Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi

Yogācāra Elements in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Robert Kritzer

STUDIA PHILOLOGICA BUDDHICA
Monograph Series
XVIII

Tokyo • The International Institute for Buddhist Studies • 2005
Vasubandhu and the Yogacārabhūmi
Yogacāra Elements in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya
STUDIA PHILOLOGICA BUDDHICA
Monograph Series
XVIII

Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi
Yogācāra Elements in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Robert Kritzer

Tokyo
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
of
The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies
2005
Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi

Yogācāra Elements in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Robert Kritzer

Tokyo
The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
of
The International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies
2005
Contents

Acknowledgements ix

I. Introduction xi
   The Yogācārabhūmi xii
   The Abhidharmaśabhāṣya xx

II. Methodology and Results xxxi
   Methodology xxxi
   Distribution and General Characterization of Results xxxiii

III. Passages from the Abhidharmaśabhāṣya and Related Passages from the Yogācārabhūmi 1
   Chapter 1 Dhātunirdeśa 2
   Chapter 2 Indriyanirdeśa 36
   Chapter 3 Lokanirdeśa 132
   Chapter 4 Karmanirdeśa 172
   Chapter 5 Anuśayanirdeśa 268
   Chapter 6 Mārgapudgalanirdeśa 346
   Chapter 7 Jñānanirdeśa 372
   Chapter 8 Samāpattinirdeśa 384

Concordance of Passages from the Yogācārabhūmi 391

Bibliography 397

Index 407
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor Yamabe Nobuyoshi for his constant advice and encouragement at every stage of my project. Both he and Professor Fukuda Takumi patiently explained innumerable difficult Sanskrit and Chinese passages. Elizabeth Kenney provided me with many invaluable suggestions regarding the work as a whole. Ian Shortreed of Mercury Software produced the camera-ready copy.

I am grateful to Professor Florin Deleanu for suggesting that I publish my work in the series Studia Philologica Buddhica and to the International Institute for Buddhist Studies for accepting my manuscript.

The Japanese Ministry of Education funded an early stage of my research, and Kyoto Notre Dame University generously subsidized the cost of preparing the manuscript.
I. Introduction

Traditionally, Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra are considered to be three clearly separated Buddhist schools. Sarvāstivāda is seen as highly conservative, Hīnayānist, and obsessed with its detailed analysis of existence and experience. Sautrāntika is supposedly more progressive and more concerned with the Buddha’s spiritual message and is said to have Mahāyānist tendencies. Finally, Yogācāra is firmly on the side of Mahāyāna, having absorbed the basic Mahāyāna teaching of dharmaśūnyatā (the emptiness of all the entities comprising existence), which informs its characteristic doctrine of idealism.

Fortunately, it would be difficult to find a contemporary scholar of Buddhism who subscribes to such a simplistic scheme. Today, we no longer take for granted that Mahāyāna Buddhism is more advanced than or superior to Hīnayāna, an appellation that has been largely superseded by non-derogatory ones such as “Śrāvakayāna,” and the very definition of Mahāyāna is coming under scrutiny (see Silk 2002). The occurrence of the term Sautrāntika before Vasubandhu has been questioned (Katō 1989: 101-109), as has the existence of Sautrāntika as an actual school (Kritzer 2003a). Moreover, early Yogācāra texts have been shown to rely on the Mūlasarvāstivādin Āgama tradition (Schmithausen 1970), and a connection between meditators such as An Shih-kao, who were perhaps forerunners of Yogācāra, and Sarvāstivāda has been suggested (Deleanu 1993: 17; Yamabe 1997).

Still, traces of the traditional rigid classifications linger in our minds, especially since the sources for historical information about Buddhist schools and their founders (for example Vasumitra’s Samayabhedoparacanacakra and Paramārtha’s biography of Vasubandhū) accept these classifications so completely. Preconceptions regarding Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra are a particular obstacle in the study of Vasubandhū, the renowned fifth century philosopher (or was it the fourth century? or were there two Vasubandhus, one in each century?), because his name is associated with all three schools.
This book is a study of one of Vasubandhu’s works, the Abhidharma-
kośabhāṣya, which he is said to have written after he had become disillusioned with 
Sarvāstivāda and while he favored Sautrāntika, but before he converted to Mahā-
yāna and became a Yogācāra. Beginning with Hakamaya’s seminal article (1986), 
Japanese scholars have been finding evidence that Vasubandhu sometimes relies on 
the Yogācārabhūmi, supposedly a Mahāyāna text, in his criticisms of Sarvāstivāda. 
These discoveries raise doubts about the actual course of Vasubandhu’s career.

My systematic comparison of these two texts shows for the first time the 
extent of Vasubandhu’s dependence on the Yogācārabhūmi. In order to complete 
this project, I have extensively referred to the *Nyāyānusāra, Samghabhadra’s 
commentary on the Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya. Below, I introduce the relevant texts 
and explain the significance of my results.

The Yogācārabhūmi

General Description of the Text

Although the Yogācārabhūmi is one of the most prominent early texts asso-
ciated with the Yogācāra school, there is nothing even approaching a complete 
translation in a western language,¹ nor is there a comprehensive monograph on the 
text. There are several reasons for this, one of which is the sheer length of the 
work: the Chinese translation is about six hundred Taishō pages. Furthermore, 
although virtually the entire Yogācārabhūmi also exists in Tibetan translation, the 
Sanskrit text is only partially extant. Perhaps most daunting is the fact that the 
structure of the Yogācārabhūmi is extremely complicated, and even the individual 
sections appear to consist of various chronological layers. In what follows, I can 
hope to give only a very general description of the structure and contents of the 
text and show its place in Yogācāra literature.

It is often assumed that two sūtras, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the 
Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra, constitute the earliest Yogācāra texts. However, 
Schmithausen argues that at least some portions of the Yogācārabhūmi predate both 
of these sūtras (1987: 11-12) as well as the three śāstras associated with Maitreya 
(Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Madhyāntavibhāga, and Dharmaḥarmatāvibhāga) and the 
three śāstras by Asaṅga (Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun, Abhidharmasamuccaya, 
includes six śāstras by Vasubandhu (Vyākhyāyukti, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Praṇītya-
samutpadavyākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā, and Triṃśikā).

The influence of the Yogācārabhūmi is particularly evident in the Hsien-yang

¹ An English translation of Hsien-tsong’s Chinese translation is planned in the BDK 
Tripiṭaka translation series but has not yet appeared.
sheng-chiao lun and the Abhidharmasamuccaya, both of which on occasion quote from or closely paraphrase it. In the Mahāyāṇasamgraha and the Trīṃśikā, concepts from the Yogācārabhūmi are developed more systematically. In contrast to these works by Asaṅga, the Maitreya texts contain terms such as abhūtāparikalpa that do not appear in the Yogācārabhūmi (Schmithausen 1987: 98-99), while they do not mention ālayavijñāna. Furthermore, they were influenced by Tathāgatagarbha ideas (Keenan 1993: 204). Nevertheless, Schmithausen asserts that the Maitreya texts “presuppose some elements” from portions of the Yogācārabhūmi (1987: 260-261 n. 98).

As the title indicates, the Yogācārabhūmi deals with the stages (bhūmi) of Buddhist practice. The first section of the text, the Maulī Bhūmi, includes seventeen stages, and essentially the entire section exists in manuscript form. However, the Sanskrit texts of only some of these stages have been edited. In Table 1, I list only the editions of complete bhūmis. A complete account of published versions of all portions of the Sanskrit text can be found in Silk 2001: 153-158.

Hattori aptly characterizes the contents of the Maulī Bhūmi: “The Yogācārabhūmi enumerates, classifies, and explains all elements that relate to the practice of each of the seventeen stages in the same manner as that of the Abhidharma treatises” (1987: 525). However, the organization according to stages is not typical of the extent abhidharma texts, and it leads to a good deal of repetition, since similar topics often pertain to more than one stage.

An examination of the Chinese translation shows that the individual chapters vary considerably in length. The two longest are the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Śrāvakabhūmi, both of which seem to have also existed as separate texts. At eighty-three Taishō pages, the shorter of these two, the Śrāvakabhūmi, is considerably more than twice as long as the combined third, fourth, and fifth chapters (the Savitarkādi-bhūmi), which comprise the third longest section. Several other bhūmis are only one or two Taishō pages long.

The second section, the Viniścayasamgrahani, is not extant in Sanskrit,

2 Until recently, the Sanskrit title of the first section of the text was unclear (see Schmithausen 1969: 17-18 n. 4). However, Matsuda has discovered a reference to maulyāṁ bhūmau in a Sanskrit fragment of the Viniścayasamgrahani (1988: 18), leading Schmithausen to adopt Maulī Bhūmi as the best way of referring to this section (2000: 245).

3 Among others who make similar observations regarding the abhidharma-like nature of the Yogācārabhūmi are Wayman (1961: 45) and Rahula (1980: xiv).

4 For convenience, I use the designation Savitarkādi-bhūmi to refer to the Savitarkā Savicārā Bhūmi, Avitarkā Vicāramātrā Bhūmi, and Avitarkāvicārā Bhūmi.
although a few manuscript fragments exist. In addition to the Tibetan and Hsüan-tsang’s

---

5 The St. Petersburg fragments contain a portion corresponding to *Yogācārabhūmi;* zi 31a5-59b2; T. 1579: 589b19-600c10 (Matsuda 1988). Furthermore, Matsuda has edited a folio of a manuscript in Kathmandu containing a portion of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* as quoted in the *Vinīścayasaṅgrahaṇī*, corresponding to T. 1579: 728c16-730c21 (1995).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Edition(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi</td>
<td>Yogaśārābhūmi: 3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Manobhūmi</td>
<td>Yogaśārābhūmi: i1-72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Avitarkāvicārā Bhūmi</td>
<td>Yogaśārābhūmi: 73-232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Asamāhitā Bhūmi</td>
<td>(Schmithausen 1987: 220-222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sacittikā Bhūmi</td>
<td>Wayman 1960, 1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Acittikā Bhūmi</td>
<td>(Schmithausen 1987: 220-222)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Śrutamayī Bhūmi</td>
<td>Śrāvakabhūmi8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Cintāmayī Bhūmi</td>
<td>Wayman 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmi</td>
<td>Bodhisattvabhūmi (Dutt); Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Śrāvakabhūmi</td>
<td>Schmithausen 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Bodhisattvabhūmi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Sopadhikā Bhūmi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Nirupadhikā Bhūmi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 I have followed Wayman (1961: 43) in listing the names of the Bhūmis as they appear in Bhattacharya’s text (Yogaśārābhūmi: 3.7-12). Note that the third, fourth, and fifth bhūmis are not divided in the text. Below, I refer to them as Savitarkādī-bhūmi. Also, in the Tibetan translation, the Śrāvakabhūmi and Bodhisattvabhūmi are contained in separate volumes from the remainder of the Maulī Bhūmi.

7 Bhattacharya’s edition of the first five bhūmis.

Chinese translation, there is also a partial translation by Paramārtha entitled *Chüeh-ting tsang lun* 決定藏論 (T. 1584).9 Wayman describes the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* as “a commentary on the seventeen bhūmis in their order” (1961: 43); in fact, as is noted in both the Chinese (T. 1579: 694c16) and the Tibetan translations (Yogācārabhūmi, zi 300a6), the Pratyekabuddhabhūmi is not commented on in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*. Wayman’s description essentially agrees with that of Ui, who, relying on the commentary of Jinaputra (Tsui-sheng-tzu 最勝子),10 says that in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* various obscure but important points from the *Maulī Bhūmi* are examined and authoritative explanations are given, hence the word *viniścaya* in the title (1958: 10).

The order of the remaining three sections differs between the Chinese (*Vivaranasamgrahaṇī, Paryāyasamgrahaṇī, Vastusamgrahaṇī*) and the Tibetan editions (*Vastusamgrahaṇī, Paryāyasamgrahaṇī, *Vivaranasamgrahaṇī*).11 These sections, too, are not extant in Sanskrit.12 The *Vivaranasamgrahaṇī* and *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī* are both very short, ten and twelve Taishō pages. Again relying on Jinaputra, Ui summarizes the contents of these sections: the *Vivaranasamgrahaṇī*

---

9 The contents of this text correspond to the first part of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi* (Yogācārabhūmi, zi 1a1-60b7; T. 1579: 579a8-601a25).

10 *Yü-ch’ieh shih-ti lun shih* 瑜伽師地論釋 (T. 1580).

11 The Tibetan translation actually contains a sixth section, *Vinayasamgrahaṇī*, between the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* and the *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī*. In the Chinese translation, most of this section is included in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī*, although, as far as I can tell, the first several folios of the Tibetan *Vinayasamgrahaṇī* (Yogācārabhūmi, yi 1a1-5a8) do not correspond to anything in the Chinese. The corresponding portion in the Chinese begins at T. 1579: 868c6. The end of the *Vinayasamgrahaṇī* (Yogācārabhūmi, yi 27a2) coincides with T. 1579: 877c2. The Tibetan text abbreviates a list of definitions of five types of powers after the second item (*bsam pa’i stobs, i lê li* 意樂力), while the Chinese goes on to define all five items (through T. 1579: 877c17).

The Sanskrit titles of the *Vinayasamgrahaṇī* and the *Vivaranasamgrahaṇī* are not attested. Hakamaya proposes *Vyākhyasamgrahaṇī-* instead of *Vivaranasamgrahaṇī* (2001: 89). For the remaining titles, see Schmithausen 1969: 18 ns. 5-8.

12 Matsuda has identified and edited a one-folio fragment of the *Paryāyasamgrahaṇī* that is kept in Kathmandu (1994). In the same article, he also reconstructs a portion of the text, identifies the sūtras from which the words under discussion in the text are drawn, and shows the significance of this little-studied section of the Yogācārabhūmi.
describes in detail the principles for interpreting scripture; the Pāryāyasamgrahāṇī collects, classifies, and explains synonyms found in the sūtras; the Vastusamgrahāṇī explains all the significant contents of the tripitaka (1958: 9).

The Vastusamgrahāṇī is by far the longest and most important of these last three sections. In the Chinese translation, it consists of three main parts, concerning sūtra (ch’i-ching shih 契經事 = *Sūtravastu), vinaya (tiao-fu shih 調伏事 = *Vinayavastu), and abhidharma (pên-mu shih 本母事 = *Māṭrākāvastu). The first and longest part is to a large extent a commentary on the Samyukāgama (Mukai 1985).

Composition and Authorship

Traditionally, the Yogācārabhūmi is considered to be the work of a single author: Maitreya, according to the Chinese translation; Asaṅga, according to Tibetan sources. However, Chinese sources say that Maitreya descended from heaven to transmit the Yogācārabhūmi to Asaṅga, so in both traditions the text is closely associated with Asaṅga. Some modern scholars, notably Wayman (1989: 201-202) and Mukai (see Schmithausen 1987: 183), insist that Asaṅga was the sole author of the entire Yogācārabhūmi. Others, like Hakamaya, maintain that Asaṅga was at least the compiler of the text (see Schmithausen 1987: 183). However, Schmithausen thinks that the text is a compilation of material that varies considerably in age and that the authors and compilers cannot be identified (most recently, 1987: 13-14, 184-185). Many scholars today agree with Schmithausen on this point, including me (see Kritzer 1999: 13-17 for a more detailed discussion of this issue).

Among both those who insist that Asaṅga alone composed the Yogācārabhūmi and those who believe that it is a compilation, there is some disagreement about the chronological order of the various sections. Wayman states that Asaṅga composed the text as follows: 1) the Śrāvakabhūmi and the Samāhīṭa Bhūmi when he was very young; 2) the Pāryāyasamgraha, the Vastusamgrahāṇī, the Śrutamāyī Bhūmi the Cintāmāyī Bhūmi, and the Bhāvanāmāyī Bhūmi before being converted to Mahāyāna; 3) the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the remainder of the Maulī Bhūmi, and the Viniścayasamgrahāṇī after his conversion (Wayman 1989: 203). According to Schmithausen there are three main layers in the following chronological order: 1) parts of the Maulī Bhūmi, including the Śrāvakabhūmi and the Bodhisattvabhūmi, and the Vastusamgrahāṇī; 2) the remainder of the Maulī Bhūmi; 3) the Viniścaya-

13 T. 1579: 772b16-868b22. This corresponds to the entire Tibetan Vastusamgrahāṇī (Yogācārabhūmi;’i 143a1-381b6).

14 T. 1579: 868c6-878a24. As mentioned in note 11, the first portion (through T. 1579: 877c22) corresponds to the majority of the Tibetan *Vinayasaṃgrahāṇī (Yogācārabhūmi;’ yi 5a8-27a2).

15 T. 1579: 878a25-881c2. This part is entirely lacking in the Tibetan.
samgrahāṇī (1987: 14). Aramaki, on the other hand, mentions seven layers of the Yogācārabhūmi in a list of fourteen strata of early Yogācāra texts: 1) the Śrāvakabhūmi; 2) the Vastusamgrahāṇī; 3) the Boddhisattvabhūmi; 4) the Maitreya, Viśalāmati, Paramārthasāmbhava, and Guṇākara chapters of the Samdhinirmochanasūtra in the Viniścayasamgrahāṇī; 5) what Schmithausen refers to as the Proof, Pravṛtti, and Nivṛtti portions of the exposition of ālayavijñāna in the Viniścayasamgrahāṇī; 6) the Sacittikā Bhūmi of the Viniścayasamgrahāṇī; 7) the Mauli Bhūmi excluding the Śrāvakabhūmi and Boddhisattvabhūmi (2000: 39 n. 2).

While Wayman believes that Asaṅga composed the Yogācārabhūmi section by section, both Schmithausen and Aramaki see the development of the text as a gradual accretion of material from various sources. Thus they do not simply identify sections that are earlier or later; rather they see different strata even within the same section. If one accepts their premises, then hardly any characteristic can be attributed to the Yogācārabhūmi as a whole. However, the heterogeneous contents of the text suggest that the Schmithausen–Aramaki approach is correct, even though the exact stratification remains uncertain.

Nobody presumes to give an exact date for the Yogācārabhūmi or for its various strata. Those who attribute the text to Asaṅga naturally place the text during Asaṅga’s lifetime, usually thought to span the end of the fourth and the beginning of the fifth century. However, if the text is a compilation assembled over a period of time, it seems likely that the oldest portions of the text might have been composed somewhat earlier than the end of the fourth century.

Doctrinal Content

The Yogācārabhūmi is one of the oldest texts, if not the oldest, associated with the Yogācāra school, and it contains some of the philosophical concepts distinctive to that school. Schmithausen has shown that the Yogācārabhūmi does not contain all of the doctrines characteristic of later Yogācāra texts. Nor does it maintain a consistent doctrinal position. Furthermore, the same terms can have somewhat different meanings in different sections of the text. Nevertheless, certain characteristically Yogācāra terms and doctrines appear, sometimes for the first time, in the Yogācārabhūmi.

The most striking of these doctrines is ālayavijñāna, “the container or storehouse of the latent residues or Impressions of previous actions (karmas) and mind processes, or...the basic layer of mind processes or even the very basic constituent of the whole living being” (Schmithausen 1987: 1). The term ālayavijñāna is completely

---

16 In addition to abhūtaparikāla, Schmithausen mentions the term vijñaptimātra, which appears, but only once, in a quotation from the Samdhinirmocanasūtra (1987: 32, 297 n. 221).
lacking in much of the Yogācārabhūmi, but it is explained in great detail in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanabhūmi, which includes a logical "proof" of its existence. The development of the concept of ālayavijñāna is explored thoroughly in Schmithausen 1987, and studies of ālayavijñāna will probably rely greatly on his work for some time to come.\footnote{An example of a recent study is the psychological discussion in Waldron 2003.}

Another term important for the Yogācāra school that is found frequently in the Yogācārabhūmi is bīja (seed). Although the term bīja is used metaphorically in the Āgamas, it is first seen as a technical term in the early Yogācāra literature, where bījas comprise or are contained in the ālayavijñāna. Yamabe identifies seven different senses in which the term appears in the Yogācārabhūmi: seeds of the future life; seeds of klesās; seeds of karma; seeds of good dharma; seeds of the pravṛtti-vijñānas; seeds of rūpa; seeds of all dharma\footnote{However, Wayman receives some support from Bareau, who points out the similarity between the list of eight asamskrtadharma\footnotesymbol{}s in texts attributed to Asaṅga, including the Yogācārabhūmi, and a list of nine asamskrta\footnotesymbol{}s attributed to the Mahāsākākas in Vasumitra’s Samayabhedopacanacakra. Bareau thinks that this proves conclusively that Asaṅga was a Mahāsākāka before he converted to Mahāyāna (1993). Hakamaya also points out the reliance of the Yogācārabhūmi on Mahāsākāka here (1990: 254). On the other hand, Schmithausen reasonably maintains that the} (1989). These seeds are not considered to be real dharma; rather, they are designations for the potential of beings to produce good or bad results.

Other distinctive Yogācāra concepts found in the text include kliśṭamanas (defiled mind) and āśraya-parāvṛtti (transformation of the basis of existence), as well as the three natures, i.e., parikalpitasvabhāva (imaginary nature), paratantrasvabhāva (dependent nature), and parinispattasvabhāva (ultimate nature). But it must be emphasized that these terms appear only sporadically. Unlike in later Yogācāra texts, most of them are not systematically presented.

In addition, certain Sarvāstivādin positions are refuted in the Yogācārabhūmi. Most important is the doctrine of sarvāstivāda itself, namely the idea that past, present, and future dharma\footnotesymbol{}s all really exist. The real existence, accepted by Sarvāstivāda, of various other items, such as the citta-viparītasamskāras and avijñaptirūpa, is denied in the Yogācārabhūmi, which frequently appeals to the operation of bījas to explain phenomena that according to Sarvāstivāda result from real dharma\footnotesymbol{}s.

Finally, much of the contents of the Yogācārabhūmi is not specifically Yogācāra at all. As I have mentioned above, a large percentage of the text is non-Mahāyāna abhidharma. Wayman argues strenuously that Asaṅga was a Mahāsākāka before converting to Mahāyāna and that his abhidharma is Mahāsākāka abhidharma (1961: 26-29; 1989), but his arguments are convincingly criticized by Schmithausen (1970: 94-95, 115-119).\footnote{Certainly, in many cases the Yogācārabhūmi is in essential}
agreement with Sarvāstivāda, and it appears that, although it disagrees with Sarvāstivāda on some extremely important points, the Yogācārabhūmi is closely connected to the Sarvāstivāda tradition.

The Abhidharmakośabhaṣya

General Description of the Text

Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhaṣya is best known as a compendium of Sarvāstivādin abhidharma, but it is also famous for its criticisms of certain points of Sarvāstivādin doctrine. In contrast to the Yogācārabhūmi, it is completely extant in Sanskrit and is available in two editions. There are two Chinese translations, Hsüan-tsang’s (T. 1558) and Paramārtha’s (T. 1559), as well as a Tibetan translation (Tohoku 4090, Peking 5591). Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese translation has been completely translated into French by La Vallée Poussin (1971), and this French translation has in turn been translated into English by Pruden (1988-1990). Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese translation has also been completely translated into Japanese by Nishi in the Kokuyaku Issaiyō series (Bidon-bu 25-26). In addition, several chapters have been translated separately into Japanese from the Sanskrit (Funahashi 1987; Sakurabe and Odani 1991; Sakurabe, Odani, and Honjō 2004) and the Tibetan (Yamaguchi and Funahashi 1955). Some important resources for the study of the Abhidharmakośa-bhaṣya include Saeki’s annotated edition of the Chinese translation (1978), Hirakawa’s index to the Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan (1973-1978), and Fukuhara’s study of the kārikas (1973, 1986).

The Sarvāstivādin abhidharma literature can be divided into several general groups. First are the seven canonical texts, listed here in the chronological order suggested by Cox (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 177 ft.): Saṅgītīparīyāya, Dharmaskandha, Prajñāpāsāstra, Vijñānakāya, Dhātukāya, Prakaraṇapāda, and fact that the Yogācārabhūmi contains some Mahāśāsaka teachings, including this list of asamskṛtayas, is not enough to prove that the text is largely based on Mahāśāsaka (1970: 119).


20 In an earlier publication (1914-1918), La Vallée Poussin also translated Chapter Three from the Tibetan translation.

21 The following discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, and not all abhidharma texts will be mentioned.
Jñānapрастhāna. 22 Next are three texts entitled Vibhāṣā, nominally commentaries on the Jñānapрастhāna, among which the one commonly known as the *Mahāvibhāṣā (T. 1545) 23 is the longest and most famous. These texts contain discussions of various positions on doctrinal points, and the *Mahāvibhāṣā establishes the orthodox position for the branch of the Sarvāstivāda school known as the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 237-238). The name Vaibhāṣika, which is frequently used more or less synonymously with Sarvāstivāda, is derived from the title of this text. The Vibhāṣās are followed by three texts known as *Abhidharmahrdaya: the *Abhidharmahrdayaśāstra of Dharmaśrī or Dharmaśreṣṭhin, the *Abhidharmahrdayaśāstra of Upaśānta, and the *Saṃyuktābhidharmahrdayaśāstra. According to Dessein, these texts are for the most part organized according to the four noble truths, with various topics discussed in an appropriate order (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 255-269).

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya closely follows the structure of the *Abhidharmahrdaya texts (Frauwallner 1995: 137-140; Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 269-274). It purports to give an account of the abhidharma of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣika school but frequently adopts unorthodox positions, especially those associated with Sautrāntika. (More will be said about this later.) There are several reasons for the enduring fame of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. First of all, despite the deviations from orthodoxy, the text gives the clearest and most complete account of the Sarvāstivādin system. Furthermore, the arguments for different points of view, orthodox and unorthodox, are skillfully presented so that they reveal the issues that are really at stake. It is also possible that the fact that Vasubandhu’s name is associated with Mahāyāna as well as Sarvāstivāda added to the prestige of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya in China, Tibet, Mongolia, and Japan. Finally, among modern scholars, its availability in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese, not to mention the excellent French translation, make it uniquely accessible among abhidharma works.

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya inspired some critical reaction from the defenders of Sarvāstivāda, notably Saṃghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra (extant only in Chinese) 24 and the Abhidharmadīpa (author unknown, extant only in Sanskrit). In addition, eight commentaries, originally in Sanskrit, are found in the Tibetan Bstan-'gyur, of

22 For complete titles, Taishō text numbers, and detailed discussions of authorship, contents, etc., see Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 177-229.

23 The term *Mahāvibhāṣā is not attested in Sanskrit, and I use it here only because it is the most common designation for this text. Elsewhere, I refer to T. 1545 as “the Vibhāṣā.”

which Yasomitra’s Abhidharmakośavyākhyā25 (available in Sanskrit, as well) and Sthiramati’s Tattvārtha26 are particularly noteworthy.27 In China, three of Hsüan-tsang’s disciples, Shen-t’ai 神泰, P’u-kuang 普光, and Fa-pao 法寶, also wrote extensive commentaries.28

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya contains nine chapters (see Table 2). The first eight chapters consist of verses, which generally are consistent with Sarvāstivāda, and commentary on each verse, in which Vasubandhu often discusses and sometimes accepts positions that disagree with Sarvāstivāda. The ninth chapter, often characterized as an appendix, is entirely prose. Although many commentaries cover all nine chapters, Saṃghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra ends with chapter eight. Dessein refers to chapters three and nine as “additional chapters,” since they do not fit into a division of the entire text according to the four truths, a division that he traces back to the *Abhidharmahṛdaya texts (Willemen, Dessein, and Cox 1998: 255-274).

Vasubandhu’s Career

The traditional account of Vasubandhu’s career is found in Paramārtha’s P’o-su-p’an-tou fa-shih chuan 婆蘇槃豆法師傳 (T. 2049; translated in Takakusu 1904):29 Vasubandhu was originally a Sarvāstivādins, and he composed the verses (karikās) of the Abhidharmakośa from the Sarvāstivādin point of view, in accordance with the teaching of the Vibhaṣa. However, when he wrote his own commentary on his verses (the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya), he frequently rejected orthodox Sarvāstivāda in favor of Saṃrāntika positions. Saṃghabhadra, an orthodox Sarvāstivādin from Kashmir, then wrote two works, one of which was extremely critical of Vasubandhu. Later, Vasubandhu converted to Mahāyāna under the influence of his older brother, Asaṅga, and he wrote a number of commentaries on Mahāyāna sūras and sāstras, as well as some Yogācāra sūtras of his own.

Like most dates in the history of Indian Buddhism, the date of Vasubandhu is

25 Tohoku 4092; Peking 5593.

26 Tohoku 4421; Peking 5875.

27 Regarding Indian commentaries in Tibetan translation, see Mejor 1991.

28 Respectively, Chū-shé lun shu 俱舎論疏 (Dai Nihon zokuzōkyō 1.8.3-4), Chū-shé lun chi 俱舎論記 (T. 1821), and Chū-shé lun shu 俱舎論疏 (T. 1822). The last two of these are frequently referred to in Saeki 1978, on which La Vallée Poussin (1971) often seems to rely in turn.

29 Other accounts are found in the works of Hsüan-tsang and of Tibetan historians, particularly Bu-ston. Cox summarizes the differences among these accounts (1995: 53-55).
Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Subject-matter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Dhātunirdeśa</td>
<td>Elements of existence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Indriyanirdeśa</td>
<td>Sense faculties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Lokanirdeśa</td>
<td>Cosmology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Karmanirdeśa</td>
<td>Action and its results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Anuśayanirdeśa</td>
<td>Defilements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mārgapudgalanirdeśa</td>
<td>The path and the noble ones (āryapudgala)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Jñānanirdeśa</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Samāpattinirdeśa</td>
<td>Meditation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Pudgalanirdeśa</td>
<td>Refutation of a self or soul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

30 For the titles of the first eight chapters, I follow Pradhan’s Sanskrit text. For the ninth chapter, I follow common usage, although I have not found any textual attestation of Pudgalanirdeśa.
not known exactly. Since different dates appear in Chinese sources, and since the number of works attributed to Vasubandhu is very large, his date has been a matter of considerable controversy among scholars. In what follows, I give a simplified account of the complex debate about Vasubandhu’s career.\(^1\)

The source of the problem is that Paramārtha gives (or is reported to give) two different dates, one in the fourth century and one in the fifth. The later date appears in his biography of Vasubandhu, while the earlier date is attributed by K’uei-chi 窮基 and Hui-hsiang 慧祥 to works of Paramārtha that are no longer extant (Frauwallner 1951: 3-5). In order to make sense of this discrepancy, Frauwallner, in a well-known monograph, *On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu*, proposes his theory of two Vasubandhus. According to Frauwallner, Vasubandhu the elder was the younger brother of Asaṅga. Frauwallner identifies this Vasubandhu the elder with the Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu and the Śhavīra Vasubandhu mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (1951: 21-22). This elder Vasubandhu became a believer in Mahāyāna, and he was the author of many Mahāyāna works, including the Śatasāstra, Madhyāntavibhāga, Daśabhūmikasāstra, Saddharmaupādānakopadeśa, Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāsāstra, and Bodhicittotpādanaśāstra (1951: 55). Vasubandhu the younger, on the other hand, was a Sarvāstivādin who moved in the direction of Sautrāntika but never converted to Mahāyāna. He was the author of the *Abhidharmakośa* and *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. The only other work that Frauwallner attributes to Vasubandhu the younger at this point is the *Paramārthasaptatikā*, and he withholds judgement concerning the *Vimśatikā* and *Trīṃśikā*, saying, “We must therefore employ other means in order to determine the author of these works; we must gain the necessary basis from their contents and the doctrines upheld in them” (1951: 56). He does not mention by name the Vyākhya, Karmasiddhiprakāraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā, Pañcasandhaka, and Trisvabhāvanirdeśa, or the commentaries on the Dharmadharmaśāvatīvaibhāga, Mahāyānasamgraha, and Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.\(^2\)

Schmithausen, following the principle stated by Frauwallner, has examined the doctrinal features of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and the various Yogācāra texts attributed to Vasubandhu. In his first publication concerning this issue, he basically agrees with Frauwallner’s theory but added the *Vimśatikā* and *Trīṃśikā* to the list of works by the author of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (1967: 136), an

---


\(^2\) This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of all the works that have ever been attributed to Vasubandhu.
addition later accepted by Frauwallner (1969: 425). In his most recent statement on this subject, Schmithausen designates the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vyākhyāyukti, *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā, and *Trīṃśikā* as “works of Vasubandhu the Kośakāra.” Although he indicates that the texts he attributes to the Kośakāra contain certain terms and ideas, particularly *santatipariṇāmaviśeṣa*, that are not found in the “Vasubandhu commentaries” (on the Madhyāntavibhāga, etc.) and the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, Schmithausen now refuses to commit himself regarding the authorship of the latter group of texts or the question of two Vasubandhus (1987: 262-263 n. 101).

Frauwallner’s theory has been attacked by various scholars since shortly after it was published, beginning with a very critical article by Sakurabe (1952), who, like Frauwallner, refers to a wide range of Chinese sources. Addressing the issue from a more doctrinal point of view, Jaini argues that criticisms in the *Abhidharmadipa* of Vasubandhu’s “Sautrāntika” views show how close these views are to Mahāyāna. Therefore, Jaini thinks that the account of Vasubandhu’s career in Paramārtha’s biography is reliable and that after writing the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu went on to compose Mahāyāna works. Regarding Vasubandhu’s date and his relation to Asaṅga, Jaini is noncommittal. He does not deny the existence of an older Vasubandhu (the Vṛddhācārya mentioned in the *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*), but, unlike Frauwallner, he does not think that Paramārtha conflated two Vasubandhus in his biography (Jaini 1958b). Hirakawa challenges Frauwallner’s interpretation of his Chinese sources and arrives at conclusions similar to Jaini’s (1973-1978). In general, Japanese scholars do not accept Frauwallner’s theory; instead, they account for differences among the various texts in terms of Vasubandhu’s doctrinal development (Nagao, Kajiyama, and Aramaki 1976: 421). Most recently, Skilling sharply questions Frauwallner’s methodology and attempts to establish the works of the Kośakāra on the basis of either cross-references in Vasubandhu’s texts (or references by Vasubandhu’s commentators) or “the evidence of style, sources used, methodology, and development of ideas” (2000: 299). Skilling includes as works by the Kośakāra the same texts as Schmithausen, as well as the *Gāthāsāṃgraha* texts and the *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*. The authorship of the commen-

---

33 Wayman, Kochumuttom, and Griffiths generally agree with Jaini, while Mejor is somewhat ambiguous (1991: 111).


35 Hakamaya (2001: 107) has assembled an extensive bibliography of recent Japanese studies along this line, including those of Matsuda (1982a, 1982b, 1984, 1985) and Muroji (1993). Another recent contribution is Iwamoto 2000.

36 These include three texts only extant in Tibetan: *Gāthāsāṃgrahaśāstra*, *Gāthārtha-
taries on the Mahāyāna sūtras or the Maitreya texts remains a matter about which scholars are reluctant to say anything definite.

It is probably fair to say that most scholars today, while admitting the existence of other figures named Vasubandhu, agree on the single authorship of at least the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vyākhyāyukti, Kamasiddhiprakaraṇa, Pratītyasamutpādayākhyā, Pañcaskandhaka, Viṃśatikā, and Triṃśikā. My comparison of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhūmi provides further evidence of Vasubandhu the Kośakāra’s affinity for Yogācāra and thus supports Jaini’s arguments against Frawullner’s theory. However, I do not directly address the issue of the authorship of the works attributed to Vasubandhu.

The Question of Sautrāntika

Writers about Buddhism confidently use the term “Sautrāntika” to refer to one of the four representative schools of Indian Buddhism (along with Sarvāstivāda, Mādhyamika, and Yogācāra). In fact, little is known about who the Sautrāntikas were and what they believed. In the last twenty years, however, a number of studies, mainly originating in Japan, have begun to question old assumptions about Sautrāntika, and a 2003 issue of the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies is dedicated to this topic. The brief discussion in the present book is based on my introduction to the JIABS issue, “Sautrāntika Reconsidered” (Kritzer 2003a).

As the name suggests, a Sautrāntika is one who follows the sūtras, and Sautrāntikas are generally considered to be people who disagreed with the Sarvāstivādin reliance on śāstra, that is to say, on the Vaibhāṣika abhidharma texts. What little we know of the history of the school comes from Vasumitra’s Samayabhedoparacanacakra, specifically in Hsüan-tsang’s translation (t-put-tsung lun lun 異部宗輪論 [T. 2031]), and from several works of Hsüan-tsang’s disciple, K’uei-chi. In the Ch’eng wei-shih lun shu chi 成唯識論述記, K’uei-chi gives the names of two early Sautrāntika teachers, Kumāralatā, whom he also calls “Dārśāntika” (T. 1830: 274a8-13), and Śrīlāta (T. 1830: 358a10-12). The term Dārśāntika is also used to refer to a dissident group within Sarvāstivāda, and there are various opinions concerning the relationship between Sautrāntika and Dārśāntika. In the commentaries on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the terms are very close to being synonymous, but it has also been suggested that Sautrāntika and Dārśāntika are, respectively, positive and negative designations for the same group or that there were two distinct groups with these names (Cox 1995: 37-41).

samgrahasāstra, and Ekaśāṅgabhāṣya. Despite the fact that the Gāthāsaṁgrahaśāstra was translated into both German and English in the nineteenth century (Skilling 2000: 306 n. 22), these texts are rarely referred to, and I am grateful to Skilling for bringing them to my attention.
Our main source of information about early Dārśāntika/Sautrāntika doctrine is the Vibhāṣā, where there are some eighty-six references to Dārśāntika ideas (Katō 1989: 70). The term Sautrāntika, on the other hand, does not appear to have been used in the original text of the Vibhāṣā (Katō 1989: 113-119). Nor is Sautrāntika found in the *Saṃyuktābhidharmaḥrdaya, although three opinions are attributed there to Dārśāntika. Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhiśāstra, although it does not mention either Dārśāntika or Sautrāntika by name, frequently agrees with the Dārśāntika positions in the Vibhāṣā (Mizuno 1930).

Thus, it seems as though the earliest occurrence of the word Sautrāntika is in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, where nineteen positions are attributed to “the Sautrāntikas” (Kritzer 2003b); Vasubandhu agrees with these positions. Only two positions are attributed to the Dārśāntikas,37 on the other hand, and Vasubandhu disagrees with these positions (Katō 1989: 81-84; Cox 1995: 39). This suggests that Vasubandhu does not consider Sautrāntika and Dārśāntika to be identical. Among the Sautrāntika opinions of which Vasubandhu approves are rejections of the reality of various dharmas accepted as real by Sarvāstivāda, including the cittaviprayukta-samskāras (forces not associated with mind), the asamskṛtadhammas (unconditioned dharmas), the anusayas (latent defilements), and viññaptirūpa (manifested matter) and avijñaptirūpa (unmanifested matter). Vasubandhu also agrees with the Sautrāntika rejection of the reality of past and future, the insistence that one cannot fall from arhatship, and the theory of seeds (bija) that appears in many Sautrāntika explanations.

Many of these positions are also found in Yogācāra texts, especially the Yogācārabhūmi, and scholars have characterized Sautrāntika as a kind of bridge between Hinayāna Sarvāstivāda and Mahāyāna Yogācāra. This explanation fits well with the story of Vasubandhu’s career as told by Paramārtha: Vasubandhu was on his way to accepting Mahāyāna when he wrote the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

However, some suggest an even closer affinity between Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika positions and Yogācāra. For example, Jaini points out that the author of the Abhidharmadīpa reviles Vasubandhu as a vaikutika, a believer in Mahāyāna, and he stresses the similarity between some of Vasubandhu’s statements and Yogācāra doctrine (1959: 247-248). Hakamaya has shown that the term pūrvācārāḥ (former teachers) in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya refers to Yogācāra teachers, with whose explanations Vasubandhu often agrees (1986). Yamabe has identified the Viniscayasamgrahanī of the Yogācārabhūmi as Vasubandhu’s source for his bija theory (1990) as well as for his idea of the mutual perfuming of nāma and rūpa (2000a). In addition, Yamabe has identified the Manobhūmi as the source of a statement, attributed to the pūrvācārāyas, concerning the transition from the antarābhava to birth in the hells (1999). Miyashita (1986) and Harada (1993, 1996) have also noted similarities between the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhūmi.

37 Vasubandhu mentions the term three times, but two of his references are to the same Dārśāntika opinion.
In 1993, on the basis of very limited evidence, I argued that Vasubandhu’s so-called Sautrāntika definition of consciousness as a member of the formula of conditioned origination actually reflected Yogācāra beliefs, in other words, that Vasubandhu was inserting Yogācāra ideas into the Abhidharmaśabhaśya under the guise of Sautrāntika. In a number of publications since then, I have identified a variety of correspondences between the Abhidharmaśabhaśya and the Yogācārabhūmi (1994a, 1994b, 1996, 1998, 1999). Most recently, I have examined all the occurrences of the term Sautrāntika in the Abhidharmaśabhaśya and identified correspondences for a large majority in the Yogācārabhūmi (2003b).38

It seems as though these corresponding positions in the Yogācārabhūmi can be categorized in two groups. One group consists of ideas that cannot be traced to the Dārśāntikas of the Vībhāṣa and are in fact not found in texts earlier than the Yogācārabhūmi. Some examples include the theory of mutual perfuming, mentioned above, and the idea of saṁtatiparināmavipīśa. The other group includes ideas (for example, the denial of the reality of the cittaviprayuktasamskāras) that are also found, frequently in a less developed form, in the Vībhāṣa, where they are attributed to Dārśāntika. It is Vasubandhu who first calls positions belonging to both of these groups “Sautrāntika.”

However, not all of the Dārśāntika positions are found in the Yogācārabhūmi, and it seems as though Vasubandhu accepts and labels as Sautrāntika only ones that are. Furthermore, Vasubandhu also criticizes, without using the term Dārśāntika, a number of positions attributed to individual Dārśāntika teachers, such as Śrīlāta. As Harada points out, in the case of many of these positions, Vasubandhu agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi in favoring the Sarvāstivāda opinion over the Dārśāntika (1993: 109-110). It must also be noted that Vasubandhu does not accept all the Dārśāntika opinions contained in the Yogācārabhūmi. The two positions attributed to Dārśāntika by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmaśabhaśya can both be found in the Yogācārabhūmi. But in each case, the Yogācārabhūmi elsewhere also contains the Sarvāstivāda position, with which Vasubandhu in these cases agrees.39

It is clear that there is a close relation between Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika

38 In the same article, I examine a number of positions in the Karmasiddhirakarana characterized by Lamotte as Sautrāntika and identify definite or probable correspondences in the Yogācārabhūmi for all of these positions.

39 Position 1: The Dārśāntikas say that there are four possibilities regarding the experience of the results of karma. This statement implies eight types of karma, three of which are determined according to the lifetime in which their results will be experienced but undetermined as to whether they will be experienced at all. Vasubandhu rejects this, saying that if karma is determined according to the lifetime in which it comes to fruition, then its result definitely must be experienced (Pradhan: 230: 10-13; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 116-117).
ideas and the Yogācārabhūmi, but the precise nature of that relation is difficult to understand. Yamabe remarks that the passages in the Yogācārabhūmi to which the Sautrāntika positions in the Abhidharmakośabhāsyā correspond do not appear to presuppose the idea of ālayavijñāna (2000b: 68). Furthermore, one idea that appears in several of the passages common to the two texts is saṃtatiparināmaviśeṣa, which may be a concept that is superseded by the theory of ālayavijñāna. If one accepts Schmithausen’s general line of reasoning, one might say that these passages were composed before the idea of ālayavijñāna was formulated. The notion of saṃtatiparināmaviśeṣa (transformation of the life-stream)40 is also found in Vasubandhu’s Vinīṣṭātikā, where Schmithausen characterizes it as a “trace” of Sautrāntika (1967); presumably, he considers it to be a Sautrāntika element in the Yogācārabhūmi as well.

Thus, one explanation for the correspondences between Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika positions and passages in the Yogācārabhūmi is that the authors of both texts rely on a common source that represented an intermediate stage between Sarvāstivāda and fully developed Yogācāra, based on the concept of ālayavijñāna. But we search in vain for any text earlier than the Yogācārabhūmi containing ideas

The Vinīṣṭaṃvaramgrahāṇi on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi gives the same four possibilities as the Dārṣṭāntikas (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 152a3-4; T. 1579: 635c5-6). The Yü-chieh-lun chi (T. 1828: 362b10-22) discusses this passage and mentions that Sautrāntika and Sauryodayika accept the Mahāyāna interpretation concerning this issue and arrive at eight types of karma (I am indebted to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for this reference).

The Savitarkādi-bhūmi, on the other hand, gives the traditional explanation, which Vasubandhu accepts: karma can be determined or undetermined regarding whether its result will be experienced, and there are three possibilities regarding the lifetime in which it comes to fruition: in the present life; in the immediately following life; in a later life (Yogācārabhūmi: 189.15-16, 189.19-190.1; Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 110a5, 110a8; T. 1579: 319b3, 319b7-9).

Position 2: The Dārṣṭāntikas say that abhidhyā, vyāpāda, and mithyādṛśti are mental karma. Vasubandhu disagrees and accepts the Sarvāstivādin view that they are karmapatha but not karma (Pradhan 237.15-20, 248.2-12; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 3: 136, 168-170; see Katō 1989: 81-84 for detailed analyses of these passages).

The Savitarkādi-bhūmi defines the three as mental karma (Yogācārabhūmi: 182.9-14; Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 105b5-8; T. 1579: 317b22-29).

The Vinīṣṭaṃvaramgrahāṇi on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi says that they are karmapatha but not karma (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 153b3; T. 1579: 636a29).


such as samtatiparināmaviśeṣa or the mutual seeding of body and mind, according to which mind contains the seeds of the physical sense organs, and vice versa. And as we have seen, the term Saurāntika is not attested before the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

My own conclusion is that in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya Vasubandhu uses the term Saurāntika to designate positions in the Yogācārabhūmi that he prefers to those of orthodox Sarvāstivāda. As I argue elsewhere (1999: 203-204; 2003b), Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya adjusts the traditional Sarvāstivādin abhidharma so that it no longer conflicts with the central theories of Yogācāra. Unlike in the Yogācāra texts attributed to him, his purpose in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is not to propound or defend these theories. Therefore, he does not mention ālayavijñāna, which would be glaringly out of place in a work that is described by its author as being largely based on Sarvāstivādin abhidharma, specifically that of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas. Instead, he borrows from the Yogācārabhūmi ideas like bija, which do not represent such a radical departure from tradition. Attributing an opinion to Saurāntika may simply be Vasubandhu’s way of claiming that it is based on a more valid interpretation of sūtra than its Sarvāstivādin counterpart.

\[^{41}\text{prāyena hi kāśmīravaibhāṣikāṇām nītyādisiddha eṣo 'smābhir abhidharma ākhyātaḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 450.1-2; La Vallée Poussin 1971, v. 5: 223).}\]
II. Methodology and Results

Methodology

Although previous studies have identified a number of passages in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that seem to be based on the Yogācārabhūmi, no systematic comparative study of these two texts had appeared before the private publication of my results for the first three chapters of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Kritzer 2001). The present work consists of the results for all eight main chapters of the text.\(^{42}\)

This project was made feasible by the fact that we have Chinese translations by Hsüan-tsang of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, the *Nyāyānusāra, and the Yogācārabhūmi. Although these texts were translated over an eight-year period,\(^ {43}\) they contain similar translations of most technical terms. Since the three texts are now available electronically,\(^ {44}\) they can be searched in a way that was impossible ten years ago.

The first step was to identify passages in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that do not concur with Sarvāstivāda. In order to do this, I referred to Saṃghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra, in which many of Vasubandhu’s statements are criticized for their deviations from orthodoxy. Conveniently, Saṃghabhadra uses the appellation ching-chu 經主 to refer to Vasubandhu in these cases. The meaning of ching-chu is not completely clear, and Cox summarizes what other scholars have said about the

\(^{42}\) In Kritzer 2001, I included the Chinese text of all relevant passages of the Yogācārabhūmi, together with the Sanskrit if edited text was available. Here, I add the Tibetan text of all passages, except for the handful for which no Tibetan translation exists.

\(^{43}\) The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya was translated between 651 and 654 (Lancaster 1979: 346, 343), the *Nyāyānusāra between 653 and 654 (Lancaster 1979: 343), and the Yogācārabhūmi between 646 and 648 (Lancaster 1979: 187).

\(^{44}\) All three texts are now available from both the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Tekisuto Dētabēsu 大正新脩大藏經テキストデータベース at Tokyo University (http://www.lu-tokyo.ac.jp/~sat/japan/) and the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (Chung-hwa tien-tzu fo-tien hsieh-hui 中華電子佛典協會) at Taiwan National University (http://www.cbeta.org/cd/index.htm). However, when I started this project, the only available text of the Yogācārabhūmi was from the Yugagyo Shisō Kenkyūkai 瑜伽行思想研究会 at Nagasaki University.
term: “Some have suggested that this reflects Saṃghabhadra’s identification of Vasubandhu as a Sautrāntika. However, a quotation from the *Nyāyānusāra in Sthiramati’s commentary on the Abhidharmakośa suggests that the Sanskrit equivalent is sūtrakāra. This could refer to Vasubandhu’s role as author of the sūtra, in this case the kārikā of the Abhidharmakośa, or it could be used with sarcasm suggesting Vasubandhu’s lack of familiarity with Buddhist scripture” (1995: 56). This issue is far from settled. Given the fact that the vast majority of Vasubandhu’s departures from Sarvāstivāda are found in the bhāṣya, not in the kārikās, it would seem strange for Saṃghabhadra to preface his criticisms of what Vasubandhu says in the bhāṣya with the epithet sūtrakāra. In any case, there is no doubt that in the approximately 250 places where Saṃghabhadra uses the term ching-chu he is always criticizing Vasubandhu.

Next, I located the passage in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya on which Saṃghabhadra was commenting. Saṃghabhadra usually follows the order of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, but not always, so it was sometimes necessary to search rather far afield to find the corresponding passage. This task was made easier by the notes to the Kokuyaku Issaikyō Japanese translation of the *Nyāyānusāra, which give the location of quoted passages in the Kandō Abidatsumakusharon (Saeki 1978), the Japanese edition of Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese translation of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

The final step was to search for a corresponding opinion in the Yogācārabhūmi. This was made difficult by the fact that the two texts are organized in completely different ways, as we have seen above. Sometimes one can find phrases or sentences identical to those of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, used in similar contexts, to make the same argument, but these cases are inconveniently few. Despite the fact that both texts were translated by Hsüan-tsang, translations of Sanskrit words can vary, and sometimes different Sanskrit words are used to convey the same idea. Frequently, Vasubandhu makes a statement to which Saṃghabhadra takes exception that has no obvious parallel in the Yogācārabhūmi, but the possibility remains that Vasubandhu’s argument relies on a statement in the Yogācārabhūmi that appears in a totally different, perhaps seemingly unrelated context. The correspondences I have found are therefore not all equally convincing. Nevertheless, I have included even the more dubious ones, usually in parentheses. Finally, Saṃghabhadra attacks many of Vasubandhu’s statements that do not appear to be related to anything in the Yogācārabhūmi. Sometimes Saṃghabhadra finds fault with Vasubandhu’s presentation of Sarvāstivādin positions; on other occasions, Vasubandhu may be expressing an idiosyncratic idea of his own that cannot be characterized as Sautrāntika or Yogācāra. However, even some of these cases may upon further investigation reveal a connection to the Yogācārabhūmi.


Distribution and General Characterization of Results

Distribution within the *Yogācārabhūmi*

The corresponding passages that I have found in the *Yogācārabhūmi* are distributed approximately as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Maulī Bhūmi</em></th>
<th>number of passages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Pañcaviṃśatikī</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pañcavijñānakāyamāndūrya</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Savitarkādi-bhūmi</em></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Samāhitā Bhūmi</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Asamāhitā Bhūmi</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Śrutamayī Bhūmi</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cintāmayī Bhūmi</em></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Śrāvakabhūmi</em></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bodhisattvabhūmi</em></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Vinīścayasaṃgrahāni</em></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Pañcaviṃśatikī</em></td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Savitarkādi-bhūmi</em></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Samāhitā Bhūmi</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Saccittikā Bhūmi</em></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi</em></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Śrāvakabhūmi</em></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Bodhisattvabhūmi (Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra)</em></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Vivaraṇasaṃgrahāni*          | 3                 |

*Paryāyasamgrahāni*           | 2                 |

*Vastusamgrahāni*             | 16                |
As can be seen from this chart, Vasubandhu relies most heavily on portions of the Yogācārabhūmi that have no specifically Mahāyāna content and, as I have mentioned, that do not expound the doctrine of ālayavijñāna. Furthermore, I have found relatively few correspondences to what Schmithausen and Aramaki consider to be the oldest sections of the text, namely, the Śrāvakabhūmi and the Bodhisattvabhūmi of the Mātī Bhūmi and the Vastusāṅgghrahaṇī.

General Classification According to Theme  

Many of the correspondences between the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and the Yogācārabhūmi can be classified according to a few general themes. In most cases, these involve rejections of major Sarvāstivādin doctrines.

sarvāstivāda

In Chapter Five of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Vasubandhu criticizes at length the basic Sarvāstivādin principle that past, present, and future dharmas all really exist. Many of his arguments are similar to those found in refutations of sarvāstivāda in the Viścayāsanggrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṣṇuṇakāyamanabhūmi and the Savitarkādi-bhūmi (items 5.12-18 and 5.21-27 in Chapter Three of this book).

prajñāpāti

A number of points concern dharmas that the Vaibhāṣikas consider to be real entities but that both Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi classify as provisional (prajñāpāti). In Chapter One, Vasubandhu indicates his disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika definition of avijñāpti rūpa, and Saṃghabhadra, looking forward to Chapter Four, states that Vasubandhu does not accept avijñāpti rūpa as being real. Similarly, the Viścayāsanggrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṣṇuṇakāyamanabhūmi defines both *saṃvararūpa and *asaṃvararūpa, equivalent to avijñāpti, as provisional, while the Viścayāsanggrahaṇī on the Cintāmayaprājñā Bhūmi includes avijñāpti in a long list of prajñāpātis (item 1.2).

In Chapter Two, Vasubandhu criticizes at great length the Vaibhāṣika definitions of the cittāvīprayustasamśkaras (dharmas associated with neither matter nor mind), calling them all prajñāpātis. Again, the Viścayāsanggrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṣṇuṇakāyamanabhūmi also denies the reality of these dharmas, and some of its arguments are reflected in Vasubandhu’s discussion (items 2.7, 2.13, 2.15-28).  

