Chinese reading may have been the original reading. It would imply the usage of parallel expressions with cumulative effect: mārasyaṣa gocaro, mārasyaṣa nivāpo ‘the very
domain [range] of the Evil One, the very dwelling of the Evil One'. The extant MS reading (which seems to be much closer to nivāpo than nivāṣa), the parallel passage in the Pali Majjhima Nikāya and the Chinese Madhyamāgama (see note below), and the Tib. translation, all support, however, nivāpa as the most likely reading.

It seems quite probable that Xuanzang’s MS read nivāsa. (Or did the Chinese master deciphered wrongly nivāpo as nivāṣa? The two aksaras are actually rather close in a number of early scripts (see Bühler 1904, Tafel VI). After all, even Homer sometimes nods... ) In the ‘Scripture on the Hunter’ (Lie shi jing 獵師經) (T1.718b-720a), the Chinese translation corresponding to the Nīvāpasutta, we find a quite appropriate rendering of nivāpa. The sentence equivalent to the Pali passage quoted above reads: “The food of the hunter” should be understood as referring to the five stratas of pleasures. “The hunter” should be understood as referring to the Evil King Māra’ 獵師食者, 當知五欲功德也. 獵師者, 當知是魔王也. (T1.719a13-14). Here what appears to correspond to nivāpa in Pali is rendered as ‘food’ 食, and nevārika as ‘hunter’ 獵師. The latter may be problematic if we are to derive it from the verb ni+ vap, but it fits the context of this sutta, where our nevārika is actually engaged in a form of deer hunting which appears as important as the field sowing (cf. nivāpa meaning in Skt. also ‘killing, slaughter’; cf. MW, s.v.). Let us also note that in the Chinese translation of the Ānañjasappāyasutta (see note 7 below), the equivalent of mārassa nivāpo is 魔餌 ‘Māra’s food’ or ‘Māra’s bait’.

The Šrībh London dedicates a chapter (3.19) to the four meanings of māra and his deeds (mārakarmānī) (Skt.: MS 94b51-95a5R; Sh 343, 10-347, 8; W 105; Tib.: D 126a2-127a6; Ch.: T 447c15-448b4), but we do not find any detail which could cast light upon the meaning intended in our passage.

69 Skt. abhidhyā ‘covetousness’. AK IV.77c-d defines the term as: ‘abhidhyā is improper covetousness for another’s property’ (abhidhyā tu parasvaviṣmaśphā) (AKBh 247,11; see also the explanation following in the next lines); 惡欲他財貪 (Xuanzang’ s tr., T29.88b2); 貪欲者, 他財不平欲 (Paramārtha’s tr., T29.243b13-14). Apart from this meaning, AKBh also mentions (but does not agree with) another meaning of the word: ‘According to others, abhidhyā refers to craving which pertains only to the entire sphere of sensual pleasures’ (sarvaiva kāmāvacarī tṛṇabhidhyethy apare) (AKBh, 147, 13-14). In our Šrībh passage, abhidhyā is listed together with ‘malice, violence, or what[ever] further [factors] which obstruct the practice of the noble disciple’. This seems to suggest that the term is understood as a particular type of greed rather than a generic name for it. If the latter latter had been the case, one would have expected to see it enumerated with dveṣa and moha. (Even if ‘take vyāpāda as an equivalent or an instantiation of dveṣa, there is nothing corresponding to moha.)

70 Skt. vyāpāda ‘malice’. AK IV.78a says: ‘vyāpāda is hatred towards living beings’ (vyāpādadh sattvavidvēṣaḥ) (AKBh 247, 18); 惡有情瞋恚 (Xuanzang’s tr., T29.88b2); 聲恚有 (Paramārtha’s tr., 243b21-22). This is further explained as: ‘vyāpāda is hatred towards living beings manifested in the form of harming others’ (sattveṣu vidvēṣaḥ vyāpādadh parapiḍākārapravṛttah) (AKBh 247, 19).

71 Skt. saṁrāmbha is polysemic. In classical Sanskrit, it means ‘agitation; ardent desire; fury, wrath; arrogance’, etc. The meaning of saṁrāmbha in our Šrībh passage as well as in other Buddhist sources (see the citation from the AbhSam in note 42 above) seems to imply ‘becoming angry and resorting to physical violence’. In Pali, we find both the form sārāmbha and the (Sanskritised?) saṁrāmbha meaning ‘impetuosity, rage’ (PED, s.v.). The Tib. rendering here is nyes rtson which means ‘to undertake [i.e., engage in] evil [acts]’ (see note to 80 Tib. ed.). In other passages of the Tibetan translation of the YoBh, saṁrāmbha is rendered as rtso dp (YoBh-D, s.v.), which means ‘to dispute, wrangle’. The Ch. equivalent in our passage in the
SrBh is 慣諤, literally ‘wrath-dispute’. In a parallel passage in the Ānañjasappāyasutta (see note 73 below), sārāmbha is rendered into Chinese as 閖諤 ‘fight-dispute’. Other Ch. translations for saṁrāmbha in the YoBh include 閖諤 ‘fight and dispute’, 諤 ‘dispute’, and 發諤 ‘become [be] enraged’. We also find asaṁrāmbha in the BoBh in a phrase which reads: asaṁrāmbhāvīhindisākrodabahutuḥ (Wogihara ed. 327, 3-4 = Dutt ed. 223, 26) ‘rich in non-wrath, non-violence, and non-anger’, said of the bodhisattva who has firmly joined the Tathāgata’s lineage (tathāgatavānānāyātā) and has obtained serenity based on faith (avetyaarpāna) (for the last term, see BHSD; cf. also CPD s.v. aveccAPPaśāda). The phrase is translated into Ch. as: 遠離分份忿怒習諤 (T30.555a7-8).

For a discussion on the technical meaning of the obstacles or obstructions (antārāya), see SrBh-Gr 245-257.

There is a parallel passage in the Ānañjasappāyasutta at MN II 261-262: Ye ca diṭṭhadhammikā kāmā, ye ca samparāyikā kāmā, yā ca diṭṭhadhammikā kāmasaṅgā, yā ca samparāyikā kāmasaṅgā: ubhayam etam Māradheyyam, Mārass’ essa visayo, Mārass’ essa nivāpo, Mārass’ esa gocaro. ett’ ete pāpaka akusalā mānāsā abhiḥjā pi vyāpādā pi sārāmbhā pi saṁvattantti, te ca ariyasaṁvākassa idha-m-anusikkhato antarāyāya saṁbhavantti. The Chinese equivalent is found in the Scripture on the Pure Imperturbability [or: Purity and Imperturbability] 淨不動道經 and reads: 若現世欲及後世欲, 若現世色及後世色, 彼一見是魔境界則是魔餌. 因此令心生無量惡不善之法, 增伺瞋恚及闇諤等. 謂: 聖弟子學時為作障礙. (T1.542b7-11). Though the extent Nikāya and Āgama texts does not match the SrBh passage word for word, the latter is most probably a citation from or, at least, paraphrase of this canonical source. See also note 67 above.

Skt. yu̯kti. In the SrBh and the SaṁNirm (see Chapters Five and Six above) as well as the AbhSam, etc. (see Yaita 1989a and Yoshimizu 1996b; cf. also Kimura 2004), the term yu̯kti has a precise range of technical meanings arranged under four categories: reasoning with regard to dependence (apekṣāyu̯kti), reasoning with regard to [the suitability of] producing [a certain] effect (kāryakaṭānu̯kti), reasoning on the basis of proof by [logical] demonstration (upapattisādhanau̯kti), and reasoning on the basis of the nature of things (dharmayu̯kti) (see SrBh-Gr 236-240). There seems to be no word in English, German or Japanese which is able to cover the whole semantic range of yu̯kti. Sakuma (1990, vol. 2, pp. 99-102) translates yu̯kti as Stimmigkeit ‘coherence’, but adds: Es ist fraglich, ob “yu̯kti” in allen vier Fällen die gleiche Bedeutung hat. He further refers to SrBh 141, 11-143, 16, in which one of the meanings of yu̯kti is explained as yoga or upāya ‘method, means’ (cf. also SrBh 145, 2, which equates the word with vinīyoga) (Sakuma 1990, vo. 2, p. 99, n. 596). Maithrimurthi (1999, 300) as well as Choi (2003, 81) similarly translate yu̯kti as Stimmigkeit but also note the difficulty of finding a precise rendering of the term (Maithrimurthi 1999, p. 300, n. 22; Choi 2001, p. 123, n. 395).

Yoshimizu (1996a, p. 114, n. 85, and 1996b) offers a detailed discussion of the term and doctrinal history of yu̯kti. In her 1996a contribution, Yoshimizu argues that the rendering Grund may be a proper rendering for all the four yu̯kti categories in the SrBh and SaṁNirm. In 1996b, 160-164, Yoshimizu brings some refinements and corrections to her views expressed in the former work. She argues that yu̯kti in the SaṁNirm, SrBh, and AbhSam ‘is assumed to mean an objective ground or principle which consists of the phenomenal world or facts and based on which one can explain originations and changes of phenomena as well as relations between things including logical relations’ (Yoshimizu 1996b, 160). Yoshimizu (1996b, 124-127) also discusses the various translations of the term in previous studies and adopts for her Japanese translation the term 道理. The latter is actually one of the most frequent traditional Chinese renderings of yu̯kti (e.g., Xuanzang’s translation of the SaṁNirm, T16.709b1ff.) and is also a binome used in modern Japanese (as well as Chinese) in the sense of ‘reason, argument’, etc.}

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The four types of ūkti are also discussed by Yaita (1989a), who similarly adopts the traditional Chinese translation 道理. The Śrībh-Gṛ translation (Śrībh-Gṛ pp. 237ff.) also renders the term as道理.

The main difficulty in rendering the term is that its semantic sphere seems to cover both the objective principles underlying the reality and the human epistemological effort to find and systematise them (cf. Yoshimizu 1996b). Without a term covering both facets (and I can think of none), the solution seems to be a choice between the objective aspect (as the German Grund) and the subjective nuance (like Stimmigkeit and ‘reasoning’). Probably a more creative manner of rendering ūkā in this special usage here would be ‘reason(ing)’, i.e., attempting to put together both ‘reason’ (Grund) and ‘reasoning’. I am afraid, however, that the reader who is not warned about the semantic complexity behind this ‘reason(ing)’ would become more perplexed than enlightened. Admittedly, ūkā covers both the objective and subjective sides, but my conjecture is that at least in the Śrībh, the emphasis is more on the subjective facet, i.e., the yogi’s effort to look into the essence of reality. I shall, therefore, adopt in my translation ‘reasoning’, without, however, denying that ūkā also has an objective facet (after all, ‘looking into the essence of reality’ means discovering its Grund). Let us further note that Powers (tr. 1995, 285-289) similarly renders the Tibetan equivalent of ūkā in the Sarvāṁīrīnām as ‘reasoning’ or ‘analysis’. Keenan (tr. 2000, 103-104) also translates the Chinese equivalent of the word here as ‘reasoning’. Cox (1995, 14, 15) uses ‘reasoned argument’ for ūkā, which is an appropriate alternative worth considering. Though my choice has been ‘reasoning’, I heartily agree with Maithrimurthi (1999, p. 300, n. 22) that das letzte Wort über die angemessene Übersetzung für ūkā is aber noch nicht gefallen.

75 Skt. putradāra. The noun putra in dual and plural may refer to ‘children’, both sons and daughters being included (see MW, s.v.). In our compound, too, it is very likely that the intended meaning was plural: ‘sons and daughters’. Whether -dāra should similarly be construed as ‘wives’ is not clear. Given the widespread institution of polygamy amongst the wealthy social groups in Ancient India, especially royal and aristocratic families (see Basham 1967, 174-176; Khosla 1986, 253-4; Hara 2003, 28-37; etc.). The character in our Śrībh passage seems to belong to such a milieu, and the authors of our text may have well intended a plural meaning for dāra, too. The institution of marriage in the Gupta Age is discussed in Pandey 1982, 160-166. Pandey argues that ‘monogamy and absolute fidelity was the ideal of a married life. Polygamy, however, was allowed in practice, though it was confined to aristocracy’ (p. 164).

76 On slavery in the traditional Indian society, see Basham 1967, 153-154. For the legal status of a slave, see Manusmrti ch. 8, ver. 415 (Olivelle ed. p. 743, tr. p. 189; Nene ed., p. 455). For various types of slaves and their legal status in the Gupta Age, see Pandey 1982, 158-159.

77 Apart from ‘companion’, (Skt.) amāṭya/(Pali) amaccā also means an ‘inmate of the same house’ or a ‘minister’ (MW, s.v.), the latter sense being frequent in the Mahābhārata and the Manusmṛti. Linguistically, ‘the adverb amā- means “at home”, and in combination with the suffix –tya- it acquires the sense of “found at home”; as a substantive it means “home-colleague” or “minister”, who was conceived as a man found at the home of a king’ (Hara 1959, 91). The amāṭya/amaccā appears to have been a king’s personal aid or confidant rather than and official minister (PED, s.v.).

The traditional interpretations of similar contexts in Buddhist literature seem to prefer the meaning of ‘companion’, though the exact meaning of this term is not easy to determine. In discussing the suffering caused by the separation from the beloved ones, Vibh 100 lists: mātā vā pītā vā bhātā vā bhagā vā mittā vā amaccā vā nātisālohitā vā. Vibh-a 107 explains amaccā as: kicca kaṅśīyesu saha bhāvāṭṭhena amā hontī amaccā. ‘Because “they are with me (amā) in the sense of association in the execution of functions”, they are amaccā (“companions”)’ (Nāṇamoli tr., p. 129). The linguistic validity of this gloss, which follows interpretative lines similar to the
Nirukta tradition, should not concern us here; the important aspect is that the Pali commentators understood the term as ‘companion’ associated in the performance of one’s duties. What exactly this association means is, however, not so easy to specify: it could be that of a companion of equal rank or that of a member of one’s retinue or a special adviser.

The character depicted in our passage in the ŚrīBh is obviously rich. Amāṭya may refer to an ‘equal companion’, an ‘attendant’, or, if we assume him to be an aristocratic or even royal figure, then ‘privy councillor’ is not excluded. In the end, I have decided to render the word as ‘companion’ in order to accommodate a plurality of nuances. Tib. blon po clearly suggests ‘a state-officer, generally of high rank’ (TED, s.v.; cf. BTsh, s.v.; on the early system of blon and zhang, contemporary to the Tibetan translators of the YoBh, see Yamaguchi 1988, vol. 2, pp. 31-34). For the Chinese rendering, see note 78 below.

78 Skt. jñātisālohitā/Pali  nāṭisālohitā is a frequent compound in Buddhist literature (PED, s.v.; BHSD, s.v.). Though not correct from the viewpoint of modern comparative linguistics, traditional Indian grammarians and commentators regarded jñāti as referring to paternal relations (see Kazama 1984, 330-2). In our compound, however, no notable difference seems to exist between jñāti and sālohitā. The same passage of the Vibh-a (p. 108) cited in the preceding note continues: ayam amhākāṇa ajhātiko ti evam jānanti, nāyantīti [PTS reading nāti emended to nāti] vā nāti. lohitena sambaddhā [on this reading, see below] ti sālohitā. Because “they know (jānanti) that ‘this is our own’” or because “they are known (nāyantīti)”, they are nāti [nāti emended to nāti] (“kin”): because “they are tied by blood”, they are sālohitā (“blood relatives”) (Nānamoli tr., p. 129). (PTS reads sambaddhā instead of sambaddhā. I think that the latter is the correct form, and the PTS reading should be emended accordingly. PED, Mizuno 1988, Kumoi 1997, s.v., list sambandha only as noun. It is true that occasionally one also meets with forms like sambandha-kula (PED, s.v. sambandha) and asambandha (CPD, s.v. and PED s.v. sambandha), but as suggested by the CPD editors, asambandha may be a wrong reading for asambaddha.)

The Chinese translation is rather problematic, posing several problems concerning the exact understanding and punctuation of the compound 父母 妻子 奴婢 作使 親友 眷屬, especially its latter half. My punctuation follows the most natural way of reading the phrase in Chinese (cf. also KIK 235 and KDK 137). This, however, leads to lack of parallelism with the Skt. compound. In order to have a perfectly corresponding translation of the 12-member dvandva compound we would need to regard each character as standing for one Sanskrit word. The first six characters raise no special problem in this respect, but construing each of the last six characters as six lexemes is not very natural in Chinese. It is more sensible to suppose that Xuanzang chose to render the compound in an abbreviated manner. The same compound is also seen in the BoBh. The occurrence at T30.509c8-9 (corresponding to BoBh Wogihara ed. 132,15-16; Dutt ed. 92,4-5) offers a perfect example to be compared with our passage. Here mātāpitipratadārāśadāsakarmakaraapauruṣeyamitrāmātyajñātisālohitayā is rendered as 父母 妻子 奴婢 作使 善友 大臣 親戚 眷屬. The parallelism between the Skt. and the Ch. is evident. But here, too, as in our ŚrīBh passage, a term like 作使 is not easy to explain. I could not find the word as a binomic compound in other Chinese sources, Buddhist or not, but the most natural way of construing it is ‘servant 職 who does the work 職’. Abandoned as a noun meaning ‘worker’ (therefore, karmakara) is not excluded (though the only its occurrence with the sense of ‘manual worker’, which I could find, is in a text composed in the Song Dynasty, see HDC, s.v.; in this case, the character should be read zuo with the second tone and not with its usual fourth tone). However, when referring to persons doing the work, the tendency in Chinese, classical and modern, is to use binomes as 作人 (a lexeme attested as early as the Book of Odes 詩經 and also used in Buddhist literature, as for instance, in Kumārajīva’s translation of the
SadPunj: T.9.17a17; 17a24; cf. also Karashima 2001, s.v.). If, however, 作使  is a lexeme, then does it render karmakara or pauruseya or both? I tend to believe that the latter is the most likely answer. Actually, it seems that 作使  regularly translates karmarkarpauruseya in the BoBh. See T30.509c8 (corresponding to BoBh Wogihara ed. 132,15-16; Dutt ed. 92,4), T30.533c16 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232, 21; Dutt ed. 160, 13, has pauruseya in square brackets, which shows the fact that the word is missing in the Patna MS and is supplied on the basis of Wogihara’s text), and T30.533c19-20 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232,26-233,1; Dutt 160,17).

Things are even more complicated with 親友眷屬, which likewise could be regarded as representing two bimorphemic words or construed as ‘close friends, friends, kinsmen and relatives’, corresponding perfectly to the Skt. mātrājñātāsālohitā. 親友 could stand for two independent words (here rendering ‘intimate friends’ (mitra) and ‘friends’ (amātya)) or could represent a binome meaning ‘close friends’, the latter being the most frequent usage (also attested in Buddhist texts; see BDJ, s.v.). Taking 親友 as a binome in our Śrābh passage does, however, raise the following problem: does it stand for mitra, or for amātya, or for both (taken to refer to basically the same category of persons). Likewise, 眷屬 could mean ‘relatives’ (the usual meaning of the binome in Chinese, cf. Shinjigen; s.v.; also found in Buddhist sources, cf. BDJ, s.v.), thus standing for jñātāsālohitā, or it could have the sense of ‘retinue, attendants’ (also seen in Buddhist texts, cf. BDJ, s.v.), rendering amātya, but then there is no Ch. equivalent for the Skt. jñātāsālohitā. The latter alternative seems quite unlikely. The compound mātrājñātāsālohitā is also found in the BoBh (passages referred to above), but its transliteration is not uniform. At T30.533c16 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232,21; Dutt ed. 160, 13-14) and T30.533c19-20 (BoBh Wogihara ed. 232,26-233,1; Dutt 160,17-18), Xuanzang renders it as: 朋友僚席眷屬. This compound, too, is not very clear. It should probably be construed as ‘friends, officials, and relatives’ (the meaning of 偽席 is defined in HDC, s.v., as 賛僚 various officials’ or 众官 ‘multitude of officers’; let us also note that 偽, apart from ‘official’, also means ‘colleague’.

Both Skt. jñātāsālohitā and Ch. 親 屬 are binomic, but as to the latter, it is difficult to know whether Xuanzang construed the compound as ‘kinsmen and relatives’ or simply as ‘relatives’ (given the fact that the Skt. components of this dvandva do not appear to show any important semantic difference?). At T30.509c8-9 (corresponding to BoBh Wogihara ed. 132,15-16; Dutt ed. 92,4-5), we find the following rendering: 善友大臣親戚眷屬 ‘good friends, ministers, kinsmen, and relatives’ (善友 may evoke the technical kalyāṇamitra but its plain sense of ‘good friend’ is attested in native Chinese writings as well as in translations of Indian texts; for 善友 standing for mitra, see BDJ, s.v.).

Though a definitive conclusion is not possible, it seems plausible to assume that here, as in other contexts, too, Xuanzang and his team were aware of the exact meaning of the compound, but they chose an abbreviated form of rendering.

Finally, let us remark that similar compounds which list relatives, attendants, etc. are frequent in Buddhist literature. See, for instance, mātāpiṣṭhstartingbhavatadvaduhitṛmiśrājñātāsālohitā (AbhissamĀl 661,28).

7 9 Odana ‘boiled rice’ is known since Vedic times. In the Rgveda, it appears to have referred to a mess ‘prepared with rice cooked in water or milk’ (Prakash 1961, 10). From the Atharvaveda on, it acquires the sense of ‘boiled rice’ (ibid. 289). Its recipe is described by Prakash (1961, 289) as follows: ‘Odana was prepared with clarified butter, meat, fruit, tubers, pulses and milk’. For rice, including odana, in Vedic literature, see Gonda’s monograph (1987). Patañjali (ca. 150 BCE), too, refers to odana as a favourite vegetarian food of his age (Puri 1990, 91). See also note 80 on kalmāṣa below.

8 0 Skt. kalmāṣa is usually translated as ‘sour gruel’ (MW, s.v.), ‘saure Reisschleim’ (PW, s.v.),
酸き粥 ‘sour gruel’ (BWDJ, s.v.), etc. Cf. Pali kummaśa ‘junket’ (PED, s.v.), ‘a kind of grain (probably a type of barley or wheat); a porridge or dumpling made of this; a broth or gruel’ (PD, s.v.). Prakash (1961, 287-8) describes kulmaśa as follows: ‘Probably the early Dravidians used this preparation. It was coarse gruel prepared by stewing some inferior food grain and mixing it with treacle and oil (Chand. Up. I 10.2.). Kulmaśa is known from Vedic times, being prepared of inferior cereals in a manner similar to the one quoted above (ibid. 11-12). ‘It seems to have generally been the food of the poor; but the rich ate in time of scarcity.’ (ibid. 12). It continued to be food of the poor and ascetics, being mentioned as such in variety of sources down to the Gupta Age (cf. ibid. 37, 85, 136, 168).

In the Kv (563), we are told that the Exalted One ate boiled rice and coarse gruel (odonakummaśam bhujjati)—‘the latter quite in keeping with his ascetic life. I surmise that the juxtaposition of odana (see preceding note) and kulmaśa in our Śrībh compound is meant to suggest the whole range of staple food from the high quality ‘boiled rice’ to the low dish of ‘coarse gruel’. The context, with its diatribe against the hedonistic attachment to the body and sensual pleasures, makes the meaning even more conspicuous: no matter if you feed upon savoury boiled rice or plain gruel, the body is doomed to destruction and suffering.

The rendering of the word has naturally led the traditional translators to some cultural modifications. Tib. zan dron is explained in B’thsh, s.v., as rtsam pa bré zas pa’i zan tsha po ‘a hot food into which parched barley flour is ground’. It is hard to say whether rtsam pa ‘parched barley flour’, which is a staple food in Tibet (cf. TED, s.v.; etc.), was chosen for its culinary similarity to kulmaśa (which also appears with the sense of ‘barley flour boiled in warm water, and made into cakes’, Prakash 1961, p. 136, n. 3, referring to Cakrapāṇi on the Carakasāṁhitā Su 27.260) or simply because it was more meaningful to the Tibetan readers, especially as it evoked a basic dish of the masses. The same can be said of the Ch. 麹, which is a type of ‘thick gruel’ known to the Chinese since early times. In his Commentary on the Li ji 禮記, the Chinese scholar Kong Yida 孔穎達 (574-648) notes: ‘麹 mi is thick [gruel] and 粥 zhou is thin [gruel]’ (麹厚而粥薄 (cf. 豐厚粥薄 ‘thick gruel’, in DKWJ, s.v.; or simply 粥 ‘gruel’, in HDC, s.v., though the editors quote under 麹粥 the above gloss by Kong Yida). MVyut # 5747 gives zan dron as the Tibetan equivalent for kulmaśa (same as in our text) but 湯麴 ‘warm noodles’ as the Chinese translation (under the influence of the Tibetan zan dron?).

The phrase odanakummaśāpacaya also occurs in the Pali Canon (DN I 76; MN II 17; etc.; cf. CPD, PD, PTS Concordance, s.v.). Buddhaghosa glosses it as: Odana-kummaśāpacayo ti, odana c’eva kummaśena ca upacito vaṭṭhito (DN-a I 220). We also find odana-kulmaśāpacaya at Mvastu 2.269,15; 277,18 (cf. BHSD, s.v.).

Like parimarduṇa (see below), usadana has a double meaning: ‘anointing’ and ‘destruction’. The usual form is utsādana (cf. CarSam Sūrashāna 14. 24, where the word is rendered by Sharma as ‘anointing’). In the BWDJ, s.v., the form utsadana is given as having the meaning of ‘cleaning the body’ 净身, while utsādana is explained as ‘anointing the body with perfumed oil’, both on the basis of the MVyut. In Sakaki’s edition of the MVyut, we find, however, only the form utsādana (in spite of its Index which registers both forms under the same entry # 6781 [Sakaki’s edition misprints as # 6881]). Edgerton, referring to the same entry of the MVyut, conjectures that Minayev’s and Mironov’s reading utsadana is an error for utsādana (BHSD, s.v. utsadana). A similar emendation is suggested by Schmidt (PW Nachträge, s.v.). The form utsadana is, however, attested at the DhSk 37. Dietz, referring to Edgerton’s conjecture, notes: ‘Die Lesung utsadana „Einreiben, Abreiben“ ist in allen vier Stellen eindeutig’ (p. 37, n. 87). SWTF, s.v., citing the same locus, adopts the same rendering. MVyut Ishihama and Fukude ed., entry # 6752 has utsādana but also records (ut)sadana(na) as a variant reading.
Ch. 覆蔽 ‘covering’ reflects another reading, most likely, *ācchādana, which is attested in the MVastu (see below). Choi (p. 125, n. 407) surmises the root chad for 覆蔽. As discussed below, the compound utsadanasnapanaparimardanabhedanacchedanavikiranaadhvaṇisansadharman appears to be a development of the Pali ucchādana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhaṁsana-dharmma (ucchādana is explained in PW, s.v., as a Prakrit form of utsādana; for Buddhaghosa’s explanation of ucchādana, see note 85 below). The compound is found in the MVastu in forms still close to the Pali version: ucchādana-parimaddana-svapna-bhedana-vikirana-viddhaṁsana-dharmma (2.269, 15-16; confirmed by MVastu MS, vol. 1 (palm-leaf) folio 201b4R) and ucchādana-parimaddana-supana-bhedana-vikirana-viḍddhaṁsana-dharmma (2.278, 1; confirmed by MVastu MS, vol. 1 (palm-leaf) folio 205a1R) (supana appears to be a BHSD variant for svapna, see BHSD, s.v.). It seems that at some stage in the MS (or oral) transmission, ucchādana gave birth to two different readings. One is utsadana, as reflected by the Skt. original and Tib. translation of the ŚrīBh, and another appears to have been *ācchādana, as suggested by the MVastu and Xuanzang’s rendering of the ŚrīBh.

82 The Pali stock-phrase cited above does not contain snapana or ‘bathing’. The MVastu passage quoted above contains svapna and supana ‘sleep’. It is difficult to say whether this is what the Buddhist compilers actually meant (adding thus a further term representative for the case one has to take of the body) or we have to do with a wrong reading for snapana. A similar occurrence in the KaPari 152, 2, reads: ucchāda-parimaddana-snapana-bhedana-vikirana-viḍddhaṁsana-dharmma. There is no way to ascertain with precision which of the two readings, snapana or svapna, was the original one, but in view of the context of ‘ointment’ and ‘massage’, it is more likely that snapana was the initial reading and svapna represents a later corruption or misunderstanding. Let us also note that MVyut Ishihama and Fukuda ed., entry # 6751 registers both forms of snāpana and snapana. (For both forms snapaya-ti and snāpayati in Middle Indic, see Sakamoto-Goto 1993, 279). Another closely related word often used in Classical Sanskrit texts for ‘bathing’ is snāna (see BudCar 11.34, for which see also below; CarSaM Śūrasthāna 5.94, in which snāna is recommended as purifying, aphrodisiac, life-promoting, eliminating fatigue, etc.).

83 Skt. parimaddana means ‘rubbing down’, ‘rubbing off’, ‘massage’ (cf. Tib. mnaye ba and Ch. 按摩) and also ‘crushing, wearing out, destroying’. The Pali word parimaddana also encompasses both meanings: ‘rubbing, kneading, shampooing, massage’ as well as ‘abrasion’ (PED, s.v.). MVyut # 6779 gives the word as part of the compound parimaddana-saṁvāhana ‘rubbing’ or ‘massage’ (saṁvāhana occurs at CarSaM Vīmānasthāna 6.16, being translated by Sharma as ‘gentle pressing’; saṁbāhana in Pali is also used in conjunction with parimaddana in Buddhaghosa’s commentary cited in note 85 below). In the CarSaM Chikitsāsthāna 21.135, we see parimaddana mentioned as a form of treatment for glandular erysipelas (granthi visarpa), which Sharma renders as ‘compression’. For ‘rubbing over the body’, the CarSaM Śūrasthāna 5.93 uses parimārjana, which is recommended for the elimination of foul smell, drowsiness, itching, etc. Though derived from a different root (pari+√myrd), parimaddana appears to be used in a similar sense. Actually, in Buddhaghosa’s gloss quoted below (note 85), the famous commentator uses both parimaddana ‘massage’ and parimajjana ‘rubbing’ (though the canonical text which he explains contains only parimaddana).

Let us also note that ucchādana and parimaddana in their concrete senses of ‘ointment’ and ‘massage’ respectively are seen together or alone in contexts describing activities related to the body hygiene (e.g., DN 1 7, 19, both words; AN 1 132, 16: ucchādana only; etc.).

84 For reasons required by the wording of the English sentence, I render -dharmana(h) (in fine composition) twice: ‘always requiring […]’ and ‘[yet] bound to […]’.

85 The compound nisya-tadasnapanaparimaddanabhedanacchedanavikiranaadhvaṇisana-
dharaman appears to be a development of the Pali anicc’-ucchedana-parimaddana-bhedana-vidhvanisma-dhamma (see DN I 76, etc.; for other occurrences, see the end of this note). The process appears to have passed through several stages. The earliest one is, most likely, the Pali compound, which Rhys Davids translates as ‘its very nature is impermanence, it is subject to erosion, abrasion, dissolution, and disintegration’ (Dialogues of the Buddha, vol. 1, p. 87). He further explains the expression as follows: ‘The words for erosion, abrasion, are cunningly chosen (ucchedana, parimaddana). They are also familiar technical terms to the Indian shampooer, and so used above (p. 7, § 16 of the text) [referring to the Brahmagiśasutta—DN I 7]. The double meaning must have been clear to the Indian hearer, and the words are, therefore, really untranslatable’ (ibid., n. 1). Referring to this note, Edgerton remarks: ‘the true interpretation was given by Rhys Davids, [....] shampooing and rubbing down (so Skt.), but with double entente (not recognised in Pali commentaries)’ (BHSD, s.v. ucchedana).

It seems that in a second stage this dual semantic features, which formed the basis of the paronomasia, were felt necessary to be brought from the deep structure to the surface structure. This created compounds like ucchedana-parimaddana-svapna/supana-bhedana-vikirina-vidhvanisma-dhama in the Mvasuto and ucchada-parimaddana-svapna-bhedana-vikirina-vidhvanisma-dhama in the KaPari (see above). In these, the first part of the compound contains terms explicitly associated with activities meant to keep a hygienic and aesthetic appearance of the body (terms probably no longer construed with their formal double meaning), while its second half consists of words stressing the inherent ephemeral nature of the body in spite of all these efforts.

This understanding is clearly reflected in Buddhaghosa’s gloss on the phrase (DN-a I PTS ed., p. 220; I have also collated the PTS text with the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed., Silakkhandhavaggatthakathā, § 234): Anicc-uddhāna-parimaddana-bhedana-vidhvanisma-dhammo ti. Huvāabhāvatthena anicca-dhammo, duggandhe-vighātātthāya tamu-vilepanena ucchedana-dhammo, āṅga-paccanāgādāha[I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: “bādhaṇa”-vinodanatthāya khuddaka-sambhātanena parimaddana-dhammo, dohara-kāle vā úrūsu [I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: dohara-kāle úrūsu] sayāpetvā gopbhāvāsena dussaṃkhiṭṭhānām tesaiṁ tesaiṁ aṅgānāṃ saṅthaṇa-sampiṭṭhatthāna aṁchana[ I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: “aṁchana”-piḷanādi-vasena parimajjana-dhammo, evam pariharito [I follow Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana ed.; PTS ed. reads: “pariharato” pī ca bhedana-vikirina-dhammo, bhījhati c’eva vikiratī ca evam-sabba lō ti atto. ‘Being of the nature of impermanent, ointment, massage, breaking, and destruction: Because it exists no [more] after having [once] existed, it [is said to have an] impermanent nature. Because of [the usage of] body ointment for the elimination of bad smell, it [is said to] require ointment. Because of soft rubbing for the alleviation of discomfort in the limbs, great and small, it [is said to] require massage. Or it [is said to] require rubbing because during infancy, [one’s body] is made to lie on [one’s mother’s?] thighs [/lap] and is pulled, pressed, and so on in order to bring in [good] shape the various parts [of the body] which have [assumed] a bad shape due the position [of the foetus] in the womb. In spite of being thus taken care of, the nature [of the body] is to break and be destroyed. And indeed it splits and falls to pieces. The meaning [of the phrase] is [to show] that it [i.e., the body] has such an essence.’ (Notes: (1) khuddaka-sambhāhana ‘moderate rubbing’, khuddaka usually means ‘small’ but here it must refer to a ‘small’ degree of sambhāna. (2) If the correct reading is úrūsu as in the PTS ed. instead of úrūsu, then the meaning is: ‘on the soil’, not ‘thighs [/lap]’. (3) gabbhāvāsena ‘due to its position in the womb’ literally means ‘due to its having dwelt in the womb’. (4) I render aṁchana as ‘pulled’; it must come from aṁchati ‘to pull, to drag’. (5) I translate piḷana as ‘pressed’; the word usually has the sense of ‘oppression’, etc., but here it seems to refer to the mechanical act of pressing; cf. Skt. piḍana.)
Our passage in the Śrī Bh. appears to be the further stage in the history of the compound (with the Ch. reading 覆蔽 = *acchādana as a sub-line of development). Its understanding was probably the same as Buddhaghosa, but anicca/anicity appears to have been felt as out of place in the first part of the compound being replaced with nitya. This was most likely construed as ‘always requiring anointment, etc.’, a meaning which the Chinese rendering 常須 actually makes explicit.

Finally, let us remark most of the whole passage starting with rūpiṇah represents a development of a classical description of the body in the Pali Canon: ayam kho me kāyo rūpi cātu-mahā-bhūtiko mātā-pettiko-sambhavo odana-kummas ’-upacayo anicc’-uccchādana-parimaddana-bhedana-viddhānśana-dhammo (DN I 76; cf. also MN I 144, 500; MN II 17; SN IV 83, 194, 292 [all these occurrences in SN IV do not contain rūpi; SN V 369-370; AN IV 386 [this occurrence in AN IV does not contain rūpi]).

8 6 Skt. nāyatra means ‘rather’ or ‘not other[wise] but’. Cf. SWFT, fascicle 2, p. 89, s.v. anyatra # 4: ‘(nach einer Negation:) vielmehr, sondern’.

8 7 The doctrinal position underpinning this passage appears to be the denial of pleasure as an independent category. This idea seems to have been expounded by the Dārstāntikas and for Sautrāntikas and is also found it in the BudCar and the SauNan (see Honjō 1987, 392-394; Yamabe 2003, 234-237) as well as in the zuochan sanmei jing 坐禅三味經, a meditation anthology translated and compiled by Kumārājiva (see Yamabe 2003, 237-238). Our Śrī Bh. passage does not contain an outright denial of the existence of pleasant feelings (sukhavedanā), but it clearly exhorts the ascetic to regard sensual pleasures only as a remedy for suffering (duḥkha-pratikāra). This view is not developed into a clearly articulated philosophical discussion (like, for instance, at AKbh 330, 9ff.), and we cannot know with accuracy the doctrinal stance of the authors on this issue. However, the underlying conception and many of the images found at BudCar, Canto 11, ver. 36-39, are so similar that we might take the latter stanzas as parallels to our Śrī Bh. passage. It is hard to determine whether the authors of the Śrī Bh. were directly inspired from Āsvaghosa’s masterpiece or they drew on a common literary and doctrinal heritage, but the similarity of ideas and imagery is undeniable.

Kāmās tu bhogā iṣī yam matiḥ syād bhogā na kecit purigānyamānāh ||
Vastraṭayo dravyagunā hi loke duḥkha-pratikārā pradhiṭhāyāh || 36 ||
Iṣṭaṁ hi tarṣa-praśāmaṁ tvayaṁ kṣunnaśahetor aṣaṁām tathāva ||
Vāḍaṭāpamābhavarāṇāya veśaṇa kaunipāśāvaraṇāya vāsāh || 37 ||
Nidrāgāhātyā tathaiva saṁyā yānaḥ tathaḥdaśaraṇamānaṇāya ||
Tathāsaṇam sthāna-vinodanāya snāṇam mrjāryaṇaḥ jāraṇayā || 38 ||
Duḥkha-pratikārānimittabhuṭaḥ tasmāt prajānaṁ viṣayā na bhogāḥ ||
Aśnāmi bhogān iṣī ko bhyupayāt prajānaḥ pratikārāvitaḥ pravṛttāh || 39 ||
(36) ‘If [you] think that the objects of desire are enjoyable, [you should understand that] none of these [objects of desire] is considered to be enjoyable.

For in [this] world, things and qualities, such as clothes [and warmth] should be considered to be the remedy for pain.

(37) For water is desired for allaying thirst; food similarly for destroying hunger,

A house for protection from wind, sun, and rain, and clothing for covering the

privy parts or against cold.

(38) Similarly, a bed is for riddance of drowsines; thus, too, a carriage for avoidance

of road-fatigue;

So, too, a seat for relief from standing, and bathing as a means of cleanliness,

health, and strength.

(39) Therefore, people’s [sense-]objects are the means of the remedy for pain and are not
enjoyable things.

What wise man applying the remedy [for pain] would think that he is enjoying something enjoyable?" (The rendering of stanzas (37) and (38) follows, with slight punctuation modifications, Johnston tr. pp. 157-158; for the translation of stanzas (36) and (39), I rely on Yamabe 2003, 236; cf. also Hara tr. pp. 225-226).

For similar ideas, see also BudCar 11, 40, 11, 42; SauNan 9, 40; 17, 19 (cf. Yamabe 2002, 235-236).

8 Skt. āptāgama ‘Trustworthy Tradition [of Buddhist scriptures]’. Ch. 至教 ‘supreme teaching’ appears to construe āptāgama as a karmadhāraya, and this is how I translate the compound here. Tib. yid ches pa’i lung is not very clear in this respect: it can be construed as ‘instruction which is [can be] trusted [ depended upon]’ and also as ‘instruction of a trustworthy [person]’. The Indian logical tradition, Buddhist and non-Buddhist, tends to understand āpta as ‘trustworthy person’ and usually construes the similar compound āptavacana as a tātpurusa, i.e., ‘word(s) of a trustworthy person’ (see Nakamura 1983, s.vv. āpta and āptavacana) (I am grateful to Prof. Junkichi Imanishi who has kindly drawn my attention to the latter reference.)

9 Skt. jñānadarsana, translated here ‘intuition’, literally means ‘wisdom and view’. The compound probably represents the nominalisation of the expression tassa evān jñāto evān passato. This refers to a unique mode of cognition which combines both comprehension and intuition. The word ‘insight’ can cover both these nuances, but I use it as a rendering for vipaśyanā. Let us note that at Vin IV 26, 1, jñānadasaṇṇa is identified with the three cognitions (tīṣo viññā). In the Sāmaññaphalasutta, jñānasetaṇṇa arises after the attainment of the four jhanas and implies comprehending (pajñātī) the following truth: yaṁ kho me kāyo rūpi cātu-mahā-bhūtiko [...] the formula which represents the canonical base of our Śrībh passage here (for the whole stock-phrase, see note 85 above).

In its occurrence here in our passage, the jñānadarsana represents the perception (pratyakṣa), which is one criterion of determining the truth alongside āptāgama and anumāṇa.

90 I render rather freely Skt. anumāṇika < >py eṣa vidhiḥ, which literally means ‘the inferential [type of reasoning] is [of] this [same] sort’.

In its early stages of development, Buddhist logic and epistemology recognised three criteria of validity: scriptural authority, direct perception, and inference. The three criteria in the Śrībh are discussed in Yaita 1989b; see also Yaita 1989a as well as Yaita 2004 (especially 31-32), the latter analysing the possible influence of these early logical developments upon Dharmakīrti. For a presentation of these logical elements in the history of Indian thought in general and early Buddhist epistemology (SaṅNīrm, YoBh, etc.) in particular, see Kajiyama 1984. Yoshimizu 1996b also contains important remarks on the contribution of the four types of yuktī to the development of Buddhist logic (see especially pp. 143-153). Cf. also SaṅNīrm 156-157 (Lamotte’s tr. at pp. 263-264); Madhvībh and MadhVībhṬ (Yamaguchi’s tr. at p. 129).

91 Skt. dharmatā, rendered here as ‘essence’, appears to be used here as, more or less, a synonym of prakṛti ‘nature’. The concept seems to refer to the reality as it is, which should be accepted as such without any further questioning. The term also occurs in passage 3.28.2.1.6. below, where, faute de mieux, I render as ‘nature’. A few more remarks about its usage in the Śrībh and early Buddhism are found in note 111 below.

92 In the context of Buddhist praxis, such a long diatribe against sensual pleasures is more than an exercise in doctrinal eloquence. According to Buddhaghosā, a mendicant who enters the first absorption without having completely eliminated its attachment by examining the detriment of the sensual pleasures (kāmāniṇava) is bound to lose (lit., come out of) this absorption soon (khimpom eva nikkhamati) (Vism 122, § 124).

93 There is a parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Ṭatiya ed. 80, 4-6; also Griffiths 1983, 429):
yena samāhitabhūmikena manaskūraṇa kāmeṣv ādīnavādīdarśanenaudārikalakṣaṇam pratisamvedayate, tadābāvā ca prathamādhyāyāṁ sāntalakṣaṇam, ayam ucyate lakṣanop-pratisamvedi [Tatia: lakṣaṇapratisamvedyam; I follow here Gokhale’s reading in his edition of the AsūSam; so Griffiths, too] manaskāraṇā. sa ca śrutacintāvyavakirṇo vedītavyāḥ.

Shukla suggests the emendation of the MS parīṣṭa to parīṣya, which is semantically possible. In this case, one would have to construe sa evam kāmān pariṣṭā prathamaṁ dhyānāṁ yatāvat parīṣyaudārikāśāntalakṣaṇena as: ‘having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, having properly examined the first absorption by means of the coarse and serene characteristic [respectively]’. I prefer, however, to emend with Choi to prathamaṁ <ca?> dhyānāṁ and leave the MS reading parīṣṭa as such. As also argued by Choi (see p. 127-8, n. 453; p. 171, n. 252) on the basis of a parallel passage in the Xiānyāng lun which contains & (T31.515a8), prathamaṁ <ca?> dhyānāṁ makes a much better reading. Besides, the Ch. rendering of our passage also seems to support such a reading (see below). Another possibility would be to construe yathāvatparīṣyāudārikāśāntalakṣaṇena with adhīmucyate, i.e. ‘becomes convinced by means of the coarse and serene characteristic properly examined’ (as implied by the Tibetan rendering), but this leads to some doctrinal difficulties which are aptly analysed by Choi in the latter part of n. 435 (p. 128).

The Tibetan translation of this passage apparently contains a few corruptions which have been transmitted in all Canons (see notes 129, 131, 134, and 135 to the Tib. ed.). Its original form can only be conjectured, but even this may have been based on a different (corrupt?) MS reading or may have partially mis-construed the Sanskrit text (?). In my emendation, the Tib. sentence reads: ‘After having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, he becomes convinced of the examined characteristic of coarseness and serenity with regard to the first of absorption as it really is, exclusively in the form of meditative cultivation, having transcended the [levels of] of listening and reflection’. If we do not emend the sentence, the rendering is: ‘After having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, he becomes convinced of the examined characteristic of coarse serenity [...]’. Or one might interpret bsaṅ gtan dang po la yongs su tshol ba dang | as an independent phrase, in which case the rendering would be: ‘After having thus ascertained the sensual pleasures, he examines the first trance and, becomes convinced of [its] characteristic of coarse serenity [...]’. Such a reading would presuppose parīṣya (as in Shukla’s emendation) rather than parīṣṭa, but I doubt whether such a reading of dang is possible here. No matter how we construe the sentence, two things are clear: (1) ji lta ba bzhiṅ gyi’s = yathāvat, which in our Skt. original precedes parīṣṭa, is construed in Tib. with adhīmucyate; and (2) parīṣṭyaudārikāśāntalakṣaṇena is taken to refer only to the prathamaṁ dhyānāṁ. If this reflects the Skt. MS used by the Tibetan translators, then this probably read prathamaṁ dhyānāṁ, not prathamaṁ <ca> dhyānāṁ (as conjectured by Choi and me). Thus, the Tibetan team was forced to interpret audārikāśāntalakṣaṇa as describing the content of the first absorption. This must have led to the rendering rugs pa dang | zhi ba’i (as I conjecture) (or the strange: rugs pa’i zhi ba’i mtschan nyid, as in the Tib. original(?)). Once again, if a reading like this goes back to the original text of the Tibetan rendering, then we could surmise that the Tibetan translators may have taken it as referring to the relative serenity of the first dhyāna when compared to the higher meditative levels.

The Ch. is much clearer: 彼既如是如理尋思，了知諸欲是其譬相，知初靜慮是其靜相。

‘Having thus already properly examined, he realises that sensual desires represent the coarse aspect and understands that the first absorption represent the serene aspect’ (my rendering is slightly different from Choi’s interpretation—see n. 435, p. 127). Xuanzang’s translation appears to presuppose an original containing ca (i.e., prathamaṁ <ca> dhyānāṁ). Unlike the Tib., Xuanzang undoubtedly construes audārikāśāntalakṣaṇena with the first part of the sentence. He actually renders yathāvatparīṣṭa as the first clause of the sentence, which consitutes, to be
sure, the logical sequence of the psychical process described here (first examining and then realising). Xuanzang takes both *kamān* and *prathamaṁ dhīyataṁ* as direct objects of *parijñāya* and correctly matches the *audārika[lakṣaṇa]a* with the former and the *sāntalakṣaṇa* with the latter. He expresses this in two separate clauses each with its own verb: तिष्ठ अर्थः and तिष्ठ अर्थः respectively. This wording does not necessarily presuppose a different Skt. original. Xuanzang probably rendered the same Skt. *parijñāya* with two distinct (albeit semantically similar) verbs for the sake of clarity (as well as elegant variation?). Although showing the trace of some editorial clarifications, the Chinese translation (as well as the parallel passage in the *Xianyang lun*) appears to be the most reliable version.

The parallel passage in the *AbhSamBh* (see below) makes it clear to what exactly this characteristic or image which represents the meditative object (*kānnimittālambanāṁ* refers) *AbhSamBh* reads: *tadāudārikaśāntalakṣaṇanimitālambanāṁ* 'having the image of the coarse [characteristic and the] serene characteristic [of the respective sphere (*dhātu*)] as meditative object'.

Ch. reads 所緣相, which suggests *ālambanimitta* rather than *nimitālambana* (see note 73 to Ch. ed.). *Ālambanimitta* is a technical term quite frequent in the YoBh (see note 73 to Ch. ed.). In the *SrBh*, the most detailed discussion is found at Sh 391, 18 – 392, 16.

6 Skt. *punaḥ punaḥ* (‘repeatedly’ or ‘again and again’) determining *adhimucyate* clearly indicates the dynamic aspect of the psychological process described by this verb. This contemplation appears to consist in repeated acts of concentration which are associated with and, at the same time, increase the conviction with regard to the meditative object. Although breaking the principle of one-to-one correspondence between the source-language and the target-language, my rendering of *adhimucyate* (as ‘he repeatedly concentrates on and [consequently] becomes convinced’) tries to capture this polysem.

7 One could also construe Skt. *ādhimokṣiko manaskāraḥ* as ‘contemplation characterised by conviction’ or ‘contemplation born of conviction’ (see note 275 to Chapter Six, Part One).

Cf. the parallel passage in the *AbhSamBh* (Tatia ed. 80, 8-10; Griffiths 1983, 429): *tadāudārikaṁ śrutaṁ caitkramyaśaktena bhāvanākāreṇa tadāudārikaśāntalakṣaṇanimitālambanāṁ śmāthavyāsvaṇāṁ bhūvanā punaḥ punar yathāparyesitām audārikaśāntatām adhimucyate. ity ayam ādhimokṣikāḥ.

8 Cf. the parallel passage in the *AbhSamBh* (Tatia ed. 80, 10-11; Griffiths 1983, 431): *tadābhyaśāt tatprathomataḥ prāhāṇamārgasaḥgato manaskāraḥ prāvivekaḥ.* MS spells without interruption: *prāvivekṣastena*. Tatia has a comma after *prāvivekaḥ*. This must have been somehow misleading for Griffiths who wrongly regards the following *tenādhimātrikleśaprakārāprahāṇāḥ tatpakṣādausthā换yāpamāca | as part of this passage (see also his English translation, p. 430). Apart from our *SrBh* passage, the fact that in almost all cases (the only exception is the first one), the name of the respective *manaskāra* comes last also supports my interpretation.

9 A literal rendering of the Skt. *tadāudārikaṁ prahāṇārāmo bhavati, vivekārāmaḥ* would be ‘beyond this [point], he becomes one who rejoices at abandonment, one who rejoices at separation’.

10 Tib. translation is explicit: *rab tu dben pa las skyes pa'i dga' ba dang | bde ba chung ngu 'small [degree of] gladness and happiness born of separation’.*

11 In the absence of more details in our text, it is not easy to understand with precision how this sentence connects with the previous one and what exactly the mental states depicted here refer to. I surmise that *ārāma* is finding pleasure in the very act of abandoning defilements and *pritisukha* describes the joy and well-being (still limited, though) resulting from the detachment which the ascetic has reached.

12 ‘Torpor, drowsiness, and agitation’ are well-known defilements, often appearing as
members of the so-called ‘five hindrances’ (Skt., pañca nivaraṇānī; Pali, pañca nivaranā). The classical list includes: lust [lit., desire for sensual pleasures] (kāmacchanda), malice (vyāpāda), torpor and drowsiness (stvānamiddha; thinamiddha) (counted as one member; see below), agitation and remorse [/worry] (uddhatyakaukṛtya; uddhaccakukkucca) (also regarded as forming one member; see below), and doubt (vicikitsā; vicikicchā). The reason why torpor and drowsiness as well as agitation and remorse are classed together is set forth at AK V 59b-c: ekavipaksāhārakṛtyatahaḥ | dyeykatā (I follow Śāstri ed., p. 852, 3-4) ‘[These] two [represent] one because of having the same antidote, source, [and] effect’. (I translate Skt. āhāra as ‘source’; it literally means ‘food’ and refers to the basis on which these mental defilements depend for their production and growth.)

The five hindrances are well-known from canonical sources, e.g., DN II 300-301 (in the Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasuttanta; the pañca nivaraṇānī are here eliminated as part of the application of mindfulness on mental factors (dhamma)); AN I 92-93 (the elimination of the five hindrances is a preliminary step to the attainment of the four absorptions; SN V 105-106; AN I 272-273 (both occurrences with formulas of abandonment different from the four applications of mindfulness); AN IV 457-8 (where the antidote of the five hindrances is, once again, the practice of the four applications of mindfulness (cattāro satipaṭṭhāna); Vibh 199 (similarly, as part of the application of mindfulness on mental factors (dhamma)), etc. For an outstanding analysis of the historical development of the four application of mindfulness, see Schmithausen 1976a. (A different view and criticism of this study is put forward in Bronkhorst 1985, 310-314. Though Bronkhorst’s article makes some valuable contributions on the whole, I do not find his arguments concerning this particular point very convincing. This, however, cannot be entered into detail here.) Definitions and ample discussions of the five hindrances are found at Vibh 253-256, Vibh-a 269-275, *Abhidharmasatipāṭhāpādasāstra 阿毘達磨集異門足論 T26.416a29-b-28; AKBh 318-319; etc. For Pali sources, see also Gunaratana 1985, 29-48. In the YoBh, the five hindrances are defined at SamBh 90-95. We also find references to the five hindrances in other parts of the ŚrīBh (e.g., ŚrīBh-Gr 20, 15-19).

The elimination of the five hindrances is essential for entering and dwelling in the dhyānas. The classical description of the first absorption depicts the ascetic as being ‘indeed aloof from sensual pleasures, aloof from unwholesome factors’ viviccēva kämehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi (e.g., DN i 73, MN I 89, 33; Vibh 245; also quoted at Vism 112; etc.). The Vibh (256), after defining the sensual pleasures (see n. 35 above), identifies the ‘unwholesome factors’ with the five hindrances (kāmacchando vyāpādo thinamiddham uddhaccakukkuccam vicikicchā: ime vuccanti akusala dhamma). We also see the similar expression viviktam kämaḥ viviktam pāpakair akusalair dharmaṁ at ArthVin 17, 3, which is glossed at ArthVinNib 179-180. Here ‘separation’ (viveka) is explained as ‘the cessation of the five hindrances’ (pañcanivaranaṇavyupāśamaḥ) (ArthVinNib 170, 2). More on the first absorption will be said below.

On the contemplation conducive to cheering up (prasadaniyo manaskārah), see ŚrīBh-Gr (18) 10, 17-12, 1. The danger of depression and sluggishness during meditation and the subsequent need to cheer up or encourage the practitioner is a topic known from other sources, too. Buddhaghosa, for example, gives details about how the meditator gladdens his mind (cittam sampahamseti) when it becomes dull (nirassādaiti cittaṁ hoti) (Vism 109, § 63).

See also the description of the contemplation comprising delight on the supramundane path (ŚrīBh Sh 506, 8-10). Cf. also the phrase sanivejanīyeṣu dharmeṣu sanivegaḥ at ŚrīBh-Gr (18) 14, 3-4.

The semantic sphere of samī-ṭ víj and its cognates is much broader. The basic sense of the verb is that of ‘to tremble or start with fear’ (MW, s.v.). The noun sanivega means ‘violent

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agitation, excitement, flurriness' (ibid.). In his article on saīvega, Coomaraswamy (1977, 182) sums up the meanings of the term as 'a state of shock, agitation, fear, awe, wonder, or delight induced by some physically or mentally poignant experience'. Coomaraswamy is especially interested in the aesthetic connotations which the word has in certain contexts, but his examination of its usage in Pali sources is a very helpful overview of the entire semantic sphere of saīvega. (I am indebted to Dr Hartmut Buescher who has kindly drawn my attention to this article.) In the Śrī Bhāṣya, the semantic emphasis seems to be mainly on intense fear or dislike towards certain negative mental states.

Skt. ratisāmāgrāhakā manaskārah could also be construed as the 'contemplation imparting delight'. The overall psychological function of the contemplation comprising [impacting] delight is to offer a counterbalance to the 'gloomy mood', so to speak, probably generated by continuously loathing the sensual pleasures (which might develop into a depressive state?). It is easy to imagine that, though increasingly convinced of the utterly pernicious nature of kāma, the ascetic may become dispirited in the process. This creates the need for cheering him or her up by emphasising the delightful state (still pariṭa 'limited', though!) of the serene detachment, without, however, loosing sight of the doctrinally paramount aim of giving up whatever pertains to the realm of sensual desires. More specifically, in terms of Buddhist psychological categories, the 'cheering up contemplation' helps removing sthāna 'torpor' and mīdha 'drowsiness', while the 'loathing contemplation' eliminates auddhatya 'agitation', or, as rendered by Choi, 'euphoria' (2001, p. 130).