Vasubandhu’s well-known theory of bija is found in his discussion of the viprayukta, prāpti, and Yamabe

---

45 Much of this section appears in a slightly different form in Kritzer 2000b.

46 For more details, see Kritzer 1999: 225-248.
has shown Vasubandhu's reliance here on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* (1990).

Also in Chapter Two, Vasubandhu indicates that he does not accept the reality of the unconditioned dharmas (*asamskrīdādharmas*). Statements in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Pañcavijñānakaśāyamanobhūmi* and the *Vastusaṃgrahani* similarly question the status of the individual *asamskrīdādharmas* (items 2.37-40).

In Chapter Four, Vasubandhu declares that *samsthānaruṣa* (shape) is merely a *prajñāpti*. The definition of *samsthānaruṣa* in the *Pañcavijñānakaśāyamaprayuktā Bhūmi* is similar to Vasubandhu's, and the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Pañcavijñānakaśāyamanobhūmi* explicitly says that *samsthānaruṣa* is a *prajñāpti* (items 4.3-4.6).

There is, moreover, another possible correspondence regarding *prajñāpti*. In Chapter One, Vasubandhu maintains that the *skandhas*, being collections (*rāṣīs*), do not have independent reality, and to support his position, he refers back to a *sūtra* that he has quoted earlier. Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not directly state that the *skandhas* are *prajñāpti*, the idea that collections are *prajñāpti* can be found in the *Vastusaṃgrahani*. The *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Pañcavijñānakaśāyamanobhūmi* quotes the same *sūtra* as Vasubandhu to show that the meaning of *skandha* is *rāṣī*. This may imply that the *skandhas* are *prajñāpti* (items 1.5-6).

*bīja*

In Chapter Two, Vasubandhu relies on the *Śrāvakabhūmi* and on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Pañcavijñānakaśāyamanobhūmi* for his statement that *bījas* are nothing other than *nāmarūpa* or the *aśraya* (item 2.11; see Yamabe 1990). He explains many of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras* in terms of *bījas*, and in almost every case, a similar explanation can be found in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Pañcavijñānakaśāyamanobhūmi* (items 2.7-2.16).

Outside of the context of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāras*, other statements by Vasubandhu explicitly or implicitly rely on the idea of *bīja* in giving explanations that deviate from Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy. For example, Vasubandhu offers an opinion to the effect that the unperceived *mahābhūtas* in a composite object exist as seeds. A closely related statement is found in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Cintāmayiprajñā Bhūmi* (item 2.4).

In Chapter Five, Vasubandhu refutes the orthodox Vaibhāṣika idea that *paryavasthāna* (active defilement) and *anuśaya* (latent defilement) are synonymous, and he insists that *anuśayas* are defilements in the state of seeds. This idea appears in several different sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, including the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* and the *Cintāmayiprajñā Bhūmi*, and the *Vastusaṃgrahani* (items 5.3-5.4).
The Coming Together of Causes and Conditions

On a number of occasions, Vasubandhu offers the coming together of causes and conditions to account for events explained otherwise by the Vaibhāṣīkas. For example, regarding the Vaibhāṣīka opinion that it is the eye that sees rūpa, Vasubandhu says that, according to the Sautrāntikas, perception is nothing more than cause and effect: there is nothing that sees or is seen. The Yogācārabhūmi contains a number of similar statements, for example, in the Vinīcayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi and in the Paramārthagāthās and their commentary in the Cintāmayī Bhūmi (item 1.14).

Another example is Vasubandhu’s denial of the reality of the reflected image, which, he says, appears due to the power of the coming together of causes and conditions. Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not explicitly state that the reflected image is unreal, a number of statements seem to imply its relative unreality. For example, in the Vinīcayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Sacitikā Bhūmi, the pravṛttivijñānas are said to depend on ālayavijñāna as the reflected image depends on the mirror. In the Vinīcayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Bodhisattvabhūmi (Sāṃkhinirmocanasūtra), the meditational image is said to be no different from the consciousness in which it is perceived, just as the reflected image depends on the mirror, with the object acting as a condition (item 3.6).

Special People and Their Powers

Finally, Vasubandhu makes a number of statements regarding the powers of special people that correspond to similar statements in the Yogācārabhūmi. For example, he says that one cannot fall from arhatship because an arhat has completely destroyed the defilements, including their seeds. The Vinīcayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi makes the same argument (item 6.9).

In his discussion of the cittavprayuktasamśkāras, Vasubandhu states that jīvitendriya is not the result of karma in the case of the arhat, who can prolong his life by the power of his meditation. According to the Vinīcayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi, arhats, Tathāgatas, and bodhisattvas have a special type of jīvitendriya that gives them the power to extend their āyuḥsamśkāras. This jīvitendriya is defined as “proceeding due to own-force.” All other types are defined as “not proceeding due to own-force.” This seems to be equivalent to the distinction made in the Abhidharmakośabhadhāsya between jīvitendriya that is not vipāka (that of the arhat) and ordinary jīvitendriya, which is vipāka. Furthermore, in the Cintāmayī Bhūmi, the Buddha is said to obtain mastery of samādhi (samādhivaśita), which he uses to discard his former āyuḥsamśkāras and to produce a new body (item 2.3).

A related example occurs in a discussion of why the Buddha chose a womb-birth over an apparitional one. One Vaibhāṣīka answer is that it was in order to leave a
body as a relic. Vasubandhu objects that this explanation will not satisfy those who think the Buddha has ādhisṭhānikī rddhi, by means of which he can prolong his life. This is reminiscent of the Bodhisattvabhāmi, according to which the Buddhas and bodhisattvas can use their magical power to continue to exist after death (item 3.4).

With the exception of bīja, one can find none of the characteristic terms of Yogācāra among the above correspondences: words such as ālayavijñāna, vijnaptimātra, and trisvabhaṅga simply do not appear. Nor is there any explicit statement of Mahāyāna themes, such as the emptiness of dharmas or the three bodies of the Buddha. However, the disagreements regarding these abhidharma issues between Vasubandhu and Sarvāstivāda are far from insignificant. As Saṃghabhadra and the Dipakāra often point out, Vasubandhu’s criticism of the Vaibhāṣika abhidharma system reflects a very different view of the world, one that we can now see is provocatively similar to that of the authors of the Yogācārabhūmi.
III. Passages from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Related Passages from the *Yogācārabhūmi*
Chapter 1  Dhātunirdesa

1.1) Vasubandhu says that the Vaibhāśikas maintain that the Buddha preached the abhidharma for the purpose of investigating dharmas and that Kātyāyanīputra and others collected the scattered abhidharma sayings of the Buddha and put them all together in the abhidharmapiṭaka, just as Dharmatrāta put together the Udānavarga.

atas tadhetos tasya dharmapracayasyārthe śāstrā kila buddhenābhidharma uktāḥ
/ na hi vinā 'bhidharmopadeśena śīṣyāḥ śakto dhammān pravicetum iti / sa tu prakīrṇa
ukto bhagavatā bhadantakātyāyanīputraprabhṛtibhiḥ piṇḍikṛtya sthāpito / bhadanta-
 dharmatrātādānavargyakaranavadd ity āhur vaibhāṣikāḥ
(Pradhan: 3.1-4; T. 1558: 1b22-28; Poussin 1: 5-6; Samghabhadra criticizes Vasubandhu, whom he calls the sūtra-master (ching-chu 經主), for not believing that the abhidharma was really preached by the Buddha and for believing that Kātyāyanīputra and the others actually created it [T. 1562: 329c18-22].)

47 Here and below, I quote from Pradhan’s edition of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, which I refer to as “Pradhan,” and I abbreviate “La Vallée Poussin 1971” as “Poussin.” For other works by Poussin, I include the date, for example, “Poussin 1936-1937.” I have not systematically corrected the texts provided in this comparison. However, I have incorporated Hirakawa’s corrections to Pradhan’s Sanskrit text. For the Tibetan text of the Yogācārabhūmi, I have generally relied on the Peking edition, but I have made some corrections on the basis of the Derge. The Chinese text of the Yogācārabhūmi is the electronic text provided by the Yugagyo Shisō Kenkyūkai, with the punctuation of the printed Taishō edition restored. In a few cases, I have supplied Chinese characters that were not included in the electronic version.
1.1) In the *Vivaraṇasamgrahani*, the insights of the Buddha’s disciples into, as well as the Buddha’s own understanding of, the nature of dharmas are both included in the category mātrkā, which is equated with the abhidharma.⁴⁸

gañ du bcom ldan 'das kyi mtshan ŋid bstan pa dañ gañ du ŋan thos gzi mnoñ bas rtogs pa la gnas pas chos kyi mtshan ŋid mnoñ bar bstan pa de yañ ma mo yin te chos mnoñ pa yañ yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; yi 64b6-7); 謂於是處世尊自廣分別諸法體相。又於是處諸聖弟子已見識迹。依自所證無倒分別諸法體相。此亦名為摩唑理迦。即此摩唑理迦亦名阿毘達磨 (T. 1579: 753b10-14)

⁴⁸ See also item 8.3.
1.2) Vasubandhu indicates his disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika definition of *avijñaptirūpa*

*ucyata iti ācāryavacanaṃ darśayati*  
(Pradhan: 8.8-9; T. 1558:3a24-25; Poussin v. 1:21; Saṃghabhadra states that Vasubandhu misrepresents the Vaibhāṣika definition and that he does not accept *avijñaptirūpa* as being real [T. 1562: 335b16-c9].)
According to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikā, rūpaskandha consists of both real and provisional rūpas. *Saṃvararaūpā (ki-i se 律儀色) and *asaṃvararaūpā (pu li-i se 不律儀色) are defined as provisional. ⁴⁹ (See also item 4.8.)

tatra sarvasmād rūpaskandhaṃ saṃgrhītaḥ rūpān navaprapkāraṃ dravyasat sprasāryaṃ saṃgrhītaḥ tu cātvāri mahābhūtāni dravyasanti / tadanyat prajñaptisad veditavyaṃ / dharmāyatanaparyāpannaṃ punā rūpān dvividhyāṃ dravyasat prajñaptisac ca / yat prabhāvataḥ samādhigocaram nirmitavat tatphalam tadvisyaṃ tatra prajñapti saṃgrhītaṃ ca tad dravyasat / saṃvarāvastu saṃgrhītaṃ tu prajñaptisaḥ,⁵⁰ de la gzugs kyi phun pos bsdu pa'i gzugs thams cad las rnam pa dgu ni rdzas su yod do / reg byas bsdu pa las 'byun ba chen po bzi ni rdzas su yod pa yin no / de las gzan pa rnam ni btags pa'i yod pa yin par rig bya'o / chos kyi skye mchud du gtags pa'i gzugs ni rnam pa gnis te / rdzas su yod pa dan btags pa'i yod pa'o / mthu las byun ba'i tin ne 'dzin gyi spyod yul sprul pa lta bu de'i 'bras bu da'n / de'i yul dan de da'n mshuns par ldan pa'i rnam par sès pa'i yul gân yin pa de ni rdzas su yod pa yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 51a7-b1); 如是一切色蘊所攝色中。九種是實物有。觸所攝中四大種是實物有。當知所餘唯是假有。墮法處色亦有二種。謂實有假有。若有威德定所行境猶如變化。彼果彼境及彼相應識等境色是實物有。若有律儀色不律儀色皆是假有 (T. 1579: 597b4-9; see Fukuwara 1973: 93)

According to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Cintāmayāprajñā Bhūmi, avijñapti is included, along with the cittaviprayuktasamāskāras, in a long list of saṃskṛtadharmas that are prajñapti.

'dus byas kyi mîn can gyi chos po la skye ba da'n / rga ba da'n / gnas pa da'n / mi rtag pa da'n / sa bon da'n mam par rig byed da'n / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa da'n / thob pa da'n / 'thob pa ma yin pa da'n / srog gi dba'n po da'n / ris mthun pa / mîn gi tshogs da'n / tshig gi tshogs da'n / yi ge'i tshogs rnam da'n so so'i skye bo nîd da'n / tshogs pa da'n ma tshogs pa da'n / 'jug pa so sor nes pa da'n / sbyor ba da'n / mgyogs pa da'n / go rims da'n / dus da'n yul grahs ne bar 'dogs pa da'n (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 208a4-6); 又於有為諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有

⁴⁹ *Saṃvararaūpā and *asaṃvararaūpā here seem to be equivalent to avijñaptirūpa. See Hirakawa 1990:190-193.

⁵⁰ According to Matsuda Kazunobu (private communication), this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī preserved in St. Petersburg, and Matsuda has reconstructed it as above (non-italicized portions represent Matsuda’s reconstruction).
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Chapter 1  Dhātunirdesa
1.2 continued) 表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身分身異生性。和合不和合流
轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16)
Regarding the question of whether avijñapti is rūpa, one Vaibhāṣika argument maintains that it is rūpa because vijñapti is rūpa. Vasubandhu gives an analogy to a tree and its shadow: as the tree moves, the shadow moves. He then says that unlike vijñapti, avijñapti is subject to modification, and he points out that the analogy is false because avijñapti continues to exist even after vijñapti no longer exists, while a shadow ceases to exist as soon as the tree ceases to exist.

sāpivijñaptirūpaṇād rūpitā bhavati/vṛksapracaḷane cchāyaapracaḷanavat/nāvikārāt/vijñaptinivrtau cāvijñaptinivrtaḥ syād vṛksābhāve cchāyā 'bhāvavat
(Pradhan: 9.18-20; T. 1558: 3c5-8; Poussin v. 1: 26; Samghabhadra states that the analogy is the sūtra-master's, not that of the school, i.e., Vaibhāṣika, that makes this argument [T. 1562: 338a9-14].)
1.3) (The Yogācārabhūmi denies the reality of avijñaptirūpa [see item 1.2], but it does not contain a discussion of the analogy of a tree and its shadow.)
1.4) Regarding the question of whether avijnapti is rūpa, another Vaibhāṣika explanation maintains that it is rūpa because the mahābhūtas that comprise its āśraya are rūpa. Vasubandhu objects that, according to that logic, the first five vijñānas would also be rūpa. The Vaibhāṣika answer to this is that the relationship between avijnapti and the mahābhūtas is like that between the shadow of a tree and the tree or the glitter of a jewel and the jewel. Vasubandhu says that it is against the principles of the Vībhāṣā to say that the shadow and the glitter rely on the tree and the jewel because, according to the Vībhāṣā, the shadow and the glitter rely on their own mahābhūtas. Furthermore, he says, even if one says that the shadow and glitter rely on the tree and the jewel, the case of avijnapti is different because, unlike in the case of the tree and jewel, avijnapti does not cease to exist at the same time as the mahābhūtas on which it is based.

{idam tāvad avaibhāṣikīyaṃ vrkṣam āśritya cchāyā vartate maṇīṃ cāśritya prabheti / cchāyādīvārṇamāṇīṃṇāṃ pratyekam svabhātacatuṣkāśrītatvābhypagamāt / saty api ca tadāśrītave cchāyāprabhavor nāvijnāptih tathaivāśrītā yuje ṣvarūpaḥ api avijnāptayāśrayeṣu mahābhūteṣu tasya anirōdho 'bhypagamyate}

(Pradeha: 9.23-10.2; T. 1558: 3c12-17; Poussin v. 1: 26; Saṅghabhadra says that the sūtra-master misrepresents the teaching of the Vībhāṣā regarding the relationship between avijnapti and the mahābhūtas [T. 1562: 33b25-b4]; furthermore, the sūtra-master's objection that avijnapti and the mahābhūtas on which it is based do not perish simultaneously is not relevant to the meaning in the Vībhāṣā [T. 1562: 33b4-22].)
1.4) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* denies the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* [see item 1.2], but it does not contain a discussion of the relationship between *avijñapti* and the *mahābhūtas.* )
1.5) Vasubandhu says that the *skandhas* are merely *prajñapti* because a collection is not a real thing.

*yadi rāśyarthah skandhārthah prajñaptaṁ sa skandhāḥ prānpuvanti / ake-drayasamūhatvāt rāśipudgalavat*

(Pradhan 13.21-22; T. 1558: 5a11-12; Poussin v. 1: 37-38; Saṃghabhūta does not specify that this is the opinion of the sūtra-master, but he refutes it, saying that *skandha* means not a collection but that which is the basis of a collection, in other words, the real *dharmas* that comprise the *skandhas* [T. 1562: 343c24-344a1; Poussin v. 1: 38 n. 2]; P'u-kuang attributes it to Vasubandhu and distinguishes it from the position of the Vaibhāṣikas, who say that *skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus* are all real, and that of the Saṃtrāṅikas, who say that, since the *āyatanas* are also *prajñapti*, only the *dhātus* are real [T. 1821: 19a24-29].)
There are a number of statements in the *Yogācārabhūmi* to the effect that the meaning of *skandha* is “collection.”

See the Vastusamgrahani:

'\( \text{du byed du gtogs pa rnam pa bcu gcig gcig tu bs dus na 'du byed kyi tshogs 'gyur te / tshogs kyi don ni phun po'i don du rig par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi;} \) ‘i 207a3-4); 復次當知十一種相總攝諸行立為行聚。應知聚義是其蘊義 (T. 1579: 796c2-3)

See also the Viniścayasamgrahani on the Pañcavigijñānakāyamanobhūmi:

ϕuṇ po’i don ni spuṅs pa’i don to žes gaṅ gzunś pa de la spuṅs pa’i don gaṅ že na / smras pa / spuṅs pa’i don ni bdag niid sna tshogs maṅ po’i don daṅ / de bžin du phan tshun ’dres pa’i dnos pos ’jug pa’i don daṅ / de bžin du gcig tu mżon par bs dus pa’i don daṅ / ‘phel ba daṅ ’bri ba’i don (Yogācārabhūmi;} zi 80a4-5); 譬如說積聚義是蘊義。何等名為積聚義耶。答種種所召體義。更互和雜轉義。一類總略義。增益損減義。是積聚義 (T. 1579: 608c16-19)

See elsewhere in the Viniścayasamgrahani on the Pañcavigijñānakāyamanobhūmi:

de la phuṇ po’i don ni gaṅ ci phyr na phuṇ po rnam par bžag pa yonis su bstan ce na / gzugs gaṅ yin pa ci yaṅ ruṅ ste / ’das pa daṅ / ma ’onis pa daṅ / da ltar byuṅ ba nas thag rīn ba daṅ / ņe ba’i bar daṅ gzugs ji lta ba bžin51 rnam par šes pa’i bar du yaṅ de bžin te / de dag gcig tu bs dus pa ni rnam pa thams cad du bs dus pa yin pa’i phyr bs dus pa’i don ni phuṇ po’i don to / yaṅ phuṇ po de dag ni bdag niid sna tshogs maṅ po yin pa’i phyr ’du byed tsam ste de las don gzan pa’i bdag med par yonis su bstan pa’i phyr phuṇ po rnam par52 rig par bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi;} zi 41a4-6); 復次蘊義云何。為顯何義建立諸蘊。謂所有色若去來今乃至遠近。如色乃至識亦爾。如是總略攝一切蘊。積聚義是蘊義(T. 1579: 593c18-20)

---

51 Derge reads bžin du.

52 Derge inserts gzung par here.
1.6) Vasubandhu mentions two alternative Vibhāṣā definitions of skandha: 1) "that which carries the burden of an effect"; 2) "a part." He quotes a sūtra to show that these definitions do not conform with sūtra and that the meaning of skandha is indeed "collection" and nothing else.

kāryabhārodvahanārthah skandhārtha ity apare / praccchedārtho vā / tathā hi vaktāro bhavanti tribhiḥ skandhair deyaṃ dāsyāma iti / tad etad utsūtram / sūtram hi rāṣya-artham eva bravīī yat kimcid rūpam atīśnāgataprayutpannam iti vistaraḥ

(Pradhan: 13.23-26; T. 1558: 5a14-18; Poussin v. 1: 38; Sanghabhadra comments only on the second of these definitions, saying that the statement that it does not conform with sūtra is the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 344a13-15] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu insists too strictly on sūtra in determining the meaning of skandha, when he should rely more on reason [T. 1562: 344a15-18].)
1.6) The Viniścayasaṁgrahani on the Pañcaviṃśātāpanakāyamanobhūmi (see above) quotes the same or a similar sūtra in defining skandha as “collection” (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 41a4-6; T. 1579: 593c18-20; [see Fukuhara 1973: 114, where the page number is mistakenly given as 592]).

53 See also the Vastusamgrahaṇī, which comments on this sūtra (Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 207a3-4; T. 1579: 796c2-3).
1.7) Vasubandhu says that the teachings of the skandhas, āyatanas, and dhātus are directed variously at people who have differing degrees of ignorance, faculties, and faith.

\[ \text{trayaḥ prakārās traidham/triprakāraḥ kila saṭṭvānāṁ mohāḥ/ kecic caitteṣu saṃmūḍhāḥ} \\
\text{piṇḍātmagrahaṇatāḥ/ kecid rūpa eva/ kecid rūpa-cittayoḥ/ indriyāṇy api trividhāni/} \\
\text{tukṣṇamadhyamṛdvinḍriyatvāt/ rucr api trividhā/ saṃkṣiptamadhyavistaragranta-} \\
\text{rucitvāt/ teṣāṁ yathākramaṁ tisraḥ skandhāyatanadhātudeśanā iti} \]

(Pradhan: 14.10-13; T. 1558: 5b4-8; Poussin v. 1: 40; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master has abbreviated the explanation [T. 1562: 344a24-27] and gives an expanded explanation [T. 1562: 344a27-b2; see T. 1545: 366c26 ff.].)
1.7) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not seem to contain a discussion relating the teaching of *skandha*, *āyatana*, and *dhātu* to the three types of people.)
1.8) An alternate explanation is given for why the \textit{asamskrta\dd{h}armas} are included in the \textit{\dd{a}yatana}s and \textit{dh\dd{a}tas}, but not in the \textit{skandha}s: like a pot which, when broken, is no longer a pot, the \textit{asamskrta\dd{h}armas} are the cessation of the \textit{skandha}, and hence are not the \textit{skandha}s.\textsuperscript{54} Vasubandhu refutes this explanation by saying that the same argument would apply to the \textit{\dd{a}yatana}s and \textit{dh\dd{a}tas}.

\begin{quote}
yathā \textit{ghaṭoparamo na ghaṭa evaṃ skandhoparamo na skandho bhavitum arhatīty apare īt \textit{dhātvāyataneśv apy eṣa prasangah} (Pradhan: 15.4-6; T. 1558: 5b26-28; Poussin v. 1: 42; Samghabhadra identifies the objection as that of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 345a10-11] and criticizes it, justifying the simile of the pot [T. 1562: 345a11-20]).
\end{quote}

\footnote{54 This explanation is found in the \textit{Vibhāśā}, where it does not seem to be an alternate opinion but rather a further reason in support of the standard Vaibhāṣika position (T. 1545: 385b17-18).}
1.8) (I have found no similar discussion in the *Yogācārabhumi*. However, various passages imply that the *asamskṛtadharmas* are not included in the *skandhas* because, unlike the entities that comprise the *skandhas*, they are not real.

First, the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* on the *Cintāmānīprajñā Bhūmi* defines real dharmas as entities belonging to the five *skandhas*.

\[de\ la\ gzugs\ la\ sogs\ po'i\ phuṅ\ po'i\ mīn\ can\ gyi\ āṇos\ po\ ni\ rdzas\ su\ yod\ pa\ yin\ pa'o\ [Yogācārabhumi; zi 208a1-2]; 此中色等諸蘊想事是實物 [T. 1579: 659a7-8]\]

Then it goes on to include the *asaṃskṛta*, ākāśa, among those items that are merely *prajñapti* [*Yogācārabhumi; zi 208a7; T. 1579: 659a16-17*].

In the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcaviśākha* and *apratisamkhyaṇidraṇa* are said to be mere appellations [see items 2.38 and 2.40], while in the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī*, *pratisamkhyaṇidraṇa* is said to be simply a designation [see item 2.39].
1.9) Vasubandhu says that the physical position of the organs (eye highest, body lowest, mind without a physical position) is a possible reason for the order in which the sense organs are traditionally listed.\(^{55}\)

\[\text{athavā asmin śarīre caṅsaco 'ḍhiṣṭānam upariṣṭāt niṇiṣṭām/tasmād adhaḥ śrotasya/tasmād adho ghrāṇasya/tasmāt jihvāyāḥ/tasyāḥ kāyasya bāhulyena/manah punas tānā eva niśritam adeśasthaṁ ceti yathāsthānam eṣāṁ kramaṁ syāt}\]

(Pradhan: 16.11-13; T. 1558: 6a5-7; Poussin v. 1: 44-45; Saṃghabhadra quotes this passage in a slightly expanded form [T. 1562: 345c27-346a2], says that the sūtra-master is either speaking provisionally or following some "other" interpretation, and points out that the organs of seeing, hearing, and smelling are arranged like a garland, with none higher or lower [T. 1562: 346a2-5].)\(^{56}\)

\(^{55}\)The same explanation is given in the \textit{Vibhāṣā}, where, as in the \textit{Abhidharmakośabhāṣya}, it is one of several possible explanations (T. 1545: 63a22-23).

\(^{56}\)In a different context, the \textit{Vibhāṣā} states that these three organs are arranged like a garland (T. 1545: 380c28-381a3), but in its discussion of the order of the organs, it does not refute the opinion attacked by Saṃghabhadra.
1.9) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not seem to contain a discussion of the order of the sense organs. However, in the Manobhūmi, consciousness at the moment of death is said to leave the body from the top down or from the bottom up, with manas being the last āyatana to be abandoned in either case [see also the Viśnuscayasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi, where a departing consciousness other than manovijñāna is adduced as proof of ālayavijñāna]. This perhaps suggests a correlation between the physical placement of the organs and the order in which they are traditionally listed.)

57 tataś cyutikāle akuśalakarmakārṇīm tāvad ārdhvabhāgād vijñānam āśrayam muñicati / ārdhvabhāgaṃ cāsya stūbhavati / sa (tam?) punas tāvan muñicati tāvad dhṛdayapradesām / sukṛtaṃ stūbhavāṃ punar adhobhāgād vijñānam āśrayam muñicati / adhobhāgaṃ cāsya stūbhavati tāvad ārdhvad dhṛdayapradesām / dhṛdayadesāc ca vijñānasya cyutir vedītavyā / tataḥ kṛṣṇa evaśrayaḥ stūbhavāti (Yogācārabhūmi: 18.16-20, incorporating Schmithausen’s corrections [1987: 311 n. 278]); de bas na re žig mi dge ba’i las byed byed pa rnams ni ’chi ’pho ba’i tshe mmam par šes par ro stod nas lus ’dor bar byed de / de’i ro stod grani mor ’gyur ro / de yan sni gar thug pa’i bar du ’dor bar ’gyur ro / legs pa byed byed pa rnams kyi mmam par šes par ni / ro smad nas lus ’dor bar byed de / de’i ro smad grani mor ’gyur ro / de yan sni gar thug pa’i bar du ’dor bar ’gyur te / sniṅ ga nas mmam par šes pa ’pho bar riṅ parbya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; dz 11a2-4); 又將終時。作惡業者。識於所依從上分捨。即從上分冷觸隨起。如此漸捨乃至心處。造善業者。識於所依從下分捨。即從下分冷觸隨起。如此漸捨乃至心處。當知後識唯心處捨。從此冷觸遍滿所依 (T. 1579: 282a7-12)

58 ci’i phyir kun bzi mmam par šes pa med na ’ci ’pho mi ruṅ že na / ’di ltar ’pho (Derge reads ’ci ’pho) ba’i ishe’i mmam par šes par lu ro stod dam / ro smad du drod yal bar byed ciṅ sloh la yid kyi mmam par šes pa ni nam yan mi ’byuṅ ba ma yin pas / de’i phyir lus len par byed pa’i kun gzi mmam par šes pa kho na dan bral bas lus kyi drod yal pa dan / lus la thok ba med par snaṅ bar zad kyi / yid kyi mmam par šes pa dan bral bas ni ma yin te / de’i phyir yan mi ruṅ no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 4a2-4); 何故若無阿頼耶識。命終時識不應道理。謂臨終時或從上身分。識漸捨離冷觸漸起。或從下身分。彼彼意識有時不轉。故知唯有阿頼耶識能執持身。此若捨離。即於身分冷觸可得。身無覺受。意識不爾。是故若無阿頼耶識不應道理 (T. 1579: 579c17-22)
Chapter 1  Dhātunirdeśa

1.10) According to the Vaibhāsikas, *gandhātu, rasadātu, ghrāṇavijñānadātu*, and *jihvāvijñānadātu* are lacking in *rūpadātu* because the only function of *gandha* and *rasa* is to be *kavaḍikārāhāra*, from which beings in *rūpadātu* are detached. Vasubandhu objects that, if *gandha* and *rasa* serve no purpose in *rūpadātu*, then the corresponding organs, *ghrāṇa* and *jihvā*, also serve no purpose and should be similarly lacking. However, according to the Vaibhāsikas, the organs *ghrāṇa* and *jihvā* are present since they are needed to beautify the body and for speech. Vasubandhu maintains that the basis for the organs, i.e., the nose and tongue, are adequate for these purposes; there is no need for the organs. There follows an argument about the functions of these organs and their difference from the sexual organs, which all parties admit are lacking in *rūpadātu*. The point of Vasubandhu’s argument is hard to figure out, especially since in the *Pañcasāndhaka* (si 18b1-2), he simply states that these four *dhātus* are lacking in *rūpadātu*. However, the logical implication in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* seems to be that in fact *gandha* and *rasa* must somehow be present.

evam tarhi ghrāṇajihvendriyayor abhāvaprasaṅgo niśprayajanatvāt / asti prayajanam / tābhyaṁ hi vinā ‘śrayaśobhaiva na syād iti vyayahāraś ca / yady etat prayajanam adhiṣṭhānam evāstu sōbhārtham vacanārtham ca mā bhūḥ indriyam

(Pradhan: 21.4-6; T. 1558: 7c9-12; Poussin v. 1: 56; Saṃghabhadra identifies the objection as the sūtra-master’s [T. 1562: 349b22-24] and basically quotes the Vaibhāṣika answer provided by Vasubandhu, without further discussion of *ghrāṇa* and *jihvā* [T. 1562: 349b24-25].)

59 In the *Vibhāṣa*, the argument goes as follows:

There is no masculine or feminine organ in *rūpadātu* and *ārūpyadātu* because there is no lust there, because one is born having abandoned those organs, and because in *rūpa* and *ārūpyadātu* there is no *kavaḍikārāhara*, which is necessary to cause the arising of those organs. And because these organs arise only in the absence of *hrī* and *apatrapā*, they do not exist in *rūpadātu* and *ārūpyadātu* because they would have no function there.

Objection: If this is so, then there are likewise no organs of smell or taste, since there is no *gandha* to smell or *rasa* to taste.

Reply: The organs of smell and taste have a function there since they beautify the body and give rise to speech. The masculine and feminine organs, however, render the body disgusting. Those with *hrī* and *apatrapā* must hide them (T. 1545: 463c15-21).
1.10) According to the Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi, although there are no actualized smells or tastes in rūpadhātu, gandhadhātu and rasa-dhātu exist there.

de la gzugs kyi khaps na ni dri dañ ro ni med la de dag gi khaps ni yod do / de ci’i phyir že na / de gñis ni kham gyi zas kyis bsdus pa yin pa’i phyir ro / de dag med pas sna’i rnam par šes pa dañ / Ie’i rnam par šes pa yañ med de / kun tu ’byuñ ba kho nar med kyi khaps las ni ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 51a5-7); 復次色界中無現香味然有彼界。何以故。此二皆是鼻食攝故。由無此二鼻舌二識亦無。此就現行說非就界說 (T. 1579: 597b1-3)
1.11) Vasubandhu says that the reason why the first five viññānas are always associated with vitarka and vicāra is that these viññānas are gross since they are directed toward external (objects).

\[ nityam ete vitarkavicārābhyaṁ samprayuktāḥ / avadhāraṇārtho hiśabdaḥ^{60} \]

(Pradhan: 22.4; T. 1558: 8a12-14; Poussin v. 1: 59;). Saṃghabhadra says that this is the reasoning of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 350a7-8], and he refutes it, saying that manoviññāna, even when directed internally, is sometimes associated with vitarka and vicāra. According to Saṃghabhadra, the real reason is that the five viññānas occur only in realms in which vitarka and vicāra are present [T. 1562: 350a8-12].

---

\(^{60}\) Note that the reason, which is omitted from the Sanskrit, is stated in the Tibetan and Chinese translations: 'di dag ni rtag tu rtog pa daṅ dpyod pa dag daṅ mtsunś par ldan pa yin te / 'di ltar kha phyi rol du bltas pa'i phyir rtsiṅ ba yin no / ni zhes bya ba ni nes par guṇ ba'i phyir ro (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya; gu 45a4); 由與尋伺恆共相應。以行相毘外門轉故。顯義決定。故説唯言 (T. 1558: 8a12-14).
1.11) In the Śrāvakabhūmi it is stated that *vitarka* and *vicāra* arise internally and encompass the external objects.

\[ \text{ete punar vitarkavicāraś caitasikāś cetasya upadyamānā upadyante / sahabhuvah samprayuktāḥ / ekālambanavṛttayoh / evam ete adhyātman upadyante / bāhyāyatana-} \]
\[ \text{samgrhītāś ca (Śrāvakabhūmi: 448.9-13; see also Wayman 1961: 127-128)⁶¹; rtog pa} \]
\[ \text{dan / dpyod pa de dag kyaṅ sens las byūn ba ste / sens skyes na skye bar 'gyur śiṅ} \]
\[ \text{lhan cig 'byuṅ ba mtshuṅs par ldan pa dus gcig tu 'jug pa yin no / de ltar na de} \]
\[ \text{dag ni naṅ nas skyes pa dan phyi rol gyi skye mcḥed du gtogs pa yin te (Śrāvakabhūmi:} \]
\[ \text{wi 203a4-5); 又正了知如是尋伺是心法性。心生時生。共有相應同一緣轉。又} \]
\[ \text{正了知如是尋伺依內而生外處所攝 (T. 1579: 467a26-29)} \]

⁶¹ In general, I rely on Wayman’s edition. I have given Shukla’s text here because Wayman does not provide the whole passage.
1.12) According to Vasubandhu, the reason that *vitarka* is never associated with *vitarka* is that it is impossible for two *vitarkas* to exist at one time.

*vitarkas tu nityam evitarko vicāramātro dvitīyavitarkābhāvāt vicārasamprayogāc ca* (Pradhan 22.10; T. 1558: 8a19-20; Poussin, v. 1: 60; Saṅghabhadra says that this is the reasoning of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 350a20], and he refutes it, saying that it is not impossible for two *vitarkas* to exist at one time, but only for two of the same thing to be associated [T. 1562: 350a20-27].)
1.12) (The *Yogacārabhūmi* does not include a similar statement regarding *vitarka*. However, the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* says the following regarding the simultaneous occurrence of two *dharmas* of the same type: each *dharma* has one nature, not two, and no two *dharmas* of the same type can be associated at one time because there is no second nature. This statement seems, if anything, to agree with Sarngabhadra. On the other hand, the phrase “at one time” seems superfluous: how can two things be associated if they are not simultaneous? Perhaps the intention here is the same as Vasubandhu’s.

又一切法一一自性無有第二自性可得。又定無有同類二法一時相應。即由第二自性無故 [T. 1579: 880c14-16])

---

62 This portion of the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* is not included in the Tibetan translation.
1.13) Vasubandhu says that the six organs and the six consciousnesses are internal since citta is the basis for the idea of an ātman. The six viśayās are external.\textsuperscript{63}

\[
\text{saḍ vijnānāni saḍ āśrayā itye dvādaśa dhātava āhyātmikāḥ / rūpādayas tu saḍ viśayadhātavo bāhyāḥ / ātmany asatīo katham āhyātmīkam bāhyam vā / ahamkāra-saṃśrayatvāc cittam ātmety upacaryate / ātmanā hi samudāntena svargam prāpnoti pañcita ity uktam / cittasya cāṇyatra damanam uktam bhagavata / cittasya damanam sādhu cittam dāntam sukhāvaham iti / ata ātmabhūrgya cittasyāśrayabhāvena praryāsannatvā / caṣuṣūriṇāṃ āhyātmikatvāṃ rūpādināṃ viśayabhāvād bāhyatvam / evaṃ tarhi saḍ vijnānadhātava āhyātmikā na prāpnuvanti / na hy ete manodhātutvam aprāptāḥ cittaśāśrayabhavanti / yadā tadāta eva te bhavantīti lakṣaṇam nātivartante / anyathā hi manodhātur aitā eva svān nānāgatapratyutpannamāḥ / ṭīṭvantī caṣṭādaśa dhātavas trayadhvikāḥ / yadd cannagatapratyutpannasya vijnānasya manodhātulakṣaṇam na saṭt aṭīte 'py adhvani manodhātur na vyavasthāpyate / na hi lakṣaṇasyādhyesu vyabhicāro 'stīti
\]
(Pradhan: 27.5-15; T. 1558: 9c17-10a1; Poussin v. 1: 73-74; Stcherbatsky 1988: 58-59; Saṅghabhadrā identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 360b21-c4] and criticizes it, largely on the grounds that the caitiskas, which are included in dharmadhātu and are thus classified as external, should also be considered as the basis for the idea of an ātman [T. 1562: 360c4-361a8].\textsuperscript{64} He then devotes a long section to a criticism of the Śhāvīra’s position that all dharmas are included in dharmadhātu\textsuperscript{65} [T. 1562: 361a17-362a7].)

\textsuperscript{63} Vasubandhu’s position seems to be almost identical to an alternate position in the Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 381a26-b3).

\textsuperscript{64} The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya seems also to include the caitas (T. 1552: 887b12-18).

\textsuperscript{65} See the Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 383b15 ff.).
1.13) (I cannot find anything in the Yogācārabhūmi directly relevant to the question of whether the caitasikas should also be considered as the basis for the idea of an ātman. However, the following pertain to the distinction between internal and external and the mistaken idea that the internal is a self.

From the Savitarkādi-bhūmi pratiyāyasamutpāda exposition:

adhyātmanam ajñānaṁ katamat/pratyātmikān samskārān āyatana ātmanam/
manasikurvato yad ajñānam/ bahirdhajñānam katamat/ bāhyān asattvasamkhyātanā samskārān
āmiyato 'yoniśo manasikurvato yad ajñānam/ adhyātmbahirdhā 'jñānaṁ katamat/
pārasāntānikān samskārān mitrāmitrodāśāhato 'yoniśaḥ kalpayato yad ajñānam
[Yogācārabhūmi: 204.10-15]; naṁ ni śes pa gaṅ že na / so so raṅ gi 'du byed rnams
la tshul bžin ma yin par bdag tu yid la byed pa'i mi śes pa gaṅ yin pa'o / phyi rol
mi śes pa gaṅ že na / phyi rol giy 'du byed sems can du ston pa ma yin pa rnams la
bdag gi bar tshul bžin ma yin par yid la byed pa'i mi śes pa gaṅ yin pa'o
/ naṅ daṅ phyi rol mi śes pa gaṅ že na / pha rol giy gyud la yod pa'i 'du byed rnams la mdza'
bšes pa daṅ / dgra daṅ / tha ma la tshul bžin ma yin par rtog pa'i mi śes pa gaṅ
yin pa'o [Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 119a5-8]; 於內無知云何。謂於各別諸行。起不如理作意。謂之為我。所有無知。於外無知云何。謂於外非有情數諸行。起
不如理作意。謂之我所。所有無知。於內外無知云何。謂於他相續諸行。起
不如理分別謂怨親中所有無知 [T. 1579: 322b11-17]

From the Paryāyasamgrahāni [the last part of this passage points out the ambiguous status of dharmadhātu, which is external in one sense but internal in another]:

sṅon gyi mtha' daṅ phyi ma'i mtha' ni ma 'ons pa rnams skye pa'i chos ŋid daṅ
skyes pa rnams zad pa'i chos ŋid du mi śes pa gaṅ yin pa'o / de de lta ma śes pas
sṅon gyi mtha' la sogs pa las brtsems nas ci bdag 'das pa'i dus nas byuṅ bar gyur
ram ŋes bya ba rgyas par tshul bžin ma yin pa yid la byed de / ji lta 'dug ji lta bur
gyur / sems can 'di dag ga las 'ons / 'di nas ši 'phos nas gaṅ du 'gro bar 'gyur ba
ʒes bya ba 'di ni sṅon gi mtha' daṅ phyi ma'i mtha las brtsems nas tshul bžin ma
yin pa yid la byed pa'o / de de lta mi rtag pa ŋid la kun du rmons pas 'du byed
rnams la bdag tu lta ba'i rjes su 'brel ciṅ naṅ daṅ phyi daṅ gūṅ ga dag la chos
tsam du mi śes te / naṅ ni naṅ gi skye mched la'o / phyi ni phyi'i lña po dag la'o /

66 Corrected by Schmithausen (1987: 518 n. 1421) from ātmanā on the basis of the manuscript.

Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Chapter 1 Dhātunistheśa
1.13 continued) phyi dañ nañ ni dbañ po'i rten de dag ŋid dañ chos kyi skye mched la ste / chos de dag ni nañ gi yin par yañ dmigs šin phy'i'i skye mched dag gis bs dus pa yin no [Yogācārabhūmi; yi 54b2-6]; 於前後際無智者。謂於未來諸行當生法性及當生已當盡法性。不了知故。彼於如是不了知者。謂依前際等起不即理思惟。我於過去世為曾有耶。乃至廣說。我為是誰。誰當是誰。今此有情從何而來。於此已當往何所。如是依前際不即理作意故。於如是無常法性。愚癡不了。於諸行中我見隨逐。於內於外俱於二種。唯有法性不能了知。內謂內處。外謂外迹。内外即是根所住處及以法處。由彼諸法於內可得。又是外處之所攝故 [T. 1579: 771b26-c8]
1.14) In verse 42, Vasubandhu gives the accepted Vaibhāṣika opinion that it is the eye that sees rūpa, but, according to Saṅghabhadra, he uses the word kilā to indicate that he disagrees. Vasubandhu then examines a number of other opinions found in the Vibhāṣā, most prominently that of Dharmatāta, to the effect that it is the visual consciousness that sees rūpa. As Katō points out (1989: 24), the commentators think that Vasubandhu favors Dharmatāta’s opinion, but in fact Vasubandhu may just be using it to refute the Vaibhāṣikas. At the end of the discussion, he ascribes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that there is nothing that sees or is seen; consciousness simply arises in dependence on the organ and the object.

atra sautrāntikā āhuḥ/ kim idamākāśam khādyate/ caksur hi pratiṣṭya rūpāni cotpadyate caksurviṣaṁ/ tatra kah paśyatī ko vā drṣyate/ nirvāpāram hidam dharmamātraṁ hetuphalaṁatraṁ ca/ tatra vyavahārārtham cchandata upacārāḥ kriyante/ caksuḥ paśyai vijnānam vijanāti nārābhviniveśṭavyam/ uktam hi bhagavatā janapadaṁ niruktin nābhviniveśata saṁjñām ca lokasya nābhīdhaved iti

(Pradhan: 31.11-16. The references for the entire discussion are Pradhan: 30.3-31.17; T. 1558:10c8-11b8; Poussin v. 1: 81-86; T. 1562: 363c12-368a11; Katō 1989: 23-24.)

68 Saṅghabhadra uses the appellation ching-chu 綺主 here (T. 1562: 365a11), as well as several other times during this discussion (365b19, 365c25, 366c18, 366c19, 367a6, 367a7).

69 Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the Dārśāntikas (T. 1562: 367b24). He does not use the appellation ching-chu. Fukuwara comments that this is very close to a Mahāyāna way of thinking (1973: 159).
1.14) The *Yogācārabhūmi* contains a number of statements to the effect that cognition is really the result of the laws of cause and effect, not of something seeing and something else being seen.

See especially the *Viniścayaśaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* on the question of what sees *rūpa*:

\[
mīg gis gzugs rnams mthoṅ ba nas yid kyi chos rnams rnam par šes so ŋes bya ba'i bar du ji skad gsun s pa de la / ci mig la sogs pas mthoṅ ba nas rnam par šes pa'i bar du yin nam / 'on te de dag gi rnam par šes pa dag gis mthoṅ ba nas rnam par šes pa'i bar du yin ŋe na / smras pa / don dam par ni mig la sogs pas kyaṅ ma yin la / de dag gi rnam par šes pa dag gis kyaṅ ma yin no / de ci'i phyir ŋe na / dūnos po rnams ni rten cin 'brel bar 'byun ba'i phyir daṅ skad cig pa'i phyir daṅ / g.yo ba med pa'i phyir ro / brda'i tshul du ni gtso bo yin pa'i mig la sogs pa la mthoṅ ba po la sogs pa ņe bar gdags pa ches rigs so / de ci'i phyir ŋe na / mig la sogs pa ddaṅ po rnams yod na ni rnam par šes pa 'byun ba ma tshaṅ pa med par ņes kyi / rnam par šes pa'i rgyun ni yod du zun kyaṅ dmig la sogs pa ddaṅ po rnams tshaṅ ba 'am ma tshaṅ bar dmigs pa'i phyir ro / lta ba la sogs pa tsam la mthoṅ ba la sogs pa ņe bar gdags pa gaṅ yin pa de ni don dam pa yin no (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 83a6-b3); 間如説眼見諸色乃至意了諸法。此為眼等是見者乃至是了者耶。為彼識耶。答 約勝義道理。非是眼等亦非彼識。何以故。諸法自性衆緣生故。剎那滅故。 無作用故。約世俗道理。眼等最勝故可於彼立見者等。何以故。若有眼等 諸根。識決定生無所缺滅。或有識流非眼等根。若缺不缺俱可得故。此中 實義唯於見等說見者等 (T. 1579: 610a19-27; cited in Saeki 1978, v. 1: 88)

See also the *Paramārthagāthās* and their commentary (*Wayman* 1961: 168, 174, 178; *Yogācārabhūmi*; dzì 236b3-4, 238a4-6; T. 1579: 363a27-b1, 364a27-b1).
1.15) Vasubandhu states his opinions regarding the nature of atoms: 1) he agrees with the Bhadanta that they do not touch one another, but they are conventionally said to do so because there is no interval between them; 2) there is no "mass" that is different from the atoms of which it consists [and, therefore, the Vaibhasika statement that masses touch, while atoms do not, is illogical]; 3) whether or not atoms have spatial division, it does not make sense for them to touch one another (if they have spatial division, they must have parts, whether or not they touch, while if they have no spatial division, the [idea that atoms] touch would not lead to the fallacy that they have parts).  

na sprśanti / nirantar te sprśasamjñeti bhadantaḥ / bhadantamataṃ caśātyam / anyathā hi sāntarānāṃ paramānānāṃ śūnyev antaresu gatiḥ kena pratibādhya / yataḥ spratighā iṣyante / na ca paramānubhyo 'nye smṛghatā iti / ta eva te smṛghatāḥ sprśyante yathā rūpyante / yadi ca paramāṇor digbhagabhedaḥ kalpyate sprśasyāsprśasya vā sāvayavatvaprasāngaḥ / no cet sprśasyāpy aprasāṅgaḥ (Pradhan: 33.2-7; T. 1558: Poussin v. 1: 91-92; Saṁghabhadra discusses these issues and attributes the first and third opinions to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 373b14-16, 373c5-7; the reference for the entire discussion is T. 1562: 373b14-373c14].)

---

70 I find this discussion rather confusing. It seems as though Vasubandhu is attacking the Vaibhasika idea of the special reality and independence of atoms as he does more explicitly in the Viṃśatikā (6.27-8.24; Kochumuttom 1982: 174-181; see also Ch’eng wei-shih lun [T. 1585: 4a7-c5; Poussin 1928-1929: 38-47]).
1.15) (What Vasubandhu says certainly does not contradict the following passages from the Yogaścārabhūmi, but it is not clear that there is a direct connection.

In the Manobhūmi, it is said that an atom is a designation for the smallest unit into which the mind can analyze rūpa. Rūpa has place [sapradesa] but no parts.

na ca rūpasamudāya kadācit paramānus utpadyate / utpadyamānas tu svabhāt samudāya evotpadyate 'nur vē madhyo vā mahān vā / na ca punah paramānubhiḥ samudāyasya cīyate / buddhyā tu paramānaparantapa paripratidayaḥ paramānusu praṇāpyate/tatra samudāyo 'pi sapradesāḥ/paramānur api sapradesāḥ/samudāyas tu sāvayavo na paramānus/ tat kasya hetoh / paramānur eva hy avayavah / sa ca samudāyasayāvastī na paramāṇoh / punar anye paramāṇavah / tasmān na sāvayavah paramāṇoh [Yogaścārabhūmi: 53.9-15]; gzugs 'dus pa la yān rdul phra rab ni nams kyaṅ skyey bar mi 'gyur te / skyey ba na rañ gi sa bon las 'dus pa ŋid chuṅ nu 'am / 'braṅ nam chen po skyey par zad kyi / rdul phra rab rnams kyis 'dus pa bskyed par ni ma yin no / rdul phra rab ni blo shdad kyi mha' yonis su bcdad pa las 'dogs pa zad de / de la 'dus pa yāṅ phyogs daṅ bcas pa yin la / rdul phra rab kyang phyogs daṅ bcas pa yin te / 'on kyōṅ 'dus pa ni yan lag daṅ bcas pa yin gyi / rdul phra rab ni ma yin no / de ci'i phyir že na / rdul phra rab ŋid yan lag yin la / de yāṅ 'dus pa ŋid la yod kyi / rdul phra rab rnams ni rdul phra rab gzhan gyi ma yin te / de bcas na rdul phra rab ni yan lag daṅ bcas pa ma yin no [Yogaścārabhūmi; dzi 29b4-8]; 復次於色聚中。曾無極微生。若從自種生時唯聚集生。或細或中或大。又非極微集成色。聚由覺慧分折諸色極量邊際。分別假立以爲極微。又色聚亦有方分。極微亦有方分。然色聚有分非極微。何以故。由極微即是分。此是聚色所有非極微。復有餘極微。是故極微非有分 [T. 1579: 290a17-23]

As an example of an incorrect conception regarding atoms, the Viniścaya-samgrahaniś on the Pañcaviṣṇukāyamanobhūmi mentions [the idea that] one atom and another either come together or separate.

rdul phra rab daṅ rdul phra rab phrad pa daṅ / 'bral bar 'dzin pa daṅ [Yogaścārabhūmi; zi 53b1-2]; 或謂極微與餘極微或合或散 [T. 1579: 598a25-26])

---

71 The Chinese translations for digbhāgabheda and sapradesa are identical: yu fang fen 有方分.
2.1) In verse 4, the last of a group of three kārikās that represent the opinion of “others,” Vasubandhu uses the word tathā with respect to the three anāsrava indriyas (anājñātamājnāsamāndriya, ājñendriya, ājñātāvindriya) and explains in the Bhāṣya that it means that these three, like the preceding nineteen items on the list of twenty-two indriyas, are separate indriyas.

pratyekam indriyam ity upadarśanārtham tathāśabdaḥ
(Pradhan: 40.3; T. 1558: 14a17; Poussin v. i: 109; Saṃghabhadra attributes this explanation to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 378b21-22] and criticizes it, saying that the word tathā should mean: “like strīndriya and puruṣendriya, which do not exist separately from kāyendriya” [T. 1562: 378b22-c3].)\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{72} There is some disagreement regarding who these “others” are. According to Paramārtha, they are Sautrāntikas (Kokuyaku Issaiyō Bidon-bu 25: 118 n. 50).

\textsuperscript{73} The Vibhāṣā emphasizes that the three anāsrava indriyas, like strīndriya and puruṣendriya, lack separate reality (T. 1545: 730a29-b13; see also Abhidharmadīpa Chapter Two verse 73 and commentary [Abhidharmadīpa 44: 11-15]).
2.1) The Yogācārabhumi, although it equates the three anāsrava indriyas with the group of five indriyas starting with śraddhā, never denies their real existence.

See the Viniścayasaṃgrahānī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyaṣanabhumi:

pho daṇ mo'i dbaṅ po gnīs kyi don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / reg byas bsdu pa kho na'i khrig pa sbyor ba'o / tshor ba'i dbaṅ po' 76 hna'i don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / bde ba daṇ sde sṅal ba daṅ yid bde ba daṅ mi bde ba daṅ btaṅ sīms kyi gnas lta bu dag ste dbaṅ po drug po de dag nīd kyi don rnam sō / dad pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / spha bar bya ba daṅ / thob par bya ba'i yul lo / bṛtson 'grus kyi dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / de gnīs kho na'i thob par bya ba la żum pa med pa daṅ spha bar bya ba la żum pa med pa a'o / dran pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / mṇam pa daṅ bsam pa daṅ bsgom pa nes par 'dzin pa'o / tin ne 'dzin gyi dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / zi gnas daṅ lhag mthoṅ no / sēs rab kyi dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / sēs bya'i de kho na'o / mi sēs pa kun sēs par byed pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ześ na / smras pa / bden pa mṇon par rtags pa la brtson pa dge ba'i chos la 'dun' pa nas bzuṅ ste / sbyor ba'i lam 78 thams cad la dbaṅ po hna'i don gaṅ yin pa de nīd 'di'i don yin par bla bar bya'o / kun sēs pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ẓe na / smras pa / rgyun du žugs pa'i 'bras bu nas bzuṅ ste / rdo rje lta bu'i tin ne 'dzin gyi bar du dbaṅ po hna'i don gaṅ yin pa de nīd 'di'i don yin par bla bar bya'o / kun sēs pa daṅ ldan pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ẓe na / smras pa / mi slob pa'i lam nas bzuṅ ste / phuṅ po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya 'nan las 'das pa'i dbyins kyi bar du dbaṅ po hna'i don gaṅ yin pa de nīd 'di'i don gaṅ yin par bla bar bya'o (Yogācārabhumi; zi 97b2-8); 請男女根何義。答因欲相應即觸所攝。問五受根何義。答隨順苦樂憂喜捨處。即六根義。問信根何義。答應得應捨所有境界。問精進根何義。答即二種若得若捨俱無所懸。問念根何義。答於聞思修憶持不忘。問定根何義。答奢摩他見鉢舍那。問慧根何義。答知真實。問未知欲知根何義。答修諸現觀者從善法欲已去。於一切方便道中即彼五根義當知是此義。問已知根何義。答從預流果乃至金剛喻定。即彼五根義當知是此義。問具知根何義。答從初無學道乃至無餘涅槃界。即彼五根義當知是此義 (T. 1579: 615c20-616a3)

74 śraddhendriya, viśendriya, smṛtindriya, samādhiindriya, prajñendriya.
75 The Derge edition includes the phrase pho daṇ mo'i dbaṅ po phon tshun between kho na'i and 'khrig.
76 The Peking edition repeats the word dbaṅ po here. I omit it on the basis of the Derge.
77 Corrected from bden on the basis of the Derge.
78 Corrected from las on the basis of the Derge.
2.2) Vasubandhu says that the word ādi in verse 4 indicates an alternate explanation (to the one given first in the Bhāṣya) of the ascending order of the three anāśrava indriyas: 1) anājñātamājñāsyamīndriya is instrumental in the destruction of darśanaheyakleśas; 2) ājñendriya is instrumental in the destruction of bhāvanāheyakleśas; 3) ājñātāvindriya is instrumental with respect to drṣṭa-dharmasukhavihāra.