The necessity of both 'cheering up' and 'loathing' is quite obvious, but the latter aspect does not fit very well into the name of this spiritual exercise, i.e., 'contemplation comprising delight'. Actually, as remarked by Choi (2001, n. 454, pp. 129-130), this appears to be the reason for which the Abhā Samāhā and the Xiānyang lun omitted samvejanīyena manaskāreṇa samvejawati. By doing this, they created, however, an imbalance since auddhatya is left 'up in the air' (Choi 2001, 130).

Cf. the parallel passage in the Abhā Samāhā (Tattā ed. 80, 11-14; Griffiths 1983, 431): tenādhimātrakleśaparāparyahānāt tatpakṣadauṣṭhulyāpamāc ca [Tattā and Griffiths have dānta here, but this should be deleted; note that the MS does not contain it either] sa yogi tadurdhvam pra[hā]nārāmo bhavati prahone 'anuṣāsvadārī pariṭāpravekapratīpāsuh-sāṃprastyā kālena kālaṁ prasadāṇīyena manaskāreṇa sampraharṣayati yēvad eva sthāna-middhahvatopasamāya |

Skt. paryavasthāna is aptly rendered by Edgerton as 'state of possession (by vice or depravity [...]') (BHSD, s.v.) (cf. the similar meaning of Pāli pariyyatthāna 'state of being possessed (or hindered by)', PED, s.v.). The word can also be rendered as '[state of] being enwrapped [ensnared]', as actually suggested by its Tibetan and Chinese equivalents. Obviously, paryavatsthāna is a noun, but the wording of my English translation above has obliged me to render the word as a verb. For the syntactic structure of the sentence, see note 118 below.

Literally, the sentence runs as follows: 'For one thus delighting in [...], the state of being possessed by defilements [...] does not occur [fully manifest itself] (samudācarati), whether he wanders about or dwells [in some place]'.

Skt. kāmachanda, rendered here as 'lust', can be interpreted as a tatpurūsa or a karmadhāraya (cf. PD, s.v. kāmachanda, which contains both 'desire that is appetite' and 'appetite for sensual pleasures'). Dhs-a 370, 16-18, suggests a karmadhāraya understanding: kāmachando ti kāmasāṅkhārito chando na kattukamyutacchando na dhammachando kāmachanda is desire [wish] in the sense of sensual pleasures, not desire [willingness] to do something, not [wholesome] desire [aspiration for] Dhamma'.

I understand Skt. kāmesu as 'objects of sensual pleasures', being almost synonymous here with kāma which in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit often has the sense of 'the objects of the
five senses’ (BHSD, s.v.; cf. also PD, s.v.; PTS Concordance, vol. 2, p. 39; etc). A similar phrase occurs at D II 51, 18-19: कामेसु कम्मचाँडमि विराजेत्वा ‘having cast aside the lust for [the objects of] the sensual pleasures’.

The exact interpretation of the sentence is not easy, being largely determined by how we regard the negation न transmitted by the Ch. translation. Together with Choi, I conjecture that the extant Skt. and Tib. are corrupt and, accordingly, adopt the Ch. न = ना as the most natural way of reading the sentence. The problem is discussed by Choi (2001) in a detailed and brilliantly argued note to his edition and translation of the खियांग लुन (n. 469, pp. 131-132).

In what follows, I shall first summarise his main points and then make a few additional remarks.

Choi shows that the Skt. sannyāśānikaṁhitam me cittaṁ vārīvad echoes the well-attested Pali phrase sasāṅkhaṇānigayaḥavārita vata and vārīvad dhṛtam may be somehow connected with (sabba)vārīdhuta. The Skt. and Tib. versions of the SrBh as well as the corresponding passage in the खियांग लुन contain no negation of dharmatābhīhita but, apart from न in the Ch. translation of the SrBh, a similar passage in the SamBh reads: na dharmatābhīhitaḥ.

(For the latter, see also Delhey ed., 166 and 247, with respective notes.)

I surmise that vārīvad represents a wrong Sanskritisation (probably coming from a misunderstanding) of vārita vata (or vārīvad dhṛtam < vārīdhuta?). Vāri in the Pali phrase vārita vata has nothing to do with ‘water’. The commentarial tradition as well as modern scholarship understands the compound as ‘having the habit (vata) of restraint (vārita)’. This is how Buddhaghosa glosses upon the compound in all its occurrences (DN-a III 1060 ad DN III 279; SN-a I 80 ad SN I 28; AN-a II 363 ad AN I 254; AN-a III 231-232 ad AN III 24; AN IV 199 ad AN IV 428), and no allusion is made to ‘water’. Actually, as pointed out by Norman (1992, 167-169), even vāri in vārīdhuta appears to mean ‘restraint’, not ‘water’ (though the latter is the only registered meaning in Pali lexicography, see Abhidhānappadiptikā, s.v. p. 94 (rendered into Skt. as vārī and into Hindi as jaḷ ‘water’); PED, s.v.; Mizuno 1989, s.v.; and Kumoi 1997, s.v.).

The Pali phrase sasāṅkhaṇānigayha vārita vata (for which the MS tradition witnesses many variae lectiones) is usually negated (na ’), and in this negative form, it describes a high meditative attainment in which the ascetic (or, at SN I 28, Gotama Buddha himself) requires no conscious effort to maintain his contemplation (samādhi) but has reached the a habitual state of spontaneous restraint. It can be translated as ‘not being controlled (niggyaya) by conscious effort (sasāṅkhaṇa) [but] having the habit of [spontaneous] restraint’, which is also how Buddhaghosa explains the compound. (For this meaning of sasāṅkhaṇa, see also Dhs 146 as well as Dhs tr. p. 34 and n. 1.) The meaning is similarly explained at SamBh, 166, 14-15: pranidhānasahagatayā cetanayā bahirdhā cittaṁ nigṛhyo tasmin samādhaṁ samavaddadhāti ‘Having held back his mind from outside [objects] by volition accompanied by exertion, [the ascetic] keeps [his mind] concentrated in this meditation.’

It seems that at a later date (probably in the process of recasting the Canon into various vernaculars, Buddhist Sanskrit or classical Sanskrit), though the general meaning of the phrase was understood, vāri was construed as ‘water’ and, in order to explain its presence, a simile was devised (or borrowed from other sources?): ‘as water’ (vārīvad) is contained by a dam, so is mind controlled by a conscious effort. The image of the dam containing the flow of water is a frequent simile in Buddhist literature. It usually stands for the moral precepts or spiritual cultivation which help the mendicant control his or her mind. Here are some occurrences of the simile in the Chinese Canon (‘dam’ is usually rendered as 堤 or 堤壩): T1.921b15; T4.158c18; T4.159a8; T12.400c19 and 22; T12.641b11 and 14; T12.1111c29; T23.565a3; T24.946b24 and c28; T27.541b21 and c4; T31.5c4; T32.395c25, 396c3; T34.499b15; T37.442b4-5; etc. (the underlined occurrences are the most relevant).
It is seems to me almost certain that vārīvad in our passage in the ŚrīBh presupposes a similar image. As for water itself, out of its rich metaphorical imagery in the Canon, we may note here one simile which occurs in Ji’s Commentary on the YoBh: 六處如泉，煩惱如水。 (T43.10l32-14 ad Śarīrathāgāthā T30.57Sb-c) ‘The six sense-fields are like a spring, defilements are like water’. It is true that here defilements in general are compared to water, but our ŚrīBh passage here may be said to represent a particular case of a more general image: the mind still attached to sensual pleasures is like water which is restrained by spiritual cultivation acting as a dam. The phrase vārīvad dhoṭa is also found at SamBh 166, 11 and 17. Here the image is explained: yathā bahīdhā prasarām na dadāti, evam vārīvad dhoṭo bhavati (166, 16-17) ‘It is contained like water in such a way that one does not give it [a chance] to flow out’.

It cannot be completely ruled out that things happened in the reverse historical order: the oldest textual layer made use of the water simile (which survived in the ŚrīBh!) and this was later misunderstood by the compilers of the extant Pali suttas as well as their subsequent commentators who wrongly emended *vārīvad into vārīvata. I believe, however, that the former hypothesis set forth above is more plausible.

As for na dharmatābhīnigṛhitah, it can be interpreted in two ways (which actually do not exclude each other). One is to construe it as ‘restrained through [the full realisation of] the nature [of sensual pleasures]’. I have not been able to find parallels to our passage in early scriptural texts, but as already mentioned, the phrase is found at SamBh 166, 17-167, 2, which suggests such an interpretation: kathām dharmatābhīnigṛhito bhavati? adhāstād audāri-k- dharmatā dṛṣṭā bhavasy upāriṣṭāc chāntadharmaṭā. sāntah prāṇitah pratiprasraṃdo labdhamārgas [to be emended to: pratiprasraṃdhala labdhamārgaḥ]? — see SamBh, p. 167, n. 548 cetaso ekotibhāvādhi gato yathāyaḥ pañcṣayāṇiṣāḥ samādhiḥ. ‘How does [the ascetic] become restrained by nature? The coarse nature below is [fully] realised, [and so is] the serene nature above. [This concentration is serene, excellent, has attained the path of calm [and] has reached the singleness of mind, like the noble concentration equipped with five cognitions.’ (On the path of calm, see pratiprasraṃdhala labdhamārga at SamBh 152, 2, as well as Ch. translation here: 得安隱道 (T30.324a20); on the noble concentration with five cognitions, see SamBh 151, 9-152, 7).

The second alternative of construing na dharmatābhīnigṛhitah is to see here the postulation of a state in which spontaneouse restraint (‘by nature’) becomes possible. The ŚrīBh actually distinguishes between ‘contemplation whose flow [requires] force [or: flowing [only] by force’ (balavāhano manaskārāh) (ŚrīBh-Gr (18), 8) and ‘contemplation whose flow [does not require] effort [lit., bending] [or: flowing without effort/spontaneously]’ (anābhogavāhano manaskārāh) (ŚrīBh-Gr (18), 10) (Cf. also Bhikkhu Bodhi S. Mawatha’s interpretation presented in Choi 2001, p. 322, n. 469). Without any further textual testimony, nothing precise can be said about how this state of ‘nature’ or ‘naturalness’ (dharmatā) was understood by the authors of our text, but I am rather sceptical about seeing here profound metaphysical senses in a full-fledged Mahāyāna vein. As far as I can see, dharmatā in the ŚrīBh (see also 3.28.2.1.27. above) appears to mean ‘nature of things’, ‘the way things are’, ‘reality of phenomena or mental factors’, etc. In this sense, it has canonical precedents; for example, dharmatā occurring at DN II 12, ff., appears to mean, as also remarked by T. W. Rhys Davids (DN tr. II p. 8, n. 3), ‘nature’ or ‘order of things’. Cf. also Buddhagosa who glosses upon this occurrence as ayam sabbhāvo ayaṃ niyamo ti vuttaṃ hoti (DN-a II 432, 2).

Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 14-17; Griffiths 1983, 431): tasyaivaṁ samyakprayuktasya kuśalapakṣapraṇayopapasiṣhvatāt kāmavacarakeśaparyevasthānāsvadācāre sati tatprahāpaprāhādāvagamārtham taduppatyavukālaśubhānimittamanakāraṇa pratavekṣaṇaṁ mimāṃsāmanaskāraṁ |
At ŚrīBḥ-Gr (18) 12, 2-4, we read that the role of the examining contemplation (pratyavēksanīyo manaskāraḥ), actually equated with the investigating contemplation (mīmāṁsāmanaskāra), is to examine the defilements abandoned and not yet abandoned (prahināprahinātāṁ klesānāṁ pratyavēksate). One would expect this parallel phrase to occur in the mīmāṁsāmanaskāra passage above (which is actually the case in the description of the investigating contemplation on the supramundane path, ŚrīBḥ Sh 506, 6-7), but I do not think that this raises special problems. After all, in spite of the specific labels and peculiarities of these contemplations, we have to deal with a continuous meditative process, and certain patterns, like the examination of the defilements which have been abandoned and those which have not been abandoned yet, are bound to be seen at different moments and levels along the path.

I construe Skt. samudghāta as ‘complete eradication’, the nuance of completeness being reinforced by sam-. For samudghāta, see BHSD, s.v. samudghāta as well as samudghāta. Cf. also Pāli samugghāta. Let us also note that I render na […] bhavati in a rather free manner as ‘do not ammoun’.

The idea that a certain preliminary practice is necessary in order to attain an upper meditative level is, most probably, very old (e.g., the elimination of the sensual pleasures and five hindrances before reaching the first dhīyaṇa/jhāṇa—see above). The codification of the preliminary stage as a preparatory path or path of preparatory training (pravṛtta) appears, however, to be an Abhidharmic development. In the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣabhāṣya, we are told: 彼為難初靜慮染，依初靜慮，起行道。(T27.83b14) ‘In order to depart from the defilement of the first absorption, he generates the preparatory path [for the second absorption] relying upon the first absorption’. The text apparently refers here to ordinary persons 諸異生(*prthagajana) who have attained detachment from sensual pleasures 離欲染 (*kāmabhya viraktāḥ) (see T27.83b13).

The word niṣṭhā for the ‘culmination’ of spiritual practice is also seen in the Hindu tradition. Niṣṭhā jñānasya or the ‘culmination of wisdom’ appears in the Bhagavadgīṭā, Chapter X VIII, stanza 50. On its basis, Śaṅkara coined one of the key-terms of his philosophy: jñāna niṣṭhā, which denotes the culmination of jñānavāga (see Bader 1990, 62-64). ‘By way of the culmination of wisdom’, says Śaṅkara, ‘he [i.e., the ascetic] attains Brahman, the Supreme Self’ (jñāna niṣṭhāḥ rūpena Brahma paramātmānam āpnoti) (Śaṅkaraḥbhāṣya 279, 19-20). In his gloss on the word, Śaṅkara defines it as: niṣṭhā paryavasānāṁ parisamāptir ity etat (Śaṅkaraḥbhāṣya 279, 23-24) ‘culmination means ‘end’ [or] ‘completion’. (Interesting to note that our passage in the ŚrīBḥ also uses the term paryavasāna in dhīyaṇaprayogamārga-paryavasānagataḥ.) And ‘wisdom’ is identified with wisdom of Brahman (brahmajñāna) (Śaṅkaraḥbhāṣya 279, 24). (See also Śaṅkara’s commentary ad Bhagavadgīṭā, Chapter X VIII, stanza 55.) In the Muṇḍaka Upaniṣadḥbhāṣya (1.2.12.), Śaṅkara also uses the expression bhramaniṣṭhā as a bahuvrihi compound for someone who is ‘grounded on [or: has attained completion/perfection in] the absolute non-dual Brahman (kevala ‘dvaive brahmāni niṣṭhā), where niṣṭhā is probably employed in both senses hinted at above or ‘absorbed in’, as construed by Bader (1990, p. 62, n. 42).

Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBḥ (Tatia ed. 80, 17-19; Griffiths 1983, 433): tasyayavam mīmāṁsāpratipakṣaṁ bhāvavatāṁ tāvatkalikayogena sarvakāmāvaccara-klesāvāsymasyogāya prathamadhyānaprayogaparyavasānagataḥ pratipakṣasamanaskāraḥ prayoganiṣṭhāḥ].

Skt. <maulāṁ> prathamāṁ dhīyaṇaṁ ‘first absorption proper’ or ‘main first absorption’. Other renderings include: eigentlich ersten Vertiefung (Choi 85); ‘first root-meditation’ (Griffiths 1983, 432), etc. See also de la Vallée Pousin’s translation of mauladhīyaṇa as recueillement fondamental (Pousin vol. 5, p. 144) or recueillement principal (Pousin vol. 5, p. 509).
178). As the analysis of the meditative techniques and the psychological states accompanying them (or what we would call today the ‘altered states of consciousness’) became increasingly refined in Buddhistscholastics, a distinction was made between the ‘absorption proper’ or ‘[immaterial] attainment proper’ and the stage preceding it. In the AKBh, we find various references to the concept of ‘absorption proper’ (mauladhyāna) and its various aspects, such as ‘concentration pertaining to the absorption proper’ (maulo dhyōnasamādhiḥ), ‘the tryad of immaterial absorptions proper’ (maulārūpyatraya), etc. For example, AK stanza VII.5a-b says:

**iti maulāṃ samāpattidravyam aṣṭavidham ‘thus the attainment-entity proper is eightfold’**

This is glossed upon as: *ity etāny aṣṭau māvāṇī samāpattidravyāṇī yadutā catvāri dhyānāni catvāra ārūpyā itī* (AKBh 436, 12-13) ‘these are the eight attainment-entities proper, to wit, the four absorptions [and] the four immaterial [attainments]’. Later in the same chapter, kārikā VII.22a explains: *aṣṭau sāmantakāṇy ēṣāṁ ‘of these, eight are the liminal [attainments]’*. The Commenary further elucidates: *ekaikasyaeikaikāmyena taipraveṣah* (AKBh 447, 17-18) ‘each [of the main attainments] has [a liminal attainment] by which [one] enters it [i.e., the main attainment]’. The first liminal attainment, marking the passage from the plane of sensual pleasures to the serenity of the absorptions, is known as anāgamaṇya ‘not [yet] arrived’ (*ādyaṁ sāmantakam anāgamaṇya* AKBh 448, 4), which points at its importance for both the ascetic and scholastic. (See also Poussin vol. 5, pp. 179-181, and the illuminating notes on the anāgamaṇya and dhyānānara.) It is actually no coincidence that the ŚR Bh deals at such length with the attainment of the first absorption, a process which actually corresponds to the anāgamaṇya.

As far as I know, Theravāda tradition has no particular term to denote the main absorptions, but its Abhidhamma also acknowledges that between jhānas there are intermediary states which prepare the passage to the higher attainments. At KV 565-569, the Theravādins argue (against the Mahiṃsāsakas and certain Andhakas—see KV-a 174-175) that when the ascetic passes (sāṅkamati) from the first absorption to the second one, certain psychological operations, like taking heed (ōvattanāti) of the coarse nature of the first jhāna compared to the second one, wishing (panidhi) to attain the superior plane of the second jhāna, etc. are necessary (KV 566). The implication is that this mental process cannot be identical either with the first or with the second absorption. The argumentation is more developed, but here it will suffice to cite the conclusion of the Commentary: *vivicc`eva kāmehi it-ādhiḥ paṭipāyē jhānānam desitaabhāvam dipeti, na anantaruppattir* (KV-a 175, 16-17) [the scriptural quotation adduced by the opponents] "indeed aloof from sensual pleasures", etc. casts light on the fact that verily the absorptions have been taught in succession, not that they come forth without an interval’. The Vism analysis concentration into two categories: ‘approach concentration’ (*upacārāsamādhi*) and ‘absorption concentration’ or ‘concentration of complete focusing’ (*appanāsamādhi*) (see note 120 below), which also hints at the fact that a preliminary step is recognised as necessary for the attainment of the main meditative state.

119 In the parallel passage at Xianyang lun, this is made explicit: ‘having the previous [contemplation] as cause and condition’ 由前因緣故 (T31.515b8-9; Choi 85). The word ‘previous’ 前 may, however, be, as pointed out by Choi, an explizierender Zusatz des Übersetzers (p. 133, n. 484).

120 The set of seven contemplations are peculiar to the ŚR Bh, but on the whole, the psychological process underlying them is delineated in other sources as well.

The Vism (101, § 27) begins its exposition on the way of entering and dwelling in absorptions by stressing the need to see the dangers which lie in sensual pleasures and to aspire at becoming aloof from them as well as to eliminate the five hindrances (see note 102 above). If the ascetic attains the first jhāna failing to achieve these requirements, Buddhaghosa adds somewhere else, ‘quite soon, he comes out from the absorption, just like a bee which has entered a soiled hive,
just like a king who has entered an impure park’ (so avisodhitam āsayaṃ pavīṭhabhīsamaro viya, avisuddham uyyānaṃ pavīṭkarajā viya, khippaṃ eva nikkhameī; Vism 122, § 124).

Buddhaghosa also distinguishes between two types or levels of concentration: ‘approach concentration’ (upacārāsamādhi) and ‘absorption concentration’ or ‘concentration of complete focusing’ (appanāsamādhi) (Vism 102, §§ 32-33). (For one of the oldest textual evidences as to how appanā was understood, see Dhs 10, § 7, which is commented upon at Dhs-a 142 as ekaggam cittam ārammane appetti ti appanā; cf. also CPD, s.v.). According to the Vism, the difference between the two types of concentration is the intensity of the constituent factors (āṅga) of the absorption. In the approach concentration, they are still weak like an infant (daharo kumārako) lifted up and stood on its feet but repeatedly falling back on the ground. In contrast, the absorption concentration has strong factors and, once generated, it can continue for one day and one night. It is compared to a strong man (balavā puriso) who, ‘after rising from his seat, can stand for a whole day’. The same passage, distinguishes between two levels (bhūmi) on which the mind becomes concentrated: the level of approach (upacārābhūmi), on which the [five] hindrances (nīvaraṇa) are abandoned, and the level of attainment (paṭīlābhabhūmi) (corresponding to the appanāsamādhi), when the jhāna constituent factors (āṅga) manifest themselves.

1 2 1 Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 19-20; Griffiths 1983, 433): tadanantaram maulaprihamadhyānasahgataḥ pravaganiṣṭhāphala iti [.]

1 2 2 Skt. pratipriṇayati. Tib. suggests paripriṇayati (see note 187 to Tib. ed.). The verb paripriṇayati appears to be directly borrowed from the extended canonical formula describing the first absorption (see note 126 below).

1 2 3 There is a discrepancy between Skt. pratanukasāṁmukhibhāva and Ch. 微薄現前, on one hand, and Tib. bde ba'i dngos po chung ngu (which suggests *pratanukasukhibhāva), one the other. Similarly, we have below Skt. ghanaviṃpurataraśaṁmukhibhāvena ‘in such a way that they profusely [lit., densely] and amply manifest themselves’ and Ch. 深重現前, on one hand, and Tib. bde ba'i dngos po shin tu mang po dang | shin tu rgya chen po'i tshul gvis (= *ghanaviṃpurataraśaṁmukhibhāvyayogena), on the other. I have chosen the Skt. and Ch. reading as the preferable one, but the decision is not so easy. The core of the problem is the lexical suitability of saṁmukhibhāva. Skt. saṁmukhi- /bhū means ‘be [come to/assume a position] face to face/opposite’, quite often used in a concrete sense. In the Pali Canon, we find a variety of occurrences in which saṁmukhibhūta means ‘face to face, in the presence of’. At DN II 155, 10-11, saṁmukhibhūto no satthā ahosi means ‘our Teacher was face to face [with us]’; at DN II 155, 11-12: na mayam sakkhimha Bhagavantaṁ saṁmukhā paṭiṇecchitun ‘we could not ask the Exalted One [when we were] face to face [with him]’; etc. The phrase satthā saṁmukhibhūta is actually a frequent occurrence in the Pali Canon, referring to being in the presence of Gotama Buddha. Later in Mahāyāna literature, in keeping with the diversification of the doctrines and religious experiences, ‘face to face’ (saṁmukha) came to include being in the presence or having a direct perception (often in a contemplative state of samādhi) of a Buddha and Bodhisattva, (see, for instance, the title of the Pratypuṇṇabuddhasaṁmukhāvasthitasamādhisītra). The compound continues, however, to maintain its concrete meaning. E.g., Aṣṭa 259: Maitreyo bodhisattvo mahāsattvah saṁmukhibhūtaḥ (cf. AbhisamĀ 734). The implication of saṁmukha in mystical experiences is one of unequivocal concreteness: the reality of being ‘face to face’ with a Buddha in samādhi is as concrete as being in his actual presence. (The word ‘reality’ should be understood in a relative way: in Mahāyāna, especially in Prajñāpāramitā literature, all so-called ‘realities’ are doubtless empty, as the same Pratypuṇṇabuddhasaṁmukhāvasthitasaṁādhisītura clearly points out; see Harrison tr. 1990, 42-44).

The word saṁmukha also has more abstract meanings, such as ‘intent upon’ (MW, s.v.) or
bedacht auf (PW, vol. 7, p. 764, s.v.; see illustrations, too: subhakarmaj, etc.). In Buddhist literature, we also find examples in which ‘being face to face’ is used in connection with mental states. At Kv 482, 7ff. we find sammukhibbūta saññojanān sammukhibbāvam, tehi samangibbāvam upagato ‘here being in thrall to’ (Kv tr. 277). Kv-a 144 glosses in the following way: \textit{tattha sammukhibbūto ti saññojanānān sammukhibbāvam, tehi samangibbāvam upagato ‘here being in thrall to’ refers to one having reached the state [in which] the fetters have [actually] become present, the state [in which he] is [actually] possessed of them’ (cf. also preceding passage, similarly worded, which is entitled nivuto nivaranān jahatī, Kv 480-482). Another relevant example is found at BoBh Wogihara ed. 193, 12-14 = Dutt ed. 133, 8-9; Pana MS folio 132b3: \textit{etam lokadharmānān samastavyastānaś āpataṇā \[I follow the Patna MS and Dutt; Wogihara reads āpataṁ\] sañmukhibbāvād yad duḥkhāṇi utpadyate tal lokadharmādhiśṭānaṁ ity ucyate.} (cf. Ch. 如是世法, 貞若是法, 當會前際, 能生眾苦, 此即名為世法處苦。T30.524a20-21). Here, sañmukhibbāva and āpataṇa (‘coming, happening, occurrence’) seem to be used as quasi-synonyms (cf. also Tibetan translation at P Zhi 115b1: \textit{'org zhing mgon du gyur pa}. (The occurrence of worldly factors refers here to suffering-engendering factors such as ‘extinction’ (kṣaya), ‘old age’ (jarā), etc.). Finally, let us see the following occurrence of sañmukhibbāva in the AKBh, which is found in the lengthy discussion of the controversy over the existence or non-existence of pleasant feelings (sukhā vedanā). To an opponent who holds that pleasure is the mere absence of painful feeling (duḥkha vedanā), Vasubandhu replies that this is absurd because one would feel pleasure (as a sort of continuously underlying feeling) when pain has ended or has not yet occurred. Furthermore, he continues, evaṁ kāmasukhasaṁmukhibbāve ‘pi vaktavyam (AKBh 332,8) ‘the same should be declared in the case of experiencing pleasure [occasioned] by sensual pleasures [/pleasant objects—see below]’. That is, the same holds in the case when pleasure does not occur, because the underlying feeling of pleasure should be perceived. Xuanzang translates: \textit{受欲樂時, 徵問亦爾}. (T29.115c6) ‘when pleasure [occasioned] by sensual pleasures is perceived, the clarification of the question is the same’ (KIK. Bidon-bu, vol. 22, part 2, p. 208 has 徵聞 but the editors of T as well as Śāheki ed. (vol. 3, p. 932) read 徵問, indicating no var. lec.; the KIK reading is probably a typographical error). Xuanzang’s rendering is rather free, but it shows that he construed sañmukhibbāva in the sense of ‘being actually experienced’, which here means ‘to feel’ or ‘to perceive’ (受). Paramārtha’s translation is closer to the original: 欲塵樂現時前, 應說如此. (T29.268a12-13) ‘when the objects of sensual pleasures (*kāmagūra?) become manifested, the same should be declared’ (on the meaning of kāmasukha as well as Paramārtha’s rendering, see Sakurada and Odani tr. 1999, pp. 46-47, n. 2). Yāsomitra comments: evaṁ kāmasukhasaṁmukhibbāve ‘pi vaktavyam iti. yathā gandharasāpṛastavyavīśvajām sukham uktam, evaṁ kāmasukhasaṁmukhibbāve ‘pi vaktavyam. (AKV 520, 29-31) “the same should be declared in the case of experiencing pleasure [occasioned] by [the objects of] sensual pleasures” means that as the pleasure generated by [such] excellences [as] odours, flavours, and tangible objects is declared, “the same should be declared in the case of experiencing pleasure [occasioned] by sensual pleasures”. Sañmukhibbāva retains a strong dose of concreteness (‘confronting/being in the presence of’), but the basic sense here is that of ‘becoming actually manifest [present]’ or ‘being actually experienced’. In spite of all these, the Tib. reading cannot be discarded outright. A reading like *sukhibbāva also makes sense. Maybe one would like to see in our case *prītisukhibbāva, but even without prīti, the compound may be acceptable. The pleasure (sukha) associated with meditative states is common in Buddhist sources (e.g., Laṅk 65, 6: samādhisukhavīrāṁ; ibid. 136, 7: samādhisukhasamāpattimanomayo, which, interestingly, reads in a Nepalese MS, called
by the editor manuscript T, samādhimukha'!)

I think, however, that the original reading in our ŚṛBh passage is more likely to have been saṁmukhibhāva. At some stage, probably a careless or tired scribe skipped over saṁ and wrote the easier and frequently occurring su kha. This may have been facilitated by the fact that in many varieties of Northern Indian scripts, su and mu are similar or often virtually identical aksaras. To be sure, one cannot rule out completely that *sukhibhāva may have been the original reading and this became later corrupted into saṁmukhibhāva. However, such a process would seem to me more intricate and less likely. This, the extant Skt. MS reading, the fact that the Ch. translation supports this lection, and the usage of saṁmukhibhāva in connection with mental states—all these have made me decide in favour of the difficilior lectio: saṁmukhibhāva.

Skt. sparhati. The verb appears to be borrowed from the extended canonical formula describing the first absorption, where, however, its usual form is parisparati (see note 126 below).

Skt. nāsti kiṁcita asphuṭam bhavati spharaṇīyam seems to be based upon the extended canonical formula describing the first absorption (see note 126 below). Phenologically, it poses here several problems. The first one is whether we should read spharaṇīyam with the MS or should emend to aspharaṇīyam. What appears to be the earliest canonical parallel of the phrase does not give any direct clue concerning this. In Pali, it reads: nāsasa kiṁci sabbvāto kāyassa vivekajena piṭusukhena asphuṭam hoti (DN I 73, 27-8; id. 173, 4-5; MN I 276, 21-24 and 30-31; etc.). The surviving Sanskrit parallels of the canonical text are more developed and appear to indicate two distinct lineages. The first one reads aspharaṇīyam and is met with in such works as the SaṅghBh II: nāsya kiṁcita sarvataḥ kāyād asphuṭāṁ bhavatī aspharaṇīyam yaduta vivekajena piṭusukhena (SaṅghBh II 243, 6-7 (MS reads: nāstyā); in citation above, I follow Gnoli's emended text—but see below; see also the largely similar phrase at ibid. 243, 15-17; 244, 1-2; etc. Similar phrases also occur at: ibid. 242, 26-243, 1 (MS reads: nāsty asya); 244, 4-5; 244, 13-14; 244, 19-21; 245, 1-2; and 245, 5-7, but they are partially or entirely reconstructed; the Tib. rendering of the occurrence at 242, 26 = bKa' 'gyur, Peking ed., Ce 254a5ff., also suggests aspharaṇīya). ArthVin 26, 2-3, also reads: tasya nāsti sarvataḥ kāyād asphuṭam bhavatī aspharaṇīyam [Samtan: has: aspharaṇīya = genuine MS reading?; decipherment mistake?; typographical error?] yaduta adhyātmaṁ vivekajena piṭusukhena. Semantically, reading aspharaṇīyam is also possible: there is no part of the body 'which would be unsuffused [or rather: unsuffusible]' (there is no commentary at ArthVinNib, 204; cf. also ArthVin 25, 10-11).

On the other hand, we have another lineage reading spharaṇīyam, which also makes sense (see the rendering of the ŚṛBh passage here in the main text above). It is attested at, for instance, SaṅghBh III 35(1a), (2a), (3a) (cited in SWFT, fascicle 3, p. 208, s.v. asphuṭa): nāsya esāṁ kiṁcit sarvatah kāyād asphuṭam bhavati spharaṇīyam yaduta vivekajena piṭusukhena (and similarly below: samādhijena prē and nisprītikena sukhenā). At SamBh 152, 13, we also read: nāsya kiṁcita aparisphuṭam bhavati spharaṇīyam (with the MS reading: nāstyā—see p. 236, n. 257 of diplomatic edition) (see also Tib. equivalent of this passage at ibid., 321, 8-9: des ci yang khyab par ma gyur pa' am / khyab par bya ba med do, as well as Ch. rendering at T30.339b19: 此身中無有少分而不充滿).

The Tibetan rendering of our ŚṛBh passage here reads: khyab par bya ba cung zad kyang med do, which also seems to presuppose something like: *nāsti kiṁcita asphuṭam spharaṇīyam. Ch. 無有間隙 is not very conclusive: 'there are no interstices and fissures [which should be still suffused/which remains unsuffused?]'. It seems that the tradition hesitated between spharaṇīyam and aspharaṇīyam (even in the same text: see above SaṅghBh II and III respectively). Since both make sense, it is preferable to respect the MS readings in each
individual case, especially when they are supported by other collateral witnesses like the Tib. and Ch. — the former certainly corroborating our Śrībh MS.

Another detail is whether asti (in nasty) should be not emended to asya (or tasya) as seen in a few examples above. This, however, is not necessary here. Our Śrībh original already contains a genitive: vartamāṇasya, which would make the presence of (t)asya superfluous. Let us also notice that Tib. contains no equivalent of (t)asya here. Besides, some of the examples above seem to hesitate between asti and (t)asya or contain both (which is unproblematic if there is no other noun in genitive). And as shown by some other instances above, the sentence can also be construed with (t)asya (cf. also SWFT, fascicle 3, p. 208, s.v. asphuṭa, citing SHT (III) 990 V 5: nāsti kiṃcid asphuṭam //).

Finally, let us note that the presence of the verb √as before another finite verb (here: asti [...] bhavati) is not unknown in Sanskrit. It seems to be used to introduce the finite verb (see SWFT, fascicle 3, p. 192, s.v. as b; CPD, vol. 1, p. 111, s.v. atthi; cf. also Śrībh Sh 497, 9-10: aham asmi [...] samsarasyām), probably with an emphatic stylistic effect.

In some of the variants of the stock-phrase depicting the four absorptions, we find more detailed descriptions of the way joy and pleasure are experienced by the meditator. So imaṃ eva kāyaṃ vivekajena pitisukhena abhisamāte, pariṣamāte, pariṣphāreṇa, nāssu kiṃci sabbāvato kāyaṃ vivekajena pitisukhena apphutaṃ (var. lec. apphutaḥ) hoti (DN I 73, 27-28; id. 173, 4-5; id. 214, 31-215, 2; MN I 276, 21-24 and 30-31; MN III 92, 36-93, 3; etc.) ‘He pervades, fills, permeates, suffuses his very body with joy and pleasure born of separation, there is no place on his entire body which is not suffused with joy and pleasure born of separation’ (cf. Buddhaghosa’s commentary at DN-a I 217, 19-26.). This is also found in Sanskrit sources. E.g., SaṅghBa II 242, 24-243, 1: <sa imaṃ eva kāyaṃ vivekajena pṛitiṣukhena>bhiṣyandayati pariṣyandayati pariṣphāreṇa pariṣphāreṇa; nāsa kiṃci sarvataḥ kāyaṃ asphuṭaṃ bhavat vīhareṇa sabhaṇḍhataṃ // (the parts of the sentence between < > are reconstructed; similar phrases occur, however, in the SaṅghBa MS below and guarantee the validity of the reconstruction). ArthVins 25, 8-11, [...] imaṃ eva kāyaṃ vāmathyātmagānāṃ vivekajena samādhiyena pṛitiṣukhena bhāṣyānti pariṣphāreṇa pariṣphāreṇa [MS omits pariṣphāreṇa here but contains the verb in the next occurrence — see below] pariṣphāreṇa | tasya nāstī sarvataḥ kāyaṃ asphuṭaṇāṃ bhavat vīhareṇa asphuṭaṇāṃ [Santani has here and in the next occurrence: asphuṭaṇāṃ — genuine MS reading?; decipherment mistake?; typographical error?] yadatra adhyātmajavivekajena samādhiyena pṛitiṣukhena | (see also below ArthVins 26, 1-3; etc.). As already remarked in notes 122, 124, and 125 above, parts of the sentence are similar to the wording of our passage, which, on the whole, can be said to be a development and adaptation of this allo-texteme to the Śrībh scheme of seven contemplations.

In his discussion of joy and pleasure in the first absorption, Buddhaghosa also makes use of some phrases and images similar to our passage. Echoing the definition of Dhs 10, § 9, Buddhaghosa describes joy as pīṇayati ti pītī (Vism 115, § 94; Dhśa-a 115, § 298) ‘it is called joy because it gladdens’ (or, as suggested by Nāṇamoli in his translation of Vism, p. 141, ‘gladden’ can be also construed as ‘refresh’; according to PED, s.v., pīneti means ‘to gladden’, ‘to cheer’, ‘to invigorate’, etc.). Buddhaghosa also qualifies pītiṣukha as pharaṇaṃcāsaḥ ‘[having] the attribute of suffusion’ (ibid.) (cf. spaharaṇi, asphuṭam, spaharaṇiyaṃ in our passage). Furthermore, he speaks of five types (or rather stages) of joy, the last one being called ‘suffusing joy’ (pharaṇaṇaṃ pītī). This is defined as: pharaṇaṇaṇītya pana uppannānaḥ sakalasārasaṃ [...]. anupaśrīpaḥhoti ‘when, furthermore, the suffusing joy arises, the whole body [...] is completely suffused’ (Vism 117, § 98 and Dhs-a 117, § 300). The description resembles the psychological state described in our Śrībh passage, in which the entire body is filled with joy and pleasure.
The rest of the sentence is the classical stock-phrase describing the first absorption. In Pali, it runs as follows: vivecc’eva kāmehi, vivecca akusalehi dhāmmehi, savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṃ pritisukhaṃ paṭhamāṃ jhānaṃ [var. lec. paṭhamajjhāna] upasampajja viharati (DN I 37, 1-3; DN II 313, 12-14; MN I 21, 34-36; etc.). For a discussion of this and the following stock-phrases of the four absorptions, see Griffiths 1983, 71-81; for a more extensive list of occurrences in Pali and Chinese sources, see Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 2, p. 1023, n. 3. As far as Pali commentarial literature is concerned, Visuddhisaṃ is, as expected, the most detailed and systematic exposition of the topic and will be frequently cited below (cf. also Samantapāsādikā I 141-157). In referring to Buddhaghosa’s glosses and views, I do not imply that there are direct historical links between the authors/editors of the Šrībh and the Theravāda tradition. A certain common heritage did, however, exist and, more importantly, in dealing with the subtleties of meditation psychology, even explanations coming from other scholastic systems can be helpful (if carefully used!).

In Sanskrit, the description is: viviktam kāmaiviviktam pāpakaiv akusalair dharmacīṃ savitarkam savicāraṃ vivekaṃ pritisukhaṃ prathamaṃ dhāyamāṃ upasampadaya viharati (e.g., Pañca 167, 4-5; LalVīs 100, 6-7, with sman at the end of the sentence; Saṅghībh 242, 22-24; M’Vycūt # 1478 (Sakaki spells: kāmāś, pāpakāś and dharmāci); ArthVin 17, 3-4, commentary at ArthVinNib 179-181; etc.).

The canonical sources differ from our Šrībh passage in only one detail: they lack the compound pañcāngam ‘[endowed] with five limbs’ (see the end of the sentence). Stuart-Fox (1989, especially 83ff.), argues that the so-called five-limb or five-factor list, which includes ruha examination (vītakka), subtle investigation (vīcāra), joy (piṭī), pleasure (sukha), and focussing [of the mind] (ekaggata) (for uniformity’s sake, I use my own renderings), is an Abhidhammic development differing from the earlier sutta enumerations which mention only the first four factors. The situation is, however, more complex, and we actually do find two suttas which speak of the five limbs of the first absorption (see Gunaratana 1985, 66-67). The Mahāvedallasutta clearly states that the number of factors of the pathamajhāna is five and enumerates cittekaggata as the last of them (MN I 294, 29-33). The Anupadasutta also mentions cittekaggata after the first four ‘standard’ factors, but its list continues with other minor mental functions which are present in the first absorption. These amount to eleven factors and include contact (phasso), feeling (vedanā), etc. (MN III 25, 12-18). It is hard to determine whether the author/editor of the latter text considered the focussing of the mind as a major factor characterising the first jhāna. Gunaratana (1985, 67) believes this to be the case, but he does not elaborate upon his grounds. It is quite possible that the Sri Lankan author may have tacitly followed the traditional post-canonical view. (Gunaratana’s study on jhānas in Pali sources is very useful and systematic, but more often than not, the author takes the Abhidhammic and commentarial (mostly, drawn from the Visuddhimagga) for granted. (There are very few exceptions to this stance—see, for example, p. 104). This is an approach which ‘hard core’ (and even moderate) historians doubtless find debatable.) One minor stylistic factor might, however, support Gunaratana’s conclusion: ca is used after vitakko, vicāro, pītī, sukho, cittekaggata but not after the other eleven mental functions (phasso, etc.) It is not, however, certain whether this can be taken as a clear indication of the sutta’s view in this respect. To be sure, its author(s) did intend to give a full description of all mental processes involved in the first absorption, including the major limbs as well as the minor and universal factors, but for some reason, he/they did not choose to distinguish clearly between them.

According to Akanuma (1929), there are two Chinese translations corresponding to the Mahāvedallasutta: the Da Gouchiluo jing 大拘毘羅經 (T1.790b-792b) and the Gouchiluo 拘毘羅 (T2.60b-c), the latter being a brief version included in the Saṃyuktāgama. (拘毘羅
*Koṭṭhila appears to be the Chinese transcription of the name of a mendicant known in Pali as Mahākoṭṭhika or Mahākoṭṭhita, and in Sanskrit as Mahākausṭhila). Neither of them contains, however, any reference to the first absorption and its constituent factors. Anupadasutta, on the other hand, apparently has no equivalent Chinese translation. When comparing the Pali Nikāyas with the Chinese Āgamas, one should keep in mind three principles concerning the differences between their versions: (1) the scholastic affiliations of the Chinese Āgamas is not Theravādin (the precise details of their doctrinal background are intricate and not yet completely resolved); (2) some Chinese translations may reflect a common text in an earlier form of development than the stage displayed by its Pali counterpart; and (3) the stylistic peculiarities and/or historical circumstances behind the masters who translated the scriptures into Chinese as well as the teams assisting them may sometimes have resulted in abridged renderings. Clearly distinguishing between these principles in practice is, however, far from easy (especially as far as (1) and (2) are regarded). Although I have no definitive proofs, I would conjecture that in our case, the Da Gouchiluo jing represents an older version and that the Pali version of the Mahāvedallasutta shows traces of later (Abhidharmic) additions and modifications.

The content of the Da Gouchiluo jing/Mahāvedallasutta itself appears to reflect a rather late historical stratum of the Suttapitaka. It includes discussions and definitions of disparate concepts and doctrines. This structure rather suggests a transitional period from early sermons to a more systematic, proto-Abhidharmic interest in classifications and definitions. The development of the sutra probably passed through several stages, and its very structure made it easy to add and interpolate new concepts. Of course, dating canonical materials is a hugely difficult process, but I would venture to surmise that the five-limbed first absorption is a late development introduced towards the final stages of the Mahāvedallasutta formation. This explains why neither of its Chinese counterparts contains any reference to the first absorption. As far as the Anupadasutta is concerned, it also shows an Abhidharmic approach. From the standpoint of spiritual cultivation, it is enough to know the main factors characterising the first jhāna. A list comprising all mental factors of a meditative state betrays theoretical interests rather than practical concerns. No matter if the cittekagattā was considered a major or minor factor, the very discussion concerning its status probably represents a fairly developed historical stage.

Stuart-Fox’s hypothesis can thus be refined. Although the ‘five-limb’ definition occasionally appears in the Sūtrapitaka, it is very rare and seems to represent a late interpretation. It is difficult to ascertain with precision when this definition came into existence. It may have been put forward before the formation of the first Abhidharmic treatises. Or, equally possible, it may have been formulated after the compilation of (at least the early) Abhidharma texts and under their influence. (There are no a priori reasons to suppose that the Sūtrapitaka is in its entirety earlier than all Abhidharma treatises. Late fragments and interpolations seem to have been incorporated into the suttas at the time of or after the formation of the latter.) Anyway, it appears rather unlikely that the cittekagattā was conceived from the beginning as one of the main factors of the first absorption.

The somehow troubling presence of this fifth factor may have also been felt by Vasubandhu. AK VII.7a-b and its commentary (AKBh 437, 16-19) list five members which characterise the first dhyāna and the last one is concentration (samādhi) or focusing of the mind (cittāpākāgratā). Vasubandhu appears to be aware of the somehow peculiar status of the ‘concentration’ and points out that the samādhi is at the same time dhyāna itself and also a constituent element of it, while the other factors are only constituent elements. (The ArthVinNib (181, 1-3) also lists five factors, with concentration (samādhi) as the last.)

The authors of our passage in the SrBH do not mention samādhi or cittaikāgratā but seem to have in mind the Abhidharmic list which includes this ‘limb’. This explains why they added
pañcāṇgam which lacks in the canonical formula. Other Books in the YoBh explicitly mention the names of all the five limbs (see, for example, SamBh 103, 1-2, and the Viṇās exegesis of the SamBh at T30.649a29-b1). Although clearly presupposing a five-factor theory, the ŚrīBh approach here is somehow different from commentarial works like the Vism (112, § 79) and the ArthaviniNīb (181). The latter texts first cite the canonical text as such, without making any editorial addition, and then in their discussions make clear that the first absorption has five factors. Similarly, Yaśomitra first cites the canonical locus classicus and then adds ‘[endowed] with five limbs’ viviktam kāmair viviktam pāpakair akuśalair dharmāiṃ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṇaṃ pratisukhaṃ prathamānānāṃ dhyānaṃ upasanaḥpadya viharatāti sūrei pañcāṇgāṃ uktam (AKVv 140, 21-24). Actually, even the ŚrīBh does not always add pañcāṇgāṃ in its citations of canonical formulae which describe the first absorption. E.g., ŚrīBh-Gr 20, 23-24; ŚrīBh-Gr (17) 8, 6-9: viviktam kāmair viviktam pāpakair akuśalair dharmāiṃ savitarkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekaṇaṃ pratisukhaṃ prathamānānāṃ dhyānaṃ yāvoc ca�arthaṃ dhyānaṃ upasanaḥpadya viharati.

My rendering of the two terms is based on their definition at passage 3.28.2.2.2. below. A similar definition is found at AKBh 60, 22: cittaudarikatā vitarkaḥ; cittasūkṣmatā vicāraḥ ‘vitarka represents the coarseness of the mind; vicāra represents the subtleness of the mind’. Vasubandhu discusses in detail the two concepts and their functioning (AKBh pp. 60-61), and so does Yaśomitra (AKVv 138-140). The following simile cited by the latter thinker is relevant for the way Buddhist scholastics (at least Vasubandhu and his followers) construed the difference between the two mental functions: tadyathā bahuṣu ghaṭeṣu avasthiṣeṣu “ko ‘tra dydhāḥ, ko jarjarāḥ “iti muṣṭiṁabhīhnato ya uhaḥ sa vitarkaḥ, “īyanto jarjarā dydhā vā” iti yad anī grahamāṃ sa vicāraḥ (AKVv 140, 19-21). ‘Vitarka is like the examination of one striking with the clenched hand many jars placed [somewhere] [in order to find out] which is hard?’ [and] “which is fragile?’. Vicāra is the final understanding that ‘so many of the jars are fragile or so many are hard.’ (See also AKVv 64, 25-28, citing the Pañcaskandhaka.) All Abhidharmic sources, Southern and Northern, abound in similes depicting the differences between these two mental processes; for other examples, especially from the Theravādin Abhidhamma, see also Cousins, 1992. The understanding vitarka and vicāra as coarse and subtle mental activity (or, at least, the emphasis of this aspect) is mainly seen in Sarvāstivādin, Sautrāntika, and other Northern Schools of Abhidharma. E.g., Jnānaprasthānāsāstra T26.927b20; AMVibh T27.269b-270a (quoting a scriptural source which says, ‘the coarseness of the mind is named vitarka, and the subtleness of the mind is named vicāra’ 心粗性名尋，心細性名伺) (T27.269b11-12), then explaining its meaning, and discussing whether this is to be understood as applying to all the spheres (dhātu) of existence or not); AbhHṛ T28.823b23-24; AbhĀv T28.982a24-27; TatSid T32.288b-c; AbhDīp 83, 1-2; AbhSam 10, 10-12; AbhSamBh 8, 26-9, 3 (= T31.669c24-670a2; see also T31.665b22-25; etc). Though not essentially divergent from the above understanding, the traditional, or at least the early, Abhidharmic definition of vitakka and vicāra in Theravāda is on somehow different lines. Here the emphasis is rather on the initial application of the mental act of examination (vitakka) and the subsequent continuation of the investigation (vicāra), which supposedly results in a closer scrutiny into the object of meditation (see Dhs 10, § 7-8; Dhs-a 114-115, § 296; Vism 114, § 88; Mil 62-63; etc). This is also reflected in the modern rendering of the two terms like ‘applied thought’ and ‘sustained thought’ respectively (e.g., Nāṇamoli 1956) or “‘initial application’ of thought and “‘sustained’ thinking about it” (Stuart-Fox 1989, 97). The Theravādin tradition does not, however, ignore the association of vitakka with coarseness and of vicāra with subtlety. According to Cousins (1992, 147), ‘this application of the distinction between gross and subtle does not appear before the Vimuttimagga and is therefore probably of Sarvāstivādin origin. Noticeably, whereas the Vimuttimagga probably gave it in the form of “grossness of mind, etc.”, Buddhaghosa refers simply to grossness, etc.’ (Cousins does not
specify the exact reference in Vim, but I assume it must be 體心受持為覺。細心受持為觀 at T32.415c7.)

The whole issue of vitakka/vitarka and vicāra is very complex and a detailed account of the history and theory of these concepts is beyond the scope of this note. A very useful survey of their usages in the Pali Canon as well as their doctrinal understanding in Theravādin Abhidhamma and Northern Abhidharma in connection with classical Yoga is found in Cousins (1992). To Stuart-Fox (1989) we owe a very insightful discussion of these two terms in early Pali canonical and Abhidhammic sources. Based on the observations in the PED, s.v.v., Stuart-Fox argues that in their earliest usage in the Suttapiṭaka, vitakka and vicāra meant the same thing and their collocation in the pathamajjhāna stock phrase was rather a stylistic emphasis of the same basic concept of ‘thinking’ (pp. 82-83). The dichotomy between initial application of thought and sustained application of thought came as an Abhidhammic development (pp. 86-87), probably resulting from a ‘more refined introspective analysis’ (p. 97). I think that Stuart-Fox’s analysis is in correct in broad lines, though a more detailed historico-philological investigation (‘vicāra!’), part of which was actually undertaken by Cousins (1992), into the whole corpus of early Buddhist scriptures (Pali, Sanskrit, Chinese) will undoubtedly reveal more facets and bring further refinements. Important clarifications concerning the definition and different doctrinal expositions concerning vitarka and vicāra are also found in Jaini’s Introduction to Abhidip, pp. 83-88. For other relevant remarks and sources, see also Frauwallner 1951a, p. 22, n. 1; Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 2, p. 1028, n. 2 (also containing the translation of the relevant passage in PPUpad); etc.

Whatever the doctrino-lexical history of these two words may be, most modern scholars will, I believe, agree with a statement made by C.A.F. Rhys Davids more than a century ago: ‘Vitakko and vicāro is another pair of terms which it is hard to fit with any one pair of English words’ (Dhs tr., p. 10. n. 1, also containing some useful clarifications). Heiler (1918) devotes a long note to these two terms, which he renders as Überlegung (‘reflection’) and Erwägung (‘consideration’) (p. 13), also listing other translations employed by various scholars up to the publication of his work (note 94, pp. 75-75). See also Frauwallner’s rendering of vitarka as Nachdenken (which in the English translation (1984, 132) is ‘reflection’) and vicāra as Überlegung (ibid., ‘deliberation’). To limit our discussion to the English language, the problem stems from the fact that terms like ‘examination’, ‘investigation’, ‘reflection’, ‘consideration’, etc. must be qualified by one or more attributes to express the denotations and connotations which (at least in Abhidharmic definitions) are associated with vitarka and vicāra. Finding a one-to-one equivalence seems almost impossible. Cousins’s equating vitakka with ‘thinking of something’ and vicāra with ‘thinking about the same thing’ (1992, 153) is very ingenious and apt, but using these phrases as such in all contexts is stylistically quite difficult.

Let us add a few further clarifications concerning the concepts of joy and pleasure in the context of meditation (see note 126 above). The difference between them is explained by Buddhaghosa as follows: pīti is the feeling of satisfaction which one experiences at the idea that one’s wish can be fulfilled, just like an exhausted man in a desert would hear about or see a pond nearby; sukhā is the actual experiencing of the pleasure when one’s wish has been fulfilled, just like our man in the desert at the moment when he really drinks water from the pond or stays in the shade of the woods (Vism 110, § 100; Dhs-a 117-118, § 301, more developed than Vism).

Here we should also mention Vasubandhu’s identification of sukhā in the first two absorptions with prasrābdi ‘tranquillity’ or ‘ease’ (AK VIII.9b) and the long discussion concerning the definition and understanding of the concept by the Vaibhāśikas and Dārśāntikas (AKBh 438, 17-440, 8). See also ArthVinBh 180, 4-181, 7. See also below the ŚrīBh gloss upon pīṭisukha in the first absorption as well as relevant notes.

Our text classifies defilements (kleśa) into strong or excessive (adhimātra), of middling

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kind (madhyaprakāra), and of weak or mild kind (mṛduprakāra). Though using different terminologies, this taxonomy based on the intensity of defilements has scriptural precedents. At AN I 254, the impurities (upakkilesa) are classified into coarse (olārika), moderately clinging to (lit., ‘accompanying’) [the person] (mañjhisahaga), and subtly clinging to the [person] (sukhumasahaga). Early Abhidharmic taxonomies do not list this intensity-based scheme (see, for example, Ds 215 § 1229-220 § 1253; Vbh 385, 16-18, id. 391, 11-14), but later commentarial works contain references to it, though not necessarily associated with defilements. Peṭ 77, 21, using terms similar to our passage in the Šrībh, states: so ca paccayo tividho: mudu, mañjo adhimatto ‘and the condition is of three kinds: mild, middling, and excessive’. Nett 99, 16, in its discussion on accumulating karma (kammamaddāna), says: sabbesani mudumajjhādhamattatā. ‘In everything, there is mild[ness], moderate[ness], and excessiveness’.

The Abhidharma of the Northern Tradition displays a more elaborate pattern of the intensity-based taxonomy. The Abhīṣṭa Ṛṣi divides defilements into nine categories: mild-mild 微微, mild-moderate 微中, mild-excessive 微上, etc., up to excessive-excessive 上上 (T28.819a) (cf. also Frauwallner 1995, 164). This pattern is also adopted by Vasubandhu in the AKbh. In his commentary to AK VI.33c-d, he says: mṛdumadyādhamātrā hi trayo mūlaprakāraṇā | teśāṁ punaḥ pratvekam mṛdumadyādhamātavena trividhatvā nava vyavasthāpyante | (AKbh 355, 11-12) ‘For weak, middling, and strong are the three basic categories. Because these are furthermore [divided into] three sorts by each [being subdivided into] weak, middling, and strong, [finally] nine [categories] are established’. The statement occurs in the context of the classification of defilements (klesa) (see p. 355, l. 4).

In the Chapter on the Supramundane Path (lokottaramārga), the Šrībh speaks of the cultivation of the [still] weak path (mṛdumārgabhaṇā), in which the coarse (audārika) or strong (adhimātra) defilements are eliminated, the cultivation of the moderate path (madhyamārgabhaṇā), in which the middling (madhya) defilements are eliminated, and the cultivation of the intense path (adhimāramārgabhaṇā), in which all defilements, including the weak (mṛdu) ones, are eliminated (Śrībh, Sh ed. 505, 15-19; Tib. D Dzi 192b6-7; Ch. T 30.476c15-18).