ādiśabdo ‘nyaparyāyadhyotanārthaḥ / katamo ‘nyah paryāyaḥ / darśanaheya-
kleśaparīhānaṃ praty ājñāsyāmīndriyasyādhipatyaṃ / bhāvanāheyakleśaprahānaṃ
praty ājñendriyasya / drṣṭadharmaṇaḥsukhavihāraṃ praty ājñātāvindriyaṣya / vimukti-
pṛītiṣukhasamvedanād iti

(Pradhan: 40.5-7; T. 1558: 14a21-24; Poussin v. 1: 110; Saṃghabhadra attributes this
explanation to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 378c3-5], criticizes it, saying that it would
result in many problems regarding the order of accomplishments on the Path [T. 1562:
378c5-10], and gives his own explanation [T. 1562: 378c10-379a3]. In the course of
this, he again refers to the sūtra-master, who, he says, would disagree with Saṃghabhadra’s
mentioning, with respect to ājñātāvindriya, the visamyoṣapraṇāti of the kleśas that are
destroyed by vajropamasamādhī [T. 1562: 379a1-3]; this must be an allusion to Vasu-
bandhu’s rejection of prāṇī as a real dharma.)

---

79 This discussion is very intricate. However, it seems as though Saṃghabhadra feels that Vasubandhu is ignoring the complicated structure of the Vaibhāṣika mārga, particularly the distinction between ānantaryamārga, in which the kleśas are abandoned, and vimuktimārga, in which their visamyoṣapraṇāti arises (see Cox 1995: 89). The Vaibhāṣika understanding of ānantaryamārga and vimuktimārga is specifically refuted in the Ch’eng wei-shih lun (T. 1545: 52b26-c1; Poussin 1928-1929: 641).
2.2) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanabhūmi* defines these three *indriyas*: 1) *anājñātānaṃjñasyāṃśindriya* is the five *indriyas* (beginning with *śradhdhā*) of one who has abandoned *kuśaladharmachanda* and is in the midst of *pravṛgya-mārga*; 2) *ājñendriya* is the five *indriyas* of one who is at a stage between attaining *srotā-āpatipāhala* and *vajropamasamādhi*; 3) *ājñātāvindriya* is the five *indriyas* of one who is at a stage between attaining arhatship and *nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa*.

śes rab kyi dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ze na / smras pa / śes bya'i de kho na'o / mi śes pa kun śes par byed pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ze na / smras pa / bden pa mgon par rtogs pa la brtson pa dge ba'i chos la 'dun" 80 pa nas bzūn ste / sbyor ba'i lam 81 thams cad la dbaṅ po lha'i don gaṅ yin pa de ŋīt 'di'i don yin par blta bar bya'o / kun śes pa'i dbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ze na / smras pa / rgyun du 'zugs pa'i 'bras bu nas bzūn ste / rdo rje lta bu'i tin ne 'dzin gyi bar du dbaṅ po lha'i don gaṅ yin pa de ŋīt 'di'i don yin par blta bar bya'o / kun śes pa daṅ ldan pa'idbaṅ po'i don gaṅ ze na / smras pa / mi slob pa'i lam nas bzūn ste / phun po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya nan las 'das pa'i dbyins kyi bar du dbaṅ po lha'i don gaṅ yin pa de ŋīt 'di'i don gaṅ yin par blta bar bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi, zi 97b5-8); 間慧根何義。答知所道義。問未知知根何義。答復諦現觀者從善法欲已去。於一切方便道中即彼五根義當知是此義。問已知根何義。答從預流果乃至金剛喻定。即彼五根義當知是此義。間具知根何義。答從初無學道乃至無餘涅槃界。即彼五根義當知是此義 (T. 1579: 615c26-616a3) 82

The *Viniścayasaṃgrahani* on the *Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanabhūmi* also explains the purpose (*so-i ch'u* 所依處, *ched du*) of each of these three *indriyas*: 1) *anājñātānaṃjñasyāṃśindriya* is for the purpose of obtaining the first three *śrāmanaphalas*; 2) *ājñendriya* is for the purpose of obtaining the *śrāmanaphala* of the *asaṅkṣa* up to *vajropamasamādhi*; 3) *ājñātāvindriya* is for the purpose of permanently destroying the basis (*so-i* 所依, *phun po*) of *dṛṣṭadharmasukhavāhāra* immediately upon obtaining permanent destruction of the *kleśas*.

mi śes pa kun śes par byed pa'i dbaṅ po ci žig gi ched du že na / smras pa / dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gi bras bu daṅ po daṅ gnis pa daṅ gsum pa 'thob pa'i ched du'o / kun śes pa'i dbaṅ po ci žig gi ched du že na / smras pa / rdo rje lta bu'i tin ne 'dzin gyi bar daṅ mi slob pa'i dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi 'bras bu 'thob pa'i ched du'o / kun

80 Corrected from *bdun* on the basis of the Derge.

81 Corrected from *ías* on the basis of the Derge.

82 This is a portion of the passage quoted in the previous item; it has been reproduced here for the sake of convenience.
Chapter 2  Indriyanirdeśa
2.2 continued) \[ \text{ processo dala spngi ched du že na} / \text{ smras pa} / \text{ bar chad med par ŋon moṅs pa spon ba μon du bya ba dān} / \text{ tshe } \text{ di la bde bar gnas pa dān phun po } \text{ 'gag pa} \text{'i ched du'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 100b3-5); } \text{ beh unph} \text{ shi dza me} \text{ la sman shi dza mna} \text{ la dza b⟩.} \]

mention the linguistic or philosophical content present in the document, focusing on the details of the text and its context.

The text is written in Tibetan script and is a continuation of a passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The passage discusses the nature of the realized state (ched) and its relationship with the mind (moṅs pa) and the essence of being (bya ba). The text also references the *Yogācārabhūmi* and a specific line (100b3-5) from it. The discussion likely involves the analysis of the mind's nature and its connection with the ultimate reality (bya ba) and the non-dual nature of experience (ched).
2.3) According to Vasubandhu, jīvitendriya is not the result of karma in the case of the arhat, who can prolong his life by the power of his meditation.\footnote{This position is found in the Vibhāṣā, where it is criticized (T. 1545: 657b1-5).}

samādhiprabhāva eva sa teṣāṃ tādṛśo yena pūrvakarmajam ca sthitikālāvedham indriyamahābhūtānāṃ vyāvartayanty apūrvam ca samādhiyam āvedham ākṣipanti / tasmān na tajjīvitendriyam vipākaṃ tato 'nyat tu vipākaḥ
(Pradhan: 43.20-22; T. 1558: 15b27-29; Poussin v. 1: 121; Saṃghabhadra attributes this explanation, to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 380c21-23] and criticizes it, alluding to Vasubandhu’s arguments against the reality of the cītaviprayuktasaṃskāra, jīvitendriya [T. 1562: 380c23-381a4].)\footnote{For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Jaini 1958a. Jaini points out that the position adopted by Vasubandhu is the same as the Mahāsāṃghika position criticized in the Kathāvatthu, and he refers to the Abhidharmadīpa, which condemns Vasubandhu for holding a Mahāyāna view (550-551).}
2.3) According to the Viṅścayasamgrahāni on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanabhūmi, arhats, Tathāgatas, and bodhisattvas have a special type of jīvitendriya that gives them the power to extend their āyuḥsāṃskāras. This jīvitendriya is defined as “proceeding due to own-force.” All other types are defined as “not proceeding due to own-force.” This seems to be equivalent to the distinction made in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya between jīvitendriya that is not vipāka (that of the arhat) and ordinary jīvitendriya, which is vipāka.

dgra bcom pa daṅ de.bzīn gṣegs pa daṅ byaṅ chub sems dpa’ gaṅ dag tshe’i ’du byed gtoṅ ba daṅ / spel bar spyod pa dag ni srog gi dbaṅ po la raṅ gis 85 dbaṅ bsgyur ba yin no / de las gzan pa dag ni raṅ gis dbaṅ bsgyur ma yin par rig par bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 26a1-2); 若阿羅漢等若諸如來若諸菩薩。於壽行中延促自在所有命根。名自勢力轉。當知所餘名非自勢力轉 (T. 1579: 587b7-9)

According to the Cintāmaiḥ Bhūmi, the Buddha obtains mastery of samādhi (samādhi-vaśīta), which he uses to discard his former āyuḥsāṃskāras and to produce a new body.

gaṅ gi tshe de.bzīn gṣegs pa naṅ du dgyes par māzad ciṅ dge sbyoṅ du ’gyur ba la brtsem nas / tiṅ ne ’dzin de la mña brjpons na / ji ltaṅ thugs mñaṃ par gṣag pa yin bzīn du / sku tshe’i ’du byed rnam sēs bya ba srid pa’i ’du byed rnam sphaṅs te / de dag sphaṅs pas mtsheṅs pa’i gzugs kyi sku ’byun ba de dag mtsheṅs pa ma yin pa’i miṅ gi sku ’byun ba bṣad ste (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 292a5-7); 又佛示現內寂靜樂及妙門樂為依止故。得定自在。如定心力捨諸壽行及諸有行。彼捨邊際妙色身生。與前等等其名身生。與前不等故有差別 (T. 1579: 383c7-11)

---

85 Corrected from raṅ gi on the basis of the Derge.
2.4) According to Vasubandhu, the Vaibhāṣikas say that mahābhūtas manifest their existence by their activity: the activity of a certain mahābhūta in a substance (mass) is stronger; therefore, only that one mahābhūta is perceived, although the other three mahābhūtas also exist in the substance.

**yady atra paṭutamam prabhāvata udbhūtaṁ tasya tatropalabdhiḥ / sūcitūṅkalāpa- sparśavat saktulavanaçcūryarasavac ca / kathan punas teṣu śeṣāśtitvaṁ ganyate / karmataḥ sāngrahadṛhtipaktyāyuḥanāt**

(Pradhan: 53.9-10 T. 1558; 18c4-6; Poussin v. 1: 146; but according to Samghabhadra [who discusses this in his comment on Chapter One verse 35], Vasubandhu misrepresents Vaibhāṣika doctrine [T. 1562: 355b15-18]. The true Vaibhāṣika position is that a given mahābhūta is perceived because its substance is greater than that of the other mahābhūtas [T. 1562: 355b18-23]. A bit later, Samghabhadra again accuses Vasubandhu of not recognizing the true Vaibhāṣika position regarding this question [T. 1562: 355c27-29]. In fact, the Vībhāṣā includes both opinions [T. 1545: 682c23-683a15]. Vasubandhu offers another opinion, which Yasomitra labels "Sautrāntika" [Abhidharmakośavyākyā 125.6], to the effect that the unperceived mahābhūtas exist as seeds: būjatas teṣu teṣāṁ bhāvo na svarūpata ity apare / santy asmin dāru-skandhe vividhā dhātava iti vacanā**[^86]** (Pradhan 53.14–15; T. 1558: 18c9-11).

[^86]: The source of this quotation is *Saṃyukṭāgama* (T. 99 [sūtra no. 494]: 129a3; see Pāśādika 1986: 31).
2.4) According to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi on the Cintāmaṇiprajñā Bhūmi, all the mahābhūtas and upādāyarūpas are present simultaneously, but only one is active at a given time; the others are present in the form of seeds that can become active when changing conditions warrant.

rañ gi sa bon de las grub pa gañ dag yin pa de dag ni rañ gi las byed pa dag yin no / de dag kyañ rgyur byas pa’i gzugs dañ lhan cig gi dchos pos tha mi dad par ’jug pa dag yin te / de dañ ’bra ba’i rgyu las grub pa yin pa’i phyir ro / thams cad du yañ thams cad ’dres śin ro gcig pa’i goñ bu lta bu yin gyi / phyé dañ ’bru dañ / nor bu’i phun po lta bu ni ma yin no / ’dod pa’i khams na ni gzugs ’dus pa gcig tu sra ba gañ yin pa de la sa’i khams dañ / gzugs dañ dri dañ ro’i khams dag las byed pa yin no / gzugs kyi khams na ni gzugs kyi khams kho na las byed pa yin no / lhag ma chu dañ / me dañ / rlun dañ / sgra’i khams sa bon du gyur pa de dañ ’brel pa dag ni rkyen dag la blos pa yin te / de ltar na chu dañ / me dañ / rlun gi min can ’dus pa dag la go rins ci rigs par blta bar bya’o / de la nañ gi gzugs ’dus pa la ni skra dañ / spu la sogs pa’i rab tu dbye bas / sa la sogs pa’i khams thams cad las byed pa dañ bcas par snañ sté / mdo las ji skad gsuns pa bzin no / phyi rol la ni sa la sogs pa’i ’dus pa so sor ci rigs par blta bar bya’o / de dag kyañ rkyen ji lta ji lta bu dag dañ phrad pa’i ’bras bu de lta de lta bu’i rgyur gyur pa yin te / ’di lta sté / dper na śin skam po legs par gshubs pa las me ’byun ba dañ / tshan mo steñ āañ / ro nê dañ / lcags dañ / dnu l la sogs pa zu bar ’gyur ba lta bu’o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 229a3-b1); 謂從自種子所生大種。又諸大種與所造色。俱時而有互不相離。由彼種類因所成故。如一味團更相涉入遍一切處。非如穀稻末尼等聚。又於一向堅色聚中。唯有地界能作業用。若於欲界亦有色香味界作業。於色界中但有色界能作業用。餘水火風及與聲界。唯有種子之所隨逐。更待異緣方能作業。如是於水火風名想聚中。如應其所次第亦爾。內色聚中一切地等諸界作業皆具可得。謂毘留那種種差別。廣說如經。當知於外得有各別地等諸聚。彼若值遇如是如是眾緣差別。即便能作如是如是果法生因。譬如善巧鑽彼乾木即便生火。又如白鐵鉛錫金銀等物融消即流 (T. 1579: 666b13-26)
2.5) Vasubandhu objects to the Vaibhāsika definition of the *kusalamahābhūmiṇa*, *upekṣā*, as the non-turning of the mind toward an object, pointing out that this would be a case of a *dharma* coexisting with its opposite, namely *manaskāra*, which is the turning of the mind toward an object and which is present at every moment of consciousness. He seems to be making the point that these *dharmas* must not exist, or be active, at the same moment (see Poussin v. 1: 160).

\[
\text{katham idānām etad yokṣyate / tatraśva citte ābhogātmako manaskāro 'nābhogātmakā copekṣeti / nanu coktaṇi durjñāna āsāṁ viśeṣa iti / asti hi nāma durjñānam api jñāyate / idaṇi tu kaly avidurjñānam yad virodhe 'py avirodha iti/an yatrābhogo 'nyatrāṇābhoga iti ko 'tra virodha / na tarhīdānām ekālambanāḥ sarve samprayuktīḥ prāpnuvanti / evaṃjātyakam atrānyad apy āyāsyatītī yas tasya nayaḥ so 'syāpi veśātavyaḥ}
\]

(Pradhan: 55.17-21; T. 1558: 19b18-24; Poussin v. 1: 159-160; Saṅghabhadra, in his comment on a later verse [Chapter Two verse 28], attributes this objection to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 392b12-13] and explains that, like the pair, *vīrya*, which is not resting while doing good, and *upekṣā*, which is equanimity while abstaining from doing bad, *manaskāra* and *upekṣā* are not really opposites [T. 1562: 392b8-12].)
2.5) According to the Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi, all of the five mahābhūmi ka dharmas accepted by Yogācāra coexist with the five consciousnesses, but they are active one by one; furthermore, they all arise from their own seeds.

sahāyāḥ satamāḥ/tatsahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dharmāḥ/tadyathā/manaskāraḥ sparśo vedanā saṁjñā cetaneti / ye ‘py anye caṅsurvijñānena sahabhūsamprayuktās caitasā dhārman te punar ekālbānāḥ anekākāraḥ sahabhuvāḥ caikaikavyttayaḥ ca / sarve ca svabhājan nirjānaḥ samprayuktāḥ sākāraḥ sālambanāḥ sāśrayāḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 5.12-15); grogs guṅ ze na / de daṅ lhan cīg ’byun ŋīṅ mtshuns par ldan pa / sens las ’byun ba’i chos nmam te / ’di lta ste / yid la byed pa daṅ / reg pa daṅ / tshor ba daṅ / ’du šes daṅ sens pa’o / sens las byun ba’i chos gzan gan dag mig gi / nmam par šes pa daṅ / lhan cīg ’byun ŋīṅ mtshuns par ldan pa de dag ni / dmigs pa gcig pa nmam pa du ma ste / lhan cīg gi ’byun ba dag kyiṅ re re ‘byun la / thams cad kyiṅ raṅ gi sa bon las nes par ‘byun ba / mtshuns par ldan pa / dmigs pa daṅ / bcas pa / nmam pa daṅ / bcas pa / gnas daṅ / bcas pa dag go (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 3b3-6); 彼助伴者。謂彼俱有相應諸心所有。所謂。作意觸受相思。及餘眼識俱有相應諸心所有法。又彼諸法同一所緣。非一行相。俱有相應一一而轉。又彼一切各各於自種子而生 (T. 1579: 279b18-22)\(^87\)

A similar statement is made in the Manobhūmi regarding manovijñāna (Yogācārabhūmi: 11.14-21; Yogācārabhūmi.: dzi 6b5-7a3; T. 1579: 280b13-21).\(^88\)

---

\(^87\) This example is in the case of caṅsurvijñāna, but the same applies to the remaining four vijñānas.

\(^88\) According to the Viścayasaṃgrahāni, upeksā is not a real entity; because it is composed of aloha, advēṣa, amoha and vīra, upeksā is simply a designation for the kleśa-removing quality of those dharmas (Yogācārabhūmi.: zi 63b8-64a2; T. 1579: 602b22-27). I am not sure whether there is any relation between this statement and Vasubandhu’s argument.
2.6) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of others that āhrīkya is lack of shame with respect to oneself, while anapatrāpya is lack of shame with respect to others. He cites an objection, namely that it is impossible to think simultaneously about oneself and others, but he defends the opinion of others, saying that āhrīkya and anapatrāpya are not intended to be simultaneous.

anye punar āhuḥ / ātmāpekṣayā doṣair alajjanam āhrīkyaṃ parāpekṣayā 'napatrāpyam iti / evam api dve apekte yugapat kathāṃ setsyataḥ / na khalūcyate yugapad ātmānam param copekṣata ity api tv astu asau kādācid alajjā yā ātmānam apekṣamāṇasyāpi pravartate sā āhrīkyam / asti yā param apekṣamāṇasya pravartate sā 'napatrāpyam
(Pradhan: 59.24-60.3; T. 1558: 21a17-21; Poussin v. 1: 171; Saṅghabhadra says that the objection to this opinion cited by the sūtra-master reflects his misunderstanding [T. 1562: 393b23-24] because the real problem with the opinion is that it does not treat āhrīkya and anapatrāpya as completely separate dharmas [T. 1562: 393b25].)\textsuperscript{89}

---

\textsuperscript{89} The Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 179c13-15) includes this as one of many explanations of the difference between āhrīkya and anapatrāpya. The proviso in the case of the immediately preceding separate definitions of each dharma (T. 1545: 179a17-18; 179b13-14), that they differ in wording but not in essence, may also apply here. For similar definitions, see Abhidharmāṅgula, Upāśanta’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya, and *Sāmyuktābhik-dharmahṛdaya (T. 1553: 972b24-25; T. 1552: 881b1-2; T. 1551: 847b19-20). Dharmārī’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya is somewhat different and seems to reverse the definitions (T. 1550: 817b21-22; Willemen 1975: 62). See also the *Tattvasiddhiśāstra (T. 1646: 319b22-23). Poussin notes (1971, v. 1: 171 n. 2) that Vasubandhu adopts this definition in the Pañcaskandhaka (si 15b5-6).
2.6) The Viniścayasamgrahaṇī on the Samāhitā Bhūmi defines āhrīkya as lack of shame with respect to oneself and anapatrāpya as lack of shame with respect to others.

ji ltar na ṇo tsha med pa daṅ / khrel med pa yin ḅe na / bdag ŋid dam gzān las brten te / ṇo tsha med pas / bsams bzin du ṇes pa byed pa daṅ / ṇes pa byun na yan chos bzin du phyir mi phyed pa daṅ / 'thab krol byed pa daṅ / mtshan90 'dru bar byed pa daṅ / rtsod par phyed pa daṅ / 'gyed91 par byed pa yin no (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 174b3-4); 云：何無慚無愧。謂於自或復觀他無所羞恥。故思毀犯。犯已不能如法出離。好為種種闢謬違諍 (T. 1579: 644c8-10)

90 Corrected from 'tshān on the basis of the Derge.
91 Corrected from 'gyid on the basis of the Derge.
2.7) Vasubandhu questions the reality of the *cittaviprayuktasamśkāra*, *prāpti*, which is accepted by the Sarvāstivādins.

*prāptir nāmāsti kimcit bhāvāntaram iti*

(Pradhan: 63.3; T. 1558: 22a26; Poussin v. 1: 181; Saṃghabhadra attributes this question to the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 397a12-13; Cox 1995: 187] and embarks on a long defense of the reality of *prāpti* and refutation of the *bīja* theory [T. 1562: 397a13-398c1; Cox 1995: 187-197].)
2.7) The Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇi on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi states that prāpti is only a prajñapti, not a real dharma.

\[ \text{\textquoteleft} \text{thob pa danā rṇed pa danā ldan pa gaṅ ze na / mdor bsdu na \textquoteleft} \text{byun ba\textquoteright} \text{rkyen gvis yon\textasciinotescirc{\textcircled{\textsl{s}}} su zin cīn sa bon yon\textasciinotescirc{\textcircled{\textsl{s}}} su rtag pa ni \textquoteleft} \text{thob pa\textquoteright} \text{zes bya ba ste / rnam graṅs des na \textquoteleft} \text{thob pa\textquoteright} \text{yan btags pa\textquoteright} \text{i yod pa yin par rig par bya\textquoteright} \text{o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 24b7-8);} \]

復次云何得成故。謂若略說。生緣攝受增盛之因說名為得。由此道理當知得是假有 (T. 1579: 586c25-27)

It goes on to explain prāpti in terms of bija.

\[ \text{\textquoteleft} \text{thob pa de yaṅ mdor bsdu na rnam pa gsum du rig par bya\textquoteright} \text{o / sa bor; danā ldan pa danā / dbaṅ danā ldan pa daṅ / kun tu \textquoteleft} \text{byun bar ldan pa\textquoteright} \text{o / de la re žig ŋon mons pa can danā lū du ma bstan pa danā / skyes nas thob pa\textquoteright} \text{i chos ma btsal bar kun tu \textquoteleft} \text{byun ba gaṅ yin pa de dag ni sa bon re žig gi gnas kyi ŋams pas kyaṅ ŋams par ma byas la / \textquoteleft} \text{phags pa\textquoteright} \text{i lam gvis kyaṅ yai dag par ma bcom pa daṅ / dge ba rnam s kyai yai \textquoteleft} \text{di lta ste / dper na dge ba\textquoteright} \text{i rtsa ba kun tu bcdad pa rnam s kyi ltar log par lta bas ŋams par ma byas pa gaṅ yin pa de ni sa bon danā ldan pa žes bya ste / \textquoteleft} \text{di ltar jir srid du de\textquoteright} \text{i sa bok de ŋams par ma byas žiṅ yai dag par ma bcom pa de srid du de ŋon mons pa can la sogs pa\textquoteright} \text{i chos kun tu \textquoteleft} \text{byun ba\textquoteright} \text{am kun tu \textquoteleft} \text{byun ba ma yin pa de\textquoteright} \text{o} \text{92} \text{dang danā ldan pa žes bya ba\textquoteright} \text{i phyir ro / dge ba\textquoteright} \text{i chos mんon par \textquoteleft} \text{du bya bas bskyed pa rnam s danā lū du ma bstan pa de dag kha cig gi \textquoteleft} \text{byun ba\textquoteright} \text{i rkyen gvis rgyu sa bon yon\textasciinotescirc{\textcircled{\textsl{s}}} su rtas pa yon\textasciinotescirc{\textcircled{\textsl{s}}} su zin pa ni dbian danā ldan pa žes bya\textquoteright} \text{o / da ltar gyi chos rnam mんon sum gyi չnos pos raṅ gi mtshan ŋid kyis \textquoteleft} \text{grub pa ni kun tu \textquoteleft} \text{byun ba danā ldan pa žes bya\textquoteright} \text{o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 25a5-b2);} \]

92 Corrected from kun tu 'byun ba de on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.
2.8) According to Vasubandhu, when the seeds of kleśas are damaged either in the ārya or by the laukikamārga, just like seeds burned by fire that change and cannot produce fruit, then that person is called prahīṇakleśa.

*ato 'gnidgdhavṛihivad abijibhūte āśraye kleśānāṁ prahīṇakleśa ity ucyate/ upahata-bijabhāve vā laukikena mārgena*

(Pradhan: 63.20-21; T. 1558: 22b26-28; Poussin v. 1: 183-184; this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398a28-b2; Cox 1995: 195], who questions Vasubandhu’s use of the simile of burned seeds in the case of both the ārya and the ordinary person [T. 1562: 398b2-9; Cox 1995: 195-196]. This is one of several statements about bija that Samghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)
2.8) The Viścayāsāṃgrahāṇī on the Pañcaviṃśāyanakāyamanobhāmi compares seeds burned by fire, which are permanently rendered unproductive, with the seeds of internal dharmas that have been destroyed by the ārya.

'phags pa ŋan thos 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis 'dod pa'i 'dod chags\(^{93}\) daṅ bral ba daṅ / khams gsun pa'i 'dod chags daṅ bral pa'i bar thob pa ni de ltar des khams gsun na spyod pa'i chos ŋon mons pa can de dag thams cad kyi sa bon thams cad kyi thams cad du yaṅ dag par bcom pa yin no / de ci'i phyir že na / 'di ltar 'phags pa ŋan thos de ni tshe 'di ŋid la 'dod chags daṅ bral ba de las yoṅs su ŋams šin / sa 'og ma pa'i kun nas ŋon mons pa snon du byed mi srid pa daṅ / sa goṅ ma dag tu skyes pa de nas ši'i phos nas yaṅ sa 'og ma rnams su skye ba yaṅ mi srid pa'i phyir ro / 'āi lta ste dper na 'bru nas la sogs pa'i sa bon nam mkha' 'am / sa gēi skam por gzhag pa rnams ni mi skye yaṅ sa bon ŋid med pa ni ma yin no / de dag ŋid me\(^{94}\) kun tu gduṅs na thams cad kyi thams cad du sa bon ŋid med pa bzin du / sa bon rnams kyi ŋams pa daṅ yaṅ dag par bcom pa 'di'i tshul yaṅ de bzin du rig par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 17a1-5); 若聖弟子由出世道離欲界欲。乃至具得離三界欲。爾時一切三界染污諸法種子皆悉永害。何以故。由聖弟子於現法中不復堪任從離欲退更起下地煩惱現前。或生上地。亦不堪任從彼沒已還生下地。如穀麥等諸外種子安置空處或於乾器。雖不生芽非不種子。若火所損者時畢竟不成種子。內法種子損伏永害道理亦爾 (T. 1579: 584a2-10)

---

\(^{93}\) Corrected from lam gyi 'dod chags on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

\(^{94}\) Corrected from med on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.
2.9) According to Vasubandhu, even in the samucchinnakuṣalamāla, the seeds of the kuṣalamālas are not completely destroyed.

tatrāyatnabhāvibhir āśrayasya tadbījabhāvānupaghātāt samanvāgata upaghātād
asamanvāgata ucyate samucchinnakuṣalamālaḥ / tasya tūpaghāto mihyādṛṣṭyā
veditavyaḥ / na tu khalu kuṣalānāṁ dharmāनāṁ bijabhāvasyātyantam santatau
samudghātaḥ

(Pradhan: 63.23-64.2; T. 1558: 22c6-7; Poussin v. 1: 184; the last part of this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398a9; Cox 1995: 193-194], who argues that Vasubandhu should not refer to the destruction of seeds, which are merely praṃapta and hence do not exist to be destroyed, and mentions a sūtra that says that the kuṣalamālas are in fact completely destroyed [T. 1562: 398a9-19; Cox 1995: 194]. It is one of several statements about bija that Saṃghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)
2.9) The Manobhūmi defines samucchinnakuśalamāla, specifying that the destruction of the kuśalamālas does not include the destruction of their seeds. (See also item 2.42.)

kathāṃ kuśalamūlaṃ samucchinnati / tīkṣṇendrivasyādhīnimātram pāpāsayādhyācāra-
dharmasamanvāgatayā tadanuvāmamitrālābhataya āsasya ca mithyādṛṣṭi-
paravyavasthānesya ghanikaraṇaparyantopagananatayā sarvapāpādhyācāreṣv
asaṃkocākaukṣyapratilābhataya ca / tatra bijam api kuśalamūlaṃ / alobhādayo
'pi kuśalamūlaṃ / kuśalamūlosamudācāravirodhena santānāsthāpanakusalamūla-
samucchedana95 bijoddharasatayā ca (Yogācārabhūmi: 14.18-15.3); ji ltar dge
ba'i rtsa ba nams rgyun 'chod par byed ce na / dbaṅ po rno la sdig pa'i bsam pa
śas chen po la lhag par spyod pa'i chos daṅ idan pa daṅ / de daṅ mthun pa'i grogs
rṇed pa daṅ / log par lha ba'i kun nas dkris pa de lhun stug par byed pas / mthar
thug par 'gro ba daṅ / sdig pa thams cad la lhag par spyod pa dag la mi ldog ciṅ /
'gyod par96 mi byed par 'gyur ro / de la sa bon yan dge ba'i rtsa ba yin la / ma
chags pa la sogs pa yan dge ba'i rtsa ba yin te / dge ba'i rtsa ba kun tu spyod pa
daṅ mi mthun pas rgyud gnas par byed ciṅ / dge ba'i rtsa ba gcod pas sa bon 'byin
par97 byed do (Yogācārabhūmi; dū 88b-9a3); 云何斷善根。謂利根者。成就上
品諸惡業樂現行法故。得隨順彼惡友故。彼邪見繫極重圓滿到究竟故。彼於
一切惡現行中得無畏故。無衰壞故。能斷善根。此中種子亦名善根。無貪瞋
等亦名善根。但由安立現行善根。相違相續名斷善根。非由永拔彼種子故 (T.
1579: 281a22-28)98

95 The manuscript reads samucchedo na bijoddharaitaya.
96 Derge reads pas.
97 Derge reads pas.
98 However, there is a textual problem. The Tibetan translation states that by
destroying the kuśalamūlas one destroys their seeds. The Sanskrit, as emended by
Bhattacharya, seems to agree with the Tibetan. But the manuscript, as Bhattacharya
represents it in the note, would appear to agree with the Chinese.
2.10) Vasubandhu says that a person is said to be endowed (samanvāgata) with good dharmas produced by effort, once they have been produced, since the power (vaśītva) to reproduce these dharmas is not damaged.

ye punar yatnabhāvinas tair utpannais tadutpattir vaśītvāvighātāt santateḥ samanvāgata ucyate

(Pradhan: 64.2; T. 1558: 22c7-9; Poussin v. 1: 184; this statement is quoted by Saṃghabhadrā [T. 1562: 398a20-21; Cox 1995: 194], who claims that Vasubandhu's statement is inconsistent with his denial of the existence of future dharmas [T. 1562: 398a22-26; Cox 1995: 194-195]. It is one of several statements about biṇa that Saṃghabhadrā later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)
2.10) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaśijñānakāya-maṇḍalabhūmi defines *vaśītvasamanvāgamma as follows: it is the grown (matured?) seeds that are the cause comprising the condition (*hetupratyaya?) for the arising of good dharmas produced by effort and a portion of neutral dharmas.

dge ba'i chos mnon par 'du bya bas bskyed pa rnam du ma bstan pa de dag kha cig gi 'byun ba'i rkyen gyis rgyu sa bon yongs su rtas pa yongs su zin pa ni dbaṅ daṅ ldan pa žes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 25a8-b1); 若加行所生善法。及 一分無記法生緣所攝受増盛因種子。名自在成就 (T. 1579; 587a18-19)
2.11) Vasubandhu defines bija as nothing more than nāmarūpa that is capable of producing result immediately (in the future) or later.

kim punar idam bijam nāma / yan nāmarūpam phalotpattau samarthaṁ sākṣāt pāram-paryena vā

(Pradhan: 64.4-5; T. 1558: 22c12-13; Poussin v. 1: 185; this statement is quoted by Samghabhadra [T. 1562: 398b11; Cox 1995: 196] and refuted [T. 1562: 398b12; Cox 1995: 196]. It is one of several statements about bija that Samghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21; Cox 1995: 197].)
2.11) The Śrāvakabhūmi identifies bīja with the saḍāyatanas or āśraya.

\[ 'o na rigs de 'i raṅ bzin ji lta bu že na / de ni lus las khyad par du gyur pa daṅ / skye mchéd drug gis zin pa daṅ / chos ŋid kyis thab pa daṅ / thog ma med pa'i dus nas brgyud de 'oṅs pa de lta bu yin te / gaṅ la 'di lta ste / rigs daṅ / sa bon daṅ / khamgs daṅ / raṅ bzin žes bya ba'i min gi rnam gneṅs 'di dag yod pa de ni rigs žes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; wi 2b1-3)]

sa bon de ni skye mchéd drug po de dag las logs sig na tha dad pa'i mtshan ŋid med do / thog ma med pa'i dus nas brgyud de 'oṅs pa daṅ / chos ŋid kyis thob pa'i skye mchéd drug po de lta bur gyur pa'i gnas skabs de la rigs daṅ / sa bon daṅ / khamgs daṅ / raṅ bzin žes bya ba'i min dan tha sñad de dag btags par zad pas (Yogācārabhūmi; wi 2b6-8); 即於如是種類分位六處殊勝。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得。於此立有差別之名。所謂種姓種子界性。是名種姓 (T. 1579: 395c24-27) \(^99\)

The Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇi on the Pañcaviṃśānāyanāmabhūmi identifies bīja with the saṁskāras and says that it is not a separate entity. It also says that bīja and phala (result) are different words for the same thing.

\[ de la sa bon gaṅ že na / sa bon\(^{101}\) ni 'du byed rnams las logs sig na rdzas gzan med de / 'du byed de ltar gyur pa daṅ / de ltar byun ba daṅ / de ltar gnas pa de dag ŋid la sa bon žes bya bar zad de / 'bras bu žes kyan bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 29b1-2); 復次種子云何非析諸行別有實物名為種子。亦非餘處。然即諸行如是種性如是等生如是安布。名為種子亦名為果 (T. 1579: 588c10-12)\(^{102}\)\]

---

\(^{99}\) See Yamabe 1990.

\(^{100}\) Neither of these passages is extant in Sanskrit.

\(^{101}\) Corrected from sa la sa bon on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

\(^{102}\) See Yamabe 1990.
2.12) Vasubandhu says that the means of producing result is a specific feature of
the transformation of the series (saṃtati pariṇāmaviśeṣa). He defines transformation
as the change-in-state of the series, and he defines the series as the samskāras as
causes and results in the three times. Finally, the Chinese translations define specific
feature as the capacity to produce a result immediately.

saṃtati pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ / ko 'yam pariṇāma nāma / saṃtater anyathātvam / kā ceyāṇi
saṃtatiḥ / hetupalalabbhūṣān trayadhivikāh samskārāḥ
(Pradhan: 64.5-6; T. 1558: 22c13-15; Poussin v. 1: 185; this statement is quoted by
Saṃghabhadra [T. 1562: 398b12-15; Cox 1995: 196], who says that Vasubandhu’s
idea of saṃtati pariṇāmaviśeṣa is inconsistent with his denial of the reality of past and
future [T. 1562: 398b15-17; Cox 1995: 196]. It is one of several statements about bija
that Saṃghabhadra later identifies as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 398b21;
Cox 1995: 197].)

---

103 何名差別謂有無間生果功能 (T. 1558: 22c15); 何者為勝類與果無間有生果
能 (T. 1559: 18b17). This explanation is found neither in the Sanskrit nor in the
Tibetan translation.
2.12) The Savitarkādi-bhūmi uses the phrase viśisṭā sanskārasantatiḥ pravartate in explaining how good or bad actions produce desired or undesired results.

yesu sanskāreṣu yac chubhāśubham karmotpamnaniruddhaṃ bhavati tena hetunā tenaprayayena viśisṭā sanskārasantatiḥ pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandhapatiitāy īśāṃśāphalaṃ nirvartate (Yogācārabhūmi: 128.2-4); 'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba’i las skyes nas ’gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des ’du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud ’jug pa de la ni bag chags ţes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdro pa daṅ mi sdro pa’i ’bras bu grub par ’gyur ba’i phyir (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 75b4-5); 謂於諸行中。為有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生(T.1579: 305b3-6)\(^\text{104}\)

\(^{104}\) See Yamabe 1990.
2.13) Vasubandhu approves of the Sautrāntika definition of prthagjanatvam as the saṃtati in which the āryadharmas have not yet arisen.

\textit{evaṁ tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / kathāṁ ca sautrāntikānām / anutpannārya-dharmasamantatiḥ prthagjanatvam iti}

(Pradhan 66.16-18; T. 1558: 23c2-3; Poussin v. 1: 193; Sarngabhadrā identifies the last sentence as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 399b10-11; Cox 1995: 203] and criticizes Vasubandhu for denying the real existence of prthagjanatvam [T. 1562: 399b11-c7; Cox 1995: 203-206].)\textsuperscript{105}

\textsuperscript{105} Cox points out that Vasubandhu does not specifically state here that prthagjanatvam is unreal, but she says that its unreality is implied in its definition as a saṃtati, “which, as a composite entity, cannot be real” (1995: 224 n. 109).
2.13) The Viśṣṭayamānaśrūṣṭi on the Pañcavijñānākāyamanobhūmi defines prthagjanatvam as a designation for the state in which the lokottara āryadharmanas have not yet arisen.

so so’i skye bo gnas skabs gan la gdags / mam pa du yod ce na / smras pa / ’jig rten las ’das pa ’phags pa’i chos ma bskyed pa’i gnas skabs la ’o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 77a8); 問依何分位建立異生性。此復幾種。答依未生起一切出世聖法分位。建立異生性 (T. 1579: 607c8-9)106

106 The other passage in the Viśṣṭayamānaśrūṣṭi that deals with the citta-viprayuktasamkāras says that prthagjanatvam refers to the seeds of darśanaheya dharmas in the three worlds that have not yet been destroyed (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 26b1-2; T. 1579: 587b25-26). I have argued that there is no contradiction between the two definitions in the Viśṣṭayamānaśrūṣṭi, or between this and the definition favored by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Kritzer 1999: 246-248).
2.14) Vasubandhu quotes the opinion of the pūrvācāryas, who say that the moment of consciousness after an unconscious trance arises from the body that is endowed with the sense organs because consciousness and the body endowed with the sense organs contain each other’s seeds.

\[ \text{āparē punar āhūḥ / kathāṃ tāvad ārūpyopapannānāṃ ciraniruddhe 'pi rūpe punar api rūpam jāyate / cittād eva hi taj jāyate na rūpāt / evam cittam apy asmād eva sendriyāt kāyāj jāyate na cittāt / anyonyabūjakam hy etad ubhayām yad uta cittam ca sendriyas ca kāya iti pūrvācāryāḥ} \]

(Pradhan: 72.18-21; T. 1558: 25c22-262.14; Poussin v. i: 212; Saṃghabhadra identifies this, without quoting it completely or exactly, as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 404a2-3; Cox 1995: 273] and criticizes it along with the seed theory that underlies it [T. 1562: 404a3-20; Cox 1995: 273-274].)
2.14) The Viniścayasamgrahani on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi states that, if the indriyas and the mahābhūtas that support them did not contain the seeds of consciousness and of the caittas, consciousness could not resume after the unconscious trances or birth in heaven.

Yogacārabhūmi

\[ gal \text{ te } dban \text{ po } gzugs \text{ can } ran \text{ gi } 'byun \text{ ba } chen \text{ po } dan \text{ bcas } pa \text{ dag } \text{ sens } dan \text{ sens las } byun \text{ ba'i chos } \text{ rnam } \text{ kyi } \text{ sa } \text{ bon } \text{ dan } \text{ ldan } \text{ pa } \text{ ma } \text{ yin } \text{ du } \text{ zin } \text{ na } / 'di na 'gog } \text{ pa la } \text{ sñoms par } \text{ žugs } \text{ pa } \text{ dan } / 'du \text{ šes } \text{ med } \text{ pa la } \text{ sñoms par } \text{ žugs } \text{ pa } \text{ dan } / 'du \text{ šes } \text{ med pa'i sens can lha rnam kyi na'n du skyes pa'i rnam par šes pa phyis yam 'byun bar mi 'gyur ba Žig na 'byun ste / de lta bas na dban po gzugs can sens dan / sens las byun bai sa bon dan ldan pa las brten te 'byun bar rig par bya'o (Yogacārabhūmi; zi 16a2-4); 復次若諸色根及自大種。非心心所種子所隨逐者。入滅盡定入無想定生無想天。後時不應識等更生。然必更生。是故當知心心所種子隨逐色根。以此為縁彼得更生 (T. 1579: 583c2-6)\]

107 Yamabe has identified the longer passage from which this is taken as the basis for the theory of the mutual perfuming of rūpa and vijnāna in the Abhidharmakosā-bhāṣya (2000a: 131-132).
Vasubandhu says that \textit{asamjñisamāpatti} and \textit{nirodhasamāpatti} are \textit{prajñaptis}, not real \textit{dharmas}. What prevents thoughts from arising is not \textit{asamjñisamāpatti} or \textit{nirodhasamāpatti} but the \textit{samāpatticitta} (the moment preceding the trance state). \textit{Asamjñi-samāpatti} and \textit{nirodhasamāpatti} are nothing more than the non-operation of thought.

\begin{quote}
\textit{samāpatticittenaiva tatpratibandhanāt/samāpatticittam eva hi taciittantaraviruddham utpadyate yena kalāntaram cittasyapravṛttimātram bhavati / tadviruddhāsrayāpādanāt / yā 'sau samāpattir iti praśnyayate taci cāpravṛttimātram na pūrvam āsūn na paścāt bhavati vyuṭhitasyeti sanskṛtā 'sau samāpattiḥ praśnyayate / athavā āśrayasyaiva tathā samāpādanaṃ samāpattiḥ}
\end{quote}

(Pradhan: 73.6-10; T. 1558: 26a13-19; Poussin v. 1: 214; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 403c25-404a1; Cox 1995: 272-273] and criticizes Vasubandhu’s statement that something can be \textit{sanskṛta} while at the same time being merely provisional [T. 1562: 404a21-27; Cox 1995: 274-275].)
2.15) The Viniścayasaṃgrahani on the Pañcaviṃśaṇakāyamanaḥbhumi states that asaṃjñisamāpatti and nirodhasamāpatti are the mere suppression and pacification, the mere non-operation, of citta and the caittas, and that they are prajñaptis, not real things.

de la ’du šes med pa’i sños par ’jug pa gan ’že na / dge rgyas kyi ’dod chags dañ bral la / goñ ma’i ’dod chags dañ ma bral ba’i ’byuñ ba’i ’du šes sṅon du btañ ba’i yid la byed pas sens dañ sens las byuñ ba’i chos rnam ’gog pa tsam dañ / ņe bar ĵi ųiñ mi ’byuñ ba tsam ni ’du šes med pa’i sṅoms par ’jug pa šes bya ste / de yan btags pa’i yod pa yin gyi / rdzas su ni ma yin no (Yogācārabhumi; zi 38b4-6); 復次云何無想定。謂已離遍淨貪未離上貪。由出離想作意為先故。謂心心所唯滅靜唯不轉。是無名想定。此是假有非實物有 (T. 1579; 592c13-16)

de la ’gog pa’i sṅoms par ’jug pa gan ’že na / ci yan med pa’i skye mched kyi ’dod chags dañ bral goñ ma’i ’dod chags dañ ma bral yan ruñ ’/ ’dod chags dañ bral yan ruñ ba’i gnas pa’i ’du šes sṅon du btañ ba’i yid la byed pas sens dañ sens las byuñ ba’i chos rnam ’gog pa tsam dañ / ņe bar ĵi ųiñ mi ’byuñ ba tsam ni ’gog pa’i sṅoms par ’jug pa šes bya ste ’/ ’jug pa’i rnam par šes pa tsam ņe bar ĵi bar zad kyi / kun ği rnam par šes pa ņe bar ĵi ba ni ma yin no / de yan btags pa’i yod pa yin gyi rdzas su ni ma yin par rig par bya’o (Yogācārabhumi; zi 39a3-6); 復次云何滅定。謂已離無所有處貪未離上貪。或復已離田止息想作意為先故。

col. 3070-3071; 復次云何滅定。謂已離無所有處貪未離上貪。或復已離田止息想作意為先故。

108 Schmithausen suggests that the occurrence of the term ālayavijñāna here is a later addition, perhaps made by the compiler(s) of the Yogācārabhumi (1987: 271-272 n. 131).
2.16) Vasubandhu says that āyus (jīvendriya) is not a real dharma but merely a (provisional) term referring to the force resulting from past karma that determines the duration of the nikāyasabhāga. He compares it to the force contained in the seed that determines the time of the fruition of grain and to the force that determines the duration of the flight of an arrow.

na hi nāstīti brūmo na tu dravyāntaram / kīṃ tarhi / traidhātukena karmāṇā nīkāya- 
sabhāgaṇa śhītikālāvedhaḥ / yāvad hi karmāṇā nīkāyasabhāgaṇyāvedhaḥ kṛto
bhavaty etāvantaṃ kālam avasthātavyam itī tāvat so ṭvatiṣṭhate tad āyur ity ucyā
e / sasyānāṃ pākākālāvedhava śaṅkteṣu sthītikālāvedhavac ca
(Pradhan: 74.3-5; T. 1558: 26b14-20; Poussin v. 1: 216-217; Saṅghabhadra identifies
this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 404b26-c3; Cox 1995: 291] and
criticizes it, denying that the force referred to by Vasubandhu can continue without
interruption and showing that the suggested similes are not apposite [T. 1562: 404c3-22;
Cox 1995: 291-292].)
2.16) The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi states that jīvitendriya is the force that, due to previous karma, determines the duration of an ātmabhāva born in a particular place.

\[\text{de la srog gi dbaṅ po gaṅ Ḿe na sñon gyī lus kyis de daṅ der lus mṅon par grub pa gnas pa'i 'dus ſes pa' phaṅs pa ni tshe daṅ srog}\text{109 daṅ srog gi dbaṅ po ſes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 25b2-3); 復次云何命根。謂由先業於彼彼處。所生自體所有住時限量勢分。説名為緣生氣命根 (T. 1579: 587a21-23)}

For a similar definition, see also Yogācārabhūmi; zi 76b7-8; T. 1579: 607b15-16.

Elsewhere in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi, jīvitendriya is explicitly stated to be a prajñapti.

\[\text{smras pa / srog gi dbaṅ po de ſnid yin te btags pa' i chos yin pa' i phyir ro (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 98a2); 答此命根是假法故 (T. 1579: 616a6-7)}\]

\text{109 Corrected from srogs on the basis of the Derge.}
2.17) Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that the *samskrta-lakṣaṇas* are not real entities since, unlike real *dharma*s such as *rūpa*, they cannot be known by perception, inference, or scripture.

\[\text{tad etad ākāśaṁ pātyata iti sautrāntikāḥ / na hy ete jātyādayo dharmā dravyataḥ} \]
\[\text{samvidyante yathā vibhajyante}^{110} / \text{kim kāraṇam/pramāṇābhāvāt/ na hy eṣāṁ dravyato} \]
\[\text{'stite kiñcid api pramāṇam asti pratyakṣam anumānām āptāgamo vā yathā rūpādīnāṁ dharmāṇāṁ iti} \]

(Pradhan: 76.20-23; T. 1558: 27b24-26; Poussin v. 1: 226; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 406b16-20; Cox 1995: 311-312] and criticizes it on the grounds that Vasubandhu must accept the provisional reality of the *samskrta-lakṣaṇas*; however, according to Saṃghabhadra, their provisional reality cannot be proven by perception or scripture, while proof by inference of their provisional reality would imply proof by inference of their ultimate reality [T. 1562: 406b20-29; Cox 1995: 312].)

---

{110} Emended from *abhivyajyante* by Shastri (v. 1: 257.2), presumably on the basis of Yaśomitra (173.26). This emendation is not made by Hirakawa, but it is accepted by Cox (1995: 358 n. 31).
2.17) The Viniścayasamgrahani on the Pañcavijñānakāyamārgabhūmi asks why the four sanskritalaksana, including jāti, are not real entities, separate from rūpaskanda, etc.

\[
\text{ci'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa 'du byed rnams las skye ba dan / rga ba dan / gnas pa dan / mi rtag pa ŋid dag rdzas gzan du yod pa ma yin par khoṇ du chud par bya ze na (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 21b1-2; 復次云何應知生老住無常離色等蘊無別實有 (T. 1579: 585c9-10))}
\]

This question is answered in the passage that follows (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 21b2-22a4; T. 1579: 585c10-28).
2.18) Vasubandhu says that the purpose of the *sūtra* statement that there are three *sanskṛtalakṣaṇas* is to show that the stream of *sanskāras* is conditioned and has originated conditionally, not to say that the *sanskṛtalakṣaṇas* belong to each moment (i.e., that each *sanskṛtadharma* is simultaneously associated with all three *sanskṛtalakṣaṇas*). This is because one cannot know the three *lakṣaṇas* of a moment.

granthajñō devānāṁ priyo na tv arthajñāḥ arthāś ca pratiśaraṇam uktāḥ bhagavatā / kaḥ punar asyārthāḥ avidyāndhā hi bālāḥ sanskārapraṇāhām ātmata ātmīyataś cādhimuktā abhiśvajante / yasya mithyādhirūkṣasya vyāvartanārthān bhagavāṁ tasya sanskārapraṇāhāsyas sanskṛtaṁ pratiṣamapannatāṁ dyotayītūkāma idam āha tṛiṇīmāni sanskṛtasya sanskṛtalakṣaṇāni / na tu kṣaṇasya / na hi kṣaṇasyoṭpādādayāḥ prajñāyante / na cāprajñāyamānā ete lakṣaṇaṁ bhavitum arhanti / ata evātra sūtre sanskṛtasyaṭpādo 'pi prajñāyata ity uktam

(Pradhān: 76.24-77.3; T. 1558: 27b28-c5; Poussin v. 1: 226-227; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the *sūtra*-master [T. 1562: 406c23-407a2; Cox 1995: 315] and argues at length that in fact the Buddha taught the three *sanskṛtalakṣaṇas* with respect to the moment and not to the stream [T. 1562: 407a2-b5; Cox 1995: 315-317].)
2.18) According to the Viniṣcayasaṃgrahānī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi, the Buddha mentioned only three samsārakālayamānas because the samskāras are analyzed in terms of the three times: jāti refers to samskṛtadharmas in the future, maraṇa to samskrītadharmas in the past, and sthiti (together with anyathāvya) to samskrītadharmas in the present.

gal te 'dus byas la 'dus byas kyi mtshan ŋid bzi po skye ba dañ / rga ba dañ / gnas pa dañ / 'jig pa 'di dag dmigs na ci'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis skye ba dañ / 'jig pa dañ gnas pa las gzan du 'gyur ba ŋid dañ gsum kho na gsums še na / 'du byed rnams ni 'dus gsum gyis rab tu phye ba yin te / des na ma 'ons pa'i 'dus na ma byun ba las 'byun bar 'gyur bas / de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis ma 'ons pa'i 'dus las brten te 'byun ba yan 'dus byas kyi mtshan ŋid yin par gsums so / 'byun ba rnams 'das pa'i 'dus su 'zig par gyur pas de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis 'das pa'i 'dus las brten te 'zig par yañ 'dus byas kyi mtshan ŋid yin par gsums so / gnas pa gann yin pa dañ / gzan du 'gyur ba ŋid gan yin pa'i mtshan ŋid ginis ni da ltar gyi 'dus kyi rab tu phye ba yin te / 'di ltar gnas pa yan da ltar gyi dus ŋid na dmigs pa yin la / sna ma ias phyi ma gzan ŋid du 111 gyur pa ŋid kyan da ltar kyi 'dus ŋid na dmigs pa yin pas / de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis da ltar byun ba'i 'dus las brten te / gnas pa dañ / gzan du 'gyur ba ŋid gcig tu bsdus nas 'dus byas kyi mtshan ŋid yin par gsums so (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 22a4-b1); 門若有為法。生老住滅四有為相具足可得。何故世尊但説三種。一生。二滅。三住異性。答由一切行三世所顯故。從未來世本無而生。是故世尊由未來世於有為法。說生有為相。彼既生已落謝過去。是故世尊由過去世於有為法。說滅有為相。現在世法二相所顯。謂住及異。所以者何。唯現在時有住可得。前後變異亦唯現在是。故世尊由現在世於有為法。總說住異為一有為相 (T. 1579: 585c29-586a8) 112

111 Corrected from gzan ŋid du gzan du gyur pa on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.
112 Although the focus of this explanation is different from that of Vasubandhu’s explanation, the substance is the same.
2.19) According to Vasubandhu, when the Buddha said that the arising, etc., of conditioned things is known, he was referring to the series, not to the moment, because the arising, etc., of a moment is impossible to know. (Later [see item 2.24], he says that the lakṣaṇas can be applied to the moment, as long as they are understood not to be real dharmas.)\(^{113}\)

\[
bhayāṁs āsaṃskārpravāhasya saṃskṛtavatśa pratītyasamutpannataṁ dyotayitukāma idam āha trīṇīṁni saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni / na tu kṣaṇasya / na hi kṣaṇasyotpādayāyā prajñāyante
\]

(Pradhan: 76.26-77.2; T. 1558: 27c3-5; Poussin v. 1: 226-227; Rospatt 1995: 60-64; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 406c28-29; Cox 1995: 315] and contradicts it, as mentioned in item 2.18 [T. 1562: 407a13-20; Cox 1995: 316].)

\(^{113}\) Note that this is a portion of the passage mentioned in item 2.18.
2.19) The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to contain an argument similar to Vasubandhu’s. Rospatt points out that the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* refers only to individual entities (1995: 64-65). However, there are several passages in which the *samskṛta-lakṣaṇas* are taken to refer to the series.

The *Vinīścayaśaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanoṇabhbhūmi*, in a list of varieties of the *lakṣaṇas*, mentions two types of jāti, at least, that apply to the series, *pratiṣamdhijāti* and *abhinirvṛttijāti*.

kun tu sbyor ba mtha 'dag yod pa 'am / kun tu sbyor ba ma tshaṅ ba yān ruṅ sems can gyi ris de daṅ / de nas și șphos nas sems can gyi ris de daṅ der phun po mňon par 'grub pa ni mtshams sbyor ba'i skye ba șes bya'o / thor bu daṅ gžon nu la sogs pa'i gnas skabs dag.\(^{114}\) nas rgas pa'i gnas skabs kyi bar du 'gyur ba ni mňon par 'grub pa'i skye ba șes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 23a1-3); 若具諸結或不具結。從彼彼有情聚沒往彼彼有情聚。諸蘊續生名相續生。若從嬰孩童子等位。乃至往趣衰老等位。名增長生 (T. 1579: 586a22-25)

Similarly, it mentions *saṃtatisthiti*.

de daṅ der mňon par 'grub pa'i lus de daṅ de dag zas de daṅ de la brten nas tshe ji srid par gnas pa daṅ / phyi rol gyi snod kyi 'jig rten rnambs bskal pa chen po'i mthar thug par gnas pa ni rgyun gnas pa șes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 24a4-5); 若諸衆生於彼彼處彼彼自體。由彼彼食為依止故。乃至壽住。外器世間大劫量住。名相續住 (T. 1579: 586c2-4)

In addition, the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* specifically states that the *lakṣaṇas* are established with respect to two contexts, that of rebirth and that of moments, but in both cases the text refers to the series (*rgyuen*).

mtshan rид gsum po de dag kyaṅ 'du byed kyi rgyun gnis la brten nas șes par 'gyur te / 'di tā ste tshe rabs gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa'i rgyun daṅ skad cig pa gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pa'i rgyun no / de la rgyun sīa ma șos kyi sems can gyi ris de daṅ der skye ba gan yin pa de ni skye ba'o / tha mar 'chi ba ni 'jig pa'o / thog ma daṅ tha ma'i bar gžon nu la sogs pa'i gnas skabs rnambs su ni gnas pa las gžan du 'gyur ba ste / tshe'i tshad ji tsam par gnas pas na gnas pa'o / gnas skabs phyi ma phyi ma'i bye brag yod pas na gžan du 'gyur ba'o / de nas rgyun phyi ma șos kyi skad cig skad cig la 'du byed rnambs sar pa sar pa skye ba gan yin pa de ni skye ba'o / skye ba'i skad cig pa de las lhag par mi gnas pa ni 'jig pa'o / skye ba'i skad cig pa tsam la gnas pa ni gnas pa'o (Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 204b 8-205a4); 如是三相

\(^{114}\)Corrected from *dags* on the basis of the Derge.
Chapter 2  Indriyanirdeśa
2.19 continued) 依二種行流轉安立。一依生身展轉流轉。二依刹那展轉流轉。依初流轉者。謂於彼彼有情衆同分中。初生名生。終沒名滅。於二中間嬰孩等位立住異性。乃至壽住說名爲住。諸位後後轉變差別。名住異性。依後流轉者。謂彼諸行剎那剎那新新而生。說名爲生。生剎那後不住名滅。唯生剎那住故名住 (T. 1579: 795c22-29)\(^{115}\)

\(^{115}\) Rospatt points out that both the Abhidharmasamuccaya (18.31-19.1) and the Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun (T. 1602: 550c16-20) apply the lakṣaṇas to the series. However, in another passage, the Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun applies them to all sanskritadharman (T. 1602: 484b15-18).
2.20) Vasubandhu says that that which is not known should not be called a *lakṣaṇa*.

_"na cāprajñāyamānā ete lakṣaṇam bhavitum arhanti"

(Pradhan: 77.2-3; T. 1558: 27c6; Poussin v. 1: 226-227; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 407b5-6; Cox 1995: 317] and says that certain _lakṣaṇas_ that are unknowable to the ordinary mind actually exist [T. 1562: 407b6-8; Cox 1995: 317].)
2.20) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says that at every moment only the *saṃskāra* can be perceived; none of the *saṃskṛta* *alakṣaṇas* can be separately perceived. (However, a connection with Vasubandhu’s statement here is doubtful.)

*tatra bodhisattvavaha saṃskāramātraṃ sthāpayitvā na tasya jātiṃ na sthitiṃ na jarāṃ nānityatāṃ sarvakālaṃ dravyavabhāvapariniśpatitāḥ paśyati / tat kasya hetoh saṃskāramātram utpadyaṃṇaṃ upalabhate nāsyānyāṃ jātiṃ na sthitiṃ na jarāṃ nānityatāṃ (Bodhisattvabhūmi: 279.6-11); de la byaṅ chub sens dpa’ ni ’du byed tsam ma gtogs par de’i skye ba dañ gnas pa dañ / rga ba dañ / mi rtag pa’i rdzas kyi no bo ņid yons su grub pa rtag tu ma mthon no / de ci’i phyir že na / des ’du byed tsam žig ’byuṅ bar dmigs par zad kyi / de’i skye ba dañ / gnas pa dañ / rga ba dañ / mi rtag pa gzan ni ma dmigs te (Yogācārabhūmi; 167b1-2); 此中菩薩觀一切時唯有諸行除此更無生住老滅。恒有實物自性成就。何以故。諸行生時唯即如是諸行可得。無別有餘生住老滅 (T. 1579: 544b17-20; Rospatt 1995: 64)
2.21) Vasubandhu explains that the fact that the sūtra uses the word saṃskṛta twice does not indicate that the saṃskṛtas and the saṃskṛtalakṣāṇas are different entities.

punah saṃskṛtagrahaṇaṃ saṃskṛtate lakṣāṇānīti yathā vijñāyeta / maivam vijñāyi saṃskṛtasya vastuno 'stitve lakṣāṇāni jalabalākāvat sādhvasādhutve vā kanyā- lakṣāṇavad iti

(Pradhan: 77.4-5; T. 1558: 27c8-9; Poussin v. 1: 227; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 407b12-14; Cox 1995: 318] and gives several different reasons why the fact that the word saṃskṛta is used twice must indicate that saṃskṛtradharmas and the saṃskṛtalakṣāṇas are not identical [T. 1562: 407b14-24; Cox 1995: 318-319].)
2.21) (Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not mention that the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas have a separate existence, I cannot find anything resembling this argument of Vasubandhu’s in the Yogācārabhūmi.)

\[116\] However, a similar argument can be found in the Ch’eng wei-shih lun, although without the same examples (T. 1585: 5e23-25; Poussin 1928-1929: 64).
2.22) Vasubandhu gives his own explanation of the four lakṣaṇas: the first arising of the series of samskāras is jāti; the series in the state of cessation is called vyaya (here equivalent to anītyatā); the procession of the series is called sthiti; the difference between earlier and later moments of the stream is called anyathātvam.

Pradhāna: 77.5-7; T. 1558: 27c11-12; Poussin v. 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who, Saṃghabhadra says, is following the school of the Sthāvira [T. 1562: 407c9-11; Cox 1995: 320], and criticizes it at length, refuting Vasubandhu’s definitions of each of the four lakṣaṇas in turn [T. 1562: 407c17-408b28; Cox 1995: 321-326].


tatra pravāhasyādir utpādo nivṛttir vyayaḥ/ sa eva pravāho 'nuvartamānaḥ sthitiḥ/ iasya pārvaparaviśeṣaḥ sthityanyathātvam

(Pradhāna: 77.5-7; T. 1558: 27c11-12; Poussin v. 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who, Saṃghabhadra says, is following the school of the Sthāvira [T. 1562: 407c9-11; Cox 1995: 320], and criticizes it at length, refuting Vasubandhu’s definitions of each of the four lakṣaṇas in turn [T. 1562: 407c17-408b28; Cox 1995: 321-326].)
2.22) According to the Viniscayasamgrahani on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi, when, due to causes, formerly nonexistent sanskrta-dharmas arise, this is called jāti.117 When the sanskrta-dharmas that arise later are different from the earlier ones, this is called jara. When these sanskrta-dharmas, having been produced, persist for a limited time, this is called sthiti. And when, after the moment of production, the characteristics of these sanskrta-dharmas are destroyed, this is called cessation or anityatā.

de lta bas na skye ba la sogs pa yan 'du byed rnams la brtags pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'o / de la rgyu yod na raṅ gi mtshan ņid sñon ma byuṅ ba 'grub pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi skye ba žes bya'o / sña ma las phyi ma gžan ņid du gžan du 'gyur ba ņid ni 'du byed rnams kyi rga ba žes bya'o / skye ba'i dus tsam la gnas pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi gnas pa žes bya ste / de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed rnams kyi 'jig pa žes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 22a2-4); 故知生等於諸行中假施設。有由有因故諸行非本自相始起說名為生。後起諸行與前差別說名為老。即彼諸行生位暫停說名為住。生剎那後諸行相盡說名為滅。亦名無常 (T. 1579: 585c24-28; see Kritzer 1999: 234-235)

117 Miyashita finds in the Yogācārabhūmi the origin of the pen-wu chin-yu (本無今有) theory in the Abhidharmakosabhaṣya (1986).
Chapter 2 Indriyanirdeśa

2.23) In support of his understanding of the *samskrta lakṣaṇas* (see the previous item), Vasubandhu quotes a *sūtra* passage in which Nanda is commended for knowing the arising, the abiding, and the destruction of feelings.\(^{118}\)

\[\text{evam ca kṛtvoktaṁ viditā eva nandasya kulaputrasya vedanā upadyante viditā avatiśṭhante viditā astam parikṣayaṁ paryādāṇam gacchantīti} \]

(Pradhan: 77.7-8; T. 1558: 27c13-14; Poussin v. 1: 227; Saṃghabhadra quotes the same *sūtra* passage [T. 1562: 407c12-13; Cox 1995: 320] and says that Vasubandhu’s position is not supported by the *sūtra*, which suggests that Nanda knows past and future feelungs, while Vasubandhu denies the existence of past and future dharmas [T. 1562: 408b28-c5; Cox 1995: 326-327].)

\(^{118}\) *Saṃyuktāgama* *sūtra* no. 275 (T. 99: 73a22-c21, specifically 73b23-25). For parallels, see Pāśādika 1989: 39.
2.23) (The same sūtra passage is commented upon in the Vastusamgrahanī [Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 269a3-270a3; T. 1579: 821a19-b21]. However, the context is different, and it does not appear to have any relevance to the discussion in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.)

\[\text{\textsuperscript{119}}\text{Specifically Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 269a8-b1; T. 1579: 821a29-b2. See Mukai 1985: 33.}\]
2.24) Vasubandhu says that the *lakṣaṇas* can be applied to the moment, as long as they are recognized as not being real *dharmas*: *jāti* is the existence of that which formerly did not exist; *vyaya* is the nonexistence of that which existed; *sthiti* is the connection between earlier and later moments; and *sthityanyathātva* is the difference between earlier and later moments.

*pratikṣaṇām cāpi saṃskṛtasyaitāni lakṣaṇāni yuyante vinā 'pi dravyāntaraśītaśānayā / katham iti / pratikṣaṇām abhūtvā bhāva utpādāḥ / bhūtvā 'bhāvo vyayaḥ / pūrvasya pūrvasyottaraśītanubandhah sthitiḥ / tasyāvisadṛśatvam sthityanyathātvaḥ iti / yadā tarhi sadṛśā utpadyante / na te nirviśeṣā bhavanti*

(Pradhan: 77.18-22: T. 1558: 27c28-28a3; Poussin v. 1: 229; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 408c7-12; Cox 1995: 327] and argues that calling the *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas* provisional in this context leads to contradictions that can only be reconciled by admitting that the *lakṣaṇas* are real *dharmas* [T. 1562: 408c12-409a2; Cox 1995: 327-329].)
2.24) The Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi defines jātī and vyaya in terms identical to those of Vasubandhu.

ma byun ba las 'byun ba ni 'byun ba yin la / byun nas med par 'gyur ba ni 'jig pa yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 22b6-7); 本無今有是名為生。有己還無是名為滅 (T. 1579: 586a17-18)

At the end of an enumeration of different types of jarā, the Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi states that there is, in addition, one type that can accomplish (become?) all the others, namely jarā that is the nature of all sanskṛta-dharmas to change from moment to moment.

gaṇ la rten nas rga ba'i rnam pa ji skad bstan pa de dag thams cad 'byun bar 'gyur ba'i rga ba gcig pa yan yod de 'du byed rnam s kyi skad cig skad cig la gzan nīd du 'gyur ba rga ba gaṇ yin pa'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 24a2); 前有一老為緣。能成如上所說一切種老。所謂諸行剎那剎那轉異性老 (T. 1579: 586b26-28)

(I cannot find a definition of sthiti in the Yogācārabhūmi that closely resembles Vasubandhu’s in wording.)
2.25) Vasubandhu argues that, if the sanskritalakṣaṇas were real, the production, cessation, etc., of the sanskritadharmas would be simultaneous.

athāpi nāma dravyāntarānyeva jātyādīni bhaveyuh / kim ayuktam syāī / eko dharmāḥ ekasminn eva kāle jātaḥ sthito jīrṇo naṣṭaḥ syād eśāṁ sahabhūtvāt

(Pradhan: 78.10-12: T. 1558: 28a22-23; Poussin v. 1: 231; Sāṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 409a2-4; Cox 1995: 329] and, as Cox points out [1995: 366 n. 92], relies on the theory of the difference between kārita and sāmarthya in arguing that the activity of the different lakṣaṇas is not simultaneous [T. 1562: 409a4-c8; Cox 1995: 329-333].)
2.25) (Although the Yogācārabhūmi, like Vasubandhu, denies the reality of the sāṃskṛtalakṣaṇas, it does not seem to employ an argument similar to Vasubandhu’s.)
2.26) In connection with the preceding item, Vasubandhu says that, if the Sarvāstivādins maintain that the last three lakṣanās perform their function simultaneously, they must admit that a dharma persists, changes, and is destroyed at the same time.

kim ayaṃ tatra kāle tiṣṭhatvā āhosvij jīryatu vinaśayatu vā
(Pradhan: 78.19; T. 1558: 28b4; Poussin v. 1: 232; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 409c17-18; Cox 1995: 333] and criticizes it, although, as Cox notes [1995: 368 n. 106], the point that Saṃghabhadra makes is unclear [T. 1562: 409c18-21; Cox 1995: 333-334].)
2.26) (As in the case of item 2.25, the Yogācārabhūmi does not seem to contain a similar argument.)
2.27) Vasubandhu says that \textit{anyathāvya}, since it describes the difference between earlier and later states, cannot be applied to an individual \textit{dharma}, which cannot change.

\begin{quote}
\begin{footnotesize}syāc ca tāvad ekasya dharmasyotpānasyāvināśaḥ sthitāḥ vināśo 'nityatā / jara tu khalu sarvathātvena na tathā / pūrvāparaviśeṣāt viparītanāmāc ca / atas tadanyathātve 'nya eva / uktaṁ hi tathātvena jaraḥ 'siddhir anyathātve 'nya eva saḥ / tasmān naikasya bhāvasya jaraḥ nāmopapadyate
\end{footnotesize}
\end{quote}

(Pradhan: 79.5-9; T. 1558: 28b21-26; Poussin v. 1: 233; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 410a19-25; Cox 1995: 336] and again appeals to the reality of the three times and his own theory of \textit{kārita} in order to refute Vasubandhu [T. 1562: 410a25-c6, Cox 1995: 336-339].)
The following passage, already mentioned in item 2.24, may be relevant here:

At the end of an enumeration of different types of *jarā*, the *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* on the *Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanobhūmi* states that there is, in addition, one type that can accomplish (become?) all the others, namely *jarā* that is the nature of all *saṃskṛtadharmas* to change from moment to moment.

*gan la* rten nas rga ba'i rnam pa ji skad bstan pa de dag thams cad 'byun bar 'gyur ba'i rga ba gcig pa yam yod de 'du byed rnams kyi skad cig skad cig la gzan ņid du 'gyur ba rga ba gan yin pa'o (*Yogācārabhūmi*; zi 24a2); 復有一老為緣。能成如上所述一切種老。所謂諸行刹那刹那轉異性老 (*T. 1579: 586b26-28*)
Vasubandhu argues that nāma, pada, and vyañjana are sound by nature and therefore belong to rūpaskandha; thus, they are not cittaviprayuktasaṃskāras.

namo caite vāksvabhāvanāḥ chadbātmakā iti rūpasvabhāvā bhavanti / kasmāc cittavyayuktā ity ucyante

(Pradhan: 80.22-23; T. 1558: 29a23-24; Poussin v. 1: 240; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 413c11-13; Cox 1995: 383] and both quotes from sūtra and provides reasoned arguments to show that nāma, pada, and vyañjana are different from sound [T. 1562: 413c13-414a11; Cox 1995: 383-385].)
2.28) The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Cintāmaṇiprajñā Bhūmi includes nāma-kāya, padakāya, and vyanjanakāya, along with the other cittaviprayuktasamskāras, vijñapti, avijñapti, and bija, as prajñapti's, saying that they are nominal designations for sanskṛtadharmaṃ. (This passage denies their reality, but the reasoning is different from Vasubandhu's.)

\[ \text{\textquoteleft} \text{\textquoteright} \text{\textquotesingle} \text{dus byas kyi mi\textquoteright} \text{\textquotedbl} \text{gyi dnos po la skye ba dañ / rga ba dañ / gnas pa dañ / mi rtag pa dañ / sa bon dañ rnam par rig byed dañ / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa dañ / thob pa dañ / \text{\textquoteright} \text{thob pa ma yin pa dañ / srog gi dbañ po dañ / ris mthun pa dañ / miñ gi tshogs dañ / tshig gi tshogs dañ / yi ge\text{\textquoteright}i tshogs rnams dañ so so\text{\textquoteright}i skye bo ñid dañ / tshogs pa dañ ma tshogs pa dañ / \text{\textquoteright}jug pa so sor ñes pa dañ / sbyor ba dañ / mgyogs pa dañ / go rims dañ / dus dañ yul dañ grans ñe bar \text{\textquoteright}dogs pa dañ (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 208a4-6).} \text{\textquoteleft} \text{\textquoteright} \text{\textquotesingle} \]

The *Vivaranasaṃgrahaṇī, in a long discussion about language, gives a number of lists of *laksanārthas (hsiang-i 相義), one of which is neng-ch'uan hsiang 能詮相, which refers to the ability of speech to indicate. This is said to be synonymous with *parikalpitavahāvakṣana (pien-ch'i so-chi tsu-hsing hsiang 遍計所執自性相), which is further said to have many names, among them, "only consisting of sound" (wei yu yin-sheng 唯有音聲) and "not possessing marks" (wu-yu t'i hsiang 無有體相).

能詮相者。謂即於彼依止名等。為欲隨詮自性差別所有語言。應知此即是遍計所執自性相。此遍計所執自性。有差別名。所謂亦名遍計所執。亦名和合所成。亦名所增益相。亦名虛妄所執。亦名言說所顯。亦名文字加行。亦名唯音聲。亦名無有體相 (T. 1579: 751a24-b1)

---

120 The Ch‘eng wei-shih lun, however, follows Vasubandhu in arguing that they do not exist independently from rūpa (T. 1585: 6a21-6b11; Poussin 1928-1929: 668-70).

121 This passage is difficult, but a comparison between it and the passage in the Ch‘eng wei-shih lan mentioned directly above shows that they are related in meaning. The passage is lacking in the Tibetan.
2.29) Vasubandhu says that not all sound is speech, but only sound by which an object can be indicated.

naiva ghoṣamātraṃ vāg yena tu ghoṣeṇārthaḥ pratīyate sa ghoṣo vāk / kena punar ghoṣeṇārthaḥ pratīyate / yo 'rtheṣu kṛtvāvadhīr vaktybhis

(Pradhan: 80.24-25; T. 1558: 29a26-29; Poussin v. 1: 240; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 414a11-15; Cox 1995: 385] and insists that sound is not adequate for conveying meaning; in fact, syllables (izu future) give rise to nāmas, which convey meaning [T. 1562: 414a15-24; Cox 1995: 385-386].)
2.29) (The Yogaśrābhumi does not accept nāma as real, but it does not contain a statement similar to Vasubandhu’s, which is a response to a Sarvāstivādin argument.)
2.30) Vasubandhu argues that *nāma* cannot logically exist as a separate entity since it is neither produced nor manifested by speech.

*iddaṃ cāpi na jñāyate kathaṃ vān nāmnī pravartata iti / kim tāvad utpādayaty āhosvit prakāśayati / yady utpādayati / ghoṣasvabhāvatvād vācaḥ sarvaṃ ghoṣamātraṃ nāmotpādayiṣyati yādṛśo vā ghoṣaviśeṣa iṣyate nāmā utpādayaḥ sa evārthasya dyotako bhaviṣyati / atha prakāśayati / ghoṣasvabhāvatvād vācaḥ sarvaṃ ghoṣamātraṃ nāma prakāśayiṣyati yādṛśo vā ghoṣaviśeṣa iṣyate nāmnāḥ prakāśakaḥ sa evārthasya dyotako bhaviṣyati*  

(Pradhan: 81.5-10; T. 1558: 29b7-12; Poussin v. 1: 240-241; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 414a24-26; Cox 1995: 386] and rejects it, insisting that without *nāma*, the meaning of speech could not be understood [T. 1562: 414a26-b9; Cox 1995: 386-387.])
2.30) (As in item 2.29, Vasubandhu’s statement here is part of his response to the Sarvāstivādin argument. A similar statement does not appear in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
2.31) Vasubandhu says that *nāma* cannot be produced (or manifested) by speech because the moments of sound cannot come together, and no *dharma* is gradually produced in parts.

na khalv api śabdānāṁ sāmagryam asti kṣaṇākamīlanāṁ / na caikasya bhāgaśa utpādo yukta iti katham utpādayāntī vān nāmōtpādayet / katham tāvad attāpekṣāḥ paścimo vijñaptikṣaṇa utpādayat avijñaptim / evam tarhi paścima eva śabde nāmna utpādaṁ yo 'pi tam evaikaṁ śrṇoti so 'py arthaṁ pratipadyeta / athāpy evaṁ kalpyeta vāg vyañjanam janayati vyañjananāṁ tu nāmeti / atrāpi sa eva prasaṅgo vyañjanānāṁ sāmagryābhāvāt / esa eva ca prasaṅgo nāmnaḥ prakāśakatve vācaḥ / vyañjanaṁ căpi vāg viśiṣṭaprajñā apy avahitacetasā lakṣaṇataḥ paricchetuṁ notsahanta iti vyañjanasyāpi vāk naivotpādikā na prakāśikā yujyate

(Pradhan: 81.10-16; T. 1558: 29b12-20; Poussin v. 1: 241; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 415a25-b3; Cox 1995: 393-394] and claims that Vasubandhu’s argument contradicts his own rejection of the reality of past and future [T. 1562: 415b3-14; Cox 1995: 394].)
2.31) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi* says that sound does not travel relying on a series composed of *rūpa* that has come together: it is not like the light from a fire.\(^{122}\)

de la sgra ni brjod ma thag tu 'jig pa'i phyir gzugs 'dus pa la rgyun brtan pa ma yin te / yul de dañ phyi rol la dmigs pa yin no / de ni de las brten te lan cig byun ba na yul gañ du grag pa'i yul de thams cad du cig char kho nar khyab par byuṅ sté / me'i 'od dañ 'bra ba yin gyi ches che ba dañ che bar 'byuṅ žiṅ 'gro ba ni ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 55b4-5); 復次諸聲纔宣發已尋即斷滅。故於色聚中不恒相續。又此音聲依質生時。質處及外俱頓可得。隨所聞處於此處所。遍滿頓起如焰光明。非漸漸生展轉往趣 (T. 1579: 599a23-26)

---

\(^{122}\) The context of this passage is a discussion of *rūpa*, not of speech, but it seems relevant to at least the first part of Vasubandhu’s argument.
2.32) Vasubandhu suggests that vyañjana has a greater degree of reality than nāma or pada, which are merely collections of vyañjanas.  

\[ \textit{astu vā vyañjanamātrasya dravyāntarabhāvaparikalpanā / tatsamūhā eva nāma-kāyādayo bhaviṣyantiḥ apārthikā tatprajñaptiḥ} \]

(Pradhan: 81.22-23; T. 1558: 29b29; Poussin v. 1: 242; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 414b9-11; Cox 1995: 387] and criticizes it, saying that even though a collection is not real, that which arises depending on it can be real [T. 1562: 414b11-22; Cox 1995: 387-388].)

\[\textsuperscript{123}\]

\textsuperscript{123} As far as I can tell, the \textit{Vibhāṣā} does not state that vyañjana is in any way more basic than nāma or pada.
2.32) Vyañjanakāya is defined in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśaśīnākāyamanobhūmi as the collection of syllables that are the basis for nāmakāya and padakāya, and it is the most condensed indicator of that which is known and that which is expressed, although it makes known only sound, not meaning.

yi ge’i tshogs rnams gaṅ že na / miṅ gi tshogs daṅ / tshig gi tshogs kyi rten gyi dṇos por yi ge’i ’bru’i tshogs rnams ni yi ge’i tshogs mams žes bya ste / šes bya brjod par bya ba’i dṇos po la / thams cad las bsdus pa ni yi ge’o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 27a3-4);

云何文身。謂名身句身所依止性所有字身。是謂文身。又於一切所知所詮事中。極略相是文 (T. 1579: 587c15-17)\(^{124}\)

\(^{124}\) For a similar definition, see also the Abhidharmasamuccaya (19.3-4) and the Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun (T. 1602: 484b20-21).
2.33) Vasubandhu criticizes an objection to the Vaibhāṣika statement that future dharmas cannot be sabhāgahetu. According to this objection, future dharmas in the state of being produced are sabhāgahetu, and thus the statement in the Jñānapraśṭhāna, that a dharma that is a cause is always a cause, is not contradicted. Vasubandhu says that another statement in the Jñānapraśṭhāna, that something cannot be samanantarapratyaya when it has not been produced, applies also to sabhāgahetu.

tasyāyam aparihāro yasmāt sa dharma utpadyamānāvasthāyāḥ pūrvam sabhāgahetuḥ abhūtvā pāscāt bhavati / ihāpi ca praśne yo dharmo yasya dharmasya samanantarāḥ kadācit sa dharmas tasya dharmasya na samanantara iti śākymanayā kalpanayā vaktuḥ syān na kadācid iti / kasmād evam āha / yadi sa dharmo notpanno bhavatīti (Praḍhan: 86.6-9; T. 1558: 31b26-c2; Poussin v. 1: 258; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 422c23-25] and criticizes it on the grounds that sabhāgahetu, which, like a seed, continues to exist while being produced and has the ability to yield result after it already has been produced, actually does not resemble samanantarapratyaya, the efficacy of which is based on its departure, and which must therefore be produced before it can be called pratyaya [T. 1562: 422c25-423a4].)
2.33) (I have not been able to find any basis for Vasubandhu’s opinions regarding sabhāgaḥetu [items 2.33-2.35] in the Yogācārabhūmi, which does not recognize sabhāgaḥetu.)

---

125 The Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun contains a criticism of the concept of sabhāgaḥetu (T. 1602: 470a15-22).
2.34) Vasubandhu accuses the author of the *Jñānapraśṭhānaśāstra* of being bad at words, presumably for making statements that allow contradictory interpretations.

*evam sati ko guṇo labhyata ity akauśalam evātra śāstrakārasyaiva saṃbhāvyeta*

(Pradhan: 86.10-11; T. 1558: 31c4; Poussin v. 1: 259; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 423a8-9] and defends the *Jñānapraṣṭhāna* [T. 1562: 423a9-18].)
2.34) (see item 2.33)
2.35) As an example of a case in which a previously produced anāsravadharma is not sabhāgahetu with respect to a subsequent one, Vasubandhu says that when a person falls from a higher attainment (phala) and realizes a lower one, the higher attainment is not the cause of the lower.

syāt pūrvotpanno 'nāsravo dharmah paścād utpannasyānāsravasya na hetuh
(Pradhan: 88.10; T. 1558: 32b22; Poussin v. 1: 266-267; Samghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 424c25-26] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu should have simply stated that sabhāgahetu is unlike vipākahetu in that it does not necessarily yield result, or at a fixed time; for example, an arhat may have sabhāgahetu that have not yielded result, and yet he may enter nirvana [T. 1562: 424c26-425a15].)
2.35) (see item 2.33)
2.36) In a discussion of the meaning of vipākahetu, Vasubandhu criticizes the Vaibhāṣika understanding, which, according to him, states that any cause that produces a result that is necessarily morally different from it (i.e., a good or bad cause that produces a neutral result) is vipākahetu. He says that this implies that the other causes give result, albeit result that is not necessarily morally different. But Vasubandhu insists that vipāka must be produced by santatiparīnaṇāvīśeṣa and it must be “result-bound,” which Hsüan-tsang explains as limited in duration according to the strength or weakness of the cause.  

(visadṛśah pāko vipākah / anyeṣāṁ tu hetūnāṁ sadṛśaḥ pākaḥ / ekasyobhayatheti vaibhāṣikāḥ / naiva tu teṣāṁ pāko yuktāḥ / pāko hi nāma santatiparīṇāvīśeṣajāḥ phalaparyantaḥ / na ca sahabhūsamprayuktahetvoh santatiparīṇāvīśeṣajām phalam asti / na cāpi sabbhāgaheśādīnāṁ phalaparyanto sti / punaḥ punaḥ kuśalādyāsamsāraphalatvāt

(Pradhan: 89.24-90.3; T. 1558: 33a10-26; Poussin v. 1: 272 n. 1; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 427b18-22] and criticizes Vasubandhu’s representation of the Vaibhāṣika position, saying that the Vaibhāṣikas do not say that everything resulting from the six causes is pāka; even if they did, pāka would not be a synonym for phala, and it would not imply vipāka [T. 1562: 427b22-24].)  

126 随顺势力勝劣時有分限 (T. 1558: 33a20, 23)

127 There is a problem with the text here. Neither Paramārtha’s nor the Tibetan translation includes the passage referred to here. Saṃghabhadra quotes only the portion of this passage that presents Vasubandhu’s understanding of the Vaibhāṣika position, and he criticizes it. Saṃghabhadra does not comment on the portion in which Vasubandhu expresses his own opinion.
There are a number of statements in the Yogācārabhūmi according to which vipākaphala is the new entity born as a result of the good or bad karma of the previous life. In the Manobhūmi, the beginningless stream of bijas proceeds by renewing itself through repeatedly seizing the vipākaphala due to perfuming by good and bad karma.

sa ca bijasantarānaprabandho 'nādikālikah / anādikālikatve 'pi śubhaśubhakarma-
viśeśaparībhāvanayā punah punar vipākaphala-parigrāhān navībhavati 128 prādurdhūte ca phala upayuktaphalāṃ bhavati tad bijam / evam hi samśāraprabandhah
pravartate yāvan na parinirvātī (Yogācārarūpānīyam: 25.20-26.2); sa bon gyi rgyud
khyi rgyun de yān thog ma med pa'i dus nas yod la / thog ma med pa'i dus nas yod
pa ŋid du zin yān / dge ba dañ mi dge ba'i las khyi bye brag gis yonīs su129 bsgos pas
/ yān dañ yon ma par smin pa'i 'bras bu yonīs su 'dzin pa'i phyir sar par 'gyur ro
/ 'bras bu byun nas sa bon de 'bras bu spyad zin pa yin te / de ltar yonīs su mya nan
las ma 'das khyi bar du 'khor ba'i rgyun 'jug go (Yogācārarūpānīyam; dzi 14b3-5); 又
種子體無始時來相續不絕。性雖無始有之。然由善惡業差別熏發。望數數
take as its fruits. It is the fruition of karma from the past life that must result in rebirth is identified with vipākavijñāna in the present life.

sahā pratīyānasamutpāda exposition of the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, the vipākaphala that is the fruition of karma from the past life that must result in rebirth is identified with vipākavijñāna in the present life.

dattaphalam bhavati vipākataḥ (Yogācārābhūmi: 199.5-7);130 rnam par ses pa
de ŋid thun mtshams stbyar ma thag tu skyes nas myon bar 'gyur ba'i las gan yin pa
de / rnam par smin pa'i tshul gis 'bras bu 'byin bar 'gyur te (Yogācārarūpānīyam; dzi
116a1-2); 無時感生受業名已與異熟果 (T. 1579: 321a29-b1)

In the Vinīscayasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāryanobhūmi, it is said that when a stāvaka enters nirupadhiśesānirvāna, his seeds of good and neutral dharmas have been damaged because his seeds of defiled dharmas have been destroyed, and he can no longer produce vipākaphala in the future.

---

128 There is some question about the last two words of this sentence. See Yogācāra
bhūmi: 26 n. 1; Schmithausen 1987: 336 n. 417).

129 Corrected from loṅs su on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

130 I have incorporated Schmithausen’s corrections based on the manuscript (1987:
329 n. 374).
Chapter 2  Indriyanirdeśa
2.36 continued) 'phags pa ṇan thos phun po'; lhag ma med pa’i mya ṇan las 'das pa’i dbyiṃs su yoṅs su mya ṇan las 'das pa de’i dge ba daṅ / luṅ du ma bstan pa’i chos kyi sa bon gaṅ yin pa de ni kun nas ṇon moṅs pa can gyi sa bon yaṅ dag par bcom pa’i phyir ṇams pa yin pas des ni phyi ma la ṇnam par smīn pa mnīṅ par 'grub par byed pa daṅ / raṅ ṇid skye bar yaṅ mi nus te (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 17a5-7); 若聖弟子將入無餘涅槃界時。所有一切善及無記諸法種子皆被損害。由染污法種子滅故。不復能感當來異熟果。亦不復能生自類果 (T. 1579: 584a10-13)
2.37) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of the Sautrāntikas that the *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* are not real and separate *dharmas*.

*sarvam evaasaṃskṛtam adravyam iti sautrāntikāḥ / na hi tad rūpavedanādīvat bhāvāntaram āsti*

(Pradhan: 92.3-4; T. 1558: 34a12-14; Poussin v. 1: 278; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a21-23] and says that he will refute Vasubandhu by proving the reality of *pratisaṃkhyānirodha* and the other two *asaṃskṛta-dharmas* [T. 1562: 429a20-21].)
2.37) (I have not found any passage in the Yogācārabhūmi that explicitly states that the category of asamskṛta is not really existent. However, in various places the text questions or denies the real existence of pratisamkhyānirodha, apratisamkhyānirodha, and ākāśa [see below].)
2.38) In the continuation of the passage immediately above, Vasubandhu explains that ākāśa is merely an appellation for the absence of touchable things. If, in the dark, one does not touch anything, one says that there is ākāśa.

kim tarhi / spraṣṭavyābhāvamātram ākāśam / tadyathā hy andhakāre pratighātam avindanta ākāśam ity āhuḥ

(Pradhan: 92.4-5; 34a14-16; Poussin v. 1: 279; Samghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a23-25] and agrees that the absence of touchable things is called ākāśa, but he insists that ākāśa is nonetheless an independent entity [T. 1562: 429a27-430a7].)
2.38) The Vinīścayasamgrahani on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi says that ākāśa is simply an appellation expressing the absence of rūpa. If some place does not contain anything, the notion arises that the place contains ākāśa. Therefore, ākāśa is only a prajñapti and is not real. (Yamabe Nobuyoshi has noted the similarity between this passage and the Sautrāntika opinion in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya [personal communication].)

de la nam mkha’ gañ že na / gzugs med pa tsam gyis rab ti phye ba ni nam mkha’ yin te / ’di ltar gañ la gzugs yi rnam pa mi dmigs pa de la nam mkha’i ’du sès ’byun bar ’gyur pas de’i phyir de yan btags pa’i yod pa yin par rig par bya’i rdzas su ni ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 39b1-2); 復次虚空云何。謂唯諸色非有所顯。是名虚空。所以者何。若處所行都無所得。是處方有虛空想轉。是故當知此唯假有非實物有 (T. 1579: 593a15-18)

See also Vastusamgrahaṇi:

觀待假有者。謂虛空非擇滅等。虚空無為待諸色趣而假建立。若於是處色趣非有假說虚空。非離色無所顯法。外別有虛空實體可得。非無所顯得名實有 (T. 1579: 879a14-18).\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{131} Not in the Tibetan.
2.39) In the continuation of the same passage, Vasubandhu explains that *pratisaṃkhyāniruddha* is the non-arising due to wisdom of a new *anuśaya* or birth when the present *anuśayas* and birth have ceased.

*utpannānuśayajanmaniruddhaḥ pratisaṃkhyābalenānyasyānupādah pratisaṃkhyāniruddhaḥ*

(Pradhan: 92.5-6; T. 1558: 34a17; Poussin v. 1: 279; Samghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a25-26] and criticizes it in very great detail, thus indicating how important the real existence of *pratisaṃkhyāniruddha* is to the Sarvāstivādins system [T. 1562: 430a18-434b6]).
2.39) The Vastusamgrahani, in a definition of *phalaprajñapti (kuo chia-yu 果假有), mentions pratisamkhyanirodha, which, it says, is not nonexistent, since it is an attainment of the path, but is not really existent, since it is simply a designation for the total non-arising in the future of kleśas that have already been destroyed.

果假有者。所謂釋滅是道果故。不可說無。然非實有。唯約已斷一切煩惱。於當來世畢竟不生而假立故 (T. 1579: 879a5-8)\(^{132}\)

---

\(^{132}\) Not in the Tibetan. The Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun gives a definition of pratisamkhyanirodha that is similar but mentions prajñā: 釋滅者。謂由慧方便有漏諸行畢竟不起滅是離繫性 (T. 1602: 484c3-4).
2.40) In the continuation of the same passage, Vasubandhu explains that *apratisamkhyānirodha* is non-arising, due not to wisdom but to an insufficiency of conditions.

\[
\text{vinaiva pratisamkhyayā prayayavaikalyād anutpādo yah so 'pratisamkhyānirodhāḥ /}
\text{tad yathā nikāyasabhāgaseṣasyāntarāmaraṇe}
\]

(Pradhan: 92.7-8; T. 1558: 34a18; Poussin v. 1: 279; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 429a26-27] and again criticizes it in detail, questioning Vasubandhu’s reduction of *apratisamkhyānirodha* to “an insufficiency of conditions” and insisting that it is a real and independent *dharma* [T. 1562: 434b9-435b2].)
2.40) The Vīścayasaṁgrahāṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi says that apratisamkhyāniruddha is simply an appellation expressing destruction or pacification when a certain dharma, its conditions for arising having been actualized, does not arise because another dharma arises. Whenever the time for a dharma to be produced is exceeded, that dharma is destroyed and will not arise. (However, if the conditions for arising are encountered, it may arise in the future, so this is not an absolute destruction.) Because it has no separate svalakṣaṇa, apratisamkhyāniruddha is a prajñāpā, not a real entity.

so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa gaṅ ūne na / de las gzan pa skye ba'i rkyen mthon
du gyur pa na de las gzan pa skye bas / de las gzan pa mi skye ziṅ ne bar zi ba'i 'gog pa tsam ni so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa žes bya ste / gaṅ de'i tshe na ma skyes śiṅ skye bas'i dus las thal ba de ni de'i tshe na ma yaṅ skye bar mi 'gyur bas / de'i phyir de yaṅ btags pa'i yod pa yin gyi rdzas su yod pa ni ma yin te / de'i raṅ gi mtshan ŋid ni gzan cuṅ zad kyan mi dmigs so / de yaṅ chos kyi rnam pa daṅ ma bral ba'i phyir dus gzan gyi tshe rkyen daṅ phrad na 'byuṅ bar 'gyur bas de'i phyir so sor btags pa ma yin pa'i 'gog pa de ni gian du ba ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 39b2-5); 復次云何非擇滅。謂若餘法生緣現前。餘法生故餘不得生。唯滅唯靜名非擇滅。諸所有法此時應生。越生時故彼於此時終不更生。是故此滅亦是假有非實物有。所以者何。此無有餘自相可得故。此法種類非離繫故。復於餘時遇緣可生。是故非擇滅非一向決定 (T. 1579: 593a19-25)

See also Vastusaṁgrahaṇī

觀待諸行不俱生起。於未來世不法中。立非擇滅無生所顯。假說為有非無生所顯可說為實有 (T. 1579: 879a18-20)\textsuperscript{133}

\textsuperscript{133} Not in the Tibetan.
2.41) In a definition of puruṣakārāphala, Vasubandhu says that the efficacy (kārita) of a dharma is called puruṣakāra.

ko 'yaṃ puruṣakāro nāma / yasya dharmaṃya yat kāritram
(Pradhan: 95.2; T. 1558: 35a28-29; Poussin v. 1: 289; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 436a7-8] and criticizes it at length, saying that puruṣakāra is sāmarthya, not kārita, which is restricted to the result-projecting force of a present dharma; the types of simultaneous causes (samprayuktaḥetu and sahabhūḥetu) that produce puruṣakārāphala do not project result [T. 1562: 436a8-26].)\(^{134}\)

\(^{134}\) For a discussion of the distinction between kārita and sāmarthya in (neo)-Sarvāstivāda, see Cox 1995: 141-146. I am grateful to Fukuda Takumi for this reference, as well as for help in understanding Saṃghabhadra’s objection.
2.41) (The system of causality in the Yogācārabhūmi does not use the term kārita, in contrast with sāmarthya, to refer to the present activity of a dharma; for one thing, it does not admit the real existence of past and future dharmas, so it does not have to assign a special type of causal function to present dharmas to distinguish them from past or future ones [see the refutation of the reality of the past and future in the Viniścayasamgrahāṇī of the Pañcacāvijñānakāyamānabhubhi].

Although the Yogācārabhūmi does not use the term kārita in this context, the explanation of the svakarmakarana of dharmas in the Savitarkādi-bhubhi and of kāryakāraṇayuktī in the Śrāvakabhubhī both suggest that the role of the organ in

\[135\] Yogācārabhūmi; zi 14a6-15b4; T. 1579: 583a5-b17.

\[136\] svakarmakaranaṃ tadyathā caक्षुंशो दार्शानम् / evam avasīṣṭāṇāṁ indriyāṇāṁ svakasvakāṃ karma veditavyam / tatāḥ prthivī dhārayati / āpaḥ kledantya / agnir dahati / vāyuḥ sōṣayati evamvahāgyam bāhyānam api bhāvānam svakasvakāṅ karma veditavyam (Yogācārabhūmi: 106.6-9); rañ gi las byed de / 'di lta ste / mig gi las nila ba'o / de bžin du dban po lhag ma rams kyañ rañ rañ gi las byed par rig par bya'o / de bžin du sa ni rten par byed chu ni rlan par byed / me ni sreg par byed / rluñ ni skems par byed / de lta bu dan mthun pa'i phyi rol gyi dchos po rams kyañ rañ rañ las byed par rig par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; dži 63b5-7).

\[137\] kāryakāraṇayuktī (Wayman [1961: 79] gives kārya-kāraṇa-yukti[h katama /]) yā [ta]d utpannāṇāṁ skandhāṇāṁ svenā hetunā svena pratayena tasmāṁ tasmāṁ svakāryakarana viniyoga śadyathā / caक्षुंशा rūpāṇi draṣṭavyāṇi / śrotreṇa śabdāḥ śrotvayāḥ / yāvan manāsā dharmā vijñeyā iti / rūpeṇa caक्षुंशo gocare avasthātavyām / sabdānā śrotvasya evam vā[va]d dharmār manasa iti / yad vā punar anyad apy evamvahāgyam / tatra tatra dharmānāṁ anyonyam kāryakāreṇa pratiyuktir yoga upāya iyam ucyate / kārya[kā]|ranyuktī (Śrāvakabhubhī: 142.3-11; non-italicized portions represent my corrections); bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa gan že na / phun po rañ gi rgyu dan / rañ gyi rkyen gyis bskyed pa gan yin pa rams ni rañ gi bya ba byed pa de dan de dag la sbyor bar byed pa yin te / 'di lta ste / dper na mig gis [corrected from gi on the basis of the Derge, Sanskrit, and Chinese] gzugs rams la lta bar byed pa dan / rna bas sgra rams ūnam par byed pa dan / yid kyis [corrected from gi on the basis of the Derge, Sanskrit, and Chinese] chos rams sses par byed pa'i bar lta bu dan gzugs kyis mig gi spyod yul du gnas par byed pa dan / sgras rna ba'i spyod yul du gnas par byed pa dan / de bžin du chos rams kyis yid kyis spyod yul du gnas par byed pa'i bar lta bu dan / gnān yin de lta bu dan / mthun pa'i chos rams dan / de dan de dag gcig la cig bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa dan / sbyor ba dan thabs su gyur pa gan yin pa de ni bya ba byed pa'i rigs pa sses bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; wi 68a7-b3).

云何名為作用道理。謂諸蘊生已由自緣故。有自作用各各差別。謂眼能見色
耳能聞聲。鼻能嗅香舌能嘗味。身能覺觸意能了法。色眼境為眼所行。乃至法為意境為意所行。或復所餘如是等類。於彼彼法別別作用當知亦爾。即此諸法各別作用。所有道理瑜伽方便。皆說名為作用道理 (T. 1579: 419b16-23)
2.41 continued) producing sense consciousness is its activity. This is denied elsewhere by Samghabhadra,\textsuperscript{138} for whom this role is only the organ’s sāmarthya.)

\textsuperscript{138} See Cox 1995: 142-143.
2.42) According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the prāptis of the kusalamūlas that are obtained when someone first regains the kusalamūlas give result but do not project it. Vasubandhu corrects this statement: “only the prāptis of the kusalamūlas that were given up at the moment of destroying the kusalamūlas give result at the time of regaining the kusalamūlas but do not project it.” Yaśomitra explains this, saying that the Vaibhāṣikas do not make the necessary distinction between the past prāptis that are obtained when one regains the kusalamūlas and present prāptis that are also obtained at the same time. These present prāptis, unlike the past ones, also project their result (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 227.6-19; Poussin v. 1: 295 n. 1).

dvitiyā kusalamūlāni pratisaṃdadhāno yāḥ sarvaprathamaṃ pratilabhate / evaṃ tu vaktavyaṃ / syāt tā eva pratisaṃdadhānasya

(Pradhan: 96.20-21; T. 1558: 35c20-21; Poussin v. 1: 294-295; Samghabhādra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 438a19-20] and defends the Vaibhāṣika position, saying that the present prāpti is actually the result projected by the last moment of the past prāpti and therefore cannot project a new result [T. 1562: 438a20-25].)

\[139\] The root grah literally means “to take,” but Yaśomitra explains that in this context grah means “to project” by acting as a cause (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 226.12-13).
2.42) According to the Manobhūmi, the samucchinnakusālamūla destroys the kuśalamūlas, but the seeds of the kuśalamūlas are not completely destroyed. (See item 2.9.) The implication is that, in the person who regains the kuśalamūlas, these seeds give their result in the form of the actualized kuśalamūlas. Their result has already been projected, so they do not project it at the moment of regaining the kuśalamūlas.

kathāṃ kuśalamūlāni samucchinatti / tīkṣṇendriyasyādhīṃtraṇaṃ pāpāśayādhyā-
cāradharmasamanvāgatayā tadanulomamitrālābhatayā tasya ca mithyādrṣṭi-
paryavasthānasya ghanākaraṇaparyanopagamanatayā sarvapāpādhyācāreyā
asanmokākaukṛtyapratilābhatayā ca / tatra bijām api kuśalamūlaṃ / alobhādayo
‘pi kuśalamūlaṃ / kuśalamūlasamudācāravirdhena santānāsthāpanakusālamūla-
samucchedanaṇaḥ₁⁴₀ bijoddharanatayā ca / kathāṃ kuśalamūlāni pratisandadhūti / prakṛtyā tīkṣṇendriyatayā mitrajñātisahāyakānāṃ punyakriyābhisamyogas-
sandārātayā satpuruṣānupasanākrāmya saddharmaśrahanatayā vicikitsotpatti-
niścayādhihigamanatayā ca (Yogācārabhūmi: 14.18-15.6); ji ltar dge ba’i rtsa ba
rnams rgyun ’chad par byed ce na / dbaṅ po rno la sdig pa’i bsam pa šas chen po
la lhag par spyod pa’i chos dañ ldan pa dañ / de dañ mthun pa’i grols rned pa dañ
/ log par lta ba’i kun nas dkris pa de lhun stug par byed pas / mthar thug par ’gro
ba dañ / sdig pa thams cad la lhag par spyod pa dag la mi ldog ciṅ / ’gyod par
mi byed par ’gyur ro / de la sa bon yan dge ba’i rtsa ba yin la / ma chags pa la
sogs pa yan dge ba’i rtsa ba yin te / dge ba’i rtsa ba kun tu spyod pa dañ mi mthun
pas rgyud gnas par byed ciṅ / dge ba’i rtsa ba gcod pas sa bon ’byin pa’i byed
do / ji ltar dge ba’i rtsa ba rnams mtshams sbyor bar byed ce na / ran bzin gyis
dbaṅ po rno ba dañ / mdza’ bses’₁⁴₂ dañ / ṇe du dañ / rten grols rnams bsdod
nams bya ba la mṇon par brtson pa mthon ba dañ / skyes bu dam pa’i thad ē suṅ nas
dam pa’i chos ṇaṅ pa dañ / the tshom skye ziṅ ņes par rtsogs par byed do
(Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 8b8-9a4); 云何斷善根。謂利根者。成就上品詐惡意樂現
行法故。得隨順彼善友故。彼邪見縛極重圓滿到究竟故。彼於一切惡現行中
得無畏故。無哀愍故。能斷善根。此中種子亦名善根。無貪瞋等亦名善根。
但由安立現行善根。相違相續名斷善根。非由永拔彼種子故。云何續善根。
謂由性利根故。見親朋友修福業故。詮善丈夫聞正法故。因生猶豫證決定故。
還續善根 (T. 1579: 281a22-b2)

---

₁⁴₀ The manuscript reads samucchedo na bijoddharaitayā.

₁⁴₁ Derge reads pas.

₁⁴₂ Derge reads pas.

₁⁴₃ Corrected from mdza’ şes on the basis of the Derge.
According to the Vaibhāṣikas, the prāptis of the akuśala dharmas that are obtained when someone first falls from kāmavairāgya give result but do not project it. Vasubandhu corrects this statement: “only the prāptis of the akuśala dharmas that are abandoned when someone attains to kāmavairāgya give result at the time of falling from kāmavairāgya but do not project it.”

dvitiyā kāmavairāgyāt parihiyamāno yāḥ sarvaprathamaṁ pratilabhate / evaṁ tu vaktavyam / syāt tā eva parihiyamānasya

(Pradhan: 96.23-25; T. 1558: 35c24-25; Poussin v. 1: 295; Sanghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sutra-master [T. 1562: 438c29-b1] and says that the same arguments apply as in the case of the previous item [T. 1562: 438b1-2].)
2.43) In the Viścayasaṁgrahāṇī on the Pañcaviśñānakāyamanobhūmi, it is said that a prthagjana who attains the first dhyāna by means of laukikamārga only weakens the seeds of kleśas and other kāmadhātu dharmas, and so, when he falls from this dhyāna, the kleśas are again actualized.

so so'i skye bo 'jig rten pa'i lam gyi bsam gtan dañ po la sñoms par žugs šin skyes pa ni\textsuperscript{144} de las gzan pa 'dod pa na spyod pa'i chos ŋon mons pa can de dag gi sa bon gañ yin pa de ni ŋams pa yin gyi / yañ dag par bcom pa ni ma yin par rig par bya'o / de ci'i phyir že na / 'di ltar so so'i skye bo de ni tin ne 'dzin\textsuperscript{145} de las yons su ŋams nas yañ 'dod pa na spyod pa'i chos ŋon mons pa can rňams mňon du byed pa dañ / bsam gtan dañ po'i sñoms par 'jug pa de nas ši 'phos nas yañ 'dod pa'i khams su skye bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro (Yogācarabhūmi; zi 16a6-b1); 復次若諸異生由世間道入初靜慮。若得生彼爾時欲界諸染污法。及餘欲界諸法種子。但被損伏不能永害。何以故。由此異生從彼定退欲界染法復現前故。從初靜慮沒已。復還生欲界故 (T. 1579: 583c11-15)

\textsuperscript{144} Corrected from skyes pa'i on the basis of the Derge.

\textsuperscript{145} Corrected from tin 'dzin on the basis of the Derge.
2.44) Vasubandhu quotes an opinion according to which one, in a moment of *kuśalacitta*, can obtain six types of *cittas*. He states that this should be corrected to seven, specifying that at the moment of entering the *mārga*, one obtains *śaikṣacitta*, while at the moment of attaining arhatship, one obtains *aśaikṣacitta*.