131 Skt. nirabhimānāta ‘freedom from conceit [/vain misapprehension’]. The AKbh (285, 2-3) defines abhimāna, one of the seven forms of arrogance (māna), as follows: aprāpte viṣeṣādhitam prāpta mayety abhāmānaḥ ‘conceit [/vain misapprehension] is [the case of one who] though having not obtained the mastery of an excellence, thinks “I have obtained [it]”. Yaśomitra comments: samādhisamanśīritāḥ sāravas cānāṃ sāravās ca dhārāṇa viṣeṣāḥ (both Wogihara and Ṣastri apply continuos sandhi: viṣeṣāḥ); tasyādhitam saśāntakaranāna viṣeṣādhitam (AKVṣ 456, 12-13; Ṣastri ed. 782) ‘excellences are those factors, both contaminated and non-contaminated, based on meditation; its mastery refers to [its] actual realisation [lit., ‘having it before one’s eyes’] — [this is the mastery of an excellence’. The meaning of abhimāna becomes particularly relevant for our passage: it is conceit [/vain misapprehension] related to meditative attainments, a trap our ascetic is prone to fall into, and freedom from it becomes an important step in his or her spiritual progress.

It’s Commentary raises the following question concerning the freedom from conceit [/vain misapprehension]: why is it placed after the middling class of defilements and not after the strong defilements or the weak kind of defilements? The Commentary, which adopts a classification into nine types of defilements (similar to the AKbh above), answers in the following way: 前品恥難易知。後三品恥難細。斷前中品恥訶。不知下品恥在。乃起増上慢 謂 “九品並盡已” 謂 “諸貪根本定”。 (T43.120c8-10) ‘The first six classes of defilements are coarse and easy to know [whether they have been eliminated or not], the last three classes of defilements are subtle and difficult to realise. After having eliminated the strong
and middling classes of defilements, first [mentioned above], [the ascetic] does not realise that the weak class of defilements [still] exists. Therefore, [he] generates conceit [vain misapprehension] [under the false impression that he has already obtained the meditative attainment]. [He then] says: “The nine classes [of defilements] have been completely eliminated”, [or] says: “[I] have already attained the absorption proper (mavaladhana)”.1 2

Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 20-25; Griffiths 1983, 433): tatra laksanapratisavanvedinā prahātavyam pṛāptavyam ca samyakparijñāya prahāṇāya pṛāptaye ca cittam prāṇādhaté | ādhinokṣikena tadārtham (Griffiths emends to tadārthvam—see below) samyakpravagam ārābhate | pravivekānāḥdmārānta klesām jahāti | ratisamgrahākena madhyam klesāprakārāṁ jahāhi | māmānsakena prāptinirabhimāṇātavāṁ cittam avasthāpayati | prayoganiṣṭhena mṛcchā klesāprakārāṁ jahāhi | prayoganiṣṭhāpālenaisāṁ (I apply regular sandhi rules; Tatia and Griffiths read: prayoganiṣṭhāpālena eṣāṁ) manaskārānāṁ subhāvīnāṁ bhavānāphalam prayamūbhavati ā. Griffiths emendation of tadārtham to tadārthvam is based on Tib. de’i og tu (P Shi 72b6; D Li 58b2). I think, however, that the MS and Tatia’s tadārtham as well as the Ch. 無所求義 (T31.736c19) are correct (though the Ch. seems rather too literal). Compared with our passage in the Śr Bh, tadārtham becomes clear: ‘for this reason’, thus avoiding the repetition of prahāṇāvya pṛāptaye ca.

3 4 Skt. vidūṣaṇāpratipākṣa ‘antidote of reviling’ refers to the becoming aware and loathing or more precisely, pointing out the shortcomings of the defilements or their objects. AbhSam 71, 6-7 (fragment based on MS) defines it as: vidūṣaṇāpratipākṣaḥ katamah | sāsreste samaskāresvādānādvaradasinam ā. See also note 134 below.

3 4 The definition of this set of four contemplations is found in Yogasthāna II: tatrānulomikā manaskārāḥ: yenālambanam vidūṣayati samyakpravagam cārābhate, no tu klesām prajahāti | tatra pratyadevasitam klesāḥ | tatra klesāḥ | tatra prasadaṇāyāḥ: yena līsāṁ cittam aprahāhakair nimittair (Ch: 靈妙相 = *prasadaṇyairnimittair?—but cf. Tib. rab tu ‘dzin par byed pa’i mshan dag gis and the parallel Pali term given below) abhipramodayati (MS: abhipramocayati; here I emend together with Śr Bh-Gr and Sh) sampraharsayati pragrhānāt | tatra pratyaveśaṇīyo manaskāraḥ: tadyathā māmānsāmanaskārāḥ, yam adhipatiṁ krtvā pragrhāhakāraṇām klesānām pratyavekṣate | Śr Bh-Gr (18) 10, 14-12, 4; Tib. D 103b6-104a2; Ch. T 438c3-9) ‘The suitable contemplation is that by which [the ascetic] reviles the meditative object [i.e., the defilements] [and] undertakes the correct practice but does not [yet] abandon the defilements. The antidote [contemplation] is that by which [the ascetic] abandons the defilements. The [contemplation which engenders] cheering up is that by which [the ascetic] gladdens, makes joyful, energises [his] depressed mind by making use of energising signs (pragrhāhakair nimittair) [cf. definition of paggāhanimitta at Dīs p. 232, § 1357; also cf. ibid. § 13 and § 56]. The examining contemplation, i.e., the investigating contemplation, is that by virtue of which [the ascetic] examines whether the defilements have been abandoned or not [yet] abandoned.’

3 5 This passage seems to be a later addition. The set of four contemplations appears in Yogasthāna II (see note 134 above), which if my analysis is correct, belongs to a later textual stratum in the development of the Śr Bh (see Chapter Five, Part One). Our passage here consists chiefly in lexico-doctrinal matchings, which cast little light on the actual practice of the seven contemplations. The fact that they are additional remarks is not, per se, an editorial ‘anomaly’. Passages 3.28.2.1.9.1. and 3.28.2.1.9.2. are also additional remarks, but these two passages come in as natural after-thoughts which clarify some important points concerning the practice of the contemplations. Not the same can be said about the passage here (3.28.2.1.9.3.).

3 6 Skt. āvatana ‘station’, ‘base’, or ‘abode’. Buddaghosa defines the word as follows: taṁ ākāsānaṁca adhiṭṭhāṇatthena āyatanaṁ assa sasampayuttadhammassa jhānassa, devānaṁ
The complete name of the attainment is ‘station of the boundlessness [infinity] of space’ (Skt. ākāśānāntyāyatanā, cf. AKBh 434, 6; Pali ākāśānañcāyatanā, cf. Vibh 245, 16; Vism 273, § 12ff).

The complete name of the attainment is ‘station of the boundlessness [infinity] of consciousness’ (Skt. vijnānānāntyāyatanā, cf. AKBh 434, 6; Pali viññānañcāyatanā, cf. Vibh 245, 18; Vism 275, § 25ff).

Wayman’s renders: ‘just as there is equipoise of the First Dhyāna by means of the seven orientations, so also there is equipoise of the Second, […]’ (p. 127). The translation apparently construes samāpatti as ‘equipoise’, but the word is clearly used in its technical sense of ‘meditative attainment’. Besides, I cannot see any mental factor amongst the so-called ‘five-limbs’ of the first absorption (see above) which would correspond to ‘equipoise’ (unless we would take ‘focussing of the mind’ (ekaggata) as resulting in such a quality, but this would be going too far). Cf. also Choi’s translation (p. 134, n 487; samāpatti is rendered as Eintritt).

Cf. the parallel passage in the AbhSamBh (Tatia ed. 80, 25-27; Griffiths 1983, 433): yathā prathamadhyānānāṃ samāpattaye sapta manaskārā evam yāvan naivasamāññānaṃ samāyatanānāṃ samāpattaye yathāyogāṃ yojavatvaṃ |

Here and below, vitarka appears in locative plural. I assume that this refers to the plurality of the acts of rough examination (and subtle investigation). Delhe (SamBh p. 352, n 9), who also notices this occurrence in the ŚrBh, calls this usage ‘a collective term’ (Sammelbegriff). Tib. closely follows the Skt. and uses the plural marker dag. Ch., which apparently contains some editorial clarifications here, translates as: 有尋有伺 ‘possessed of rough examination and subtle investigation’. In rendering vitarkey evam audārikatām paśyati below, the Chinese wording is different: 於諸尋伺觀為麁性 ‘[he] sees the coarseness in various rough examinations and subtle investigations’ (諸 ‘various’ is often employed for rendering the Skt. plural). It is quite possible that, as implied by the Ch. renderings as well as by the Skt. vitarkavicārāś occurring later in this passage, we should understand the references here to the acts of vitarka as also including vicāra.

The plural usage with a collective sense of vitarka may also point out, as also remarked by Delhe (ibid.), that to the editors of the YoBh, vitarka and vicāra did not mean, after all, completely different processes. If we closely examine the definitions in this passage, they seem to represent different steps in a continous mental process of verbalised scrutiny rather than clearly distinct functions. The compound tadambhandhānumcāri used in the definition of vicāra below seems to indicate that vitarka occurs first and vicāra follows after it. If this is true, such a view is close to the Sautrāntika interpretation found in the AKBh. According to this, the two factors are different names given to different stages of the speech activators (samśkāra) and cannot operate simultaneously (for this meaning of samśkāra, see AKBh 61, 5; Vetter 2000, 36-37). The view was different from the orthodox Vaibhāṣika doctrine, which considered that vitarka and vicāra can co-exist in one moment of consciousness (AKBh 61, 7-12; ibid. 439, 19-21; AbhDip 81-83; cf. also Jaini’s Introduction, pp. 83-88.) See also note 128 above on vitarka and vicāra.

SanaBh 84, 2-3, defines this ‘level as follows: samāhīta bhūmiḥ caturvidhā tadyathā dhīyānām vimokṣaḥ samādhiḥ samāpattiṣ ca ‘the level of concentrated [thought] is of four types, to wit, absorption, emancipation, contemplation, and attainment’.

Skt. vyāgrālombana-cāri. Wayman (p. 128) renders the compound as ‘which ranges on an unsteady mediative object’. In the next sentence, we also have vyāgrācāry evālambane (see
note 161 to Skt. crit. ed.). Furthermore, in passage 3.28.3.2.1. below, we read: vyogacārīna ālambanād viveçya and avyogacārīrya ālambane [...] cittaṃ pravartayati, vyavasthāpayati. Sakuma (135, § H.2.1.) translates vyogacārīna ālambanād as unsteten Gegenstand and avyogacārīrya ālambane as stetigen Gegenstand. As far as I can judge, all these compounds and phrases can be construed as referring either to the unsteady operation of the mind upon the meditative object or the unsteady state of the object on which the ascetic concentrates. The difference between the two interpretations is philological rather than psychological. The effect of this unsteadiness upon the yogi’s mind is the same: unsettling and unsatisfactory, especially when compared with the second absorption.

I could not find any close parallel to our passage, but there are clear descriptions of vitarka and vicāra as imperfect acts of concentration (despite the fact that they pertain to the samāhitabhāmi). The word avyagga appears in Pali sources with the meaning of ‘undisturbed’, etc. At SN V 66, 32 and 105, 4, we find the compound avyagganimittam ‘[having the] characteristic [or: ‘object of reflection’, according to CPD, s.v. avyagga] of undisturbed[ness]’ (CPD renders ‘that evites confusion’, but I think that the word refers to the steadiness of the mind rather than to the clarity of cognition). This describes the awakening-factor of concentration (samādhisambojjhāṅga). At SN I 96, 11 and 25, avyaggamano so or abvyaggamanaso describes an ‘undisturbed mind’. (For other occurrences, see CPD, s.v. avyagga).

Though not using the word vyagga/vyagra, we find clear indications that vitakka and vicāra are considered unsteady mental functions. For example, the Vism says: 近五蓋怨令覺觀動，身成懈怠，心成散亂 (T32.418b1-2) ‘being close to the enemy [which is represented by] the five hindrances makes vitakka and vicāra move [i.e., be unstable], [and this makes] the body become slothful (*kosajja) and the mind confused (*vikkhita).’ (My rendering, especially in the first part, differs from Ehara, Soma, Kheminda tr. 1961, 100). The Vism (127, § 148), describing the concentration of the second absorption, declares vitakkavicīrakkhobhavirahena aṭṭiviya acalittā suppasannattā ca [‘it is worthy to be called concentration] because of the extreme immobility and complete confidence due to the absence of the disturbance [brought about by] vitakka and vicāra’. (The word pasannattā also means ‘clarity’, but in the Theravāda tradition, it is usually understood as ‘confidence’; see SrBh passage 3.28.3.2.1. and respective notes below.) See also Vism 126, § 144: add hi pathamañjhānam vitakkavicīrakkhobena, vicittarāngasamākalam iva jātan, na suppasannam hoti. The TatSid explains a similar process: 若心散行，數數起生，名為覺 (T32.288b28) ‘if the mind operates in a distracted way and frequently arises [in this manner], this is called vitarka’; 散心微小，則名為觀 (T32.288.c2) ‘[if] the distracted mind is fine[r] and subtle[r], then [this] is called vicāra’. Sastri translates 散行 into English as ‘unconcentrated’ and renders the term into Sanskrit as vyagra (see Sastri I 215 and II 185). We have no guarantee that vyagra was the actual word used by Harivarman, but this is a possibility, and more importantly, it shows that vitarka and vicāra were understood as mental processes not exactly stable (see especially 数數起生 in the description of vitarka).

14 Skt. manojalpa is often rendered as ‘mind talk’ (e.g., Wayman 128) or, more faithfully, ‘mind murmuring’ (Cousins 1992, 147) (cf. also Delhey’s German translation: Denksprechen, SamBh p. 352, n. 9). The term refers to the verbalisation of our thoughts and is clearly differentiated from the actual language. In the TatSid (T32.351a16-19), we read about an opponent who, on scriptural basis, points out that for the practician who enters the first absorption, language ceases to function (語言滅). He questions how it is possible to speak of vitarka and vicāra in this context since these are processes causing (or activating) language (覺觀是語言因). Harivarman answers that here by ‘ceasing’, the scriptures mean the actual uttering
of words, not the processes occurring in the mind. In this sense, we can speak of language ‘ceasing’ even in the case of a person in the realm of sensual pleasures (kāmadr̥t̄a) who stops talking. We can see from this explanation that manojalpa, associated with vitarka and vicāra, represents the flow of mental judgement, implying language, but without any uttering of words, whether loud or murmuring (in spite of the basic meaning of jalpa). On could say that manojalpa refers here to the linguistic basis of discursive thought.

In the Śṛutimāya bhūmiḥ, we are told that the focusing of the mind (cittaikārya) is of three kinds: samāsatas trividhān cittaikāryam yathābhūta<jñāna> āsāṃvartate | manojalpagataṁ vicitrabhinnālabanacārākāraṁ | manojalpasamantaram vicitra-bhinnālabanacārākāraṁ eva | manojalpasamatiṃkṛtān caikāryam acitrabhinnālabana-cārākāraṁ | (YoBh MS folio 89a1; Tib., P Dzi 196b3-4; Ch., T30.349c23-26) (I am indebted to Prof Schmithausen for his kindly checking the Sanskrit MS). ‘Briefly stated, three types of focusing of the mind are conducive to (sāṃvartate) [for this sense, see BHSD, s.v.] the true wisdom and view, [to wit] [the focusing of the mind] occurring at (-gata) [the time of—see Tib. ‘i tshe] mental verbalisation and having the form of operating upon various different objects; [the focusing of the mind] occurring immediately after the [period of] mental verbalisation and just [as the preceding type] having the form of operating upon various different objects; and focusing of the mind transcending mental verbalisation and having the form of operating upon an object not various and different [like in the preceding cases].’

Cf. AbhSaṃBh 8, 26-9, 3 (T31.669c24-670a2; cf. T31.665b22-25, too) which also employs the concept of mental verbalisation (here called manaso ‘bhijalpanā) for the definition of vitarka and vicāra. For other sources on manojalpa, see T31.104c19-27; 142c20-24; 199b3-5; etc. See also Ji’s commentary (T43.121a20-27).

For a similar definition of vitarka and vicāra, see Viniṣ (T30.623a14-18). See also note 128 above.

Skt. bāhyāyatana. This appears to refer to the dharmāyatana which comprises all concomitant mental functions (caita). The distinction between the six internal bases (cha ajjhātikāṇi āyatanāni) and the six external bases (cha bāhīrāṇi āyatanāni) is well-known from canonical sources. E.g., DN III 243, 14-19; MN III 216, 9-18; etc. For this technical sense and the meanings of āyatana in general, see CPD, s.v.; PD, s.v.; PED, s.v.; Nyanatiloka 1995, s.v.; etc.

MS, Sh: ākāyikās. The word is not attested, and, if this is a lexical invention of the ŚrīBh authors, the only meaning I could imagine would be ‘lasting as long as the body’ (cf. āmarāṇām/-āt ‘till death’, MW, s.v. ā). This, however, is not only semantically problematic, but also lacks an equivalent in Tib. and Ch. (see below). Doctrinally, too, a reference to the ‘body’ is hardly relevant here. Though the ‘body’ is ephemeral, its being used for such an image would be, as far as I can see, an unfelicitous choice in this context. After all, the whole range of mental functions present in absorptions do ‘last as long as the body’, and limiting the expression to vitarka and vicāra would have little, if any, persuasive power. To my knowledge, the only context related to the first absorption in which kāyika, in fine compositi, occurs is Brahmakāyika ‘belonging to the company of Brahma’ or ‘Brahma’s retinue’. Brahmakāyikā or the gods who are Brahma’s retinue represent the first level (bhūmi) of the first heaven of the material realm corresponding to the first absorption (see, for instance, AK Bh 111, 20; Brahmakāyikā devā are also known from canonical sources DN I 222, 1, etc.; see also Vīm: 佛所說 “少修初禪得梵天眷屬” (T32.407a29). ‘What the Buddha said [is] “[Those] who practise the first absorption for a little while attain [rebirth in] Brahma’s retinue’”; cf. ŚrīBh passage 3.28.6.1. below). But connecting ākāyika and Brahmakāyika for a plausible emendation here could at best be described as indulging in wild imagination.
Tib. byung nas 'jig pa and Ch. 增或減 as well as parallel phrases in the SrBh and other sources suggest a very plausible emendation here: "āyāpāyika [characterised by] arising [/coming] and decay [/going]", which has also the advantage of staying close to the MS reading. Let us further mention that āyāpāyika also means "gain and loss", a connotation which may have enhanced the rhetorical effect of the compound. We find the compound attested at SrBh MS 110bL-M = Sh 424, 3-4, in a sentence followed by lexemes similar to our passage: āyāpāyikatām [Sh: āyāpāyikatān] tāvatālīkātām itvaratraputpasthāyitām. At SrBh MS 122a3L = Sh 480, 9-10, and MS 125b7R = Sh 498, 9-10, we have āpāyikatām tāvatālīkātām itvaratraputpasthāyitām. However, the corresponding Tib. passages (P 219a6 and 229a7 respectively) read: byung nas 'jig pa, while the equivalent Ch. (472a20 and 475b19-20 respectively) has: 增或減. This strongly supports the emendation of the above SrBh MS readings to ā<yā>pāyikatām.

Another possible emendation would be āpāyika(ta). Its meaning is 'decay' or, in BHS and Pali, 'pertaining or leading to an evil fate (such as existence in hell)' (BHSD, s.v. āpāyika). Confusion or hesitation between āyāpāyika and āpāyika appears actually to be attested in other sources, too. This was probably not only because āpāyika is phonetically and graphically so close to āyāpāyika, but also because semantically the former does not depart from the general purport of the context. We find also the same indecision in, for example, Mahāsūtra 150, 2: āpāyikas tāvatālīkā itvaratraputpasthāyina. Here, too, Tib. has skyeh zhing 'jig pa (P Phi 255a8), which suggests āyāpāyikāh. Ch., however, reads 壞滅 (T31.646b25), which means that the Skt. MS used for the translation read (or was interpreted as?) āpāyika. I think, however, that in a phrase like in our SrBh passage here, which contains compounds like tāvatālīkāh and itvaratraputpasthāyinah, the reading āyāpāyikāh 'arising and decay' fits much better. And of course, the latter is also supported by Tib. and Ch.

Another possible emendation which would keep fairly close to the MS reading would be ākālika 'momentary, instantaneous' (MW, s.v.), nur einen Augenblick während, momentan (PW, s.v.), but this is not supported by Tib. and Ch. as well as by the parallel phrases cited above. See also note 124 to Ch. ed.

1 4 Skt. ārabhya is used here in the sense of 'referring to, having to do', which, in our sentence can also be rendered (admittedly, rather freely) as 'comparing/compared with'. Tib. renders in a free way, too, but it faithfully captures the original meaning: ītōs pa 'looking at' or 'considering'. Ch., on the other hand, seems to be presuppose another MS reading or was too free in its choice of 求 'wish', seek for', etc. If the latter was the case, then the sentence must have been construed as 'when seeking [to attain] the upper level, [the lower level appears to the ascetic as] accompanied by the state of suffering [...].'

The yogi's inner monologue describes a reflective pattern whose structure roughly corresponds to the examination of the six aspects (see passages 3.28.2.1.2.1. to 3.28.2.1.2.7.). The order is admittedly different, and the text is not always very clear as to the precise item to which it refers. Here is, however, the approximate correspondence:

- the first part containing the definitions of vitarka and vicāra seems to correspond to the specific characteristic (svaḷaṅkaśaṇa).
- the sentence starting with ete punar vitarkavicārīś probably corresponds to the meaning (arthā).
- the phrase beginning with evam ete adhyātmam might be the equivalent of the thing (vastu).
- hetusamutpannāḥ, etc. appears to refer to the general characteristic (sāmānyālakṣaṇa).
- kṛṣṇapakṣyāḥ is clearly a reference to the category (pākṣa).
- nityāṃ nityakālaṁ dhruvaṁ dhruvakālaṁ corresponds to the time (kāla).

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— tādṛṣṭi prakṛtyā could be a hint to the reasoning on the basis of the nature of things (dharmaṭāyukti).

Supplied on the basis of Ch. 諸尋伺. See note 141 above.

The coarse nature of the first absorption from the perspective of the superior level of the second jhāna/dhyāna is depicted from various sources: DN I 37, 10-11; Vim (T32.418a28-b15); Vism 128, §§ 151-152; AKBh 440, 6-7: sormikeva hi nadi vitarkavicīrakṣobhītaṁ saṁtattā aprasannā vartate ‘because the [mental] series agitated by vitarka and vicāra is not calm, just like a river with waves’; Zuochan sanmei jing (T15.277c23-278a4: 此覺觀二事並亂定心，如水澄靜波蕩則濁。行者如是內已一心覺觀所懾，如極得息，如睡得安。是時次第無覺無觀生清淨定。內淨喜樂得入二禪。 (the image of the waves is present here, too); PPUpad (T25.185c8-13 (translating verse): 知二法亂心 較遙而應離，如大水澄靜 波蕩亦無見，譬如人大極 安隱睡臥時，若有喚呼聲 其心大懾亂，攝心入禪時，以覺觀為懾 是故除覺 觀; note the similarities with the passage in the Zuochan sanmei jing, which is not surprising at all since the latter work was compiled from various sources and translated into Chinese by the same Kumārajīva); TatSid (T32.341b10-c3; see especially 341b26-27: 又行者於初禪中定未具足，常為覺觀所亂‘furthermore, in the first absorption, the ascetic[‘s] concentration is not yet complete and is always disturbed by taking notice (vitarka) and observation (vicāra)’; 覺 used for rendering vitarka should be construed in its sense of ‘become aware’ rather than of ‘fully comprehend/realise’); etc.

Most likely, here duḥkha is construed in the sense of duḥkhavedanā ‘unpleasant [/uncomfortable] feeling’.

Skt. duḥkhataravīhārāti ‘dwelling in more suffering’ and aprasāntataravīhārāti ‘dwelling in less serenity’ are counted as the first aspect of coarseness; alpāyūkta-ratātā ‘shortness of the life’ is the second one (cf. Ch. rendering). Xianyang lun (Choi 86, § 32.2.) counts each of these as one aspect and declares that the coarse characteristic should be understood as being threefold. The parallel passage in the AbhSaṃbh quoted below (see note 156) appears to offer the best solution. It explains as ‘dwelling in more suffering on account of dwelling in [a state of] non-serenity’ (duḥkhataravīhārāti ‘prāśāntavihārātya’ (cf. also Choi, p. 134, n. 492).

On the lifespan in various heavens and levels corresponding to the absorption, see AKBh III.79-81 (pp. 173-174). At AN I 267-268, the deities abiding in the station of boundless space have a lifespan of 20,000 aeons (visatim kappasahassāni āyuppamāṇam), those dwelling in the station of boundless consciousness have a lifespan of 40,000 aeons (cattāriṣaṁ kappasahassāni āyuppamāṇam), and those born in the station of nothing whatsoever have a lifespan of 60,000 aeons (saṭṭhipa kappasahassāni āyuppamāṇam). No mention is made here of the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, but according to the Vibh, the lifespan of the deities abiding in this sphere is 80,000 aeons. Actually, the Vibh (422-426) contains a much more detailed list of the lifespans of various deities or heaven-born beings (deva) from the Cātumahārajika gods to those dwelling in the sphere of neither ideation nor non-ideation (see also Vibh-a 518-522; Poussin, vol. 2, p. 173, n. 2.).

In the Āyuḥparyantastūtra (Matsumura ed., in Enomo, Hartmann, and Matsumura eds. 1989, 69-100), a Śrāvakayāna scripture describing the lifespan in all realms throughout the samsāric Universe, the life in the Heaven of Brahma’s retinue (the first heavens corresponding to the first absorption) is half an aeon (brahmakāyikānāṁ bhikṣavo devānām ardhakalpa āyusah pramāṇaṁ[...]) p. 86, ll. 1-2; cf. Tib. tr. at ibid. p. 99, ll. 1-2; Ch tr. at T17.603c16) and gradually increases to 80,000 aeons for those born in the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation. The extant Skt. MS of the Āyuḥparyantastūtra ends with the Akanistha Heaven but from its Tibetan version (Matsumura ed., in Enomo, Hartmann, and Matsumura eds. 1989, 99-100) as well as the parallel passages in the MVyut (# 3107-3113) we can be reasonably confident that this is the
duration (cf. Matsumura’s reconstruction on p. 87). See also the Chinese translation at T17.604a2-6 – interesting to note that the Chinese version reads 大劫 ‘great aeon’ (*mahākalpa) for the immaterial spheres but has劫 ‘aeon’ (*kalpa) for the other heavens and realms.

For the lifespan in the heavenly worlds, see also YoBh 77, 13ff.

154 Skt. saḍbhīr vastubhīr. The six aspects (saḍ vastūni) are the meaning, object, characteristic, category, time, and reasoning, described in detail in passages 3.28.2.1.2.- 3.28.2.1.2.7. Their examination actually represents the contemplation perceiving characteristics. Also supporting this identification is the usage of the verb paryēṣate, which is frequently employed with the six aspects (see 3.28.2.1.2. above). Xuanzang’s rendering 由前事 ‘by means of the six aspects’ [explained] before is probably an editorial edition which points at a similar understanding.

155 Briefly stated, this means that the ascetic will attain each of the four absorptions and four immaterial attainments by means of the seven contemplations. In the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation, the last of the eight meditative stages, the attainment of the fruit of the culmination of the practice coincides with the full realisation of this level and also marks the climax of the mundane path. Cf. also Ch. ed.


157 Tib. contains here an additional passage which cites the entire canonical stock phrase describing the attainment of the first absorption. Neither the extant Skt. MS and nor Ch. the Chinese rendering contains such a citation. An almost identical sentence is found at 3.28.2.1.9. 1. Tib. reads: ‘dod pa dag las dben pa’i) sdig pa mi dge ba’i chos rnam la dben pa | rtog pa dang bca’i spyon pa dang bca’i | dben pa las skyes pa’i dga’ ba dang bde ba ca | bsam gtan dang po’i yan iag lnga bsgrubs te gnas pa dang | . This corresponds to Skt. vivikta<ś> kāmaṁ viviktaṁ pāpakārī akusālāṁ dharmanāṁ saviṭṭhāṁ savīcāraṁ pritīsukhāṁ prathamaṁ dhīyānaṁ paṇcā<ś>g āgam upasamāpadya viharati (cf. also ŚrBh-Gr 20, 23-24, but without paṇcā<ś>g āgam). The only difference in the Tibetan citation before passage 3.28.3.1.1. is the omission of paṇcāṅgam (omission which actually agrees with the scriptural stock phrase; see note 127 above). If the Tib. reflects a different MS reading (lost in Skt. and Ch.), the original can be restored as: *viviktaṁ kāmaṁ viviktaṁ pāpakārī akusālāṁ dharmanāṁ saviṭṭhāṁ savīcāraṁ pritīsukhāṁ prathamaṁ dhīyānaṁ upasamāpadya viharati uktah “it is said [in the scriptures], “[the ascetic] dwells having attained the first absorption which is separated from sensual pleasures, is separated from bad and unwholesome factors, is possessed of rough examination, is possessed of subtle investigation, [has] joy and pleasure born of separation”.

It is true the quotation is quite natural in this context, and the following passages represent glosses on each of the words above, but this does not necessarily mean that the extant Skt. MS contains a lacuna here. We have seen that the citation is also missing in Ch. Actually, the Tib. version cites the canonical formulæ at the beginning of all the sections dedicated to the absorptions and immaterial attainments (see below). All these quotations similarly lack in Skt. and Ch. The most likely explanation for this is that the citations of the stock-phrases were added by the Tibetan translators as part of an editorial effort to bring more clarity (a reader-friendly reminding of the entire formula?).

For similar glosses on this and all the following absorptions below, see also Xianyang lun (T31.486c24ff.).

158 See passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. and note 38 above.

159 These two separations obviously correspond to the two aspects of sensual pleasures. The
most natural way of construing samprayogaviveka is ‘separation from the union with defilements’. Sakuma renders samprayogaviveka as die Loslösung von der Verbindung [des Geistes mit den Begierden] (vol. 2, p. 132). This is the basic Abhidharmic understanding and is also attested in the Far Eastern exegetical literature. After glossing kleśakāma and vastukāma (see note 38 above), To-ryn defines the two separations as follows: 對治起時, 與不貪俱, 名相應離。朕背五塵, 名境界離。（T42.472c7-9）‘When the antidote arises, it is accompanied by non-greed, [this] is called separation [from] union [with greed]. Abhorrning and averting the five dust[y sense-fields i.e., visible objects, sounds, smells, tastes, tangible objects] are called separation from the objects’. Ji’s Commentary has nothing to say on this matter (see T43.121a20-121b18), but we find in Chengguan’s Subcommenatry on the Avataṃsakasūtra the following gloss: 內心不與貪貪相應, 名相應離。不染外境, 名境界離。（T36.486b23-24）‘Inwardly, the mind not being united with greed is called separation from union. Not being polluted by the exterior objects is called separation from the [exterior] objects’. In the Commentary on the Avataṃsakasūtra (T35.783c28-29), Chengguan also mentions these two separations, citing juan 33 of the Śrībh, but does not elaborate upon them.

AKBh 312, 7-8, defines the secondary defilements (upakleśa) as follows: ‘the secondary defilements are all those defiled factors different from the principal defilements, [those] mental functions comprised in the aggregate of volition and impulses (saṃskāraskandha) (ye ‘py anye kleśebhyāh kliśā dharmaḥ saṃskāraskandhasaṃghritāḥ caitasikās ta upakleśās). Cf. also AKBh pp. 10-11 (ch. 1, kārikā 15a-b).

It is not clear how the subject of the sentence should be analysed (cf. Sakuma, p. 133, n. 745). I think that though stylistically awkward, the most natural way of construing the sentence is understanding ‘bad and unwholesome factors’ (which I supply in square brackets) as its subject. The authors might have thought that pāpakair akusuāair dharmair iti in the citation is enough to announce the subject and did not express it again in nominative, as a more careful style would have required. This is also the understanding reflected by the Ch. translation (Ch., however, reads *kleśakāmahetukāḥ instead of Skt. upakleśāḥ and Tib. nye ba'i nyon mongs pa; cf. note 44 to Ch. ed.). Syntactically it is also possible to construe the sentence as: ‘[bad and unwholesome factors] are secondary defilements; [being] caused by sensual pleasures, unwholesome factors, to wit, bodily misdeeds, [...] occur’. The other solution is to take akuśalā dharmās as the subject and translate as ‘the unwholesome factors are secondary defilements, which are born of sensual pleasures causes, [they are] to wit, [...]’ (cf. Sakuma 132). The need of a relative pronoun would be felt here, and Tib. gang dag actually suggests such a possibility. It is hard to know whether this is the reading of the MS used by the Tibetan translators or is their editorial addition in order to make the sentence clearer. A final pronouncement is certainly difficult, but I believe that (though not a masterpiece of style!) the sentence can be read even without a relative pronoun.

The latter part of the sentence has canonical roots. A similar stock-phrase is found at DN II 59, 1-3 (and below several times); DN III 289, 6-8; MN I 410, 30-31; AN IV 400, 28-401, 2; Vibh 390, 15-17. The phrase usually occurs in the context of explaining the cause and results of craving (tanḥā). The description of the pernicious fruition of craving ends with the following sentence: ‘Because of guarding [one’s property], various bad and unwholesome factors [such as] taking up a staff, taking up a [stabbing] weapon, strife, quarrel, dispute, contention, slander, [and] untrue words occur’ (ārakkhaḥdikaraṇaṃ daṇḍādaṇā-satthādaṇā-kalaha-viggaha-vivāda-tuvaṁtuva-pesuṇṇa-musā-vādā aneke pāpakā akusalā dharmā sambahavanti). (There are some differences in the wording of each text mentioned above, the most important ones being at DN III 289, 6-8, which reads: ārakkhaḥdikaraṇaṃ patīca, and at MN I 410, 30-31, which does not contain ārakkhaḥdikaraṇaṃ; note also that the latter
occurrence is found in a different doctrinal context.) (For the gloss of some of the terms above, see DN-a II 500, § 10.) The history of some of the words in this stock-phrase can be traced to an even earlier stage. The Kalahavidesutta, included in the Aṭṭhakakavagga of the Suttaipāta (pp. 862-877), contains a brief catechism regarding the cause of strifes (kalāhā) and disputes (vivāda) as well as other negative factors ending in slander (pesuṇā). The ultimate cause is, we are told, the incorrect ideation (saṇṇā) concerning mind and matter (nāma-ca rūpa-ca) (see verses 872-874). (The Aṭṭhakakavagga section of the Suttaipāta belongs probably to one of the earliest strata of Buddhist literature; see Nakamura 1989, 27; von Hübner 1997, 49.)

The compound kalahabhanḍanavigravahivādasāṭhyavañcananikṛtimṛṣāvāṇāh which appears in our Śrībh passage is partly different from the canonical kalahavivādasāṭhyavañcananikṛtimṛṣāvāṇāh-pesuṇā-muṣāvāṇā. Actually, Buddhist literature contains a few more or less similar compounds, the Śrībh form apparently being a developed version. For instance, in the MVśātu (3.48, 13-14), we find: kalahabhanḍanavigravahivādaṁ. The same compound appears in quite a few Sarvāstivādin canonical sources (see SWTF, fascicle 9, pp. 35-36, s.v.). Similarly, we see in the SuvParPP (125, 8-9): kalahabhanḍanavigravahivādaṁ. In the Sādzu (452, 8, verse 23), we see a simpler version: kalāh ca vivādaṇgāra. The Daśī (Rahder ed. 26-27, ch. 2, § Q) contains some of the words above, but they do not appear in the compounds or even in same sentence. Later Sanskrit Buddhist sources also contain similar phrases. E.g., SikSām 149, 8: kalahabhanḍana-vivādaṇakṣobhyaḥ; PrasPad 52, 8: kalahavigrava-vivādaṁ; etc. The BoŚṛbh contains a form which is even more developed than the Śrībh counterpart. It reads: saśradāna -daṇḍāna-kalaha-bhanḍana-vigraha-vivāda-sāṭhya-vančana-nikṛti-mṛṣāvāṇa-muṣāvāṇa-muṣāvāṇa (BoŚṛbh 253, 2-4). At BoŚṛbh 7, 8-9, we also see: kalaha-bhanḍana-vigraha-vivādaś; and BoŚṛbh 179, 26, contains: kalaha-bhanḍana-vigraha-vivādeś; both closely resembling the first half of the compound in the Śrībh.

Some lexical remarks on śastra and danda are necessary. Skt. śastra means 'an instrument for cutting or wounding', 'knife', 'sword', 'dagger', and (to make matters worse!) 'any weapon' (MW, s.v.). In the Pali Canon, the word sattha is certainly construed as a generic term. For example, in the Vinaya, the rule entailing expulsion [from the Order] (pārājīka) in the case of killing a human being contains the compound satthahārakām, the first part of which is explained as: asim vā satthim vā bhendim vā lagulam vā pāsānam vā sattham vā visam vā rajjham vā (Vin III 73, 26-28). This is translated by Horner as 'a knife or a dagger or an arrow or a cudgel or a stone or a sword or poison or a rope' (Vin. Engl. tr. I 126) (see also Buddhaghosa's commentary and Horner, ibid., p. 125, n. 2). It is noteworthy that sattha is construed first as a word encompassing all kinds of weapons (including even poison) and then is employed as an individual term meaning, in all likelihood, 'a sword'. Probably, a rendering like '[a weapon like] sword[,... etc.]' is the closest we can get to conveying the entire semantic sphere of sattha/śastra. In the BoŚṛbh passage here, śastra seems to be contrasted with danda, implying thus a stabbing weapon versus a striking one. Sakuma (vol. 2, p. 132) similarly construes the word as [Stich-]Waffen or ['stabbing'] weapon', which seems to be the most appropriate translation here. This is also supported by Tib. mishon and Ch. JJ, both usually meaning 'sword' but also having the more generic sense of 'stabbing or cutting weapon or tool'.

Skt. danda equally poses problems, especially as to the length of the tool/weapon meant here. The word can mean 'stick, staff, rod, pole, cudgel, club' (MW, s.v.). No doubt, all these could be used for aggressive purposes. An argument from practicability is, therefore, of no help. We might add here that danda does not appear to have been employed as a regular weapon of the ksatriyas or of the foot-soldiers in the traditional Indian army either (see Pant 1970). The word in our passage has, therefore, no specialised military sense, which could be verified from archeological findings. The only clue we have here is Xuanzang's rendering. Ch. 枪 refers to a 'walking
stick’ or any staff about the same size which, if need be, can be used for defence or attack. Unfortunately, there is no way we can verify whether Xuanzang and his team rendered the word having in mind a size accurately corresponding to the Indian weapon denoted by daṇḍa. Nevertheless, without any other hint, I have decided to rely on Xuanzang’s 枷 (1) for my translation of the term.

The instrumental of the Skt. phrase svabhūmikair vitarkavicāraḥ kāmaprātipaksikaiḥ kusalaḥ can be construed as meaning ‘in the form of’, as also suggested by Sakuna’s in Gestalt von (p. 133, § H.1.3.), or in a sociative sense of ‘accompanied by’ (thus explaining sa- in svitarkaṁ savicāram), as apparently understood by Tib. I incline to believe that the former alternative is more likely, but my rendering above tries to capture both nuances. I understand the plural of vitarkavicāraḥ as referring to the multiple acts of coarse examination and subtle investigation (see passage 3.28.2.2.2. above).

Our text qualifies the coarse examination and subtle investigation as being wholesome factors. Buddhist thought actually distinguishes between wholesome (kusala/kusāla) and unwholesome (akusala/akusāla) varieties of vitakka/vitarka. For instance, DN III 215, 3-6 states: Tayo akusala-vitakka. Kāma-vitakko, vyāpāda-vitakko, vihimsā-vitakko. Tayo kusala-vitakka. Nekkhamma-vitakko, avyāpāda-vitakko, avihimsā-vitakko. ‘Three kinds of unwholesome thoughts: thoughts [directed at/under the sway of] sensual pleasures, thoughts of malice, [and] thoughts of violence. Three kinds of wholesome thoughts: thoughts [directed at] deliverance [from sensual pleasures], thoughts of benevolence [lit., non-malice], [and] thoughts of non-violence.’ (see also MN 114-118; Vibh 362-363). AN I 254, 16-25, adds to these three unwholesome thoughts another set of three ‘secondary defilements subtly accompanying [the mind]’ (sukhumasahagatā upakkilesā), i.e., thoughts [of attachment] for one’s relatives (nātīvitakko; the PTS text reads: jāṭī); see, however, AN-a II 362, 19-20, which has: nāṭī; Woodward and Rhys-Davids, AN Engl. tr., vol. 1, p. 232, n. 6, also propose the reading nāṭī-vitakko, though they do not indicate their source), thoughts [of attachment] for one’s [home] land (janapadavitakko), and thoughts connected with [the wish] not to be despised (anavānāṭī-putissamyutto vitakko) (or, as Woodward and Rhys-Davids suggest, on the basis of the Commentary, caring for one’s ‘reputation’ (AN Engl. tr., vol. 1, p. 232)). After the elimination of these six types of unwholesome thoughts, there still remains, our Pali text continues (AN I 254, 27-255, 2), another kind of vitakka called dhammavitakkak, which appears to refer to vitakka in the first absorption. Buddhaghosa glosses the word as: dasavipassanāpakkilesavitakka (AN-a II 362, 25-26). Woodward and Rhys-Davids (AN Engl. tr., vol. 1, p. 232, n. 8) discuss the word, concluding that the rendering of ‘reflections about mind-states’ is more appropriate than ‘righteous thoughts’ (the latter being the equivalent suggested by the PTS). I think, however, that dhamma⁸ can also be construed here as ‘in accordance with the Teaching’ (cf. putissamyutto in anavānāṭī-putissamyutto vitakko above). The meaning is, I assume, that of thoughts or reflections which agree with the prescriptions for practice of the first jhāna. From the viewpoint of the higher absorptions, it is true that this kind of reflections are an obstacle to be abandoned (and therefore upakkilesa as categorised by Buddhaghosa), but as far as the first jhāna is concerned, they can be called ‘righteous thoughts’. (For vitakka/vitraka in the Vibh and parallel sources, see Schmithausen 1986, especially p. 225.)

The category of unwholesome thoughts, whether three or six, is also known in the Northern tradition (see Tatsid T32.352a29-353a22: ‘The Chapter on Unwholesome Thoughts’ 惡覺品; Zuochan sanmei jing T15.273a26-b5; etc.). The unwholesome thoughts are also mentioned in the Śrībh several times. E.g., tatra vitarkah kāmavitrakādayah kṣīṣṭā vitarkāh. (MS 105a5L-M; Sh 399, 4-5) ‘Herein, “thought” [refers to] defiled thoughts, [to wit.] thoughts [directed at] sensual pleasures, etc.’ (the enumeration is, most likely, meant to include the thoughts of malevolence

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and the thoughts of harming). In the same context, the Śrībh also mentions other minor forms of unwholesome thoughts, such as thoughts [of attachment] for one’s relatives, thoughts [of attachment] for one’s [home]land, thoughts [of attachment] for immortality (MS 105b1M, Sh 406, 4: ānātījanapādamāravītarkā, which largely agrees with the Ch.: 於親屬土地不死 […] 諸惡尋思 (T30.457b27-28); Tib. nye du'i rnam par rtog pa dang ljon gyi rnam par rtog pa (P 177a6; D147a3), however, does not contain the equivalent of amara which appears in Skt. and Ch as well as in other parallel passages). We also see jñātījanapādamāravītarkā at ŚrīBh-Gr 152, 12, etc. (cf. also Tib D Dzi 39a5, this time containing the equivalent of amaraviṣṭaka = mi 'chi ba'i rnam par rtog pa; Ch. T30.412a3-4). At AKBh 319, 2, we find jñātīviṣṭaka janapādamāravītarko 'maravītarkaḥ. BoBh 145, 13-16, also lists similar unwholesome thoughts, which compared with the earlier canonical sources, have gradually increased in number: yathā kāma-vītarkam. evam vāyāda-vihimsā-jñātījanapādamāravītarka avamanyanā-pratisāmyuktah kulodayata-pratisāmyuktah ca vītarko veditavyah. 'It should be understood that just as the thoughts [directed at] sensual pleasures are, even so are the thoughts of malice, of harming, of [attachment] for one’s relatives, of [attachment] for one’s [home]land, for immortality, [the thoughts] associated with contempt, and thoughts associated with [the arrogance] of success [in life] [high status] of [one’s] family.' (cf. also Tib. D Wi 78b3-4, also containing the correspondent of amaraviṣṭaka = mi 'chi ba'i rtog pa; Ch. T30.512c18-20) (for the meaning of kulodayatā-pratisāmyukta, see Tib. rendering; cf. SWFT, fascicle 10, p. 94, s.v.). For vītarka in Viniś, see Ahn 2003, 147-148 (Tibetan edition) and 355-358 (German translation).

The wholesome thoughts (kusalavītakka/kaśalavītakkaḥ) are, obviously, the absence or abandonment of their negative counterparts (see DN III 215, 3-6, cited above; MN 114-118; TatSīd T32.353a23-354c2: ‘The Chapter on Wholesome Thoughts’ 善覺品; Zuochan sanmei jing T15.273b6-274c19, with detailed advice on how each of the six unwholesome thoughts can be eliminated; etc.)

It is interesting to note that vītarka and vicāra also appear associated with meditative states in the Hindu spiritual tradition. Thus Mahābhārata 12.188.15 (vol. 3, p. 2245) declares that ‘investigation, examination, and discrimination arise in the sage intently concentrating upon the first absorption for the first time’ (vicāras ca vītarkās ca vivekās copajāyate | muneh samādadhānasya prathamāṁ dhyānam ādītaḥ ||). It is not clear from the text whether vicāra and vītarka were construed precisely in the same way as in Buddhism. One notices that they appear in the reverse order from the usual sequence in Buddhist sources. More importantly, the Mahābhārata contains an extra element: viveka, a typically Hindu philosophical term (for its meaning see, e.g., Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.9.2., where viveka is the faculty of discerning the real essence; the passage follows almost immediately after the famous phrase tat tvam āsi which occurs at VI.8.7.; cf. also YS II.26: vivekakhāti, YS III.55: vivekañjāṁ jñānam; etc.). The association of this factors with prathamāṁ dhyānam may suggest a Buddhist influence. What is intriguing is that the Mahābhārata does not continue with the second, third, etc. absorptions and thus prathamāṁ dhyānam looks somehow unusual. (Or does this refer to ‘meditation which is first [acquired by the sage], a sense reinforced by ādītaḥ? — less likely?)

YS 1.17 defines the samādhi characterised by conscious mental faculties in the following way: vītarkavicārānandāsmitārūpānugamāṁ samprajñātāḥ ‘[contemplation is] conscious because it is accompanied [by mental factors] in the form of examination, [or] investigation, [or] joy, [or] the sense of existing [as a distinct individuality]’. (Meisig 1988, 49, reads: ‘āsmitānugamāṁ but records “āsmitārūpānugamāṁ as a var. lec. in quite a number of editons (p. 53); cf. also Prasāda ed., p. 32, and Woods tr., p. 40, which also read with “rūpā”). Vyāsa’s understanding of vītarka and vicāra in his commentary to this sūtra is along the same lines as
the Northern Buddhist Abhidharma: ‘vitarka’ is the coarse orientation of the mind towards the meditative object; vicāra is the subtle [orientation of the mind] (vitarka ś cittasyālambane sthūlābhogāḥ | sūkṣmo vicāraḥ |; Rāma Prasāda, ed., p. 32; Prasāda reads: vitarkacita; cf. also Vācaspatimiśra’s sub-commentary, ibid., pp. 33-34).

Cf. the Tib. and Ch. translations which are more explicit about the way the phrase should be construed.

Skt. vipulapraśrābdhicittakāyakarmānayatā. The word vipula literally means ‘extensive’, ‘abundant’, etc. Cittakāyakarmānayatā ‘malleability [flexibility] of the mind and body’ is identified in the Śrībh as ‘ease’: citakāyakarmānayatā, iyaṃ atra kāyacittapraśrābdhiḥ (Sakuma 26, § G.2.; see also cittakarmānayatā citapraśrābdhir upadyate; ibid., p. 27, § G.2.). AK Bh 55, 8-9 also equates the two terms: praśrābdhiś cittakāramanayatā. (Equally relevant is the subsequent discussion in the AK Bh concerning kāyapraśrābdhi). At AK Bh 438, 18, we read: iha praśrābdhisukham ‘here [i.e., in the first two absorptions] there is joy [in the form of] ease’. See also kāyakammānātā and cittakammānātā at Dhs 15, § 46 and § 47, as well as the definition of praśrābdhi at Sam Bh 89 (cited in note 184 below).

The syntax and, closely related to it, the meaning of the sentence raises a few a problems. Sakuma (p. 133, n. 746) correctly analyses it as consisting of four phrases: the first two (ipsitaṁbhilaśitarhasanaprāpe, prītau ca doṣadosarasānāt) refer to prītī and the last two (sarva daṇḍhulīyapagamāc ca vipulapraśrābdhicittakāyakarmānyatā) describe sukhā. In his translation (p. 133), Sakuma, in a manner similar to the Sanskrit tradition of glossing separately upon each component (pratiṣkha) of a compound, divides priti sukham into its constitutive parts, equating pritī with the former two phrases and sukha with the latter two. This equation is certainly appropriate, but as far as my translation is concerned, I have preferred to stay as close as possible to the original Skt. wording.

Grammatically, the first three phrases are in ablative and the last one in instrumental. Usually, when both cases are employed to express the reason, the instrumental tends to be subordinate to the ablative. Here, however, it seems that the instrumental functions as a supplementary reason which clarifies why the first dhyāna is said to characterised by ‘joy and pleasure’. Vipulapraśrābdhicittakāyakarmānayatā is therefore not to be taken as the reason of sarva daṇḍhulīyapagamāc ca (i.e., ‘due to the dissappearance of all noxiousness [disappearance caused] by […] ease’). On the contrary, we know from canonical sources (see below) that praśrābdhi is not the cause but the effect of the disappearance of daṇḍhulīya (cf. also Sakuma p. 133, n. 746). (My rendering suggests this relation between the last two phrases by adding ‘resulting’ in square brackets.)

Furthermore, we must also notice that though we find prītau in the second phrase, there is no parallel phrase referring directly to sukha. In other words, we have no *su&khe ca doṣadosarasānāt, though at the level of the first absorption, the ascetic is equally unaware of the deficiency of both prītī and sukha! Finally, let us also note that the first half of our passage presumably qualifying prītī can hardly be considered a clear definition, i.e., an accurate description of ‘joy’ in terms of the psychological factors which it implies. The phrase ipsitaṁbhilaśitarhasanaprāpe would seem to be as relevant for ‘joy’ as much as it is for ‘pleasure’. The achievement of the goal, for which our yogi has so much yearned, is the attainment of the first absorption, which is possessed of prītī and sukha alike. The second phrase, prītau ca doṣadosarasānāt directly refers to ‘joy’, but it does not say anything on its psychological content either. Actually, for a more precise definition, we must wait until passage 3.28.3.2.5. below, i.e., the gloss upon ‘joy and pleasure’ in the second absorption.

All in all, these details show that we have to do with a sentence lacking stylistic refinement and commentarial precision. It may reflect a (rather crude) oral style of a master (hastily?) giving a few practical explanations to his disciples.
Our gloss here seems to identify sukha with praśrabdhi. The latter is frequently depicted in Buddhist sources as a precondition or qualification of sukha. At DN I 73, 20-24 (immediately preceding the paṭhamajjhāna stock-phrase), we read: tass’ ime pañca nīvarane pahine attani samanupassato pāṃjījam jāyati, pamuditassa pītā jāyati, pīṭṭhanassa kāyo passambhati, passaddhakāyo sukhām vedeti, sukhino cittaṃ sāmadhiyati. *Upon perceiving that the five hindrances have been abandoned, gladness is born; in him who is gladdened, joy is born; the body of he whose mind is filled with joy acquires ease; the body having acquired ease feels pleasure; the mind of him who feels pleasure becomes concentrated* (my rendering is fairly free). A similar sequence of pīṭṭ, passaddhi, and sukha is also found at DN I 196, 10-12. The post-canonical Nett (29, 21-22), probably echoing these canonical sources, says: pīṭṭi passaddhiyā padaṭṭhānam. passaddhi sukhassa padaṭṭhānam ‘Joy is the base [proximate cause; see PTSD, s.v.] of ease. Ease is the base of pleasure’. For an early classification of passaddhi (in the sense of ‘calming’), see SN IV 217-218; also see the definitions of kāyapassaddhi and cittapassaddhi at Dhs 14-15, § 40 and § 41 respectively.

AK VIII.9b considers that praśrabdhi (var. lec. prasrabdhi) best describes the content of sukha in the context of meditation psychology: praśrabdhī sukham ādyayoh | prathamadvitayyas uḥ dhīyāyayoh praśrabdhīḥ-ḥ> sukham ity utkṣam (AKBh 438, 17-18) (Pradhana reads: praśrabhīsukham but in note 5, p. 438, records the ‘G’ reading: praśrabdhī sukham, which I follow here; I also amend the subsequent occurrence of praśrabhīsukham to praśrabdhī-ḥ> sukham; Tib. consistently presupposes praśrabdhī sukham, and so does Ch. seem to do). *In the first [two absorptions] pleasure is ease. It has been stated that in the first and second absorptions, in contrast (tu) [to the third absorption], pleasure is ease*. The subsequent discussion in the AKBh (438, 18 - 440, 8) makes it clear that important differences between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Dārṣṭāntikas existed on how sukha and praśrabdhi should actually be construed in this context (see note below).

The phrase sarvdausṭhulyāpāgamāc also seems to be closely related to praśrabdhi, and thus indirectly to refer to sukha. The elimination of the noxiousness [badness] (dausṭhulya) is a condition determining the obtainment of the ease. In the Bhāvanamaya dhīmith, for example, we read: ▶重已遠離故，獲得輕安。輕安故，生心清涼。 (T30.394c29-395a1). *Because noxiousness has disappeared, [the ascetic] obtains ease. Because of ease, he produces in his body and mind [a sensation of] coolness*. My translation follows the Chinese version. The Tibetan rendering (which is part of a larger sentence) has a slightly different wording: gnas ngan len dang bas kyang de’i shin tu sbyangs pa dang | shin tu sbyangs pas bskyed pa’i lus dang dangs kyi phan pa bsil bar gyur pa bsgom pa yongs su rdzogs pa’i gyur ba (ZT 72.1328, 18-20) (Tib. gnas ngan len dang tral pas strongly suggests dausṭhulyāpāgamāc, similar to our passage in the Šrībh). On dausṭhulya, see Schmithausen 1969a, n. 145, pp. 156-158.

See also note 184 below on joy and pleasure in the second absorption.

As pointed out in the preceding note, the AKBh identifies ease (praśrabdhi) with pleasure (sukha) in the first two absorptions. By using praśrabdhi to gloss upon sukha, the Šrībh seems to share a similar view. This actually sheds some light upon the doctrinal stance of the Šrībh authors. Vasubandhu discusses in detail the differences between the Ābhidhārmikas (the orthodox Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāṣikas) and ‘others’ (identified by Yaśomitra as the Dārṣṭāntikas and/or Sautrāntikas) concerning the precise understanding of sukha (AKBh 438, 18 - 440, 8; see also AKV 673 - 676, for details and the identification of the opponents.) The debate is full of doctrinal intricacies, but the relevant points for our discussion can be summed up as follows. The Ābhidhārmikas deny the fact that the sukha experienced in dhīyanas can be bodily ‘because one who is in meditative attainments does not have the complex of [sensible] cognitions [i.e., visual perception, etc.]’ (samāpānasaṃa viśālayābhāvā | AKBh 438, 21) (cf. also AMVibh
The Dārṣṭāntikas, on the other hand, consider that in the first three absorptions there is no faculty of mental pleasure (caitaisikam sukhendriyam) and that in all these three dhyānas, pleasure refers only to corporal pleasure (kāyi kama sukham aṇgaṁ) (AKBh 439, 1-2; see also AKBh 41, 12-18; cf. AMVibh, T27.412b3-4, referring to a similar opinion of other proponents 有訥者, who are not, however, identified). From the viewpoint of the Dārṣṭāntikas, prasārabdhī is present in all the four absorptions but is different from sukh (see prasārabdhīsukhayeṣ prthagvacanān na prasārabdhī eva sukham | AKBh 439, 9; cf. AKV 674, 5-9; cf. also AKBh 439, 6, for fourth absorption). In this meditative context, prasārabdhī is described as a wind which pervades the body and is born of a special concentration. This wind leads to a pleasant bodily feeling or sensation (AKBh 439, 10ff; AKV 674, 27), which is the object of a tactile perception associated with pleasure (AKV 674, 17ff.). The fact that unlike the Ābhidhārmikas, the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas seem to accept the existence of both citta-prasārabdhī and kāyaprasārabdhī is also attested in other parts of the Kośa (see AKBh 55, 8-16; AKV 128-129; for the identification of this view as being connected with the Sautrāntikas, see Saheki 1978, vol. 1, p. 158, and Poussin, vol. 1, 157).