*anye punar abhedenāhūḥ / klīṣte citte navānāṃ hi lābhaḥ ity ucyate buddhaiḥ / śaṅcām tu kuśale citte tasyaivāvyākṛte khalu / tatra saptānāṃ kuśale citta iti vaktavyam / kāmāvacārasya kuśalasya samyagdṛṣṭyā kuśalamūlapratisamdhānāt kāmarūpāvacārayor anivṛtyāvyākṛtayor vairāgyataḥ rūpārūpyāvacārayoh kuśalayos tat asty asamādhilābhataḥ śaikṣaśaikṣasya ca nīyāmāvākrānty arhātavayoḥ śeṣam ata eva vyākhyānād avadhāryam*

(Pradhān: 109.21-110.2; T. 1558: 40c5-12; Poussin v. 1: 330-331; Sarṇghabhadrā identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 456a1] and explains that these last two moments are mentioned as one since they are both *anāśrava* [T. 1562: 456a1-2].)
2.44) (I have found no similar enumeration of *kuśalacittas* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, it is perhaps possible that Vasubandhu’s insistence on listing *śāikṣacittas* and *aśāikṣacittas* as separate items has something to do with an issue mentioned by Schmithausen [1987: 147-148], namely the existence of a type of morally neutral *satkāyadrṣṭī* that can “occur even in Śāikṣas” [1987: 148, 439 n. 28]. To the extent that the *śāikṣa* has such a *drṣṭi*, even though it is not *akuśala*, Vasubandhu may have thought that the *śāikṣacitta* was significantly different from that of the *aśāikṣa* and should not be conflated with it.)

---

146 See the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*:

```text
[Translation]

See also the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*:

bdag tu lta ba rnam pa bē ni ṇa’o sūam pa’i brgyal skye ba’i rkyen gyi bya ba byed pa yin te / ’di lta ste rnam par brtags pa ni ’di las phyi rol pa’i mu stegs can rnam s kyi gan yin pa’o / lhan cig skyes pa’i tha na ri dags dan bya ba rnam s la yañ yod pa gan yin pa’o (Yogācārabhūmi, zi 112b6-113a1); 復次有四種我見所依止能生我慢。一有分別我見。謂諸外道所起。二俱生我見。謂下至禽獸等亦能生起 (T. 1579: 779c10-12)

147 Elsewhere, as Schmithausen (1987: 439 n. 928) notes, Vasubandhu attributes the assertion of the existence of such a *sahaja satkāyadrṣṭī* to the *pīrvācāryas* (Pradhan: 290. 19-21; T. 1558: 102c26-27; Poussin v. 4: 41).```
3.1) According to Vasubandhu, in ārūpyadhātu there is no support for consciousness external to consciousness itself. (According to the Ābhidhārmikas, the support is nikāyasabhāga and jīvitendriya.) The projecting cause (ākṣepahetu) is sufficient to establish consciousness in a new lifetime, regardless of whether the realm contains rūpa or not.

\[
\text{tasmān nāsty arūpiñāṃ sattvānāṃ cittasantater anyaṃ niśraya iti sautrāntikāḥ / api tu yasyāś cittasantater ākṣepahetur avītālreṇo rūpe tasyāḥ saha rūpeṇa saṃbhavād rūpaṃ niśrītya pravṛtīr yasyāḥ tu hetur vītālreṇo rūpe tasyāḥ anapekṣya rūpaṃ pravṛtīh / hetos tadvimukhatvād iti}
\]

(Pradhan: 112.18-20; T. 1588: Poussin v. 2: 6; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 458c1-8] and criticizes it, insisting that nikāya-sabhāga and jīvitendriya are necessary to support consciousness in the absence of rūpa and showing that Vasubandhu’s explanation regarding ārūpyadhātu is inconsistent with how consciousness arises in the other realms [T. 1562: 458c8-458c25].)

---

\[148\] On this occasion, Vasubandhu does not explicitly deny the reality of nikāyasabhāga and jīvitendriya. However, Saṃghabhadra, using the term ching-chu ("sūtra-master"), points out that Vasubandhu’s rejection of the Ābhidhārmika position is based on such a denial (T. 1562: 458b19-c1).
The Viniścayasamgrahani on the Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi includes nikāya-sabhāga and jīvintendriya, along with the other cittaviprayuktasamskāras, in a long list of samśkritadharmas that are prajñāpti and thus not real (see item 1.3).

'tus byas kyi min can gyi dnos po la skye ba dan / rga ba dan / gnas pa dan / mi rtag pa dan / sa bon dan rnam par rig byed dan / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa dan / thob pa dan / 'thob pa ma yin pa dan / srog gi dban po dan / ris mthun pa dan / min gi tshogs dan / thig gi tshogs dan / yi ge'i tshogs rnam s dan so so'i skye bo ūd dan/tshogs pa dan ma tshogs pa dan / 'jug pa so sor nes pa dan / sbyor ba dan / mgysogs pa dan / go rims dan / dus dan yul dan grants ūe bar 'dogs pa dan (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 208a4-6); 亦於有為諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有表無表得命根衆同分。名身句身分身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16)

The Savitarkādi-bhūmi specifies that the samskāras perfumed by karma, i.e., ākṣepahetu, which consists of bijas, project a new lifetime in all three realms.

tatra vāsanāhetvadhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāyaākṣepahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetōḥ / tathā hi / subhāsubhakkarmaparibhāvitāḥ samskārās traiḍhātukeṣṭiṣṭhānte avatāvatiṣvāvatiṣṭhānābhāvān ākṣiptāni (Yogācārabhūmi: 107.20-108.2); de la rgyu'i gnas bag chags la brten nas / 'phen pa'i rgyu 'dogs par byed de / de ci'i phyir že na / 'di ltar dge ba dan / mi dge ba'i las kyi yonis su bsgos pa'i 'du byed rnam kyis kham gsum du sdlg pa dan / mi sdlg pa'i 'gro ba rnam s / sdlg s pa dan mi sdlg pa'i lus rnam 'phen par byed pa dan / de ūid kyi dban gis phyi rol gyi dnos po rnam kyon / phan sum tshogs pa dan / rgyud par 'gyur ba'i phyir te / de bas na 'du byed rnam kyis dge ba dan mi dge ba'i las kyi bag chags la brten nas 'phen pa'i rgyu 'dogs so (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 64b5-8); 依習氣因依處。施設牽引因。所以者何。由淨不淨業薰習三界諸行。於愛愛趣中牽引愛不愛自體。又即由此增上力故外物盛哀。是故依諸行淨不淨業習氣依處。施設牽引因 (T. 1579: 301b28-c3)\(^{149}\)

The Viniścayasamgrahani on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi says that, if consciousness did not contain the seeds of rūpa, rebirth after falling from ārūpyadhātu would be impossible.

gal te rnam par šes pa gzugs kyi sa bon dan ldan pa ma yin du zin na / so so'i skye bo gzugs med pa rnam s su skyes pa tshe zad ci'n las zad nas de nas 'ci 'pho zin yah 'og tu skye pa'i gzugs kyi sa bon med pas 'byun bar mi 'gyur ba žig na 'byun ste / de lta bas na gzugs kyi sa bon dan ldan pa'i rnam par šes pa de la brten nas / de'i gzugs

\(^{149}\) For other relevant definitions of ākṣepahetu in the Yogācārabhūmi, see Kritzer 1999: 155-165.
Chapter 3  Lokanirdeśa
3.1 continued) 'byun bar rig par bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 16b4-6; see Schmithausen 1987: 21, 288 n. 172 b); 復次若諸識非色種子所隨逐者。生無色界異生。從彼壽盡業盡沒已還生下時。色無種子應不更生。然必更生。是故當知諸色種子隨逐於識。以此為緣色法更生 (T. 1579: 583c7-10)\(^\text{150}\)

\(^{150}\) The Vastusamgrahāṇī also says that the bijas of rūpa exist in ārūpyadhātu consciousness: gzugs med pa dag ni rnam par ’ses pa med la yān brten la gzugs kyi sa bon la yān brten to / miṅ daṅ gzugs kyi sa bon yān rnam par ’ses pa la brten ciṅ ’dug sie / gzugs kyi rgyan chad zin pa las kyaṅ gzugs kyi sa bon de las phyi ma la ’byun bar ’gyur te (Yogācārabhūmi; ’i 285b7-286a1); 在無色界。諸有情類識。依於名及色種子。名及色種依識而轉。由彼識中有色種故。色種間斷後當更生 (T. 1579: 827c29-828a2). This would appear to be an example of a case in the Yogācārabhūmi in which consciousness in ārūpyadhātu maintains a connection with matter (see Schmithausen 1987: 47-50).
3.2) In a discussion of the vijñānasthitis, Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of the Sautrāntikas that the Ābhāsvara gods are said to have different ideas because, at the time of destruction of the universe, some of them have the idea of fear, while others do not. (According to the Vaibhāṣikas, it is because their feelings alternate between pleasant and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant.)

sautrāntikā vyācakṣate / sūtra uktaṁ yathā te nānātvasaṃjñinē / tatra ye sattvā ābhāsvare devanikāye 'ciropapannā bhavanti naiva saṃvartanikusalā na vivartanikusalā asya lokasya te tāṁ arciṣaṁ drṣṭvā bhūtāḥ santa uñvijante samvegam āpadyante / sahaivaśā 'ṛciḥ śūnyaṃ brāhmaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhvā 'ṛvāg āgamīṣyatī / tatra ye sattvā ābhāsvare devanikāye ciropapannāḥ saṃvartanikusalā vivartanikusalās cāsya lokasya te tāṁ sattvān bhūtān āsvāsayantī / mā bhaiṣṭa māṛṣṭā mā bhaiṣṭa māṛṣṭā / pūrvaṃ apy eṣā 'ṛciḥ śūnyaṃ brāhmaṃ vimānaṃ dagdhvā 'traivāntarhitē ti / āto 'ṛciḥ āgamavypagama saṃjñitvāt bhūtā bhītasamjñītvāc ca te nānātvasaṃjñīno na sukhādūkhāsukhasaṃjñītvād iti

(Pradhan: 116.16-23; T. 1588: 43a10-19; Poussin v. 2: 20; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the position of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 463b5], with which the Sthavira’s position is said to agree [T. 1562: 463b11-13], and he rejects it, saying that fear is inconsistent with vijñānasthiti, which implies pleasant feelings and mental stability [T. 1562: 463b6-11].)

\[151\] Before this item, in the context of a discussion of whether antarābhava is a gati, Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of “others” that the gatis can be kuśala and klīṣta. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, they must only be avyākṛta (Pradhan: 115.3-6; T. 1558: 42b13-16; Poussin 2: 14). Saṃghabhadra identifies the opinion mentioned by Vasubandhu as the argument of the sūtra-master (T. 1562: 459c2-5) and criticizes it (T. 1562: 459c5-460a21). But P’u-kuang says that this is a Mahāsāṃghika position (T. 1821: 152a14). I have found nothing in the Yogācārabhūmi to suggest disagreement with the Vaibhāṣika position on this issue.

Saṃghabhadra refers to the sūtra-master three more times (T. 1562: 460b11, 26, 29) in the remainder of the discussion (Pradhan: 115.6-13; T. 1558: 42b17-28; Poussin 2: 14; T. 1562: 460a21-460b29).
3.2) According to the Śrūṣṭi-Bhūmi, the Ābhāsvara gods have different ideas because when they see Brahmā’s conflagration, some are afraid and some are not.

'od gsal gyi lha gnas na ni sna phyir skyes pa rnams / tshaṅs pa’i ’jig rten tshig pa’i me lce mthon ba las ’jigs pa dan / mi ’jigs pa’i ’du šes su ’gyur bas / de dag ni ’du šes mi ’dra bar rig par bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; 211a5-6): 光音天衆先後生者。由観梵世猛焰熄然。爾時便有怖不怖想。是故於彼有異類想 (T. 1579: 354e20-22)
3.3) One of Vasubandhu’s explanations for why there are only four vijñānasthitīs (i.e., why vijñānaskandha is not also a vijñānasthiti) compares vijñāna to a seed and vijñānasthiti to a field: these two must be different.

\[
\text{api ca kṣetrabhāvena bhagavataḥ catasro vijñānasthitayo deśitāḥ / bijabhāvena ca}
\]

\[
sopādānāṃ vijñānāṃ kṛtāṃ evetī na punar bijaṃ bijasya kṣetrabhāvena vyavasthāpayāṃ babhāvety abhiprayaṃ parikalpaṃ bābhāvati ye dharmāḥ sahavartino vijñānasya te 'syā kṣetrabhāvena sādhīyāṃso bhavantītī ta evāsya sthitaya uktāḥ}
\]

(Pradhan: 118.10-13; T. 1588: 43c8-c14; Poussin v. 2: 25-26; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 465b7-14] and says that the simile of seed and field is valid since it does not contradict sūtra, but he rejects Vasubandhu’s explanation of the simile for several reasons [T. 1562: 465b14-c9].)
3.3) The Vastusamgrahaṇī (Yogyācārabhūmi; ‘i 201a2-2; T. 1579: 794b6-24; Mukai 1985: 30) comments on Śaṃyuktāgama, sūtra 39 (T. 99: 8c26-9a27), in an explanation of how the sprout of the next life arises from the seed, which is vijñāna. In this passage, vijñāna is said to be the hetu and the four vijñānaasthitis, which are compared to a field, are said to be pratyayas.

yañ srid par s ky english ba’i myu gu ’byuṅ ba la ni rgyu gcig dañ rkyen gnyis yoč de / ’du byed rnam pa lha po dag la ṅon mons pa sa bon dañ ldan pa’i rnam par šes pa ni rgyu’o / rnam par šes pa’i gnas bzi žin dañ ’dra ba dañ / dga’ ba dañ ’dod chags des rnam par šes pa s ky english ba de dañ der ŋin mtshams sbyar ba’i phyir rlan par byed pa ni rkyen yin no / de la kha cig ni rnam par šes pa’i gnas bzi phun ’por gtogs par ’gyur la dga’ ba dañ ’dod chags ni des tshe ’di la gsar du bsags śin bsdu na (Yogācārabhūmi; ‘i 201a2-4); 復次一因二緣令後有芽當得生長。謂五品行中煩惱種子所隨逐識。説名為因。與田152相似四種識住。說名為緣。又由意貪滋潤其識。令於彼彼當受生處結生相續。感速迦耶。亦名為緣。此中有一由四識住攝受所依由意貪故。於現法中新新造集及以增長 (T. 1579: 794b6-12)

See also an explanation in the Vastusamgrahaṇī of defilement (Yogācārabhūmi; ‘i 314b2-315a2; T. 1579: 840a12-24; Mukai 1985: 36), which comments on Śaṃyuktāgama, sūtra 374 (T. 99: 102c28-103a12).

152 Corrected from yin 因 on the basis of the alternate reading in the Taishō note and the Tibetan translation, žiṅ (Yogācārabhūmi; ‘i 201a3), which corresponds to kṣetra.
3.4) One Vaibhāṣika answer to the question of why the Buddha chose birth in the womb over an apparitional birth is that it was in order to leave a body as a relic. Vasubandhu objects that this explanation will not satisfy those who think the Buddha has ādhisthānikī rddhi, the power to maintain his body after death.

ādhisthānikīm rddhim bhagavata icchatāṁ na yukta eṣa parihāraḥ
(Pradhan: 119.25-26; T. 1558: 44a27-28; Poussin v. 2: 31; Samghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 467c25-26] and rejects it in favor of the Vaibhāṣika explanation, saying that a body maintained after death by rddhi would not be impregnated with the Buddha’s special powers and so would not be very beneficial to the world [T. 1562: 467c27-468a15].)

\[^{153}\text{See the } Vībhāṣā (T. 1545: 627c9-15).\]
3.4) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* says that the Buddhas and bodhisattvas can use their magical power to continue to exist after death.

kimcic ca nirmānam adhitiṣṭhati yad uparate 'pi bodhisattve tathāgata vā 'nuvartata eva (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*: 64.23-25); byaṅ chub sems dpa’ ’am / de bzin gšegs pa’ ‘das pa’i og tu yaṅ sprul pa la la gnas pa kho nar byin gyis rlob pa daṅ (*Yogācāra-bhūmi*; zi 42a4-5); 於中或有諸佛菩薩雖滅度後由住持力而故隨轉 (*T.1579*: 493b6-7)
3.5) According to Vasubandhu, denying the existence of antarābhava by comparing death and rebirth to an object and a reflected image is wrong because the reflected image is not real.

pratibimbam asiddhatyād asāmyāc cānidarśanam/pratibimbam nāmānyad evotpadyate dharmāntaram ity asiddham etat

(Pradhan: 120.19-20; T. 1588:44b28-c11; Poussin v. 2: 34-35; Kritzer 2000a: 243-247; Samghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 470a18-b2] and criticizes it at very great length, refuting each of Vasubandhu’s arguments and insisting that the reflected image is in fact real [T. 1562: 470b2-472a22].)
3.5) According to the Viśṇucayasyaṃgṛhaṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamārṣabhūmi, the comparison between death and rebirth and object and image is invalid and does not disprove the existence of the antarābhava.

bar mdo'i srid pa yod par rgyu gaṅ gis khoṅ du chud par bya že na / smras pa / śi 'phos nas sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba gnas med pa rnam yul gzan du phyin mi srid pa'i phyir daṅ / rnam par 'khrul pa tsam yin pas brag ca lta bur yaṅ mi ruṅ ba daṅ / ma 'gags pa'i phyir gzugs brpañ lta bur yaṅ mi ruṅ ba daṅ / 'gro bab med pa'i phyir dmigs pa 'dzin pa lta bur yaṅ mi ruṅ ste / gaṅ gi phyir dpe de dag mi ruṅ ba de'i phyir bar mdo'i srid pa yod par rig par bya ste (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 55a5-8);

問何因得知有中有耶。答從此沒已。若無所依諸心心所。無有道理轉至餘方故。不應如聲唯感亂故。不應如影像彼不滅故。亦不應說如取所緣。非行往故。由如是等所說譬喩。不應道理。是故當知定有中有 (T. 1579: 599a9-14)
According to Vasubandhu, the reflected image, which is not real, appears due to the power of the coming together of causes and conditions. He says that the variety of the capabilities of dharmas is unthinkable.

`sāmagryās tu sa tasyās tādṛśāh prabhāvo yat tathā darśanam bhavati / acintyo hi dharmānāṃ śaktibhedāḥ`

(Pradhan: 121.4-5; T. 1558: 44c10-11; Poussin v. 2: 35; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 472a22-24] and criticizes it bitterly, suggesting that if one denies the reality of the reflected image, one might as well deny the reality of all dharmas [T. 1562: 472a24-c10]; see Fukuda 1998a: 3-9; Kritzer 2000a: 243-244.)
3.6) According to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Sacittikā Bhūmi, the pravrtti-vijñānas depend on the ālayavijñāna as the reflected image depends on the mirror; this suggests the relative unreality of the reflected image.¹⁵⁴

\[\text{don dam pa'i ishul rmam par b'zāg pas 'jug pa gañ że na / mdor bsdu na rmam par šes pa ni rmam pa gnis te / kun gzi rmam par šes pa dañ / 'jug pa'i rmam par šes pa'o / de la kun gzi rmam par šes pa ni gnas yin no / 'jug pa'i rmam par šes pa ni gnas pa yin te / de yañ rmam pa bdun te / mig gi rmam par šes pa na / yid dañ yid kyi rmam par šes pa'i bar te / chu'i cho bo dañ / rlabs lta bu' am / me loñ dañ gzugs brīñan lta bu yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 189b1-3; see Schmithausen 1987: 325-326 n. 357); 云何名為勝義道理建立差別。謂略有二識。一者阿賴耶識。二者轉識。阿賴耶識是所依。轉識是能依。此復七種。所謂眼識乃至意識。譬如水, 浪依止暴流。或如影像依止明鏡。如是名依勝義道理建立所依能依差別 (T. 1579: 651b13-i7)\]

The definitions in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi of šaktivaiticrya hetvadhiśṭhāna and sāmagrī hetvadhiśṭhāna may be relevant here: šaktivaiticrya refers to the multiplicity of forces necessary to produce the variety of dharmas associated with kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, and ārūpyadhātu, as well as non-associated (anāsrava) dharmas, while in the case of sāmagrī of production, when the totality of causes necessary for the production of any dharma is realized, the dharma arises.

\[\text{tatra šaktivaiticryam hetvadhiśṭhānam aḍhiśṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoh / tathā hi / kāmapratisamanyuktā dharman vicitravasvabāvā vicitrād svabhāvavisēsāc chaktivaiticryād utpaśiyante / yathā kāmapratisamanyuktā evaṃ rūpa-pratisamanyuktā ārūpyapratisamanyuktā apratisamanyuktāh / tasmāc chaktivaiticryam adhiśṭhāya pratiniyamahetuḥ prajñāpyate / tatra sāmagrīhetvadhiśṭhānam aḍhiśṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñāpyate / tat kasya hetoh / tathā hi / svām utpattisāmagrīm āgamyā kāmapratisamanyuktām dharmān evaṃ hastaḥ bhavati / yathā kāmapratisamanyuktām evaṃ rūpa-pratisamanyuktām ārūpyapratisamanyuktām apratisamanyuktām / yathotpattisāmagrī evaṃ prāptisāmagrī siddhisāmagrī nispatīsāmagrī kriyāsāmagrī / tasmāt sāmagrīm adhiśṭhāya sahakārihetuḥ prajñāpyate}\]

¹⁵⁴ In a similar passage in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Bodhisattvabhūmi (Samdhinirmocanasūtra), the meditational image is said to be no different from the consciousness in which it is perceived, just as the reflected image depends on the mirror, with the object acting as a condition; this suggests that the reflected image has no independent reality (Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 7466-75a3; T. 1579: 724a3-13; Samdhinirmocanasūtra; 90.22-91.17; T. 676: 698a22-b9). Fukuda thinks that Vasubandhu carefully avoids stating a position similar to the one that underlies this famous passage (1998a: 9). However, as we can see, Saṅghabhadra clearly thinks that Vasubandhu’s statement has radical implications.
Chapter 3  *Lokanirdeśa*
3.6 continued) (Yogācārabhūmi: 109.19-110.7); de la rgyu’i gnas daṅ mthu sna tshogs la brten nas / so sor ṇes pa’i rgyu ’dogs par byed de / de ci’i phyir že na / ’di ltar ’dod pa ldan pa’i chos ṇo bo ņid rnam pa sna tshogs pa rnam sni / ᇥo bo ņid kyi khyad par rnam pa sna tshogs / mthu rnam pa rna tshogs can las byun bà'i phyir ro / ’dod pa daṅ ldan pa rnam sji lta ba bzin du / gzugs daṅ ldan pa rnam daṅ / gzugs med pa daṅ ldan pa rnam daṅ / ldan pa ma yin pa’i rnam skaṅ de daṅ ’dra ste / de bas na mthu sna tshogs la brten’⁵⁵ nas / so sor ᇥes pa’i rgyu ’dogs so / de la rgyu’i sna tshogs pa brten nas / lhan cig byed pa’i rgyu ’dod par byed de / de ci’i phyir že na / ’di ltar raṅ skye ba’i tshogs daṅ phrad nas ’dod pa daṅ ldan pa’i chos rnam skaṅ ba’i phyir ro / ’dod pa daṅ ldan pa rnam sji lta ba bzin du / gzugs daṅ ldan pa rnam daṅ / gzugs med pa daṅ ldan pa rnam daṅ / ldan pa ma yin pa rnam skaṅ de daṅ ’dra’o / skye ba’i tshogs pa ji lta ba bzin du thob pa’i tshogs pa daṅ / grub par gyur pa’i tshogs pa daṅ / ’grub pa’i tshogs pa daṅ / gnas pa’i tshogs pa daṅ / byed pa’i tshogs pa rnam skaṅ de daṅ ’dra ste / de bas na tshogs pa la brten nas lhan cig byed pa’i rgyu ’dogs so (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 66a3-b1); 依差別功能因依處。施設定異因。施作所依。依於Finals法自性功能有差別故能生種種自性功能。如欲繫法。如是色無色繫及不繫法亦爾。是故依差別功能依處。施設定異因。依合和合依處。施設同事因。所以者何。要由獲得自生和合故。欲繫法生如欲繫法。如是色無色繫及不繫法亦爾。如生和合。如是得成辦用和合亦爾。是故依合和合依處施設同事因 (T. 1579: 302a2-10)⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Corrected from rten on the basis of the Derge.

⁵⁶ See the definition in the Viniścayasamgrahanī on the Pañcaviśāṅkāyamanabhūmi of sāmagrī as a cittaviprayuktasamśkāra: all the causes and conditions that can produce dharmas are referred to by the single term sāmagrī (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 2663-4; T. 1579: 587b29-c2). See also Kritzer 1999: 249-253.
3.7) According to Vasubandhu, avidyā in the āvasthika interpretation of pratītya-samutpāda is accompanied by all the other kleśas, like a king by his retinue.

sāhacaryāt tadvaśena teṣām samudācārāc ca / rājāgamanavacane tadanu-yātrikāgamanasiddhavat
(Pradhan: 131.19-20; T. 1588: 48b21-23; Poussin v. 2: 63; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 484a12-14] and, objecting to Vasubandhu’s understanding of the word sāhacarya on the grounds that it establishes an improper separation between avidyā and the rest of the kleśas, refers approvingly to the Vaibhāṣika position that avidyā here refers to the five skandhas of the past life in the state of defilement [T. 1562: 484a15-27].)
3.7) (Perhaps it is relevant that in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, avidyā is said to be viparyāsata, while satkāyādṛṣṭi, part of antagrāhādṛṣṭi, sīlavrataparāmarṣa, and rāga are viparyāse proper, and mithyādṛṣṭi, part of antagrāhādṛṣṭi, pratigha, māna, and vicikitsā are viparyāsanisyyanda.

tatra viparyāsatalam avidyā / viparyāsahā 157 satkāyādṛṣṭir antagrāhakādṛṣṭer eka- deśo drṣtiparāmarṣa rāgaś ca / viparyāsanisyyando mithyādṛṣṭir antagrāhādṛṣṭer ekadeśah pratigho māno vicikitsā ca [Yogācārabhūmi 166.16-18; see Schmithausen 1987: 449 n. 963]; de la phyin ci log gi rtsa ba ni ma rig pa'o / phyin ci log ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba daṅ / mthar 'dzin par lta ba'i phyogs gcig daṅ / ltu ba mchog tu 'dzin pa daṅ / tshul khrims daṅ brtul žugs mchog tu 'dzin pa daṅ / 'dod chags so / phyin ci log gi rgyu mthun pa ni / log par lta ba daṅ/ mthar 'dzin pa'i lta ba'i phyogs gcig daṅ / koṅ kho ba daṅ / na rgyal daṅ / the tshom mo [Yogācārabhūmi]; dzl 97a8-b2];倒根本者。謂無明。顛倒體者。謂薩迦耶見。邊執見一分。見取戒禁取及貪。倒等流者。謂邪見邊執見一分。恚慢及疑 [T. 1579: 314b14-16])

157 Corrected by Schmithausen from viparyāsanisyyandaḥ on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese.
3.8) Vasubandhu questions the āvasthika interpretation of pratītyasamutpāda: if each member contains all five skandhas, why should the members receive the name, avidyā, etc.?

āvasthikah kileśto 'yam yady angam angam pañcaskandhāḥ kim kāraṇam avidyādīn eva dharmān kīrtayati sma/prādhānyat tv angakīrtanam/avidyāpradhānām avasthām avidyāṁ jagāda saṃskārapradhānām saṃskārān yāvaj jarāmaranān ity adosah

(Pradhan: 133.10-13; T. 1588: 48c22-26; Poussin v. 2: 66-67; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who uses the word kīla to show that he does not accept the Vaibhāṣika āvasthika interpretation [T. 1562: 494b15-19]. Saṃghabhadra then presents the first of the Sthavira’s six detailed objections to the āvasthika interpretation [494b21-c10] and refutes it [494c10-495b19].)
3.8)  (Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* does not have a discussion of this issue, it nowhere states that the members of the formula consist of the five *skandhas*, and none of the various *pratītyasamutpāda* expositions in the text resembles the Sarvāstivādin *āvasthika* interpretation.)
3.9) Vasubandhu refutes the Sthavira’s explanation of why ayoniśo manasikāra is not mentioned as an āṅga of the pratītyasamutpāda formula. According to the Sthavira, ayoniśo manasikāra is said in a sūtra to be the cause of avidyā, but another sūtra says that it is produced by avidyā. Thus, the mutual dependence of the two eliminates the need to mention ayoniśo manasikāra as a separate āṅga. According to Vasubandhu, the real reason is that the purpose of the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra was to explain the connections between the past and present lives and the present and future lives; therefore, no further members are required.

avidyājarāmaranayaḥ pareṇāṅgāntarānabhidhānāt saṃsārasasyādyantavatvaprasaṅgaḥ / na cāparipūrṇo nirdeśa iti / kim kāraṇam / pravṛtitasammuḍhebhhyo vineyebhyah katham paralokād ihaloka ihalokaḥ ca punah paralokāḥ sambadhya ity etāvato ‘trārthasya vivakṣitavat / etasya ca pūrvam evoktavat / pūrvāparāntamadhyeṣu sammohavinivṛttyaye

(Pradhan: 135.21-136.1; T. 1588: 49c10-17; Poussin v. 2: 72; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 497b22-28], and he criticizes Vasubandhu for inventing his own explanation, which differs from the perfectly adequate Vaibhāṣīka explanation, which Vasubandhu already has mentioned, namely that avidyā, as a klesa, arises from klesa and from karma [T. 1562: 497b28-c12].)

\[158\] The passage quoted contains only Vasubandhu’s explanation of his own position.

\[159\] Pradhan: 135.2-3; T. 1588: 49b13; Poussin v. 2: 69.
3.9) The śarīra portion of the pratītyasamutpāda expositions in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi and the Vastusamgrahaṇī states that pratītyasamutpāda can be summarized with reference to three aspects: how one is born into the present from the past; how one is born into the future from the present; and how one can attain to purification in the present life.

śarīram katamat / samāsatas tribhir ākāraih pratītyasamutpādasya vyavasthānaṁ bhavati / yathā pūrvāntān madhyānte sambhavati / yathā ca madhyāntād aparānte sambhavati / yathā ca ca madhyānte sambhūto vartate vyavadānāya ca paraiti (Yogācārabhūmi: 198.17-19); lus gaṅ že na / mdor bsdu na / rten ciṅ ’brel par ’byun ba ni rnam pa gsum du gzag pa yin te / sśon gyi mtha’ nas ji ltar dbus kyi mthar ’byun ba daṅ / dbus kyi mtha’ nas ji ltar phyi ma’i mthar ’byun ba daṅ / dbus kyi mthar byun nas ji ltar gnas pa daṅ/rnam par byan bar ’gyur ba’o (Yogācārabhūmi; dīzi 115b3-4); 略説由三種相建立緣起。謂從前際中際生。從中際後際生。中際生已若趣流轉。若趣清淨究竟(T. 1579: 321a17-19)\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{160} The remainder of the śarīra portion explains this process in detail (see Kritzer 1999: 82-87). See also Yogācārabhūmi; ’i 287b5-6; T. 1579: 828c9-12.
3.10) Vasubandhu sees a contradiction between the sūtra statement, “I teach pratiṣṭhasamutpāda and pratiṣṭhasamutpānadharmas,” and the abhidharma teaching that both terms refer to all saṃskṛtadharmas. Arguing on the Sarvāstivādins’ own terms, he shows that they would have to include future dharmas among the pratiṣṭhasamutpānadharmas, which would not make sense. Instead, he follows the opinion of Vasumitra in the Vībhāṣā (T. 1545: 118b25-c5; Poussin v. 2: 74 n. 1) in explaining that the angas of the pratiṣṭhasamutpāda formula are pratiṣṭhasamutpāda in that they are cause and pratiṣṭhasamutpanna in that they are result.

tajjātiṣyatvāt tat tatraivatideśo yathā na ca tāvad rūpyate rūpaṁ cocye te tajjātiṣyatvād ity adoṣah / sūtrābhiprayas tv ayam ucyate / hetur atra samutpādah samutpannam phalam matam / hetuḥhitam anga[m] pratiṣṭhasamutpādaḥ samutpadyate ‘smād iti kṛtvā phalabhūtam anga[m] pratiṣṭhasamutpannam / evaṁ sarvāṇy angāṇy ubhayathā śudhyanti / hetuḥpalabhāvāt / na caiṇaṁ satavyavasthā bhavanthy apekṣābhedāt / yad apeksya pratiṣṭhasamutpādo na tad evāpeksya pratiṣṭhasamutpannam hetuḥalavat pitṛputravac ca
(Pradhān: 136.6-11; T. 1588: 49c23-50a3; Poussin v. 2: 74; Samghabhadra discusses Vasubandhu’s explanation at great length [T. 1562: 498b15-499a1], stating that Vasubandhu misunderstands the sūtra, while the Ābhidhārmikas understand it correctly [T. 1562: 498c26-499a1].)

3.10) In the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, pratityasamutpāda is defined as the nature of samskāras to arise, while pratityasamutpannata is defined as the fact that they have arisen.

\[ \text{katamaḥ pratityasamutpādaḥ} / \text{katamaḥ pratityasamutpannataḥ} / \text{yā utpattidharmata}^{163} \]

samskārāṁ āyaṁ pratityasamutpādaḥ / yā punar utpannataiva sā pratityasamutpannaiety ucyate (Yogācārabhūmi: 219.8-11); rten cine 'brel par 'byun ba ni gan / rten cine 'brel par 'byun ba ni gan že na / 'du byed mams kyi skye ba'i chos niid gan yin pa de ni / rten cine 'brel par 'byun ba'o / skyes pa niid gan yin pa de ni rten cine 'brel par 'byun ba niid ces bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 128b7-8); 云何縁起。云何縁生。謂諸行生起法性是名縁起。即彼生已說名縁生 (T. 1579: 325c10-12)

In the Viniścayasyasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviḍānuśāsanobhūmi, it is said that, among those dharmas that arise due to conditions, causes are called pratityasamutpāda, while results are called pratityasamutpanna. The same principle is applied to the members of the pratityasamutpāda formula.

\[ \text{de la rgyu gan yin pa de la ni rten cine 'brel par 'byun ba žes bya'o} / \text{'bras bu gan yin pa de ni rten cine 'brel par byun}^{164} \text{ ba žes bya bar blta bar bya'o} / \text{de la ma rigs pa'i bag la ŋal ma spams pa yod pas ma rig pa'i kun nas dkris pa 'byun no} / \text{ma rig pa'i kun nas dkris pa skyes pa'i phyir 'du byed rnams kyi 'jug pa skye'o} / \text{de bzin du 'du byed kyi sa bon ma spams pa yod pas 'du byed rnams 'byun no} / \text{'du byed rnams skyes pa'i phyir rnam par ŋes pa 'jug pa skye'o} / \text{de bzin du rten cine 'brel par 'byun ba'i yan lag lhag ma rnams kyi 'jug pa'i tshul yan ci rigs par rig par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 86b4-7); 當知此中因名縁起果名縁生。此無明隨眠不斷有故。彼無明縁有。此無明縁生故。彼諸行轉。如是諸行種子不斷故。諸行得生。諸行生故得有識轉。如是所餘諸縁起支流轉道理。如其所應當知亦爾 (T. 1579: 611b19-24) \]

---

163 Punctuation corrected from Bhattacharya’s pratityasamutpannata yā utpatti-dharmata / on the basis of the Tibetan and Chinese.

164 Derge reads 'byun.
3.11) Vasubandhu criticizes the āvasthika interpretation as being unjustifiable by sūtra because the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra is nīṭārtha.

atra tu sautrāntikā vijñāpayanti / kiṃ khalv etā iṣṭaya ucyante yā yasyeṣṭir āhosvit
sūtrārthah / sūtrārtha ity āha / yadi sūtrārtho naiṣa sūtrārthah / kathāṃ kṛtvā / yat
tāvad uktam āvasthika esa pratītyasamutpādo dvādaśapañcaskandhikā avasthā
dvādasāṅgāṇīty etad utsūram / sūtre 'nyathā nirdesād / avidyā katamā / yat tat
pūrvānte jñānam iti vistareṇa / yac ca nīṭārtham na tat punar neyam bhavatīī naiṣa
sūtrārthah

(Pradhan: 136.14-18; T. 1588: 50a7-13; Poussin v. 2: 75; Samghabhadra identifies
this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 495c22-27], relates it to the last of
the Sthavira’s six detailed objections to the āvasthika interpretation [T. 1562: 494c6-
10], and refutes it, turning Vasubandhu’s argument about nīṭārtha and neyārtha sūṭams
against him [T. 1562: 495c27-496a11]).

---

165 See item 3.8.
3.11) In the pratītyasamutpāda exposition of the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, the explanation of the individual members essentially follows and comments upon the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra (Yogācārabhūmi: 204.1-212.3; Yogācārabhūmi; dā 119a1-124a6; T. 1579: 322b2-324a15; see Kritzer 1999: 33-52 for a summary of this section). Due to the length of the passage, I do not provide the text here.
3.12) Vasubandhu’s defense of the etymology of the word *pratītyasamutpāda* against the criticism of the Grammarians is based on the idea that, although past and future *dharman* are nonexistent, the coming together of conditions results in the arising of *dharman*. The meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda* is expressed in the *sūtra* statement: “this being, that exists; from the arising of this, that arises.”

*naiṣa doṣah / idam tāvad ayaṃ praṣṭavyah sābdikah / kim avastho dharman utpadyate vartamāna utāho ‘nāgata iti / kim cātāh / yadi vartamāna utpadyate / katham vartamāno yadi notpannah / utpannasya vā punar utpattāv anavsthāprasāṅgah / athānāgata utpadyate / katham asataḥ kartṛtvam siddhati akartṛkā vā kriyeti / ato yad avastha utpadyate tad avastha eva pratyeti / kim avasthaś cotpadyate / utpādābhimukho ‘nāgataḥ/tad avastha eva pratrayam pratyetity ucyate/anispannām cedam yad uta sābdikīyaṃ kartṛkriyāvasthānaṃ bhavanty esa karābhūtit ity esa kriyā / na cātāḥ bhavitur arthāḥ bhūtim anyām kriyām paśyāmah / tasmād acchānam vyavahāreṣu / esa tu vāyārthah / asmin saty asya bhūvah asyotpādād idam utpadyata iti yo ‘ṛthaḥ so ‘ṛthaḥ pratītyasamutpāda iti”

(Pradhan: 138.9-16; T. 1588: 50b25-c7; Poussin v. 2: 78-79; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the *sūtra*-master [T. 1562: 481b23-29] and refutes it, saying that it implicitly accepts that the moment of arising of a *dharma* belongs to the future; this is inconsistent with Vasubandhu’s denial of the real existence of future *dharman* [T. 1562: 481b29-c4].)

---

166 Vasubandhu, in response to a question (according to P’u-kuang [T. 1821: 169c18], from the Mahāsāṃghikaś), gives an etymological definition of *pratītyasamutpāda*, which Saṃghabhadra attributes to the *sūtra*-master (T. 1562: 481b8-13). Saṃghabhadra also identifies the Grammarians’ objections as hypothetical ones posed by the *sūtra*-master (T. 1562: 481b16-17).
3.12) In the nirukti portion of the pratītyasamutpāda exposition in the Savitarkādi-
bhūmi, the momentary nature of conditioned origination is stressed, since conditions
quickly perish, but the efficacy of these conditions, even though they are in the past
and no longer existent, is maintained. Furthermore, it is said that the complete meaning
of pratītyasamutpāda is expressed in the sūtra statement: “this being, that exists; from
the arising of this, that arises.”

punah pratayayata upadah pratītyasamutpadah / kṣaṇikārtham adhikṛtya / punah
pratayayād aittād atyaktāt svasantataḥ upadah pratītyasamutpadah / asmin satīdaṁ
bhavaty asyotpādād idam udpadyate nānyathā ity etam artham adhikṛtyaitan
nirvacanam draṣṭavyam (Yogācārabhūmi: 214.7-10);\(^{167}\) rkyen las skyes pa dañ / skad
cig ma'i don gi dbaṅ du bya ste / myur du 'jig pa dañ ldan par skye pa ni rten ciṅ
'brel par 'byuṅ ba'o / gžan yan rkyen 'das pa dañ / ma btaṅ ba las raṅ gi rgyud du
skye ba ni / rten ciṅ 'grel par 'byuṅ ba'o / 'di yod pas 'di byuṅ / 'di skyes pas 'di skye
pa ste / gžan du ma yin no / žes bya ba'i don 'di'i dbaṅ du byas nas / de ņes pa'i tshig
tu lta bar bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 125b5-7); 復次依託衆緣。速謝滅已。續和
合生故。名緣起。此依剎那義釋。復次衆緣過去而不捨離。依自相續而得生
起故。名緣起。如說此有故彼有。此生故彼生。非餘。依此義故。釋名應知
(T. 1579: 324c3-7)

\(^{167}\) Bhattacharya’s notes contain some questionable remarks about both the Tibetan
translation and the contents of the manuscript. I have here reproduced his text without
attempting to improve on it.
3.13) According to the pūrvācāryas,\textsuperscript{168} “this being, that exists” refers to the fact that if the cause is not abandoned, the result will arise; for example, “if avidyā is not abandoned, the saṃskāras will not be abandoned.” “From the arising of this, that arises” corresponds to “Due to the arising of [avidyā], [the saṃskāras] arise.”

aprāhīṇotpattiṃpanārtham ity ācāryāḥ / avidyāyām aprāhīṇāyāṃ saṃskārā na praḥīyante / tasyā evotpāda utpadyanta iti vistaraḥ
(Pradhan: 139.12-14; T. 1588: 51a6-8; Poussin v. 2: 82-83; Saṃghabhadra identifies these teachers as the sūtra-master’s own teachers, whom he, Saṃghabhadra, does not respect [T. 1562: 483a7-13], and refutes them, reasoning that their argument would logically imply that avidyā is conditioned by the saṃskāras and that, if the saṃskāras are not abandoned, avidyā will not be abandoned [T. 1562: 483a13-19].)

\textsuperscript{168} ācāryā iti pūrvācāryāḥ (Abhidharmakaśavyākhyā: 298.18-19).
In the *pratīyasamutpāda* exposition in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*, it is said that “this being, that exists” means that, from undestroyed conditions, something else arises.

In the *Vastusaṃgrahāṇī*, the *sūtra* (*Saṃyuktāgama*) statement, “this being, that exists” (T. 99 [sūtra 298]: 85a14; Mukai 1985: 35), is explained as meaning “because this cause is not destroyed, that result is not destroyed.” “From the arising of this, that arises” means “Since this undestroyed cause arises, that undestroyed result will arise.”
3.14) Vasubandhu criticizes another opinion (that of the Sthavira), according to which “this being, that exists” means that, when the effect exists, the destruction of the cause exists. According to Vasubandhu, if the Buddha had had this intention, he would have said, “this being, that does not exist.” Furthermore, why would the Buddha, when expounding pratītyasamutpāda, have spoken first about the destruction of the cause?

punar āha asmin satīdaṁ bhavatīti kārye satī kāraṇasya vināśo bhavatīti / syān matam ahetukam tarhi kāryam upadyata ity ata āha nāhetukam / yasmād asyotpādād idam upadyata iti / eṣa cet sūtrān ho bhaviṣyad asmin satīdaṁ na bhavatīty evācakṣata / pūrvaṁ ca āvat kāryasyotpādānevaevācakṣata\(^{169}\) paścād asmin satīdaṁ na bhavatīti / evam hi sādhuḥ kramo bhavati / itaraṁ tu pratītyasamutpādaḥ katama ity āder arthe kaḥ prathamo vināśavacananasya / tasmāṁ naiveṣa sūtrārthaḥ

(Pradhān: 139: 17-21; T. 1588: 51a12-19; Poussin v. 2: 83; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the criticism of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 482c5-28] and condemns Vasubandhu for only criticizing the wording of the Sthavira’s interpretation of the sūtra; according to Saṃghabhadra, the Sthavira should also be condemned for suggesting that the result can arise before the cause has ceased to exist.\(^{170}\) Saṃghabhadra seems to be implying that Vasubandhu accepts this idea, which, as we have seen, is attributed to Vasubandhu’s teachers.)

\(^{169}\) The reading pūrvaṁ ca kāryasyotpādam in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (289.34-35) seems preferable.

\(^{170}\) At the end of the discussion, Saṃghabhadra again criticizes the sūtra-master for arguing with the Sthavira about the meaning of the sūtra rather than completely rejecting his argument (T. 1562: 483a5-7).
3.14) (The following is the same passage that is quoted in item 3.13.) In the pratītyasamutpāda exposition in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, it is said that “this being, that exists” means that, from undestroyed conditions, something else arises.

*katham asmin satīdaṁ bhavaṁty ucyate / aprahīnaṁ pratayāt tadanyotpādārthena* (Yogācārabhūmi: 221.16); *ci’i phyir ’di yod pas ’di ’byun žes bya ze na / rkyen ma spans pa las de las gzan pa skye ba’i phyir ro* (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 130a6-7); 問云何說言此有故彼有。答由未斷緣。餘得生義故 (T. 1579: 326a27-28)
Vasubandhu mentions an opinion that good prajñā can be mixed with defiled prajñā in the same way that consciousness can be defiled by rāga, even when rāga is not currently active.

kim punar evam nesya / kliṣṭayā prajñayā kuśalā prajñā vyavakīryamāṇā na viśūdhyati / ato 'sau tasyā upakleśa iti / yad vāpi rāgopakliṣṭaṁ cittaṁ na vimucythe / kim tad avaśyaṁ rāgaparyavasthit-an bhavati / upahataṁ tu tat tathā rāgena bhavati yan na vimucythe / taṁ punarbhāvanāṁ vyāvartayato vimucythe / evam avidyopakṣitaṁ prajñā na viśūdhyatīty avidyopahataṁ parikalpayāmaḥ

(Pradhān: 141.19-23; T. 1588; 51c29-52a6; Poussin v. 2: 91; Saṃghabhadrā says that the sūtra-master is presenting a hypothetical argument (chia tso chiu 假作救) for the theory that avidyā is actually kuprañjā [T. 1562: 501a5-12]; Saṃghabhadrā refutes this argument in detail and concludes by reiterating that avidyā is a separate, real dharmā [T. 1562: 501a12-c23]. Neither Yaśomitra [Abhidharmakośaavyākhya: 301.34-302.1] nor the Chinese commentators (T. 1821: 173c20; T. 1822: 605b29) think that Vasubandhu agrees with this position.)

171 La Vallée Poussin says that Fa-pao and P’u-kuang disagree on this point (v. 2: 91 n. 1), but he appears to be mistaken. They both say that Vasubandhu accepts the Saṃvāstivādin position here, and Fa-pao adds that Vasubandhu does not necessarily adopt the position of any one school: he accepts what reason dictates (T. 1822: 605b29-c1).
3.15) (Although a passage in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pāñcaviṃśa-kaṇḍa-kāyamanobhūmi implies that avidyā may exist as a bija [Yogācārabhūmi, zi 86b4-7; T. 1579: 611b19-24; see item 3.10], I have found no discussion in the Yogācārabhūmi concerning the mixture of good and defiled prajñā.)
3.16) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of others that not all the mental vedanās are *manopavicāras*; only the defiled ones are. For example, the arhat has a mental satisfaction, the object of which is a dharma that is good but laukika.

*a para āha / asty evaṃ manopavicārāṇāṃ vaibhāṣikīyo ’ṛṭhaḥ / sūtrārthas tv anyathā drṣṭaye / na hi yo yasmād viśārāgaḥ sa tad ālambanam upavicarati iti yuktam / atāḥ sāsravā api na sarve saumansyādayo manopavicārāḥ / kim tariḥ / sāṃklesikā yair mano viśayān upavicarati / kathāṃ copavicarati / anunīyate ca prathihanyate cāpratisāmkhāya copekṣate yeṣāṃ pratipakṣena śat sātataḥ viṁrā bhavanti/caksusā rūpāṇi drṣṭvā naiva sumanā bhavati na durmanā upeksako viharati smṛtimān samprajāṇan evaṃ yāvan manasā dharmān viṁnāyeti / na hy arhato laukikaṃ nāsti kuśalam dharmālambanāṃ suamanasyaṃ yañ tu tat sāṃklesikāṃ manasa upavicārabhūtaṃ tasyaiva pratiṣedho lakṣyata iti

(Pradhan: 149.23-150.7; T. 1588: 54b3-12; Poussin v. 2: 114-115; Samghabhadra says that this alternate opinion is hypothetically offered (*chia wei i shuo* 假為異說) by the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 508a20-29] and criticizes it, upholding the Vaibhāṣika position that even an undefiled mental vedanā is *manopavicāra* [T. 1562: 508b1-18].)
3.16) (I have been unable to find anything in the Yogācārabhūmi relevant to this discussion.)
According to Vasubandhu, a moment (kṣaṇa) endures for as long as a dharma takes to obtain its existence when all conditions are present.

kṣaṇasya tu kim pramāṇam/samagreṣu prayayēṣu yāvatā dharmasyātmalābhaḥ
(Pradhan: 176.12; T. 1588: 62a20-22; Poussin v. 2: 177; Samghabhadra identifies this as the rash explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 521b23-25] and criticizes it from the Vaibhāṣika standpoint, saying that, since past and future dharmas are actually real, it makes no sense to talk of “obtaining existence” [T. 1562: 521b25-c14].)
3.17) The Viniścayasaṅgrahāṇī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi, in an explanation of why the saṃskṛtalakṣaṇas are prajñāpti, at least strongly implies that the kṣaṇa of the arising (jāti) of a saṃskṛtadharma is the very duration of the dharma (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 21b1-24b7; T 1579: 585c9-586c25; see Rospatt 1995, especially pages 94-110). In particular, vyaya is defined as the destruction of the lakṣaṇas of all saṃskṛtadharmas after the moment of arising.

\[ \text{de lta bas na skye ba'i skad cig gi 'og tu 'jig pa'i skad cig ni 'du byed mams kyi 'jig pa zes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 22a3-4); 生刹那後諸行相盡說名為滅。亦名無常 (T. 1579: 585c27-28)} \]

*Kṣaṇajāti* is defined as the fact that all saṃskṛtadharmas arise anew from moment to moment.

\[ \text{de la 'du byed mams skad cig skad cig la skye ba ni skad cig gi skye ba zes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 23a1); 此中諸行刹那剎那新新而起。名刹那 (T. 1579: 586a21-22)} \]
According to Vasubandhu, the reason that the Buddhas do not appear in the world during the period of diminishment, when people’s life spans shrink from one hundred years to ten years, is that the five *kaśāyas* become very strong then.

*kasmān na satāḥ / tadā hi pañcakaśāyāḥ abhyutsadā bhavanti / tadyathā 'yuṣkaśāyāḥ kalpakaśāyāḥ kleśakaśāyāḥ drṣṭikaśāyāḥ sattvakaśāyāḥ ca*

(Pradhan: 183.1-2; T. 1588: 64a20-22; Poussin v. 2: 193; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the position of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 523c26-27] and says that the reasoning is wrong; in fact, a Buddha will appear even when lives are short and the *kaśāyas* are strong, as long as someone can properly achieve what the Buddha accomplished [T. 1562: 523c27-524a8].)
3.18) (I have been unable to find any discussion in the Yogācārabhūmi in which the non-appearance of the Buddha is linked to the five kaśāyas. However, it is perhaps relevant that in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, āyuṣkaśāya is defined as the period, like our own, in which the human life span diminishes to less than a hundred years.

\[
\text{tadyathā etarhy alpaṃ jīvitam manuṣyāṇāṃ / yaś ciraṃ jīvati / sa varṣaśatam [Bodhisattvabhūmi: 252.19-20]; 'di lta ste / da ltar gyi mi rnams ni 'tsho ba'i yun thuṇ ste / gaṅ yun riṅ du 'tsho ba des kyan lo brgya\textsuperscript{172} thub par zab do [Yogācārabhūmi; ži 152a4-5]; 如於今時人壽短促。極長壽者不過百年。昔時不爾。是名壽濁 [T. 1579: 538a7-9])}
\]

\textsuperscript{172} Corrected from rgya on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.
4.1) According to Vasubandhu, kṣaṇika means “possessing a moment,” that is, being destroyed immediately after coming into existence. He compares this to the word dantika, which means “possessing a stick (danḍa).”

ko ’yaṃ kṣaṇo nāma / ātmalābhō ’nantaravīśī / so ’syāstīti kṣaṇikām / dantikavat
(Pradhān: 193.2; T. 1558: 67c11-12; Poussin v. 3: 4; Saṃghabhadrā identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 533b21-22] and criticizes it on the grounds that, unlike a man and a stick, which are different things, there are no two separate things corresponding to kṣaṇa and kṣaṇika [T. 1562: 533b22-c4; Poussin 1936-1937: 146]; see Rospatt 1995: 105-110.)
4.1) (I have found nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding specifically to this argument, but similar notions of momentariness appear in the text. See, for example, item 3.17.)
4.2) Vasubandhu asserts that destruction is not dependent on a cause.

*samskṛtasyāvasyaṃ vyayāt ākasmiko hi bhāvānāṃ vināśaḥ / kim kāraṇam / kāryasya
ihī kāraṇam bhavati / vināśaś cābhāvaḥ / yāś cābhāvas tasya kim kartavyam / so ’śāvākasmiko vināśo yadi bhāvasyotpannamātrasya na syāt paścad api na syād bhāvasya
tulyatvāt / athāryathībhūtaḥ na yuktāṃ tasyaivānyathātvam / na hi sa eva tasmād vilakṣyano yujyate

(Pradhan: 193.5-10; T. 1558: 67c17-20; Poussin v. 3: 5; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 533c6-9] and criticizes it, saying that, because of the validity of the samskṛtalakṣanas, destruction must have a cause [T. 1562: 533c9-21]; see Rospatt 1995: 180-181.)
4.2) In the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi of the Viścayasaṃgrahaṇī, it is said that all saṃskāras are destroyed due to their own nature.

tatra sākalyena rūpaskandaḥ kṣaṇikāḥ vaktavyāḥ / tat kasya hetoh / utpannasya vināśopalambhataḥ / na cotpādakāraṇaḥ vināśakāraṇaḥ [/] yuyjate vilakṣaṇatvāt / nā-(lacuna) <ata>-ḥ svarasavināśaḥ sarvasaṃskāraṇāṁ veditavyāḥ / ataś ca kṣaṇikatvaprasiddhiḥ (Sanskrit manuscript as quoted by Rospatt [1995: 182 n. 399]); de la gzugs kyi phuṅ po thams cad ni skad cig pa yin par brjod par bya’o / de ci’i phyir že na / skyes nas ’jig pa dmigs pa’i phyir ro / skye ba’i rgyu ni ’jig pa’i rgyu yin par mi ruṅ ste / mtshan ņid mi ’dra ba’i phyir ro / skyes pa gnas pa’i rgyu de las gzan pa yāṅ mi dmigs pas de’i phyir ’du byed thams cad ni raṅ gi naṅ gis ’jig pa yin par rig par bya ste / de’i phyir skad cig pa ņid rab tu grub bo (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 58a4-6); 復次一切色軀當言皆是剎那滅性。何以故。諸行纔生尋即壞滅。現可得故。又不應謂能生之因即是滅因。其相異故。又法生已餘住住因不可得故。是故當知一切諸行皆任運滅。由此道理剎那義成 (T. 1579: 600a18-22)\(^{173}\)

\(^{173}\) This passage is translated by Rospatt, who also provides the Tibetan text and the text from the Sanskrit manuscript (1995: 181-182 n. 399). Rospatt thinks that the argument here is somewhat different from that of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (1995: 181-182).
4.3) Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that *saṃsthānarūpa* is only a *prajñapti*, because if it were real, then a single *saṃsthānarūpa*, for example, length, would be perceived by two *rāpindriyas*, for example, the eye and the body.

\[\text{nāsti saṃsthānaṃ dravyata iti sautrāntikāḥ / ekādiṁmukhe hi bhūyasi varṇa utpanne} \]
\[\text{dīrgham rūpam iti prajñapyate / tam evaṃ śaḍāśyālpīyasi hrasvam iti / caturdiśaṃ} \]
\[\text{bhūyasi caturasram iti / sarvatra same vṛttim iti / evaṃ sarvam / tad yathā 'lātam} \]
\[\text{ekasyāṃ dīśi desāntareṣv anantareṣv nirantarāṃ āśu dṛṣṭyamānaṃ dīrgham iti} \]
\[\text{pratīyate sarvato dṛṣṭyamānaṃ maṇḍalam iti na tu khalu jātyanaram asti saṃsthānam} \]
\[\text{/ yadi hi syāt dvigrāhyam syāt cakṣuśā hi dṛṣṭvā dīrgham ity avasīyate kāyendriyenaśi} \]
\[\text{spṛṣṭveti dvābhīyāṃ asya grahaṃ prāpnyāt / na ca rūpāyaṇasyā dvābhīyāṃ} \]
\[\text{grahaṇam asti / yathā vā spraṣṭavye dīrghādigrāhaṇaṃ tathā varṇe saṃbhāvyatām} \]

(Pradhan: 194.14-21; T. 1558: 68b1-11; Poussin v. 3: 8-9; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 535c23-536a4] and criticizes it at length, arguing that a single *indriya*, for example, the eye, perceives two different characteristics, for example, length and whiteness [T. 1562: 536a4-b5].)
4.3) In the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, samsthanarūpa (shape) is said to be a praṇapti because it is nothing more than a conglomeration of rūpa with no characteristics of its own.

riṅ po daṅ thuṅ nu ŋid la sogs pa gaṅ dag dbyibs žes bya ba de dag kyaṅ ci rdzas su yod pa 'am / btags pa'i yod pa yin par brjod bar bya že na / smras pa / btags pa'i yod pa yin par brjod par bya'o / de ci'i phyir že na / bsags pa las gnas pa ni dbyibs šes bya ba'i nes pa'i tshig yin pa daṅ bsags pa tsam dmigs pa daṅ / mtshan ŋid las gzhan pa'i don mi dmigs pa daṅ / bltos sīn bltos na no bo ŋid 'dres par 'gyur ba daṅ (Yogācārabhūmi, 56a1-3).

See also the Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktā Bhūmi, where the definition is the same, but samsthanarūpa is not said to be a praṇapti (Yogācārabhūmi, 4.15-17).

In a passage in the Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktā Bhūmi (just after the one mentioned above), it is stated that samsthanarūpa is a conglomeration of rūpa having features distinguished as “long,” etc.

dsamsthanam katamat / yo rūpakāracya dirghādipyicchedākaraḥ (Yogācārabhūmi, 5.2); dbyibs gaṅ že na / gaṅ gzugs rgyas par riṅ po la sogs par yonis su bcad [corrected from gead on the basis of the Derge] pa'i rnam pa'o (Yogācārabhūmi, 3a6); 形色體謂若色積集長短等分別相 (T. 1579: 279b8-9).
4.4) The Sarvāstivādins explain that *saṃsthānarūpa* is not perceived by touch, etc. Instead, the notion of length, etc., arises from our memory when we perceive something, just as when we see a fire, we remember that fire is hot. Vasubandhu argues that this is a false analogy, because fire and heat are invariably associated, whereas touch and shape are not.

*smṛtimātram tatra spraṣṭavyasāhacaryāt bhavati / sa tu sāhacaryāt bhavati na tu sākṣāt grahaṇom/yathā 'gnirūpaṃ drṣṭvā tasyoṣṇatāyām smṛtir bhavati puspagandhaṇ ca ghrātvā tad varṇa iti / yuktam atrāvyabhicāratvād anyenānyasya smaraṇaṃ na tu kimbhāt spraṣṭavyac kvaicit saṃsthāne niyataṃ yatat tatra smaraṇaṃ niyamena syāt / athāsasy api sāhacaryaniyāme saṃsthānasmarāṇaṃ niyamena syāt / varṇe 'pi syāt varṇavād vā saṃsthāne 'py aniyamena syāt / na caivaṃ bhavati / ayuktam asya spraṣṭavyaṃ smaraṇaṃ*

(Pradhan: 194.22-195.3; T. 1558: 68б11-20; Poussin v. 3: 9-10; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 536б5-7] and says that Vasubandhu’s argument does not successfully disprove the real existence of *saṃsthānarūpa* as a separate entity from *varṇa* [T. 1562: 536б7-18].)
4.4) (Although the *Yogācārabhūmi* states that *samstānarūpa* is not a real entity [see item 4.3], nothing corresponding to this argument can be found in the text.)
4.5) Vasubandhu argues that samsthānarūpa, unlike real rūpa (i.e., varṇa), cannot be found in an atom. It is merely a designation for many things arranged in a certain way.

ywac cāpi kincit pratighaṃ rūpaṃ asti tad avaśyaṃ paramāṇau vidyate / na cānau tat
na ca samsthānaṃ paramāṇau vidyate dirghādi / tasmād bahuṣv eva tathā saṃnvisaṣteṣu
dirghādi-prajñaptih / atha matāṃ samsthānaparamāṇava eva tathā saṃnvisitā
dirghādisaṃjñā labhanta iti / so 'yam kevalaḥ pākṣapātas teṣām asiddhatvāt / siddha-
svalaścaṇanāṃ hi teṣām saṃcayo yujyate / na ca saṃsthānāvavānāṃ varṇādivat
svabhāvah siddha iti kuta eṣām saṃcayaḥ
(Pradhan: 195.6-10; T. 1558: 68b22-29; Poussin v. 3: 10-11; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as another “proof” of the unreality of samsthānarūpa, presumably the idea of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 536b19-26], and criticizes it, arguing that varṇa and samsthānarūpa are in fact two independently existing types of rūpa and that, just as atoms of varṇa are proved to exist, so are atoms of samsthānarūpa [T. 1562: 536b26-c21].)
4.5) The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamānabhūmi adduces, as another reason for why saṃsthānarūpa is a prajñapti, the fact that it can be divided by thought, like a cart.

_de blos bye ba śiṅ rta la sogs pa dan ’dra ba’i phyir ro (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 56a3);
又如車等彼覺可壞故 (T. 1579: 599b11)
4.6) The Sarvāstivādins ask what kāvyavijñapti is, if it is not samsthānarūpa. Vasubandhu answers that it is samsthānarūpa but that samsthānarūpa is prajñapti, not dravya.

atha āddhānīya kāyasya gatiṁ nirākṛtya samsthānaṁ ca tatra bhavantāḥ suat̄rāntikāḥ kāṁ kāvyavijñaptim prajñapayanti / samsthānam eva hi te kāvyavijñaptim prajñapayanti / na tu punar dravyataḥ

(Pradhan: 195.15-17; T. 1558: 66c8-9; Poussin v. 3: 12; Samghabhadra says that the sūtra-master is stating the opinion of his own school [T. 1562: 537a24-26] and criticizes it, suggesting that since Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas argue that samsthānarūpa is not different from varṇa, then they must think that varṇa is prajñapti, too [T. 1562: 537a26-b13].)\(^{174}\)

\(^{174}\) In the course of this argument, Samghabhadra refers to Sautrāntika three times (T.1562: 537b3, b7, b8). It seems as though he is all but identifying Sautrāntika as the school of the sūtra-master.
4.6) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not define kāyavijñāpti as saṃsthānarūpa. But see 4.3 and 4.5 for its assertion that saṃsthānarūpa is prajñāpti.)
4.7) Vasubandhu defines kāyavijñānti as an action that has the body as its object. He equates this action with the volition that initiates the movement of the body. Vāgvijñānti and manovijñānti are to be understood similarly.

\[\text{tān ca prajñapayantah kathāṃ kāyakarma prajñapayanti / kāyādhiṣṭhānaṃ karma kāyakarma yā cetanā kāyasya tatra tatra pranetri / evaṃ vānmanaskarmāṇi api yathā-yogam veditavye / yat tarhi cetanā karma cetayitvā cety uktam sāmkalpecetanā pūrvam bhavaty evaṃ caivaṃ ca kārīṣyāmīti / tathā cetayitvā paścāt kriyā cetanotpādyate / yayā kāyāḥ preryate sā 'sau cetayitvā karmety ucyate}\]

(Pradhan: 195.17-21; T. 1558: 68c10-17; Poussin v. 3: 12-13; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. i562: 537b13-21] and criticizes it in great detail [T. 1562: 537b21-539b29]; in the course of this argument, Samghabhadra attributes to Sautrāntika the belief that all karma is cetanā, a belief that he refutes from the Sarvāstivādin point of view (T. 1562: 537c17-538b7.).)
4.7) According to the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi*, both kāyābhisamāskāra and vāgabhisaṃskāra arise due to, and after, abhisamāskāralakṣaṇa.\(^{175}\)

karmasvabhāvah katamah/yodharmasthānokhābhishāṃskāralakṣaṇasamotpadyate
tasya cotpādāt kāyābhisamāskāra vāgabhisaṃskāras tad uttarakālaṃ pravartate/ ayaṃ
cotpadyate karmasvabhāvah (Yogačārabhūmi: 170.17-19); las kyi ṅo bo ṅid gan že na /
chos gan skye ba na mīon par 'du byed pa'i\(^{176}\) mshān ņid kyan skye la / de skyes pas
dei rjes la lus kyi mīon par 'du byed pa daṅ / ņag gi mīon par 'du byed pa 'jug par
'gyur de / 'di ni las kyi ṅo bo ņid ces bya'o (Yogačārabhūmi: dzi 99b5-6); 業自性云何。謂若法生時。造作相起。及由彼生故。身行語行於彼彼時造作而轉。是名業自性 (T. 1579: 315a18-20)

The Manobhūmi says that the activity of cetanā is to arouse vitarka, kāyakarma, vākkarma, etc.

cetanā kiṃkarmikā / vitarkakāyavākkarmādiṣamutthānakarmikā (Yogačārabhūmi: 60.13-14); sens pa las ci byed ce na / rtog pa daṅ / lus daṅ ņag gi las\(^{177}\) la sog pa
bsloṅ ba'i las byed do (Yogačārabhūmi: dzi 34b1); 思作何業。謂發起尋伺身語業等為業 (1579: 291c11-12)

See also the Viścayasaṅgghraha in the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi for the same statement (Yogačārabhūmi: zi 62b1; T. 1579: 60a2a).

The Savitarkādi-bhūmi defines karma as cetanā as well as kāyakarma and vākkarma, which arise after a volition.

kṛtam karma katamat / yac cetitaṃ cetayitvā punaḥ kāyena vācā samutthāpitam
(Yogačārabhūmi: 190.6-7); byas pa'i las gan že na / bsam pa 'am / bsam nas kyan
lus daṅ ņag gis kun nas bsloan ba gan yin pa'o (Yogačārabhūmi: dzi 110b4); 作業者。謂若思業。若思已所起身業語業 (1579: 319b13-14)

\(^{175}\) The Kokuyaku Issaikyō translation equates abhisamāskāralakṣaṇa with manas-karma and says that the point of the passage is that karma is cetanā in essence (Kokuyaku Issaikyō Yuga-bu 1: 151 n. 27; the contents of this note are based on the Karmasiddhi-prakāraṇa [T. 1609: 785c22-28], a portion of which is quoted by P'u-kuang [T. 1821: 205a6-8]).

\(^{176}\) Corrected from pa pa'i on the basis of the Derge.

\(^{177}\) Corrected from ņag gi la sog pa on the basis of all other versions.
4.8) One Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of avijñaptirūpa is that the sūtra says that there are three types of rūpa, one of which is invisible and not subject to collision (apratigha). According to Sarvāstivāda, this must be avijnapi (Pradhan: 196.6-9; T. 1558: 68c29-69a4; Poussin v. 3: 14). Vasubandhu, in making what he describes as the Sautrāntika argument against Sarvāstivāda, quotes those who practice yoga (yogācārāḥ) as saying that, due to the power of meditation, a rūpa that is the object of meditation is produced in meditators. This rūpa is invisible because it is not the object of caksurindriya, and it is not subject to collision because it does not cover any place. Vasubandhu defends this statement against a possible Sarvāstivādin objection.

yat tāvad uktam trividhārupokter iti / tatra yogācārā upadiśanti / dhyāyinām samādhiviśayō
rūpaṃ samādhiprabhāvād utpadyate / caksurindriyāviśayatvāt anidarśanam /
deśānvaranatvād apratigham iti / atha matam / katham idānīḥ tat rūpam iti / etad avijnaptau samānam
(Pradhan: 197.4-7; T. 1558: 69a29-b4; Poussin v. 3: 18; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 540c21-24] and criticizes it, saying that rūpa produced by meditation, like other types of rūpa, such as rūpa in the antarābhava, and rūpa in a dream, is based on visible rūpa; the implication, I believe, is that in contrast avijnaptirūpa has no relation whatsoever to visible rūpa [T. 1562: 540c24-541a8].)

178 The reading in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā is better: samādhiviśayarūpam (355.15).
4.8) The Viññācayasāmgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṣṇūnāmaṁyanobhūmi includes, in the category of really existent, rūpa that is: 1) like a transformation belonging to the domain of samādhi as the result of supernatural power; 2) the result of that [samādhi]; 3) the object of that [samādhi]; 4) the object of the consciousness associated with that [samādhi]. This is contrasted with *samvarārūpa and *asamvarārūpa, which are merely prajñāpti. (See also item 1.2.)

dharmāyatanaparyāpannam punaḥ rūpam dvividham dravyasat prajñāptisac ca / yat prabhāvataḥ samādhigocaram niṃmitavat tatphalam tadviṣayam tatpratisamyukta-vijñānaviṣayam ca tad dravyasat / saṃvarāsaṃvarāsaṃgrhītaṃ tu prajñāptisat;\textsuperscript{179} chos kyi skye mched du gtogs pa’i gzugs ni rnam pa’i gnis te / rdzas su yod pa daṇ btags pa’i yod pa’o / mthu las byun ba’i tīṅ ne ’dzin gyi spyod yul sprul pa’i lta bu de’i ’bras bu daṇ / de’i yul daṇ de daṇ mtshuṅs par ldan pa’i rnam par sēs pa’i yul gaṅ yin pa de ni rdzas su yod pa yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 51a8-b1). 潛法處色亦有二種。謂實有假有。若有威德定所行境猶如變化。彼果彼境及彼相應識等境色是實物有。若律儀色不律儀色皆是假有 (T. 1579: 597b6-9)

\textsuperscript{179} According to Matsuda Kazunobu (private communication), this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the Viññācayasāmgrahaṇī preserved in St. Petersburg, and Matsuda has transcribed it as above (non-italicized portions represent Matsuda’s reconstruction).
4.9) Another Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of avijñaptirūpa is that the sūtra says that there is an anāsravarūpa. Vasubandhu again quotes those who practice yoga, who say that the rūpa produced by the power of samādhi is anāsrava if the samādhi in which it is produced is anāsrava.

yad apy uktam anāsravarūpakter iti tad eva samādhiprabhāvasaṃbhūtaṃ rūpaṃ anāsrave samādhave anāsravam varṇayanti yogācārāh

(Pradhan: 197.7-8; T. 1558: 69b4-6; Poussin v. 3: 18-19; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 541a11-13], questions the identity of these yogācāras, expressing surprise that Vasubandhu quotes from them in interpreting sūtra [T. 1562: 541a13-15], and allows that an anāsravarūpa, different from both varṇa and samsthānārūpa, may be produced by the power of samādhi; however, this rūpa can actually be nothing other than avijñaptirūpa [T. 1562: 541a13-19].)
4.9) The *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañcaviṃśatikāyaṃvamobhūmi* says that the *ṛūpa* that is the object of *samādhi* arises on the basis of the *mahābhūtas* associated with that *samādhi*, and it arises on the basis of *laukikasamādhi*, whether *sāsrava* or *anāsrava*. However, it does not arise on the basis of *lokottarasamādhi* because it is caused by a *samādhi* in which *prapañca* is present.

\[
{\text{tat punaḥ samādhiḥgocaram rūpaṃ yatpratisamyuktah samādhiḥ tatpratisamyuktāny eva tammahābhūtāny upādāya laukikāṃ sāsravānāsraṇaṃ samādhiḥm}}
\]

\[
{\text{upādāyotpadyate na tu lokottaram / saprapaṃcākārasamādhihetukatvāt tasya;}}{\text{180}}
\]

\[
{\text{tiṅ ne 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs de yan tiṅ ne 'dzin181 'byuṅ ba chen po dag rgyur byas pa'i gzugs gaṅ daṅ mštunḥs par ldan pa de dag ŋid daṅ de yan mštunḥs}}
\]

\[
{\text{par ldan pa yin no / 'jig rten pa'i tiṅ ne 'dzin zag pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ zag pa med}}
\]

\[
{\text{pa la brten nas skye ba yin gyi / 'jig rten las 'das pa las ni ma yin te / de ni spros}}
\]

\[
{\text{pa'i rnam pa daṅ bcas pa'i tiṅ ne 'dzin gyi rgyu las byuṅ ba'i phyir ro (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 51b1-3);}}
\]

\[
{\text{又定所行色若依此繫定。即由此繫大種所造。又}}
\]

\[
{\text{此定色但是世間有漏無漏由定而生。非出世間由此定色有戲論行定為因故 (T.}}
\]

\[
{\text{1579: 597b9-12)}}
\]

---

180 According to Matsuda Kazunobu [private communication], this passage appears in a Sanskrit manuscript fragment of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* preserved in St. Petersburg, and Matsuda has transcribed it as above.