Our passage in the Śrī Bhūta, though not as explicit as the AKBh, makes, however, some hints at its doctrinal background. Judging from vipsula-prasārabdhicittakāyakarmayatvā (as well as from tatprātīpekṣkaprasārabdhicittakāyakarmanyatāsukhānugavatvā in passage 3.28.3.2.5.), the authors of our text, unlike the Ābhidhārmikas, seem to accept both citta-prasārabdhī and kāyaprasārabdhī. It thus seems that in this respect, the Śrī Bhūta stance is similar or identical with that of the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas. Furthermore, if this qualification refers to sukh (as it most likely does), then the Śrī Bhūta is again different from the Ābhidhārmikas, for whom sukh in the first two absorptions would be citta-prasārabdhī only. In this respect, however, it seems that the Śrī Bhūta standpoint is also distinct from the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas since the latter do not identify the sukha in absorptions with prasārabdhī.

See also passages 3.28.3.2.5., 3.28.3.3.5. and respective notes below.

1 71 Skt. upanidhyāna ‘reflection’. In Pali, upanijjhāna and upaniṣṭānaya mean ‘reflection, meditation’ as well as ‘looking at’, and upaniṣṭāyati is ‘to contemplate, hence, 1. to look at regard intently or covetously; 2. to meditate upon (acc.)’ (CPD, s.v.). We thus find upaṇijjhāna used in the sense of ‘meditation’ in, for example, the Jātaka Commentary: jhāyati lakkhaṇuṣṭanijjhāna-āraṇmaṇuṣṭanijjhānasamkhātehi jhānehi jhāyati (Ja V 251, 18-19) ‘meditates means that [the pacceka buddha Sonaka, one of the characters of the tale] meditates by means of the so-called meditations of ‘reflection upon characteristics [and] reflection upon meditative objects’. The latter reflection, i.e., āraṇmaṇuṣṭanijjhāna, is actually identical with alambanopaniṣṭānaya in our passage. We have no further details, however, on the way the authors of the Jātaka Commentary defined the term. On the other hand, upaniṣṭānaya, upaniṣṭāyati, etc. often appear in collocations related to desire, i.e., looking with a covetous eye at something (e.g., Mil 124, 21; Vism 353, § 51; cf. also Vin I 193, 6, etc.: upaniṣṭāyati).

We also find the word in the BoBh (8, 22; 17, 2-3; and 209, 10-11; in the last two occurrences together with samyag), and though there is no detailed definition, upanidhyāna as a technical term seems to stress the reflective or contemplative aspect of meditation. The Tibetan and Chinese renderings of the term in our Śrī Bhūta passage also support such a conclusion (see text and footnotes to the respective editions). It is noteworthy that though the Śrī Bhūta deals here with dhyāna in the strict sense of absorption, it, nonetheless, stresses the observational (as opposed to enstatic) nature of these meditative states (cf. also smrti ‘mindfulness’ in the next phrase).

Let us also note that the Śrī Bhūta passage here contains some parallels with the definition of dhyāna at AKBh 433, 7-13.

1 72 Skt. ekāgrasmyuyoniprabandhā can be interpreted in two ways. The word upanibandha literally means ‘being linked/bound to’. One way of construing this is to take this as referring to
being linked to the meditative object by means of the one-pointed mindfulness, as I render above. Sakuma (1990, vol. 2, p. 134) translates more freely as *da man seine Achtsamkeit in konzentrierter ("einspitziger") Form /auf den Gegenstand/ richtet (upanibandha), but this obviously points to a similar understanding. Another possibility is to construe *ekāgrasmṛtyupanibandha in the sense of "relying on one-pointed mindfulness", therefore taking the 'linkage' to refer to the yogi's mental process 'being bound to', i.e., relying upon *ekāgrasmṛtī. Ėdgerton actually registers the word upanibandha as 'connexion, dependence (of effect on cause)' (see BHSD, s.v.). See also the use of the verb upanibandhāni in passage 3.28.3.2.1. below. I think that this interpretation also makes sense, but I prefer the former alternative.

Both Tib. and Ch. show differences with regard to the way in which they construe this passage. See Tib. ed. and Ch. ed. as well as respective notes.

173 Or, literally, 'through', 'by'. The value of the Sanskrit instrumental here is what Speijer ([1886] 1988, 48 and 50-51) calls 'accompanying circumstances and qualities'. See Sakuma's interpretation which suggests that samāpattāya should be construed in the sense of *samāpannatayā, "als ein Eingetretener" (p. 135, n. 749). Cf. also Skillings' remarks with regard to the rendering 'dwell in emptiness' (1997, 347).

174 Ji comments on the duration of the attainment as follows: 何故不言多時，唯言七日等者？[To-ryun's citation of Ji's Commentary contains 謂 here] 彼欲界中段食絕 [Ji's text reads 経 instead of 経; I follow here the reading in To-ryun's citation of Ji's Commentary; one of the versions of To-ryun's text (甲本), however, also reads 経; see T vol. 42, p. 472, n. 9] 七日故。若過七日出定已，其身即壞故。(T43.121b8-10) 'Why doesn't [the Śrāvakabhūmi] say a longer [period of] time [and] only says "seven days"? Because [the nutritional value of] food [necessary for sustaining life] in the realm of sensual pleasures is exhausted in seven days [or, if adopt the 経 reading, '[can] last [only] seven days' (?)]. [And] because his body will be immediately destroyed if [the ascetic] comes out from the meditative attainment [after a period] longer than seven days.' (See also To-ryun citation at T42.472c20-21).

As far as the meaning of viharati is concerned, let us note that this is not the only way of construing it. Vībh. (252, 26-27), for instance, explains viharati in physical terms, i.e., 'to dwell' means that the meditator sits cross-legged, walks, etc.

175 Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0. above and 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., etc. below), contains the citation of the whole canonical formula on the second absorption (which lacks in Skt. and Ch.): de rtog pa dang dpyod pa dang bral zhung nang yongs su dang ste | sens kyi rgyud gcig tu gyur pas | rtog pa med pa dang | dpyod pa med pa | ting nge 'dzin las skyes pa'i dga' ba dang bde ba can bsam gtan gnyis pa bsgrubs te gnas so = Skt. *sa vitarkaviccāraṇāṁ vyūpasamād adhīyāmasaṃprastādā cetasā ekotibhāvād avitarkam avicāraṇān samādhijāmi prītisukhān dviitīyam dhīyānām upasāṃpadya viharati. 'Due to the stilling of the rough examination and exhaustive investigation, due to inner clarity, due to singleness of mind, he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells having attained the second absorption which is without rough examination, without subtle investigation, born of concentration, [and is characterised by] joy and pleasure'. The Sanskrit is reconstructed according to ŚrīBh-Gr 22, 1-2 (see also MVastu 1.228, 4-6; id. 2.131, 18 - 132, 1 (reading ekotibhāvā, which is an ablative singular form occurring mostly and frequently in MVastu; see BHSD vol. 1, pp. 52-53); id. 283, 7-9 (having, this time, *saṃprastādā); Pašca 167, 5-7 (omitting initial sa and reading adhīyāmāṇi); LaLvis 100, 7-9 (spelling *ekotā with sma at the end); SaṅghBhII 243, 12-14 (reading adhīyāmāṇi and spelling ekotā); DaśBh Kondō ed. 55, 16-56, 1 (spelling ekotā/*'itā but Kyoto Univ. MS reading ekotā and Tokyo Univ. MS ekotā) = Rahder ed. 34, 1-3; ArthVin 17, 5-6 and commentary at ArthVinNib 182-183: MVyut # 1479 (reading adhīyāmāṇi); etc. (cf. also note 127 above). In the ŚrīBh glosses which follow below, there is no mention of the personal pronoun sa (but see the
var. lec. in Tib. (D-C-ZT stemma): de’i phiyir de). Furthermore, dhyānam upasampadya viharati is no longer glossed upon, but no doubt, this is to be understood as in the explanation for the first absorption (see 3.28.3.2.6.: evam sarvam pūrvavat vaditavat).

The parallel Pali stock-phrase is: vitakkavicāranaṁ vipasamā ajjhatthāṁ sampasadanaṁ cetasā ekodibbhāvanī avitakkām avicārāṁ samādhiyām pīṭasukhaṁ dutiyayājñānaṁ upasampajjā viharati (DN I 74, 13-16; see also DN I 173; MN I 21-22; id. 41; id. 276; MN III 4; id. 14; id. 25-26; id. 36; SN III 236; SN V 10; id. 214; AN III 11; etc.). Unlike the Sanskrit version, the Pali formula has only the first phrase in ablative while ajjhatthāṁ sampasadanaṁ cetasā ekodibbhāvanī qualifies dutiyayājñānaṁ. I cannot figure out a decisive reason as to why the Sanskrit equivalent put the first three phrases in ablative. To be sure, from a psychological viewpoint, the change is not of major importance, but it can offer a clue for the scholastic who counts the basic factors (āṅga) of the absorption. A wording like that of the Sanskrit formula would make it much easier to conclude that the basic factors are three in number. It is, however, the Southern Abhidhamma which defines the second jhāna as consisting of three basic components: joy (pīṭa), pleasure (sukha), and focusing of the mind (cittasaka ekaggatā) (see Vibh 263; Vism 126, § 139; id. 128, ch. 4, § 150). The Northern Abhidharma tradition, on the other hand, considers that the second absorption consists of four fundamental factors: the three mentioned above plus the inner peace (adhyātmasamparasā) (see AKbh 438, 2; ArthVinNib 183, 3-4).

For the Tib. way of construing the phrase, see note 332 to Tib. ed. Cf. also passage 3.28.2.2.2. and note 143 above.

Skt. ekarasaṭā is an abstract noun formed from ekarasa which usually means ‘having only one pleasure [or: one object of affection]; having always the same object of affection; unchangeable’ (see MW, s.v.). The word occurs in Pali, too, with a wide range of connotations, from the concrete meaning of ‘(having) the same/a single taste’ to the figurative usage (like in the compound vimuttirasa ‘taste of liberation’) and to technical sense of ‘having the same character/nature; having the same/single function/accomplishment’ (CPD, s.v. ekarasaṭā). The latter is, obviously, a later philosophical development characteristic of the commentarial literature, but we can see a transitional stage in the history of the word already in the Āṭīṣ (see A.K. Warde, in ‘Introduction by PTS Editor’ to the Path of Discrimination translated by Bhikkhu Nāṇamolī, p. X VIII and p. X X X V).

Though retaining a figurative shade (‘taste’, in the sense of spiritual experience), the term ekarasaṭā in our Ṣrī Bhāṣa passage is closer to the meaning of ‘state’ or ‘function’. It seems to refer to a mental state completely turned inwards, unmixed with other emotional or cognitive processes, and most notably, unobstructed by the discursive thinking implied by vitarka and vicāra. A more ‘poetic’ rendering would be ‘singly flavoured state’. In the Samīṣṭha (143, 10-13), in a similar context, we find a relevant description, which makes the sense of ekarasa even more evident: katham avitarko vicāraṁ samādhir bhavati? vitarkavicārebhyasaṁ cittaṁ adhyupekṣya saced ekarasādhyāyām ālambanam adhimucyaśa ekarasena ca sampārakhāyāte ‘How does the concentration without rough examination and subtle investigation arise? [It arises] when [the ascetic] becomes convinced of the inner meditative object in a homogeneous way, after having rendered [his] mind indifferent towards rough examination and subtle investigation, and when it fully appears [manifests itself] in a homogenous [way].’ In the Chinese translation of the Śrī Bhāṣa, we also see 一味 describing the perfectly unified and concentrated state of samata. 諸心相續、諸心流注前後一味、無相、無分別、寂靜而轉。 (T30.460c12-13) ‘The mental continuua, the mental currents roll on homogeneously [lit., ‘[with] a single flavour’] before and after, with no characteristic, no conceptualisation, tranquil’. The extant Skt. corresponding to this sentence does not, however, contain ekarasa: sarvā cittasantatiś cittadhārā paurvaparyena

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nirnimitā pravarteta, nirvikalpā upaśāntā (MS 109a5M-R; Sh 416, 22-417, 1). The sentence, with a few additions and a slightly different wording, is repeated at T30.461a22-24, which corresponds to MS 109b5M-L; Sh 419,8-10. As usual, it is difficult to decide whether this is an editorial addition by Xuanzang or a different reading witnessed by the Skt. MS in his hand, but here I would rather incline to favour the latter alternative. In BoBh (260, 18-20), we come across a passage, which partially resembles the wording of the above citation from the Śrībh and describes samaṇha as follows: tasmāṁ ca nirabhilāpye vastumāre nirnimittāya ca nirvikalpacittāsāntyā sarvadharmasamataikarasagomī. This time, the Skt. contains the word ēkarasa. The sentence is rendered into Chinese as: 即於如是, 難言惟事, 由無有相, 無所分別, 其心寂靜趣向一切法平等性, 一味實性。(T30.539c29-540a2).

Skt. samprāśaṇā means ‘perfect quiet’ (which, according to MW, s.v., especially refers to ‘repose during deep sleep’), ‘serenity’, and also ‘trust, confidence’. The Tib. equivalent yong su dang ba ‘wholly pure/purity’ as well as the Ch. 等浄 ‘uniformly pure/purity’ stresses the idea of ‘purity’. Prasāḍa, which is prefixed here with -sam, actually, means ‘brightness, clearness, purity’ as well as ‘calmness, tranquillity’, etc. In the context of spiritual praxis, one would expect that either of the meanings (or both!) would be unquestionably sanctioned by the Abhidharma exegets, but rather surprisingly, they seem to favour the sense of ‘confidence’. This is seen in both the Northern and Southern exegetical traditions. The Viśh (258, 7-8) defines the term as: sampasādanan tī: yā saddhā saddahanā, okappanā, abhippasādo ‘samprasādana means faith, believing, confidence, trust’. The same line of interpretation is inherited by the Vism (126, § 142: sampasādanam vuccati saddhā; etc.). The Akībh (440, 9-11) similarly says: śraddhā prasāḍaḥ: tasya hi dvitiyādyānālabāḥ samāhitabhūminihsaranem samāprayaya utpadyate | sā ‘tṛādhvāṃsasamprāśaṇā tī | ‘Prasāḍa is faith: because due to the attainment of the second absorption, complete trust in [the possibility of] riddance of [this] concentration level arises in the [ascetic]. This [faith refers] here [to] inner confidence (adhyātmam samprāśaṇā). As suggested by Xuanzang’s rendering 於定地亦可離 (T29.147b23), samāhitabhūminihsarane probably refers here to the fact that the ascetic is able to abandon the meditative level without becoming attached to it; cf. also T29.762a11ff.) In the ArthVinNib (182, 4-5), we find the same equation stated in almost identical wording: śraddhāsamprāśaṇāḥ | yasmat tasya yogino dvitiyādyānālabāḥ samāhitabhūminihsanānem samāprayaya utpadyate. ‘Samprasāda is faith through which, due to the attainment of the second absorption, complete trust in [the possibility of] riddance of the concentration level [of the first attainment] arises in the yogi’.

The Śrībh contains only one other occurrence of samprāśaṇā. The word appears in the stock-phrase describing the second absorption (Śrībh-Gr 22, 1; see note 175 above). No definitions of the technical terms in the formulae are, however, provided. In the Samībh (103, 8-9), some further details are given: dvitiye dhyāñe ‘dhyāmam samprāśaṇā ālambana- grahanārthena. samādhir adhyātmam prāśaṇasamānirudāyārthena ‘in the second absorption, the inner clarity has the purpose [or: is used in the sense] of grasping the object, the concentration has the purpose [or: is mentioned] in the sense of [providing] a support for the inner clarity’. Construing here samprāśaṇā as ‘confidence’ (concerning to the object) is not impossible, but the sense of ‘clarity’ of view (which helps ‘grasping’ the meditative object) is an equally plausible alternative. At Samībh 153, 8, adhyātmamsamprāśaṇā is compared to ‘a lake’ (hrada; Ch. (T30.339c1) renders 泉 ‘spring’), which might also point to the clearness of water (=view?), but without any further details it is difficult to draw definite conclusions (hrada, to be sure, can also suggest the abundance of water, etc.). The Viṇīs ad Samībh contains some relevant clarifications. It says: 間: 內等淨何法為自性？答: 念正知捨為自性。 (T30.649b4) ‘Question: What is the nature of adhyātmamsamprāśaṇa? Answer: Mindfulness (smrīti), discernment (samprajñā), and equanimity (upeksā) are [its] nature’ (cf. Tib. P Zi 185a1). A few lines below,
the text explains that in the first dhyāna, the mindfulness, discernment, and equanimity are also present, but because they are activated by means of vitarka and vicāra, they cannot operate properly and are not, therefore, declared to be basic factors (aṅga) of this absorption. The Viniś further adds: 第二靜慮由彼自性能有作業，又由踊躍心隨煩惱之所纏縛，是故顯示內等淨名。(T36.649b10-12) (cf. P Zī 185a4) "[In the case of] the second absorption, [they] function on account of [their] nature [i.e., spontaneously] but are [still] enveloped by the defilement [Ch. 隨煩惱: secondary defilement] of excitement (Tib. sms"dga' ba = * cittaudpibya?) [exuberant mind, Ch. 趵躍心]. Therefore, [the canonical formula] uses [i.e., reveals/makes clear] the name of adhyātmasāṃprāsādaa. Mindfulness and discernment, two of the psychological functions representing the nature of adhyātmasāṃprāsāda, would seem to hint at clarity in the process of concentrating upon the meditative object. Though I have no definitive proof that the latter was the sense intended by the Śrībh authors, I have opted for rendering here saṃprāsāda as ‘clarity’.

Finally, let us add that saṃprāsāda is counted as one of the fundamental factors of the second absorption (see AK Bh 438, 1-2).

1^79 Skt. vitarkavicārasa<<>> chidrasāntarām avasthām. Sacchidra means ‘having holes’ or ‘faulty’ (chidra being ‘a hole, opening; a gap; a defect, imperfection’, etc.). Likewise, sāntarām has the sense of ‘having an interval or interstices’, ‘not close or compact, open in texture’, etc. as well as of ‘different’ and ‘mixed or mingled with others’ (MW, s.v.). Sakuma’s (p. 136) aptly renders as unterbrochen und lückenhaft und frei vom Unterbrechungen und Lücken respectively. Perfect concentration, at least in jhāna/dhyāna, is supposed to be a completely non-verbal focusing of the mind on the meditative object. The discursive thinking implied by the rough examination and subtle investigation, though having already transcended the sphere of sensual pleasures, is regarded as full of ‘holes’ and ‘interruptions’ in the mental flow. The achievement of the singleness of mind marks the cessation of all ratiocinative process, cessation which is described below as ni<<>> chidrāntarām avasthām. It would appear that in the beginning, the attainment of the second absorption is not stable, being liable to interruptions. During such unstable intervals, the mind seems to fall back to the level of the first dhyāna.

1^80 Skt. cetaso ekotibhāvā ‘singleness of mind’ (Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, also “ekoti”, though the spelling “ekoti” appears more common; see BH SD, s.v.); Pali, cetaso ekotibhāva. The etymology and early meaning of the word have been subject to much debate (cf. CPD; BH SD, s.v.), but in the context of meditative psychology (at least, as depicted in the Abhidhamma/Abhidharma tradition), the term is equated with ekaggatā/ekāgratā ‘one-pointedness’. Vībh 258, 10-11, describes cetaso ekotibhāva as samāsamādhi ‘correct concentration’. Vism, after a (Nirukta-like) analysis of the word (126, § 143), explains that in the first absorption, samādhi is not fully manifest because of the lack of sampasāda (which in Theravādin understanding means ‘confidence’). In the second jhāna, due to the absence of the obstructing activity of vitakka and vicāra, sampasāda gains full power, and ‘by the very obtainment of strong confidence as [its] companion’ (balavasaddhāsahāyapaṭilābhen eva), ‘singleness of mind’ becomes fully established (126-127, § 144). At Sam Bh 152, 2-3, we read: cetaso ekotibhāvādīgata ity avitarkāvicārābhūmīlībhitā ‘Attainment of the singleness of mind — [this] is [achieved] because of the obtainment of the level without rough examination and subtle investigation [i.e., the second dhyāna]’.

1^81 See the almost identically worded gloss upon vivekajam ‘born of separation’ in passage 3.28.3.1.4. above.

The Vism (127, § 148) stresses that although concentration is also present in the first absorption, it is only the second jhāna that deserves the qualification samādhijam because of the extreme steadiness and confidence (ativiya acalattā suppasannattā ca) resulting from the elimination of the disturbing activity of vitakka and vicāra.
Tib. suggests: "noxiousness [corresponding] to rough examination, subtle investigation and the category of defilements of the first absorption". See also note 353 to Tib. ed.

Tib. seems to subdivide the phrase vitarkavicārāprathamadhyānakeśasparvadāuṣṭhulayāpamātā to tatprātiṣṭhākasparvadāuṣṭhulayāpamātā, prātradhiṣṭhātākāyakarmayatāsukhānugatvātāi "because it is accompanied by pleasure [...] due to the elimination of all noxiousness [...]". This is a possibility, but I have preferred to follow the Skt. syntax faithfully.

The gloss is more detailed than the parallel passage explaining ‘joy and pleasure’ in the first absorption (see 3.28.3.1.5. above and respective notes). Some of its phrases and parts of its compounds, i.e., īṣṭāhīhaśṬīrthaḥ, arthaśārthaḥ pritau cādūsadarśanāt, "sarvadāuṣṭhulayāpamāt, and prāradhācittākāyakarmayatā" are actually identical. Furthermore, like 3.28.3.1.5., the first part of our passage here seems to be a gloss upon priti while its latter half constitutes a description of sukha. (In his translation, Sakuma again divides the compound into pratikas, assigning to each the respective phrases which gloss upon them. Here, too, I prefer to follow the original as closely as possible and leave the compound undivided like in the original Skt. as well as in Tib. and Ch.)

The following passage from the SamBh clearly shows that priti equated with saumanasya and sukha is linked to prasrabdhi. The beginning of this fragment is also cited by Sakuma (p. 136, n. 753) directly from the YoBh MS. The whole passage has meanwhile been edited by Delhez (SamBh 89, 1-6), whose text I follow here: pritiḥ katamā? yaḥ samyakprayogapārvako harṣaḥ pritiḥ(? ) saumanasyaṁ cittakalyata. prasrabdhiḥ koamā? dauṣṭhulayāpamāt kāyacittakarmayatā. sukhāṁ katamat? tathā(?) karmanyacittaya(?) yat kāyikacaitasikam avyāvadhyasaṅkhaṁ vimuktisukhaṁ; yatpaksyaṁ hi tad dauṣṭhulayam apogataṁ, tebhya upakīṣeṣevyaḥ vimuktih. "What is joy? It is rejoicing preceded by [i.e., resulting from] correct practice, joy, [mental] satisfaction, mental well-being. What is ease? It is mental and bodily malleability [attained] due to the elimination of the noxiousness. What is pleasure? It is the impregnable bodily and mental pleasure, the pleasure of liberation [experienced by the ascetic] who has thus [attained] a malleable mind; liberation [refers here to] [being free] from the secondary defilements to which the eliminated noxiousness belongs'.

AK VIII.9c also equates the two terms: pritis tu saumanasyam dvīdhāgamāt. ‘But [it can be asserted that] priti is mental satisfaction because of [being stated so in] two scriptures’. The Bhāṣya cites the canonical sources which prove this statement (AKBh 440, 16-21; for the identification of the scriptures, see Poussin vol. 5, p. 160, n. 1 and 2; Honjō 1984, pp. 112-113; Pāśādika 1989a, pp. 121-122, # 494). Vasubandhu also adds that below the level of the third absorption, the faculty of satisfaction is the feeling of mental delight (caitasasīkā sātā vedaṇā saumanasvendriyam, AKBh 41, 16-17), and this [mental] satisfaction is identified as ‘joy’ (pritīr hi saumanasya, AKBh 41, 18). In the third dhyāṇa, however, bodily sensations are no longer possible because the complex of five sensible cognitions no longer functions. Instead of it, the feeling of mental delight becomes the faculty of perceiving pleasure (śātā vedaṇā caitasasukhendriyam | na hi tatra kāyikā vedaṇā 'stī | pañcaviśeṣānā kāyābhāvāh | AKBh 41, 13-14).

Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., etc.) contains the whole citation of the stock-phrase describing the third absorption (for which there is no equivalent in Skt. and Ch.): de dga’ bai ‘dod chags dang bral bas | btang snyoms la gnas sking dran pa dang shes bzhin can yin te | bde ba lus kyi myong la | ‘phags pa rnam sles kyi gang de dran pa dang ldan pa bde ba la gnas pa | btang snyoms pa ‘o zhes brjod pa ste | dga’ ba med pa bsam gyan gsum pa bsgrubs te gnas so = Skt. *sa priter virāgād upeksako viharati smrtiṣṭhī sampraṣāṇaḥ<śa> [MS: samprajñā; ŚBhGr 22, 4: sampraṇāṇa; I emend on the basis of the reading in passage 3.28.3.3.3. below] sukham ca kāyena pratisamvedayati; yat tad ārya ācāryate "upeksakāḥ smṛtīmān sukhavihārī"ti nispritiṣṭhī trīyānām dhīyāṇam upasampadaya viharati. ‘Due to detachment from joy [i.e., the ascetic] dwells equanimous, mindful, discerning, and
experiences pleasure with [his] body; he dwells having attained the third absorption free from joy, which the Noble Ones describe [with the words] “[he is] equanimous, mindful, dwelling in [enjoying] pleasure”. The Skt. reconstruction here follows MVyat # 1480 (with my punctuation).

There is also a variant of the canonical formula which does not contain nisprātimāṇi after “upekkṣakāḥ smṛtimāṇa sukha-vihārī” and spells pratisamvedaye instead of pratisamvedayati (e.g., Śrībh-Gr 22, 4-6; AKVy 673, 15-17; etc.). The corresponding Pali phrase has a slightly different wording: putiyya ca virāgā ca upokkha ca viharati sato ca sampajāno, sukhaṁ ca kāyena paṭisamvedeti yan ānāṇā añeyam čikkhaṇī: “upekkhako satimā sukha-vihārī” ti tatiyājihānā upasampajja viharati (DN I 75, 6-10; for other Sanskrit and Pali sources, see note 175 above). The standard Pali formula does not contain nippitika, but in its more detailed version, the description continues: so imam eva kāyam nippitikena sukhaṇa abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti paripparatati, nāṣa kiṅci sabbāvato kāyassa nippitikeva sukhaṇa apphubatān hoti (DN I 75, 10-14; MN I 277, 17-20; etc.).

It is difficult to ascertain with precision whether nimittī refers here to characteristics or to the mental image based on or refined from them (see note 17 above). Sakuma’s tentative rendering Erscheinungs-und-Vorstellungsbildern (p. 137; cf. n. 757, too) seems to imply the latter. Ji and To-ryun do not gloss the term 喜相 which occurs in this passage. We find in To-ryun’s Commentary (ad scrolls IV to VI of the YoBh) the following remark: 己見第二靜慮相過失而厭離之 (T42.338c22) ‘[The ascetic] having seen the deficiency in the characteristic of joy in the second absorption, averts [lit., ‘abhors and leaves’] it’. But this remark, too, offers no precise answer as to how nimittī should be construed. Neither is pritīnimitta found amongst the 32 types of nimittā discussed in the SamBh (pp. 122-128).

Skt. virāgā means ‘indifference’, ‘dislike’, ‘dispassion’, etc. To-ryun’s Commentary (see note 186 above) implies ‘aversion’. Vism (128, § 154) accepts both meanings: virāgo nāma vuttappakārāya putiyyā jīgucchānaṃ va samatikkamā va ‘the so-called virāga means disgust for or the transcending of joy as described [above]’.

Skt. upeksā/Pali upokkha ‘equanimity’. Buddhaghosa analyses upokkha into ten types (Vism 129, § 156-131, § 171). As remarked by Maithrimurthi in his outstanding study on the four apramāṇas (1999, 139-142; see also 428), this appears to be a later commentarial development, though early canonical sources also show upokkha used in various contexts (ibid., 143). According to Buddhaghosa’s exegesis, upokkha in the phrase ‘dwells equanimous’ is called ‘absorption-equanimity’ (jhānupekkhaḥ) and is described as aggasukke pi tasmin apakāppatajanani upekkha (Vism 130, § 165) ‘the equanimity engendering impartiality [lit., ‘non-falling into one-sidedness’] towards even the highest [form of] pleasure [of the third absorption] or: towards even this state [i.e., third absorption] possessed of the highest [form of] pleasure’. The same ten kinds of equanimity are found in the Dhs-a (172-173), and the jhānupekkhaḥ is defined in a similar way (the only difference is: accanta-aggasukhe). In the Northern tradition, the AKBh appears to distinguish between three types of upeksā: (1) the intermediate (madhyā) feeling of neither suffering nor pleasure (aduśkāsukha vedanā) (AKBh 41, 20); (2) the cognitive indifference defined as upeksā cittasmatā cittānābhogatā (AKBh 55, 16-17) ‘upeksā is mental equality, lack of mental orientation [towards a specific object]’ (this is actually the opposite of manaskāra and the possibility of their coexistence in one mental act gives rise to different interpretations between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, ibid. 55, 17-21); and (3) equanimity as a one of the four boundless states (apramāṇa) (AKBh 452-454, kārikās VIII 29-31). These are termed by the AKVy as feeling equanimity, volitional equanimity, and equanimity as a boundless state (trividhā hi upeksā: vedanopeksaḥ, samskāropeksaḥ, apramānopeksaḥ ceti. AKVy 129, 23-24). The ArthVInNib, which actually follows the same
threefold classification, identifies upēksā in the third absorption as saṃskāropeksā (183, 7-184, 1; cf. also Maitripratihāra 1999, p. 140, n. 5).

The Tibetan translation of the Yogācāra bhāmāvyāksā enumerates 10 types of equanimity, but it concludes that they can be reduced to three basic categories (see Maitripratihāra 1999, 140), which seems to echo the AKBh and AKVyo. On upēksā in Yogācāra literature, see Gadim Nagos’s study ‘Tranquil Flow of Mind: An Interpretation of Upeksā’ (1991, 91-102).

Skt. smṛtī also means ‘recollection’, ‘memory’, etc., but the primary sense in Buddhist texts in general is that of ‘mindfulness’ (see Cox 1992; Griffiths 1992). A collection of studies dedicated to mindfulness and remembrance in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism was edited by Janet Gyatso (1992). The most important contributions to the understanding of the concept of smṛtī in the Buddhist tradition are Cox 1992 (an excellent study of the history of the concept from Early Buddhism to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma), Griffiths 1992, and Jaini 1992.

Skt. cittam adhyupeksate. Sakuma renders: hält den Geist frei [von ihnen] (?). I render the phrase as ‘makes his mind indifferent [to them, i.e., those ideations and acts of attention accompanying joy]’. This does not contradict Sakuma’s understanding since the implication is that by making the mind indifferent to these disturbing factors, the ascetic become free from them. (Cf., for instance, MN II 223, 13ff., where by becoming indifferent (ājhupekkhato) to the source of suffering (dukkhanidānassa), the mendicant becomes detached (virāgo) from it.) The basic meaning of the verb adhyupeksate (adhi+upeksate) is ‘ignores, disregards, is indifferent to’ (BHSD, s.v.) or ‘to look with indifference’ (無関心に見る, in BWDJ s.v.) (the primary sense of adhi- here most probably is ‘[directed] towards’). The Pali equivalent is ajjhipekkhāti, which is rendered in CPD (s.v.) as ‘to look on without interfering, to tolerate, to be indifferent’. The phrase cittam ajjhipekkhāti occurs in a number of sources and appears to have two main usages. One seems to be causative (like in our Śīrṣa passage): ‘to make the mind indifferent to [something]’, ‘to turn away the mind from [something]’, or, simply, ‘to make the mind free from [something]’. E.g., AN III 435, 22-23: yasmīṁ samaye cittam ajjhipekkhitam, tasmiṁ samaye cittam ajjhipekkhakati ‘when the mind should be made indifferent, he then makes his mind indifferent’. The other usage seems to take cittā as the direct object of the verb ajjhipekkhakati in the sense of ‘to look at the mind with indifference’. Thus, at Nidd 1 508, 10-12 (in verse), we see the collocation cittam [... ajjhipekkhāti, most probably meaning ‘look upon the mind with equanimity’ (cf. Nandana daizōyō, vol. 43, p. 404: 心を [...] 捨置す). At Paṭīs 168, 6-10, in a passage describing the cultivation or frequent training of equanimity (upekkhanubrāhāna) for the first jhāna (and below, for the other absorptions and immaterial attainments, too), we read: visuddham cittam ajjhipekkhāti, samathapatipannaṁ ajjhipekkhāti, ekattuṇapṭhaṁ ājighipekkhāti [...] ‘[the meditator] looks at the purified mind with equanimity, looks at [the mind which] has practised tranquillity [or, as Nāṇamoli construes at Paṭīs tr. 170: ‘as having made way for serenity’] with equanimity, looks at [the mind which] has established [mental] unity with equanimity [....]’ A similar meaning can be seen at MN III 86, 16-17 (and below): so tathāsamaṁhātaṁ cittam sādhukam ājighipekkhitaḥ hoti.

The collocation is also attested in Sanskrit sources. As Sakuma also points out (p. 138, n. 761), the AKBh (339, 20), too, employs the phrase in the following context: kāyāṁ cittam cādhyupeksya. Sakuma translates this as Körper und Geist unbeachtet lassend and also refers to Poussin’s rendering (vol. 4, 154): laisser le corps et la pensée tels quels (or, in note 6, sans se préoccuper du corps et de la pensée). The phrase, which occurs in the context describing the first stage of the mindfulness of breathing, means that no particular attention should be given to bodily and mental processes other than counting. Yasomitra glosses upon it as: anāsajyethi arthah (AKVyo 528, 5) ‘the meaning is without clinging [being attached to them]’. The verb adhyupeksate (in various grammatical forms) also appears in the BoBh. E.g., sacet saṃsāram
yathābhūtāṁ na parijāniyān, na śaknyūd rāgadeśamohādikāt sarvasaniklesāc cittam adhyupekṣitum. anadhyupekṣamānaś ca sambhajitānaṁ samśāre samśāraṁ naiva buddhadharmāṁ paripācaayet (BoBh 40, 9-12) ‘If [the bodhisattva] does not comprehend thoroughly the cycle of rebirths as it is, he cannot turn [his] mind away from [or: make his mind indifferent to] all defilements, [to wit] passion, hatred, misguidedness, etc. And since he does not turn away [his mind from them], [with] his mind defiled [and] wandering in the cycle of rebirths, [the bodhisattva] surely cannot mature the factors [necessary to become] a Buddha’. See also tathā tathā bhāyasyā mātṛyā paropārabhavāda vā kṣapā prakāśamāṇapātaśacākāśāḥ ca vyṛttraśākṣāsa vṛttarāgā nyanāya parijñāya cittam adhyupekṣate (BoBh 42, 7-9), where the phrase means ‘make the mind indifferent [to criticism, etc.]’ (cf. Uī’s translation: 心を無関心にする, at BoBh Index, p. 40.)

Finally, a few words about the Tib. and Ch. translations of cittam adhyupekṣate in the ŚrīBh. The former renders the phrase as sems byaṅ snyoms sbyed pa ‘make the mind equanimous’. Ch. translates it as 心住上捨 ‘[his] mind dwells in superior equanimity’ (thus construing citta in nominative). 上捨 seems to be a literal rendering of adhyupekṣate (= 捨). (Some Tibetan equivalents of adhyupekṣate, etc. in the YoBh also construe the verb similarly: lhag par byaṅ snyoms sbyed pa or lhag par byaṅ snyoms su ‘jog pa; see YoBh-D, s.v. adhi-upa-√iks.) The term 上捨 actually appears a few times in Xuanzang’s translation of the YoBh: 心得平等便修上捨. (T30.676c22); 若復於彼深觀過患，於上捨中不生愛味. (T30.858a9-10); etc. In Xuanzang’s translation of the BoBh, we also see: [...] 安止上捨，故名不愛. (T30.489b6-7) ‘because of dwelling in superior equanimity, [this] is called non-craving’. In the extant Skt. text, there is, however, no adhyupekṣate (or any form derived from it) but simply upeksaka. The text runs as: [...] upeksaka ca viharati. evam kāntiṁ na karoti (BoBh 49, 14-15). Without a Sanskrit original for the other occurrences above (and, more importantly, without being able to ascertain Xuanzang’s Skt. MS used for the rendering), it is difficult to determine whether 上捨 consistently stands for adhi-upa-√iks.

Skt. smṛta ‘mindful’ and saṃprajāṇa ‘discerning’, together with ‘equanimity’ (upekṣa), are fundamental factors (āṅga) of the third dhvāṇa (see AK Bh 438, 3-5). The gloss here (as in many other places in the ŚrīBh) seems to be more concerned with the spiritual process the yogi experiences rather than with Abhidharmic definitions and systematisation. For the sake of more terminological precision (a vice which I share with the Ābhīdhārmikas!...), I shall quote here definitions from other sources. Buddhaghosa comments upon saṭo ca saṃpajāṇo in the corresponding Pali stock-phrase as follows: sarati ti sati, saṃpajjāṇāti ti saṃpajjāno [...] tatthā saranālakkaṇhā sati, asammuṇsamaraṇā, ārakkhaṇaccharānaṃ, asammuhananāṃ saṃpajjāṇānaṃ, tīranaṃ sati, pavīcayaccharānaṃ (Vism 131, § 172) ‘[Because] he remembers, he is called “mindful”, [because] he discerns, he is called “discerning”. [...] Here, mindfulness has the characteristic of remembering, the function of not forgetting [for this meaning of rasa, see note 177 above], [and] the manifestation of guarding. Discernment has the characteristic of non-bewildernemt, the function of judgement [recognition], [and] the manifestation of investigation’. See also Dhs 11, § 14 and 16, § 53 for the definition of sati and saṃpajjāna respectively, and Dhs-a 121-122, § 306, and 131, § 325, for detailed glosses on these definitions. Yasomitra, commenting upon AK Bh VII 8a-b, says: saṃskāropekṣā ‘tra grhyate. yā prīter [Wogihara reads: prītir; my emendation is based on Tib. P Chu 350a5: da‘a ba la] anābhogalakṣāṇaṅ. smeṣṭṛ upeksānimittāsyaśaṃpramaṇaḥ. smeṣṭrvasaṃpramaṇe saṃprajjānānaṃ saṃprajjāṇānaḥ (AKVv 672, 7-8; Wogihara spells: saṃprajjāṇānaḥ) ‘Here, [equanimity] [should be] taken as [meaning] volitional equanimity [see note 184 above]. It has the characteristic of not being directed towards joy. Mindfulness [means] non-losing [this] characteristic of equanimity. Discernment [means] discernment as to not losing this mindfulness’.
The gloss here has a rather irregular form. All the other glosses end in tenāha or the canonical word/phrase is preceded by nouns in ablative (occasionally, in instrumental) explaining how the state in question arises. Formally, the gloss here appears to continue into the next two sentences, the last one containing the typical tenāha. Doctrinally, however, this has nothing to do with them, as the latter represent an explanation of sukhaṁ ca kāyena pratisamvedayate. The passage here (3.28.3.3.4.), on the other hand, deals with nispritikam, a word which actually occurs in the gloss itself. In Tib., which has a different order from Skt. and Ch. (see note 407 to Tib. ed.), the explanation of dga’ ba med pa = nispritikam is clearly structured as a gloss apart.

It must also be noted that in the canonical formula (see note 185 above), nispritikam appears later in the sentence, after the phrases which are glossed upon in passage 3.28.3.3.5. and 3.28.3.3.6.

Skt. rūpakāya ‘material body’. This refers to the physical body. I render to rūpa as ‘matter’ or, in its attributive usage, as ‘material’ (cf. ‘immaterial’ for its negative forms). In spite of its wide-spread employment, I do not think that ‘form’ is the most felicitous rendering of the term. Seyfort Ruegg’s apt remarks (1998, 137) concerning the unsuitability of ‘form’ for rūpa are definitely worth mentioning in this context.

Skt. manāhkāya ‘mental body’. The canonical stock-phrase, which is the object of this gloss, seems to construe sukha in the third absorption simply as a bodily experience of pleasure or ease. Early sources usually conceive of sukha in general as an agreeable body sensation (e.g., SN V 209, 7-9: katamaṁ ca bhikkhave sukhendriyaṁ? yaṁ kho bhikkhave kāyikaṁ sukhāṁ kāyikaṁ sātāṁ kāyasamphassajāṁ sukham sātāṁ vediyatāṁ; actually, the whole chapter here (SN V 207-216) is dedicated to sukhendriya).

The problem becomes, however, much more complicated with the development of the Abhidharmic analysis. Bodily sensations in the third dhyāna are declared to be no longer possible due to the absence of the five sensible cognitions. The Kośa says that the faculty of pleasure is the feeling of mental delight (sādā vedanā caitasi sukhendriyam | na hi tatra kāyikā vedānā ‘stī | pañcaviṇṇānakāyābhāvāt | AKbh 41, 13-14) (see note 184 above). Vasubandhu discusses the problem in detail at AKbh 438, 18 - 440, 8 (cf. also AKVy 673-676). Here, he seems to present a Dārśāntika position (see AKVy 673, 6-7), though he directs some criticism at it (see AKbh 440, 4-5). Basically, Vasubandhu describes a polemical dialogue between an opponent (apparently a Vaibhāṣika) and the others (apare) (probably the Dārśāntikas). To the oponent who adduces scriptural proof that sukhendriya is mental as well as bodily sensation ([...] kāyikam caitastikam sātāṁ vedityām [...] AKbh 439, 2-4, which actually is the Skt. parallel of SN V 209, 7-9, quoted above; the latter, however, contains no equivalent of cetasika), it is replied that this is a wrong extrapolation (adhyāropita esa pāthah, AKbh 439, 4) and that the canonical formula of the third absorption expressly states that pleasure is experienced by the body ("sukham ca kāyena pratisamvedayata" āt svaśabdena vacanā ca, AKbh 439, 5). But how is this to be solved if we accept that at this level there are no more corporal perceptions? The Dārśāntika answer is that kāyena must be understood here as a ‘mental body’ (manaskāyveneti cet AKbh 439, 5). The term is explained by Yasomitra as manahsamsudāyaṇa (AKVy 673, 18) ‘mental complex’ (cf. also trīye dhyāne yat sukhām, tan mana evāśritam, na caṣkṣुndrīyādyāśritam iti AKVy 310, 34-311, 1).

In the Southern Abhidharmma tradition, the Vibh (259, 20-28) was more outright and argued that sukha in the third jhāna is to be understood as mental (cetasika) and that the kāya experienced in it refers to the aggregate of ideation (saṁnākkhandha), the aggregate of impulses and volition (saṁkhārakkhandha), and the aggregate of consciousness (viśñānakhandha).

Our ŚrīBh passage here appears to represent a position different from the Dārśāntikas and the Theravādins. Though no appeal to scriptural authority is made here, the ŚrīBh standpoint seems
to come closer to the opponent (Vaibhāṣika?) against whom the Dārṣṭāntikas argue. It must, however, be stressed that the Śrībh gloss is too succinct to allow us clear conclusions concerning the details of how the authors regarded this matter.

195 The Skt. original (as well as the Ch.) merely cites this last part of the canonical formula, without glossing upon it. Tib. contains, however, a separate gloss (see note 439 to Tib. ed.) which tells that the rest of the sentence should be understood as above, i.e., in the case of the first absorption.

196 Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0, 3.28.3.3.0., etc.) gives the whole citation of the stock-phrase describing the fourth absorption (for which we have no equivalent in Skt. and Ch.): de bde ba yang spangs te | snga nas sdug bsngal yang spangs shing yid bde ba dang | vid mi bde ba yang nub pas bde ba yang ma yin | sdug bsngal yang ma yin | btag snyoms dang | dran pa yongs su dag pa bsam gtan bzhi pa bsgrubs te gnas so = Skt. *sa sughasya ca prabhāṇā duhkhasya ca prahānāt puṇvam eva ca saūmanasasantaranasayor astaṃgamā duḥkhāsukham upeksāṣātyāparaśuddham catutthham dhyānam upasampadya viharati (reconstructed according to Śrībh-Gr 22, 7-9; note that the Śrībh-Gr editors spell aṣṭaṃgamā while MS 3a8L reads as above (for the choice of this spelling, see note 263 to Skt. crit. ed.); prabhāṇā duhkhasya ca is omitted in MS, but MVyut # 1481 as well as other sources (see note 175 above) contain it). ‘Due to the abandonment of pleasure and due to the abandonment of [bodily] pain as well as due to the fact that [mental] satisfaction and dissatisfaction have already disappeared before, he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells having attained the fourth absorption which is neither painful nor pleasant [and] is pure with regard to equanimity and mindfulness’ (on the interpretation of the compound upeksāṣātyāparaśuddham, see note 207 below). The equivalent Pali canonical formula is: sukhassa ca pahānā dukkhassa ca pahānā puṃ eva somanassanassānaṃ atthagamā dukkham asukham upekkhāsatīparaśuddhim catutthajhānaṃ upasampajja viharati (DN I 75, 28-31; for other Pali sources, see note 175 above; atthagamā is also spelled aṭṭhaṅgamā, e.g. Vībh 245, 15, but with var. lec.: aṭṭhaṇgamā—cf. also note 263 to Skt. crit. ed.).

197 Ji comments on this passage in the following way: 此中捨念正知名能對治, 第三禪樂名所對治。經中唯說所斷之樂。不言能斷捨念正知者以第三禪已明捨念等能對治故與此第四禪相對治法相似。 (T43.121c1-4; I differ from the Taishō punctuation) ‘Here, equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment are called “[factors] capable of being antidote”. Pleasure [in] the third absorption is called “[factor upon which the] antidote is effected [or: subject to the antidote]”. The fact that the scriptures speak only of the pleasure which is abandoned and do not mention equanimity, mindfulness, and discernment, which are the factors capable of being antidote, is because the factors capable of being antidote, [i.e.,] equanimity, mindfulness, etc., which have been explained for the third absorption, as well as the factors capable of being antidote in the fourth absorption are similar.’

198 It seems that (at least according to the Ābhidharmikas) in the context of the fourth absorption, both pleasure (sukha) and pain (dukkha) should be conceived of in a narrow sense. The Vībh (260, 19-31) defines both of them as ‘bodily’ (kāyika) sensations. Buddhaghosa (Vism 134, § 187) says that pain (dukkha) may re-appear during the access phase the first absorption (paṭhamajjhānāpaçāre) in the form of contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, etc. or the discomfort of an uneven seat (damsamakaññadīsaśamhasena vā visamāsanaṣapatiṣena vā). This understanding of dukkha and sukha as bodily sensations of discomfort and comfort respectively has canonical roots (e.g., the definitions of sukkhinidriya and dukkhinidriya at SN V 209 ff.). In the Northern tradition, the ArthVinNib (186, 2-3), the gloss upon sukhasya ca prahānād in the canonical formula of the fourth absorption, says: sukhasya kāyikasya, dukkhasya ca kāyikasyaiva ‘veriṣy [it is abandonment] of bodily pleasure and of bodily pain’.
Our passage in the ŚrBh, too, appears to construe sukha and duṣkha here as ‘bodily’ since they are contrasted with saumanasaya and daurmanasaya. But this leads to the problem of the exact interpretation of sukhaduṣkhavatyākramam: if sukha and duṣkha are understood in a narrow sense (as the passage on the whole seems to do), then why are not saumanasaya and daurmanasaya (which are also transcended) mentioned? One possible answer is that in this compound here, sukhaduṣkhaa should be construed in a broader sense as including saumanasaya and daurmanasaya (cf. also Sakuma p. 140, n. 772). See also note 204 below.

A more literal translation of the Skt. yac ca pūrvaprahitām yac caitartī prahihate, tasya samākalanaṁ kuryaṁ would be ‘putting this together, [i.e.,] both what has been previously abandoned and what is abandoned now’.

199 [Mental] satisfaction (saumanasaya) is equivalent to joy (prīti) (see passages 3.28.3.1.5. and 3.28.3.2.5. above as well as respective notes).

200 [Mental] dissatisfaction (daurmanasaya) is the antonym of saumanasaya. At SN V 209, 22-24, the faculty of dissatisfaction (domanassindriya) is described as ‘an unpleasant mental [feeling], an uncomfortable mental [feeling], an unpleasant, uncomfortable feeling arising from mental contact’ (yam ... cetisakam dukkham cetisasam asātam manosamphassajam dukkham asātam vedayitam). AK II 8b-c defines it as: aśāta caitasi punah | daurmanasam (AKBh 41, 20-21) ‘furthermore, daurmanasam is unpleasant mental [feeling]’. To this Yāsomitra adds: upaghāti kā ca iti punā daurmanasam (AKVy 100, 32) ‘daurmanasam is an afflicting mental feeling’.

200 The same pattern of abandonment as in the ŚrBh is also suggested at SamBh (107, 18-108, 10). See also Ji’s Commentary (T43.121c13-122a4). Vism (134, § 185), which also glosses upon the disappearance of the same four factors for the ascetic who attains this jhāna, assigns the levels in a different manner: [mental] satisfaction (somanassa) is abandoned at the moment of the access to the fourth absorption (catunnāṁ jhānānāṁ upacārakhe), [bodily] pain (dukkha) at the moment of the access to the first absorption, [mental] dissatisfaction (domanassa) at the moment of the access to the second absorption, and pleasure (sukha) at the moment of the access to the third absorption.

According to the Artvinīb (186, 3-5), bodily pain (dukkha) and mental dissatisfaction (daurmanasaya) disappear with the obtainment of the first absorption, bodily pleasure (sukha) with the second absorption, and mental satisfaction (saumanasaya) with the third absorption.

202 The verb asiti at the beginning of the sentence clearly expresses emphasis. This grammatical pattern is discussed by Sakuma (p. 141, n. 776).

204 Here, too, aduhkhāsukha seems to be used in the sense of lack of both corporal and mental pain and pleasure (on the definition of sukha vedanā, duṣkha vedanā, and aduhkhāsukha vedanā, see ŚrBh-Gr (18) 38, 10-16). Vism (135, § 193) identifies adukkhum-asukham with equanimity (upekkhā) and says that it has the ‘characteristic of experiencing the opposite of the desired and non-desired’ (iṭṭhāniṭṭhavipariitānuvavatālakkhānā), without describing these either as mental or bodily. The Artvinīb (186, 7-8), commenting upon the aduhkhāsukha in a similar context, says: aduhkhāsukhalakṣaṇā vedanoktā, caturthadhyanasaṁāpattāu hi sukkhānām asambhavāt ‘the characteristic of neither-pain-nor-pleasure is stated because of the non-existence of the pleasure, etc. at the attainment of the fourth absorption’. Here, too, ādi seems to imply that duṣkha as well as saumanasaya and daurmanasaya are also referred to.

205 The precise limits of this gloss with regard to the former one are not easy to determine. There is no doubt that they are closely related, but it is not clear where one ends and the other starts. Sakuma (pp. 35-36, § H.4.2.) takes them as forming one single textual unit and divides them into two paragraph: the first from tasmin samaye sa dhūyī sukhabhūtvatyākramam to prathamadhyānasaṁāpattikēda duurmanasayasya, and the second one from asiti tāvat to tenāhā aduhkhāsukham. This is a possibility which has its own advantages (such as avoiding to include
in the same sentence the apparently repetative sukhaduhkhasya prahānād). I believe, however, that my tentative solution suggested above has some merits, too. First, it ends the first gloss with the citation from the canonical formula, which appears to be the formal tendency of most glosses in this subchapter (the only exceptions being passages 3.28.3.5.5. and 3.28.3.8.1.). It also explains better the presence of tatra, which often introduces a new textual unit. Furthermore, unless linked to the sentence starting with asti, the phrase introduced by tatra has no verb. The only way of construing it is to take it as adding further information to the preceding citation and supply a verb like ‘herein, [it is thus said]’—no doubt, a possibility, but connecting it with the sentence beginning with asti seems more natural syntactically.

My tentative solution is not, however, completely satisfactory. First, we have the repetative usage of sukhaduhkhasya prahānād. This could be explained as (emphatically?) summing up the abandonment of the four kinds of feelings, abandonment which results in aduhkhāsukham. If this interpretation is correct, we would have to conclude that the style of the gloss is rather clumsy. Another stylistic irregularity is that we only have ca after sukhasya but not after duhkhasya, saumanasyasya and daurmanasyasya. (This, however, is difficult to explain no matter how we divide the gloss here!) It could be argued that ca is a sentence connector, but taking it with tatra and assuming an ellipsis of the main verb would be quite odd. I surmise that though stylistically crude (careless?), our sentence used ca after sukhasya (as in the canonical formula) and then abbreviated it after duhkhasya, saumanasyasya and daurmanasyasya.

Let us also briefly look at how Ch. and Tib. construe this passage. They would rather seem to favour an interpretation closer to Sakuma’s understanding, but, I believe, not in a decisive way. Ch. is not perfectly clear, but it appears to take this phrase with the previous gloss. The most natural way to read the Chinese is to see 謂 as explaining the preceding canonical phrase 樂斷苦斷先喜憂没. Ch. 謂 most probably renders here tatra (cf. BCSD, s.v.). But this is not a definitive proof. After all, even in my division and understanding of the passage, tatra seems to imply a nuance like ‘herein, [this] being the case’ (*tatraivam sati?), thus closely connecting the gloss which it introduces with the previous one. Tib. is even less clear. Glosses in Tib. usually start and end with the same lexical or textual unit commented upon, but the equivalent of the problematic phrase tatra caturthadhyānasamāpattiśāle sukhasya [...] prathamadhyāna-

samāpattikāle daurmanasyasya occurs in between the citation at the end of the previous gloss and that at the beginning of the next one and contains only independent sentences (connecting neither with the preceding passage nor with the following one). From a purely formal viewpoint, it creates an irregularity no matter if we include it in the previous gloss (which would not end with the citation) or in this one (which does not begin with the quotation of the canonical item).

As Edgerton shows in his illuminating entry (BHSD, s.v.), Skt. āśvāsapraśvāsa as a compound means ‘breath’ and is used as a synonym of ānāpāna. Though the tradition is not always clear and different interpretations exist (see the Vism discussed by Edgerton), āśvāsa appears to be ‘breathing out’ and prāśvāsa ‘breathing in’. Both Tib. dbugs rnung pa dang dbugs ‘byung ba and Ch. 入息出息 suggest the same, and this is the interpretation which I adopt in my translation. Vasubandhu also construes the words in this way. In his gloss upon ānāpāna, he says: ānam āna āśvāsa yo vāyuh praviśati | āpananām apānāḥ prāśvāsa yo vāyuh niṣkrānati | (AKBh 339, 7-8) āna is inhalation, breathing in, the wind [i.e., air] which enters [the body]. āpāṇa is exhalation, breathing out, the wind which exits [the body]. Cf. also Vyāsa’s similar gloss on śvāsa-praśvāsa ‘inhalation and exhalation’ in YS 1.31. (YS, 54).

The idea that respiration is an obstruction to perfect concentration appears to be very old. At AN V 135, 3, we are told that catuthassa jhānassa assāsapassassā kañjako ‘breathing in and out is a thorn to the fourth absorption’. Actually, we know from other canonical sources that
breathing vanishes altogether at this meditative level. Catutthajñānam samāpannassa assāsapassāsā niruddhā honti (DN III 266, 9-10; cf. AN IV 409, 11-12, with slightly different wording) ‘for one attaining the fourth absorption, breathing in and out ceases’. Nāgasena explains to the doubtful King Milinda that for the ascetic who reaches the fourth jhāna and has his body, virtue, mind, and wisdom cultivated (bhāvita), it is possible indeed to stop respiration just as someone stops snoring when his or her body is bent. And this explanation is, of course, sufficient to make the King exclaim the usual kallo si bhante Nāgasena ‘how clever you are, Venerable Nāgasena!’ (Mil 85, 18-30). Vasubandhu, too, recognises that respiration does not exist at the level of the fourth dhyāna (AKBh 340, 17).