4.10) A third Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of avijñaptirūpa is that the sūtra says that merit increases. Vasubandhu quotes the pūrvācāryas, who say that the merit increases when the recipients of a gift use the gift, even though, in the time between the giving of the gift and its use, the giver of the gift might have a bad thought. Due to the nature of dharmas, the saṃtattis of the givers of gifts are perfumed by the volition toward the recipient that accompanied the gift, and their saṃtattis undergo a gradual transformation until they can give rise to greater results.¹⁸¹

yad api uktam punyābhivṛddhivacanād iti tatāpi pūrvācāryā nirdhiṣanti dharmatā hy eṣā yathā yathā dārṣṭām dāyāḥ paribhujyante tathā tathā bhoktṛṇāṁ guṇaviśeṣād anugrahaviśeṣāḥ cānyamanamanāḥ api dārṣṭām taddālambanadānacetanābhāviḥ saṃtattayah sūkṣmam parināmaviśeṣaṁ prāpnuvanti yenāyatāṁ bhaṭitaraphalābhāhi-
nīśpattaye samarthā bhavanti

(Pradhan: 197.14-17; T. 1558: 69b13-20; Poussin v. 3: 20; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 541c8-14], explains the terms saṃtatt, parināma, and viśeṣa, says that he has already refuted similar ideas that Vasubandhu is now deviously expressing in different words, and proceeds once again to criticize the theory of parināmaviśeṣa and the bija metaphor from the Viśhāṣika standpoint [T. 1562: 541c14-542b6].)

¹⁸¹ Hakamaya mentions this passage and suggests the possibility that the idea of parināmaviśeṣa here may be that of a Sautrāntika group that preceded Vasubandhu and that cannot be identified with Yogācāra. But he leaves the question open (1986).
4.10) (The Yogacārabhūmi does not explain the accumulation of merit in terms of the transformation of the saṃtati. However, the following passages may be relevant:

The Savitarkādi-bhūmi uses the phrase viśiṣṭa saṃskārasatantī pravartate in explaining how good or bad actions produce desired or undesired results. [See item 2.12.]

yesu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāṣubham karmotpannamiruddham bhavati tena hetunā tena prayayena viśiṣṭa saṃskārasantatī pravartate sā vāsanety ucyate / yasyāḥ prabandhapaiṭāya istāniṣṭaphalāṃ nirvartate [Yogacārabhūmi: 128.2-4]; 'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags Žes bya ste / de rgyu du gnas pa las sdug pa daṅ mi sže pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir [Yogacārabhūmi; dzi 75b4-5]; 謂於諸行中。曾有浄不浄業。若生若滅由此因縁彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛愛果生 [T. 1579: 305b3-6]

In the Cintāmaṇi Bhūmi, it is said that wealth accrues due to good karma produced by dāna and accumulated in former lives.

ji ltar na sbyin pa las loṅs spyod can du 'gyur ba yin Že na / 'di ltar 'di na la la sṇon gyi tshe rabs gžan dag tu sbyin pa las byuṅ bai bsod nams bya ba'i dḥos po byas Žin bsags par gyur te / de da ltar phyug pa'i khyim daṅ / nor che ba nas mdzod daṅ / ban mdzod kyi tshogs man ba'i bar gyi khyim du skye bar 'gyur ba 'bla bu'o [Yogacārabhūmi; dzi 269a2-4]; 云何布施能具珍財。謂如有一昔餘生中及増長施福事業。由此因縁。今生巨富大財寶家。乃至衆多府車盈積云 [T. 1579: 375b13-16]

The idea that certain observable phenomena are attributable to the nature of dharmas [dharmatā] appears in various places in the Yogacārabhūmi in definitions of dharmatā-yuktī, for example in the Šrāvakabhbūmi:


catuṃ cāsau dharmatā / saivaṃtā yuktīr yoga upāyā evam vā etasmāt / anyathā vā naiva vāṃśāt sarvatraiva ca dharmataiva pratiprasaraṇam dharmataiva yuktih / civaḥ dharmatā-yuktī [Wayman 1961: 79; Šrāvakabhbūmi: 143.4-16]; chos ŋid kyi rigs pa gaṅ že na / ci'i phyir phuṅ po rnam ds la bur gyur pa yin / 'jig rten gnas pa de la bur gyur pa yin / ci'i phyir sa'i
Chapter 4  Karmanirdeśa
4.10 continued) mtshan ŋid sra ba yin / chu'i mtshan ŋid gšer ba yin / me'i mtshan ŋid tsha ba yin / rluṅ gi mtshan ŋid g.yo ba yin / ci'i phyir phun po rnam mi rtag pa yin / ci'i phyir mya 'nan las 'das pa ŋi ba yin / de bžin du ci'i phyir gzugs kyi mtshan ŋid gzugs su rnu ba yin / tshor ba'i mtshan ŋid myon ba yin / 'du sès kyi mtshan ŋid kun sès par byed pa yin / 'du byed rams kyi mtshan ŋid mnon par 'du byed pa yin / rnam par sès pa'i mtshan ŋid rnam par sès par byed pa yin 'zh na / de ni chos ŋid yin te / chos de dag gi raṅ bžin de yin 'zin / de dag gi 'no bo ŋid de lta bu yin pas chos ŋid de gaṅ kho na yin pa de ŋid 'dir rigs pa daṅ / sbyor ba daṅ / thabs yin no / de bžin du de lta bu 'am / gǎn nam / gǎn du ma 'gyur pa ni sems la bžag par bya ba daṅ / sems la go bar bya ba'i phyir thams cad du yaṅ chos ŋid kho na la brten pa daṅ / chos ŋid kho na'i rigs pa yin te / de ni chos ŋid kyi rigs pa žes bya'o [Yogācārabhūmi; wi 68b6-69a4];

云何名為法爾道理。謂何因緣故即彼諸蘊。如是種類。諸器世間。如是安布。何因緣故地堅為相。水濕為相火煬為相風用輕動以爲其相。何因緣故諸蘊無常諸法無我涅槃寂靜。何因緣故色變壞相受領納相。想等了相行造作相。識了別相。由彼諸法本性應爾。自性應爾。法性應爾。即此法爾說名道理瑜伽方便。或即如是或異如是或非如是。一切皆以法爾爲依。一切皆歸法爾道理。令心安住令心曉了。如是名爲法爾道理 [T. 1579: 419b28-c9]
4.11) Vasubandhu raises a hypothetical objection to the argument of the pūrvacāryas that he supports in 4.10: how can the recipient’s action affect the donor? He answers this objection by saying that the argument would apply equally even if one attributed the increase in merit to avijñapti.

atha matam katham idānīṁ saṁtānāntaraviśeṣād anyamanaso 'pi saṁtānāntarasya pariṇāmaḥ setṣyatīti/ etad avijñaptau samānam/katham idānīṁ saṁtānāntaraviśeṣāt saṁtānāntare dharmāntaram avijñaptih setṣyatīti

(Pradhan: 197.18-20; T. 1558: 69b20-23; Poussin v. 3: 20; Saṁghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 542b6-11] and, after complaining that Vasubandhu confuses issues by not properly understanding the reasoning of his own or other schools, explains that the avijñapti is continually replicated in the donor’s saṁtāna and that, since all saṁskṛtadharmaṁ depend on external causes, it is not wrong to say that a special quality of the recipient can result in an increase in the donor’s merit [T. 1562: 542b11-28].)
4.11) (I can find no corresponding argument in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
4.12) After explaining that merit increases in the case of non-material meritorious actions because the saṃtāna undergoes a subtle transformation due to the repetition of volitions with the Tathāgata and the śrāvakas as objects, Vasubandhu points out that the Sarvāstivādins would say that there is no vijñapti in the case of non-material meritorious actions, and therefore there should be no avijñapti.

nirupadhikesv idānim puṇyakriyāvastuṣu katham bhaviṣyatīti / abhikṣṇam tad-ālambanacetanābhīśāt svapnayeṣv api tā anuṣaṅgīnyo bhavanti / avijñaptivādinas tu niraupadhike yatra vijñaptir nāsti tatra katham avijñaptih syāt

(Pradhan: 197.20-22; T. 1558: 69b23-26; Poussin v. 3: 20-21; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 542b28-29] and criticizes it, saying that when one honors the Tathāgata and the śrāvakas, one does in fact produce vijñapti as well as avijñapti because there is a physical manifestation that accompanies the non-material meritorious action; furthermore, the increase in merit would be impossible without avijñapti [T. i562: 542b29-c12].)

---

182 See the Abhidharma kośaavyākhyā: 356.10-12.
4.12) (I can find no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*)
4.13) A fourth Sarvāstivādin argument in support of the reality of *avijñaptirūpa* is that, if *avijñapti* did not exist, it would be impossible for the action of a person who orders someone else to do something to be *karmapatha*. Vasubandhu responds that the person who gives the orders will have a subtle transformation of his *sautrāna* at the moment the action is carried out. This transformation is called *karmapatha*.

_yad āpy uktām kārayatah katham karmapathāḥ setsyantīti tatrāpy evaṁ varṇayanti /tatprayogena pareśām upagātaviśēṣāt prayoktuḥ sūkṣmaḥ santatiparināma viśēṣo jāyate yata āyatām saṅtatir āpiḥ bhūtaraṇaḥ bhāhvinvartanasamarthā bhavatiḥ svayam āpi ca kurvataḥ kriyāphalaparismāptāv eṣa eva nyāyo veditavyaḥ / so 'sau saṁtāti-parināma viśēṣaḥ karmapatha ity ākhyāyate / kārye kāraṇopacārāt / kāyikavācikatvām tu tatkriyāphalatvād yathā 'vijñaptivādīnām avijñāpter iti_ (Pradhan: 198.2-6; T. 1558: 69c6-11; Poussin v. 3: 21-22; Saṁghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 542c12-18] and refutes it, yet again criticizing the theory of *saṁtāti-parināma viśēṣa* from the Vaibhāṣika point of view [T. 1562: 542c18-543a17].)

---

183 Corrected from *samante 'pi* by Funahashi on the basis of the Tibetan (1987: 66 n. 11).
4.13) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not contain an argument regarding the karma of one who orders an action to be committed. However, the Viniścayasaṃgrahānī on the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi explains how a person belonging to the ranks of those who are asaṃvara repeatedly accumulates bad thoughts, thereby activating bad actions and increasing unmeritorious karma. When his bad thoughts enable him to actualize karma, and when, due to seeds and due to their actualization, there is a change in his saṃtāna, he is called “one who is asaṃvara.”)

sdom pa ma yin pa’i rigs su skyes pa ji la ba bzin du gaṅ su yaṅ ruṅ ba gaṅ daṅ gaṅ nas ‘onis kyaṅ ruṅ ste / sems sbyed par byed pa yaṅ de bzin du rgyas par rig par bya’o / de ni ji srid du sdom pa ma yin pa’i sems pa spoṅ bar mi byed pa de srid du ma bsdam par brjod par bya ste / de ni ŋin gcig bzin du sems pa de maṅ du sogs pa daṅ / las de kun tu sbyor bas bsdod nams ma yin pa mnon par ’phel bar rig par bya’o / de’i log par smon pa’i sems pa ma dad pa daṅ / le to daṅ brjod nas pa daṅ / rnam par g.yeṅ ba daṅ / sès roḥ ’chal pa daṅ ldan pa las de yaṅ dag par len par byed pa / las de kun nas slon bar byed pa de yaṅ ji srid du gton ba’i rgyu dag gi spoṅ bar mi byed / yoṅs su gton bar mi byed kyi bar du de phyin chad kyaṅ sa bon daṅ kun tu spyod pa las rgyud du gogs pa ’byuṅ ba ni sdom pa ma yin pa žes bya’o [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 31b1-4]; 如生不律儀家如是。隨是何人。隨由何事起決猛心。廣說應知。此人乃至不律儀思未捨己來。常得說名不律儀者。於日日分彼不善思廣積集故。彼不善業多現行故。當知非福速遠增長復次此邪惡願思。恆與不信懈怠忘念散亂惡慧俱行。能受彼業能發彼業。從此已後由種子故及現行故。處相續中現在轉時名不律儀者。乃至由捨因緣未捨未棄 [T. 1579: 589c3-11]
4.14) The sixth Sarvāstivādin argument for the existence of avijñapti is that, without avijñapti, three members of the eightfold noble path, namely samyagvāc, samyak-karmānta, and samyagājīva, would be lacking in the case of an ārya in samādhi. Vasubandhu responds by asking whether the Sarvāstivādin thinks that the ārya engages in correct speech, etc., while in samādhi.

yad apy uktam aṣṭāṅga āryamārgo na syād iti / aṅgaṃ tāvad ācakṣya / kathāṃ mārga-samāpannasya samyagvākkarmāntājīvā bhavanāti / kim asau vācaṃ bhāsyate kriyāṃ vā karoti cīvarādīn vā paryēṣate

(Pradhan: 198.17-19; T. 1558: 69c28-70a1; Poussin v. 3: 23; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 543a28-b2] and says that Vasubandhu and the Sautrāntikas should be asked the same question [T. 1562: 543b2-5].)
4.14) (I can find no corresponding argument in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
Vasubandhu gives his own explanation for how the ārya in samādhi can be said to have all members of the eightfold path: the ārya has an intention (āśaya) and an āśraya\textsuperscript{184} that, after he emerges from meditation, enable him to continue to produce samyagvāc, etc.

\[yady evam ihāpy evam kim na grhyate mārgasamāpanno vināpy avijñaptyā tadrāpam āśayam ca āśrayam ca pratilabhate yasya pratilambhāt vyutthito 'pi na punar mithyā-vāgādiṣu pravartate samyagvāgādiṣu ca pravartate / ato nimitte naimittikopacāraṃ kṛtvā aṣṭau mārgāṅgāni vyavasthāpyanta iti\]

(Pradhan: 198.22-199.1; T. 1558: 70a4-7; Poussin v. 3: 24; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 543b5-8] and argues that, according to Vasubandhu’s logic, the same thing could be said about samyagdṛṣṭi, which in fact must be present in samādhi; according to the Ābhidhārmikas, samyagvāc, etc., are actually present in samādhi in the form of avijñapti [T. 1562: 543b8-27].)

\textsuperscript{184}The Abhidharmakośavyākhyā glosses āśraya as āśrayaparāśrit (357.31).
4.15) According to the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi of the Viniścayasaṅgраhana, ālayavijñāna is the cause of the activity of kleśas and of the non-activity of the Path,\(^{185}\) while āśrayaparivṛtti is the cause of the non-activity of the kleśas and the activity of the Path.

\[\text{kun} \ \text{gzi} \ \text{rnam} \ \text{par} \ \text{ses} \ \text{pa} \ \text{ni} \ \text{ñon} \ \text{moṅs} \ \text{pa} \ \text{rnams} \ \text{kyi} \ \text{jug} \ \text{pa'i} \ \text{rgyu} \ \text{daṅ} \ \text{lam} \ \text{gyi} \ \text{jug} \ \text{pa'i} \ \text{rgyu} \ \text{ma} \ \text{yin} \ \text{la} / \ \text{gnas} \ \text{gyur} \ \text{pa} \ \text{ni} \ \text{ñon} \ \text{moṅs} \ \text{pa} \ \text{rnams} \ \text{kyi} \ \text{jug} \ \text{ma} \ \text{yin} \ \text{pa} \ \text{daṅ} / \ \text{lam} \ \text{du} \ \text{jug} \ \text{pa'i} \ \text{rgyu} \ \text{yin} \ \text{te} \ (\text{Yogācārabhūmi}; \text{zi} \ 9b6-7); \text{又阿頼耶識。是煩惱轉因。聖道不轉因。轉依是煩惱不轉因。聖道轉因} (\text{T. 1579; 581c12-14}; \text{see Schmithausen 1987: 369 n. 570})

---

\(^{185}\) This is according to the Chinese translation. According to the Tibetan translation, ālayavijñāna is the cause of the activity of kleśas and is not the cause of the activity of the Path.
4.16) Vasubandhu says that the reason why vipākaja citta can be neither the cause (pravartaka) nor the accompaniment (anuvartaka) of karma is that it occurs without effort.\textsuperscript{186}

vipākajā tu cittaṃ naiva pravartakaṃ nānurvartakaṃ nirabhisaṃskāravāhyāt
(Pradhan: 205.2; T. 1558: 71c24-25; Poussin v. 3: 41; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 547b17-18] and criticizes it on the grounds that not all things that are not produced by effort fail to give rise to karma. He gives the example of innate kuśala, which can cause the production of vijnāpatikarma, and says that the real reason is that vipākaja citta is too weak to act as a cause\textsuperscript{187} [T. 1562: 547b26-29].)

\textsuperscript{186} Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese translation explains Vasubandhu’s earlier statement that anāsrava citta is likewise neither the cause nor the accompaniment of karma: he says that this is because anāsrava citta is only produced in meditation (T. 1558: 71c25). Although this explanation is not found in the Sanskrit, the Tibetan, or Paramārtha’s translation, it is supported by the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (366.26-27; see Poussin, v. 3: 40 n. 1). Saṃghabhadra criticizes Vasubandhu’s reasoning, saying that the citta of sāsrava meditation likewise is neither cause nor accompaniment of karma (T. 1562: 547b15-16).

\textsuperscript{187} This is the reason offered by the Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 610b24-26).
4.16) (I have found no corresponding argument in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
4.17) Vasubandhu poses the question: does the moral nature of viññaptikarma correspond to its pravartaka or its anuvartaka? He finds objections with each possibility and concludes that if the pravartaka is bhāvanāheya, the viññapti must correspond to it. But if the pravartaka is darśanaheya, the viññapti does not (necessarily?) correspond to it. According to Vasubandhu, there must be a bhāvanāheya pravartaka moment between the first pravartaka and the viññapti, and the viññapti will correspond to this second pravartaka.

kim idānīṁ yathā pravartakam tathā viññaptir āhosvid yathā 'nuvartakam / kim cātaḥ / yathā pravartakam cet / ihāpi niyātavāktā viññaptiḥ prāpnoti / satkāyānta- grāhādṛṣṭipravartitatvāt / na vā sarvam darśanaprahātavyaṁ pravartakam iti viśeṣanam vaktavyaṁ / yathānuvartakam cet akuśalāvāktācittasya prātimokṣā- viññaptiḥ kuśalā na prāpnoti / yathā pravartaka tathā viññaptir na tu yathā darśana- prahātavyaṁ / bhāvanāheyaṁantaritvatāt

(Pradhan: 205.2-7; T. 1558: 72a13-18; Poussin v. 3: 41-42; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 547c23-29] and accuses Vasubandhu of expressing his own opinion while claiming to be presenting the view of the Ābhidhārmikas [T. 1562: 547c29-548a5].)
4.17) (I have found no corresponding argument in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
4.18) Vasubandhu says that the sūtra, when it says that mātṛyādrṣṭi causes vijnāpiti, does not contradict his own opinion that vijnāpiti does not correspond to a darśanaheyā pravartaka. Mātṛyādrṣṭi causes another pravartaka, one that is bhāvanāheya, which causes vijnāpiti. (This seems like little more than a restatement of Vasubandhu’s position in 4.16.)

yadi nānuvartakavaśād vijnāpateḥ kuśalādītvam na tarhīdām vaktavyam / hetusamutthānaṁ saṃdhāyoktaṁ sūtre na tatkṣaṇasamutthānam / ato nāstiha nivṛtvāvyākṛta vijnāpitr īti / evam vaktavyam / anyavayavahitaṁ hetusamutthānaṁ saṃdhāyoktaṁ īti
(Pradhan: 205.7-9; T. 1558: 72a20-25; Poussin v. 3: 42-43; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 548a5-8], explains it, and criticizes it, again complaining that Vasubandhu does not accurately present the Sarvāstivādin position [T. 1562: 548a8-23].)
4.18) (I have found no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The *sūtra* to which Vasubandhu refers [Pradhan 203.11-12; T. 1558: 71b25; Poussin v. 3: 39] is *Samyuktāgama, sūtra* 749 [T. 99: 198b13 ff.], which is not commented on in the *Vastusaṃgrahāṇī*.)
4.19) In verse 26ab, Vasubandhu says that *samvara* that is produced by *dhyāna* is obtained by means of the *dhyānabhūmi*, that is to say, at the moment of obtaining the *citta* of the *dhyānabhūmi*.

*dhyānajo dhyānabhūmyaiva labhyate yadā dhyānabhūmikaṃ cittaṃ pratilabhyaṃ maulīyaṃ sāmantakīyaṃ vā sāsravāṃ tadā dhyānasamvaro 'pi sahabhūtatvāt* (Pradhan: 211.19-21; T. 1558: 74b5-16; Poussin v. 3: 59; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 551a23, referring to what was quoted at 551a9-12] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu should have said “by means of *dhyāna*,” not “by means of *dhyānabhūmi*” because the word *dhyānabhūmi* refers to all the *dharmaś* in *dhyāna*. In other words, if I understand correctly, Vasubandhu does not distinguish between the *dhyāna* and the *samvara* obtained therein [T. 1562: 551a20-24].)
4.19) (I have found nothing in the Yogacārabhūmi concerning this question. However, an explanation of dhyānasamyāra can be found in the Viniścayasamgrahani on the Pañcavidhānakāyamanabhūmi [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 33b1-3; T. 1579: 590b23-27].)
4.20) Vasubandhu objects to the Sarvāstivādin statement that refraining from eating at an improper time is both fasting and a “member of fasting” (upavāsāṅga). The Sarvāstivādins say that it is analogous to samyagdrṣṭi, dharmapravicaya, and samādhi, which are, respectively, mārga, bodhi, and dhyāna and, at the same time, mārgāṅga, bodhyāṅga, and dhyānāṅga. Vasubandhu says that the Sarvāstivādin explanation implies that the earlier samyagdrṣṭi is a member of the later samyagdrṣṭi, in which case the first moment of the mārga would not have eight members.

na tu teśāṃ eva samyagdrṣṭyādīnāṃ ta evāṅgatvāya kalpanta iti / pūrvakāḥ samyag-

pravāh samyag-

drṣṭyādaya uttareśāṃ aṅgaṃ yadi syuh prathamakṣaṇotpampana āryamārga nāṣṭāṅga

syāt

(Pradhan: 214.20-21; T. 1558: 75c14-17; Poussin v. 3: 69; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 552c19-12] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu misrepresents the Sarvāstivādin position, according to which samyag-

drṣṭi, etc., do not act as aṅgas with respect to themselves but only with respect to the

other members [T. 1562: 552c12-22].)188

188 See Kokuyaku Issaikyō Bidon-bu 28: 424 n. 41.
4.20) (I have found no corresponding argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*)
4.21) According to Sarvāstivāda, one becomes an upāsaka simply by taking the triple refuge: one is thereby endowed with the upāsaka discipline. However, Vasubandhu points out that this contradicts the Buddha’s statement that there are different kinds of upāsakas, who practice varying numbers of the five rules. The Sarvāstivādin explanation is that all upāsakas are endowed with the five rules but that some upāsakas do not observe all of them. Vasubandhu says that the Sarvāstivādins base their opinion on a sūtra that is not directly relevant to the definition of an upāsaka.  

\[\text{yadi sarva evopāsakā upāsakasaṃvarasthāḥ katham bhagavatā ekadesakāri pradeśakāri yadbhīyakāri paripūrṇakāri copāsaka uktāḥ / tatpālanāt kila proktāḥ yo hi yacchikṣāpadāṃ pālayati sa tatkārītī uktāḥ / sarve tu samaṃ saṃvarasthāḥ / idam utsūtraṃ vartate / kim arotsūtraṃ / upāsakatvābhupagarād eva saṃvaralābhō yasmāt prāṇātipātām ity aheti / na hy evam saṃtrāpaṭāhāḥ ukto yathā mahānāmasūtre pāthaḥ / tatraiva copāsakalakṣaṇopadeśo nānyatra / yatra tv eṣa pāṭho yāvajjīvaṃ prāṇāpetan sarāṇaṅgatam abhiṃprasannam iti / tatra te drśṭasatyā avetyaprasādāvayam prāṇair api sādharmaṇopaganamāṃ sma / jīvāhetor api abhavyā vayaṃ enam dharmam paritvaṃ avyayam / tv eṣa lākṣaṇopadeṣaḥ saṃvarasya / prāṇapetan tu na kvacīt pathyate}\

(Pradhan: 215.14-22; T. 1558: 76a19-28; Poussin v. 3: 73-74; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 553b3-12] and defends the Sarvāstivādin interpretation of sūtra [T. 1562: 553b12-c2].)
4.21) (The Yogācārabhūmi contains nothing explicit regarding this subject. However, the threefold division of upāsaka saṃvara in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanobhūmi might be relevant:)

De la dge bsñen gyi sdom pa ni yan lag gsum gyis bs dus pa yin te / yan lag gsum gaṅ že na / gzan la gnod pa'i düns po¹¹⁹ spoṅ ba yam dag par blan ba'i yan lag daṅ / yan dag par blans pa las ŋams pa phyir gso ba'i yan lag daṅ / yan dag par blans pa las mi ŋams pa'i yan lag go / de la gzan gyi srog la gnod pa daṅ / loṅs sypod la gnod pa daṅ / chuṅ ma la gnod pa spoṅ ba ni yan lag daṅ po yin no / brdzun du smra ba spoṅ ba ni yan lag gnis pa yin no / chaṅ daṅ bcos pa'i chaṅ daṅ sbyar ba'i chaṅ bag med pa'i gnas spoṅ ba ni yan lag gsum pa yin par rig par bya'o [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 34b7-35a2];

近事律儀由三支所攝。何等為三。一受遠離最勝損他事支。二遠越所受重修行支。三不越所受支。若永遠離損害他命損壞他財損他妻妾。是名初支。[ ]

遠離妄語是第二支。遠離諸酒衆放逸處。是第三支 [T. 1579: 591a9-14]

Furthermore, another passage in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanobhūmi clearly shows a gradual obtainment of saṃvara in the case of the bhikṣu.

sdom pa yan dag par blan ba de yan rnam pa brgyar gtogs par rig par bya ste / mi dge ba'i las kyi lam bca' spoṅ ba las¹¹² brten te / srog gcod pa'i phyogs gcig spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar gyi phyogs gcig spoṅ ba 'di dag ni rnam pa bco'o / srog gcod pa phal cher spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba'i bar phal cher spoṅ ba 'di dag kyaṅ

¹¹⁹-This description of the upāsaka saṃvara does not mention rules, in which respect it differs from the description of the bhikṣu saṃvara, which immediately precedes it: dge sloṅ gi sdom pa ni yan lag tu žig gis bs dus / dge bsñen gi sdom pa ni yan lag tu žig gis bs dus / bsñen gnas pa'i sdom pa ni yan lag tu žig gis bs dus par rig par bya že na / dge sloṅ gi sdom pa ni yan lag ži gis bs dus par rig par bya ste / yan lag ži gane ža na / bsñen par rdzogs pa'i yan lag daṅ / de daṅ mthun pa'i chos kyi bslab pa'i ži'i ži yan dag par bia'n ba'i yan lag daṅ / gzan gyi sens rjes su bsruṅ ba'i yan lag daṅ / bslab pa'i tshogs yan dag par blans pa rjes su sruṅ ba'i yan lag go / de la gsol ba dan bzi'i las bya ba daṅ / ji ltar bslab pa'i ži'i che loṅ dag nod pa ni bsñen par rdzogs pa'i yan lag yin te / yan lag de daṅ láan na dge sloṅ de daṅ po kho nar dge sloṅ [Derge adds gi düns po'i] tshul khrims des tshul khrims dan ldan pa žes bya'o [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 34a7-b4]; 問芯芏近事近住律儀。當知各由幾支所攝。答芯芏律儀四支所攝。何等為四。一受具足支。二受隨法學處支。三隨護他心支。四隨護如所受學處支。若作表白第四羯磨。及略攝受。隨苑學處。是名受具足支。由具此支故。名初芯芏具芯芏戒 (T. 1579: 590c24-29).

¹¹² Derge reads düns po'chen po.

¹¹³ Derge reads la.
Chapter 4  Karmanirdeśa
4.21 continued)  gzhan rnam pa bcu’o / srog gcud thams cad spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba’i bar thams cad spoṅ ba ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / dus yun thun nu nīn mtshan nam zla ba phyed dam / zla ba’am lor srog gcud pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba’i bar spoṅ ba ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / dus yun riṅ po lo phan chad nas ji srīd ’tsho’i bar du ni ma yin par srog gcud pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba’i bar spoṅ ba ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / ji srīd ’tsho’i bar du srog gcud pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba’i bar spoṅ ba ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / bdag ñid srog gcud pa spoṅ ba nas log par lta ba’i bar spoṅ ba ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / gzan dag de dag ñid yan dag par len du ’jug pa ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / de dag gi bṣnags pa rnam grangs du mar rjod par byed pa ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / srog gcud pa sboṅ ba nas log par blta ba’i bar spoṅ ba mthoṅ na yid bde bar ’dzin gcin dga’ ba daṅ yid bde ba skye ba ’di dag kyan gzan rnam pa bcu’o / bcu pa rnam pa bcu po de dag gcig tu bsdus nas rnam pa bṛgyar ’gyur te / bsod nams skye ba yan de tsam kho nar rig pa bya’o [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 32b2-8]; 復次當知由自行所攝而受律儀。謂於十種不善業道少分離殺。乃至少分遠離邪見。是名初行。若多分離殺生。乃至多分離邪見。是名第二行。若全分離殺生。乃至全分離邪見。是名第三行。若少時離殺生乃至離邪見。謂或一日一夜。或半月一月。或至一年。是名第四行。若多時離殺生乃至離邪見。謂過一年不至命終。是名第五行。若盡壽離殺生乃至離邪見。是名第六行。若自離殺生乃至離邪見。是名第七行。若於此事勸進他人。是名第八行。若即於彼以無量門稱揚讚述。是名第九行。若見離殺生者乃至離邪見者。深心慶生大歡喜。是名第十行。如是十行總說為百行。所生福量當知亦爾 [T. 1579: 590a13-28])  

193 I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for bringing this passage to my attention.
4.22) According to Vasubandhu, the Sarvāstivādin argument that \textit{upāsakas} are endowed with all the rules but break some of them does not make sense. The Sarvāstivādins assert that, if \textit{upāsakas} were not always endowed with all the rules, then \textit{bhikṣus} and \textit{śrāmaṇeras} would likewise not always be endowed with all the rules. Vasubandhu replies that this argument is invalid because, unlike in the case of \textit{upāsakas}, the Buddha has not mentioned \textit{bhikṣus} or \textit{śrāmaṇeras} who are not completely endowed with the rules.

\begin{quote}
\textit{ekadeśakāryādīṁs tu khaṇḍitaśikṣān adhikṛtya praśna eva na yuyate / kuto visarjanam āvenikadharmānāṁ / ko hy upāsakasamvarāṁ jānan etan na jñāsyate yo hi yacchikṣapādaṁ na khaṇḍayati sa tatkāri bhavatī / upāsakasamvarasya tu parimāṇānamabhijñāṁs tanmātraśikṣākṣamān práty esa prāśna yuyate / kiyatā bhadantopāsaka ekadeśakārī bhavati yāvat paripūrṇakārī bhavati / yadi tarhi vinā saṃvareṇopāsakaḥ syād vikalena vā bhikṣusrāmaṇerāv api syātam / katham tāvād eṣām upāsakasamvarādīnāṁ anagapratiniyamo bhavati / śaśtraprājñaptivasāt / upāsakatvādipratiniyamo 'pi śaśtraprājñaptivasād iṣyatām / vināpi hi saṃvareṇopāsakaḥ prajñaptito na tu bhikṣusrāmaṇerāv iti te tv etan na gacchanti kāśmīrāḥ}
\end{quote}

(Pradhan: 216.1-8; T. 1558: 76a29-b12; Poussin v. 3: 74-75; Sanghābhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 553c2-9] and insists that the Sarvāstivādin understanding that \textit{upāsakas} are endowed with all five rules but observe varying numbers of them is correct [T. 1562: 553c9-554a21]).
4.22) (See 4.20.)
4.23) According to the Sarvāstivādins, when one takes refuge in the Buddha, one takes refuge in the aṣaiṅśadharmaḥ, not in the physical body of the Buddha. Vasubandhu objects that, if the Buddha were nothing more than these dharmas, injuring him would not be a major offense (ānantaryakarma).¹⁹⁴ Vasubandhu discounts the Sarvāstivādin answer to this objection and says that their own texts never deny that the Buddha’s āśraya also comprises buddhatva.

yady aṣaikṣā dharmā eva buddhaḥ katham tathāgatasyāntike duṣṭacittarudhirotpādanaḥ ānantaryam bhavati / āśrayaviṣṇu daṇāt te ‘pi vipāditā bhavantiti vaibhāṣikāḥ / śāstraṁ tu naivām vācakam aṣaikṣā dharmā eva buddha iti / kim tarhi / buddhakārakā iti / ati āśrayasya buddhatvāpṛatīṣedhād acodyum evaitat
(Pradhāna: 216.23-217.2; T. 1558: 76c7-12; Poussin v. 3: 78-79; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 55b7-11] and criticizes it, saying that if one took refuge in the Buddha’s body, then even those who had not attained the aṣaikṣa-dharmas could accomplish Buddhahood; furthermore, even if one did take refuge in the Buddha’s body, it would have to be in his paramārtha body, which is equivalent to the aṣaikṣa-dharmas [T. 1562: 55b11-25].)

¹⁹⁴ This objection, attributed to Vasubandhu or to the Sautrāntikas by P’u-kuang (T.1821: 227b4-5), seems to be a hypothetical one.
4.23) In the *Viniścayasaṅgrahāṇi* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Samdhinirmocana-sūtra*), the characteristic of the Tathāgata’s dharmakāya is defined as the perfection of his āśraya resulting from his practice.

*bcom ldan ’das la byaṅ chub sems dpa’ ’jam dpal gyis  žu bžus pa / bcom ldan ’das de bzin gség pa rnams kyi chos kyi sku ’zes bgyi na / bcom ldan ’das de bzin gség pa rnams kyi chos kyi sku’i mtshan  nhid ji lta bu lags / bcom ldan ’das kyis bka’ stsal pa / ’jam dpal de bzin gség pa rnams kyi chos195 sku’i mtshan  nhid ni sa daṅ pha rol tu phyin pa bsgoms pa’i nes par ’byuṅ bar gyur pa196 yan dag par grub pa yin no (Yogācārabhūmi, i 100b6-101a1); 某殊室利菩薩摩訶薩請問佛言。世尊。如佛所說如來法身。如來法身有何等相。佛告某殊室利菩薩曰。善男子。於於諸地波羅蜜多。善修出離。轉依成滿。名如來法身之相 (T. 1579: 733c16-20)

This is contrasted with the āśrayas of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha, which are not called dharmakāya.

*bcom ldan ’das ci lags ṇan thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas rnams kyi sa gnas gyur pa gaṅ lags pa de yaṅ chos kyi sku legs par brjod par bgyi’am / ’jam dpal brjod par mi bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi, i 101a2-3); 世尊。聲聞獨覺所得轉依。名法身不。善男子。不名法身 (T. 1579: 733c23-24)

---

195 Corrected from *de bzin gség pa rnams kyi sku’i* on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.

196 Derge reads *nes par ’byuṅ bas gnas gyur pa.*
4.24) Vasubandhu says that if the Buddha is nothing more than the *aśaikṣa-dharmas*, then the *sangha* is likewise nothing more than the *śaikṣadharmanas* and *aśaikṣadharmanas* of the various monks. Thus, no one with a *laukikacitta* could be either the Buddha or a monk.

*anyathā hi laukikacittastho na buddhāḥ syān na sanghaḥ*

(Pradhan: 217.2-3; T. 1558: 76c12-13; Poussin v. 3: 79; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 556b25-28] and criticizes it, saying that one does not lose these dharmas simply because one has a *laukikacitta* [T. 1562: 556b28-c4].)
4.24) (I can find nothing in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that corresponds to this part of Vasubandhu’s argument.)
4.25) Vasubandhu says that yet another undesirable consequence of the Buddha’s being nothing more than the *aśaikṣadharman* is that the word *bhikṣu* would refer only to the vows and not to the body of the *bhikṣu*.

*śīlam eva ca bhikṣukarakoṁ bhikṣuḥ syāt*

(Pradhan: 217.3; T. 1558: 76c13; Poussin v. 3: 79; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 556c4], says that the word *bhikṣu* is provisionally used to indicate the body of the *bhikṣu* because he takes the vows, and criticizes Vasubandhu for misunderstanding the “*abhidharma* tradition” [T. 1562: 556c4-7].)
4.25) (I can find nothing in the Yogācārabhūmi that corresponds to this part of Vasubandhu's argument.)
The Sarvāstivādins argue that the unrestrained person is unrestrained with respect to all beings. But Vasubandhu argues that the sheep-killer has the intention only to kill the sheep, not, contrary to the Sarvāstivādins, to kill his own parents, who have been reborn as sheep. He maintains that, if the sheep-killer has the intention to kill his future parents, he is not unrestrained in the present with respect to the sheep.

\textit{yadi cānāgatātmabhāvāpekṣayā vartamānād asamyṛtaḥ syād urabrādīn api te putribhūtāt sarvathā na hanyur iti na syāt tebhyo \textcircled{\textit{sāṃvaraḥ}}}

(Pradhan: 221.20-21; T. 1558: 78c18-21; Poussin v. 3: 92; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 563a29-b3] and criticizes it, arguing that the evil intention is pervasive and is directed at all beings [T. 1562: 563b3-10].)
4.26) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not contain a similar argument. However, the explanation of the unrestrained person in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on the *Pañca-vijñānakāyamanabhūmi* [*Yogācārabhūmi*, zi 31a6-b4; T. 1579: 589b24-c11, partially quoted in item 4.13] suggests that becoming unrestrained is a gradual process resulting from the accumulation of bad actions based on bad thoughts or intentions. If so, it would not be unreasonable for one to be unrestrained toward certain beings and not toward others.)
4.27) In order to refute the Sarvāstivādin insistence that one who is not restrained is unrestrained with respect to all the infractions, Vasubandhu gives examples of sheep-killers who logically cannot be unrestrained with respect to all the other infractions: one who does not steal; one who is content to have sex only with his wife; one who is mute (and therefore cannot lie).

\[ \text{yaś caurabhrikā janmanāpy}^{197} \text{ ādatte svadāraparitūṣot mūkaś ca / katham asya sarvāṅgebhyo}^{198} \text{ 'sāmvarah syāt} \]

(Pradhan: 222.2-3; T. 1558: 78c25-26; Poussin v. 3: 93; Saṃghabhadra quotes this [T. 1562: 563b10-11] after his criticism of the preceding item, obviously treating it as part of the opinion of the sūtra-master, and says that, by killing the sheep, the sheep-killer destroys all his good intentions and therefore obtains all the \emph{asāṃvaras} [T. 1562: 563b11-16].)

\[ \]

\[^{197}\text{Funahashi says that a negative should be added on the basis of all the translations (1987: 219 n. 1).}\]

\[^{198}\text{Corrected from } \text{pārvāṅgebhyo} \text{ (Hirakawa 1973-1978, v. 1: 431).}\]
4.27) (The Yogācārabhūmi contains neither these examples nor the argument in general.)
4.28) Vasubandhu, in order to refute the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas, who say that monks who break even the most serious rules do not lose their bhikṣu śīla, quotes a passage from the Vinaya that implies that they do. The Sarvāstivādins argue that this passage cannot be taken literally: it really means that one who breaks a serious rule is not a “true” bhikṣu, that is to say, an arhat. However, Vasubandhu insists that the passage can be taken literally. He refers to another Vinaya passage that mentions four types of bhikṣus, the last of whom is the arhat. But he says that the first Vinaya passage refers to yet another type of bhikṣu, one who has taken the four vows (in other words, the ordinary bhikṣu). If a monk were an arhat to begin with, he would not be capable of breaking a rule and losing the quality of being a bhikṣu.  

yat tarhi bhagavatoktam bhikṣuḥbhikṣubhāvāt / katamasya bhavati śrāmanyakdhvastam patitam parajitam iti / paramārthabhikṣutvaṃ somdāyaitad uktam / idam abhisāhasam varṣate / kim atarābhīsaśasam / yat bhagavatā niśūrtham punar anyathā niyate / dāhsvīlīya ca bahukleśebhyāḥ pratayā dyante / katham etan niśūrtham / eṣa hi vinaye nirdeśaḥ / caturviḍho bhikṣuḥ / samjñābhhikṣuḥ pratijñābhikṣuḥ bhikṣuṣa iti bhikṣuḥ bhinnakleśatvāḥ bhikṣuḥ / asmiṃs tv arthe jñāpaticaturthakarmopasaṃpanno bhikṣuḥ iti / na cāsa tu pūrvaṃ paramārthabhikṣuḥ āśid yataḥ paścad abhikṣuḥ bhavet

(Pradhan: 223.11-18; T. 1558: 79b14-24; Poussin v. 3: 96-97; Sāṃghabhadra quotes the portion beginning with idam abhisāhasam, identifying it as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 565a14-22], and criticizes it, saying that the Sarvāstivādin idea of a “true” bhikṣu is correct and that Vasubandhu’s argument does not successfully refute it [T. 1562: 565a22-b12].)

199 Mochizuki suggests that Vasubandhu’s is the standard Buddhist position (1974: 5: 4273). Again, I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for this reference.

200 Funahashi (1987: 232 n.3) says that this should be read as abhikṣur on the basis of all the translations and the quotation in the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā.

201 Funahashi says that katamasya is a mistake for hatamasya (1987: 232 n. 4).
The Bodhisattvabhūmi states that a bodhisattva who breaks even one pāraṇīka rule becomes incapable of having the full requisites of the bodhisattva and of having purity of intention. He is a bodhisattva in appearance only, not a real bodhisattva. If he breaks the rule with a weak or medium paryavasthāna, he does not lose his bodhisattvasālasaṃvara, but if he breaks it with a strong paryavasthāna, he does. Furthermore, unlike a bhikṣu, who loses his pratimokṣasamvāra by breaking a pāraṇīka rule even once, the bodhisattva only loses his bodhisattvasālasaṃvara if he repeatedly breaks a rule badly, without guilt or shame, with pleasure, and thinking it is good to do so. And even this bodhisattva can regain his bodhisattvasālasaṃvara in the same lifetime, unlike the bhikṣu, who cannot.

7.96.16-20. Itīṁe catvāraḥ pāraṇīyika-sthānīyā dharmāḥ yeṣāṁ bodhisattvaḥ anyatamānyatamām dharmam adhyāpadya prāg eva sarvān a-bhavyo bhavati drṣṭe dharme vipulasya bodhisambhārasyopacayām pariprahaṁya. a-bhavyo bhavati drṣṭa eva dharme aśaya-visuddhayet. sa bodhisattvaḥ prati-rūpakaḥ ca bhavati. no tu bhūto bodhisattvaḥ. mṛḍu-madhyā-paryavasthānataś ca bodhisattvaḥ ebhiḥ caturbhīḥ pāraṇīyika-sthānīyaṁ dharmair na tac-chīla-saṃvāra-samādānām vijāhati. adhimātra-paryavasthānatas tu vijāhati. yataḥ ca bodhisattvaḥ esāṁ catturnāṁ pāraṇīyika-sthānīyānāṁ dharmānāṁ abhiṣkṛṇa-saṃudācārāṁ parītām api hrī-vyapatryāpyaṁ notpādayati. tena ca priyate. tena ca ramate. tatraiva guṇa-dārsī bhavati. iyaṁ adhimātratraḥ paryavasthānasya veditavyāṁ. na tu bodhisattvaḥ sakṛta eva pāraṇīyika-sthānīyā-dharmanasaṃudācārāṁ bodhisattva-sīla-saṃvāra-samā-dānaṁ vijāhati. tathāḥ pāraṇīyikair dharmair bhikṣuḥ prātimokṣa-saṃvaram. parityakta-samādāno 'pi ca bodhisattvo drṣṭe dharme bhavyaṁ punar ādānīya bodhisattva-sīla-saṃvāra-samādānasya bhavati. nābhavya eva tathāḥ pāraṇīyikādhyāpannāṁ prātimokṣa-saṃvāra-stho bhikṣuḥ. (Bodhisattvabhūmi: 159.3-23) bhiṣ po de dag ni pham pa'i gnas lta bu'i cho chos rnam yin te / de dag las byaṅ chub sems dpa202 cho shon yin raṅ ba byas na yin thse 'di la byaṅ chub kyi tshogs rgya chen po sogs pa dan / yoṅs su 'dzin pa'i skal ba med par 'gyur na thams cad la byas na lta ci smos / tshe 'di niṅ la bsam pa rnam par dag par 'gyur ba'i skal pa yin med de / de ni byaṅ chub sems dpa' ltar bcos pa yin gyi yin dag pa'i byaṅ chub sems dpa' ma yin no / pham pa'i gnas lta bu bhiṣ po 'di dag gis kun nas dkrīs pa chuṅ nu dan / 'bruṅ gis ni tshul khrims kyi sdom pa yin dag par blains pa de byaṅ chub sems dpa' byaṅ bar byed cīn de la dga' ba dan / de niṅ lla yon tan du lta ba can du gyur pa 'di ni kun nas dkrīs pa chen po yin par rig par bya'o / 'di lta ste / pham pa'i cho chos rnam byas pa'i dge slob gis so sorr thar pa'i sdom pa byaṅ bar 'gyur pa bzin du / byaṅ chub sems

202 Derge reads dpa.
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Chapter 4  Karmanirdeśa
4.28 continued) dpa'i pham pa'i gnas lta bu'i chos can lan cig tsam kun tu dpyad\textsuperscript{203} pas ni byaṅ chub sms dpa'i tshul khrims kyi sdom pa yan dag par blaṅs pa btaṅ bar mi 'gyur ro / byaṅ chub sms dpa'i ni yan dag par blaṅs par yoṅs su btaṅ du zin kyaṅ tshe 'di la byaṅ chub sms dpa'i tshul khrims kyi sdom pa yan dag par blaṅs pa phyir mnod pa'i skal pa yod do / 'di lta ste / dge sloṅ so sor thar pa'i sdom pa la gnas pa pham pa byaṅ ba bzhin du skal pa med pa kho nar 'gyur pa ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; ži 96b4-97a3); 菩薩於於他勝處法。隨犯一種況犯一切。不複堪能於現法中增長 擱受菩薩大菩提資糧。不復堪能於現法中意樂清淨。新名為相似菩薩。 非真菩薩。菩薩若用軟中品纏。毁犯四種他勝處法。不捨菩薩淨戒律儀。上 品纏犯。即名為捨。若諸菩薩毀犯四種他勝處法。數數現行無懲恥。深生 愛樂見是功德。當知是名上品纏犯。非諸菩薩。暫一現行他勝處法。使捨菩 薩淨戒律儀。如諸苾芻犯他勝法即便棄捨別解脫戒。若諸菩薩由此毀犯。棄 捨菩薩淨戒律儀。於現法中堪任更受非不堪任。如苾芻往別解脫戒犯他勝法。 於現法中不任更受 (T. 1579: 515c7-20)\textsuperscript{204}

The Śrāvakabhūmi lists five types of bhikṣus: the same four that are mentioned in the Vinaya passage quoted by Vasubandhu, as well as one who has taken the four vows.

tatra pañca bhikṣavāḥ / bhikṣatāḥ / bhikṣuḥ / pratiñābhikṣuḥ / saṁjñābhikṣuḥ / bhinnakleśa- tvād bhikṣuḥ / jñāpticaturthena karanopasampādito bhikṣuḥ (Śrāvakabhūmi: 341.10-12); de la dge sloṅ ni rum pa lta ste / 'di lta ste / sloṅ ba'i\textsuperscript{205} dge sloṅ dān / khas 'che ba'i dge sloṅ dān / min gi dge sloṅ dān / nön moṅs pa bcom pa'i phyir dge sloṅ dān / gsol ba dān bzi'i las kyis bṣien par rdzogs pa'i dge sloṅ no (Yogācārabhūmi; wi 152a7-8); 芳芻復有五種一乞勺苾芻。二自稱苾芻。三名想苾芻。四破壞 煩惱苾芻。五百四羯磨受具足戒苾芻 (T. 1579: 447a19-21)

\textsuperscript{203} Derge reads spyaṅ.

\textsuperscript{204} Elsewhere, the Bodhisattvacchāra again says that the bodhisattva who breaks one of the pāraśīta rules with a strong paryavasthāna loses his śīlasaṃvara and has to receive it once again (saced bodhisattvāḥ pāraśītya-sāṃśīram dharmam adhyāpapno bhavaty adhīmātrena paryavasthānena tena tyaktah samvaram. dvir api punar ādātavyaḥ [Bodhisattvacchāra: 180.26-181.2]; gal te kun nas dkris pa chen pos byaṅ chub sms dpa' la pham [corrected from pham on the basis of the Derge] pa'i gnas lta bu'i chos byaṅ bar gyur na des sdom pa gtan ba lan gniś su slar yan nod par bya'o [Yogācārabhūmi; ži 108b2]; 若諸菩薩以上品纏違犯。如上他勝處法失戒律儀。應當更受 [T. 1579: 521a22-23]).

\textsuperscript{205} Derge reads sloṅ ba'i phyir.
4.29) Vasubandhu invokes the Buddha, who compares the monk who has broken an important rule to a palm tree, the head of which has been cut off. Just as the palm tree cannot continue to grow, the remaining rules cannot thrive if an important rule has been broken.

\[\text{yac coktam ekadeśakṣobhād iti atra śāstraiva datto 'nuyogas tad yathā tālo mastakā𝑐chinnno 'bhavyo 'ṅkūritatvāya abhavyo virūdhim vyḍḍhim vipulatāṁ āptum ity upamāṇ kuruva}\]

(Pradhan: 223.18-19; T. 1558: 79b24-27; Poussin v. 3: 97; Saṃghabhadra does not discuss this in order but returns to it slightly later, identifying it as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 566a6-10], and criticizing Vasubandhu’s understanding of the Buddha’s simile, which, according to Saṃghabhadra, does not prove Vasubandhu’s contention that by breaking one rule a monk loses his bhikṣu śīla [T. 1562: 566a10-b5].)
4.29) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not contain such a simile in this context.)

206 In a note, La Vallée Poussin (1971, v. 3: 96 n. 1) points out that this simile appears in this context in the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya (Shih-sung lü [T. 1435: 157a6-9]). He also indicates that the palm tree simile is used elsewhere (he cites the Majhimanikāya) in a different context, that of destroying the āsravas (1971, v. 3: 97 n. 3). In the same note, he also mentions the Vībhāṣā, but he does not make it clear that, in the Vībhāṣā, too, the simile appears in the context of the āsravas, not of the breaking of the pārājika rules (T. 1545: 356b24-26). Pāśādika repeats La Vallée Poussin’s citation of the Vībhāṣā, without making clear that the context is different from that of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (1986: 81).

The simile does, in fact, appear in the Cināmāyī Bhūmi (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 302a4, 303a7-8; T. 1579: 387b14,387c19-21) and the Sopadhikā Bhūmi (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 329a4-5; T. 1579: 576c10-13), but the context in both places is that of defilement.
4.30) Vasubandhu, responding to the Sarvāstivādin insistence that the evil (mārga-dūśin) śramaṇa is still a śramaṇa, argues that he is only called a śramaṇa because he has the external form of a śramaṇa. Vasubandhu gives a number of similes, e.g., burnt wood, which, once it is burnt, is no longer wood but is still called “wood.”

sa tv eṣa ākṛtimātrāvaśeṣatvāc chramaṇa ukto dagdhakāṣṭhaśuṣkahradaśuṣkanāśa-pūtibūjālātacakramṛtasattvavai

(Pradhan: 224.9-10; T. 1558: 79c12-13; Poussin v. 3: 98; Saṅghabhādra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 565b20-22] and, in support of the idea that even a bad bhikṣu is still a bhikṣu, argues that the similes are not opposite: for example, wood that is only partially burnt is still called “wood”; only totally burnt wood is no longer called “wood” [T. 1562: 565b22-c12].)
4.30) The definition in the Śrāvakabhūmi of the mārgadāsīn emphasizes this śramaṇa’s alienation from the Buddhist path.

tatra yovaṃ pudgalo duḥśīlāḥ pāpadharmā yāavad abrahamacārī [brahmacārī] (ri) pratijñāḥ / ayanu ucycet mārgadāsī duṣitoneṇa mārgo bhavati mūlata āditāḥ / yenaḥyam abhavyo bhavaty apratībalah / abhājanabhūto mārgasyotpattaye / satyāṃ samvidyamānāyāṃ mārgadesanāyāṃ sati samvidyamānedhiyame tasmān mārgadāsīni ucyate207 (Śrāvakabhūmi: 339.16-340.1); de la gañ̃ zag tshul khrims ’chal pa sdig pa’i chos can / tshangs par spyod pa ma yin par tshangs par spyod pa khas ’che ba’i bar gañ̃ yin pa de ni / lam sun par byed pa žes bya ste / des ni lam bți dañ po nas208 sun par byed pas / des na de lam bskyed par bya ba dañ / lam bstan pa yod ciṅ med pa ma yin la rtoqs par bya ba yod ciṅ / med pa ma yin na yah / skal pa dañ mthu med la snod du gyur pa ma yin pas na de’i phyr lam sun par byed pa žes bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi: wi 151b6-8); 若諸犯戒繆持佉羅多行惡法。廣説乃至實非梵行自稱梵行。名壞道沙門。由彼破壞最初所有正道根本。無力無能非生道器。雖現前有說正道教及現前有 證正道者。而彼不得。是故名為壞道沙門 (T. 1579: 446c26-447a2)209

In a description of the characteristics of the fifth of six types of people who are without gotra, the Śrāvakabhūmi mentions the qualities of a false śramaṇa, who seems to be pure externally, while harboring rottenness inside.

lha ’am lha gañ̃ yañ rui ba dag tu smon pa’i phyr tshangs par spyod pa spyod par byed pa dañ / bslab pa phul nas spaiṃ pa la ’jag par gyur ba dañ / tshul khrims ’chal pa dañ / nañ myags pa dañ / ōes ’deag tu gyur pa dañ / ōi rul pa lta bur gyur pa dañ / lui boñ ltar kun tu spyod ciṅ dge sbyoṅ ma yin par dge sbyoṅ du khas ’che ba dañ (Yogācārabhūmi: wi 9a5-7); 請求生天或餘天處。或樂退捨所學禁戒或犯尸羅。

207 I have simply transcribed Shukla’s text here; I have not attempted to make any emendations.

208 I have emended from the Peking, which reads des ni lam géi dañ / dañ po nas, on the basis of the Derge. The Tibetan text diverges from both the Sanskrit and the Chinese at this point and includes material found in neither.

209 This is in contrast with the Vibhāṣa, which says that the mārgadāśin possesses a sāśraya āryamārga: 問善賢經說。若此處有八支聖道當知是處有四沙門。沙道沙門豈此之所。答亦此之所。以聖道支有實有假。實謂無漏正見等八。假謂有漏正見等八。沙道沙門亦得成就有漏正見。故彼亦是初沙門攝 (T. 1545: 342a24-28). Furthermore, although he breaks his vows and his preliminary practices, he does not destroy his understanding or his intention: 沙道沙門雖復破戒而不破見。雖破加行不破意樂 (T. 1545: 342b5-6).
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Chapter 4  Karmanirdeśa
Yogācārabhūmi

4.30 continued) 内懷朽敗外現真貧。如水所生雜穢蝸牛螺音狗行。實非沙門。自稱沙門 (T. 1579: 398b9-12;\textsuperscript{210} see also the Śrāvakabhūmi [51.4-8; Yogācārabhūmi: wi 25a6-b1; T. 1579: 404c1-6] and the Paryāyasamgrahani [Yogācārabhūmi: yi 51b3-52a2; T. 1579: 770b9-22] for similar passages)

\textsuperscript{210} Most of this passage seems to be missing from the Sanskrit manuscript. Shukla claims to have reconstructed the damaged leaf (Śrāvakabhūmi: 18 n. 4), but, in fact, he does not seem to have understood the extent of the missing portion. Of our passage, the only portion that he includes is aṣramaṇaḥ śramaṇapratijñaḥ, of which all but the final -jñaḥ is reconstructed (Śrāvakabhūmi: 18.11).
4.31) The Sarvāstivādins argue that if monks who break a rule lose the quality of being a bhikṣu, then there could be no penitent bhikṣus. Vasubandhū answers that he is not saying that all rule-breakers are pārājika, but that no pārājikas can be bhikṣus. He goes on to explain that, if someone breaks a serious rule but, due to the special nature of his saṃtāna, does not think to hide his transgression, he is not pārājika.\footnote{This seems to correspond to the position of the “foreign masters” (wai-kuo chu shih 外國諸師) in the Vibhāṣā (T. 1545: 623a13-16).}

\[ yadi hi dauḥśilyād abhikṣuḥ syāt śikṣādattako na syāt / na vayaṃ brūmāh sahādhyāpattyā sarvāḥ pārājikāḥ iti / yas tu pārājikāḥ so 'vaśyam abhikṣuḥ/ kaścit tu saṃtānaviśeṣān na pārājika ekacittāny apraticchādanād iti vyavasthāpitam dhārmavāminā (Pradhan: 224.10-12; T. 1558: 79c14-18; Poussin v. 3: 98-99; Samghabhadra identifies the passage as far as avaśyam abhikṣu as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 565c24-26] and criticizes it, saying that this is what the Sautrāntikas, not the Ābhidhārnikas, say [T. 1562: 565c26-566a5]. Samghabhadra does not comment on the reasoning implicit in Vasubandhū’s argument concerning the state of the saṃtāna, namely that the volition behind an action causes a change in the saṃtāna; in this case, it is concealing the transgression, rather than the transgression itself, that is powerful enough to leave the transgressor no longer capable of being a monk.)

\footnote{Samghabhadra also uses the term wo-kuo chu shih 我國諸師, presumably refer-ring to the Kāśmīra Vaibhāśikas.}
4.31) In the Vastusaṃgrahāṇī, several cases are mentioned in which there is no serious transgression even though pārājīka rules have been broken. One of these is the case in which there is no thought of hiding the transgression.

制立所犯。要由意樂增強力故。若雖有犯。而無一念起覆藏心。彼亦可出。於沙門果仍有堪能其 (T. 1579: 869b6-8)\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{213} This is from the portion of the Vastusaṃgrahāṇī that is not found in the Tibetan translation.
4.32) Vasubandhu says that, as long as someone who has broken rules is still a bhikṣu, one should honor his being a bhikṣu, even if he is such a bad one.

_kaś cāyam anarthe nirbandho yady asau tathābhūto 'pi bhikṣur namo 'stu tasmai tādṛśāya bhikṣutvāya_

(Pradhan: 224.15; T. 1558: 79c23-25; Poussin v. 3: 99; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 566b5-7] and criticizes it, saying that the word bhikṣu should be replaced by the word śramāṇa because [see item 4.30] the Buddha said that even the mārgadāsin still possesses śīla [T. 1562: 566b8-16].)
4.32) (I have not found any corresponding statement in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. However, see item 4.30 for a possible basis in the *Yogācārabhūmi* for Vasubandhu’s not using the word śramaṇa in this passage.)
4.33) Vasubandhu says that *dhyānasamvara* can be lost due to birth in a different stage, due to leaving a meditation state, and due to dying (in the case of *prthagjanas*).

*sarvam eva dhyānāptaṁ kuśalam dvābhyaṁ kāraṇābhyaṁ parityajyaeva upapattito vā bhūmisāṃcārād ārdhvan cāvaśyang ī pārihāṇito vā samāpatter nikāyasabhāgatvāc ca kincit*  

(Pradhan: 224.19-20; T. 1558: 80a1-5; Poussin v. 3: 100; Saṃghabhadra criticizes the sūtra-master for not mentioning another occasion for losing *dhyānasamvara*, namely at the time of *vairūgya* [T. 1562: 566c6-7].)²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Funahashi corrects this to *cādhaś ca* (1987: 235 n. 1).

²¹⁵ Funahashi corrects this to *sabhāgatyāgāc ca* (1987: 235 n. 2).

²¹⁶ P’u-kuang gives a long and complicated explanation of the difference between Vasubandhu’s and Saṃghabhadra’s opinions on this point (T. 1821: 237c15-238b7).
The Yogācārabhūmi contains no specific explanation of how one loses dhyanasamvara. However, the Viniścayasaṃgrahani on the Pāṇcavijñānakāya-
manobhūmi explains the five ways by which bhikṣus can lose their saṃvara in general:
by losing their śikṣā; by breaking a pārājika rule; by being reborn in a different state;
by destroying their kuśalamūlas; and by dying. Losing saṃvara at the time of vairāgya
is not mentioned.

de la rgyu dus na dge sloṅ gi sdom pa blaṅs kyaṅ gtoṅ bar 'gyur že na / mdor bdus na
rgyu lnas te bslab pa'i gzi 'bul ba daṅ / ltun ba'i rtsa ba lhag par spyod pa daṅ / mthun
dub ciṅ mthun gnis skyes pa daṅ dge ba'i rtsa ba chad pa daṅ / rigs mthun pa spangs
kyaṅ dge sloṅ gi sdom pa blaṅs pa gtoṅ bar 'gyur ro [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 38a7-b1]; 有
有幾因縁苾芻律儀受已還捨。答或由捨所學處故。或由犯根本罪故。或由形
沒二形生故。或由善根斷故。或由棄捨衆同分故。苾芻律儀受已還捨 [T.1579:
592b29-c3]
4.34) Vasubandhu says that there are three ways to lose that which is both good and pure: by obtaining a phala, one loses the previous pratipanvakamārga; by purifying one’s indriyas, one loses the mārga of weak indriyas; by falling, one loses a phala or a higher mārga of a phala.

anāsravam tu kuśalam tribhiḥ kāraṇaḥ parityakṣyate / phalapraptitah pūrvako mārgaḥ parityakṣyate / indiryottapanena mṛdvidriyamārgaḥ / parihānita uttaro mārgaḥ / phalāṃ phalaviśisto vā

(Pradhan: 224.23-225.1; T. 1558: 80a6-9; Poussin v. 3: 100-101; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 566c7-10] and criticizes him, saying that there are really only two ways, since the first way [obtaining a phala] really includes the second way [purifying one’s indriyas] [T. 1562: 566c10-14].)
4.34) (I cannot find anything relevant to this topic in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*)
4.35) Vasubandhu says that the last of six ways to destroy *avijñapti* that is neither *saṃvara* nor *asaṃvara* is to begin to destroy the *kuśalamūlas*.

*yadā kuśalamūlāni samucchettum ārabhata ity*
(Pradhan: 225.17-18; T. 1558: 80b7-8; Poussin v. 3: 102; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 567a22-23] and criticizes him, saying that Vasubandhu should not have limited his statement to the *kuśalamūlas*; the *akuśalamūlas* should also be included, and the verse is correct in simply saying *mūlaccheda* [T. 1562: 567a23-27].)
4.35) (I cannot find anything relevant to this topic in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
4.36) Vasubandhu attributes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the statement that the three types of mental misconduct (*abhidhyā*, vyāpāda, and *mithyādṛṣṭi*), which the Sarvāstivādins say are essentially *kleśa*, are actually karma.\(^{217}\)

\[abhidhyādaya eva manaskarmeti dārṣṭāntikāḥ / saṃcetanīyasyātre vacanāt / evaṃ tu sati karmakleśayor aikyaṃ syāt / kiṃ syād yadi kaścit kleśa ’pi karma syāt / naitad asti\]

(Pradhan: 237.17-18; T. 1558: 84b3-6; Poussin v. 3: 136; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 574b28-29]\(^{218}\) and criticizes it, saying that the causes of karma should not be conflated with karma itself [T. 1562: 574b29-c15].)

\(^{217}\) As La Vallée Poussin points out, Yaśomitra explains that these “Dārṣṭāntikas” are a type of Sautrāntika (*Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*: 400.17). La Vallée Poussin also claims that Vasubandhu later attributes the same opinion to the Sautrāntikas (1971, v. 3: 169), but in fact both the Sanskrit (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 248.10-11) and the Chinese (T. 1558: 88c13) mention Dārṣṭāntika. The Tibetan, however, reads *mdo sde pa*, i.e., Sautrāntika (*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: gu 241a5).

\(^{218}\) However, Vasubandhu actually rejects this and favors the Vaibhāṣika opinion. See the introduction for a discussion of this passage. A passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* that agrees with Vaibhāṣika appears on the next page.
4.36) According to the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, abhidhyā, vyāpāda, and mithyādṛṣṭi consist, at least in part, of mental karma.

abhidhyā katamā / parasyārikaraṇābhīprāyasya kliśacetasah parasvākaraṇābhīprāye nīścayaprayoge tanśniśṭhāyāṃ ca yan manaskarma / vyāpādaḥ katamah / paravyāpādābhīprāyaniścayaprayoge tanśniśṭhāyāṃ ca yan manaskarma / mithyādṛṣṭi katamā / apavādābhīprāyasya kliśacetaso 'pavādābhīprāyanīścayaprayoge tanśniśṭhāyāṃ ca yan manaskarma (Yogācārabhūmi: 182.9-14); brnab sens gaṅ ze na / gzan gyi nor bdag gir bya ba’i bsam pa can ṇon moṅs pa can gyi sens dan ldan pas / gzan gyi nor bdag gir bya ba’i bsam pa la / nes par sbyor ba byas pa dan / de mthar thug par byas pa’i yid kyi las gaṅ yin pa’o / gnod sens gaṅ ze na / gzan la gnod par bya ba’i bsam pa can gyi ṇon moṅs pa can gyi sens dan ldan pas / gzan la gnod par bya ba’i bsam pa la nes par sbyor ba byas pa dan / de mthar thug par byas pa’i yid kyi las gaṅ yin pa’o / log par lta ba gaṅ ze na / skur pa ’debs pa’i bsam pa can ṇon moṅs pa can gyi sens dan ldan pas / skur pa ’debs pa’i bsam pa de la nes par sbyor ba byas pa dan / de la mthar thug par byas pa’i yid kyi las gaṅ yin pa’o (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 105b5-8); 云何貪欲。謂於他所有。起己有欲樂起染污心。若於他所有。起己有欲樂決定方便。及於彼究竟中所有意業。云何瞋恚。謂於他起害欲樂。起染污心。若於他起害欲樂決定方便。及於彼究竟中所有意業。云何邪見。謂於起誹謗欲樂。起染污心。若於起誹謗欲樂決定方便。及於彼究竟中所有意業 (1579: 317b22-29)

However, according to the Viniścayasaṁgrahāṇi on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, they are karmapatha but not karma.

brnab sens daṅ / gnod sens daṅ / log par lta ba dag ni las kyi lam kho na yin la las ni ma yin par blta bar bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi: 153b); 貪恚邪見業道非業 (T. 1579: 636a29)
4.37) Vasubandhu disagrees with the Sarvāstivādins regarding the meaning of drṣṭam (seen), srutam (heard), vijnātam (known), and matam (felt). The Sarvāstivādins say that they refer to what is perceived by the eye, ear, mind, and the three organs of smell, taste, and touch, respectively. Vasubandhu attributes to "some people" the following opinion: that which is immediately perceived by the five material sense organs is drṣṭam; that which is learned from another is srutam; that which is accepted on the basis of proper inference is matam; that which is perceived immediately by mental cognition is vijnātam. In other words, the five material objects are seen, heard, known, and felt, while mental objects are heard, known, and felt, but not seen. Vasubandhu then attributes to the pūrvācārya a somewhat similar opinion: that which is perceived by the eye is drṣṭam; that which is perceived by the ear or which is transmitted by another is srutam; that which is thought by oneself is matam; that which is experienced internally or which is understood is vijnātam.

\[\text{sūtram tāvad ajñāpakam}\]

\[\text{anyārthatāt / na hy atra sūtre bhagavān vyavahārānāṃ lakṣaṇam śāsī sma / kim tathā / atra ca te saṃvidhe viśaye ca tusva vyavahāresu drṣṭādyavayavahāra-}\]

\[\text{mātraṃ bhaviṣyati na priyāpriyarimittādhyāropa ity ayaṃ atra sūrārtho drṣṭate / kim punar drṣṭam kim ca yāvad vijnātam / kecit tāvad āhuh / yat pañcabhir indriyāḥ pratyakṣam tad drṣṭam / yat parata āgamatam tac chrutam / yat svayaṃ yuktyanumānta rucitaṃ tan matam / yan manahpratyakṣabhāvanādhiṣṭhitam pratyātmavedyaṃ tad vijnātam iti / ete ca}\]

\[219\] P’u-kuang identifies “some people” as “some Saurāntikas.” It appears as though he is taking this opinion to be one Sarvāntika position, not necessarily Vasubandhu’s (有餘師説至亦為非理者。經部答。有餘經部師説 [T. 1821: 261a13-14]). He identifies the pūrvācāryas as those who study the yā-ch’ieh lun 瑜伽論 (T. 1821: 261a25-27). This certainly appears to be a reference to the Yogācārabhūmi, especially since P’u-kuang’s only other use of the term yā-ch’ieh lun clearly refers to the title of a book from which he quotes (T. 1821: 269c4). I am grateful to Yamabe Nobuyoshi for informing me that P’u-kuang here seems to be referring to a passage from the Savitarādi-bhūmi of the Viśṇucaryasangrahaṇī (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 111b4-112a1; T. 1579: 621a4-13).

It is quite possible that P’u-kuang intends to say that the pūrvācāryas are Saurāntikas who study the Yogācārabhūmi.

\[220\] This passage is mentioned by Hakamaya, who identifies the corresponding passage in the Yogācārabhūmi (1986).

\[221\] Funahashi rejects Hirakawa’s addition of na before sūtram and instead corrects from tāvaj jñāpakam (1987: 356 n. 4).

\[222\] Corrected by Funahashi (1987: 356 n. 5) from manahpratyakṣabhāvenādhiṣṭhitam
4.37) In its explanation of the four vyavahāras, the *Manobhūmi* gives definitions of *drṣṭam, śrutam, matam,* and *vijnātam* similar to those that Vasubandhu ascribes to the *pūrvācāryas.*

catvāro vyavahārāḥ katame / *drṣṭo* vyavahārāḥ śruto mato vijnāto vyavahārāḥ / *drṣṭo* vyavahārāḥ katamah / yad anena bahirāḥ pratyakṣikṛtam bhavati caekṣṣā tad upādāya yat pareṣām vyavaharavyayam ucyate *drṣṭo* vyavahārāḥ / śruto vyavahārāḥ katamah / yat paratāḥ śrūtam bhavati tad upādāya yat pareṣām vyavaharati / mato vyavahārāḥ katamah / yad anena na *drṣṭam* bhavati na śrutam api tu svayam eva cintitam tuṣitaṃ upaparīkṣitaṃ tad upādāya yat pareṣām vyavaharati / vijnāto vyavahārāḥ katamah / yad anenaḥdhyāmaṃ prativeditaṃ bhavaty adhīgataṃ sparśitaṃ sāksākṛtaṃ ca bhavati tad upādāya yat pareṣām vyavaharatyayam ucyate vijnāto vyavahārāḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 50.9-16); *tha sīad bzi gan ze na / mthon ba’i tha sīad dan i thos pa’i tha sīad dan i / bye brag phyed pa’i tha sīad dan / mam par šes pa’i tha sīad do / mthon ba’i tha sīad gan ze na / gan des mig gi* 223 *phyi rol mnon sum du byas nas de la brten te / gzhan dag la tha sīad du brjod pa gan yin pa de ni mthon ba’i tha sīad ces bya’o / thos pa’i tha sīad gan ze na / gan gzan las thos nas de la brten te / gzhan dag la tha sīad du brjod pa gan yin pa’o / bye brag phyed pa’i tha sīad gan ze na / gan des 224 ma mthon ma thos par bdag ņid kyis bsam s rin gcal la ṛe bar brtags nas / de la brten te / gzhan dag la tha sīad du brjod pa gan yin pa’o / mam par šes pa’i tha sīad gan ze na / gan des nañ so sor rañ giš rig pa dan / rtogs pa dan / reg pa dan / mnon sum du byas nas de la brten te / gzhan dag la tha sīad du brjod pa gan yin pa de ni / mam par šes pa’i tha sīad ces bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 27b3-8). 云何四種言說。謂依見聞識知所有言說。依見言說者謂依眼故現見外色。由此因緣為他宣說。是名依見言說依聞言說者。 謂從他聞。由此因緣為他宣說。是名依聞言說。依覺言說者。謂不見不聞。但自思惟稱量觀察。由此因緣為他宣說。是名依覺言說。依知言說者。謂各別於內所受所證所觸所得。由此因緣為他宣說。是名依知言說 (T. 1579: 289b13-21)