Breathing is also considered an obstacle to concentration in classical Yoga. At YS I.31., we read: duḥkha-duṣṭaṃsya viṣṭevatāya upekṣaṇa-viṣṭevatāya vilāvatāḥ vikṣepasahahāvahāḥ ‘pain, dissatisfaction, moving of the [body] limbs, breathing in and out are accompanying factors to the distractions [listed in the preceding sūtra].’ (cf. Woods tr., p. 65). Vācaspāti’s gloss seems to imply that śvāsapravāsā refers here to non-controlled respiration (see Prasāda ed., p. 55; see also Woods tr. 65), which makes sense and also explains why breathing in and out is associated with distractions.

I have strong doubts as to the complete cessation of the respiratory process on the higher meditative levels (though Nāgasena and Vasubandhu do mean that it actually stops!). Recent medical research on altered states of consciousness and yogic practices has accumulated sufficient data to prove that various meditative attainments lead to a substantial decrease in the pulmonary activity, which is actually quite in tune with the sharp reduction of all metabolic functions accompanying such states. To the outside observer as well as to the meditator himself, respiration may become hardly perceptible, and this may have led Buddhist and Hindu scholars to postulate the possibility of stopping the breathing process.

2 The interpretation of the compound upekkṣāsmtipariśuddha differs in the Theraśāda Abhidhammic tradition. Vibh 261, 15-16, says: ayami sati imāya upekkhāya vivatā hoti parisuddhā pariyoḍaśā. tena vuccati “upekkhāsmtipariśuddhin” ti. ‘This mindfulness, because of this equanimity, is unobstructed, entirely pure, completely purified. Therefore, it is said “purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity.”’ (for the meaning of vivatā, see PTS, s.v. vunāṭi). Vism (136, § 194) adopts the same view (actually citing the Vibh in support of its interpretation), and adds: na kevalaṁ c’ettha tāya sati yeva parisuddhā, api kho sabbe pi sampayuttaśvādhammā. sattisāsappana desanā vutti ‘And not only is mindfulness purified by this [equanimity] here, but also [are] all the factors associated with it [purified].’

2 Here, too, Tib. (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0, 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0, etc.), cites the canonical formula depicting the first immaterial attainment (which lacks in Skt. and Ch.): de rnam pa thams cad du gzugs kyi ‘du shes rnams las yang dag par ‘das te | thogs pa’i ‘du shes rnams nub par gyur cing | sna tshogs kyi ‘du shes rnams yid la mi byed pas | nam mkha’ ’mtsa’ yas so snyam nam | nam mkha’ ’mtsa’ yas skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so = Skt. * sa sarvaśa rūpasamānānām samatiṃkramat pratighasanānānām astaṃgamām nānāvasanānānām amanasiṣkarād “ananantam ākāśam” ity ākāśanānāyatanam upasampadayu vihari. (The Skt. reconstructions follows here MVyut # 1492, with my punctuation). ‘Due to the complete surmounting of the ideation of matter, due to the disappearance of the ideation of resistance, due to not paying attention to the ideation of variety, [thinking] “space is infinite”, he [i.e., the ascetic] dwells having attained the station of the infinity of space’. See also DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 5-7 = Rahder ed. 34, 9-11; Paśca 168, 11-12; ArthVin18, 2-4, with the commentary at ArthVinNib 189, 1-190, 6; etc. The Pali counterpart runs as follows: sabbaso rūpasanānānām samatiṃkramāt pratighasanānānām astaṃgamām nānattasaṇānānām amanasiṣkarā “ananantam ākāśa” ti ākāsānaṇāyatanam upasampadayu vihari (AN IV 410, 13-15; see also MN I 41, 19-22; MN III 27, 7-9; SN III 237, 13-16; AN I 41, 3-5; ibid. 267, 3-6; Vibh 245, 17-19; etc.). A
similar formula is used to describe the fourth liberation (catuttho vimokho), a spiritual exercise virtually identical with the attainment of infinite space (see, e.g., Vibh. 342, 35-38).

In this and a few other occurrences below, I render adhimokṣa as ‘concentration’. I think that here this dynamic connotation is much stronger. It should not be forgotten, however, that the semantic sphere of the word also covers the result of this intense and repeated process, which is gaining ‘conviction’ with regard to the objects meditated upon. See note 15 above.

Skt. nilapitalohitāvadātī. Actually, nila could also mean ‘dark colour’ in general or ‘dark-green’ (MW, s.v.). In contrast to this, pīta may refer to white (or light) colours (PED, s.v.). In our passage here, the presence of avadāta makes it, however, more likely that pīta simply means ‘yellow’. In Buddhism, nilapitalohitāvadātī ‘dark-blue, yellow, red, and white’ are the four basic colours from which all other colours are derived (see AKbh p. 6, line 8 and lines 11-12 and AKVý p. 25, ll.8-9 and ll. 14-15; YoBh 4, 14-15; etc.).

This appears to be the meaning of the instrumental in anābhhasagatayā here and nirvidvirāgatayā below. See also notes 278 and 279 in Skt. crit. ed.

Hongjïng, quoted by To-ryun, explains the order of transcending the material sphere as consisting of three steps. 慕師解云：以於虛空起勝解故：初、過青黃等眼識相應想。次、過耳識身識及[I follow the Jin Canon; T has: 反; see Taishō, p. 473, n. 8.]縷五根意識等有對想。三、過第四靜慮下緣欲界飲食瓶衣及種種想[T reads: 相, with no var. lec., but it is clear from the context as well as the parallel sentences above that this must be scribal error for: 相].” (T42.473c16-19). ‘Master [Hongjîng elucidates [as follows]: “Due to the concentration upon the [infinity of] space: First, [the ascetic] surmounts the ideations associated with the visual cognition, such as dark-blue, yellow, etc. Next, [the ascetic] surmounts the ideations of resistant [things] (*sapratiṣṭhasa) [associated with] the auditive cognition, tactile cognition and the mental cognition which have the five sense faculties as its object [support], etc. Third, [the ascetic] surmounts the various ideations which have as their object [support] [things belonging to] the realm of pleasure [such as] drink, food, bowls, clothes, etc. which are below [the level of] the fourth absorption.’ The last sentence could also be construed as: ‘Third, [the ascetic] surmounts the various ideations [occurring in] the fourth absorption having their object [support] downwards in [things belonging to] the realm of pleasure [such as] drink, food, bowls, clothes, etc.’ The passage from the AMVbh quoted in note 215 below would rather seem to support the latter reading.

It is noteworthy that the SrBh authors/redactors do not mention and gloss upon sarvaśo ‘completely’, which appears in the canonical formula of this attainment (see note 208 above). It is not excluded that they did not consider it important or that they used an allotexte without sarvaśa (though the Tib. citation of the stock-phrase does contain rnam pa thams cad de). In the ArthVinNib (189, 2-190, 2), Vīryaśrīdatta is, however, definitely interested in glossing upon sarvaśa because of an important doctrinal problem underlying it. This refers to whether there is any matter (rūpa) in the immaterial spheres or not? The author concludes that not even the subtlest form of matter exists there (sūkṣma nap api rūpaṁ tatra nāsti | ArthVinNib 190, 1), siding thus with the Vaibhāṣikas (see note 5, p. 189, in the modern edition; cf. also AKbh 431, 17-22). This, however, was not the only view. According to the Mahāvibhāṣa, the Viśhyavādins held that there was some form of matter in the the ārāyanas (T27.431l6ff; see also Poussé vol. 5, p. 141, n. 2). The authors/editors of the SrBh may have found it more convenient to skip over the word and the difficult problems which it implied and focus instead on the practically relevant aspects of the canonical formula.

In a similar context, ArthVinNib (190, 2-3) comments as follows: pratīghasānījñā praśūt-ghātastavbhbāv [Samtani reads: praghātastavbhāv] | sā rūpaṁ anyonyāvaranāt sambhavati |. The ideation of resistance has the nature of opposition [prevention of free
movement]. It arises due to the mutual obstruction of the material objects.' See also Vibh 261, 31-37 and Vism 274, §§ 16-19.

Skt. *avaśīṣṭeṣu* is quite problematic. It is supported neither by the Tibetan translation nor by the Chinese rendering. Tib. *thsogs pa khyad par can rnam pa sna tshogs pa de dag nyid la suggests something like: *teṣy eva vicitreṣu visiṣṭeṣu [nānāprakāresu/nānāvidheṣu] pratighāteṣu.* Ch. reads: 所有於彼種種聚中差別想轉 = *yāḥ [...] teṣu nānāvidheṣu [vicitreṣu] samghāteṣu visiṣṭāḥ [visiṣṭa]-sanjñāḥ pravṛttāḥ (see also respective notes to Tib. ed. and Ch. ed.). The word *pratighāteṣu* suggested by Tib. is not excluded, but there are no compelling reasons to prefer it to samghāteṣu in the extent the extent Skt. (which is also supported by Ch.). On the other hand, whatever the original may have been, the 'diversity' suggested by both Tib. rnam pa sna tshogs pa and Ch. 種種 makes a much better reading than extent Skt. *avaśīṣṭeṣu.* The only way I can construe it is to explain ‘remaining’ as referring to the ideations not associated with sensual pleasure and aversion. According to Vibh (369, 32-33), kāmasaṃñāṇa vyāpādasaṃñāṇa vihīṃsāsaṃñāṇa: ayam vuccati nānattasaṃñāṇa ‘ideation [associated with] sensual pleasures, ideation [associated with] malice, ideation [associated with] violence: this is called the ideation of diversity.’ In our Śrābh passage, however, the diversity of ideation refers to the conceptualisation of the sense-data into diverse ‘things’, i.e., conventional objects (or, to follow the Tib. version, into the fictitious ‘wholes’ of everyday usage). No suggestion is made that such ideations as ‘food, …mountain, etc.’ are directly connected with sensual pleasures and desires. After all, kāma as such has already been abandoned at the stage of the first absorption. Buddhaghosa (Vism 273, § 15) clearly points out that the surmounting of ideation cannot occur for one who is not detached from the ideation object (ārammaṇe avirattassa saññāsamatikkamo na hoti). However, up to the level of the fourth absorption, the mind still preserves its cognitive capacity of conceiving images and ideas in general, which involve the epistemic operation of treating things as being differentiated (visiṣṭa). This, however, represents a source of distraction which can threaten the yogi’s meditative calm even at the level of the fourth absorption. Buddhavarman’s translation of the AMVibh (T No 1546) explains this as follows: 云何種種想思惟？謂: 第四禪中諸散想。問曰: 何故各種種想。答曰: 此想緣種種入故。染污者緣十入。不染污者緣十二入。問曰: 何故說無種種想思惟？答曰: 種種想, 維第四禪欲時, 極作留難, 令離欲法不相續。如守門人不令他入。彼亦如是。是故佛作是說: “不應思惟種種相, 應離第四禪欲.” (T28.362b2-9) ‘What is the thought [here apparently rendering *manaskāra*] [directed] at the ideation of diversity? Answer: “[It represents] the various distracted ideations [or: ideations [directed] here and there] during the fourth absorption.” Question: “Why is it called ideation of diversity?” Answer: “Because these ideations have diverse sense-fields (*āyatana) as their object. The defiled ones are based on ten sense-fields [which exclude mind and mental objects from the usual list of the sadāyatana]. The non-defiled ones are based on the twelve sense-fields.” Question: “Why is it said that there is no thought [directed] at the ideation of diversity?” Answer: “At the time when [one is about to] abandon the desire for the fourth absorption, [this] ideation of diversity strongly operates [as] an impediment and makes the factor [facilitating the] abandonment [of this meditative level] un[able to] continue [its functioning]. It is like a doorman who does not allow others to enter. This is the same [with the ideation of diversity]. Therefore, the Buddha said this: “[One] should not think of the ideation of diversity. [One] should leave the desire for the fourth absorption.”.’ It thus appears that the mere habit of forming ideation of diversity is considered a major obstacle to achieving the immaterial attainments. And it may be precisely this aspect which is hinted at by the word ‘remaining’ in our Śrābh passage here.

216 A more literal rendering is: ‘absolutely no orientation [of mind] to these operates for him’. The so-called ‘[mental] orientation’ (ābhoga) often appears used as a (quasi-)synonym of
Attention (manaskāra). In Pali canonical sources, it collocates with attention (manasikāra) and concentration (samānāhāra) (Vibh 321, 6-7; DN a 1122, 6-8 glossing upon cetaso abhogo at DN 1 37, 32-33, Mil 97, 10-11, only with manasikāra; etc.) (see CPD, s.v.; cf. also BHSD, s.v.) As we have seen in note 6 above, the AKbh and the Trim use the term abhoga to define manaskāra. In our Śrībh passage, too, abhoga < > py asya na pravartate is clearly employed as a synonymic explanation of amanaskārāt.

On liminal attainments and absorptions/attainments proper, see note 118 above.

According to AKbh 447, 8-10, maulānām kusālārūpyānām adhobhūmitam sāsravam vastu nālambanaṃ svārdbhūmyālambanatvāt | (...) sāmantakānamantaryamārgānāṃ tv adharā bhūmīr ālambanam | ‘A contaminated thing pertaining to the lower levels is not the [meditative] object of the wholesome, immaterial [attainments] proper because [the latter] have [as their meditative] object only what pertains to their own [level or the] level(s) above. [...] But the paths of non-obstruction [on the level of the] liminal [attainments] have the lower level as [their meditative] object’. (On the definition of the ānantaryamārga as well as the closely related prayogamārga, vimuktimārga, and viśesamārga, see AKbh 382, 1-3).

Ji devotes a whole paragraph to the discussion of our Śrībh gloss. In doing so, he largely relies on the concept of the ‘ninth [stage] of the path of liberation’ 第九解脫道. Ji frequently makes use of this Abhidharmic category, and actually both the path of non-obstruction (ānantaryamārga) and the path of liberation (vimuktimārga) are key-terms in his explanation of the seven contemplations 七作意 in the Śrībh. He considers that the first six contemplations coincide with the first nine stages of the path of non-obstruction and the first eight stages of the path of liberation 前九無間道八解脫道 and that they take place at the level of the liminal attainment 皆在近分定 (T43.120a26). The fruit of the culmination of the practice coincides with the ninth stage of the path of liberation and the attainment of the absorption proper 第九解脫道居根本靜慮 (T43.120a25-26). The ninth [stage of the] path of liberation (navamo vimuktimārgah) is also met with in Indian Abhidharmic texts. It refers to the complete emancipation from a certain level, whether the realm of sensual pleasures or a meditative absorption (see AKbh 409, 15-410, 2). It also marks the detachment from the summit of existence (bhavāgra) in the case of an Arhat (see ibid. 409, 8). To return to Ji’s Commentary, this is how the Chinese master elucidates the relation between various meditative levels and their object or support 伴 (ālambana): the ninth stage of the path of liberation coincides with the seventh contemplation and the attainment proper. In the first moment 刹那 (kṣaṇa) of obtaining the path of liberation, its meditative object comprises only the aggregates 諸蘊 of its own level 自地. In the second moment, the mind of the yogi obtains the aggregates of the levels above and below 由上地 as its meditative objects. However, the Chinese master adds, the Śrībh summarises the process and speaks only of the first moment. In the liminal attainment, the first nine stages of the path of non-obstruction contain aversion towards the lower level as their meditative object, while the first eight stages of the path of liberation contain the aggregates of the lower as well as upper levels as their object [cf. here AKbh 368, 6-14 and also AKV 576, 16-577, 8, but not exactly in the same sense as here]. But the Śrībh again simplifies the process and speaks only of the effect the of path of non-obstruction. (第四禪以上, 其第九解脫道第七作意唯在根本定中。其初得解脫道，此一剎那時，唯緣自地諸蘊。第二剎那心者得緣上下地蘊。今約最初一剎那解脫道義故，言亦緣自地諸蘊。若近分定前九無間道但緣下地生厭故，故言亦緣下地所有諸蘊。其前八解脫道亦緣上下地諸蘊。今約無間道說故，言亦緣下地諸蘊，而唯不遮近分根本，但緣上下及自地諸蘊。於近分定八解脫道不說論九無間故，言緣下蘊。於根本定，既初一剎那隱立第二剎那以去故，言亦緣自地蘊。故論文中不言唯緣自地諸蘊等，而言亦緣。此無間解脫道如前初禪中解。若與顯揚對法第二卷相違。如彼有
The wording of the sentence is admittedly difficult and rather confusing. The Xianyang lun explains the process more concisely: "無邊識者謂：緣無邊虛空之識；今緣此為境界。" (T31.487c13-14). ‘Infinite conscious’ is the consciousness which has infinite space as its object; now, [the ascetic] makes this [consciousness] [his] object’. The gist of the psychological process appears to be the following: in the act of contemplating the infinity of the space, the consciousness assumes the attribute of boundlessness which characterizes its very object. Space is no longer necessary as a meditative support and can therefore be transcended. By surmounting space, the ascetic attains the sphere of infinite consciousness, i.e., a state of consciousness contemplating itself as an infinite object.

221 Roughly speaking, the psychological process presented here is not different from the one described in the Vism. In tune with the Theravāda Abhidhamma, Buddaghosa does not use the concepts of liminal attainment and attainment proper. Instead, ‘approach concentration’ (upacārasamādhi) and ‘absorption concentration’ or ‘concentration of complete focusing [of the mind]’ (appanāsamādhi) (Vism 102, §§ 32-33), which approximate the same functions, are employed. Speaking of the way to attain the station of infinite consciousness, Buddaghosa explains: "tass' evam tasmām nimitte punappuṇam cittan cārentassa nīvaraṇāni vikkhambhanti, sati santithāt, upacāraṇa cittam samādhiyati" (Vism 276, § 26) ‘For him who thus repeatedly directs [his] mind to this characteristic [image], the hindrances are surpressed [blocked], [his] mindfulness is firmly established, and [his] mind is concentrated by means of the approach [concentration].’

222 The PPUpad explains the whole process of this attainment with more clarity. While contemplating the space, the ascetic takes the feelings (vedanā), ideations (samjñā), impulses and volition (saṅskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna) associated with this contemplation as a disease, etc. ‘Having formulated such thoughts, [he] abandons space [as] an object and [makes] consciousness [his] sole object’ (如是念已，捨虛空緣，但緣識。T25.186c6-7). ‘This consciousness is boundless and infinite just as space is boundless and infinite (是識無量無邊，如虚空無量無邊。T25.186c8-9).

223 Unlike the other glosses above, the Skt. MS of the ŚrīBh (as well as Ch.) cites here the canonical formula almost entirely (omitting only the pronoun sa). Of course, Tib., too, contains the complete stock-phrase as it does above (see Tib. 3.28.3.1.0., 3.28.3.2.0., 3.28.3.3.0., 3.28.3.4.0., 3.28.3.5.0., and 3.28.3.6.0.). Let us note that the citation in our passage here is identical with MVyut # 1494 but slightly different from DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 8, which reads sa sarvaso vijñānānantaṃ yāyatanasaṃtikramat (= Rahder ed. 34, 13-14, but reading samatikramān
due to sandhi). The Pali parallel reads: sabbaso viññānaññāyatanam samatikkamma “n’aththi kīcī” ti akīcchāññāyatanam upasampajja vihārati (AN IV 410, 17-19; etc.). For other sources, see note 208 above.

Skt. past participle uccalito does not mean that the yogi has actually proceeded upwards. It rather seems to imply that the ascetic is ‘driven to proceed upwards/advance’ or that he ‘has set out for moving up’ or, more concretely, ‘has jumped up [in order to attain the upper level]’. Ch. 求上進 ‘seeking to proceed upwards [/advance]’ aptly conveys the meaning here. See also passage 3.28.3.8.1. below.

Skt. ālambana ‘object’. So far, I have translated the word as ‘meditative object’. Here its sense is, however, more general: not only that the meditative support cannot be perceived but there is no perceivable cognitive object whatsoever. I think that in this context, it is, therefore, preferable not to limit the meaning of ālambana to ‘meditative object’. The Ch. translation of this passage is quite relevant in that it uses 境, 境性, and 境界 for ālambana, though so far in our chapter (and many other passages in the Śrī Bh.), the term has been translated as 緣.

I construe kīcchā pratisamuyuktām rūpi vā arūpi vā as a post-verbal aditional phrase qualifying ālambana in this sentence. Though often separated by a few words from the noun which they modify (like in our passage), such constructions occur frequently in Pali and Buddhist Sanskrit texts.

Buddhaghosa (Vism 277, § 35) gives an illuminating simile as to what precisely meditating on (or rather, in!) the station of nothing whatsoever means. Suppose, he says, a man witnesses the scene of monks gathering in a place like the monastery hall, etc. (māndalamālādīsas). With the completion of their ecclesiastical meeting, the bhikkhus will all leave, and then after a while the man comes back alone to the hall. ‘Standing in the doorway, looking again at that place, he sees it just empty, just deserted. It does not occur to him: “So many of the monks [once gathered here] have passed away, or [so many of the monks] have left the region”, but [only] “this [place] is empty, deserted”; he [thus] sees only the absence [lit., the state of no [one] being [there]].’ (dvāre thāvā puna taṁ ṭhānaṁ olokeno suṁṇam eva passati, vivittan eva passati, nāsa evaṁ hoti: “ettākā nāma bhikkhū kālāṅkatā vā, disāppakatā vā” ti, aṭṭha kho: “suṁṇam idāṁ, vivittan” ti natthibhāvaṁ eva passati; with my punctuation). In brief, the state seems to be an awareness of cognitions and perceptions, with no disturbing ratiocinative inference as to what this absence is.

Tib. contains the whole citation of the canonical formula describing the fourth immaterial attainment as a passage apart at the beginning of the section (see also Tib. ed. 3.28.3.1.0, 3.28.3.2.0, 3.28.3.3.0, 3.28.3.4.0, 3.28.3.5.0, and 3.28.3.6.0. above). For this passage there is no direct parallel in Skt. However, at the end of passage 3.28.3.8.3. below, Tib. repeats the citation: de rnam pa tham cad du ci yang med pa ’i skye mched las yang dag par ’das nas | ‘du shes med ‘du shes med min skye mched bsgrubs te gnas so, which corresponds to Skt.: sarvasa aṅkiccaññayatana<ś> samatikramya naivasamjñānāsāmjñāyatanam upasampadya vihārati (only sa is omitted: cf. MVyut # 1495, in Sakaki’s spelling: sarvaso and nāiva; see also Daś Bh Rahder Kondō ed. 56, 9-10, which reads: “samatikramāo naivasamjñānasamjñāyati […]; Daś Bh Rahder ed. 34, 15-16, has, however, “samatikramān naivasamjñānasamjñāyatanam […], omitting naivasamjñānasamjñāyati). ‘Having completely surmounted the station of nothing whatsoever, [the ascetic] dwells having attained the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation’. The Pali parallel reads: sabbaso aṅkiccaññayatanam samatikkamma nevasamjñānasamjñāyatanam upasampajja vihārati (AN IV 410, 19-20; etc.). For other sources, see note 208 above.

Skt. animittālambane. The compound could also be construed as ‘an object of [which] no characteristic [/image] is perceived’. See also the gloss found in To-ryun’s Commentary (T42.474b2-4). Cf. the various doctrinal and psychological explanations concerning this state in
the AMVibh (T27.433c1-21).

Vism (280, § 50) explains: sā patuṣsāṅkiccaṁ kātuṁ asamathatāya n’eva saṅnā, sankhārvasesasukhumabhāvena vijamanāttā nāsaṅnā ‘this is neither ideation because it is incapable to perform [its usual] function of sharp ideation, nor [is it] non-ideation because it [still] exists in a subtle form [in so far as only] a latent impulse [of it] remains’. Cf. also ArthVinNibh 191, 3-5.

Actually, as made clear by Tib., this is rather a gloss on the final part of the formula.

Buddhaghosa gives two similes which illustrate this state. In the first one (Vism 281, § 51), a novice (sāmaṣera) lays aside a bowl (patta) after having smeared (makkhetvā) it with oil (telena). Later, when the elder (thera) asks him to bring that bowl, the novice tells him that there is oil in it. Hearing this, the elder requires the novice to bring the oil in order to fill the tube (nāli) used as a storage container. But this time the novice replies, ‘Venerable, there is no oil’ (n’atthi, bhante, telam), meaning, of course, not enough to be poured into the tube. In the second simile (Vism 281, § 54), a novice who walks ahead of an elder sees some water (thokam udakonī) on the road and warns the therā to remove his sandals (upāhana). The elder, not knowing how much water is there, wishes to bathe. This makes the novice tell the elder that there is no (n’atthi) water, this time in the sense that its quantity is not sufficient to bathe in. The similes are quite illustrative. (I wonder whether apart from their illustrative function, the similes were also intended to contain a touch of ecclesiastical humour.) Both attempt to account for the seemingly illogical expression ‘neither X nor non-X’ by showing that seen from different angles, the same reality can be described, with equal validity, as existing and not existing.

Sh (see note 329 to Skt. crit. ed.) and the editors of ZT (see note 598 to Tib. ed.) seem to take this passage as belonging to the next section which expounds the two attainments without mental activity. From the viewpoint of its content, the passage is, however, related to the absorptions (see dhyānasamāpattikāle in the text) and immaterial attainments (see ārūpyasamāpattikāle). Actually, the scribe of the Śrībh MS uses  ||  before and after this passage, which clearly marks that he (and/or the scribal tradition behind him?) understood this as a section in its own (but, admittedly, the punctuation of our MS is far from being a model of consistency). The Chinese, Korean, and Japanese traditions, as reflected by the editorial and exegetical literature, also understand this as a passage connected with the preceding section. In the traditional Canons which adopt the convention of opening paragraphs at the beginning of new sections, this passage is included in the preceding section (on immaterial attainments) and the start of the new paragraph coincides with the section on the two attainments without mental activity (see ZT (Jin) 668c10; Koryō 742a10; Qisha 343a13). The same is the situation reflected in modern editions (Shukusatsu daizōkyō 156a12; Manji daizōkyō. Taiwan ed., 0119a12; T 469a4) as well as in KDK, p. 149 and KJK, p. 244.

The precise meaning of the passage is not easy to understand. This is largely due to rasātala, a word quite intriguing, especially for a Buddhist text dedicated to meditation. The main lexicographical sources render it as Unterwelt, Hölle; N. einer der 7 Unterwelten (PW, s.v.) or ‘one of the seven hells or regions under the earth’, ‘the lower world or hell in general’ (MW, s.v.). This does not fully reflect the complex imagery associated with the term. The seven subterranean worlds are a major feature of the Hindu cosmology (see Kirfel [1920] 1967, 143-147). They were adopted in the Vedānta philosophy (see Dass Gupta [1922] 1991, vol. 2, p. 76; see also Vedāntasūtra 78, § 163: bhūrāticaturdāśabhavanā) and also mentioned byVyāsa in his Commentary ad Yogasūtra III.25 (Prasāda ed., pp. 225-226). These otherworlds are not to be confused with the hells proper (naraka), though they are populated by demonic beings, snakes, etc. and occasionally are described as places whose denizens suffer some form of punishment (see Hopkins 1915, 111).

To limit our discussion to Rasātala, the term does not appear in all variants of the seven
worlds (see Kīrīṭa [1920] 1967, 144), but when it does, it is the sixth or the seventh level of these subterranean spheres. In the Rāmāyaṇa (1.39.21) and the Mahābhārata (V.3602), it is the lowest of the netherworlds (Kīrīṭa [1920] 1967, 145). One possibility to interpret the ŚṛBh passage here is that the term ‘Rasātala’, in the sense of the bottom level of the subterranean realm, was used as a metonymy for all the worlds under the earth. (If this is true, the random choice of any other level would have certainly been less meaningful as a stylistic device.)

According to the Purāṇas, the inhabitants of Rasātala are the Dānavas who are powerful enemies of the gods but have been subdued by Lord Hari and now live in fear of Indra (Kīrīṭa [1920] 1967, 147; see also the translation of the Bhāgavataapurāṇa in Dimmitt and van Buitenen 1978, 349-350). In this sense, Rasātala may appear like a hell (and inasmuch as the Dānavas had to submit to and fear the gods, it may be considered so), but the overall image of these netherworlds is not always that of a gloomy place of ordeal and agony. According to the Bhāgavataapurāṇa (Dimmitt and van Buitenen 1978, 348), the Dānavas as well as the denizens of other subterranean worlds lead household lives with families, friends, and servants. The cities of these netherworlds are sumptuously adorned and the ‘floors are teeming with loving couples of Snakes and Asuras, doves, parrots and mynah birds. Their gardens outshine the beauty of the world of the Immortals […]’ (ibid.). The lack of sunlight is compensated, ‘for the jewls in the hoods of the great Snakes dispel all darkness’ (ibid.). One verse in the Rāmāyaṇa (V.102.11) actually goes as far as to declare that ‘no heaven is so blessed a place’ (Hopkins 1915, 61) as Rasātala.

It is very difficult to say which was the precise image which the authors/editors of the ŚṛBh had in mind. Admittedly, many of the Purāṇas are later than the ŚṛBh (though they may be based on earlier materials), but as much as one can be certain in the quicksands of Indian chronology, at least large parts (if not most of) the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa must have been in circulation when our work was being forged into a whole (ca. 3rd century C.E.; see Chapter Five above). With quite a few Buddhist scholar-monks coming from Brahmā families, their familiarity with Hindu literature and mythology would come as no surprise at all. What is intriguing is that the term rasātala does not seem to occur in any Buddhist source (as far as I know) and its introduction from the Hindu tradition does not appear to be doctrinally or stylistically imperative for our text. (The underworlds in general are not a feature of the Buddhist cosmology as set forth in the YoBh; see also Kajiyama 2000.) The only related term which I could locate in Buddhist literature is pāṭāla, another netherworld of Hindu cosmology, whose place varies (the first, second, third, and, quite often, the seventh level; see Kīrīṭa [1920] 1967, 144-145). Again, it is risky to establish a forced semantic linkage between the two words in the absence of positive textual evidence in Buddhist literature, but their lexical association in classical Sanskrit suggests that such a relation is not totally impossible. Actually, some passages in the Rāmāyaṇa seem to make no difference between Rasātala and Pāṭāla (Hopkins 1915, 61).

The word pāṭāla occurs in the Pali Canon a few times (SN I 32, 25; ibid. 127, 16; ibid. 197, 17; Th 1104; Jā III 530, 21; Mil 286, 27-28; etc.). SN IV 206 contains a sutta actually called Pāṭāla, in the word which is employed as a simile for the feeling of bodily pains (sārīrīkānaṁ [...] dukkhānaṁ vedanānaṁ adhivacananti). The meaning in all of the above texts appears to be that of ‘abyss’ or ‘bottomless pit’, though some occurrences may also denote or connotate ‘hell’. For instance, pāṭālarājo at SN I 197, 17, may suggest ‘hell’ (rāja means ‘dust’ or ‘dirt’ and here may also have the connotation of rajas in Classical Sanskrit, i.e., ‘gloom’ or ‘darkness’; the compound could, therefore, be construed as ‘the gloom of the abyss’). In many other occurrences, we could say with sufficient certainty that pāṭāla appears to be a bottomless pit, mainly associated with the ocean (cf. also Mrs Rhys Davids’s note to verse 1104 of Th, in Engl. tr., p. 418). It is interesting that at SN IV 206, 7-10, the existence of a pāṭāla in the great ocean.
(mahāsāmuddde) is denied and such a belief is attributed to ignorant ordinary people (assutavā putthujano). The far-from-ignorant Nāgasena, however, seems to find no problem with this ‘geography’ and takes it as a matter of fact (see Mil 286, 27-28). The word pātāla is also found in Buddhist Sanskrit sources (e.g., BhiKvin 149, 2, in a stanza similar to Th 1104 (see above); Laṅk 98, 7), and as far as I can see, it is used in a sense similar to the Pali texts examined above.

Now, what are we to make of the term rasātala in our ŚrīBh passage after this excursus in mythical geography? Our text is too elliptic, and unfortunately, no definitive conclusion can be reached. Roughly speaking, however, it can be reasonably assumed that Rasātala is used here as a metonymy for the netherworld. Which connotations are associated with it remains, nonetheless, unclear. It does not seem very likely that Rasātala was meant to be an image of paradisiac splendour in this context. Was it used as a more general symbol of a silent, self-contained (albeit dark!) realm far away from the maddening world of the sensual pleasures? This, too, could be a possibility. Or did the authors of the ŚrīBh intend Rasātala to evoke the gloomy, uncomfortable, and confined world under the earth? If so, it would serve as a metaphor of the limited freedom which the yogi possesses in the material sphere (as narrow as a subterranean world!). Compared to this, the ārūpyasamāpattis allow the yogi to transcend all bonds of matter and make him feel as if flying up in the sky. It is true that much of the Buddhist literature relegates the immaterial attainments to the position of an appendix to the dyānas, themselves usually regarded as an ancillary or optional practice on the path to Awakening. We find, however, some canonical passages which seem to grant the immaterial attainments a more important role. At MN I 410, 28-30, for instance, the meditator wishing to attain the immaterial stations thinks: dissante kho rāpaśādikaranai daṇḍādāna-satthādāna-kalahā-viggaha-vivāda-tuvantuva-pesuṅña-musāvāda, n’athī kho pan’ etam sabbaso āruppe [I follow the reading of the quotation in Vism (see below); PTS ed. has: aritepi] ti. ‘Because of matter (rūpa) do taking up a staff, taking up a [stabbing] weapon, strife, quarrel, dispute, contention, slander, [and] untrue words occur, but nothing of this whatsoever is in the immaterial [states].’ In the Vism, Buddhaghosa cites this passage at the beginning of his chapter on immaterial states, adding that the meditator sees detriment in matter in the form of eye-disease, ear-disease, etc. (c’eva cakkhu-sotārogādaṇna ca abādhasahasasānaṃ vasena karajarīpe adinavai disvā [...]) Vism 271, § 1) (in Pali literature, the list of diseases often begins with the eye, ear, etc. (e.g., Nidd I 13, 2) and in their most developed forms include (or should include) 98 afflictions; see PED, s.v. roga). The ŚrīBh passage may have echoed such ideas and compared the absorptions to the uncomfortable world of Rasātala and the immaterial attainments to the freedom of flying up in the sky. Though not the only possibility, I think that this is the most probable line of interpretation.

Finally, we should also consider the possibility that rasātala may be a corrupt reading. I cannot, however, think of any suitable emendation, and neither the Tib. nor the Ch. suggest a better lection. Tib. sa’i ‘og tu ‘under the earth’ or ‘underground’ clearly refers to a subterranean world. The Ch. has a reading which I find even more obscure: 處室 ‘staying in a room’. This reflects, in all likelihood, a different MS. The fact that in Ch. there is no equivalent for Skt. adho further corroborates my hypothesis that Xuanzang’s MS must have been worded differently here. The phrase 處室 is found in several places throughout the Chinese canon (e.g., T1.309a28; T13.812b6; T15.31a20 (actually 處室字); and T35.785a24, in what appears to be a close paraphrase of our ŚrīBh passage). Though all these occur in a related context (‘sitting in a room’ for the purpose of meditation), none of them provides us with a clue for our ŚrīBh passage. (One also recalls suṇāgara ‘empty room’ (e.g., DN II 291, 3, etc.), as a standard recommendation for meditation practitioners, but this, too, has no particular relevance here.) No matter whether Xuanzang’s MS read ‘room’ instead of Rasatāla or, less likely, whether the Chinese master
choose to render Rasaṭāla (quite!?) freely as ‘room’, 處室 ‘staying in a room’ can serve as an image of being in a self-contained world or as a contrast to the infinity of the sky. This actually appears, I believe, to be the way how Xuanzang and Chengguan (T35.785a24) construed the phrase. See also notes 255 and 256 to Ch. ed.

We must add that the image of Rasaṭāla and the sky in our passage, whatever their precise meaning(s) may have been, are not used for their poetical value only. The main interest of the Śrībh authors seems to focus here on two points intimately linked to the spiritual praxis: (1) there are some physical signs or changes in the bodily appearance of the yogi who reaches the dhyānas and immaterial samāpattis, signs which he (as well as probably the master guiding him) can and should know; and (2) though these are good signs indicating the mastery of these meditative states, the ascetic should not become infatuated with them and lose his tranquillity. Unfortunately, we have no detailed description of the actual signs, but to an ‘initiated’ reader and listener in the tradional yagic circles, the images must have struck a familiar note.

The idea that the attainment of non-ideation is cultivated and reached only by ordinary people while the attainment of cessation is the exclusive ‘province’ of the Noble Ones is also expressed at Kv-a 157, 10; AKBh 69, 14-16; 70, 15-26, 72, 13; BoBh 90, 10-11; etc. See also notes below.

Skt. naivasamjñānāsamjñāoccaltenālambanasamniruddhena ca manaskāraṇa. The exact interpretation of the compound is not easy. My rendering above is based on understanding it as an (absolutive) tapurusa. Tib. construes it as ‘du shes med ‘du shes med min skyed mched las bskyod cing dmigs pa yang dag par ‘gags pa’i yid la byed pas ‘contemplation [characterised by] the meditative object having ceased [/stopped’]. Ch., on the other hand, translates as: 由從非求非求思欲求上進, 暫時止息所作意以之為首‘due to [/by means of] seeking to proceed upwards from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation [and due to/by means of] taking the contemplation of temporarily suppressing the meditative object [/support] as the main factor’. This is obviously more developed than the extant Skt. and Tib. (see note 263 to Ch. ed.), but apart from this, the main difference appears in taking samniruddhena in an active sense. This is not impossible in BHS, and if this was meaning intended by our authors, then the rendering of naivasamjñānāsamjñāoccaltenālambanasamniruddhena ca manaskāraṇa should be ‘contemplation which has proceeded upwards from [the station of] neither ideation nor non-ideation and has suppressed the meditative object’ or ‘contemplation which has suppressed the meditative object [by] having proceeded upwards from [the station of] neither ideation nor non-ideation’. I think, however, that reading samniruddhena in an active sense in our compound here is less likely.

The idea that the attainment of cessation is obtained by proceeding upwards from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation is also found at AKBh 70, 7-8; 72, 12; AbhSam, 10, 12; etc. Our passage does not refer directly to the level (bhūmi) on the basis of which the attainment of non-ideation is achieved, but its mentioning of becoming ‘detached from [the Heaven of] the Splendid Perfection [but] not detached from [the Heaven of] the Great Reward’ (see passage 3.28.4.2. below) hints at the fourth absorption (catutradhyāna). The doctrine that the attainment of non-ideation relies upon the fourth absorption is actually set forth at AKBh 69, 5; 72, 12; AbhSamBh 9, 15-16; AbhAv (Matsuda ed.) 37, 29-38, 1; etc.

Skt. and Pali ganda as a pathological condition means ‘Kropf und andere Halsanschwellungen’ (PW, s.v.), ‘goitre or any other excrescence on the neck’ (MW, s.v.), ‘a swelling, esp. as a disease, an abscess, a boil’ (PED, s.v.). The term is also used in canonical sources as a simile for the body (kāya) or sensual pleasures (kāma) (cf. PED, s.v.). A very concrete (and quite graphic!) description of ganda is found at AN IV 386, 16-21, which clearly points at a boil (though its anatomical location is not specified) said to have nine wound openings (nava vaṇamukhāni) and suppurring puss (asuci yeva pagghareyya). This boil is
declared to be 'a metaphor [/designation] of this body made up from the four elements [...]'
(gaṇḍa ti kho bhikkwe imass' etam cātumahābhūtikassa kāyassa adhivacanām[…] ; see also p. 386, ll. 22-23). The same metaphor is found in the Uddakasutta (SN IV 83, 24-25). Here, however, we have no details about gaṇḍa as a pathological condition, and the main image employed in the text, i.e., gaṇḍamāla, appears to have the more general sense of 'root of illness' (cf. SN-a II 386, 20, which equates gaṇḍamāla with dukkhamāla). (For gaṇḍa as metaphor for sexual pleasures, see note 239 below.) Vism (301, § 71) mentions gaṇḍa as one of the places where pus (pubba) is produced.

As might be expected, medical literature offers more precise and detailed descriptions. CarSam (Cikitsāsthāna, 12.79ab) makes the following distinction: galasya pārśve galagaṇḍa ekaḥ syād gaṇḍamālā bahubhis tu gaṇḍaiḥ. 'On the side of the throat [/pharynx] would galagaṇḍa be [found] [and] one [in number], but gaṇḍamālā is made up of many swellings'. Sharma (CarSam, vol. 2, p. 199) renders the former term as 'goitre' and the latter as 'cervical adenitis' (incidentally, his translation of gala is 'pharynx'). The latter half of the stanza goes on to say that these 'swellings' can be curable, but if accompanied by coriza, pain in sides, cough, fever, and vomiting, they may turn into incurable diseases (I follow Sharma's translation of the terms). Gaṇḍaṇḍa (goitre) also appears in the chapter on swellings, whose generic name in the CarSam is sōtha, as a disturbance of kapha within the throat (Sūrāsthāna, 18.21). Gaṇḍa also appears with a similar sense in the Pali medical tradition. Bhes uses it several times (ch. 1, ver. 96, ch. 2, ver. 26, ch. 11, 130, etc.), and according to Liyanarate (Bhes Engr. tr., p. 15, n. 7), the term encompasses galagaṇḍa 'goitre' and gaṇḍamālā, which the translator renders as 'glandular tumescence round the neck'.

It is difficult to know whether our Śrībh authors had in mind the general sense of boil (or, even more generically, illness?) or a particular meaning of one or the whole group of cervical tumecences. In view of the canonical antecedents, I would rather favour the first alternative, though I do not rule out a more technical usage, which appears to be hinted at by the Tib. and Ch. renderings. According to BTsh, s.v., Tib. bbras seems to refer to a solid lump about the size of a grape formed from coagulation of infected blood (caused, in its turn, by fatigue or [improper] diet) and containing pus. The Chinese equivalents given in BTsh are 脸疮 'scrofula' and 肿核 'tumoural lump (?)', in which case, if the renderings are medically accurate, the former would point at the cervical region as gaṇḍa does in its Indian medical usage. Xuanzang's rendering 颞 yong appears even more closely associated with the latter meaning. The character is usually defined as a 'malignant swelling or tumour' mainly appearing on the face, neck, or back (DKWJ, s.v.). HDC, s.v., which renders it as 'abscess' 肿疮, describes the condition as a cutaneous or subcutaneous inflammation, mainly occurring on the neck and back and accompanied by chilliness and fever. In severe cases, the HDC says, the disease can evolve into septicemia. The examples given here by HDC are from the Zhuangzi 莊子, Records of the Historian 史記, etc. (these classical occurrences do not, however, elaborate upon the details of the disease). Chinese medical literature suggests, however, other usages as well. In the Huangdi nei jing su wen (actually not mentioned in either DKWJ or HDC), 瘡 is used to describe a stomach tumour (or ulcer?) resulting from an abnormal movement of the stomach energy 氣 upwards and the ensuing accumulation of heat in the upper region of the stomach (vol. 2, pp 195-196). It is not perfectly clear how Xuanzang construed the term, but in the light of the more general usage of 瘡 as well as the sense of gaṇḍa in Indian sources, the meaning of pathological swelling round the neck seems more likely. (Did Xuanzang receive first-hand information in India about such technical terms?)

239 The function of iti here seems to be that of explaining the content of the contemplation which turns away from ideation (saṃjñāvimukham manaskārami) as consisting in saṃjñā rogaḥ
[...] yadutāsamījñikam. The content of the contemplation is based upon the following canonical formula: saññā rogō saññā ganḍo saññā sallan, etam santam paśitam yaddam asaṇhītan ti (MN II 230, 17-19). ‘Ideaion is [like] illness, ideation is [like] a boil, ideation is [like] an arrow; serene is this [and] exquisite, to wit, [the state of] non-ideation.’ The sentence is actually quoted as representing the stance of some recluses and brahmans (samaṇabrāhmaṇa) who criticise others postulating that the self has ideation and is unimpaired after death (saññīni attānam paññāpentī arogīm param maraṇī, p. 230, l. 16). The theme of the suttā is the exposition and refutation of various philosophical speculations as to the nature of the self. We also find a similar statement about ideation in the Chinese translation of the Madhyamāgama: 優陀羅摩子如是見，如是說：“有<想>[T and KiK, Agon, vol. 5, p. 143 read 有 only, without any variae lectiones; the content of the scripture as well as 無想者 below makes the addition of 想 preferable]者是病，是癡，是刺，設無想者是愚癡也。若有所覺是止息是妙，謂乃至非有想非無想處。(T1.603a10-12) (愚癡 is probably a rendering of saññomha—see AKBh below). This is a sutra presenting the views of Udraka Rāmaputta (the text partially corresponds to SN IV 83-84, but the latter does not contain the whole citation above). Actually, such canonical formulae appear to be the source of Vasubandhu’s citations at AKBh (436, 9-10) (see Pāsādīka 1989a, p. 120, # 486). This is a passage which describes the way in which the ascetic prepares himself to reach the fourth immaterial attainment: […] prayuyyate saññī na rogā, saññī ganḍa, saññī sālaya; āsaññīkāma saññomha, etac chāntam, etat prājīta, yaduta naivasamījñāṇasaññīḥavyatanam (Pradhan reads: prayuyyante; but see Yaśomitra’s quotation at AKVī 671, 18; cf. also Pāsādīka 1989a, p. 120, # 486) (Pradhan reads: āsaññīkīka, while MS has: āsaññīkāka (see AKBh p. 436, n. 3) and AKVī 671, 19, reads: āsaññīkāha; I think that āsaññīkāma makes the best reading). ‘The following is practised—“ideation is [like] illness, ideation is [like] a boil, ideation is [like] an arrow; [the state of] non-ideation is complete unconsciousness; serene is this, exquisite is this, to wit, the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation”’ (for saññomha as ‘unconsciousness’, see AKVī 671, 19-20: āsaññīkīka saññomha [Wogihara reads: āsaññīkīkaḥ saññomaha; see my remark above] iti: saññīyā ābhāvo hi saññomaha-kāraṇam ‘[the state of] non-ideation is complete unconsciousness: for non-existence of ideation is the cause of complete unconsciousness’).

The similes of illness, boil, and arrow appear in the Pali Canon frequently employed in connection with sensual pleasures. Probably, one of the oldest occurrences is Sn 51, which urges the ascetic to see kāma in the following way: ‘calamity, boil, misfortune, disease, arrow, and danger is this for me’ (iti ca ganḍa ca upadāvo ca | rogo ca sallan ca bhaya ca m’etam). AN IV 289, 20-23; 290, 3-4, declares: ‘illness is a metaphor [/designation] for sensual pleasures, boil is a metaphor [/designation] for sensual pleasures, arrow is a metaphor [/designation] for sensual pleasures’ (rogo ti bhikkhave kāmān etam adhivacanaṃ, ganḍo ti bhikkhave kāmān etam adhivacanaṃ, [...] (similar phrases at AN III 310, 29-311, 1, but without sallan [...]). See also Thi 491, SN IV 64, 33 (as metaphors for ejā ‘agitation’), etc. Sometimes, we also find these metaphors as methods of contemplating the five aggregates (MN I 435, 34; AN IV 25: rogato ganḍato sallato). In the AMVīb, they are similes for the five aggregates to which one clings (pañca(cpādāna-skandhā): 胴尊者言： "修觀行者知五取賊知病，如癡，如箭等已，次求其因，知是集諦." (T27.404c24-26) Venerable Pārśva says: "Having realized that the five aggregates [to which one] clings are like an illness, like a boil, like an arrow, etc., the yogi next seeks for their cause, [and] realises that this is the Truth of Origination". (Venerable Pārśva was one of the Sarvāstivādin Patriarchs and editors of the Mahāvībāṣā.) 五取賊 are the pañca(cpādāna-skandhā. My rendering of the term as the ‘five aggregates to which one clings’ is based on Schmithausen 1987a, vol. 1, p. 24. Another possibility of construing the compound is the ‘five
items as inviting appropriation (upādāṇiya), which is suggested by Vetter (2000, 80). Vetter also suggests ‘branch of appropriation’ for upādāṇekkhandha (ibid., p. 81); his analysis of the concept in early Pali sources is found in ibid., pp. 73-82.

240 The person formulating such a thought is an ordinary person (prthagjana). Ch., most likely as part of its editorial clarifications, clearly expresses this: 諸異作如是念. Doctrinally speaking, the person engaged in this praxis may be a meditator below the level of a Stream-Enterer, a lay practitioner, or a non-Buddhist yogi.

241 Skt. sacittikāvasthā. SABh (Schmithausen ed.) 222, 8-19 defines the concept as follows: sad avasthāh sthāpayīvā sacittikā bhūmir veditavyā ‘the level with mental activity should be understood [as referring to all states] with the exception of the six states’. The latter include sleep without thought, i.e., dreamless sleep (acittikamiddhāvasthā), attainment of non-ideation (asamjñāsamāpatti), attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), etc. and represent the level without mental activity (acittikā bhūmiḥ).

242 The Heavenly World [/Abode] of Splendid Perfection (Śubhakṛṣṇa) is one of the planes of the third absorption, while the Heaven of the Great Reward [or: Abundant/Full-Grown Fruit] (Bṛhatphala) is one of the spheres of the fourth absorption. They are both part of the Buddhist cosmography and can be traced to early canonical sources. (For a general survey of the Heavenly Worlds in both Pali and Northern Buddhist literature, see Kirfel [1920] 1967, 190-198.) In the Pali Canon, they are known as Subhaṅkīna (var. lec.: Subhaṅkīha) (e.g. DN II 69, 8-10; MN I 2, 19-22; MN III 102, 31-32; etc.) and Vehapphala (e.g. MN I 2, 22-26; MN III 103, 1; etc.) respectively.

Later Abhidharmic and commentarial sources give more systematic presentations of these cosmic planes arranged and attained according to the meditative levels. E.g. MN-a I 35, 19-21 and 25-26 (explaining the meaning of the abodes names); Abhidh-s Tīkā 126, 4-6 and 8-9 (also explaining the meaning of the abode names); AKBh 111, 23-24; AKVy 255, 14-16 and 19-21 (also explaining the meaning of the abodes names); YoBh 76, 1-2; Śr Bh 468, 16 and 18 (see passages 3.28.6.3. and 3.28.6.4. respectively below); BoBh 62, 4-5; etc.

AKBh 68, 19, gives more details: Bṛhatphalā nāma devā yesāṁ kecid asaṁjñikāḥ pradeśe bhavanti. ‘Gods named Bṛhatphalā, some of whom, in a [certain] region [of this Heaven], are beings with no ideation’ (Xuanzang apparently renders pradeśe as 高騰處 (T29.24b19) ‘a high [elevated] place’). YoBh 76, 3, also says: Asaṁjñikāṁ [which probably it should be emended to Asaṁjñikām] Bṛhatpalaparyāpamottvān na sthānāntaram. ‘Because of being included in the Bṛhatphalā, [the Abode of] Non-ideation is not a different place [from Bṛhatphalā]’ (Ch. (T30.295a9) renders Asaṁjñikāṁ as 無想天 ‘Heaven of Non-Ideation’). In the Southern tradition, a similar statement is found at MN-a I 35, 31-32: Asaṁkṣasattā devā Vehapphelahi saddhīṁ ekatalā eva ‘The gods who are beings with no ideation are indeed at the same level with the gods in Vehapphala’ (Vehapphala being the Pali equivalent of Bṛhatphala).

The idea expressed in our Śr Bh passage as well as in the similar fragment in the AbhSam (see note 244 below) is that the prthagjana yogi has abandoned his attachment to the third absorption level (whose highest plane is Śubhakṛṣṇa) but has not yet become detached from the fourth dhyāna. (Cf. the similar explanation is also found in the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論 (T31.37b25-26: 有異生伏遍薀貪，未伏上染。) Actually, the latter is the level which serves as the basis for achieving the attainment of non-ideation. Quite naturally, the karmic retribution for these yogis is rebirth in the Heavenly Spheres of the fourth absorption, and since they represent a separate category, they have an special abode which is part of the Bṛhatphala/Vehapphala. Cf. also the concept of asaṁnīlabhava in the Pali tradition.

For a full list in the Śr Bh of the Heavens corresponding to meditative attainments, see passages 3.28.6.1. to 3.28.6.6. below.
Skt. ‘pūrvaka also means ‘accompanied by’. See PW, s.v., rendered as begeleitet von, verbunden mit. See also a similar usage in the following passage as well as in the AKBh and AbhSam cited in the note 244 below. It is difficult to make a definitive pronouncement on whether pūrvaka is here construed as ‘accompanied by’ or ‘preceded by’. The main reason is the specific nature of this contemplation, which is presumably accompanied by a certain type of ideation in its initial stages, but once fully attained, it can (or rather should) be depicted as being preceded by this ideation.

Similar doctrines concerning the attainment of the asaṃjñīsamāpatti are also seen in other Buddhist sources. According to the AKBh, the attainment of non-ideation is preceded/ accompanied by the ideation of riddance (niḥsaranasamājñāpūrvakaṇa) (AKBh 70, 5; see also AKBh 69, 16-17) or obtained by the method of the contemplation preceded/accompanied by the ideation of dwelling in riddance (niḥsaranāvihārasamājñāpūrvakamanaśikāraprayogāt) AKBh 72, 12). The AKBh 69, 5ff., explains that some people cultivate the asaṃjñīsamāpatti because they want to attain niḥsarana or escape from the cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra) and falsely believe that merely suppressing the ideation (without practising the supramundane path) constitutes the means for attaining complete liberation (mokṣa) (see also AKV 160, 35-161, 1).

AbhSam (10, 19-21) contains a passage whose wording is almost identical with the ŚrīBh: asaṃjñīsamāpattiḥ katamā | subhakṛtstvaśitāghosyoparyāvatāgasa niḥsaranasamājñā- pūvekena manasikārenāsthīvarānām cittacaitasikāgām dharmānāṁ nirodho asaṃjñī- samāpattititi prajñāpitih |. (This is a passage based on the extant Skt. MS fragments of the AbhSam (see Schmithausen 1976b, p. 112, n. 1), not on Pradhan’s Sanskrit retranslation from Chinese and Tibetan) (see also AbhSamBh 9, 8-9). It is very likely that our ŚrīBh passage is the source of the AbhSam definition of the asaṃjñīsamāpatti, but similar descriptions are also found in earlier sources (see Abhidharmaprakarāṇāpādasāstra T26.628c13ff. = T26.694a19ff, AMVibh T27.772c28ff, cf. also YoBh T30.592c13ff.).

A similar but more developed passage on the attainment of non-ideation (containing quite a few identical phrases and sentences) is found at SamBh 158, 17-159, 7. This, too, appears to be based on the ŚrīBh. See also notes 246 and 249 on nirodhasamāpatti below.

For the attainment of non-ideation in the Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論, with relevant fragments rendered into English, see Lusthaus 2002, 143-149.

I render this sentence freely. Literally, Skt. evaṁ ca punar asyāḥ prāptir bhavati translates as ‘and, furthermore, thus its obtainment occurs’. Cf. also the same sentence at the end of passage 3.28.4.3. below.

The attainment of non-ideation (asaṃjñāsamāpatti) is well-documented in the Northern Abhidharmic sources. We do not find, however, the term asaṃjñāsamāpatti in Pali canonical sources. Certainly, words like asaṅṇa, asaṅṇasatta, asaṅṇabhava, etc., which are attested in numerous Pali texts, show that the mental state of non-ideation and the beings who experience it (and also enjoy its karmic fruition) were well-known. However, the only references to the attainment itself, i.e., asaṅṇasamāpatti, which I could locate in Pali texts are three occurrences in paracanonical and commentarial sources. (No lexicographical work, including the CPD and PTS Concordance, record them or the word asaṅṇasamāpatti). Two of them occur at Nett 76, 23 and 100, 8, in passages which list asaṅṇasamāpatti together with saṅṇāsamāpatti, nevasaṅṇānaśaṅṇa- samāpatti, vibhūtaasaṅṇasamāpatti, and nirodhasamāpatti under the heading of ‘attainment’ (samāpatti). We are still faced with many questions concerning the formation of the Nettippakaraṇa, but there are quite a few aspects hinting at the continental (Northern?) origin of the entire text or, at least, parts of it (see Hinüber [1996] 1997, 77-80). The third occurrence is found at Kv-a 157, 7, where asaṅṇasamāpatti is said to be a term synonymous with the attainment of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), also called attainment of the cessation of ideation and feeling (saṅṇāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti). The text goes on to say that there are two
types of attainment of the cessation of ideation and feeling: one is mundane (lokiyā), practised by ordinary people (puthujjanassa) and leading to rebirth in the realm of non-ideation (asaṅghasattupikā), and the other is supramundane (lokuttarā), cultivated by the Noble Ones (ariyānām) and non-conducive to rebirth in the realm of non-ideation (nāsaṅghasattupikā). This is the Theravāda doctrinal stance asserted against the Hetuvādins. The Kv passage (pp. 518-519) upon which the Aṭṭhakathā comments uses only the word saṅkhāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti. Kv-a mentions asaṅghasamāpatti as a synonym of this term and does not treat it as a separate type of attainment, though the dichotomy between the two types of saṅkhāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti closely parallels the distinction between asaṅgisamāpatti and nirodhasamāpatti in the Northern tradition (see above). It would thus appear that the latter distinction (in its full-fledged form, at least) and the developments concerning asaṅgisamāpatti as a separate type of meditative practice probably originated in a period following the separation of the Sarvāstivāda School from the Shaviravādins. The usage of the term asaṅghasamāpatti in the Kv-a may represent an inner Theravāda evolution (compound coined from the already widely used asaṅṇa and samāpatti) or a faint echo of the Northern vocabulary (quite faint indeed since the term is not treated as a separate practice). As for the dichotomy mundane - supramundane, the concept of lokuttara meditative practices already appears in Dhs (pp. 72-75) (for a discussion of their place and importance, see Frawullner 1995, 68-70), and the Kv-a doctrinal viewpoint may constitute the result of an internal development. See also note 30 above.

4. The idea that the attainment of cessation can be obtained only by the most advanced practitioners (often referred to as ‘Noble Ones’) can be seen in a number of texts belonging to both the Southern and Northern traditions. The Vism (604-605, § 18) gives a detailed list of persons able and unable to achieve it. Non-returners and destroyers of the contaminations (= Ārahants) who have mastered and can obtain the eight meditative attainments (aṭṭhasamāpattilābhino […] anāgāmino khīnasavā ca) represent the former class, while ordinary people (pūñhujana), stream-enterers (srotāpanna), once-returners (sakadāgāmino), non-returners and Ārahants who have reached their stages by bare insight without practising tranquillity (sukkhavipassakā ca anāgāmi-arahanto) belong to the latter category (See also Vism 312, § 124).

According to the Kośa, ordinary persons cannot generate this attainment (na hi prthogjanā nirodhasamāpattim upādayitum sakunvanti; AKBh 70, 16). Vasubandhu continues, ‘and because it is generated by the power of the Noble Path, [only] one who [has reached] Nirvana in the present life [can] attain it’ (āryamārgagalena cotpādanā dṛṣṭaḥdharmarṇāna taddhimmukitaḥ; AKBh 70, 16-17). (I render here adhimukti freely as ‘attained’; the concrete sense is that the ascetic becomes ‘convinced of it’ as a result of zealous application; see note 15 on adhimokṣa above.) Yaśomitra’s interprets this sentence in two ways. He first explains that the Noble One becomes convinced that what is called ‘Nirvana in the present life’ is just that (tad iti), i.e., nirodha ‘cessation’. The second way of construing the sentence is: dṛṣṭaḥ dharmarṇāna, which Yaśomitra explains that only a person who has seen Nirvana in the sense of nirodhasatyā ‘the truth of cessation’ on the darsanamārga ‘path of vision’, therefore a Noble One, can attain [become convinced of] this, i.e., nirodha ‘cessation’ (AKV 161, 15-25).

On the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation as a basis for the attainment of cessation, see DN II 71, 15-17 (for other canonical sources, see note 249 below); Vism 92, § 120; etc. AKBh also says that nirodhasamāpatti is produced by proceeding from the station of neither ideation nor non-ideation which is also known as the summit of the [conditioned] existence (bhavāgra) (AKBh 70, 7-8). See also AbhSam and SamBh (note 248 below).

7 My addition is based on the idea expressed in the first sentence of this passage as well as on AKBh 70, 5, and AbhSam (see note 243 below) in which the name of the contemplation is ‘contemplation preceded by the ideation of dwelling in serenity’ (sāntaavihārasaṁjñāpūrvakeṇa
manasikāreṇa). SamBh 159, 9 (see note 243 below), has, however, the same vihārasaṁjñā-
pūrvakaṇa manasikāreṇa, without any qualification of the ‘dwelling’. The Chinese translation of our ŚṛBh passage offers an original rendering, different from all other versions: 求暫住想作意
為先 ‘preceded by the contemplation of the ideation of seeking to dwell temporarily [in this state]’. See also note 280 to Ch. ed.

248 AbhSam (10, 21-11,2) contains a definition whose wording is very close to our ŚṛBh
passage: nirodhasaṁpatīḥ katamā | ākiñcanyāyatanaṁvitorāyasaṁ bhavāgrād uccalatasya
śāntavihārasaṁjñāpūrvakaṇa manasikāreṇaṁsthāvarāṇāṁ <tadekatyānāṁ ca sthāvarāṇāṁ> [adeed on the basis of Tib. and Ch. and confirmed by the pratiṭika glossed upon at AbhSamBh 9, 20] cittaṭcattastikāṇāṁ dharmaṁ nīrodhe nirodhasaṁpatītī prajñāpīṭh | (This belongs to a
passage based on the extant Skt. MS fragments).

A similar passage on the attainment of cessation (with quite a few identical phrases and
sentences) is found at SamBh 159, 8-14. The passage continues with a discussion (see note 249
below) on the nature of the nirodhasaṁpatī (SamBh 159, 15-161, 9).

For similar definitions, see also Abhidharma-prakārama-pādasāstra (T26.628c15-17 =
T26.694a20-22); AMVibh (T27.774a22ff.); etc. Cf. YoBh (T30.593a1-3).

249 Unlike the asaṁjñāsaṁpatī, the attainment of cessation is well-attested in canonical
texts. In the Pali scriptures, it usually appears by the name of ‘cessation of ideation and feeling’
(saṁñāvedayitanirodha). E.g., DN I 71, 15-17 (as part of eight liberations (attāna vimokhā);
MN I 160, 7-9; MN I 301, 30-32, 27 (here called saṁñāvedayitanirodhasaṁpatī and
discussed in detail); MN III 1-3; SN II 212, 13-17; AN I 41, 12-13; etc. It seems that the
appellation nirodhasaṁpatī (most likely an abbreviation of the former name) becomes
frequent in later texts belonging to the Abhidhammadpiṭaka and commentarial literature. E.g.,
Paṭis 97, 28; 100, 24; Vism 606 § 16ff; etc. The term saṁñāvedayitanirodha continues, however,
to be used in later sources as well (see Paṭis 99, 11; Kv 202, 22; etc.).

Its place and role in the spiritual praxis of Early Buddhism remains a matter of debate. No
matter what later Abhidharmic and commentarial literature (as well as a part of modern
scholarship following in the footsteps of the Buddhist exegetic tradition) tells us, it seems that
certain passages in the early scriptures regard saṁñāvedayitanirodha as the base upon which or
the state in which Liberation is attained (see, for instance, MN I 160, 7-10). Furthermore,
there is no doubt that a quite a few canonical sources regard the attainment of cessation as
a prelude to or rehearsal of Nirvana in this very life. A detailed discussion is beyond the scope
of this note, and the problem requires a meticulous examination of the way enstatic
meditation praxis (samatha/samatha) interacts with the reflective practices (vīpasīyāna/vīpasanā).
This issue has received considerable attention (though it deserves even more) in modern Buddhist
studies from la Vallé Poussin’s (1937) ‘classic’ article to recent contributions such as
Schmithausen 1981, Griffiths 1983, and Vetter 1988 (to name only some of the most remarkable
ones).

Although Abhidharma theory in general regards nirodhasaṁpatī as an optional practice, the
attainment continued to capture the interest of the later commentators and philosophers mainly
for two reasons: (1) the necessity to explain (away!) those passages apparently giving this
meditation a predominant role on the path to Awakening; and (2) the unique nature of the
experience which it entails, i.e., a complete cessation of all mental functions and the possibility
of restarting the psycho-biological continuum when emerging from it. The AKBh devotes quite
a few passages to it (mostly in Kośasthāna II., pp. 70, 1-73, 12). So does the Vism, which in its
main treatment (604, § 16-611, § 52) deals with the attainment of cessation not as a practice
necessary for Awakening but as a benefit of the wisdom cultivation (paṁnābhaṁvānānīsaṁa).
nirodhasamāpatti is a meditative attainment reserved to the Noble Ones but not absolutely necessary for obtaining Liberation. The attainment of cessation is discussed in more detail and using more developed concepts in the SamBh (159, 15-161, 9). This suggests that the SamBh represents a later historical layer in the YoBh, which probably made use of the ŚrBh material (see also note 248 above) but reinterpreted it in a more elaborate manner. This SamBh passage actually contains a reference (p. 160, ll. 6-9) to the the ālayavijñāna which is employed to explain the possibility of resuming the mental continuum after the psychic lacuna brought about by nirodhasamāpatti. This is what SchmithAUSEN (1987a, 18ff) considers to be the origin of the ālayavijñāna doctrine. The attainment also appears in other later Yogācāra sources which are discussed in SchmithAUSEN’s magnum opus on the early history of ālayavijñāna (cf. also the partial citation of our ŚrBh passage in ibid., Part II, p. 282, n. 156).

Finally, some recent contributions on the subject must be mentioned in this context. The first one belongs to Paul Griffiths who in his excellent monograph dedicated to the nirodhasamāpatti ([1986] 1999) lucidly discusses the doctrinal history of the praxis in the Theravāda, Vaibhāṣika, and Yogācāra traditions and also analyses their philosophical presuppositions. The second is one is the Chapter on ‘Asaṃjñi-samāpatti and nirodhasamāpatti’ (actually dealing mostly with the latter) in Dan Lusthaus’s study (2002, 123-159). Leaving aside his (rather controversial) view that Yogācāra Buddhism is a type of phenomenological approach, the examination of the historical aspects of this meditative attainment is an important contribution (see also the translation of the relevant fragment on the nirodhasamāpatti in the Cheng weishi lun, pp. 149-151). Finally, in Japanese Buddhist studies, Hakamaya’s contribution (2001, 521-540) on the historical significance of the attainment of cessation in the Vijñānavāda tradition is noteworthy.

In spite of their frequent presence in Buddhist literature, the supernatural faculties have not received sufficient scholarly attention. Certainly, important studies and remarks concerning their role do exist, but we still have no detailed historico-philological monograph(s), which the abhiñās/abhiññās doubtless deserve. One reason for this is, I suppose, the wide-spread impression that the five supernatural faculties are more or less an optional appendix in the edifice of spiritual cultivation—to be sure, a view with deep Abhidharmic roots, though the latter has been much more generous with its usage of ink and palm-leaves for the discussion of the subject. To this, more often than not, we can add the persistence of a rather uncritical view that Buddhism, especially in its early period, strictly prohibited the display of supernatural faculties in public. It certainly did upon some occasions, but we equally find situations when their usage is permitted and even encouraged. Modern Buddhist scholastics and apologetics manage to find various arguments for the latter (see, e.g., Gunaratana 1985, 128-129—not surprising for a traditional Theravāda scholar; Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 1983, whose main ideas are developed in Bucknell and Stuart-Fox 1986, 78-94—both contributions concerned not so much with the historico-philological problems but rather with formulating a hermeneutico-apologetic re-interpretation of the three knowledges in a modern framework which does not require the traditional view of saṁsāra as actual rebirth; etc.). But what we need is a critical study of the complex fabric of the permission and prohibition of the abhiñās/abhiññās.

This is not the place to embark upon a full discussion of the problem which would require more than one bulky volume, and for the time being, it will suffice to mention some basic bibliographical data. The only monograph dedicated to the subject is Lindquist (1935), which discusses the Buddhist abhiññās in relation to the siddhis in classical Yoga. The book can, however, at most be described as a general introduction. Lindquist refers only to a very limited number of canonical sources, draws heavily upon the Vism, his mention of the Northern tradition is scarce and and often restricted to de la Vallée Peussin’s French translation of the AKBh. Furthermore, its discussion of the topic in classical Yoga and Brahmanism is not always
satisfactory. (The supernatural faculties are the main theme of Chapter III Vībhūtipāda in Patañjali’s Yogasūtra, especially III.16-49; many of these attainments bear close resemblance to the Buddhist abhiñās/abhiñās, but lack of space and time do not allow me to go into details.) Lindquist is frequently preoccupied with explaining the supernatural faculties in terms of hypnotism and self-suggestion— an enterprise worth undertaking but not before a general historical picture has emerged and not without a sound knowledge in the latest scientific research in the field (which, by the way, has hugely developed meanwhile).

Definitely much more valuable from a historico-philological perspective are Dayal [1932] 1978, 106-134 (presenting the six abhiñās in Pali and Sanskrit Buddhist literature, with special emphasis on the latter), Démievil 1927 (discussing the three cognitions (vidyā 明) in Chinese and Pali canonical sources as well as in some Abhidharmic texts), de la Vallée Poussin 1931 (an article which is not philologically rich but meaningful in reminding Buddhist scholars of his (as well as our!) age that the Buddha was not a pure rationalist fighting against superstitions but was equally portrayed as having achieved supernatural faculties), and Bareau 1963, 75-91 (analysing the various versions of the Buddha’s awakening in which the three cognitions play a crucial role). More recently, Gregory Schopen’s excellent article (1983) on the development of the concept of jātismera (memory of former births) in mediaeval Mahāyāna sūtra literature is definitely worth mentioning. The author clearly shows how this yogic attainment, which initially was conceived of as the exclusive province of the ‘religious virtuoso’, becomes a practice or faculty within the reach of all Buddhist believers and can be brought about even by external agents ‘undertaking specific ritual or merit-making activity’ (p. 132) on behalf of other individuals. Another important contribution is Donald S. Lopez’s paper dedicated to the Buddha’s memory of former lives (1992), mostly notable for bringing welcome corrections to Mircea Eliade’s interpretation of the concept. Last but not least, one should not forget Enomoto’s excellent article (1982) dedicated to the early history of ‘three cognitions’ (tisso vijjā 三明) and the six supernatural faculties.

In addition to these contributions, one can also mention Lamotte’s introduction to the six supernatural faculties (or ‘supersavoirs’, as the Belgian scholar rendered them) in the PPUPad (Lamotte tr. 1944-1980, vol. 4, pp. 1810-1816). Vallée Poussin’s notes to the AK Bh (especially, Poussin vol. 5, p. 98, n. 1) as well as the CPD entry on abhiñā are also very useful. As most of the relevant primary sources are listed in these works (especially Lamotte tr. 1944-1980), in what follows I shall concentrate only upon particular aspects relevant to our ŚrīBh passages.

According to the AK Bh 422, 2, ‘the five supernatural faculties depend on the level of the fourth dhyāna’ (pañcābhiñān caturthadhikāranabhūmi) (see also note 33 above). The AK Bh 422, 2-12, explains why their basis cannot be the immaterial attainments. The Vism also hints at the fact that the achievement of the supernatural faculties is preceded by the attainment of the fourth absorption. Glossing upon the subject of the canonical formula describing the practice of the abhiñās, Buddhaghosa says: tathā so ti so adhisattacattujjhāno yogi (Vism 317, § 13) ‘herein, “he” is the yogi who has attained the fourth absorption’. See also Vism 317, § 19; 323-4, § 49; 347, § 22; etc. In the PPUPad, we told: 四禪諸通皆易得 (T25.265b15) ‘in the fourth absorption, all supernatural faculties are easy to obtain’ (compared to the preceding dhyānas, which are suitable for the attainment of only particular abhiñās; this view is presented as the opinion of ‘some people’ 有人言 *ity apare but is not rejected by the author(s) of the PPUPad). Cf. also ŚrīBh passage 3.28.1.2. above.

What exactly this ‘pure absorption’ (parisuddham dhyānam) means is not defined here, but some similar terms and concepts are found in other sources. In the Sāmaññaphallasutta, after the description of the four absorptions and the contemplation of the impermanence of the body, the Exalted One explains in detail the supernatural powers. Each is introduced by the phrase
evāṁ samāhīte citte parisuddhe [...] (DN I 77, 6; etc.) ‘with [his] mind thus concentrated, purified [...]’. Vism 317, § 14, explains that here parisuddhe refers to purification by means of the ‘cultivation of the purity of mindfulness [brought about by] equanimity’ (upekkhāsattipārisuddhibhāvena) (on the interpretation of this term, see note 207 above). See also Skt. parallel at Saṅghabh 246, 13: evāṁ samāhīte citte parisuddhe [...].

I could not find, however, any Pali or Sanskrit source mentioning or describing *parisuddham jhānam/parisuddham dhyānam as such. The closest term to this notion appears to be sūdhakāṁ dhyānam, which we find, for instance, in the SamBh and the AkBh. (Let us, however, note that sūdhakāṁ dhyānam itself does not occur in the ŚrīBh.) At SamBh 132, 3-7, the term is explained as a meditative state of not savouring the pleasant feelings which one can derive from the attainment of absorptions: sa parataḥ prathamadhyāyasamaṁpaṭer āśvādam ādīnavam ca śṛgaty uttare ca niḥsaraṇaṁ. [...] samāpadya tam evādīnavam manasikurvann uttari ca niḥsaraṇaṁ prajānaṅ ānāśvādayati. ‘He [i.e., the ascetic] hears from other[s] [i.e., his master and/or fellow-meditators] of the relish of the first absorption and of [his] detriment as well as of the [necessity to achieve] riddance [from it by proceeding] to the upper [levels]. Having attained [the absorption], fixing [his] attention on the fact that it is such a detriment and knowing the [necessity of] riddance [from it by proceeding] upwards, [he] does not relish [it].’ At AkBh 427, 4, we read: nirmāṇacittād api sūdhakāṁ dhyānam nirmāṇacittād citspade nānyat ‘from [after] a [magical] creation, in its turn, there arise a pure absorption and [another] magical creation thought, nothing else’. The concept of pure attainment is defined at AkBh 437, 7: laukikāṁ kuśalāṁ samāpatti-dṛvyāṁ sūdhakam ucyate ‘lobhādīsuddhādharmanyogat ‘the entity of the mundane wholesome attainment is called ‘pure’ since it is associated with pure factors [like] non-greed, etc.’.

In a Mahāyānikī context, we also find a similar concept in, for example, BoBh (210, 18-211, 4; for a French translation, see Demiéville tr. [1957] 1973, 317-319). Here, it is called bodhisattvasya viśuddham dhyānam ‘pure absorption of the bodhisattva’ and classified into ten types. The first one, reminding of the SamBh, runs as follows: laukikāṁ suddhāṁ viśuddhāṁ anāśvādatām dhyānām (BoBh 210, 19-20) ‘non-relished absorption pure as far as mundane purity is concerned’ (Demiéville (p. 317) renders: Le Dhyāna en tant que non savouré, qui est pur d’une pureté mondaine (see also n. 2, p. 318); I construe the instrumental as an instrumentalis partis (see Speijer [1886] 1988, 53-54); cf. Tib. ‘jig rten pa’i dag pas rnam pa dag pa ro myang ba med pa’i bsam gtan (D Wi 1128-1131a); Ch, seems to understand it as an instrumental expressing cause: 由世間離諸善趣清淨静慮, T30.528b14).

2 I read here: yo \(\rightarrow\) nenābhijnādhipateyo dharmā\(\rightarrow\)ḥ. Shukla also suggests a more or less similar emendation (see note 355 to Skt. crit. ed.). MS nenābhijnādhipateye and Wayman’s reading ‘nenābhijnādhipateye represent a possibility which though remote, is, however, worth considering. The way to construe such a reading would be to see ‘ādhipateye either as a dative singular of adhipati, a word which means ‘controller, dominant influence or factor’ (BHSD, s.v.; cf. Pali adhipati ‘ruler, master, owner; controller, dominant factor’ in CPD, s.v.; ‘ruler, master; ruling over, governing; predominant; ruled or governed by’ in PED, s.v.; see also PE, s.v.), but none of these sense would fit in here. Wayman’s translation (p. 129) reads: ‘that [doctrine] in order to master the supernormal faculties’, but adhipati in the sense of mastery of a certain skill or knowledge is, to the best of my knowledge, unattested. The same can be said of ādhipateya which also means ‘control, influence, mastery, lordship’ (see BHSD, etc.; none of the occurrences would point, however, at a ‘mastery’ of a skill; the meaning seems to be that of political control).

The word ādhipateya, which appears to me the best editorial choice, is an abstract semantic development from ‘lordship’ but in a rather different direction. It means ‘having something as the chief/main [topic/interest]’. The term is actually employed similarly in a few other
passages in the Śrībh. At MS 101a1L, Sh 377, 11, Maithrimurthi 1999, 278, § II [1.], we read: maitrayadhipateyam dharmam adhipatiṃ kṛtvā, correctly rendered by Maithrimurthi (1999, 296) as Anhand eines Lehrtextes, welcher das Wohltollen zum Thema (genauer Hauptthema?) hat ‘(main topic', suggested by Maithrimurthi within brackets, is more appropriate). Similarly, MS 101b4L-M, Sh 381, 2-3, reads: taddadhipateyam dharmam adhipatiṃ kṛtvā, with a similar sense, ‘this' (tad) referring here to the ‘dependent origination' (pratītyasamutpāda). See also MS 6b2R, Śrībh-Gr 108, 9, Sh 69, 9: yadaddhipateyam; MS 6b3L, Śrībh-Gr 108, 10, Sh 69, 11: na tadadhipateyam (Sh wrongly reads here: ca tadadhipateyam); Śrībh MS 107b4L, Sh 411, 11-12; etc. The term also occurs at SamBh 107, 15-16.

Let us finally note the Tib. rendering, which in our passage is dbang du byas pa, lit., ‘made the chief [topic/point]' suggests a similar understanding. (Note, however, the alternative (but less precise) translation at D 27b6 and b 7: dbang des and dbang de mdzad pas corresponding to the last two Skt. occurrences in the Śrībh quoted above.) Xuanzang’s 增上, lit., ‘increase-above’, (T30.453b1, 454a17, 407b2, and 407b4 corresponding to the Śrībh citations above), usually meaning ‘additional’ or ‘superior’, is too literal. I think that to the average Chinese reader, such a rendering fails to convey the sense of the Skt. word.

2 5 4 Skt. rddhīviṣaya ‘range of miraculous powers’. I must confess that am not completely happy with my rendering of rddhi as ‘miraculous powers’ for three reasons. (1) The word ‘miraculous’ may carry a (here undesired) connotation of ‘divine intervention’. Needless to say that in a Buddhist treatise on meditation, especially a Śrāvakayānikā one, such a nuance is not present. (2) A miracle is usually understood as an inexplicable break in the known laws of Nature, but from a Buddhist viewpoint, the attainment of the abhiṣiktas is a ‘natural’ result of one’s spiritual cultivation. I must stress in this respect that I write and translate from the viewpoint of prathagjana who in his deluded belief in natural laws as defined by modern physics would describe rddhi (if proven to be a reality at all!) as a miracle. (3) From a strictly lexical viewpoint, the exact meaning of the Pali iddhi and Sanskrit rddhi is not that of ‘power’ (miraculous or not). A semantically closer rendering would be ‘accomplishment’ or ‘success’. AKBh 425, 5, glosses rddhi as rddhati ‘succeeds’ (or ‘prospers’, etc.), which AKVt 658, 21, further explains as sampadyata ity arthah [its] sense is “succeeds [its fulfilled/accomplished]”’. Buddhaghosa, in much more detailed gloss (Vism 318, §§ 20-23), explains iddhi as ijjhana ‘succeeding’, nippathi ‘accomplishment’, patilabha ‘obtainment’ (318, § 20). In spite of these strictly semantical considerations, a rendering like ‘accomplishment’ would hardly evoke in English the idea of passing through walls and stroking the Sun and the Moon (see below).

The compound rddhīviṣaya used here in the Śrībh is attested in other sources as well. More often than not, Pali texts employ iddhiyāviṭṭha ‘type(s) of miraculous powers’ (Vism 323, § 47, glosses upon vidha as koṭṭhīsa ‘divison, part'), but occasionally we also see iddhiyāvisaya (e.g., Vin III 67, 17). Sanskrit sources are divided between the usage of rddhīvidhi (Paṇca 83, 8; DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 16; MVyu # 208; etc.) and rddhīviṣaya (AKBh 421, 8; AKVt 654, 3; BoBh 58, 13; etc.).

2 5 5 Skt. cuyutupapādajñāna ‘knowledge of the deaths and births [of all sentient beings]’ is also known as the ‘divine eye’ (Skt. divyam caksuh; Tib. lha'i mig; Ch. 天眼; see MVyu # 202; etc.). Ji also says: 論解五通中死生智通亦得是天眼相應慧. (T43.122b22) ‘Amongst the five supernatural faculties explained in the [Yogācārabhumi] Sāstra, the supernatural faculty of the knowledge of the deaths and births [of all sentient beings] also [refers to] obtaining a [type of] wisdom associated with the divine eye’.

2 5 6 Skt. cetyāpaññayājnāna ‘knowledge of the ways of thought [of other sentient beings]’. I rely on Edgerton’s understanding of the term (BHSĐ, s.vv. cetyāpāññā and paryāyā,). Tib. sems kyi rnam grangs shes pa uses (rather mechanically) rnam grangs, lit. ‘part-number', for
**paryāya** (probably in the latter’s sense of ‘arrangement’ or ‘method’), which points at a similar understanding. Ch. 心差別通 ‘comprehension of the mind distinctions [/differences]’ is a rather free rendering (差別 for **paryāya**) but basically shows the same understanding. The Theravadā commentarial tradition, on the other hand, construes **paryya** as ‘penetration’. Thus, the **Vism** 344, § 8, links the word with verbs like **paryātī** ‘goes round’ and **paricchindati** ‘determines’. PED translates the word as ‘penetration’ s.v. **parya**, but construes it as a syncope of **paryya** s.v. **cetoparyya**, whose equivalent is given as ‘the ways of the heart (= **paricca**’). PTS Concordance, vol. 3, p. 190 s.v., renders **parya** as ‘encompassing’.

Let us add here that the canonical order of describing or listing the supernatural faculties is miraculous powers (**rddhi**), divine ear (**divyaśrotra**), knowledge of the ways of thought [of other sentient beings] (**cetāhparyāyajñāna**), recollection of [one’s own] previous lives (**pūrvanivāsānusmṛti**, also spelled **pūrvenivāsānusmṛti**; see **pūrvenivāsa** in our passage; cf. BoBh 66, 22; ibid., 389, 15) knowledge of the āeth and birth [of all living beings] (**cunyatpādajñāna**), and, when the sixth **abhinnā** (attainable only by Buddhist adepts) is added, knowledge of the destruction of the contaminations [/cankers] (Śkt. **āśravakṣayajñāna**; Pali **āsavakkhyajñāna**). This order seems to be ‘scrupulously followed by the Pali Nikāya and Abhidhamma and a considerable part of the Sanskrit Āgama’ (Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 4, p. 1819, n. 1). This is also the order adopted by SaṅghBh II 246, 13-251, 16; DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 16-59, 8 = Rahder ed. pp. 34-36; Paṇca 83, 7-88, 6; AKBh 421, 6-9; AKVy 23; BoBh 58, 5, 13; etc. The order in the Śrībh is, however, different from this as well from the order of the ‘meditation scripture [or: scriptures?]’ (T25.464c25-465a13) and that followed by the Buddha during the night before his Awakening (T25.465a13-216), both of which are discussed in the PPUpad (see Lamotte 1944-1980, 1822-1827). It is difficult to decide whether the Śrībh passage here reflects a different scriptural tradition or is just an arrangement peculiar to our text and does not constitute a historically significant variation. The MVyat (Sakaki ed. § XIV) confronts us with yet another order: **divyaṃ caṇthu**, **divyaṃ śrotram**, **paracittajñāna/ cetāhparyāyajñāna**, **pūrvanivāsānusmṛtiṣṭijñāna**, **rddhividhiṣṭijñāna**, and **āśravakṣayajñāna**. (Sakaki ed. contains an extra **parasya cetāhparyāyajñāna** after **divyaṃ śrotram**, which appears to be Sakaki’s own addition since it has no Tib. and Ch. equivalents and is not found in either Csoma de Körös ed. § C L X XIX (11) or Ishihama and Fukuda ed., p. 12, §§ 199-206, of the MVyat.)

² 7 Skt. **arthapratisaṃvedināṇaḥ** ‘thoroughly knowledgeable about meaning’ and Skt. **dharmapratisaṃvedināṇaḥ** ‘thoroughly knowledgeable about [the wording of the respective teaching]’ seem to be related to the first two of the four kinds of thorough knowledge (Skt. **pratisaṃvid**; Pali, **paṭissambhidā**), i.e., **arthapratisaṃvid**, **dharmapratisaṃvid**, **niruktpratisaṃvid**, and **pratibhānapratisaṃvid**. Various renderings of **pratisaṃvid** into European languages as used by Buddhist scholars up until the early 1930s are gathered by Dayal ([1932] 1978, 259-260). Dayal proposes ‘detailed and thorough knowledge’ (ibid. 261), which is very apt but rather long. I think that ‘thorough’ also implies that the knowledge is ‘detailed’. Let us note that other ways of construing the term are also possible (see Vasubandhu’s understanding and Oltramare, in ibid., 262). Equally pertinent is Dayal’s brief description of the **raison d’être** of this set: ‘They simply imply thorough knowledge of something for purposes of propaganda’ (ibid. 261).

The **paṭissambhidās** are known from early canonical sources (e.g. AN II 160, 19-37; etc.) and have received extensive treatment in the **śāstra** literature (e.g., Paṭis I 88-91; **Vism** 372, § 21-374, § 27; AKBh 419, 7-420, 5; BoBh 258, 4-24; etc.). In Mahāyāna Buddhism, developed and re-seasoned in the spirit of the new movement, they become cardinal virtues of the bodhisattva (for further sources and discussion, see Dayal [1932] 1978, 259-267, and Lamotte 1944-1980, vol. 3, 1614-1615).

The **Kośa** identifies **dharmapratisaṃvid** with the knowledge concerning the complexes (**kāya**)

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of names, phrases, and syllables, and arthapratisānvid with the knowledge concerning the meaning of these complexes of names, phrases, and syllables (AKBh 418, 13: nāmapadavyañyanakāyevyarthā). To use modern terms, we could roughly say, that the former represents the signifier and the latter the signified. The sense of dharmā in dharmapratisānvid is explained as ‘Buddhist teachings’ (AKV 652, 14: dharmapratisānvid iti: iha deśanā dharmāh; see also Vism 373, §§ 23-24).

BoBh 258, 5-10, defines the terms as follows: yat sarva-dharmānām sarva-paryāyeṣu yāvadbhāvīkatayā yathāvadbhāvīkatayā ca bhāvanāmayam asaktam avivartyam jñānam, iyam esāṁ dharmapratisānvid. yat punah sarva-dharmānām eva sarva-lakṣanāṃ yāvadbhāvīkatayā yathāvadbhāvīkatayā ca bhāvanāmayam asaktam avivartyam jñānam, iyam esāṁ arthapratisānvid. ‘That which is unhindered (asakta; cf. Tib. thogs pa med cing. D 137a1; Ch. 無所滯礙, T30.539b6 and 8-9), unshakable knowledge produced by meditative cultivation, with regard to every single type [of expression/teaching] of all dharmas covering the entire reality and in conformity with reality, that is their [i.e., the bodhisattvas’; cf. Ch. 名菩薩法無所礙, T30.539b6-7] complete knowledge with regard to [the teachings concerning] phenomena. Furthermore, that which is unhindered, unshakable knowledge produced by meditative cultivation concerning every single characteristic of the same all dharmas covering the entire reality and in conformity with reality, that is their complete knowledge concerning the meaning [of phenomena]’. The sense of dharmas in the first sentence is usually construed as ‘teachings’. In the second sentence, however, dharmas appear more likely to be used in the sense ‘phenomena’ (lakṣaṇa does not fit well with ‘teachings’). If this is true, then sarva-dharmānām eva ‘the same all dharmas’ suggests that in the first sentence, too, the meaning is also ‘phenomena’. In his commentary on BoBh, Sāgaramegha explains dharmas here as referring to ‘dus byes lenams conditioned things’ and sarva-lakṣanāṃ as sva laksana, etc. (rNal byor spyod pa’i sa la byang chub sems dpa’i sa ‘i lenam par bshad pa, 506).

In many of the Northern Abhidharma texts as well as Mahāyāna sources, the four kinds of thorough knowledge are listed with dharmapratisānvid as the first member followed by arthapratisānvid. In the Pali tradition as well as in a few Mahāyāna scriptures, we find, however, the reverse order (Dayal [1932] 1978, 263). The latter is also seen in our ŚrīBh passage here.

We should also notice that although the four kinds of thorough knowledge usually appear together, sometimes only the pair arthapratisānvid and dharmapratisānvid is mentioned. (This pair may have historically preceded the four-pratisaṃvid formula.) In the Pali Canon, we find the following expression: tathā tathā so tasmām dhamme athathapatisaṃvedi ca hoti dharmapaṭisaṃvedi (DN Ⅲ 241, 6-8; AN Ⅲ 21, 17-19; etc.). Closely related to this seems to be the collocation of attvaveda with dhammaveda (e.g., MN Ⅰ 37, 30-31; etc.). Dayal ([1932] 1978, 263) also refers to the occurrence of only two knowledges and points out the pair arthavādi dharmavādi in the DaśBh (Rahder ed. 24, 22 = Kondō ed. 39, 7). Furthermore, Dayal draws the attention to what he takes as a set of three kinds of thorough knowledge in the BoBh (which exclude niruktipratisānvidā). This, however, appears to be a mere scribal omission. Dayal worked before the publication of any edition of the text and had to rely only on one Skt. MS. Wogihara’s ed. (89, 25) actually has niruktipratisānvidā and notes that the MS omission is emended on the basis of Tib. (see p. 89, n. 4). Dutt’s ed. (63, 14) contains the word (reading: niruktipratisānvidāpratibhānapratisānvidā ca—this is probably a typographical error to be emended to niruktipratisānvidā pratibhānapratisānvidā ca), without any note, which means that the MS discovered by Sāṅkrtyāyana does not omit it.

The order of listing the four kinds of thorough knowledges is discussed in the AMVibh (T 27.905b7-25). According to it, in the sūtras 契經, the arthapratisānvid is listed first, followed
by the dharmapraitisamīvid (like in our Śrībh passage), while in Abhidharma 阿毘達磨, the order is reversed. It is interesting that the AMVibh explains both enumeration orders by making appeal to the experience of the meditation adepts 瑜伽師 (*yogacāra) (cf. also Nishi 1975, 252). A definitive conclusion is not possible, but if we regard the order adopted by the Śrībh as symptomatic for its doctrinal affinities, we could speculate that our authors deliberately chose a pattern different from the Abhidharmic tradition. Were they trying to distance themselves from the Vaibhāṣikas and stress their reliance upon canonical sources (and a related Dārṣṭāntika/ Sautrāntika tradition)?

See also passage 3.28.5.2.11. below and respective notes.

2 5 8 AKBh 430, 5-14, admits that certain individuals can also have innate (upapattiyāpta, upapattilambhika, upapattiprayilabdhā, or upapattipratilabhya) miraculous powers similar to the abhijñās. Technically, however, they should not be called abhijñās and do not have the same 'high quality' of the latter. For example, the divine eye of a person with innate miraculous powers cannot see beings in their intermediate states (anatarābhava). In contrast to these, the supernatural faculties developed by the ascetic represent the fruit of spiritual cultivation (bhāvanāphala), which actually is the same term used in our Śrībh passage.

2 5 9 Or: 'ideation of agreement [conformity] between body and mind'. Let us also note that in passage 3.28.5.2.5, the compound appears in the reverse order: cittakāyasamavadhānāsamanjñā 'ideation of the mind-body fusion'. For its definition, see passage 3.28.5.2.5. below.

2 6 0 Here the ideation is called adhimuktaśamjñā, but in passage 3.28.5.2.6.1. below, which is dedicated to its definition, the term employed is adhimokṣhasamjñā. Tib. (mos pa'i 'du shes) and Ch. (勝解想) use the same renderings for both Skt. readings. If adhimuktasamjñā (here) and adhimokṣhasamjñā (below) are the exact wording of the Śrībh authors, then there is no doubt that, at least in this context, the two compounds were regarded as freely interchangeable synonyms.

2 6 1 Although many of these ideations have canonical and Abhidharmic parallels, the dvadaśa samjñāḥ listed here seem to represent a set unique to the Śrībh. More details will follow in the text and notes below. Here it will suffice to quote a general remark in Ji’s Commentary: 論解十二想中前五想是修神境通法，餘四次第修一一通法。(T43.122b26-27) ‘Amongst the twelve ideations explained in the [Vagācaṃbhūmi] Śāstra, the first five ideations represent the cultivation of the miraculous powers, the remaining four [ones represent] in the order [of their enumeration] the cultivation of each of [the rest of] the supernatural faculties’. This means that the recollection of the previous lives is attained through the sixth ideation, the divine ear through the seventh one, the knowledge of the deaths and births of all sentient beings through the eighth one, and the knowledge of the ways of thought of other sentient beings through the ninth one. The remaining three ideations constitute well-known meditative practices but are not directly linked to the achievement any particular faculty. As argued below, passage 3.28.5.2.11., where the last three ideations are discussed, may represent a later addition to the Śrībh. It is very likely that the original text of the Śrībh contained only the first nine ideations, and the ideation of the eight liberations, the ideation of the eight bases of mastery, and ideation of the ten totalities were added later (just in order to complete the yogi’s repertoire?). Their somehow irregular presence in this context is also supported by the fact that they perform no specific role in the attainment of the supernatural faculties. For more details, see note 304 below.

2 6 2 Skt. ātman appears to be used here in the sense of 'one’s own body' (a sense recorded in PW, s.v. and MW, s.v.). Tib. makes this quite clear: bdag nyid kyi lus. In the next passage, Skt. reads kāyam, which Tib. similarly renders as bdag nyid kyi lus. The meaning of ‘body’ for this word generally thought to be the paramount denotation of the Soul may be quite surprising. However, such a usage is seen even in the most orthodox Hindu texts. For example, Śākhara, in his Commentary upon the Bhagavadgītā, clearly construes some occurrences of ātman as deha
‘body’ (two occurrences) or indriya ‘sense faculties’ (one occurrence) (see Hara 1999, 71; cf. also p. 77, p. 84). A careful look at the Bhagavadgītā passages so glossed upon by the great philosopher prove that he did not miss his ‘semantic’ mark (though such interpretations surprised a modern Indologist like Zaechner—see Hara 1999, p. 67, n. 2). One of the usages of ātman, which goes back to the Ṛgveda, is that reflexive pronoun or ‘oneself’. It is, after all, not so surprising to see ‘oneself’ construed as including or simply referring to the body. And such an understanding appears to be even older than the Bhagavadgītā. At Chāndogya Upaniṣad 8.8.4., ātman is employed in a sense which seems to refer to the ‘body’ (Radhakrishan [1953] 1989, 504, renders this occurrence as ‘one’s (bodily) self’). In Buddhist literature, too, this usage is rare, but not absent. At Thī 28, we read: sele khambhesiṁ attānāṁ ‘I propped my body [myself] against the rock’, where attānāṁ is best understood as referring to ‘oneself’ in a physical sense, i.e., ‘body’. Thī-a, 33 construes attānāṁ as attabhāvāṁ. One of main meanings of attabhāvāṁ is ‘body’ (see CPD, PED, PD, s.v.). For attabhāva as one of the terms in the semantic group denoting ‘body’, cf. also Abhidhānapadāpiṅkā, p. 25, ver. 151.

Skt. tūlapicār vā karpāsapicār vā vāyunāndalake. The pair tūlapicār vā karpāsapicār vā appears in a series of scriptural sources. In a context similar to our Śrībh passage, the Avogula-sutta describes how the Tathāgata can reach Brahma’s Realm with his mentally-constructed body (manomayena kāyena) as well as his physical body made up of the four elements (cātuḥmahābhūtimikena kāyena). As a result of his exquisite meditative and miraculous powers, the Tathāgata can rise up from the ground ‘light as a tuft of tūla-cotton or a tuft of karpāsa-cotton wafting through the air’ (seyavatāhi […] tūlapicār vā karpāsapicār vā lahuco vātupādāṇo SN V 284, 1-2) (for other occurrence of vātupādāṇa, see also SN IV 399, 27).

Though not connected with supernatural faculties, the same scriptural evidence is also employed as a simile for lightness at SN V 443, 27-28 (Ch. equivalent at T2.107b29-3 reads: 如小緯丸、小劫貝軒屋四駿道頭、四方風吹、則隨風去向一方) (The tūla-cotton and karpāsa-cotton are found as similes for the soft touch of the treasure-woman’s (itthiratana) skin at DN II 175, 27-28 and MN III 175, 4. In Sanskrit sources, we find tūlapicār vā karpāsapicār vā at Divy 210, 14-15, 388, 14-15. Tūlapicār alone is also employed in the Visn 341, § 131 (explaining the ideation of lightness (see note 265 below) by means of which the ascetic reaches Brahma’s Realm ‘as a tuft of cotton blown by the wind’ vātukkhittataupicunā); Aṣṭa 286, 4-5 (as a simile for the waving intellect (buddhi) of a bodhisattva not cultivating the perfection of wisdom; cf. Abhisamā 584, 3-4); AKbh 167, 25 (as a comparison for the softness of the soil of Indra’s royal residence on the top of Mount Meru); etc. For Sanskrit sources from Central Asia, see SWTF, s.v. tūla-picu.

The main difference from the Pali parallel phrases (SN V 284, 1-2 and 443, 27-28) is vāyunāndalaka. I assume that the reference here is not the ‘wind-sphere’ (though both Tib. and Ch. render as such) as a cosmic region but rather to a strong ‘whirlwind’ (see MW, s.v.; BHSD, s.v. vāyunāndalāvata). We see the expression vāyunāndalavat at Avad 114, 1, where five hundred hungry-ghosts (paṭca pretāśātāni) are whirled round in the air as a whirlwind (vāyunāndalavata akāśe parihramantti). Vāyunāndalaka in our Śrībh passage here may be a stylistic change (the force of the whirlwind emphasising the image of lightness) or a corruption (oral or scribal) of the old Pali compound vātupādāna.

The most difficult part is the exact identification of the materials which karpāsa and tūla denote. All lexicographical sources I have consulted basically render both of them as ‘cotton’. In the case of the former, we appear to know more. Monier-Williams (s.v.) identifies karpāsa as the ‘cotton-tree’ or, simply, ‘cotton’ and gives the scientific term of Gossypium Herbaceum. Similarly, the Japanese scholar Maku (1977, 129-131) translates karpāsa as ワタ ‘cotton’ or キワタ ‘cotton-tree’ (with a photo on p. 129, and the same Latin name Gossypium Herbaceum.
in the Index, p. 10). No such a precise identification seems possible for *tūla* (even in modern Indo-Aryan languages and dialects, the derivates which can be traced to *tūla* merely point to ‘cotton’; see Turner 1966 [1999], s.v.).

The Tib. and Ch. renderings raise the additional problem of determining to what precisely they refer. Even if the translators had a clear idea about what these plants and materials meant, they had to grapple with languages reflecting quite different ecosystems. Tib. *shing bal gyi ’dab* (= *tūla*) literally means ‘tree (shing)’-wool (bal)-leaf (’dab). As a compound, BTsh, s.v., records *shing bal gyi ’dab ma* and renders it into Chinese as 綿絮 ‘floss silk’. It is difficult to know, however, whether this applies to old sources such as the SrBb translation. In the case of *karpāsapicu*, its equivalent is *ras bal gyi ’dab*, literally, ‘leaf of cotton-wool’, but, once again, its precise identification is not easy. (Note that the modern English word ‘cotton wool’ refers to ‘raw cotton’ and probably has nothing to do with the Tibetan rendering above.)

Ch. translates *tūla* with the help of a phonetic transcription: 布織绵 ‘*duluo*-cotton’ (for the reconstruction of the mediaeval pronunciation of 布 and 織, see Pulleyblank 1981, 83 and 203 respectively) and *karpāsa* as 布絮 ‘white (?) cotton’ (布 usually means ‘to fold up’ but can also have the sense of ‘white cotton’ or, simply, ‘cotton’; see DKWJ, s.v., and Mathews 1943, s.v. 布 = ‘a kind of white cotton cloth’). The word *tūla* transcribed in this or various other ways (for which, see T54. 510b13; 1172a23-27) is well-attested in Chinese sources and has attracted the attention of a number of exegetes. Of direct concern is Ji’s Commentary who glosses upon the term as follows: 論云布織綿者謂：野蠶虫繭，名布織綿。(T43.122b5) ‘The *tūla*-silk mentioned in the [Yogacārabhūmi] Śāstra is [obtained from] the cocoon of wild silkworms and called *tūla*-silk’ (in this case, 絨 should be construed as ‘silk’ not ‘cotton’). The word is similarly defined by To-ryun (T42.474c23-24). However, Puguang 普光, who as Ji was also one of Xuanzang’s chief disciples, shows a different understanding: 布織綿：布織是樹名, 綿從樹裹 [var. lec. 果] 中出, 名布織綿; 如言柳絮。(T41.189b10-11) ‘*Tūla*-cotton: *tūla* is the name of a tree, [and] the cotton comes from the fruit of the tree, [therefore] it is named *tūla*-cotton; it is like the expression “willow-catkins”’ (i.e., the latter word is coined in the same way the term *tūla*-cotton). (Puguang’s gloss is ad AKBh Ch. T29.59c26 = Skt. 167, 25.) A similar and more detailed definition is found at T54.1172a23-27. It is hard to decide which of the glosses is the correct one, but even if we could attain a decision, the exact material or species from which it comes would remain obscure. See also MVyut # 5874.

A more comprehensive study accompanied by a sound knowledge of Indian plants and textiles may reveal more in the future, but to all intents and purposes, I have decided that here we have to deal with two types of cotton and the safest way to distinguish them is to make use of the original Sanskrit. It can be briefly mentioned here that Indian flora abounds in species of cotton. A very brief browsing through the vast botanical literature has led me to the ‘discovery’ of two types of so-called silk cotton trees: red and yellow. Their scientific names are *Bombax malabaricum* and *Cochlospermum religiosum* respectively (see Saldanha and Dhanwan 1984, plates 47-50).

Finally, let us add that the phrase occurs one more time in the SrBh (MS A*b44L; this is part of a folio omitted by Sh). The context is the exposition of the mindfulness of breathing, a practice in which the yogi becomes aware of all types of wind or air (vāyu) circulation in and around his body. One type of wind is described as follows: *evaṁ sarvam kāyaṁ [...] tadyathā tūlapicur vā karpāsapicur vā laṅhukam adhiśmucyate* [the ascetic] thus concentrates upon [his] whole body as [being] light like a tuft of *tūla*-cotton or a tuft of *karpāsa*-cotton (= Tib. P 195b4-5 and D 162a1-2 (which I follow here): dper na | shing bal gyi ’da’ ba dang | ras bal gyi ’da’ ba ltar yang ba nyid du mos par yang byed do | | ; Ch. 464b20-22: 如姪絡絨或如畳絮等諸輕飄物於 是諸相而起勝解。).
We can reconstruct with a certain degree of confidence the monastic furniture which serves for our yogi’s ‘trans-gravitational’ itinerary. The Pali Vinaya lists four types of beds (maṅca) and four types of chairs (piṭha) (Vin IV, 40, 5-8). The former are also described by Krishna Murthy (1982, p. 78 and figures X VIII and X IX; for piṭha in the sense of ‘stool’, see p. 8 and for ‘chairs’ in general, see pp. 37-42 and figure IX). The third piece mentioned in our text is tīnasāṁstaraṇaka which Edgerton renders as ‘mat or bed (of grass)’ (BHSD, s.v. sāṁstaraṇaka; cf. also SWFT, s.v.). The Pali equivalent tīnasāṁstaraṇaka also suggests a grass mat (cf. also Krishna Murthy 1982, p. 79) but not necessarily serving as a bed. At Vin I 286, 24, it is used to put a robe on it, at Vin II 113, 36, to protect a bowl from being broken, and at Vin II 116, 15-16, to protect a kāṭhina-frame from dust. In our Śrībh passage, it, too, seems to be a grass mat but not used for the bed (the yogi flies from the latter to the tīnasāṁstaraṇaka and then back). As suggested by the Ch. 草座, it seems to be a rather grass mat used as a seat (for meditation?) set as a separate piece of furniture.

Concerning the Tib. and Ch. equivalents, some unavoidable slight differences exist, but roughly speaking, they seem to match the Skt. original. The only slightly problematic term might be Ch. 坐. In Classical Chinese, the word is basically used in the sense of ‘a small table’ used to place things or support one’s elbow on it (see DKWJ, s.v.; HDC, s.v.) (Its shape can easily be figured out from the form of the character, which is a pictogram.) The sense of ‘bench’ is, however, also attested (see Mathews 1943, s.v.). As far I see, this seems to be a secondary meaning, but in the light of the Skt. original, it is more likely that Xuanzang used the word in the sense of ‘bench’ or ‘stool’.

Let us also remark that the yogi’s flight is described here with a certain reticence, and this seems to have been the general tone for the Abhidharmic ‘accounts’ of the initial steps in such experiences. In the AMVibh, we are told that the *yogācāra 瑜伽師 cultivating the range of miraculous powers 神境通, first rises above ground as high as half a sesame-seed 半谷蔭 (T27.414c26) and then slowly increases his ‘flight abilities’ to a full sesame-seed, etc. It is only in the final stages of his training that he can reach the realm of the gods at summit of the conditioned world (*ākaniṣṭhā devāḥ) 色究竟天 (T27.414c29).

Skt. laghusaṁjñā. The ideation of lightness as a method facilitating the attainment of the ability to raise from the ground can already be seen at SN V 283, 9-10; 17-19; 23-24: sukhasaṁjñā ca lahusaṁjñā ca kāye [var. lec. kāyena] okkamittā viharati ‘[The Tathāgata] dwells having attained (okkamati) [for this verb, see CPD, s.v.] the ideation of pleasure and ideation of lightness in [his] body [var. lec.: by means of [his] body’]. SN-a III 261, 9, explains the term as follows: kilesa-dandhāyatattassa ca abhāvā lahu-saṁjñā nāma ‘and because of the absence of slowness [caused by] defilements, it is named “ideation of lightness”’. This points at an understanding not only as physical lightness which allows flying but also, more abstractly, as getting rid of the ‘weight’ of the cankers. The Vism (340, § 131) contains a more detailed explanation, which similarly makes a point in saying that the lightness comes from having become freed from hindrances (nīvaranēhi). There is no doubt, however, that this lightness allows the yogi to fly with astonishing speed to Brahma’s Realm in his physical body (kāyena Brahmalokaṁ gacchati). Though the term laghusaṁjñā is not found in the AKbh, the treatise refers, however, to a similar praxis: ṛdhhyādināṁ tu laghatvasādabālokanasikaranāṁ prayogah (AKbh 422, 11-12) ‘but the preparatory practice for [the attainment of] the miraculous powers, etc. is the contemplation of lightness, sound, and light’. AKVy 656, 22-24, explains that the contemplation of lightness prepares for the miraculous powers, the contemplation of sound for the divine ear, and the contemplation of light for the divine eye.

Skt. kauśeyam vā kacāṁ vā pāṭṭaṁ vā. The identification of the materials is again a task far from easy. Furthermore, the Tib. and Ch. translations face us with lexical items which
complicate the picture. Kauśeya is rendered by Monier-Williams (MW, s.v.) as ‘silk cloth’ or, simply, ‘silk’ (which I have adopted for my translation here). This, however, does not agree with Tib. rendering which is shing bal or ‘cotton’. It is rather intriguing that the same Tib. word is employed to translate kauśeya here and tūla in the preceding passage. I do not know whether this should be seen as a proof of their synonymity or simply as a symptom of a ‘loss of words’ (quite literal!) on the part of the Tibetan team.

Ch. 绢囊 ‘silk [cotton] sack’ (a binome otherwise not attested in any lexicographical source) adds further problems. 绢 means both ‘floss silk’ and ‘cotton’ (see Mathews 1943, s.v.; DKWí, s.v.; HDC, s.v.), and it is difficult to ascertain which of the two materials Xuanzang had in mind. Furthermore, 囊 ‘sack’, ‘bag’, etc. looks rather odd here. A remote possibility would be to construe it as the sense of ‘sack material’ (i.e., ‘cloth’?), but I am not sure whether 囊 could be used in such way. (For ‘cloth’, 布 would have been a much better choice.) Another (equally remote!) possibility would be to take 囊 as a metaphor for the body, i.e., ‘[like a soft] sack [filled with] floss silk/cotton’. It is true that occasionally Buddhist scriptures compare the body with a ‘bag’, but not in a context similar to ours and usually with pejorative connotations. For instance, at MN 1 57, 21, the ascetic engaged in the practice of satipatthāna views his body as a ‘double-mouthed bag’ (ubhāto mudā mūtoṭi). This is definitely a negative image, which has nothing to do with the semantic spectrum one would expect in our ŚrīBh passage. It is quite possible that Xuanzang had another lection in his MS. If this was the case, I would rather suspect that whatever stood for 囊 was probably a corrupt reading.

For the next word, kaca, I have followed Edgerton’s ‘cotton or raw silk’ (BHSD, s.v.). This agrees with (at least one of the meanings of) Tib. sin bal. Das (TED, s.v.) equates the compound with ras bal and renders it as ‘cotton, flock silk, raw silk’. I am not sure whether sin bal covers all these materials. Judging from its component words, i.e., sin < sin bu ‘worm’ (here, ‘silkworm’) and bal ‘wool’, it rather appears that (at least the primary) meaning of the compound is ‘silk’. Actually, BTsh s.v. defines the compound as sin bu las byung ba'i bal ‘wool produced from [silkworms]’, and gives 丝绵 ‘silk floss’ as its Chinese equivalent. (See also MVyut # 5870.)

On the other hand, Xuanzang’s translation of kaca is 毛毘 which usually means ‘down’, ‘very soft feathers’ (DKWí, s.v.). This sense is certainly stressed by the second character, an ideogram in which the repetition of 毛 ‘hair’ or ‘fur’ graphically represents the minuteness of the feathers. Actually, we also find 毛毘 in as a synonym or, more likely, an explanation of the tūla: ‘it is [as soft as] down’ (T54.1172a26) (see also note 263 above). It is somehow surprising that the binomic lexeme 毛毘 is not always employed in connection with soft cloth or garment. We actually find it in the same ŚrīBh (ŚrīBh-Gr 278, 9 = Ch. T30.422b4), where 毛毘 stands for aurnika ‘woolen’, and 毘衣 (ŚrīBh-Gr 278, 8 and 10 = Ch. T30.422b3 and 5) translates nāmatika ‘wearing garments of felt’. The latter binome can hardly refer here to soft wool since nāmatika is one of the austerities (dhūtaguna) which by their very nature rule out any degree of comfort. Actually, a similar rendering can be seen in the Chinese Ekottarakāgama 增壹阿含經 translated by Gautama Saṅghadeva sometime in the latter half of the fourth century C.E. In a sūtra parallel to the second half of the Pali Mahāsīhanādasutta (MN No. 12), wearing 毛毘 (T2.671b23) is one of the extreme forms of ascetic practices which Gautama had undertaken before his Awakening. It is not clear what 毛毘 precisely means here since the Pali counterpart is more developed and contains more types of cloths which Gotama wore (compare T2.671b22-23 with MN 1 78, 10-15). One possibility is that it refers to black antelope skin (ajina) (typical of Brahmanical ascetics), but this is a mere conjecture. Whatever it is, the material could, however, hardly convey the idea of ‘softness’. Now to return to our ŚrīBh
passage, in spite of the conflicting usages of 毛絨, our binomic lexeme 毛絨 should be taken here as a soft material. As to exactly what material it refers, I am afraid that a certain answer is not easy to give. Roughly speaking, however, ‘down’ or ‘soft wool’ are the most likely meanings. On the other hand, ‘silk’ is, I think, quite improbable.

According to MW, s.v., paṭṭa, the third of our similes, refers to ‘cloth, fine or coloured cloth, woven silk’ (see also paṭṭa ‘woven cloth’, ‘cloth’, etc.; for the meaning of the latter in Buddhist literature, cf. BHSD, s.v.). Tib. dar simply means ‘silk’, but Ch. 熟練 seems to be used here in the sense of ‘dressed silk’ (see 熟練 in Mathews 1943, s.v. 熟練 (b) ‘to soften raw silk by boiling’; DKWJ, s.v. 熟練 = ねりぎぬの衣服; HDC, s.v. 熟練 = 熟練丝, 麻, 棉组织使之洁白柔软). ‘Fine cloth’ for paṭṭa is a possible rendering, but it is more likely that the authors of the ŚrīBh wanted to enumerate different kinds of silk and contrasted paṭṭa in the sense of silk processed and already woven in a cloth or garment to kaca ‘raw silk’. Of course, both of them are very soft and primarily meant here to be similes for the ascetic’s ‘body being soft’ (mṛdukām kāyam), but stylistically it sounds better to list quasi-synonyms each with a different nuance (one cannot, however, exclude the possibility that our authors were not so good at or did not care so much about literary effects!).

Let us also add that there is another possible reading here: prīṅga (see note 115 to Skt. dipl. ed. and note 379 to Skt. crit. ed.), which also makes good sense, but in my opinion, not so good as paṭṭa. Edgerton (BHSD, s.v.) renders prīṅga as ‘figured silk’ (see also BWDJ, s.v.). Actually, both dictionaries cite Mvyut # 5866 (var. loc.: ṃṛṅga), whose Tib. equivalent is dar ri mo can and Ch. rendering is 絹絹. It seems that the stress is on the ‘figures’ (Tib. ri mo; Ch. 絹) of the silk, which would appear to me less relevant in our passage. Admittedly, one of the meanings of paṭṭa given by Monier-Williams above is ‘coloured silk’, but this does not appear to be of primary importance in our passage. Let us also note the fact that when Tib. uses ri mo, it probably must have a substantial semantic weight. The term dar ri mo can also renders citrapaṭṭaka (TSD, s.v.) where dar renders paṭṭa which is qualified by ri mo can = citra, probably in the sense of ‘spotted, speckled’ (or ‘bright-coloured’?). Though prīṅga remains a ‘candidate’ lection in our passage, I think that paṭṭa, with its nuance of ‘woven/dressed’ as opposed to ‘raw’, seems better. Besides, though the MS decipherment here is not easy, the word most probably reads paṭṭa, which requires no emendation. The other possible decipherment is paṅga, which would have to be emended in order to read prīṅga.

The meaning of Skt. rūpagaṭāṁ seems to be ‘any [kind of] matter’ or ‘consisting in matter’. The Tib. rendering gzugs kyi rnam pa should probably be construed as ‘type of matter’. Ch. 色聚 literally means ‘collection of matter’, here 聚 most likely standing for ‘collection’ in the sense of ‘variety of [types of] matter’ (see below). Rūpagaṭa is also found in Pañc. We see the compound at, for instance, AN IV 422, 24, alongside vedānāgataṁ, saññāgataṁ, saññharagataṁ, viññānagataṁ. The basic meaning does not appear to be different from rūpa, etc. used alone. The text says that whatever ‘belongs to [/consists in/is associated with] matter’, etc., all these factors (te dhamme) are seen by the meditator who dwells in the first absorption as being impermanent and causing suffering (anicchato dukkho), etc. See also AN-a IV 195, 15-16: [...] yam rūpaṁ nāma pavattatī; vedānāgataṁ sampaṭṭavaṇānādinaṁ [...] This canonical passage seems to be the basis of a reference at AKBh 435, 14-16: yat tatra bhavati rūpagaṭāṁ vā yāvad viññānagataṁ vetī [...] rūpagaṭaṁ vetī nāvacyat (cf. Honjō 1984, pp. 110-111; Pāśādika 1989a, p. 120, # 485). The Tib. translation here is also gzugs kyi rnam par (P Ngu 78a5) and gzugs kyi rnam pa (P Ngu 78a7). Both Paramārtha (T29.297b26 and 28) and Xuanzang (T29.146a26 and 29) have 色類 ‘type of matter’. It is noteworthy that both translators render rūpaṁ occurring in the same passage also as 色類. Cf. also rnam pa used for -gata in the DaśBh (cf. TSD, s.v.) as well as in the MVyut # 4651 dṛṣṭigataṁ = lta ba'i rnam
pa 'am lta bar gyur ba.

The idea that the perfect unity or interpenetration of mind and body leads to supernatural faculties is very old. SN V 283, 8-12, describes it using terms and images clearly similar to our Śrī Bhagavata: *yasmin ānanda samaye Tathāgato kāyaṁ pi cete samādhati cittam pi ca kāye samādhati || sukhasaṁñānaṁ lahusaṁñānaṁ kāye okkamitvā viharati || tasmaṁ ānanda samaye Tathāgatassā kāyo lahutaro ceva hoti mudutaro ca kammaniyatara ca pabhassaratara ca ||* (see also commentary at SN-a III 261). The Śrī Bhagavata passage here is more developed and uses its own concept of *cittakāyasamavadhānasamajñāna*, but there is little doubt that its authors (or the tradition to which they belonged) must have drawn their inspiration from this canonical source. The theoretical refinement of the idea that the body-mind unison serves as the basis for the attainment of supernatural faculties also appears to have continued in the Theravāda School, as reflected in, for instance, the Paṭisā ᴱ I 111 (cf. Paṭisā-ᵃ ᴱ I 345).

Skt. *karaṇīyam vistārena* can be construed as an instruction for the ascetic, i.e., ‘[the exercise] should be done in full’. The Tīb. and Ch. renderings clearly point in this direction (see below). An alternative, not necessarily contradicting the first interpretation, is to take the phrase as a direction for the preacher/reader/listener of the text, in the sense of ‘[the rest of the elements] are to be supplied [understood] in full’. A similar phrase is found at Divyā 377, 1: *vistārena kāryam*, which Edgerton translates as ‘the text is to be done (i.e. recited in full)’ (BHSD, s.v. *vistāra*). Cf. also the Index to the Divyā, s.v., where Cowell and Neil explain the word *vistara* as ‘direction to the narrator (‘expand here’)’ (p. 690). Pali *vithārena* is also used in the sense of ‘in detail’. E.g., DN III 241, 15: *dhammam vithārena paresam deseti* ‘teaches other the doctrine in detail’ (a phrase seen in other texts as well: AN III 178, 4, and below; also with negation at ibid., p. 177, l. 12, and below; etc.). In Sanskrit sources, *vistārena* is also frequently employed with the same meaning: Bo Bh 90, 21; AKbh 327, 5 (*vistārenekhyātam*); 394, 11 (*vistārenoktam śāstre*), etc.; Abhisamāl 36, 8 (*vistārenoktaḥ*), 43, 9-10 (*vistārena nirdiṣṭāḥ*), etc.

Tib. seems to take the sentence as an instruction for the yogi and translates in a rather free way: *de bzhin du ‘byung ba chen po re re zhung geig la geig ’khrul bar rgya cher mos par byed pa dang* | ‘Thus, [he] intensely envisages (mos par byed pa) in full [detail] each of the elements in such a way that one transforms (’khrul bar) into the other*. It appears that the content of *karaṇīyam* (for which, one would usually expect *bya ba*) is concretely explained by supplying *’khrul*, which is a synonym of *’phrul* (meaning ‘magical feat [transformation]’, TED, s.v.; cf. BṬsh, s.v., rendering it into Ch. as 変幻, 幻化).

Ch. also seems to construe the phrase as an explanation of the yogi’s praxis and freely renders *karaṇīyam* as an active sentence: 如是——差別大種轉轉相作 ‘in this way, the elements, one by one separately, transform one into another [lit., create each other]’ or ‘in this way, [the ascetic] mutually creates [i.e., transforms] [with regard to] each separate element’ (the latter reading is suggested by the *kundukot* reading at KDK 152 and KIK 246). What is peculiar to Ch. is that it (wrongly) takes *vistārena* 廣 with the next sentence: 廣如變化所作勝解，或色變化，或聲變化. This sentence can be interpreted in two ways. (1) ‘Broadly, [he] intensely envisages in accordance with the magical creations, be they magical creations of visible [things] or magical creations of sounds’. This is the most natural reading in Chinese, but we would have to assume that Xuanzang’s MS read: *yathā nirmitam adhimucyate*. (變化所作 is a rendering for *nirmita*; see BCS, s.v.; cf. also 变化所作 in Paramārtha’s translation of the *Mahāyānasamgraha* which in Tib. corresponds to *sprul pa*—see Nagao 1994, Part 2, s.v. *nirmita*.) (2) ‘Broadly, [he] thus (?) intensely envisages the magical creations, be they magical creations of visible [things] or magical creations of sounds’. This reading takes 如 as rendering *tathā* (which occurs as such in our Skt. MS), which is a lexical possibility (see BCS, s.v.), but
from the view point of Chinese syntax, it is far less natural.

The BōBh devotes a whole passage (p. 60, l. 5 - p. 61, l. 9) to the bodhisattva’s powers to transform the elements (māhābhūta) from one into another by deliberately cultivating the firm conviction (adhimucyate) that they are (or will become) as he decides. Its underlying ideas as well as some phrases (e.g., sacet prīthvīm apa ‘dhimucyate tat tathāvai bhavati, 60, 5-6; dūraṁ c‘āsannam adhimucyra, 61, 8, etc.) bear a close resemblance to our ŚrīBh passage.

It seems that although all the five ideations mentioned so far must be perfected in order to achieve the miraculous powers detailed in this passage, the ideation of conviction plays a central role. This is clearly expressed in the phrase laghumdvākāśadhātucittakāyasamatvadhānasañjñāparighrhitaśvātimuktasañjñāyā at the end of the first paragraph of this passage.

Skt. ātmānam ‘oneself’, or, as we have seen in passage 3.28.5.2.2. above, one’s ‘own body’. Tib. renders the Skt. word here as bdag nyid (unlike bdag nyid kyi lus in passage 3.28.5.2.2.). In this passage as well as in 3.28.5.2.2., Ch. translates as身.

Skt. < > bhidyamānena srotasā literally means ‘by means of a stream which is not broken’ or ‘without the stream being broken’. Cf. SaṅghBh 2.246, 20: abhinnaṃsroto.

This list of miraculous powers is based on a stock-phrase frequently employed in Pali and Sanskrit sources. Let us first see the canonical formula in Pali: so anekavihitam iddhividham paccamubhoti—eko pi hutva bahuḥd hoti, bahuḥd pi hutva eko hoti, avibhāvam tirobhāvam tirokuddham tiropākāram tirō-pabbatam asajjamano gacchati seyyataḥ pi ākāse, paṭṭhaviyā pi ummujjaniyajān karoti seyyatthā pi udake, udake pi ahijjamano gacchati seyyatthā pi paṭṭhaviyam, ākāse pi pallaṅkana kamati seyyatthā pi pakkhi sakuṅo, ime pi candimāsuriye evam mahiddhike evam mahāmubhāve pāṇīna parimassati parimajjati, yāva Brahmalokā pi kāyena vasamī vatteti (DN I 78, 1-10, which, however, misprints: [.]. kāyena va samvatteti) (= MN I 34, 10-20; 494, 24-35; SN II 212, 18-27; AN I 255, 3-13; etc.; for a detailed explanation see Vism, 314-342). For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.246, 15-23, and below; PaṅcA 83, 7-84, 2; DaśBh Kondō ed. 56, 16-57, 7; BoBh 61, 2-4 (abbreviated formula); AVy 602, 11-17 (bhūyo on line 15 is to be emended to sūrya-); MVyut # 215- # 228; etc. Our ŚrīBh passage describes the same stock of miraculous powers linking it with the five ideations described above and also adding two new ideations.

Skt. parighṛita, which I have translated rather freely as ‘assisted (by)’, seems to be used here in the sense of ‘followed (by)’.

The ‘due order’ refers here to the fact that the last four miraculous acts described above correspond to each of the four ideations in the order of their enumeration.

Skt. upādāyarūpa ‘derived matter’. More literally, it means ‘matter [arisen] in dependence upon [the four elements, i.e., earth, water, fire, and wind]’. The concept is seen, for instance, at Dhs 124, 33-34: cattāro ca māhābhūtā ca tattvamai ca maññati ca māhābhūtanām upādāya rūpaṁ—idaṁ vuccati sabbam rūpaṁ ‘the four elements [lit., great elements] and the matter depending on the four elements—this is what is called all [kinds of] matter’. The Vism (375, § 33 - 382, § 80), which treats the topic in detail, calls the matter based upon the four elements bhūtarūpa (aptly rendered by Nāgapolō tr. [1956] 1991, 443) as ‘primary materiality’) and distinguishes it from upādāyarūpa ‘derived matter’, classified into twenty-four types (eye, ear, nose, etc.). The same distinction is seen in the Northern Tradition. The Kośa mentions upādāyarūpa quite frequently (AKBh 8, 12; 53, 24; 84, 12; 85, 2; 103, 4; 199, 12-14; 340, 8; 413, 16). Vasubandhu does not give a detailed definition of the term, but from his usage, it is obvious that he basically has in mind a dichotomy similar to the one set forth in the Southern Abhidhamma (see especially AKBh 199, 12-14). YoBh 52, 10-53, 8, discusses in detail the relation between the four elements
and the derived matter as well as the complex mechanism of the dependence of the latter’s seeds (bijā) on the former. For our purpose here, it suffices to cite the following: *kathām tannisītiram upādāyārūpaṁ bhavati | tathā hi | uppannam upādāyārūpaṁ bhūtadesāvinirbhāgaṇa pravartate* | (YoBh 53, 2-3) (= Tib. D Tshi 26b3-4: *rgyur byas pa’i gzugs ji ltar de ltar de la brien ce na | ’di ltar rgyur byas pa’i gzugs s’kyes pa de ’byung ba’i phyogs dang tha dad pa med par gnas pa’i phyir*); Ch. T30.290a9-11: 云何造色依於彼耶？由造色生已不離大種處而轉故。) ‘Why is it [said] that derived matter depends upon the [elements]?’ It is because derived matter exists [functions] having arisen [from them] [and] not being separated from the locus (Skt. deśa; Tib. phyogs; Ch. 處) of the elements’. Cf. also YoBh 207, 5ff., which classifies derived matter into ten material bases (*daśa rūpīṇy āyatanāmi*) and matter included in the base-entities [not perceptible by external senses] (*dharmānyaparyāpannam ca rūpaṁ*) (YoBh 207, 6-7).

This paragraph constitutes an additional gloss on *vaśe vartayati*. It explains the ‘wielding of power’ (*vaśe vartanaḥ*) as (1) exercising bodily mastery in a spatial sense, i.e., moving at will to Brahma’s World; and (2) exercising physical power on material entities up to Brahma’s World, most likely in the sense of being able to move or alter them. The Eastern exegetical tradition shows a similar understanding. Ji, who offers two interpretations, says: 一分造色謂色聲二種, 故言一分。不迴轉跡及五根等故, 唯內境故言一分。(T43.122c6-7) ‘One part of the derived matter refers to matter and sound, therefore it is said one part. Because [the ascetic] does not act upon the touch and the five sense organs [but only upon] the external objects, it is said one part’. Shentai 神泰, an early Tang exegete whose work has survived only in To-ryun’s quotations (cf. Yuki 257-258), explains as follows: 二種運轉者：一、神通人身往来自在；二、能轉變梵世一分造色，或青或黃自回轉，非轉一切，言一分。(T42.475a11-14)

‘Two types of *vartanaḥ* [mean]: (1) by means of the miraculous powers, [the ascetic] goes to and returns from [Brahma’s World] at will; (2) [the ascetic] can modify a part of the derived matter in Brahma’s World, [for example,] [colours like] blue or yellow are acted upon at will; [however, this] is not [the ability] to act upon the entire [World of Brahma], [and therefore] it is said one part’. (This view actually agrees with Ji’s second interpretation, see T43.122c7-9.) The ŚrīBh passage is, admittedly, far from easy, and this lead to erroneous explanations even among traditional commentators (e.g., Fuhui 福慧 (T85.944c3-5) who is completely off the mark).

Though not exactly the same, a similar miraculous power is described by the Vism in a different context. Glossing upon dūre pi santike adhiṭṭhāti ‘[the ascetic] concentrates [sets his mind] upon something as if being close in spite of [its being] far’ (Vism 339-340, §§ 129 - 128), Buddhaghosa gives examples of miraculous feats performed by the Exalted One and his advanced disciples. One of these consists in making far destinations come physically close to them and sometimes even by taking other monks with them. We are also told here of the ability to make what is much (bahukam) become little (thokam) and vice versa, or what is sweet (madhuram) become non-sweet (amadhuram) and the other way round. It is interesting that Buddhaghosa also describes the yogī’s ability to travel to Brahma’s World in this body, whether a visible (dissamanēna kāyena) or an invisible one (adissamanēna kāyena) (Vism 338-339, § 119), but nothing similar to our ŚrīBh passage is said here.

Northern Abhidharma literature, though hinting at developments and refinements of the concept of magical travel, does not, however, show clear similarities with the ŚrīBh description. At AKBh 425, 9, we are told: *śārīravāhini ādhimokṣikī manojava ca tatra gatiḥ ‘there are three [types] of going, [to wit] that carrying the body, that [based on] conviction [/zealous meditative application], and that [moving] with the speed of mind’. The Kosā continues by explaining that the last of these three kinds of supernatural movement is reserved only to the Buddha, but *śārīravāhini and ādhimokṣikī can also be achieved by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. They are defined as follows: [...] śārīravāhini ca gatiḥ | pāksīvat kramaṇa śārīravāhanāti | ādhimokṣikī*
ca dūrasyāsannādhimokṣenāṣṭugamanāt (AKBh 425, 15-16) ‘and the going which carries the body is [called so] because of carrying the body by means of [gradually] moving like a bird [i.e. flying]. And [going based upon] conviction [/zealous meditative application] is [called so] because of rapid going by means of the conviction that what is remote is near’. These two kinds of movement, especially the last one, is probably similar to the first of type of vaśe varjanā in the Śrībh, i.e., ‘[actually] going’ (gamana).

It is hard to determine whether the Śrībh gloss here is part of the original early version of the text or is a later interpolation coming from the hands of a compiler who felt that some further clarifications were needed. Whichever textual layer it may belong to, the explanation of vaśe varjanā seems, however, to be unique to the Śrībh. The BoBh (61, 2-9) also contains a passage on the bodhisattva’s ability to travel not only to Brahma’s World but to wherever he wishes in the whole Trichiliomegachililocosm [lit., Universe consisting of a triple thousand great thousand worlds] (prisāhasrāmahāsahasrām lokadhātām gacchaty āgacchatī ca). Here, however, no mention is made of the bodhisattva’s ability to alter material phenomena in these worlds.

279 Skt. audārikaudārikatayā ‘clearly [manifested]’ (cf. ojārika ‘manifest, clear’, CPD, vol. 2, p. 768, s.v.). This seems to be a natural semantic development of audārika. From its basic sense of ‘coarse’, ‘not-subtle’, etc., the adjective was probably construed as expressing the ‘completely manifested’ or ‘clear’ (i.e., ‘not faint’, ‘not slight’) quality of the noun which it qualifies, or, if used adverbially, of the verb it modifies.

280 Skt. avyutkramaṇikayā literally means ‘in the manner of not skipping [/passing over] [each act]’. See note 417 to Skt. crit. ed.

281 In analogy with passage 3.28.5.2.9. below, it also is possible to construe bhāvanāphalam as the direct object of an elliptical verb like pratilabhate and render as ‘[obtains] the fruit of the cultivation’. Or the elliptical verb could be utpadaye as in bhāvanāphalam cetahparyāyajñanam utpadaye (passage 3.28.5.2.10. below). However, the sentence can be understood even without presupposing such an ellipsis.

282 The primary function of Skt. vistarena here is to mark a direction for the listener/reader/preacher to supply the exact wording of the stock-phrase which describes how past experiences are recalled. This function is clearly stressed by yāvat. A similar usage of vistarena yāvat is seen in passage 3.28.5.2.9. below. As pointed out in note 269 above, vistarenā might also be taken as a direction for the yogi: the act of recollection should cover all details as in the canonical formula. Basically, this is not contradictory to the interpretation suggested above. Since the yogi must recollect his past lives following the exact pattern of the canonical formula, this ends up meaning pretty much the same thing: the ascetic (who is at the same time a listener or reader of the text) must supply the wording of the entire stock-phrase. The difference with the plain listener/reader (if such recipients were ever envisaged by the Śrībh authors), is that the ascetic would have been also expected to practice and actually attain what the canonical formula describes.

The Śrībh passage here refers to the canonical formula which starts with the recollection of one life (ekam pi jātiṁ) and ends with many aeons of formation and disintegration (aneke pi saṁvāṭta-vivāṭta-kappe). The canonical passage can be found at DN I 81, 9-82, 18. In a shorter version, it is also seen at MN I 35, 5-18; 495, 23-36; SN II 213, 16-32; AN I 255, 30-256, 7; etc. This texteme is glossed upon and discussed in detail in Vism 346, § 13-357, § 71. For Skt. parallels, see SaṁghBh 2.249, 3-34; Pañca 86, 1-87, 2; DaśBh Kondō ed. 58, 1-11; MVyut # 229- # 230 (partial citation); etc.

283 Skt. sākāramaṇ soddeśam ‘with [all] aspects and particulars/details’ (soddeśam comes from sa+uddēsa ‘with+explanation, exposition, setting forth’). Vism (357, § 71), commenting upon the canonical formula which contains this phrase, says: nāmāgottavasena sa-uddesam, vannādvāṣena sākāramaṇ ‘due to [including the recollection of] the name and the clan, [it is
called] with [all] particulars; due to [including the recollection of] the appearance [/colour], etc., [it is called] with [all] its aspects'. In the stock-phrase, it is stated that the ascetic recollects his name, clan, appearance, the food which he has eaten, his pleasant as well as painful experiences, and his death.

The basic structure of this long and intricate sentence is the typical syntactic construction employed in definitions: ‘tatra X, yah (yad/yā) Y’. In our case, this is: tatra nāṇāprakārāśabdasamānīpātinighosasamjñā [...] yā saṃjñābhāvanā. In our passage here, the sentence continues after saṃjñābhāvanā with a relative clause introduced by yāḥ, but I am afraid that the English style would not bear any attempt of further expanding the sentence. I have, therefore, rendered this relative clause as an independent sentence: ‘by means of this [ideation] [...]’ (see below).

Skt. tatra nimittam udghva literally means ‘having grasped the characteristic regarding this’. Here, tatra appears to be used in the sense of ‘in this regard’, referring to the sounds and noises which in the Sanskrit sentence are enumerated before.

Skt. āryānārēṣu refers, most likely, to the Noble Realm (āryāyatana), where the Noble Law prospers, and to its counterpart, the ‘border regions’ (pratīyānta), populated by barbarians.

Tib. dbus dang | mtha’ ‘khub pa ‘central and border [areas]’ clearly construes the compound in this way. Of course, Āryāyatana implies the Sanskrit language, and ‘the noble sounds’ may refer (only or mainly?) to sounds uttered in Sanskrit. I think it is, however, more likely that the usage of ārya here is wider, and though it certainly includes the language, it should be probably construed as ‘the sounds uttered by the people living in the Noble Realm’.

The Śṛbh (Śṛbh-Gr 10, 9-10) describes a person belonging to the Noble Realm as madhyēṣu janapadesu pratīyājato bhavati ‘[someone] born in the middle regions’. This is one of the propitious conditions regarding oneself (ātmamipad) which is a requisite (sambhāra) for the practice of the Noble Path. The reverse is being born in a border region (mtha’ ‘khub—Skt. unavailable; for Tib. text, see Śṛbh-Gr 6, 1-5).

The Noble Land (āryāvarta) is also a central concept in the cultural and spiritual geography of Brahmanism and Hinduism. The Manusmṛti, chapter 2, ver. 22, defines it as follows: ā samudrát tu vai pārvād ā samudrát tu pāscimāt | tayor evāntaraṁ gīyor āryāvartaṁ vidur budhāḥ || (Olivelle ed., pp. 406-407). ‘The land between the same mountain ranges extending from the eastern to the western sea is what is called “Āryavarta”—the region of the Āryas’ (Olivelle tr., p. 95) (the same mountains refer here to the Himalaya and Vindhya ranges which are mentioned in the preceding verse). This is ‘the natural range of the black buck’ (kṛṣnasāras tu carati mrgo yatra svabhāvataḥ | (Manusmṛti 2.23a-b, Olivelle ed. p. 407; tr. p. 95) (a rendering closer to the original is found at Doniger with Smith tr., 1992, p. 19: ‘where the black antelope ranges by nature’). The concept had important practical consequences because the twice-born were expected to do all efforts to settle in this regions, beyond which lie the lands of the barbarians (mlecchadeśa) (Manusmṛti 2.24; ibid.). Even travelling outside the prescribed boundaries should be avoided, and when a journey to barbarian lands becomes absolutely necessary, strict rites of purification await the twice-born upon return to Āryāvarta.

The canonical passage describing the divine ear can be found at DN I 79, 6-22 (in its most developed form); MN I 34, 21-24; 494, 36-495, 3; SN II 212, 31-35; AN I 255, 14-17; etc.). DN I 79, 6-22, is the basis of the discussion at Vism 343-344, §§ 1-7. For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.248, 1-12; Pañca 84, 9-16; DaśBh Kondō ed. 57, 7-9; etc.

Once again, we have a direct reference to and partial quotation from a canonical formula, this time the texteme describing the divine eye. Let us first see the Pali stock-phrase. It starts with: So dibbenā cakkhusa visuddhena atikkanta-mānasakena satte passati cavamē ne pañjājamē, hine pañīte suvanne dubbane sugate duggate yathākamūpace sate pañjānāti
(DN I 82, 26-29). ‘By means of the pure divine eye, surpassing the human [one], he sees sentient beings passing away [and] being [re-]born, he fully knows sentient beings, [whether] mean [or] lofty, pleasant [or] unpleasant, happy [or] unhappy, [each being] born [lit., reaching a state] according to [their] acts’. (A similar idea is hinted at by kusālākāsālakarma-kriyādibhedena in our ŚrīBh passage). The ascetic sees then how those having committed wrong bodily, verbal, and mental deeds are reborn in a bad form of existence and those with a good karma and correct views (sammādītthikā) ‘after the destruction of the body after [their] death are born in a good destination, a heavenly world’ (kāvāsa bhedā paramā marañña sugatiṁ saggio lokam uññapanna) (DN I 37-39). This last part is actually cited in our ŚrīBh passage. The only difference is that in Pali we find no equivalent for ‘amongst deities’. The latter appears, however, in the Sanskrit parallel: kāvāsa bhedā sugatau svargaloke deveśu papadayante (SaṅghBh 2.250, 16). The beginning of the citation, ‘by means of the divine pure eye’, is also found in both Pali (see above) and Skt. (divyena caksuṣā viśuddhena; SaṅghBh 2.250, 5-6).

For the canonical formula in Pali sources, see DN I 82, 22-83, 34 (in its most developed form); MN I 35, 18-36; 496, 1-17; SN II 213, 33-214, 18; AN I 256, 8-24; etc. Vism discusses and glosses upon the canonical formula at pp. 357-368, §§ 72-129. For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.250, 3-19; Pañca 87, 3-88, 6; DaśBh Kondō ed. 58, 11-59, 5; etc.

Skt. klesākṛtarupavikārasanānā ‘ideation of the specific changes in physical appearance determined by defilements’. Vikāra and vikṛti (used below in rūpavikṛti) mean ‘alteration, transformation, modification’, etc. The sense of the term here seems to be that of a ‘change’ in the physical appearance of a person in accordance with the type of defilement dominant in him or her. Let us also note that one of the senses of vikāra is ‘contrortion of the face, grimace’ (see MW, s.v.).

Skt. paridāḥa ‘ardent desire’. The word can also be rendered as ‘feverish longing’ or ‘fever’ in a purely pathological sense (see BHSD, s.v.). Paridāha does not appear to be a standard Āsthiddharmic category, at least, not in the doctrinal system expounded in the AKBh. Actually, passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. of the ŚrīBh (see above) lists pradāśa ‘stubborn adherence [to one’s views]’ after mṛakṣa in a similar enumeration of defilements. It is not excluded that paridāha here is a scribal error or later editorial change of pradāśa, but the former is not out of place here. Actually, paridāha appears in other Buddhist sources, too, sometimes occurring in similar lists of defilements. Pali pariñāha or ‘fever’ is frequently employed in a figurative sense of ‘feverish passion’ and in collocation with kāma or other ‘burning’ defilements (e.g. MN I 101, 30; SN II 143, 28; 151, 19: kāmapariñāha; 151, 25: vyāpāpariñāha; 151, 30-31: vihimsāpariñāha; AN I 68, 5; 137, 18-19; etc.).

The word paridāha occurs in Sanskrit sources with apparently the same meaning. I could not find a scholastic definition of the term, but its often being enumerated together with defilements leaves no doubt that it was considered one of them. At LalVis 42, 21-22, we find it alongside rāga, dveśa, moha, īrya, mātsarya, māna, mṛakṣa, and mada. See also LalVis 206, 3, kāmeṣu paridāha ‘burning longing for sensual pleasures’, in a passage containing several parallel expressions: kāmeṣu nandiḥ, kāmeṣu rāgaḥ, [..]. DaśBh Kondō ed. 39, 14-15, includes it in the following list: krodhopanāhahkhilmalamāvyāpāparidāhasāṃdhukṣitapratihātyānī (var. lec.: sādyānī) (my underlining). At ŚīkSa 109, 26-27, in a quotation from the Ugradattaparipṛcchā, the term paridāha appears with rāga, dveśa, moha, mana, mada, mṛakṣa, lobha, īrya, and mātsarya as one of the mental states which the bodhisattva must fear and abandon.

It can easily be seen that these enumerations partly overlap with our ŚrīBh passage. Such a textual tradition may have determined the ŚrīBh authors to deliberately include paridāha here in spite of the similar enumeration at 3.28.2.1.2.4. which has pradāśa. It is unclear to me, however, whether this is a change motivated by doctrinal reasons (I cannot see any compelling ones
requiring it!) or is just a pure stylistic preference.

Ch. contains extra items in its list of defilements (see note 332 to Ch. ed.). Furthermore, it is not clear whether Ch. renders pradāsa or paridāha (see note 331 to Ch. ed.).

With the exception of paridāha (see preceding note), all the other defilements enumerated in Skt. also appear in passage 3.28.2.1.2.4. above. For their meanings and doctrinal background, see respective notes to the Engli. tr. of the passage.

Skt. sagadgadasvaratā. The word gadgada usually means ‘stammering, stuttering’, but Monier-Williams also records the sense of ‘indistinct or convulsive utterance (as sobbing, etc.)’ (MW, s.v.), which I think is more relevant for our passage. A person dominated by hatred is more likely to be described as having wrathful ‘convulsive utterances’ than as ‘stuttering’ (though admittedly wrathful ‘convulsive utterances’ may sound or culminate in hysteric ‘stuttering’ or ‘indistinctness’ of sounds).

A detailed description of the persons ‘whose [habitual] behaviour [is governed/dominated by] passion’ (rāgacarita), ‘whose [habitual] behaviour [is governed/dominated by] hatred’ (dveṣacarita), and ‘whose [habitual] behaviour [is governed/dominated by] bewilderment’ (mohacarita) is found at the beginning of Yogasthāna II (Śṛbh-Gr (13) 106-112, in Chapter 3.5. (see my Synoptic Presentation above), which contains the classification of persons (pudgala) into 28 types.)

Skt. vitarkitaṁ vicāritam mano manasā. In the Pali canonical formula, the parallel sentence runs as follow: so parasattānaṁ parapuggalāṁ cetasā ceto paricca pajānāti (DN I 80, 22-24). This corresponds to Skt.: sa parasattvānāṁ parapudgalānāṁ vitarkitāṁ vicāritam mano manasā yathābhūtāṁ praṇānāti (SaṅghBh 2. 248, 18-20) (for other sources, see note 296 below). In Skt. sources, as in our Śṛbh passage, we see cetasā ceto paricca replaced by mano manasā and vitarkitāṁ vicāritam added to the sentence. In Pali, the latter is not only absent in this sentence but also lacks in the enumeration of the various mental frameworks known by the yogi. This list starts in Pali sources with sarāgaṁ vā cittaṁ and ends with avimuttaṁ vā cittaṁ (e.g. DN I 79, 35-80, 14) while in Sanskrit texts, it begins with sarāgaṁ cittaṁ and finishes with <su>vimuktaṁ vā cittaṁ (e.g. SaṅghBh 2. 248, 20-26). Vitarkitāṁ vicāritam appear to be construed here as action nouns which clarify the content of manas (grammatically, they are appositions to the latter). Rendered more freely, vitarkitāṁ vicāritam mano [..] praṇānāti is: ‘[the ascetic] fully knows the mind [of the sentient beings], [i.e.,] their thinking, be it coarse or subtle’.

The canonical description of the knowledge of the ways of thought of other sentient beings is found at DN I 79, 26-81, 8 (in its most developed form); MN I 34, 24-35, 4; 495, 4-22; SN II. 213, 1-15; AN I 255, 18-29; etc. Vism discusses the canonical formula at pp. 344-345, §§ 8-12. For Skt. parallels, see SaṅghBh 2.248, 16-249, 2; Pañca 85, 1-14; DaśBh Kondō ed. 57, 9-58, 1; etc.

In our Śṛbh passage, we see three characteristics in the treatment of this supernatural faculty. (1) Like with other abhijñās, its obtainment is based on a particular type of ideation. (2) The mental states described in the stock-phrase are modified to accommodate the personality taxonomy peculiar to the Śṛbh and brought in line with the much more precise Abhidharmic typology of defilements. (3) In the canonical description of the supernatural faculty, the knowledge of other people’s minds is a psychological process (albeit a supernormal one), but in our Śṛbh passage, the yogi starts from observation of the physiognomy and only later achieves actual penetration into the thoughts of other beings. It must, however, be added that such a development is not confined to the Śṛbh alone. Though implying a different procedure, the idea of beginning with the observation of a material phenomenon is also met with in the Vism (344-345, §§ 9-10). Here the meditator who has already obtained the divine eye makes use of
this supernatural faculty and looks at the colour of blood (lohitassa vaṇṇaṁ) in another being’s heart (hadayā’). He thus comes to understand that a mental state of satisfaction (somanasacittān) is accompanied by red (ratta) blood, dissatisfaction by dark or black (kāla) blood, etc. When his practice has gained firmness (thāmagate), the meditator does not need to look at the blood colour and can penetrate directly the minds of other beings. Non-dependence on material signs also allows him to know the minds of the beings in the immaterial (ārūpa) spheres of existence.

297 For a presentation and discussion of these sets of spiritual exercises in canonical and Abhidharmic sources, see Lamotte tr. 1944-1980, vol. 3, pp. 1281-1290 as well as their treatment in the PPUpad, ibid., pp. 1291-1307. See also AKBh 456, 8-458, 9.

298 This refers to SamBh pp. 136-140, which discusses all these sets of meditative exercises.

299 To-ryun comments upon this as follows: 變是通體，化是通果。亦名神通。勝解通者：遠作近解，屈伸臂頸 (var. lec. 頸) 至色究竟，及想地等，名為勝解。(T42.475b14-16).

‘Transformation is the essence of [this] faculty, creation is the fruit of [this] faculty, [which] is also called miraculous power [lit., divine penetrating faculty]. The faculty of conviction: [the ascetic] “becomes convinced that what is remote is near” [and thus becomes convinced that by] bending and stretching his arm [or] neck, [he can] reach the Summit of the Material Realm (i.e., Akanistha), and formulates the ideation that “earth is water”, etc.—[this faculty] is called conviction’. To-ryun’s citations seem to be based on the passage 3.28.5.26.1. above.

For a detailed treatment of pārīṇāmika rddhiḥ and nairamāṇīkī rddhiḥ, see BoBh Wogihara ed. 58, 19ff. (Dutt ed. 40, 16ff.).

300 Skt. tadyathā seems to be used here in a rather irregular way. Usually, the word clarifies the immediately preceding lexical element or brings illustrations to it, but here neither sense seems to fit in this context. The words following tadyathā appear to be listed as further accomplishments obtained through the cultivation of the vimokṣābhībhvāyatanaakṛṣṇāyatana- sāmīḷā. Tib. contains the equivalent of tadyathā = ‘di lta ste but continues juxtaposing (with dang) the rest of the nouns in a sequence similar to the former part of the sentence. Ch. clearly construes the lexical elements after tadyathā as an addition to the preceding terms: 及能引 ‘and [he] can [also] generate […]’.

The nouns following tadyathā also seem to show a grammatical irregularity. Unlike the preceding nouns which are in accusative, arañā, pāṇidhiñānam, catasrah pratīṣṭasmiḍaḥ tadyathā dharmapratisamvit, arthapratisamvit, niruktapratisamvit, pratibhānapratīṣṭasamvit are in nominative. I think that all nouns in accusative would sound (at least, stylistically) better, but I must confess that I have not checked all usages of tadyathā in the ĖrBh and related texts. This change of case may have been an admissible change. If this was not, emendation becomes necessary. The irregularity could then be explained as a corrupt transmission or a less careful (oral?) style. Or it may reflect a later accretion which was included in the text without carefully linking it to the rest of the sentence, i.e., without making the grammatical case uniform.

301 Skt. arañā ‘freedom from impurity’. In Pali, a-raṇa means ‘free from passion (beyond strife)’ (CPD, s.v.) and is often contrasted to sa-raṇa (see MN III 235, 17-237, 17; Dhs 7, 3; Vibh 19, 9; etc.) (cf. also the compounds arañavihāra and arañavihārin). The semantic duality of raṇa, which means both ‘fight, battle’ and ‘intoxication, desire, sin, fault’ (PED, s.v.; cf. also CPD, s.v., which explains that raṇa is identified in the Pali tradition with kilesa), seems to survived in later usages and definitions of arañā in Buddhist literature. The word is translated by Edgerton (BHSD, s.v.) as ‘free(dom) from depravity, passion; impurity’ (BHSD, s.v.). I render the word here as ‘freedom from impurity’, but I think that the nuance of ‘beyond strife’ may have also remained in the word as a (latent?) connotation.

I shall discuss here two occurrences. The first one comes from Subhūti’s story in the Avad
Before becoming an Arhat, Subhūti had a very irascible character and this was related to his previous 500 rebirths as a serpent (nāga). Having realized this, Subhūti feels pity not only for himself but also for all sentient beings harbouring hatred against others. During his alms-round, he thus starts to inspect the ground in order not to harm living beings and formulates the wish that no one, not even an ant (pipilaka), should have reasons to bear grudge against him (232, 14-16). In the end, he is declared by the Exalted One to be the foremost amongst the dwellers in passionlessness/peace (aranāvihāriṣīm agraḥ, p. 233, l. 11). The story ends with an explanation of the ultimate cause of Subhūti’s 500 births amongst serpents: this is his ‘not having abandoned the defilements’ (aprapiṇātva klesānām, 233, 13), which would appear to underlie the basic sense of the word a-raṇā. But even with this specification, the nuance of ‘conflict’ is present since among the details concerning the nature of these defilements, an important one is Subhūti’s former attitude of hatred towards mendicants and his scolding them ‘with words [harsh as] a venomous serpent’ (āśīvṛṣavadena, 233, 14).

The definition in the AK Bh (417, 2-5) also witnesses the semantic complexity of the term: tatrāraṇā nāma kaścid evārhaṃ klesaprabhavam sattvānam duḥkham vidvītvāmaṇam ca daksiniyaviśeṣam paresām tād laṃ pādam parihartukāmām tād dhriṣṭam jñānam upādavyati yena paresām sarvathāpi raṇāṃ natpādayati | na kasyacit tadālambano rāga upadayate dveṣo māṇc vā | naśa pratipat kimcic eva raṇayatīta arāṇā |. ‘Herein [i.e. in the compound occurring in the preceding senetence, the so-called arañā is [as follows]: indeed, some Arhat, realising that the suffering of the living beings has its source in defilements and that he himself is especially worthy of revereration for others, wishing to avoid that a defilement having him as its support may arise in others, produces such a knowledge [that] by its means he does not arouse others’ passion [conflict] (raṇa) at all [in such a way that] no passion, hatred, or arrogance having him as its support arises in anyone. Because this practice does not become the cause of anybody’s becoming contaminated (raṇayatī), [it is called] raṇā (raṇayatī is equated with klesa by Yaśomitra—raṇayatīti klesavyatī artoḥ (AKVy 651, 21); cf. also BHSD, s.v. raṇati). (AK Bh 417, 5-16, continues with the discussion of various doctrinal facets of the concept.) It is true that one of the defilements the Arhat may produce in others is ‘passion’ (rāga), but another is ‘hatred’ (dveṣa), which implies a nuance of conflict. Furthermore, according to Sthiramati’s explanation in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyajīka (P Tho 495a8), the most obvious defilement which might be generated by the sight of a Worthy One is envy (cf. also AK Bh 128, 3).

Skt. pranidhijñāna ‘cognition [arising from] the wish [to know an object as it is in reality]’. After discussing several theoretical aspects of the concept (most of which are similar with arañā), the AK Bh (418, 5-6) describes how pranidhijñāna is attained: pranidhīpūrvakam jñānam pranidhijñānam | yad dhi pranidhiyā prāniakoṭikam caturhāṃ dhyānāṃ samapadyate “idam jāniyām” iti, tad yathābhūtam jānati, vāvāms [MS, Pradhān read: sarvas; I follow AKVy 652, 11] tattva-dhīviṣayath | (my punctuation). ‘Pranidhijñāna is a [form of] knowledge preceded by a wish. For having resolved upon what [is to be the known], [the meditator] enters into the fourth absorption [which represents] the culmination [of the dhyāna levels] [or: into the highest [form of the fourth absorption], [thinking] ‘I’d like to know this’, [and] that he [comes to] know in conformity with reality as much as the domain of his meditation [extends].’ According to the AKVy 652, 11-13, the last part of the sentence appears to refer to the fact if the meditator is a disciple (śrāvakas), he can know only as much as the domain of knowledge of his śrāvaka level allows, which is different from that of pratyekabuddhas, etc.

For the definition arañā and pranidhijñāna, see also AbhSamBh 127, 26ff. (§§ 156-157).

For a discussion of the set of the four kinds of thorough knowledge and its first two members, see note 257 above. Here, I shall briefly present the last two members. According to the AK Bh 418, 13, nirukti is the thorough knowledge concerning speech. Edgerton (BHSD, s.v.)
is, I think, correct in remarking that nirukti is ‘explanation, not necessarily etymological, of the meaning of a word or text’. See also AbhSambh 128, 8ff.

The last of these knowledges is defined by the the Kośa as follows: yuktamuktābhilāpitāṁ samādhiṣaṁśaṇaprabhūyāṁ cāvivartayāṁ jñānāṁ pratibhānāpratisaṁvit (AKBh Śāstri ed. 1103, 1-2 = Pradhan ed. 418, 15-16) I follow Śāstrī; Pradhan reads the last word as: pratibhānasavatt; cf., however, Tib. P Ngu 68bl: spobs pa so so yang dag par rig pa and AKV 652, 26: pratibhānaprajasamvit; see also AKBh Index (vol. 1, p. 436), Corrigenda, which emends to: pratibhānasamvit. ‘Pratibhānahaprajasamvīd is the unobstructed knowledge concerning the clarity [obtained] by one who has mastered meditation, [clarity] which is expressed appropriately [and] unimpededly’. (My rendering relies on Yasomitra’s understanding; see AKV 652, 22-25). For a discussion of the niruktiprajasamvīd and pratibhānaprajasamvīd, see also Dayal [1932] 1978, 265-267.

The passage bears the mark of an editorial adjustment and probably represents a later addition. The explicit reference to the SamBh shows that it must have assumed its present form after the latter Book had been compiled. We cannot be certain whether the ur-Śrāvakabhūmi gave full information concerning the practices listed in this passage or even whether it contained this passage at all. I think that the hypothesis of its complete absence cannot be ruled out. The so-called ‘ideation of the [eight] liberations, [eight] bases of mastery [and] [ten] totalities’ does not seem to be a form of cultivation in its own, and the passage as such does not offer any clue on how it or the meditative techniques it is supposed to trigger should be practised. This contrasts with the other ideations which describe or present concrete forms of praxis. Besides, all the other ideations are related to the obtainment of supernatural faculties. This last passage, on the other hand, first announces three names of ideations about which no details are given and which have no direct relevance to the abhijñās. It then continues with the enumeration of spiritual cultivation and knowledge derived from it.

The passage, especially the cognitions appearing it its last part, reminds of the AKBh fragment which starts with kārikā VII.35 (AKBh 416, 17ff.). Vasubandhu states that the Buddha shares some qualities (guna) with the disciples (śrāvaka) and some guṇas even with the ordinary people (prythagīnaya) (presumably referring here to ‘ordinary people’ engaged in spiritual cultivation). The qualities listed by Vasubandhu include: aranāpranidhījñānaprasaṁvidaṁ-abhijñāḥdhyanārūpyāpramāṇavimokṣābhībhavatanakṛṣṇasvayatanādayāḥ (AKBh 417, 1) (AKV 651, 12-14, explains that the qualities shared with the disciples are aranā, pranidhījñāna, and so on, and those common with ordinary people are abhijñā, dhvīna, ārūpyā, etc.). Vasubandhu first treats the first three categories in detail and then deals with the six abhijñās (AKBh 421, 5ff.). Though not expounded in detail, we also see a similar list of spiritual practices and cognitions in the BoBh, which this time are presented as being shared by bodhisattvas with the Śrāvakāyānikas: bodhisattvavimokṣābhībhavatanakṛṣṇasvayatanānāṁ pratisaṁvīdaranā- pranidhījñānadānām guṇānāṁ śrāvakasādāhārayānānām (Wogihaara ed. 207, 21-23). It thus appears that these practices and cognitions, which are anyway ancillary or optional in the great edifice of the spiritual path (at least, in Abhidharma literature), were perceived as forming a sort of a common set or section in the overall treatment of meditation and ensuing cognitions.

I surmise that the editors of a late or final version of the ŚrBh looked for a place to fit in this appendix, and due to an Abhidharmic tradition which discusses it in the vicinity of the abhijñās (as, for instance, the AKBh does), the subchapter on the ideations linked to the supernatural faculties appeared as appropriate. This must have been felt quite suitable also because they occur in the Laukkikāmārga Chapter, and some of these techniques were considered as attainable even by ordinary people and non-Buddhists (see the AKBh and AKV 652 above). Such a conjecture would also mean that the ideations must have originally been nine, not twelve. As for the reference to the SamBh, I think that it could be even later (see Subsection 2, Section II,
Chapter Five, Part One above). See also note 261 above.

Like other Buddhist texts (see AK VII.35: *śisyasādhāraṇā anye dharmāh kecit prthagjanaḥ | arañāprenaiddhiṁnapratīsainvīdguṇādayaḥ | | and AKBh 417, 1 (quoted with AKVĀy explanation in previous note above); cf. also AKBh 421, 9-10, about the first supernatural faculties: *āśāṁ pūtica prthagjanaḥ sādhāraṇāḥ*), our text admits of the possibility that the ordinary people can attain miraculous powers, but the quality of the latter is decidedly poor, apparently not surpassing the level of magic. It is, however, important to note that though expounding the mundane path, to which even non-Buddhists have access (see passage 3.28.1.1. above), the authors of the ŚrīBh are very keen to stress the ‘noble supernatural faculties’ (or: ‘supernatural faculties [cultivated] by the Noble Ones’) (see also *āryāṇām [...] guṇānām* in the paragraph below and *āryāṁ rādhīm abhinirharati* in passage 3.28.5.2.11. above).

Ji does not say anything about this in his Commentary on the YoBh (see T43.122c), but the whole of this ŚrīBh passage is cited in another major work of his, the *Dacheng fa yuan yi lin zhang* 大乘法苑義林章 (T45.336c3-7). The citation appears in a section dealing with differences in meditative attainment and derived faculties between the Noble Ones and ordinary people.

Tb. *phags pa rnam sbyin yon tan* suggests: ‘qualities of the Noble Ones’. Ch. 諸聖功德 is not clear: 諸 could refer to 聖 ‘the Noble Ones’ or to 功德 ‘qualities’.

My rendering above is a compromise between the attempt, on one hand, to keep as close to the original as possible and, on the other, to make the sentence sound reasonably natural and clear in English. The Skt. original does not contain any active verb, and a more literal rendering would be: ‘the generation of [...] should be known’. The number of lexical elements modifying *abhinirhāra* has, however, made me desist from any attempt to stay close to the original. Though I do not deny that a more experienced translator could find a better solution, it must be noted that the Skt. sentence itself is rather clumsily constructed. Actually, both Tib. and Ch. appear to have experienced similar difficulties and probably tried to bring more clarity by splitting the sentence into two phrases (see Tib. ed. and Ch. ed. as well as respective notes). The place of the two adverbs *yathāyogam* seems particularly problematic. It is not excluded that the original sentence contained just the *yathāyogam* before *pañcānāṁ abhiśānām*, but this may have been felt as being limited to the supernatural faculties only. Probably later in the editorial process, a second *yathāyogam* was added after the phrase *āryāṇāṁ ca guṇānām aprthagjana-sādhāraṇānāṁ* in order to stress that these qualities, too, are generated ‘in accordance with what is suitable in each case’. It goes without saying that this is a merely conjectural scenario, and other alternatives (from a rather careless style to a corrupt transmission) are also conceivable.

With the exception of the Heavenly Worlds corresponding to the attainment of non-ideation, all these cosmic planes, similarly structured, are also listed and discussed at AKBh 111, 16-114, 4. See also YoBh 75, 14-76, 9; MVyūt # 3084 - # 3113; etc. (for other sources, see note 242 above).

Skt. *yathāyogam* ‘in due order’, indicating here that the lowest Heavenly World on the respective cosmic plane is obtained if the ascetic has a low level of meditative proficiency, the second one if his proficiency is intermediate, and the third one if his practise has been intense and fully mastered the respective *dhyāna*.

Skt. *upasāmpadāyate*. Usually, the verb means ‘to come to, to reach; to arrive; to obtain’ and is often used in the context of spiritual cultivation. In its absolute form, Skt. *upasāmpadāya* (Pali, *upasampaja*) (preceding *viharati*) appears in all canonical formulae describing the eight meditative attainments (see above, especially passage 3.28.3.1.7. which glosses it). We also find it employed in the description of other meditative states. E.g., AKBh 197, 24: *samādhiṁ kāyena sākṣākṛtyopasāmpadāya* (scriptural citation); AKBh 439, 9: *pritiṁ kāyena sākṣākṛtyopasāmpadāya* (scriptural citation); AKBh 455, 2: *subham vimokṣaṁ kāyena*
sāksātkṛtvopasampadya viharti tṛūhaḥ [i.e. the third of the eight liberations]; etc. In the present context of the Śrī Bh., which presupposes being "[re-]born" in Heavenly Worlds, one would expect upapadyate. A corrupt transmission cannot be ruled out, but our text is consistent all throughout this passage. Tib. and Ch. simply read "is born" in all occurrences. If upasampadyate was indeed the original word employed by the Śrī Bh. authors and was intended to be more than just a quasi-synonym of upapadyate (though, admittedly, the two words are not usually construed in a relation of synonymity), it must have been meant to stress that one attains a meditative level and as its result is reborn in the cosmic plane corresponding to it. Unfortunately, there is no English (and, as a matter of fact, no Tibetan or Chinese) word able to convey both nuances, and "is [re-]born" appears to be the best solution.

More precisely, Skt. sabhāgata means 'likeness, community'. Cf. also Tib. skal ba [pa] mnyam pa (see note 870 to Tib. ed.). BHSD, s.v., also gives the sense of 'being one of a category or group'. AK II.42a defines it as 'similarity [shared by] living beings' (sattva-sama-yam) (AKBh 67, 12; see also AKBh 67, 13: sabhāgata na ma dravyam | sattvanāṁ sādṛśyān [...']). AKVy 157, 4-5 glosses upon this as: samāno bhāgo bhajānam eṣām iti sa-bhāgāḥ. tad-bhāvah sabhāgatā. [They are called] "with [the same] share [/lot]" because they have the same share [or] possession. This state is sabhāgata. The term also refers to the 'similarity' in general physical appearance of the beings sharing the same cosmic sphere.

My renderings of the Heaven names in this sub-chapter cannot convey their entire semantic wealth. A detailed description of their meanings and traditional interpretations represents a very complex issue which cannot be tackled here. In what follows, I shall limit myself to those Heavens which are terminologically more problematic.

The exact sense of the word avyha or abṛha (see also note 473 to Skt. crit. ed.), which serves as the name of this Heaven, is not clear (cf. also PED, s.v. Aviha 'of uncertain origin'; CPD, s.v., PD, s.v., and SWFT, s.v., do not mention anything concerning its etymology). I think that Edgerton is probably right in suggesting that 'as the lowest of the five Śu. [i.e. Śuddhāvāsa] classes these gods may have been called [relatively] not great' (BHSD, s.v.). This is what Tib. Mi-che-ba clearly suggests (cf. also MVyut # 3102). At least one of Yaśomitra's scholastic etymologies points in the same direction: Śuddhāvāsantarebhyo 'nukṛṣṭayād abṛhihitā iti Abruḥ. (AKVy 255, 22). [These deities are called] Abruḥ because [they] are not [fully] developed [/prosperous] on account of lack of excellence [when compared] to the other Pure-Abode[-Gods].' The other, more fanciful, etymology would suggest a translation as 'Heaven which is not [easily] thrown away'. Yaśomitra's gloss runs as follows: nālpena va kālen ātmanah sthānam bhanti [both Wogihara and Śaṭṭri read: bhṛṇhanti, but this is to be emended; see below] jahatīty Abruḥ (AKVy Wogihara ed. 255, 22-23; Śaṭṭri ed. 382, 23). 'Or [they are called] Abruḥ because they do not throw away [lit., root up], abandon their own place in a short while.' I think the sentence makes sense only with the emendation suggested above. There are actually two verbs with the same root √bhṛ: one (spelled √bhṛ or √vṛḥ) means 'to tear, pluck, root up'; the other (spelled √bhṛ or √bhṛṇḥ) has the sense of 'to grow great or strong' (MW, s.vv., p. 735). It is very likely that the name of the Heaven discussed here is etymologically linked with the latter verb, which is actually Yaśomitra's first line of interpretation. The second etymology, however, seems to exploit the other root. The sentence would actually make little sense if we read it as ['... they do not prosper [and] abandon [...] in a short while']. The present form of the first root is bhṛati, while the latter √bhṛṇḥ has both bhṛati and bhṛṇhati (see MW s.v.). Actually, this similarity can also explain the scribal mistake which must be at the basis of both modern editions cited above. The gloss links vibhṛha with the verbal root √bhṛ which is semantically similar to √hā "to abandon". The same etymology is also seen in the Abhidh-s Šīka (126, 17-18): imesu pana paṭhamatalavāsino appakena kālena
attano ṭhānaṁ na vijahantī ti Avīhā. (This seems to be a a hermeneutical or nirukta etymology; the term ‘hermeneutical or nirukta etymology’ was proposed by Seyfort Ruegg in his excellent contribution published in 1998, pp. 118-119, especially note 9. One could also define this type of exegesis as ‘scholastic etymology’ since such semantical exercises were done by scholars trying to find the ‘original’ meaning of words which, more often than not, were (made to be) in conformity with their own philosophical paradigms.) The modern translators of the Abhidhānas also seem to reflect this understanding in their renderings of the Heaven’s name: ‘immobile gods’ (Aung and Mrs Rhys Davids, Compendium of Philosophy, p. 142) or ‘the Enduring’ (Wijeratne and Gethin, Exposition of the Topics of Abhidhamma, p. 165).

The Chinese translation of the ŚrīBh, on the other hand, renders the name of the Heaven or of its celestial denizens as 無煩 ‘Without-Affiction’. This is probably based on a different (folk or hermeneutical) etymology which must have linked bhāṇa with बहँ/varḥa, a verb meaning, among others, ein Leid zufügen (PW, s.v.) or ‘to hurt’ (MW, s.v.). Xuanzang employs this rendering here and in other translations as well (e.g., AKBh T29.41a20-21 = Skt. p. 111, l. 24). The term was not, however, devised by him. We already see it in several earlier Chinese translations. E.g., the Chinese version of the *Madhyāmāgama 中阿含經 (see T1.478b1) rendered by Saṅghadeva between 397-398; the so-called Different Translation of the *Sānvyūkta-gama 別譯雜阿含經 (see T2.442b29 and c14), whose translator’s name is lost but whose date can be placed between 350-431 (see Akanuma Chizen, in Ono Gennyo ed. 1968, vol. 7, p. 62, s.v. 雜阿含經); the *Sānvyūkta-gama 雜阿含經 (see T2.159b8 and b22) translated by Guṇabhadra sometime between 435-443; etc.

The AKBh (362, 9 - 366, 5) gives ample details about this meditative practice. Some Arhat and Non-Returners (anāgāmin) mix moments (kṣaṇa) of non-contaminated (anāsrava) and contaminated (āsrava) fourth absorptions. The culmination of the exercise is fusing the non-contaminated and the contaminated dhyāna in the same moment. This is actually a Saurāññikata view which is supported by Vasubandhu. The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, did not agree with this and held that only the Buddhas can mingle the two in the same moment. Vasubandhu tells us that there are three reasons for undertaking such a practice: (1) Non-Returners with keen faculties (tiṣṇendriya) may cultivate it in order to be re-born in the Pure Abodes (AKBh 363, 2) (this is also the category hinted at in our ŚrīBh passage); (2) the same class of persons may cultivate it in order to dwell in a comfortable state (sukhavihāra) in this very life (dṛṣṭadṛṣṭhaṁ) (AKBh 363, 2-3); and (3) Non-Returners with weak faculties (mṛḍvediniya) may practise it ‘by excluding the meditation associated with delection because they are afraid of [the re-activation of] the defilements, [or to be more precise] in order to avoid falling back [to a lower level]’ (kleśabhīṁsā ċāsāvādānāsāmprayuktasaṁśādhiśūcraṇaḥ aparīṇāṁyartham, AKBh 363, 3-4; Pradyhan reads: [...] aparīṇāṁyartham; I follow the reading of AVy 566, 3-4). In the case of Arhats, there are two classes who engage in this form of exercise: (1) those with keen faculties practise it in order to dwell in a comfortable state in this very life; and (2) those with weak faculties cultivate it in order to avoid falling back (AKBh 363, 4-5) (see also AVy 565, 25-566, 4). AKBh 363, 7-11, continues with a brief discussion of the five Pure Abodes.

The AKBh discusses in detail (436, 17-437, 13; 447, 1-15; etc.) the differences between non-contaminated meditative attainments, which are conducive to the abandonment of the defilements, and their counterpart, i.e., contaminated meditation. The latter is further analysed into two aspects: (1) the meditative state itself which being dissociated (albeit temporarily) from the realm of sensual pleasures, is called pure (suddha); and (2) its enjoyment or delection (āsāvāda), described as being associated with craving (sattvā), i.e., developing attachment to such blissful (yet, alas, impermanent) states. Of course, the non-contaminated attainments are

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never associated with such enjoyment and are practised only with the aim of Liberation.

The Kösa similarity divides the first three absorptions into three planes each and the fourth dhyāna into eight levels: dhyānām tribhūmikam tatra caturthaṁ tv aṣṭabhūmikam (AK III.2c-d). Yaśomitra makes clear that this division depends on the intensity of the meditative practice. Using expressions similar to our Śrībh passage, he says the following about the first three absorptions: tatra rūpadhātu sarveṣam api dhyānānāṁ mṛdumadyādhirātṛatheneda pratyekam tribhūmikam (AKV Letter, 254, 34-35). Then, the fourth dhyāna is commented upon as: tasya tv adhimātrasayāvānāravadyāvānavācikāraṇa mṛdumadyādhirātṛātma-rāgabhūnna punaḥ pañca sthānāntarāṇi (AKV Letter 255, 3-5).

The same idea is expressed at AKBh 112, 1-8. AK III.3a says: ārūpyadhātur asthānāḥ ‘The immaterial realm contains no [physical] place’. The Bhāṣya comments upon this as: na hy arūpinaṁ dharmaṁ sthānam asti (AKBh, 112, 2) ‘because there is no [physical] place [necessary for] the immaterial factors’. The lack of matter obviously accounts for the absence of the different physical landscapes which exist in the Heavens of the material realm (rūpadhātu). The only difference in the immaterial spheres becomes the mental state itself (vihāra) experienced by the ascetic as long as his karmic ‘fuel’ lasts.

For the attainment of non-ideation, see passage 3.28.4.2. above and note 242 (which deals with the abodes of the beings without ideation).

Skt. na cāsyerīyāpatra āṣu paryādiyate ‘his posture does not quickly come to an end [or: is not exhausted]’. I am not aware of any other context in Sanskrit or Pali literature in which paryādiyate/paryādiyati is found in collocation with īryāpatha/īryāpatha (see BHSD, s.v.; CPD, s.v.; etc.). The verb means ‘masters, overcomes; exhausts’ (BHSD, s.v.). In Pali (see PED, s.v. and PTS Concordance, s.v. pariśādāti) as well as in Buddhist Sanskrit (see BHSD, s.v.), it is frequently employed for (usually bad) mental states and sometimes for physical elements (e.g., udakāṁ [...] sighaṁ paryādiyati, J. A. V. 186, 27-28, ‘the water swiftly goes out [/is exhausted’]). Its usage in the Śrībh passage here is not, however, impossible to understand. It seems to refer to the fact that the person detached from sensual pleasure does not restlessly change his (or her) posture but keeps it for a long time with no agitation. The sight of such a person is, no doubt, bound to impress anyone as a mark of dignified deportment. This characteristic is actually detailed in the next sentence, too.

Tib. de’i sphyod lam byur du mi jig pa faithfully translates the Skt. (see especially jig pa ‘to destroy; to be lost, to decay’). Ch., on the other hand, seems to be a rather free rendering which, furthermore, contains an extra phrase. From the viewpoint of the syntactical order, the phrase corresponding to Skt. na cāsyerīyāpatra āṣu paryādiyate should be 威儀進止無有躁擾 ‘in [his] postures there is no agitation’. 威儀進止 is a four-morpheme compound synonymous with 威儀, the usual Ch. rendering for īryāpatha, which is actually employed below in the same sentence. Literally, 威儀進止 means ‘postures, advancing, [and] stopping’; the original and ‘orthodox’ sense of 威儀 is ‘dignified [/decorous] demeanour’; in a Buddhist context, the main semantic value is that of ‘postures’, but the nuance of ‘dignified deportment’ (which a monk is expected to show at all times) is also present (see DKWJ, s.v.). The compound 威儀進止 is frequently seen in the Chinese Canon: e.g., T22.412c5; 412c7; 412c9; T23.649b10-11; 876c24; 909a18; T24.462a21; 682b2; 806a12; 1018b8 (all the above occurrences are from Vinaya texts); T54.1284c24 (in a passage dealing with morality); etc. (cf. also BCS, s.v. 威儀進止 = īryāpatha; but as usual, BCS does not indicate its sources). In the YoBh, our passage here is the only place which uses 威儀進止 (incidentally, the compound is not recorded in the YoBh Index.)

As for 躁擾 ‘(be) agitated, troubled, disturbed, etc.’, this is a binome which in the ŚrīBh (quite aptly) translates words like: utplāvitaṁ (ŚrīBh-Gr (17) 20, 1 = T 30.436c25), samkṣobha
(ŚrBh Sh ed. 418, 21-22 = T30.461a15), or (apparently both) _druta_ and _pluta_ (ŚrBh-Gr 132, 2: drutamānasah, plutamānasah = T30.409c1: 余意躁擾; alternatively, one may take 躁 as rendering _druta_ and 擾 as standing for _pluta_, with both words condensed in the same phrase for the sake of brevity). To return to our ŚrBh passage here, 無有躁擾 can hardly be a translation of _na paryādyate_. In order to find the Ch. equivalent of the latter, we actually must go two phrases below. Here is how the whole Chinese sentence reads: 警儀進止無有躁擾，於一警儀能經時久，不多驚懼，終不數數易脫警儀。‘In [his] postures there is no agitation, the time [he] can spend in one posture is long, [he] is not surprised and frightened, [he] does not repeatedly change [and] leave [his] posture [for another] as long as necessary (終不)’. It seems that Ch. 不 [...] 易脱 stands for _na paryādyate_. But this leaves us with two Ch. phrases (無有躁擾 and 不多驚懼) for the Skt. present participle _aparitasayāna_. The BHS verb _paritasyati_ means ‘is wearied, exhausted, troubled, disturbed’ (BHSD, s.v.). Semantically, both Ch. phrases are not far from the Sanskrit word, though the latter would seem rather too strong (see also the presence of 多 which has no direct Skt. equivalent). A different reading in Xuanzang’s MS is not excluded, but it is also possible that the Chinese master decided that _aparitasayāna_ has two main semantic values, both of which had to be translated. Thus, 無有躁擾 ‘there is no agitation’, i.e., the postures are ‘not troubled/disturbed’, translated the typical BHS sense of _paritasyeti_, which is actually the most appropriate in this context. On the other hand, the verb _paritasyati_ is equivalent with _paritrasyati_ (see BHSD, s.v.), the latter being based on the root _pras_ ‘to tremble, to be afraid’. This sense of the root may have been rendered as 驚懼 (modified by 多 for rhythmic reasons, i.e., four-character phrase, as well as for enhancing the stylistic effect (?)). Actually, we find instances in the YoBh where _a-paritasanā_ is rendered as (無)怯弱 (see Choi 2001, 245 and 344), which semantically is not so far from (不)驚懼.

Skt. _bhavati_ ‘is’. It is difficult to convey all the shades of the Sanskrit verb. Here, it implies that the qualities are not inborn but obtained through practice. One could render as ‘he has become’ or ‘he has acquired’ [as a result of spiritual cultivation]. This would, however, disturb the style of the English sentence, and I have, therefore, chosen the less ‘dynamic’ dimension of the verb rendering it as a simple copula.

Skt. _na saṅgaṇikārāmaḥ, na saṁsarga-rāmaḥ_. Both terms are known from Pali canonical sources. E.g., _saṅgaṇikārāma(ta) _at DN II 78, 11-12; MN III 110, 16-17; etc.; at AN III 293, 11ff.-295, 2, it appears together with _saṁsaggāraṁa(ta) _and similarly has the pejorative connotation of associating with the ‘maudding crowds’, which can hamper spiritual cultivation. AN-a III 348, 16-19 (ad AN III 293, 11ff.-295, 2) glosses the words as follows: _saṁgaṇikā _ti _gaṇasaṁgaṇikā _; sā ekassa dutiya hoti dvinnam pi tatiyo ti ādīnā nayena veditabbā. _saṁsaggo ti _savanadassasamullāpasambhogakāya-saṁsaghavasena pavatto saṁsaṭṭhahāvā. ‘Saṁgaṇikā _means association with a crowd; it should be understood [in the following way:] one [person] has [with him or her] a second [person], the two [persons] have in their turn (pi) a third [person with them], and so on similarly [until it makes up a multitude]. _Saṁsagga _means the state of living in association [with others] which happens for the sake of hearing, seeing, conversing, eating [living] together, and [having bodily contact.] If we are to follow strictly this explanation, it would appear that _saṁgaṇikā _is a gathering of people without any strong bonds, while _saṁsagga _would rather point at a stable human group sharing a common mode of living. It is hard to know whether all Buddhist authors and compilers, including those of our text, shared a similar understanding, but we continue to see the two terms used side by side in Sanskrit Buddhist literature, usually with the same negative nuances. E.g., _Laṅk 49, 7-8:_ _saṁgaṇikāsaṁsargamiddhanivaranaḥ_, which should be abandoned by the bodhisattva who wishes to fully realise (bodhisattvena [...]) _pariññātukāmaṇa_ the unreal nature of the dichotomy.
between the grasped (grāhyā) and the grasper (grāhaka); ŚīkSam 111, 24 (as a citation from the Ratnarāśisūtra): sansargasānganiṅkābhīrataī tat tattvāḥ (Bendall reads: "sānganiṅkābhīr etaiḥ; emended on the basis of Tib.), i.e., worldly beings who pursue thoughts directed at sensual pleasures (kāma-vitarka), malice (vyāpāda) and thoughts of violence (vihīṃsā-vitarka)—these being precisely the thoughts which the ascetic in our ŚṛBh passage had to eliminate; see note 164 above as well as note 323 below.

It is interesting to note here that both Tib. bre mo gtam ‘foolish talk’ and Ch. 諺雜 ‘boisterous mixing’ seem to construe sānganika as the frivolousness or the noise associated with a crowd rather than as the group itself.

Skt. no tu seems to be emphatic here. In Vedic Sanskrit, no means ‘and not’, but from Epical Sanskrit onwards, the negative adverb becomes used mostly as a substitute for na due to metrical reasons (PW, s.v.). It is possible that no might also carry a nuance of emphasis. This, however, is not registered in the main lexicographical sources. The authors of the PW (s.v.) say: Die lexicographen (AK 3,55,11. H.1539) führen = mit anderen Negationen auf ohne Angabe der Bedeutungsverschiedenheit. (AK. is an abbreviation for the Amarakośa; H. stands for Hemacandra’s Abhidhānacintāmani.) As far as I could check, later commentators on the Amarakośa do not add anything conclusive and only limit themselves to giving examples (see Amarakośa with Unpublished South Indian Commentaries, vol. 2, p. 625). On the other hand, the Japanese Indologist Naoshiro Tsuji (1987, 256) holds that no is an emphatic form of negation. In Pali, too, no appears to be stronger than na (PED, s.v.; see also Warder 2001, 400).

Whether reflecting a usage in Classical Sanskrit or in BHS, the adverb in our ŚṛBh passage, occurring in collocation with the adversative conjunction tu, seems to have an emphatic nuance: the ascetic perceives sound, etc., but experiences absolutely no passion for it (Let us remember that our yogi has already attained detachment from sensual pleasures and his detachment is, presumambly, complete).

Skt. upagūḍha means ‘hidden, concealed, covered’. This is faithfully rendered by Tib. nye bar bsdkor ba and Ch. 隱密. See also Pali upagūḍha ‘embraced’, derived from upagūḍhāti ‘to embrace, to clasp’ (CPD, s.v.). Here, however, the sense of the word appears to be more general: ‘containing’ or ‘possessed of’. Cf. also gūḍha used to depict the Realm of Absolute Reality or Dharma-body (dharma-kāya) or Tathāgata-embryo (tathāgata-garbhā) as ‘hidden’ under the husk of countless or all defilements (RatVibh 40, 17, (a)paryantaklesakoṣakoti-gūḍha and RatVibh 79, 11-12, sarvaklesakoṣakoti-gūḍhe respectively; Takasaki (1966a) in his Correction and Emendation (396-399) reads: -upagūḍhaḥ for RatVibh 40, 16-17, aparyantaklesakoṣakoti-gūḍhaḥ).

Skt. kāma-vitarkādayaḥ most likely refers to the canonical triad which begins with thoughts directed at [under the sway of] sensual pleasures (Skt., kāma-vitarka; Pali, kāma-vitakka) and continues with thoughts of malice (vyāpādvitarka; vyāpādvitakka) and thoughts of violence (vihīṃsā-vitarka; vihīṃsā-vitakka). For sources and a discussion of this sense of vitarka/vitakka, see note 164 above.

It is difficult to convey all the nuances of Skt. tāvat. Its basic sense is that of ‘so much, so far, so long’, but here tāvat also means ‘to begin with’. This indicates that the mundane path is the first of the two topics of the Yogasthāna IV. Though not entirely successful, my rendering tries to capture both shades of meaning.
ADDITIONAL NOTES

① I should like to add a few remarks on the *kimpāka* fruit (referred to in note 54 above) as well as on the *tūla*-cotton and the *karpāsa*-cotton (discussed in note 263 above).

Unfortunately, none of the sources on Indian floras which I have consulted (see Dastur 1964; McCann 1966; Randhawa 1974; Sastapau and Henry, [1973] 1983; Majupuria 1988; Pandey 1989) registers any of these Sanskrit terms. However, the following botanical information has some relevance to the notes.

According to Pandey (1989, 53-54), the Sanskrit name of *Trichosanthes palmata* (*Cucurbitaceae* family) is *Mahakala*. The name does not correspond to *kimpāka*, as identified by Monier-Williams. Pandey describes *Trichosanthes palmata* as ‘a large climber, commonly found in the Himalayas, up to 5,000 feet’ (p. 54). Its ‘red coloured poisonous fruit’ is apparently used by Hindus of Western India for religious purposes as an ear ornament for the idol *Ganapati* (ibid.). Some details fit the features discussed in note 54 above. It is not excluded the tree was known by more than one name, and *kimpāka* may have been an alternative appellation. Concerning my remark that it is not likely that the tree was familiar to the Tibetans readers, this should be qualified. It appears from Pandey’s description that *Trichosanthes palmata* grows up to ca. 1,500 metres. This is certainly lower than the Tibetan plateau (which averages 4,900 metres), but since the tree is ‘commonly found in the Himalayas’, it may have been known to the Tibetans as well. I still think, nonetheless, that in the light of the canonical intertextuality presented in note 54 above, it is more probable that *shing kim pa ka’i bres bu* reflects a reading in the Indian MS used by the Tibetan team.

Concerning the silk-cotton trees, which I have mentioned in relation to the *tūla*-cotton and the *karpāsa*-cotton, it seems that some of the species are used commercially to produce cotton. Thus, the red silk-cotton (*Bombax ceiba*) is used for ‘stuffing pillows and mattresses’ (Santapau and Henry, [1973] 1983), s.v., p. 24. According to Randhawa (1974, 90), the floss covering the seeds of the yellow silk cotton tree is also used for stuffing mattresses, pillows, and cushions. It would thus appear possible that botanically, *tūla* could have been linked to one or more species of silk-cotton trees. This, however, remains just a hypothesis until firm linguistic evidence is adduced.


② The latest instalment of the edition and translation of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* prepared by the Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group of Taishō University has been published:


The article has been issued just as I prepare to send my draft to press, which unfortunately makes it impossible to cite and refer to it in this book. With the publication of this instalment, the entire Yogasthāna II has been covered. According to the Preface to the article (p. 1), the Group plans to publish the whole edition and translation of this Yogasthāna as a separate volume. No doubt, this will constitute a further major contribution to the understanding and study of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AND
ABBREVIATIONS

References to and citations from Sanskrit and Pali texts indicate, more often than not, the page and line number (separated by comma) of the edition(s) listed below. For example, AKBh 52, 3, refers to Pradhan's edition of the Abhidharmakośabhaṣya, page 52, line 3. In case when more editions of the same work have been consulted, the editor's name follows the Sanskrit abbreviation (e.g., AKVy Wogihara ed.; AKVy Śastri ed.). The same convention was adopted for translations, whether traditional or modern (e.g., AKBh Paramārtha's tr.; AKBh Xuanzang's tr.).

'Ver.' stands for 'verse', § for 'section', and # for 'entry number' (the latter chiefly used for the MVyut). Some works are cited or referred to by the chapter or canto number followed by the verse number. These will be indicated under each respective title. The kārikā number in the Abhidharmakosā (abbreviated as AK) is represented by an Arab number preceded by a Roman numeral, which stands for the chapter number. Thus, AK II.32a-b means the first two quarters of kārikā 32 in chapter II of the Abhidharmakosā. When quoting and/or translating a kārikā immediately followed by its commentary, I write the former in bold type. A word or phrase glossed upon in a traditional commentary or treatise is also written in bold type.

With the exception of the Visuddhimagga and the Abhidhammapadātipā, all references to Pali texts are made to the PTS editions. Occasionally, when a text was not available in PTS edition, I cite or refer to the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana CD-ROM. The system of Pali abbreviations follows the Epiglomena to vol. I of A Critical Pāli Dictionary (cf. also von Hinüber 1997, 250-253). An abbreviation of a Pali title followed by 'tr.' and number(s) indicates the page(s) of the respective PTS English translation. In the case of multiple PTS translations or when I refer to a translation issued by other publisher, I give the translator's name as well.

In the case of Tibetan translations and works, I have adopted sigla only for the classical xylographic Tibetan Canons. Traditional historiographical works and catalogues are referred to by short titles (e.g., Bu-ston's Chos 'byung). When Tibetan sources other than the SrBh are cited or referred at, I write the Canon abbreviation followed by the traditional volume number (given in accordance with the Tibetan alphabet), folio number, and line number. For example, P Shi 318b1 refers to the Peking Canon, volume Shi, folio 318b (= verso of 318), line 1.

Chinese texts other than the Śrāvakabhūmi are quoted according to the Taishō

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1 Apart from the heading (title of the text, chapter, etc. written at the top of the page), I have in principle counted all lines of the printed text, whether containing the original or the chapter title, section number, bibliographical data, etc. which some modern editions also include. The only exception is the Taishō Canon for which, in keeping with the Japanese philological practice, I count from the last line (or rather column) of a segment, numbered as 29, and go decreasingly towards its first line. This is usually done because the bigger font-size of the titles as well as some texts beginning after a blank would result in a non-uniform counting compared with other segments. (The running text in the Taishō Canon is uniformly printed in 29 lines per segment).
Canon (T), followed by the volume, page number, segment, and (more often than not) line number. Some texts, frequently mentioned are cited by short titles (e.g., the Cien zhuan 慈恩傳). Occasionally, I also note the number (= No.) given by the Taishó editors to the texts (for instance, T No.1580). I usually refer to Chinese translations of Buddhist texts by their Indian title, whether the latter is clearly attested or hypothetically reconstructed. For those texts which were compiled or written in China, I quote the title in pinyin transliteration. Of course, there are also instances when I refer to Buddhist texts, Indian, Tibetan, or Chinese, by the English translation of their titles.2

Books and articles containing only editions and/or translations are also listed as Primary Sources under the editor’s/translator’s name. It must be noted, however, that there are quite a few secondary sources containing large portions of edited texts and/or translations (e.g., Wayman 1961). Conversely, many editions/translations include extensive discussions of related topics (like, for instance, Delhey ed. and tr. 2002). If I have referred primarily to the editor’s/translator’s views expressed in the introductory study, not to the respective edition/translation itself, I have included the publication in the section of Secondary Sources (e.g., Harrison 1992). Though sometimes potentially confusing for the reader, from a bibliographical viewpoint, this reflects faithfully the way in which the publication in question has been used in my book.

References to dictionaries and indexes are made s.v. (sub verbo); volume and page number are given only occasionally. I have listed all lexical sources which have helped me in one way or another, though some of them are not cited or directly referred to in my edition, translation, or study.

Some abbreviations of Chinese Canons, which have been used only for the critical edition of the Chapter on the Mundane Path, as well as general abbreviations (such as ‘BHS’ for Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, etc.) are found in Chapter One, Part Two.

All sources (including Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan texts) are listed according to the Roman alphabet order. Letters with diacritics are treated as their plain counterparts. E.g., ‘ŚrBh = Śrāvakabhūmi’ is listed under ‘S’.

I PRIMARY SOURCES
(ORIGINAL WORKS AND TRANSLATIONS)

AbhAv: Abhidharmāvatārasāstra = Ru apidamo lun 入阿毘達磨論, T No. 1554
Sanskrit fragments edited by:
Matsuda Kazunobu 松田和信, ed. 1996. ‘Nyū abidatsuma ron no Girugitto
shahon zanketsu’ 『入阿毘達磨論』のギルギット写本残巻. Bukkyō gakkai kiyō
仏教学会紀要. 4: 35: 42.
AbhDip: Abhidharmadīpa with Viṃhāṣāprabhāvṛtti
Padmānabha S. Jaini, ed. 1977. Abhidharmadīpa with Viṃhāṣāprabhāvṛtti:
Critically Edited with Notes and Introduction. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal
Research Institute.
AbhHṛ: *Abhidharmahṛdaya (or *Abhidharmasāra) = Apitan xin lun 阿毘曼心論,

2 For the most frequently quoted works, such as for the AKBh and the YoBh, I also give the titles and Canon text number of the Chinese and Tibetan translations.
T No. 1550
(For English translation, see Willemen tr. 1975)

Abhidhānappadīpika

AMVibh: Abhidharmamahāvibhāsāśāstra
1. Apidamo da piposha lun 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, translated by Xuanzang 玄奘, T No. 1545
2. Apitan piposha lun 阿毘毘婆沙論, translated by Buddhavarman 浮陀跋摩, Daotai 道泰, etc., T No 1546

AbhSam: Abhidharmasamuccaya

AbhSamBh: Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya


AK: Abhidharmakosā (for edition, see AKBh)

AKBh: Abhidharmakosābhāṣya
(See also Śāstrī ed., under AKVy)
Chinese translations:
1. Apidamo jushe lun 阿毘達磨俱舍論, translated by Xuanzang 玄奘, T No. 1558.
   (For the French translation of this version, see Poussin below)
Tibetan translation:
Chos mgon pa'i mdzod kyi bzhad pa, translated by Jinamitra, Dpal-brtsegs, etc., P No. 5591; D No. 4090.

AKVy: Abhidharmakośavyākhyā
(Unless otherwise indicated, references are made to the Wogihara edition.)

Amarakośa:


ArthVin: Arthaviniścayasyasūtra (for edition, see ArthVinNib)

ArthVinNib: Arthaviniścayasūranibandhana

Aṣṭa: Aṣṭasahasrikā prajñāpāramitā
Rajendralala Mitra, ed. 1887. Ashṭasahasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. Calcutta: Asiatic Society. (References are also made to Aṣṭa as quoted in AbhisamĀĀ, Wogihara ed.)


Avad: Avadānasātaka


(See also J.F. Fleet ed. and tr. [1988] 1970)


BhiKr: Bhāvanākrama. Here I refer only to the Third Bhāvanākrama = BhKr III as edited in:
(For critical Tibetan edition, see Namdol ed. 1985; for French translation from the Tibetan, see Lamotte tr. [1952] 1987.)

BhikVin: Bhikṣuṇīvinaya

Biography of Dharmācārya Vasubandhu 婆薮槃豆法師傳, translated into Chinese by Paramārtha, T No. 2049.
(For English translation, see Dalia tr. below)
Biographies of Eminent Monks by Huijiao 慧皎, T No 2059.
(For partial French translation, see Shih tr, below)

BoBh: Bodhisattvabhūmi
(Unless otherwise indicated, references are to the Wogihara edition.)
(For partial translations, see Frauwagner, 1969, pp. 270-279; Willis tr., 1979; Demiéville tr. [1957] 1973.)

BudCar: Buddhacarita

Bu-ston rNam thar: see below Seyfort Ruegg, tr. 1966.

Bu-ston’s Chos ʼbyung.
Original Tibetan text is found in:
1. Lokesh Chandra, ed. The Collected Works of Bu-ston, Part 24 (Ya), from the Collection of Prof. Dr. Raghu Vira. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971; Sata-Piṭaka Series, Volume 64 (used for the parts of the text related to Buddhism in India).
(For English translation, see below.)

Bu-ston’s Chos ʼbyung tr.:

Bu-ston’s Catalogue:

C: Co-ne bsTan ‘gyur. Consulted after the microfiche reproduction of the Co-ne bsTan ‘gyur made available by the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions (New York) and stored at the International College for Postgraduate Studies Library (Tokyo).
CarSan: *Carakasamhitā*
*CBETA Dianzi fodian (Dazhengzang)* CBETA 電子佛典（大正藏）. CD-ROM. 2000. Taiwan.


*Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 (*Vijñaptimātrāsiddhi*), T No. 1585.


*Chu sanzang ji ji* 出三藏集記 by Sengyou 僧祐, T No. 2145.

*Cien zhuan* 慈恩傳: *Da tang dacien si sanzang fashi zhuan* 大唐大慈恩寺三藏法师傳, T No. 2053.

(For English translation, see Li Ronxi tr.)

CintBh: *Cintamayī bhūmiḥ Book of the YoBh.*

Ex tant Sanskrit fragments are edited and translated in:

Conze, Edward and Iida Shotaro, eds. 1968. “‘Maîtreya’s Questions’ in the Prajñāpāramitā”. In *Mélanges d’Indianisme à la mémoire de Louis Renou.* Paris: Éditions E. de Boccard.


D: sDe-dge Canon. Facsimile reproductions:


Damodulo chung 達磨多羅禪經 (*Yogācārabhūmi), T No. 618

DasBh: Daśabhūmikāsūtra

DasBh MS: Daśabhūmikāsūtra Manuscript(s)

Deb ther sngon po (original Tibetan text):
   hGos-lotsawa gZhon-nu-dpal. The Blue Annals, reproduced by Lokesh Chandra from the Collection of Prof. Raghu Vira. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1976; Śata-Piṭaka Series, Volume 212.

Deb ther sngon po tr.:

Delheyl, Martin.: see under SamBh.

DhSk: Dharmaskandha


Divyā: Divyāvadāna


Dunhuang Glossary:


Fangshan: Fangshan Stone-carved Canon 房山石經. Facsimile reproduction:


(See also D. R. Bhandarkar ed. and tr. 1981)

G: dGa'-ldan (or Golden) *bsTan 'gyur.* Facsimile reproduction:


Hongwu: Hongwu Southern Canon 洪武南藏. The facsimile reproduction:

*Huangdi nei jing su wen* 黃帝內經索問
*Gendaigoyaku Kötei naikyō somon* 現代語訳 黃帝內經素問. 3 vols. Ichikawa: Tōyō gakujutsu shuppansha.

Ishikawa Mie, ed.: see under SrBh.


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3 The entire series, including the texts carved during the Sui, Tang, and Ming Dynasties, has 29 volumes.


Ji’s Commentary:

Ji基, *Yuqie shi di lun lüezuan* 瑜伽師地論略纂, T No. 1829.

Jñānapraśthānasāstra = *Apidomo fā zhi lun* 阿毘達磨發智論, T No. 1544.


KaPari: *Kāśyapa-praparivarta.*


KS: *Karmasiddhiprakarana.*


KIK: *Kokuyaku issaikyō* 國譯一切經.


Wa-kan senjutsu-bu 和漢撰述部. 100 vols. 1930-. Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha.5

Konyaku monogatari-shū 今昔物語集


Koryō: 2nd edition of the Korean Canon 高麗再雕版大藏經. Facsimile reproduction:

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4 The series was originally published by Kokumin bunko kankō-kai. Bibliographic details of the reprints vary with each individual volume. For the *kundoku* translation of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, see Chapter One, Part Two.

5 During the past decades, Daitō shuppansha has issued a number of reprints and new revised editions. Bibliographic details vary with each individual volume. For the *kundoku* translation of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, see Chapter One, Part Two. The *Wa-kan senjutsu-bu* series is still in progress.
Seoul: T'ungkug daehakkyo.

*Koša*: also used as an abbreviation for the *Abhiddhamakośabhāṣya* (see under AKBh).

Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag.

LalVis: *Lalitavistara*.


É. Lamotte, ed. and tr. 1935, see under SāṁNirm.


*Lam rim chen mo*: mNyam med Tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa’i byang chub lam rim chen mo.
(For the edition of the *Zhi gnas* Chapter, see Kelsang and Odani 1991, pp. 21-116; for English renderings, see Wayman tr. 1997 and Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee tr. 2002.)


Laṅk: *Laṅkāvatārāśūtra*


MadhVibh: *Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya*


**Mahābhārata:**

References are made to:


**Mahāsūtrasamuccaya** by Dipamkaraśrījāna

Critical Tibetan edition as published in:


**Mahāvibhāṣa:** also used an abbreviation for the *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāstra* (see under AMVibh)

MahSūṭ: *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra*


Manjī zokūzō: *Manjī zokūzō 仏字續藏 (= Shinsan Dai Nihon zokūzōkyō)*


Manjī zōkyō: *Manjī zokūzō 仏字蔵藏 (= Dai Nihon kōtei kunten daizōkyō)*


**Manusmrīti:**


(For translation, see also Doniger, with Brian K. Smith, tr. 1992).

Matsuda Kazunobu 松田和信 ed. and tr. 1995. ‘Ge jin mik kyō ni okeru Bosatsu jū ji

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no bonbon shirō: *Yoga ron* ‘Shō ketchaku bun’ no Katumandu dampen yori’ 『解深密經』における菩薩十地の梵文資料 —「瑜伽論」‘撰決択分’のカトマンドゥ断片より—. *Bukkyō daigaku sōgō kenkyūjo kiyō* 佛教大学総合研究所紀要 2: 59-77.

Mochizuki Kaie, 2004, see under *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya*


MS: manuscript; unless otherwise indicated, it refers to the manuscript of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (see under *ŚrīBh*).

MVastu: *Mahāvastu*

MVastu MS: *Mahāvastu* Manuscrit

MVyut: *Mahāvyuttapati*
1. Sakaki Ryōsaburō 檜生三郎. 1916. *Mahāvyuttapati* 翻譯名義大集. Kyoto: Shingon-shū Kyōto Daigaku. (References to the MVyut are usually to the entry, marked as #, and occasionally to section, marked as §.)


N: sNar-thang bsTan 'gyur. Consulted after

1. Photocopies made from the microfiches stored at the Library of the Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibet, Hamburg University.

2. Woodblock print of the sNar Thang bsTan 'Gyur, recently released in India (n.d.), stored at the International College of Postgraduate Buddhist Studies Library.7


7 The International College of Postgraduate Buddhist Studies Library started the purchase of the Indian reprint in 2001.


Nanden daizōkyō:

NAS: *Nyāyānusārasāstra = Apidamo xun zheng li lun 阿毘達磨順正理論, T No. 1562.

P: Peking Canon. Facsimile reproduction:

Pañca: Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā prajñāpāramitā.

Paryāyasamgrahani
Fragment edited by:

PaVastu: Pañcavastuka

Phyag rgya chen po zla ba'i 'od zer:
(For English translation, see Lhalungpa tr.)


PPUpad: *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa = Da zhidu lun 大智度論 (T No. 223) (For partial translation, see Lamotte tr. 1944-1976).

PrasPad: Prasannapadā

PratBSS: Pratyutpanna-buddhhasammukhāvasthitasamadhisūtra
Tibetan text edited by:
(For English translation, see Harrison tr. 1990.)

PratVy: Pratityasamutpādavyākhyā

603

Pratyekabuddhabhūmi:


RatVibh: Ratnagotrabhibhāga

Records of the Western Regions 西域傳 by Xuanzang 玄奘, T No. 2087.
(For translations, see Beal tr. [1884] 1981, and Li Rongxi tr. 1996.)

SABh: Sacittikābhūmi and Acittikābhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi
2. Wayman ed. and tr. in Wayman 1984 (see Secondary Sources below), 327-331.

SadPunḍ: Saddharmapunḍarīka

Sāgaramegha, rNal ’byor spyod pa’i sa la byang chub sms pa’i sa’i rnam par bshad pa (= Gangs can rig brgya’i sgo ’byed lde mig, deb nyer lnga pa, krung go bchod brgyud mtho rim nang bstan slob gling gi slob gzi rtsom sgrig tshe chung gis bsgrigs). 1997. Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.


Samayabhedopararacanacakra

604

SamBh: Samāhitābhūmi

SaṁNirm: Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra
(For an English translation from the Tibetan, see Powers, tr. 1995; for a German translation of Chapter VI, see Frauwallner 1969, 284-295; for the English translation of Xuanzang’s rendering, see Keenan tr., 2000; for a Sanskrit fragment containing the ten stages in the SaṁNirm as quoted in the Vinīcayasamgrahaṇī as well as its Japanese translation, see Matsuda ed. and tr., 1995.)

SaṅghBh: Saṅghabhedavastu.

Śaṅkarabhāṣya: Śaṅkara’s Commentary to the Bhagavadgītā (Śrīmadbhagavadgītā-

bhāṣya)


SauNan: Saundarananda

Schmithausen ed.: see under ŚrīBh.


Seyfort Ruegg, D., tr. 1966. The Life of Bu ston Rin po che, with the Tibetan Text of the Bu ston rNam thar. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.

Sh: see under ŚrīBh.

Sh II : see under ŚrīBh.


Shisan jing 十三經

Shukla: also used as an abbreviation for Sh and Sh II ; see under ŚrīBh.

Śīksāsamuccaya


SoNirBh: Sopadhikā bhūmiḥ and Nirupadhikā bhūmiḥ

ŚrBh: Śrāvakabhūmi. (Complete bibliographical data concerning traditional Canons and relevant sigla are found in Editing Conventions, Part Two)


8. ŚrBh-Gr: Shōmon ji Kenkyūkai 壟聞地研究会 (Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group), ed. and tr. 1998. Yuga ron Shōmon ji Daiichi yugasho: Sansukurituogo

‘Bonbun Shōmon ji (13): Daini yugasho (1) wayaku, kamon’ 梵文声聞地（十三）― 第二瑜伽处（1）和訳・科文―. Taishō daigaku sōgō būkkyō kenyūjo nenpō 大正大学総合佛教研究所年報 16: 73-129.

‘Bonbun Shōmon ji (14): Daini yugasho (2) wayaku, kamon’ 梵文声聞地（十四）― 第二瑜伽处（2）和訳・科文―. Taishō daigaku sōgō būkkyō kenyūjo nenpō 17: 19-71.


‘Bonbun Shōmon ji (16): Daini yugasho (4) wayaku, kamon’ 梵文声聞地（十六）― 第二瑜伽处（4）和訳・科文―. Taishō daigaku sōgō būkkyō kenyūjo nenpō 23: 77-137.


ŚrīBh-Gr: see under ŚrīBh.
ŚrīBh-Gr (13)-(20): see under ŚrīBh.
ŚrūBh: Śrutamayī bhūmiḥ.

Extant Sanskrit fragments are edited and translated in:


SukhVy (L): (Larger) Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra

SuPrabh: Suvarṇaprabhāsāsūtra

SuvParPP: Suvikrāntivikrāmipariṇāmaśāra-jñāpāramitāsūtra

T: Taishō Canon.

Taishō: Taishō Canon; see under T.
Tāranātha’s Chos byung (original Tibetan text):

Tāranātha’s Chos byung tr.:”
(Unless specified, references to ‘Tāranātha’s Chos byung tr.’ indicate pages in the English translation above.)

TatSid: *Tattvāsvadhi = Cheng shi lun 成實論, T No. 1646.
(For Sanskrit and English translations, see Sastri tr. 1975 and 1978 respectively.)


Thub pa’i dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba:
Tibetan Chronological Tables:

Trim: *Triṃśikā viṃśaptimātratāśiddhiḥ*

TrimBh: *Triṃśikābhāṣya.* For edition, see under Trim.

To-ryun’s Commentary:
To-ryun 道倫, *Yuga rong gi* 瑜伽論記, T No. 1828.

 UdVar: *Udānavarga*


 Vim: *Vimuttimagga* (preserved only in Chinese translation) = *Jietuo dao lun* 解脫道論 T No. 1648. (see also Eharā, Soma, and Kheminda tr. 1961.)

 Viniś: *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi.*

 Vism: *Visuddhamagga* (cited by page, often followed by section (marked as §) number)

 W: see Wayman 1961, in Secondary Sources below.


Xianyang lun: Xianyang shengjiao lun 顯揚聖教論 (*Aryadesanāvikhyāpanaśāstra, *Śāsanaprakāśanaśāstra, etc.), T No. 1602. (For the German translation of juan VII, see under Choi above.)

Xiuxing dao di jing 修行道地經 (*Yogācārabhūmi*), T No. 606


yd bzhin nor bu dbang gi rgyal po ’i phreng ba

YoBh: Yogācārābhūmi

References to the Sanskrit text of the first five Books are based upon:

For references to other Books, see under each entry (e.g., ŚrBh, BoBh, etc.)

Chinese translation:
Yuqie shi di lun 瑜伽師地論, translated by Xuanzang 玄奘, T No. 1579.

Tibetan translation:
Rnal 'byor spyod pa'i sa, translated by Jinamitra, Prajñāvarman, Ye-shes-sde, etc., P Nos 5536-5543; D Nos 4035-4042.

Yongle-bei: Northern Canon of Yongle Era 永樂北藏. Facsimile reproduction:

YS: Yogasūtra

2. Rāma Prasāda, ed. and tr. 1912. Patañali's Yoga Sūtras, with the Commentary of Vyāsa and the Gloss of Vāchaspati Miśra. Subhīndranātha Vasu: Allahābad. (For the YS proper, I follow mainly Meisig’s text or choose from the variant readings which he lists at the end of his edition; I have used Prasāda’s edition chiefly for the commentaries.)

ZC: Zhonghua Canon (Chinese Texts).
Zhonghua: Zhonghua Canon (Chinese Texts); see under ZC.

ZT: Zhonghua Canon (Tibetan Texts).
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INDEX

The Index registers the main occurrences of the principal Buddhist technical terms and phrases in Sanskrit and English as well as proper names such as traditional figures, monasteries, schools, etc. As far as the technical terms are concerned, priority has been given to the occurrences in the Sanskrit critical edition and the English translation, notes included. Words like ‘Buddha’ and ‘bodhisattva’, for instance, occurring in other places than the edition and the translation of the Chapter on the Mundane Path have been considered too general to present interest. Furthermore, I have focused on the technical senses of the Sanskrit words rather than on their more general usages. For example, artha has been recorded with its sense of ‘meaning’ as one of the ‘six aspects’ (see passages 3.28.2.1.2.1., 3.28.2.1.2.2., etc.) but not in an occurrence as tadartham ‘for this reason’ (citation in note 132, p. 520). The Sanskrit terms are recorded in their root form when listed alone. Phrases are usually given in nominative. The root form of a word or the nominative of a phrase should be understood as covering all grammatical forms (e.g., sapta manaskāraḥ covers saptabhir manaskāraḥ, etc.). I have also included the main occurrences of various technical Sanskrit terms used in the Introductory Study and the notes to the English translation, especially those which are relevant to the present book. Sanskrit terms reconstructed on the basis of the Tibetan and/or Chinese renderings are preceded by asterisk.¹

Section IV records all the occurrences of the main terms as they appear in the English translation of the Chapter on the Mundane Path. As for the other parts of the book, including the annotations to the English translation, precedence has been given to the main occurrences, especially to those notes which explain the entry in question. When the same English word translates two different Sanskrit terms, the latter are treated as distinct subheadings and the page number of their occurrences are listed separately. Different English words rendering the same Sanskrit term have been registered as separate entries. In the case of polysemic lexemes, I have recorded only the main meaning(s). More relevant information will often be found in the annotations.

Sanskrit, Pali, and Tibetan entries are listed according the traditional order of each language.² Entries in English, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean follow the order of the Roman alphabet. Japanese names are transcribed according to the modified Hepburn system.³ Korean names follow the McCune-Reischauer system.

The number after each entry indicates the page where it occurs. I have not specified whether the page number refers to an occurrence in the main text or in a note. Bold type has been used for those occurrences of the English technical terms as well as the main proper names which give particularly detailed information on the respective entries.

¹ Unfortunately, lack of time has prevented me from compiling a Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese-English Glossary. I intend to continue my work with the edition and translation of the Chapter on the Supramundane Path (Lokottaramārga). This future critical edition and annotated translation is planned to include such a polyglot glossary for the entire Yogasthāna IV.
² Section II also contains entries such as ‘Tārānātha’ and ‘Dalai Lama’, which strictly speaking are not Tibetan words.
³ For this system, see Masuda ed., Kenkyusha’s New Japanese-English Dictionary, p. X III.
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This book has been prepared as a camera-ready draft on my computer. Several technical problems have led to the disabling of the spellchecking and autocorrection programmes. This has resulted in a number of mistakes which have unfortunately gone unnoticed. I sincerely apologise and provide below a list of the major errors which I have detected so far. As far as typos such as ‘practitioner’ for ‘practitioner’, ‘different’ for ‘different’, etc. are concerned, I shall beg the indulgence and patience of my readers. Furthermore, if necessary, I shall be very glad to send a list containing all errors, minor ones included, to anyone who e-mails me to florindeleanu@yahoo.co.jp or writes to the postal address of the International Institute of Buddhist Studies, Tokyo. And needless to say, I shall be profoundly grateful to receive any comments and criticism concerning the book in general.

ADDENDA

(Index) p. 663, l. 15: The following page number should be added to ‘Ṭaranātha’: 248.

CORRIGENDA

p. 19, l. 45 (n. 12): circulating → circulating
p. 22, l. 3: are also used → is also used
p. 27, l. 8: relation with → relation to
p. 34, l. 32 (n. 1): having been → have been
p. 36, l. 31 (n. 18): exant → extant
p. 36, ll. 40-41 (n. 18): is are kośasthānas → is the kośasthāna
p. 44, l. 6: is different → are different
p. 44, l. 6: and I enumerate → I enumerate
p. 45, l. 46: independent → independent
p. 51, l. 11: seires → series
p. 51, l. 27: are not given → are given
p. 51, l. 43: et all. → et al.
pp. 53, l. 28: by the dGe’-dun → by dGe’-dun
p. 55, l. 22: slant → slanting
p. 59, l. 24: our a text → our text
pp. 63, l. 19 (n. 1): commorated → commemorated
pp. 77, l. 45: one manuscripts → one manuscript
p. 79, l. 44: might be prove → might prove
p. 80, l. 28: schematical → schematic
p. 80, l. 28: schematical → schematic
p. 83, l. 20: compilation → compilation
p. 94, l. 41 (n. 31): lengthths → length
p. 101, l. 42 (n. 93): choosing → choosing
p. 104, l. 47 (n. 118): A a report → A report
p. 112, l. 29: relevations → revelations
p. 112, l. 36: desist → desist from
p. 118, l. 38: the the Liao Canon → the Liao Canon
p. 119, l. 16: the the presence → the presence
p. 129, l. 8: numer → number
p. 132, l. 4: the text has has → the text has
p. 135, l. 6 (n. 14): Brahman → brahman
p. 137, l. 25 (n. 36): the the major → the major
p. 141, l. 21 (n. 75): many way → many ways
p. 144, l. 20, (n. 108): It is was → It was
p. 150, l. 33: In a passage → In passage
p. 150, l. 38: usually a → usually
p. 153, l. 31: provisio → proviso
p. 157, l. 5: section 3.28.4. → subchapter 3.28.4.
p. 158, l. 27: absorptions → absorptions
p. 159, l. 2: the the rest → the rest
p. 160, l. 32: Instead → Instead
p. 166, l. 21: signelessness → signlessness
p. 168, l. 28: attitude → attitude
p. 168, l. 28 and passim below: inclusivistic → inclusivé
p. 170, l. 40: conditioned factors → conditioned factors
p. 173, l. 29: followes → followers
p. 174, l. 22: define the constitute → constitute
p. 180, l. 1: inten tense → intense
p. 182, l. 29: translational → transitional
p. 183, l. 8: thoughty → though
p. 183, l. 26: cross-reference → cross-references
p. 185, l. 7: Section 3.16.2. → Subchapter 3.16.2.
p. 187, l. 6: dates → date of
pp. L X X IV →
pp. L X X IV-L X X V
p. 190, l. 26: p. L X X IVV
p. 190, l. 28: nourished → nourished
p. 192, l. 12: palced → placed
p. 193, l. 24: between 410 to 430 →
between 410 and 430
p. 195, l. 15: highy → highly
p. 201, l. 22 (n. 3): chapters, sections, → chapters, subchapters, sections
p. 201, l. 22 (n. 3): as the same as → are the same as
p. 202, l. 17 (n. 11): textural layers → textual layer
p. 203, l. 28 (n. 19): see this a → see this as a
p. 208, l. 35 (n. 40): contradistinction → contradiction
p. 210, l. 30 (n. 41): one one would → one would
p. 212, l. 9 (n. 50): issue → issue
p. 214, l. 34 (n. 69): another aspect → there is another aspect
p. 216, l. 32 (n. 88): temporarilly → temporarily
p. 218, l. 10 (n. 101): an seminal → a seminal
p. 220, l. 33 (n. 117): kindly send → kindly sent
p. 220, l. 39 (n. 118): non-existing → non-existing
p. 223, l. 38 (n. 140): to the to the totality →

to the totality

p. 224, l. 36 (n. 144): teachings → teachings

p. 236, l. 13 (n. 214): refers also discuses →

also discuses

p. 237, l. 43 (n. 227): unware → unaware


p. 237, l. 48 (n. 228): an usurper → a usurper

p. 240, l. 17 (n. 236): typescripted study → typescript

p. 244, l. 4 (n. 262): palpied → placed

p. 248, l. 13: to a very a succinct → to a very succinct

p. 248, l. 26: have been undertaken →

has been undertaken

p. 248, l. 43: Tārāṇātha → Tārāṇātha

p. 249, l. 23: upon all five → upon all the five

p. 268, l. 7 (n. 27): only problems → only problem

p. 268, l. 16 (n. 27): In my opinion → In my opinion

p. 271, l. 1 (n. 44): website of → website of the

p. 277, l. 43 (n. 122) and passim below: bimomic → bimorphic lexeme

p. 281, l. 27: reads the same → read the same

p. 282, l. 28: will reflect → will reflect

p. 286, l. 11: if far from easy → is far from easy

p. 295, l. 1 (n. 15): Wayman → Wayman

p. 295, l. 4 (n. 16): adopt → adopts

p. 295, l. 28 (n. 20): could not reproduced →

could not be reproduced

p. 297, l. 5 (n. 28): ma lu → malu

p. 303, l. 40 (n. 31): scibe → scribe

p. 307, l. 37 (n. 62): would be decipherer →

would be to decipherer

p. 309, l. 40-41 (n. 88): looks more closer →

looks closer

p. 312, l. 26 (n. 110): seems to deciphers →

seems to decipher

p. 324, l. 45 (n. 96): expaining → explaining

p. 331, l. 27 (n. 191): are not necessary →

is not necessary

p. 332, l. 29 (n. 206): might rather suggests →

rather suggests

p. 385, l. 41 (n. 434); p. 408, l. 37 (n. 874):

transmissional → transmission

p. 393, l. 20 (n. 556): its is regular → it is regular

p. 394, l. 27 (n. 573): is also → it is also

p. 395, l. 39 (n. 622): end of the this → end of this

p. 412, l. 34 (n. 10) and passim below: binomic →

bimorphic lexeme

p. 420, ll. 16-17 (n. 86): or or allographs →

or allographs

p. 440, l. 26 (n. 318): this an epithet →

this is an epithet

p. 452, l. 45: initially → initially

p. 462, l. 23: facilitated → facilitated

p. 463, l. 2: mastery of the the first →

mastery of the first

p. 464, l. 23: passioned → impassioned

p. 470, l. 7 (n. 7): Rnyal 'byor → rNal 'byor

p. 481, l. 39 (n. 41): the the unsuitable →

the unsuitable

p. 495, l. 16 (n. 74): essence → essence

p. 504, l. 1 (n. 94): phsychological → psychological

p. 509, l. 11 (n. 114): eradicatation → eradication

p. 520, l. 2 (n. 131): exists → exists

p. 524, l. 32 (n. 148): seems to be presuppose →

seems to presuppose

p. 525, l. 37 (n. 153): lifespan → lifespan

p. 530, l. 38 (n. 165): this factors → these factors

p. 543, l. 2 (n. 194): succinct → succinct

p. 544, l. 47 (n. 205): two paragraph →

two paragraphs

p. 547, l. 42 (n. 213): the the āruṇyas → the āruṇyas

p. 549, l. 41 (n. 218): effect the of path →

effect of the path

p. 550, l. 9 (n. 219): reconstructions → reconstruction

p. 551, l. 22 (n. 227); p. 552, l. 19 (n. 232):

ecclesiastical → ecclesiastical

p. 552, l. 42 (n. 234) and passim below: subterranean →

subterranean

p. 554, l. 10 (n. 234): paradiasiac → paradisiacal

p. 554, l. 16 (n. 234): the the yogi → the yogi

p. 555, l. 13 (n. 234): traditional → traditional

p. 562, l. 6 (n. 249): the the ālayavijñāna →

the ālayavijñāna

p. 562, l. 48 (n. 250): and and often → and often

p. 567, l. 15 (n. 257): complete knowledge →

thorough knowledge

p. 567, l. 18 (n. 257): complete knowledge →

thorough knowledge

p. 568, l. 38 (n. 261): the the ideation → the ideation

p. 571, ll. 29-30 (n. 265): the the ability → the ability

p. 573, l. 12 (n. 266): garment → garment

p. 575, l. 1 (n. 269): syntax → syntax

p. 577, l. 5 (n. 278): is probably → are probably

p. 582, l. 21 (n. 301): revererence → reverence

p. 582, l. 39 (n. 302): to be known → to be known

p. 583, l. 3 (n. 303): the the Kośa → the Kośa

p. 584, l. 10 (n. 305): faculties → faculties

p. 584, l. 41 (n. 309): practise → practice

p. 586, l. 1 (n. 313): a a hermeutical →

a hermeneutical

p. 604, l. 9; p. 616, l. 9: et all. → et al.

p. 623, l. 30: Infinitive → Infinite

p. 633, l. 42: no taiō → to taiō

p. 647, l. 26: are listed → is listed

*NB: In a number of occurrences, the Tibetan letter ṭ appears romanised as ‘a. It should be corrected to ‘a.
Afterword to the Electronic Edition

Nine years after the publication of the book, two words come to my mind: gratitude and apologies. Sincerest gratitude is due to all the kalyāṇamitras who have generously given their feedback and encouragement over the years, to my colleagues at the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies and its International Institute for Buddhist Studies whose wholehearted support has made my research and this electronic edition possible, and last but not least, to all the readers who have kindly perused, purchased, or merely leafed through the book.

It came as a great surprise that only a few years after its publication, this modest study went out of print. I still cannot fathom the mysterious (acintya!) forces behind this unexpected honour, but my first reaction was that a second edition would be the best way to show my gratitude. This was also made necessary by the imperfections besetting the first edition as well as the developments in many of the areas directly or indirectly relevant to the Śrāvakabhūmi. And for a while, I did work on a second edition. Unfortunately, as I became involved in a few different projects, more urgent in nature, my toil on the new edition has slowly petered out.

This brings me to the apologies: unfortunately, a second edition appears now an increasingly distant dream. As the International Institute for Buddhist Studies has decided to post its publications online starting with the titles out of print, it seems more practical – at least for now – to make the book available to a wider readership as it is (yathābhūtam!). My apologies do not stop here: the labours with the would-have-been second edition have made my digital file unusable. In its current form, my manuscript is neither a donkey nor a horse 非驢非馬: some parts are heavily edited while others are virtually unchanged, with the consequent havoc in pagination. This explains why the online file is an unsearchable scan of the printed book. For all these reasons as well the many flaws of the first edition, I sincerely apologise to all my readers.

What was the second edition supposed to look like? Roughly speaking, the revision would have consisted in updating and refining the content (from the philological and codicological data concerning the Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese textual witnesses to the historical background of early Yogācāra Buddhism and the legacy of the Śrāvakabhūmi), polishing the style, and last but least, correcting the numerous typos.¹

¹ I hope the latter deficiency is partly alleviated by the accompanying Addenda and Corrigenda. There remain, however, typos and stylistic imperfections for which I do apologise. I add here only the correction of one embarrassing error which goes beyond mere spelling. On page 468, line 26, ‘eleven mahābhūmikas’ should be emended (of course!) to ‘ten mahābhūmikāḥ’.
I am relieved, however, that as to this date no major error in the edited texts has come to my attention. A possible alteration in the overall structure would have been to get rid of the entire Diplomatic Edition of the Sanskrit Manuscript (Part Two, Chapter Two), which appears to me now as a superfluous appendage. Its automatic excision would, however, affect cross references in the Critical Edition as well as the entire pagination and therefore the index. Unfortunately, fixing these details would require more time than I can spare at the moment. Superfluous as it may be, I dare believe, however, that this diplomatic edition is just a harmless philological curio.

As far as the major updates are concerned, suffice it to mention that the most exciting news concerning the Śrāvakabhūmi is the completion of the critical edition and Japanese translation of its Yogasthāna II and Yogasthāna III thanks to the tireless efforts of the Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group. I hope the Group will continue its admirable work and before long we shall also have Yogasthāna IV and thus the entire text in its first trustworthy edition and translation into a modern language.

The Śrāvakabhūmi is not only a mine of scholastic reflection on meditative theory and psychology but also a vibrant guidebook to its actual practice offering a rare glimpse into the way Buddhist contemplatives lived and taught their spiritual path some eighteen centuries ago. The entire picture of this intricate edifice has recently received more and more attention in scholarly circles. And I hope one day, not so far from now, a faithful and clear translation into English will make this fascinating text available to a larger readership.

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