223 Corrected from *mig gi* on the basis of the Derge and the Sanskrit.

224 Corrected from *de* on the basis of the Derge and the Sanskrit.
4.37 continued) pañca viśayāḥ pratyekam drṣṭvā iti kṛtvā vyavahriyante / śrutā matā vijñātā iti vā / saṣṭo 'nyatra drṣṭād iti nāsti gandhādiṣu vyavahārabhāva-
prasaṅgāḥ / tasmād yuktir api eṣā yuktir na bhavati / pūrvacāryā evam āṇuh / tad
drṣṭam yat prayakṣeṣāt ca kṣaṇāḥ / śrutam yac chrotreṇa parataḥ cāgamtam
drṣṭam yat saṃyām cintitaṃ vijñātāṃ yat paratyāmapratibuddhāmtam adhigatam ca

(Pradhan: 245-246.8; T: 1558:87c14-27; Poussin v. 3: 161-162; Samghabhadra identifies
the opinion of “some people” as that of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 579a28-b8] and,
criticizing Vasubandhu for his idiosyncratic interpretation, insists that the intention of the
sūtra is to match each of the six types of objects of consciousness with one term indicating
how it is perceived [T. 1562: 579b8-579c15]. Samghabhadra also criticizes the opinion of
the pūrvacāryas, which, he says, would lead to a conflation of that which is seen and that
which is known, as well as a loss of distinction between that which is perceived and
knowledge [T. 1562: 579c15-21].)


227 Pradhan’s text reads cotpannam. Funahashi corrects this to ca nispannam and
takes nispannam as the first word of the next paragraph (1987: 356 n. 8).
4.38) According to Sarvāstivāda, it is possible to commit murder without moving one’s body and to lie without speaking. Vasubandhu rejects this, saying that both would be impossible since in kāmadhātu, there can be no avijñapti without vijnāpti, and there would be no vijnāpti in these types of murder or lying.

yady ubhayathā ’pi na parākrameta na cāvijñaptikāsty avijñaptih kāmāvacarī kathaṃ tayoḥ karmacathāḥ Siddhyati / kartavyo ’tra yatnāḥ
(Pradhan: 246.13-14; T. 1558: 88a4-6; Poussin v. 3: 163; Saṅghabhadra identifies this rejection as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 579c25-28] and criticizes it, showing that there really is a vijnāpti in these cases and mentioning an opinion that not all avijñapti in kāmadhātu depends on vijnāpti [T. 1562: 579c28-580c15; partially quoted in Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 408.13-24; translated in Poussin v. 3: 163-164 n. 5].)
4.38) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not seem to contain any similar discussion.)
4.39) Vasubandhu describes the various combinations of cetanās and bad karmapathas. According to him, one karmapatha accompanies one cetanā in two cases: 1) when someone has desire, etc., without doing another, physical karmapatha, such as murder; 2) when someone has ordered another person to perform a bad karmapatha but his own mind is akṣiṣṭa at the moment that the deed is done.

ekena tāvat saha vartate / vinā 'nyenābhidhyādisaṃmuḥkhiḥbhāve akiṣṭacetaso vā tat prayogena rūpiṇām anyatamanisṭhāgamane

(Pradhan: 251.9-10; T. 1558: 89c9-11; Poussin v. 3: 177-178; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 581c11, 13] and criticizes what Vasubandhu says about both cases: according to Saṃghabhadra, in the second case, certain klesas, such as māna (pride), can indeed be present [T. 1562: 581c12-13]; in the first case, certain non-physical karmapathas should also be included [T. 1562: 581c13-15].)
4.39)  (I can find nothing relevant to this issue in the *Yogācārabhūmi.*)
4.40) According to Vasubandhu, two karmapathas accompany one cetanā in the following cases: 1) when a man commits murder while his mind is afflicted with anger; 2) when a man who is overcome by desire steals, commits adultery, or speaks nonsense.

dvābhyaṃ saha vartate / vyāpannacittasya prāṇivadhe abhidhāvīṣṭasya vā 'dattādāne kāmamithyācāre sambhinnapralāpe vā

(Pradhan: 251.10-11; T. 1558: 89c11-12; Poussin v. 3: 178; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 581c24-26] and criticizes what Vasubandhu says about both cases. According to Samghabhadra, one must specify in both cases whether the person himself does the actions or orders another to do them. If the person himself does the actions, it goes without saying that his mind is afflicted, respectively, with anger or desire. If the person orders another person to do the actions then any combination of the three mental and the seven material karmapathas may be present [T. 1562: 581c26-582a1].)

228 This is summarized by Poussin (1971, v. 3: 178 n. 2), who also gives Vasubandhu’s hypothetical rejoinders, apparently on the basis of P’u-kuang (T. 1821: 267b16-c4).
4.40) (I can find nothing relevant to this issue in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
4.41) In an explanation of the *niṣyandaphala* of the *karmapathas*, Vasubandhu says that *mithyādṛśti* will cause one to be very confused in a future human existence because confusion is predominant in *mithyādṛśti*.

*mithyādṛśtyā tīvramohah / tasyā mohabhūyastvāt*\(^{229}\)
(Pradhan: 254.4; T. 1558: 90c5; Poussin v. 3: 186; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 583b9] and criticizes the explanation, *tasyā mohabhūyastvāt*, saying that *mithyādṛśti* is not associated with *avidyā* [T. 1562: 583b9-17].)\(^{230}\)

---

\(^{229}\) Regarding an identical sentence found in the same context in Tatia’s text of the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (65.13-14), see Kritzer 2003c.

\(^{230}\) The *Vibhāṣā* refers to an opinion resembling Vasubandhu’s according to which, even though *mithyādṛśti* actually destroys the *kuśalamūlas*, confusion associated with *mithyādṛśti* is said to destroy them because of the predominance of confusion at that time: 復有說者。此說邪見相應癡不善根能斷善根不說前位貪等。雖實邪見能斷善根爾時癡增故作是說如念住等 (T. 1545: 181c18-20).
4.41) According to the Cintāmañī Bhūmi, one type of mithyādrsti increases as a result of one's encountering misleading teachings and thus being unable to achieve liberation. Due to confusion with respect to causally produced dharmas, and as a result of being bound by this type of drṣṭi, one cannot escape from saṁsāra.

lta ba'i kun nas ńon moṅs pa gaṅ że na / de sred pa de ńid kyi kun 'byuṅ ba'i bden pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas / gal te kun nas ńon moṅs pa la nmam par thar pa 'dod pa de la / kun nas ńon moṅs pa las nmam par thar pa'i chos phyin ci log tu ston pa'i sdig pa'i gregs po gaṅ yin pa la brten na de phyin ci log gi chos bstan pa de la brten nas / thar pc yân ńams su mi len la / lta bar gyur pa drug rtsa gņis las gaṅ yân rūṅ ba'i lta ba nmam par 'phel bar byed de / de rten ciṅ 'brel bar 'byuṅ ba rmoṅs pa'i dbaṅ du byas nas / de lta bu'i kun tu sbyor ba daṅ de daṅ ldan pa las 'gro ba lña'i i 'khor ba nas yons su grol bar mi 'gyur ba'o (Yogācārabhūmi; dźi 283a5-8); 何諸見雜染。謂即由彼貪愛集諸增上力故。曾遇惡友説顛倒法為今雜染得解脫故。彼雖徧求雜染解脫。由遇如是倒說法故。不證解脫。於六十二諸見趣中。隨令一種邪見增長。於諸緣起法愚癡增上故。彼由如是見結所縛。於五趣等生死大海不得解脫 (T. 1579: 380b3-9)

However, in the Pañcavijñānakāyamanobhūmi of the Viniśčayasaṅgrahārani, it is argued that avidyā and mithyādrsti are separate entities and that the two are normally not associated. Nevertheless, it is possible for that which is not avidyā in essence to become avidyā in the way that prajñā becomes defiled by association with other kleśas, even though its essence is not defiled.

gal te ma rig pa daṅ lta ba nmams mṭshan ńid 'dra bar gyur na / des na bcom ldan 'das kyi bag la ńal bdun po dag tu lta ba'i bag la ńal nmam par gẑag pa mźad par mi 'gyur la / bcom ldan 'das kyi lta ba nmams la ma rig pa žes bya ba'i min ni gaṅ du'aṅ ma bstan to / gal te ńon moṅs pa daṅ mṭshuṅs par ldan pa'i log pa'i ŋes pa ma rig pa yin par gyur na de ltar na 'jig tshogs la lta ba la sosgs pa lta ba lña po gaṅ dag yin pa de dag kyan ŋes pa'i no bo ńid yin pas / ŋes pa'i rdzas gni mṭshuṅs par ldan pa ni med pas / de dag ni ma rig pa daṅ mi ldan pa yin par 'gyur ro / gal te 'dod chags la sosgs pa ńon moṅs pa'i dbaṅ gis ŋes pa de gti mug ńid yin ni / des na 'dod chags la sosgs pa'i dbaṅ gis gti mug tu 'gyur gyi / gti mug gi dbaṅ daṅ gti mug sṅon du 'gro ba las 'dod chags la sosgs pa ńon moṅs pa nmams 'byuṅ ba ma yin par 'byuṅ ńo / ji ltar ńon moṅs pa daṅ mṭshuṅs par ldan pa'i ŋes rab ni mṭshuṅs par ldan pa las ńon moṅs pa con yin gyi / de'i no bo ńid ni ma yin pa de bźin du / gti mug gi bṛaṅ ńid ma yin pa de yaṅ gti mug bṛaṅ gdi daṅ bar bjod mi nus te / dper na de las gẑan pa'i sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i chos ńon moṅs pa con gyi bṛaṅ ńid ma yin pa / ńon moṅs pa daṅ mṭshuṅs par ldan pa dag lta bu'o / de lta bas na ma rig pa ni sems las byuṅ ba'i chos sems daṅ mṭshuṅs pa ldan payin par lta bar bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 88a4-b2); 又若無明與諸見相無差別者。世尊不應七隨眠中於無明外立見隨
Chapter 4 Karmanirdeśa
4.41 continued) 眠。又佛世尊曾无一处於诸见上示无明名。若诸烦恼相应邪智是无明者。萨迦耶等五种邪见智为自性。无二智体俱有相应。是则诸见应与无明常不相应。又若贪等烦恼力故令相应智成愚痴性。即应贪等上力故得有愚痴。非愚痴上。痴为导首故有贪等一切烦恼。又应可说如余烦恼相应之慧。由相应故得成染污非彼自性。非愚痴体可成痴性。又如诸余烦恼相应。非烦恼性诸心心所。是故当知别有无明。是心所性与心相 (T. 1579: 612a15-26; see Miyashita 1992)
4.42) Vasubandhu says that a brief human life span is not in itself the result of a murder committed in a former life, since even a short human life is the result of good karma. Rather, the murder acts as an obstructing cause that shortens the life span.

\[ \text{alpam apy āyur maṇuṣyeśu kuṣalaphalam/tat kathāṃ prāṇātipātasyaniṣyandaphalam} \\
\text{/nocyate tad evāyus tasya phalam/kīṃ tārhi/tenālpāyur bhavaṭīti/ato 'ntarāyahetuh} \\
\text{prāṇātipātas tasyāyuṣo bhavaṭīti veditavyam} \]

(Pradhan: 254.5-7; T. 1558: 90c5-8; Poussin v. 3: 186-187; Saṃghabhadrā identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 583b18-20] and criticizes the explanation, which he characterizes as very difficult to understand, saying that a brief human life is in fact the niṣyandaphala of an act of murder [T. 1562: 583b29-c10].)
4.42) (The Savitarkādi-bhūmis of both the Maulī Bhūmi [Yogācārabhūmi: 184.1-5; Yogācārabhūmi; dī 106b7-107a2; T. 1579: 318a14-18] and the Vinīcayasaṅgahāraṇī [Yogācārabhūmi; dī 144a8-b1; T. 1579: 633b27-29] contain passages in which a shortened life span is said to be the nisyandaphala of murder. There is no contradiction of this position in the Yogācārabhūmi.

However, the Ch’eng wei-shih lun defines two types of nisyandaphala: 1) similar dharmas caused by repetition of good, etc., and 2) subsequent result that resembles the previous action [T. 1585: 42b1-2]. The notes in the Shindōjōyuishikiron say that the first type is really nisyandaphala, while the second type is only provisionally designated as nisyandaphala. They give the example of the short life span resulting from murder in a previous existence: this is actually adhipatipahala, but it is called nisyandaphala since it is a result of karma [Poussin 1928-1929: 464; Shindōjōyuishikiron: 346].

The Savitarkādi-bhūmi mentions an antarāyahetvadhiṣṭhāna, which is associated with virodhahetu [Yogācārabhūmi: 110.8-12; Yogācārabhūmi; dī 66b1-4; T. 1579: 302a10-14]. Furthermore, virodhahetu only establishes adhipatipahala [Yogācārabhūmi: 111.4-5; Yogācārabhūmi; dī 67a3-4; T. 1579: 302a25-26]. Perhaps there is some connection between Vasubandhu’s antarāyahetu and the Yogācārabhūmi’s virodhahetu. If so, then the short life would logically be adhipatipahala, not nisyandaphala.)

---

231 A similar distinction is found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (102.20-24; Yogācārabhūmi; dī 65a1-3; T. 1579: 502b4-6) and in the Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun (T. 1602: 571a6-8).

232 Virodha hetu is defined in the Bodhisattvabhūmi as the cause that prevents arising (utpattāv antarāyiko hetur virodha hetu), [Bodhisattvabhūmi: 98.6-7; Yogācāra-bhūmi; dī 62a6; T. 1579: 501a27].
5.1) Vasubandhu says that the other five *anusayas* exist in a latent form with respect to an object due to the force of the first *anusaya*, *rāga*.

*tathāgrahaṇaṁ rāgavaśenānayeśām ālambanāanusāyītaṁjñāpanartham*

(Pradhan: 277.12; T. 1558: 98c1-2; Poussin v. 4: 2; Sāmghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 596c5-7] and criticizes it, saying that the word *tathā* does not indicate a causal relationship among the *anusayas*; it is just used to fill out the verse [T. 1562: 596c7-15].)
5.1) (I have found nothing in the Yogācārabhūmi corresponding to this argument.)
5.2) The Sarvāstivādins argue that the \textit{anuśayās} cannot be \textit{cittaviprayuktā} because, if they were \textit{cittaviprayuktā}, they would always be present, and if \textit{anuśayās} were always present, then good could never arise. Vasubandhu refutes this by saying that those who argue that \textit{anuśayās} are \textit{cittaviprayuktā} attribute the functions of defilement to active \textit{kleśās}, not to \textit{anuśayās}. Since the active \textit{kleśās} are not always present, the Sarvāstivādin argument does not prove that the \textit{anuśayās} are \textit{samprayuktā}.

\begin{quote}
\textit{anuśayānāṁ cittakleśakarativād āvaraṇatvāc chubkair viruddhatvāt/yasmād anuśayaiḥ kliṣṭam cittam bhavaty apūrvam kuśalam notpadyate utpannāc ca parihiyate tasmān na viprayuktāḥ / atha viprayuktair apy evaṁ syāt / kuśalaṁ na kadācid upalabhyyeta teṣāṁ nityam saṁnihitavāt / upalabhyyate ca / atāḥ kuśalasya copalambhād aviprayuktāḥ atha ihānuśayaiḥ iti / tad idam ajñāpakaṁ yasmād yo viprayuktam anuśayam icchati sa etat sarvam anuśayakṛtam necchati / kleśāktam evecchati}
\end{quote}

(Pradhan: 278.9-17; T. 1558: 98c23-99a1; Pousson v. 4: 5-6; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the suṭra-master [T. 1562: 599b20-23] and criticizes Vasubandhu, saying that he does not do justice to Dharmaśī’s argument and insisting that \textit{kleśās} and \textit{anuśayās} are not separate entities [T. 1562: 599b23-27].)

\[233\] Samghabhadra discusses this passage somewhat out of order.
5.2) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not contain a discussion of why anuśayas are not cittaviprayukta. But it does maintain that anuśaya and kleśa are not synonymous, a position that lies behind Vasubandhu’s argument here. See the next item.)
5.3) Vasubandhu approves of the theory of the Sautrāntikas, who define *anuśaya* as *kleśa* in the state of a seed and say that it is not a separate *dravya*.

`evam tu sādhu yathā sautrāntikānām / katham ca sautrāntikānām / kāma-rāgaśyānuśayaḥ kāmarāgaṇuśaya iti / na cānuśayaḥ saṃprayuktas tasyādṛavyaṁtaratvāt / prasuto hi kleśo 'nuśaya ucyate / prabuddhah paryavasthānam / kā ca tasya prasuptih / asaṃmukhībhūtasya bhījabhāvānubandhah / kāḥ prabodhah / saṃmukhībhāvah / ko 'yam bijabhāvo nāma / ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpāda-śaktih / yathānubhavajñānajā smṛtyotpādasāsaktī yathā cānkarūdināṃ śālīpha-bāja śālīphalotpādaṁ śāsaktī itī`

(Pradhan: 278.17-22; T. 1558: 99a1-9; Poussin v. 4: 6-7; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 596c24-597a2] and criticizes it, pointing out that, as Vasubandhu himself admits, *anuśayas* are not real, separate entities and arguing that Vasubandhu’s ideas of *anuśaya* and *bīja* are illogical [T. 1562: 597a2-15].)
5.3) The Viṇīścayasamgrahaṇī on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi contains an explanation of anuṣṭaya and paryavasthāna that is almost identical to the one attributed to the Sautrāntikas in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya.

ñoṇ moṅs pa’i kun nas ŋoṇ moṅs pa’i rab tu dbye ba rnam par bžag pa gan že na / mdor bsdu na ŋoṇ moṅs pa daṅ ŋoṇ moṅs pa’i ji skad bstan pa rnam kyi ni gnyu gnis kyi sems can rnam kun nas ŋoṇ moṅs par byed de / ’di lla ste / kun nas dkyis pa daṅ bag la ŋnal gnyis so / de la ŋoṇ moṅs pa kun t'u ’byun ba m yön du gyar pa ni kun nas dkyis pa žes bya'o / de ’nād kyi sa bon ma spangs śiṅ yas dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la ŋnal žes bya ste / gnas ŋan len kyang de yin no / ma sad pa’i phyir ni bag la ŋnal yin la sad pa’i gnas skabs kyi phyir ni kun nas dkyis pa yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 118a8-b3); 云何建立煩惱雜染染淨差別。謂如所說本隨二。惑略二緣故染
悩有情。一由繚故。二隨眠故。現行現起煩惱名繚。即此種子未斷未害。名
曰隨眠亦名麁重。又不覺位名曰隨眠。若在覺位說名為繚(T. 1579: 623a20-24)

The Yogācārabhūmi in several other places identifies anuṣṭayas as being the seeds of klesas. See the Savitarkādi-bhūmi:

sarvalaukikotkarṣabhyanugamayatvād anuṣṭayāḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 167.6); ’jig rten pa’i yar ’phel ba thams cad kyi sa bon daṅ ldan pas na bag la ŋnal rnam so (Yogācārabhūmi; dži 97b8-98a1); 一切世間增上種子之所隨逐故名隨眠 (T. 1579: 314b25-26)

See also the Viṇīścayasamgrahaṇī on the Cintāmayiprajñā Bhūmi:

de la daṅ ba’i gzugs daṅ / sems daṅ sems las byun ba’i chos ji skad bstan pa thams cad la ŋoṇ moṅs pa’i sa bon yan dag par ma bcom pa daṅ / ma spangs pa gan yin pa de ni bag la ŋnal žes bya ste / gnas ran len kyan de yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 215a5-6); 若於清淨諸色。及於如前所說一切心心所中。煩惱種子未害未斷。說名隨眠。亦名麁重(T. 1579: 661b26-29)

According to the Viṇīścayasamgrahaṇī on the Cintāmayiprajñā Bhūmi, bijas are prajñapti:

’duṣ byas kyi mīn can gyi dña po la sgyi ba daṅ / rga ba daṅ / gnas pa daṅ / mī rtag pa daṅ / sa bon daṅ rnam par rig byed daṅ / rnam par rig byed ma yin pa daṅ / thob pa daṅ / ’thob pa ma yin pa daṅ / srog gi dbang po daṅ / ris mthun pa daṅ / mīn gi tshogs daṅ / tshig gi tshogs daṅ / yi ge’i tshogs rnam daṅ so so’i sgye bo ŋid daṅ / tshogs pa daṅ ma tshogs pa daṅ /’jug pa so sor nes pa daṅ / sbro ba daṅ / mgyogs pa daṅ / go rím ba daṅ / dus daṅ yul daṅ gnyen sê bar ’dogs pa daṅ (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 208a4-6); 又於有為諸法想事。假立生老住無常種子。有
Chapter 5  Anuśayanirdeśa
5.3 continued) 表無表得命根根同分。名身句身分身異生性。和合不和合流轉定異相應勢速次第時方及數 (T. 1579: 659a12-16)
5.4) The Sarvāstivādins insist that the *sūtra*, when it says that a certain person has *rāgānuśaya* with respect to pleasurable feelings, uses the term as a synonym for *rāga*. Vasubandhu points out that the *sūtra* does not specify that the person has *rāgānuśaya* at that particular moment. In other words, the *sūtra* may be specifying the person’s latent desire for future pleasurable feelings. Another explanation is that the *sūtra* may be designating the cause (*rāga*) by the name of the effect (*rāgānuśaya*).

*bhava*īti *vacanān nāsau tadaivānuśayaḥ / kadā tarhi bhavati / yadā prasupto bhavati / hetāu vā tadupacāra esa draṣṭavyaḥ*

(Pradhan: 279.3-4; T. 1558: 99a13-15; Poussin v. 4: 7; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the *sūtra*-master [T. 1562: 598b16-18] and criticizes it, saying that: 1) it would not make sense to say that, at the moment of the arising of *rāga paryavasthāna*, *rāgānuśaya* is actualized because saying, “there is *rāgānuśaya* for pleasurable feelings,” means “*rāgānuśaya* is present among the pleasurable feelings”; 2) *anuśayas* have no intrinsic existence; 3) Vasubandhu’s statement that the *sūtra* designates the cause by the effect is groundless [T. 1562: 598b18-c16].)
5.4) The Vastusamgrahaṇī, commenting on a related sūtra statement, makes it clear that the anuṣayas are the latent state of klesas.

\[\text{bde ba las ni 'dod chags / sdug bshial ba las ni ŋe sdaṅ / sdug bshial ba yañ ma yin bde ba yañ ma yin pa las ni ma rig pa rgyas par 'gyur te / 'di ni tshor ba rnama' las kun nas ŋon moṅs pa'o / bde ba la sogs pa'i gnas skabs thams cad la gnas pa'i ni thams cad ma spāṅs}\]

\[\text{234 bag la ŋal rgyas par 'gyur mod kyi / 'on kyaṅ dmigs pa raṅ raṅ gi spyod yul des kun nas dkris pa skyes pa de dag de'i rjes la rgyud de ŋid la ŋon moṅs pa daṅ 'brel pa gniṅ}\]

\[\text{235 log pa bzin 'dug pas na bag la ŋal žes bya'ø / de la 'dir tshaṅs par spyod pa spyad pa ni bag la ŋal gön pa'i phyir yin gyi / kun nas dkris pa'i bsal ba tsam gyi phyir ni ma yin no (Yogācārabhūmi\(\text{\textemdash}\) i 340b5-8); 於樂受中有貪隨眠。於苦受中有瞋隨眠。於非苦樂無明隨眠。是名於受所起雜染。難\(\text{\textemdash}\)於樂等所有諸受現前分位。一切未斷煩惱隨眠之所隨眠。然由緣彼各別所行諸縛。生起此後睡眠煩惱隨縛。即名於彼相續隨眠。為欲永害諸隨眠故。熟修梵行。非唯為遣諸縛因緣 (T. 1579: 851a3-9)}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{234} Derge reads ma spāṅs pas.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{235} Corrected from gniṅ on the basis of the Derge and the Chinese.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{236} The Kokuyaku Issaikyō translation corrects nan \textit{難} to sui \textit{難} without any com-ment (Yuga-bu 6: 274). This is supported by the Tibetan.}\]
5.5) According to Vasubandhu, bhavarāga is attachment to the ātmabhāva in rūpadhātu and ārūpyadhātu because the desire for sensual objects has been overcome.

ātmabhāva eva tu bhavah / te ca sattvāḥ samāpattīṁ sāśrayāṁ āsvādayantā ātmabhāvam evāsvādayanti kāmavātāgatvāt

(Pradhan: 279.11-12; T. 1558: 99a22-25; Poussin v. 4: 8; Samghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 599c29-600a3] but says that it is not significantly different from the Sarvāstivādin position [T. 1562: 600a3-7].)
5.5) (Schmithausen, in connection with a passage in the Manobhūmi that lists synonyms for bija, mentions Vasubandhu’s statement that bhava means ātmabhāva. Schmithausen equates ātmabhāva with bija here [1987: 511 n. 1405].

Furthermore, the Viniścayamgrahanī on the Samāhitā Bhūmi refers to two types of rāga, attachment to the ātmabhāva and attachment to objects.

gñis pas ni lus dañ yul la mñon par ēn pa sad par byed pa spoñ bar ’gyur ro [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 179a3]; 第二作意修習多修習。故能斷保著內身外境二種貪欲 [T. 1579: 646c9-10]

However, it is not clear that there is any direct connection between Vasubandhu’s statement and the Yogācārabhūmi.)

---

237 bijaparyāyāḥ punar dhātura gotraṁ prakṛtir hetuḥ satkāyāḥ prapañca ālaya upādānaṁ duhkhaṁ satkāyadrṣtiadhiṣṭhānam asmīnādhiṣṭhānam cetv evambhāgīyāḥ paryāyā veditavyāḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 26.18-19); sa bon gyi rnam graṅs ni / khams daṅ / rigs daṅ / raṅ bzin daṅ / rgyu daṅ / ’jig tshogs daṅ / spros pa daṅ / kun gzi daṅ / len pa daṅ / sdug bsñal ba dañ / ’jig tshogs la lta ba’i gnas daṅ / nā’o šiṅam pa’i rna rgyal gyi gnas daṅ / de lta bu daṅ ’thun pa rnam ni rnam graṅs su gtogs par rig par bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 15a5-6); 又諸種子。乃有種種別之名。所謂名界。名種姓。名因。名薩迦耶。名戲論。名阿賴耶。名取名苦。名薩迦耶見所依止處。名我慢所依止處如是等類差別應知(T. 1579: 284c10-14)
5.6) Vasubandhu explains the meaning of *darśanaheya* and *bhāvanāheya*: those *anuśayas* the objects of which can be destroyed by *darśana* of a certain truth are said to be destroyed by insight into that truth, while the remainder can be destroyed by practice.

*yaye yaddarśanaheyālambanās te taddarśanaheyā avaśiṣṭā bhāvanāheyāḥ*

(Pradhan: 280.13; T. 1558: 99b29-c2; Poussin v. 4: 12; Samghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 601b13-15] and criticizes his explanation of the term *darśanaheya*, saying that *anuśayas* that are destroyed by the *dharmajñānaksānti* and *anvayajñānaksānti* regarding a certain truth are said to be *anuśayas* destroyed by insight into that truth [T. 1562: 601b15-23].)
(The Yogācārabhūmi does not contain a definition of darśanaheya similar to Vasubandhu’s. However, in several places, it mentions the objects of the darśanaheyakleśas.

In the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, ten darśanaheyakleśas are said to be without substance because their objects are unreal.

ñon moṅs pa bcu po de dag las mthon ba span bar bya ba gaṅ dag yin pa de dag ni gzi med pa žes bya ste [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 116a3-4]; 又十煩惱見所斷者。名曰無事。彼所緣事非成實故 [T. 1579: 622b15-16]

Also in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, the unsubstantial objects of the four groups of darśanaheyakleśas are contrasted with the substantial objects of the bhāvanāheyakleśas.

mthon ba daṅ bsgom pas span bar bya ba’i zag pa ji skad bstan pa de dag gi dmigs pa ni mdor bsdu na rnam pa lhār rig par bya ste / log par rnam par brtags pa’i dnos po la dmigs pa daṅ / lta ba la mig pa daṅ / tshul khrims daṅ brtul źugs la dmigs pa daṅ / raṅ gi rnam par brtags pa’i mīn la dmigs pa daṅ / raṅ gi naṅ gis ye yod pa’i dnos po ladmigs pa’o! [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 122b8-123a2]; 復次即如所說見所斷諸煩惱。當知略有五種所緣。一緣無分別所起事境。二緣見境。三緣戒禁境。四緣自分別所起名境。五緣任運堅固事境 [T. 1579: 624c12-15])
Vasubandhu gives the following etymological analysis of the word *satkāyadrṣṭi*: *sat*, from the root *sad*, means “to perish”; *kāya* is a collection (*caya, saṃghāta, skandha*); *satkāya* thus means the collection of perishable things, or the *paṅcopādāraskandhas*.

\[
\text{sūdatī sat / cayaḥ kāyaḥ saṃghātaḥ skandha ity arthaḥ / sac cāyaṃ kāyaś ceti}
\text{satkāyaḥ paṅcopādāraskandhāḥ / nityasaṃjñāṃ pindaṃsaṃjñāṃ ca tyājayitum evaṃ}
\text{dyaśitaḥ / etatpūrvako hi teṣv ātmagrahaḥ}
\]

(Pradhan: 281.19-21; T. 1558: 100a1-4; Poussin v. 4: 15-17; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 606a3-6] and objects to Vasubandhu’s etymology, saying that, according to Vasubandhu’s reasoning, the syllable *sat* would be superfluous; *kāya* by itself is adequate to counter the idea of imperishability [T. 1562: 606a6-9; Poussin v. 4: 16 n. 3].)
5.7) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not discuss the etymology of satkāyadrṣṭi.)
The Sarvāstivādins say that non-Buddhists who think that their non-Buddhist path leads to a pleasant rebirth or to purification are afflicted by śīlavrataparāmarśa that can be destroyed by insight into duḥkhasatyā because these ideas are based on confusion regarding duḥkha. Vasubandhu says that, by this reasoning, all kleśas, not just the drṣṭīs, would be destroyed by insight into duḥkhasatyā, and thus no kleśas would be destroyed by insight into the other truths.

duḥkhe vipratipannatvāt / sarvesāṁ sāsravālabonānāṁ duḥkhe vipratipannatvāt
(Pradhan: 282.21-22; T. 1558: 100b11-12; Poussin v. 4: 20; Sarngabhadrā identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 607b10-11])

and criticizes it, saying that there are two types of śīlavrataparāmarśa that confuse path with non-path: one is destroyed by insight into duḥkha, the other by insight into mārga [T. 1562: 607b11-19].)

---

238 The Sanskrit text is extremely terse here, and it cannot be understood without the help of the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (450.32-451.3).

239 Sarngabhadrā’s discussion is slightly out of order here, coming after his discussion of the following argument in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.
5.8) (I can find nothing in the Yogācārabhūmi that is directly related to this argument.)
5.9) According to Sarvāstivāda, śīlavrataparāmarśa is to be destroyed by insight into the truths of duḥkha and mārga. Vasubandhu suggests that a certain type of śīlavrataparāmarśa, namely following a false path in the belief that it will result in purification, is to be destroyed by insight into the truth of nirodha, not mārga. Vasubandhu also refers back to his earlier suggestion that other types of śīlavrataparāmarśa, for example the belief that throwing oneself into fire or water will result in rebirth in heaven, are to be destroyed by insight into samudaya, not duḥkha.

athānyaṁ mokṣamārgam parāmrṣya eṣa mokṣamārge nāstūy āha / so 'pi tenaivānyena sūddhim pratyeti na tayā mithyādṛṣṭyeti / tasyāpy asau mārgadarśana-prahātavyālambano na stūhyati / yaś cāpi samudayaniruddharśana-prahātavyālambanāyā mithyādṛṣṭyā sūddhim pratyeti sa kasmān na taddarśanaheyaḥ / tasmāt parīksya eṣo 'ṛthaḥ

(Pradhan: 283.1-4; T. 1558: 100b16-18; Poussin v. 4: 20-21; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 606c21-24], accuses Vasubandhu of not properly explaining the Sarvāstivādin position, refutes him in detail, and concludes that śīlavrataparāmarśa can only be destroyed by insight into duḥkha and mārga [T. 1562: 606c24-607b8].)
According to the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, sīlavrataparāmarṣa specific to confusion regarding samudrayasatyā, which is predicated on false views arising from confusion regarding samudrayasatyā, is to be destroyed by insight into samudrayasatyā.

ji ltar na kun 'byuṅ ba’i bden pa la bag la ŋal brgyad po log par ŋugs pa dag yin ŋe na / dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze rgyu med par smra ba rnams kyi log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa de daṅ dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze mi mthun pa rgyur smra ba rnams kyi dbaṅ phyug la sogs pa / dños po rnams kyi byin pa po daṅ sprul pa po daṅ byed pa po yin no ŋes log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa de daṅ / sbyin pa med do mchod sbyin med do / sbyin sreg med do legs par spyan pa med do ŋes par spyan pa med do ŋes log par lta ba gaṅ yin pa de dag dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze lha

240 mi spon bar smras kyi

log par lta ba de dag las phyogs gcig gan yin pa daṅ / gzan mu stegs can rnams kyi kun 'byuṅ ba’i bden pa la skur pa 'debs pa’i log par lta ba dge sbyoṅ gau ta mas ŋan thos rnams la kun 'byuṅ ba’i bden pa gdags pa byas pa gaṅ yin pa de ni med do ŋes zer ba gaṅ yin pa’i log par lta ba de dag ni kun 'byuṅ ba’i bden pa la log par ŋugs pa yin no / lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa gaṅ gis lta ba de dag la dam par mchog tu 'dzin ciṅ de dag gis dag pa daṅ grol ba daṅ ŋes par 'byuṅ bar 'gyur ro ŋes lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa de’āṅ kun 'byuṅ ba’i bden pa la log par ŋugs pa yin no / lta ba de dag daṅ rjes su mthun pa daṅ de dag daṅ mthun pa’i chos tshul krim sāṅ brtal ŋugs yan dag pa blaṅ ba de la dam par mchog tu 'dzin ciṅ des dag pa daṅ grol ba daṅ ŋes par 'byuṅ bar ‘gyur ro / ņes tshul khrims daṅ brtal ŋugs mchog tu 'dzin pa gaṅ yin pa de’āṅ kun 'byuṅ ba’i bden pa la log par ŋugs pa yin no / lhaṅ ma 'dod chags la sogs pa the tshom gyi mthar thug pa rnams ni sna ma bzin du bla bar bya ste / de ltar na ŋon moris pa brgyad po de dag ni kun 'byuṅ ba’i bden pa la log par ŋugs pa daṅ kun 'byuṅ ba mthon bas sāṅ bar bya ba dag yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 121a4-b3); 云何迷集有八隨眠。謂諸沙門若婆羅門誹因邪見。又有沙門若婆羅門。計自在等是一切物生者化者及與作者。此惡因論所有邪見。又有邪見。無施無愛亦無禪定。無有妙行亦無惡行。又有邪見不死婆羅。外道沙門若婆羅門所起一分。又有邪見誹誹集論誹誹集論。謂諸外道作如是計。如彼沙門誹因種種為諸弟子所誹集論。此定無有。如是等見是迷集論所起邪見。若有所見取彼諸見以爲第一能得清淨解脫出離。是迷集論所起見取。若於隨順此見諸法所受戒禁。取爲第一能得清淨。廣說如前。是迷集論戒禁取。餘疑貪等如前應知。如是八種煩惱隨眠。迷於集誹見集所斷 (T. 1579: 624a15-28)

240 Corrected from lta on the basis of the Derge.

241 Derge reads smra ba rnams kyi.
Chapter 5 Anuṣayanirdeśa
Yogācārabhūmi

5.9 continued) The Vinisçayasamgrahaṇī on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi makes a similar statement about śīlavrataparāmarṣa specific to confusion regarding nirodhasatyā.

ji itar na bāg la ṇāl bṛgyad 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par žugs pa yin že na / dge sbyon dān bram ze mtha' 'dān mtha' med pa dān lha mi sbyon bar smra ba rmags kyi lta ba'i phyogs gcig gan yin pa dān dge sbyon dān bram ze tshe 'di la nyā ṇān las 'da' bar smra ba rmags kyi log par lta ba gan yin pa dān / rgyas par 'jig rten na dgra bcom pa dag med do žes log par lta ba gan yin pa las dgra bcom pa de dag kyi ann span s pas rab tu phye ba dān ēs s pas rab tu phye ba ste / de la span s pa la skur ba 'debs pa'i log par lta ba gan yin pa dān gzan ma stegs can rmags kyi 'gog pa'i bden pa la skur ba 'debs pa ra mgyi log par lta ba snā ma lta bu gan yin pa dān / de dag gi log pa'i thar pa yons su btags pa'i lta ba gan yin pa'i log par lta ba de dag ni 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par žugs pa yin no / lta ba de dag la lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pas snā ma bźin du dam par mchog tu 'dzin pa'i lta ba mchog tu 'dzin pa gan yin pa de'ān 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par žugs pa yin no / lta ba de dag dān rjes su mthun pa dān de dag dān mthun pa'i chos tshul khrims dān brtul žugs yan dag par bna la de la dam par mchog tu 'dzin ciṅ / des dag pa dān grol ba dān ŋes par 'byun bar 'gyur ro žes tshul khrims dān brtul žugs mchog tu 'dzin pa gan yin pa de'ān 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par žugs pa yin no / khoṅ khoṅ ba ma gtoṅs pa lhaṅ ma 'dod chags la sogs pa ni snā ma bźin du rig par bya'o / 'gogs pa la skrag pa'i sens dān kun nas mnar sens kyi sens dān khoṅ khoṅ ba'i sens dān ldan pa'i khoṅ khoṅ pa gan yin pa de'ān 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par žugs pa yin te / lhaṅ ma ni snā ma bźin no / de itar na bāg la ṇāl bṛgyad po de dag ni 'gog pa'i bden pa la log par žugs pa dān 'gog pa mthun bās span bar bya ba dag yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 121b3-122a2); 云何迷滅有八隨眠。謂諸沙門若婆羅門。計邊無邊不生死諸見一分。又有沙門若婆羅門。謂說現法涅槃論者所有邪見。又有邪見發無世間阿羅漢。乃至廣說。彼阿羅漢二德所顯。謂斷及智。此中但取誇斷邪見。又有邪見誇滅諸見。謂諸外道廣說如前。又有橫計諸邪解脫所有邪見。如是諸見是迷滅諸所起邪見。若有見取彼諸見以爲第一。廣説如前。是迷滅諸所起見。若於隨順彼見諸法所受戒禁。取爲第一。廣説如前。是迷滅諸戒禁取。所餘貪等如前應知。唯除瞋恚。謂於滅諦起怖畏心起損害心起恚惱心。如是瞋恚迷於滅諦。餘如前說。如是八種煩惱隨眠。遂於滅諦見滅所斷 (T. 1579: 624a29-b14)
5.10) The Sarvāstivādins insist that sattvadrṣṭi and nityadrṣṭi with respect to Brahmā are not satkāyadrṣṭi and antagrāhadrṣṭi; they are not drṣṭi at all, but merely mithyājnāna, not all forms of which are drṣṭi. Vasubandhu questions this, asking why these two drṣṭis cannot have Brahmā as an object if the other drṣṭis can.

kuto nu khalv etadanyā tadālambanā drṣṭir eṣā na drṣṭir
(Pradhan: 287.17; T. 1558: 102a1-2; Poussin v. 4: 34; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the criticism of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 613a5-6] and refutes it, essentially reiterating the Vaibhāṣika opinion, recorded in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, to the effect that, since beings in kāmadhātu do not identify themselves with Brahmā, they cannot be said to have saktāyadrṣṭi and antagrāhadrṣṭi with regard to Brahmā [T. 1562: 613a6-12].)
5.10) (I can find nothing directly related to this issue in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
5.11) Vasubandhu quotes the pūrvācāryas as saying that innate satkāyadṛṣṭi, like that of animals and birds, is avyākṛta, unlike vikalpita satkāyadṛṣṭi, which is akuśala.

\[ \text{sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭir avyākṛtā / yā mṛgapakṣinām api variate / vikalpita tv akuśaleti} \]
\[ \text{pūrvācāryāḥ} \]

(Pradhan: 290.19-20; T. 1558: 102c25-27; Poussin v. 4: 41; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 618a17-19] and refutes it, saying that that which is avikalpita cannot be considered a drṣṭi; thus, this innate satkāyadṛṣṭi should actually be included in the category of aklīṣṭāvyākṛta mithyājñāna [T. 1562: 618a19-29].)
5.11) The Viniścayasamgrahaṇī on the Savitarkādi-bhūmi mentions two types of satkāyadrṣṭī, the innate one of ordinary people, animals, and birds, and the speculative one of non-Buddhists.

de la 'jig tshogs la lta ba gaṅ že na / ṇe bar len pa'i phuṅ po lña po dag la bdag gam bdag gir ba lta ba daṅ / mñon par žen pa daṅ sems la 'jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba žes bya'o / de'aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste / lhaṅ cig skyes pa daṅ kun brtags pa'o / de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad daṅ tha na ri dags daṅ bya rnam kyi yaṅ yin no / kun brtags pa ni gžan nu stegs can rnam kyi yin par blta bar bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 112b6-113a1); 薩迦耶見者。於五取蘊心執增益見我我所名薩迦耶見。此復二種。一者俱生。二者分別起。俱生者。一切愚夫異生乃至禽獸並皆現行。分別起者。諸外道等計度而起 (T. 1579: 621b6-10)

The text goes on to say that the first type is avyākṛta, while the second type is akyūṣala.

de la 'dod pa na spyod pa'i 'jig tshogs la lta ba lhan cig skyes pa gaṅ yin pa de ni lūṅ du ma bstan pa yin te / yaṅ daṅ yan kun tu 'byuṅ ba'i phyir daṅ / bdag daṅ gžan la sīn tu gnod pa'i gnas ma yin pa'i phyir ro / rtag pas mñon par žen pa gaṅ yin pa de ni mi dge ba yin no (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 115b2-3); 復次俱生薩迦耶見唯無記性。數現行故。非極損惱自他處故。若分別起薩迦耶見由堅執故與前相違。在欲界者唯不善性 (T. 1579: 622a26-28) 242

---

242 This correspondence has been noted by Hakamaya (2001: 510, 513). The subject of innate satkāyadrṣṭī is discussed by Schmithausen in relation to the origin of klīṣṭa-manas (1987: 146-152).
5.12) Vasubandhu argues that if past and future were real, they would be the same as the present and there would be no need to call them “past” and “future.” He counters Vasumitra’s theory of “change of state,” according to which the difference between a present dharma and a past or future one is that only the present one is active, with the example of tatsabhāgacaksuṣa, i.e., an organ of sight that exists in the present but which is inactive. Furthermore, if activity were equivalent to yielding result, then past causes such as sabhāgahetu would actually have to be present since their activity (of yielding result) takes place in the present.

*yady aṭītam api dravyato ‘asty anāgatam iti / kasmāt tad aṭītam ity ucyate ‘nāgatam iti vā / nanu coktam adhvānāḥ kārītrenā vyavasthitā iti / yady evaṁ pratyuppannasya
tatsabhāgasya caṇusah kim kārītram / phaladānāpratigrahaṇam / aṭītānām api tarhi
sabhāgaheśvāṁphaladānāḥ kārītrasaṅgaḥ ‘rthakārītrasaṁ ‘veti lakaṇṭhaśaṁkaraḥ
(Pradhan: 297.13-17; T. 1558: 105a1-5; Poussin v. 4: 55-56; Saṃghabhadra identifies
this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 631c1-5; Poussin 1936-1937: 94] and
refutes it, saying that Vasubandhu does not understand the nature of dharmas and that
he does not distinguish between the power to project a result [kārītra] and the other
powers of a dharma [sāmarthya] [T. 1562: 631c5-17; Poussin 1936-1937: 94-96].)
5.12) The Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśātakāyamanabhūmi says that, if the samskāras of the past and future were real, the Buddha would not have talked about their past or future nature. However, it does not mention tatsabhāgacakṣus or go into any further detail regarding kāritra. (See also items 5.14 and 5.15.)

de ltar na bcom ldan 'das kyis de yaṅ gal te 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa de 'du byed kyi mtshan ŋid daṅ ldan pa kho nar 'gyur na 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa'i dhos po de med do žes mi bstan pa žig na (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 21a4-5); 謂若去來諸行性相是實有者。不應由彼去來之性說言是有 (T. 1579: 585b27-28)²⁴³

²⁴³ The Tibetan translation differs here from the Chinese: it says that the Buddha would not have said that the past and future nature did not exist (dḥos po de med do žes mi bstan pa žig na). But this does not make sense. Paramārtha’s version in the Chūeh-īng tsang lun agrees with Hsüan-tsang’s translation: 謂於過去及未來行除實執故。若去來行其相實有則非去來 (T. 1584: 1023a16-17).
5.13) Vasubandhu argues that if the kārita of a dharma is the dharma itself, it would have to exist at all times, and therefore the difference among the three times could not be established. The only way to justify the three times is to say that a dharma exists after previously not existing and ceases to exist after having existed.

yaśa dharma eva kāritaṃ kosmāt sa eva dharman tenaivāmanā vidyamānāḥ kadoscic aśta ity ucyate kadoscic arāgata ity adhvanāḥ vyavasthā na sidhyati / kim atra na sidhyati / yo hy ajato dharmah so 'nāgataḥ / yo jāto bhavati na ca vinaśtaḥ sa vartamānāḥ / yo vinaśtaḥ so 'tītāḥ iti / etad evātra vaktavyam / yadi yathā vartamānāṃ dravyato 'sti tathā 'tītam anāgataṃ cāsti / tasya tathā sataḥ / ajātanāṣṭatā kena tenaiva svabhāvāna sato dharmasya katham idam sidhyaty ajāta iti yo vinaśta iti yeti / kim asya purvam nāsīd yasyābhāvād ajāta ity ucyate / kim ca paścān nāsī yasyābhāvād vinaśta ity ucyate / tasmān na sidhyati sarvathā 'py atrādhyatrayam / yady abhūvā bhavatīti neṣyate bhūtā ca punar na bhavarītī
divyāya pradhan: 298.8-17; T. 1558: 105a17-27; Poussin v. 4: 57; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sutra-master [T. 1562: 633a16-19, b7-13; Poussin 1936-1937: 105-106, 107] and refutes it, denying that he says that the kārita and the dharma are identical, maintaining that past, present, and future should be explained in terms of states [avasthā] of activity, and accusing Vasubandhu of talking nonsense and being the destroyer of the sutras [T. 1562: 633a19-b7, b13-25; Poussin 1936-1937: 106-107, 107-108].

244 Samghabhadra’s discussion here is out of order.
5.13) The Viśnucayasaṅgrahāni on the Pañcatijñānakāyamanobhumi, in explaining the saṃskṛtalaksanās, says that jāti means that something previously not existing now exists, while vyāya means that something ceases to exist after having existed. The same argument is relevant to the question of past, present, and future.

mi rtag pa ŋid kyaṅ ma byuṅ ba las ’byuṅ bas rab tu phye ba daṅ / byuṅ nas kyaṅ med par ’gyur bas rab tu phye ba yin te ma byuṅ ba las ’byuṅ ba ni ’byuṅ ba yin la / byuṅ nas med par ’gyur ba ni ’jig pa yin no (Yogācārabhumi; zi 22b6-7); 無常性相本無今有。是名為生。有己還無是名為滅 (T. 1579: 586a16-18)
5.14) The Sarvastivadins claim that the fact that the Buddha mentioned the past and the future proves that they really exist. Vasubandhu agrees that they exist, but not as something ultimately real like the present.\textsuperscript{245}

\begin{quote}
vayam api br\textacutes\it{\i}s\textit{\y}a atit\textit{\y}an\textit{\y}agatam iti / atit\textit{\y}an\textit{\y}a tu yad bh\textit{\y}utap\textit{\y}rvam / an\textit{\y}agatan\textit{\y} yat sati hetau bhavisyat\textit{\i} / evan\textit{\y} ca k\textit{\y}tv\textit{\y}a 'st\textit{\y}ity uc\textit{\y}ate na tu punar dravyatah
\end{quote}

(Pradhan: 299.1-3; T. 1558: 105b4-7; Poussin v. 4: 58; Samghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the s\textit{\y}utra-master [T. 1562: 626b20-24; Poussin 1936-1937: 60], takes Vasubandhu to task for his understanding of the verb "to exist" and says that Vasubandhu's real meaning is that the present exists while the past and future do not [T. 1562: 626b29-c19; Poussin 1936-1937: 61-62].)

\textsuperscript{245}Samghabhadra criticizes this statement together with another statement that follows shortly afterwards (see 5.16).
5.14) According to the Viśeṣcayasamgrahāṇi on the Pañcaviṣeṣānakāśyamānabhūmi, when the Buddha mentioned the samskāras of the past and future, his intention was to indicate the fact that the samskāras of the present are the results of past samskāras and the causes of future ones. The first of the two misconceptions that the Buddha intended to eliminate was that past and future really exist.²⁴⁶

２⁴⁶ Mukai (1972) points out many correspondences between Vasubandhu’s criticism of sarvāstivāda in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and that in the Śāvatarkādi-bhūmi, and he refers to the passage in the Viśeṣcayasamgrahāṇi on the Pañcaviṣeṣānakāśyamānabhūmi, as well. He concludes that “the author” of the Yogācārabhūmi and Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, basing himself on Sautrāntika, share an essentially identical position, but he does not suggest that the Yogācārabhūmi was Vasubandhu’s source.
5.15) Vasubandhu raises an objection: if the past and the future really exist, then how can they be called “past” or “future”?

*kathaṃ tad atitam anāgatam cocyate yadi nityam astīti*

(Pradhan: 299.3-4; T. 1558: 105b9; Poussin v. 4: 58; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master, who, he says, is following the teaching of the Sthavira here [T. 1562: 625b2-4; Poussin 1936-1937: 52], and turns Vasubandhu’s argument back on those who deny the past and future: if the past and future did not exist, it would be impossible to talk about them [T. 1562: 625b4-13; Poussin 1936-1937: 52-53].)
5.15) (See item 5.12.)
5.16) According to Vasubandhu, the reason that the Buddha said that past and future exist was to refute those who deny the validity of cause and result. In the expressions “the past exists” and “the future exists,” the word “exists” in these cases means “existed” and “will exist,” respectively.\(^{247}\)

\[
tasmāt bhūtapūrvasya ca hetor bhāvinaś ca phalasya bhūtapūrvavatāṃ bhāvitāṃ ca jñāpayitum hetuphālāpavādadorśtripratiśedhārtham uktam bhagavatā asy aśīṭam asy anāgatam iti / asaśābdaya nipātavāt / yathā ’sti dipasya prāgabhāvo ’sti paścād abhāva iti vaktaro bhavanī yathā cāsī niruddhah sa dipa na tu mayā nirodhita iti / evam atitānāgatam apy aṣṭhī uktam / anyathā hy atitānāgataḥ bhavaḥ eva na sādhyet (Pradhan: 299.4-8; T. 1558: 105b10-15; Poussin v. 4: 58-59; Samghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 626b24-28; Poussin 1936-1937: 60] and criticizes it, saying that, if past and future are not real, it is impossible to refute those who deny causality [T. 1562: 626c19-627a10; Poussin 1936-1937: 62-63].)
\]

---

\(^{247}\) See Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (473.5-6).
5.16) According to the *Viniścayasaṅgrahani* on the *Pañcavijñānakāyamanabhūmi*, the second of two misconceptions that the Buddha intended to eliminate by mentioning the *saṃskāras* of the past and future was the negation of the present (which is tantamount to a denial of cause and effect).

*ji ltar ’das pa daṅ ma ’oṅs pa med pa de bzin du / da ltar byun ba yan med do žes mnon par žen pa nams kyi mnon par žen pa de (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 21a6); 謂彼妄計如去來世現在亦爾都無所有 (T. 1579: 585b 29-c1)*
According to Vasubandhu, when the Buddha said that a past action exists, his meaning was that a potential to yield result, which was placed in the \textit{sam\textit{tati}} in the past, exists in the \textit{sam\textit{tati}} in the present. Furthermore, the Buddha said in the \textit{Param\textit{ārthaśûnyatāsûtra}²⁴⁸} that when \textit{cakṣurindriya} appears, it does not come from anywhere, and when it is destroyed, it does not go into any collection: it exists after not having existed, and after existing, it does not exist.

\textit{yat karmābhyaśitaṁ kṣīṇam niruddham vigataṁ vipariṇatam tad aṣṭiśi / kine te tasya tasya karmano bhūtāpārthvataṁ necchanti sma / tatra punas tadāhitasya tasyāṁ samṛtatau phaladānasāmārthyaṁ saṁdhāyoktam / anyathā hi svena bhāvena vidyamānaṁ arūṇaṁ na sindhet / itihem ca itad evam yat paramārthaśûnyatāyāṁ uktam bhagavatā cakṣur utpadyamānaṁ na kutaścid āgacchati cakṣur niruddhyamānaṁ na kvacit samnicayāṇam gacchati / iti hi bhikṣavaś cakṣur abhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca pratigacchatī²⁴⁹} (Pradhāna: 299.9-14; T. 1558: 105b16-22; Poussin v. 4: 59; Saṃghabhadrā identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 627a10-15; Poussin 1936-1937: 63] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu ignores the obvious meaning of the Buddha’s statement that past actions exist and tries to twist the Buddha’s words in support of his own theory of \textit{bīja}, which Saṃghabhadrā has already refuted [T. 1562: 627a15-b11; Poussin 1936-1937: 64-65].)

²⁴⁸ \textit{Saṃyuktāgama, sūtra} 335 (T. 99: 92c12-26; see Pāśādika 1986: 98).

²⁴⁹ Pāśādika emends \textit{pratigacchatī} to \textit{pratīvakacchatī} on the basis of Yaśomitra’s commentary and the \textit{Bodhicaryāvaśīrpaṇījā} (1986: 98).
5.17) The Savitarkādi-bhūmi explains that when the Buddha said that a past action exists, he was really talking about impressions of the action, not the action itself. These impressions endow the saṃtati with the potential to yield results.\(^{250}\)

\[\text{yad apy uktam asty aṭṭhaṃ karma yataḥ sattvāḥ savyābadddhā vyābādhāḥ}^{251}\text{ vedayanti / tatrāpi tadvāsanāyāṃ tadastitvopacāram abhipretoktaṃ / yeṣu saṃskāreṣu yac chubhāṣubhāṃ karmotpannaṁiruddhaḥ bhavati tena hetunā tena pratyayaena viśītā saṃskārasaṅgatih pravaratate să vāsanety ucylete / yasyaḥ prabandhapatitāyā iṣṭāṇiṣṭaphalāṃ nirvartate iti na yujyate / tato 'pi nāsti doṣaḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 127.19-128.4); 'di ltar sens can rnams gnod pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ / gnod pa med pa'i tshor ba myon bar byed pa / 'das pa'i las yod do žes gsums pa gaṅ yin pa de la yān / bag chags de la / de yod pa'i 'dogs pa la dgonis nas gsums pa yin te / 'du byed gaṅ dag la dge ba daṅ mi dge ba'i las skyes nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de daṅ rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chags žes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sdbug pa daṅ mi sdbug pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir mi rnu ste (Yogācārabhūmi; dzī 75b3-5); 又雖說言有過去業。由此業故諸有情受有損害受無。此亦依彼習氣意假說為有。謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生。是故於我無過。而汝不應道理 (T. 1579: 305b1-6)\]

The Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇi on the Pañcaviṃśatikāyamanobhūmi gives a similar explanation, but with the addition of the term *karmabija*.

\[\text{bcom ldan 'das kyis las 'das pa ni yod de gal te las 'das pa med du zin na 'di na la las gnod pa daṅ bcas pa daṅ / gnod pa med pa'i tshor ba myon ba mi 'gyur žes gaṅ gsums pa de la dgonis pa gaṅ že na / 'das pa'i tshor bas rnams su las dge ba daṅ mi dge ba bskyed ciṅ 'gags pas phyi ma la 'bras bu 'dod pa daṅ mi 'dod pa mthan par 'grub par de'i sa bon gyis 'du byed kyi rgyun phyi ma phyi ma yonis su bsgom pa las dgonis nas (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 20b4-6); 問如世尊言。有過去業。若過去業體是無者。不應今時有一領納有損害。或復不應有一領納無損害。此何密意。答過去生中淨不淨業已己滅。能感當來愛不愛果。此業種子遭受薰習。於行相續展轉不斷。世尊為顯如是相續。是故說言有過去業 (T. 1579: 585b7-13)\]

The Vastusāṃgrhaṇi, although not mentioning caṣṭurindriya, gives an interpretation of the Paramārthaśīnyatlāsūtra (see Mukai 1985: 34) similar to Vasubandhu’s, in which it denies the reality of past and future saṃskāras.

\[\text{de la ma 'onis pa'i dus na 'du byed rnams 'du byed kyi phun por 'dug ste / de las 'du}\]

\(^{250}\) Mukai points out the similarity between this argument and Vasubandhu’s (1972).

\(^{251}\) Bhattacharya mentions in his note that the reading is doubtful.
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

Chapter 5 Anuśayanirdeśa
5.17 continued) byed rnams skye pa'i tshe 'on bar 'gyur ba med do / gal te yod par 'gyur na ma 'oins pa'i dus na ran žin gyis yoňs su grub žin pa de dag ni skyer yaň mi ruň la mi rtag pa ņid du snaň bar yaň mi 'gyur ba'i rigs na snaň žiň yaň 'dug ste / de bas na skye ba'i tshe gan nas kyan mi 'on la med pa las yod par yaň 'gyur ba 'di ni phyi ma'i mtha' ston pa ņid do / de la 'das pa'i dus na 'du byed rnams phun por 'dug ste / der 'du byed skyes nas 'gag pa rnams sogs par 'gyur ba med de / gal te yod par gyur na 'das pa'i 'du byed kyi tshogs ran gi bdag ņid kyis gnas pa'i phyi r 'du byed 'gag pa yaň med pa kho nar 'gyur la 'gag pa med na ni rtag pa ņid du yaň snaň bar mi 'gyur ba'i rigs na snaň žiň yaň 'dug ste / de bas na 'du byed rnams 'gag pa'i tshe gan du yaň sogs par mi 'gyur la yod pa las 'gag pa'i rgyu la ma bitos par ran gi ņan gis phyi r med par 'gyur ba 'di ni sňon gyi mtha' ston pa ņid do (Yogācārabhūmi: 'i 282b4-283a1). 當知此中無有諸行於未來世。實有行聚自性安立諸行生時從彼而來。若有是事彼不應生。於未來世諸行自性已實有故。又不應有無常可得。既有可得。是故當知。諸行生時。無所從來。本無今有。是名後際空。又無諸行於過去世。有實行聚自性。安立。已生已減。諸行往彼積集而住。若有是事。不應施設諸行有滅。過去行聚自性儼然常安住故。若無有滅。彼無常性應不可知既有可知。是故諸行於正滅時。都無所往積集而住。有已散滅不待餘因。自然減壞。是名前際空 (T. 1579: 826b12-23)
According to the sūtra, consciousness is always based on two things, an organ and an object. The Sarvāstivādins argue that, since one can think about past or future things, they must be the object of manas and hence real. Vasubandhu makes a distinction between those objects that are producing conditions (janakapratyaya), which he implicitly admits are necessarily real, and those that are mere objects, for example, nirvana, which cannot possibly be the cause of the production of anything. Such mere objects are not necessarily real, and so the Sarvāstivādin argument does not prove the real existence of past and future.

(idam tāvad iha sampradhāryam / yan manas pratiṣṭyā dharmaś cotpaṭyate manoviṇñāṇaṁ kim tasya yathā manojañakah pratyaya evaṁ dharmaḥ āhosvīd ālambanamātraṁ dharmaḥ ēti / yadi tāvat jaṇakaḥ pratyayo dharmaḥ kathāṃ yad anāgataṁ kalpasahasreṇa bhavisyati va na vā tad idānāṁ viṇñānaṁ janīṣyati / nirvāṇaṁ ca sarvara vyttino tīdhāj jaṇakaṁ nopapadyate / athālambanamātraṁ dharmaḥ bhavanti / atītānāgataṁ apy aḷambanaṁ bhavati tu brūmaḥ

(Pradhāna: 299.17-21; T. 1558: 105b27-c3; Poussin v. 4: 60; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 627c19-25; Poussin 1936-1937: 68] and criticizes it, arguing that the idea of an unreal object of consciousness is against the teachings of the Buddha [T. 1562: 627c25-628a27; Poussin 1936-1937: 68-71].)
5.18) In the Viśeṣayasaṁgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśānākāyamanobhūmi, an objection is mentioned: if past and future saṃskāras are not real, why did the Buddha say that they are conditions that produce manovijñāna? The answer is that even unreal things, such as past and future, can give rise to manovijñāna by being its object.²⁵²

bcom ldan 'das kyis yid ni 'das pa'i 'du byed rnam las kyaṅ brten te 'byun la / yid ni ma 'öns pa' i 'du byed rnam las kyaṅ brten te 'byun no žes gaṅ gsums pa de la / gal te 'das pa'i 'du byed rnam sksan med la ma 'öns pa rnam sksan med na gaṅ gi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis yid 'byun no žes gsums pa'i yid kyi dmigs pa gaṅ yin / gal te yid dṇos po med pa kho na žig la dmigs na ni de la bcom ldan 'das kyis legs par gsums pa daṅ / legs par brjod pa gaṅ yin pa 'di lta ste / rnam par šes pa ni giṅs la brten te 'byun no / giṅs gaṅ že na / mig daṅ gzugs las rgyas par yid daṅ chos kyi bar las zo žes bcom ldan 'das kyis legs par gsums pa daṅ / legs par brjod pa de la ji ltar śin tu gnod par byas par mi 'gyur Že na / yid ni rnam par šes pa'i tshogs lha po dag gi spyod yul ma yin pa'i don gaṅ yin pa 'dzin par byed de / de la bcom ldan 'das kyis chos gtags par mūzad nas / yid daṅ chos rnam la brten te yid kyi rnam par šes pa 'byun no žes gsums so / bcom ldan 'das kyis dgoṅs pa de yaṅ rgyu gaṅ gis khoṅ du chud par bya že na / 'di ltar yid kyi rnam par šes pa ni 'das pa'i rnam par šes pa la dmigs pa yaṅ yod / ma 'öns pa'i rnam par šes pa la dmigs pa yaṅ yod med kyi / rnam par šes pa ni chos kyi skye mchod du gtsogs pa ma yin no / gāṅ yaṅ yod pa yaṅ yod pa'i don glys rnam par gnas sīn yod pa'i don 'dzin par byed la / med pa yaṅ med pa'i don glys²⁵³ rnam par gnas sīn med pa'i don 'dzin par byed pas / de la yid kyi rnam pa šes pas ni yod pa yaṅ daṅ gaṅ gis rnam par gnas pa'i don de Žnid kyis rnam par šes par bya la / med pa yaṅ daṅ gaṅ gis rnam par gnas pa'i don de Žnid kyis rnam par šes pa bya'o / gal te de giṅ gaṅ ga'i don glys rnam par šes pa mi byed na ni yid don thams cad la dmigs pa daṅ / don thams 'dzin pa yin par mi 'gyur ro / gaṅ de skad ces zer na / des ni grub pa'i mtha' la yaṅ śin tu gnod pa byas par 'gyur te / ji ltar yod pa Žnid med pa'o žes brjod du ni tshul ma yin no / de lta bas na ji ltar 'das pa daṅ / ma 'öns pa de gṇos po med pa de bzőn de la dmigs pa'i yid kyaṅ med la / dmigs pa yin par khoṅ du chud par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 19a2-b4); —问如世尊言。過去諸行為緣生意。未來諸行為緣生意。過去未來諸行非有。何故世尊宜說彼行為緣生意。若言亦緣非有事境。而得生者。云何不違妙言說。如世尊言。由二種緣諸識得生。何等為二謂眼及色。如是廣說乃至意法。答由能執持諸五識身所不行義故。佛世尊假說名法。是故說緣緣及法意識得生。問何因緣故知佛世尊有是密意。答由彼意識亦緣去識為境界世現可得。非彼境識法處所攝。又有性者安立有義能持有義若無性者安立無義能持無義故皆名法。由彼意識於有性義。若由此義而得安立。即以此義起識了別。於無性義。若由此義而得安立。即以此義起

²⁵² Mukai points out the relationship between this argument and Vasubandhu’s (1972).

²⁵³ Corrected from gyi on the basis of the Derge.
5.18 continued) 識了別。若於二種不由二義起了別者。不應說意緣一切義取一切義。設作是說。便應違害自悉彌多。又不應言如其所有非有亦爾。是如理說。是故意識如去來事非實有相。緣彼為境。由此故知意識亦緣非有為境
(T. 1579: 584c18-585a8)
5.19) The Sarvāstivādin challenges Vasubandhu: how can something nonexistent be an object of perception? Vasubandhu answers that something in the past is remembered with the knowledge that it is past, not present, and that something in the future is imagined with the knowledge that it is future, not present. If the object were existent, it would be perceived as being in the present—in other words, it would not be a past or future object.

\[yadi\ na\̣sti\ \text{katham} \ \\text{ālambanam} \ / \ \text{atredānīn} \ \text{brāhma} \ / \ yadā \ \text{tad} \ \text{ālambana} \ \text{tathāsti} \ \text{katham} \ \text{tad} \ \text{ālambanam} \ \text{abhū} \ \text{bhaviṣyatī} \ \text{ceti} \ / \ \text{na} \ \text{hi} \ \text{kaścid} \ \text{ātita} \ \text{rūpam} \ \text{vedanā} \ / \ \text{vā} \ \text{smarann} \ \text{asūti} \ \text{paśyati} \ / \ \text{kiṃ} \ \text{tarhi} \ / \ \text{abhūd} \ \text{iti} \ / \ \text{yathā} \ \text{khalv} \ \text{api} \ \text{vartamāna} \ \text{rūpam} \ \text{anubhūta} \ \text{tathā} \ \text{tad} \ \text{ātita} \ \text{smaryate} \ / \ \text{yathā} \ \text{cānāgatam} \ \text{vartamāna} \ \text{bhaviṣyatī} \ \text{tathā} \ \text{buddhyā} \ \text{grhyate} \ / \ \text{yadi} \ \text{ca} \ \text{tat} \ \text{tathāvāṣi} \ \text{vartamāna} \ \text{prapnoti} \ / \ \text{atha} \ \text{nasti} \ / \ \text{asad} \ \text{apy} \ \text{ālambanam} \ \text{bhavatī} \ \text{siddham} \]

(Pradhan: 299.21-25; T. 1558: 105c4-11; Poussin v. 4: 60-61; Saṁghabhadra identifies this as the sūtra-master’s response to his own objection [T. 1562: 628a27-b5; Poussin 1936-1937: 71] and, calling Vasubandhu “the disciple of the Dārṣṭāntika,” criticizes it at length, saying that Vasubandhu’s intellectual deficiencies prevent him from contemplating past and future clearly and arguing that Vasubandhu’s statement that past objects are remembered actually proves that they are real [T. 1562: 628b5-27; Poussin 1936-1937: 71-73]).\(^{254}\)

\(^{254}\) For a discussion of this issue as treated by Vasubandhu and Saṁghabhadra, see Cox 1988: 61-68.
5.19) (I am unable to find anything in the *Yogācārabhūmi* corresponding to this argument of Vasubandhu’s.)
5.20) Vasubandhu argues that cognition of the absence of sound before the sound is made is based on a nonexistent object, not on a future sound, as the Sarvāstivādins maintain.

yas ca śabdasya prāgabhāvam ālambate kim tasyālambanam / śabda eva / evaṁ tarhi yah śabdabhāvan prārthayate tasya śabda eva kartavyaḥ syāt / anāgatāvastha iti cet / sati kathāṁ nāstibuddhiḥ / vartamāno nāstīti cet / na / ekatvāt / yāvatā tasya viśeṣas tasyābhūtvābhavasiddhiḥ / tasmād ubhayaṁ vijñānasālambanam bhāvas cābhāvas ca

(Pradhan: 300.9-12; T. 1558: 105c23-29; Poussin v. 4: 62; Samghabhadra identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 624b4-9; Poussin 1936-1937: 45] and criticizes it, saying that what Vasubandhu sees as the nonexistence of sound is really the supporting conditions (adhiṣṭhāna) of sound in the state in which no sound is produced; in any case, Samghabhadra insists that future sound actually does exist and can be the support of the cognition of the absence of sound [T. 1562: 624b9-c1; Poussin 1936-1937: 45-47].)

255 Samghabhadra discusses this passage out of order. For a summary of Samghabhadra’s argument, see Cox 1988: 58-59.
5.20) (The refutations of the reality of past and future in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi [Yogacārabhūmi: 122.12-129.4; Yogacārabhūmi; dzī 73b3-76a7; T. 1579: 304b24-305b26] and the Viniscayasamgrahaṇī on the Pañcaviṃśānākāyamanarbhūmi [Yogacārabhūmi; dzī 20b4-21b1; T. 1579: 585b7-c8] do not include this argument. Nor can I find it elsewhere in the Yogacārabhūmi.)
5.21) The Sarvástivādins refute Vasubandhu’s assertion that both existent and non-existent things can be objects of cognition. According to them, if this were so, the Buddha would not have stated that it was impossible for him to know that which does not exist in the world. Vasubandhu responds that the Buddha meant that he does not mistake non-existent things for existent ones. Furthermore, if all cognition had a real object, there could be no uncertainty about whether something is real and thus no distinction between the Buddha and other people.

apare ābhimānikā bhavanty asantam apy avabhāsāṁ santam paśyanti / aham tu santam evaśīti paśyāmiśy āyam tatrābhiprāyāḥ / itarathā hi sarvabuddhīnāṁ sadālambanatve kuto 'syā vīmāśāḥ syāt ko vā viśeṣaḥ (Pradhan: 300.13-16; T. 1558: 106a1-4; Poussin v. 4: 62-63; Samghabhadra identifies this as the explanation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 622c11-14; Poussin 1936-1937: 34] and criticizes it, saying that illusory cognitions are simply mistaken cognitions, not cognitions of non-existent objects [T. 1562: 622c15-27; Poussin 1936-1937: 35].)²⁵⁶

²⁵⁶Again, see Cox 1988: 61-68 for a general discussion of this issue.
5.21) In its refutation of the real existence of the past and the future, the *Savātarkādi-bhūmi* answers the objection that, if past and future are unreal, then there must be cognition of nonexistent objects, which contradicts sūtra. The *Savātarkādi-bhūmi* argues that, if there were no cognition of nonexistent objects, ideas such as the nonexistence of a self, the horn of the hare, or the child of a barren woman would be impossible.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁷ Mukai points out the relationship between this argument and Vasubandhu’s (1972).
5.22) Vasubandhu gives another argument for the cognition of nonexistent objects: the Buddha says that his disciples will know, through his teaching, that existent things exist and that nonexistent things do not exist.\(^{258}\)

\[\text{ittham} \text{ ca'itvat evam / yad anyatra bhagavatoktam etat}\] \(^{259}\) \[\text{bhikṣur mama śrāvako yāvat sa mayā kalpaṁ}\] \(^{260}\) \[\text{avoditaḥ sāyaṁ viśeṣāya paraśyati / sāyaṁ avoditaḥ kalpaṁ viśeṣāya paraśyati / sac ca sato jñāsyati asac cāsataḥ sottaram ca sottaram anuttaram cānuttaram iti}\]

(Pradhan: 300.16-18; T. 1558: 106a4-8; Poussin v. 4: 63; Saṅghabhāṣāra identifies this as the explanation of the śūtra-master [T. 1562: 622c28-623a2, 623a9-9; Poussin 1936-1937: 35-36] and criticizes at length Vasubandhu’s misleading understanding of the sūtra, saying that in this sūtra passage the word \textit{sat} means “good,” not “existent,” while the word \textit{asat} means “bad,” not “nonexistent” [T. 1562: 623a2-8, 623a9-b2; Poussin 1936-1937: 36-37].)


\(^{259}\) Citing Honjō 1984, Pāṣādīka emends \textit{etat} to \textit{etu} (1986: 98).

\(^{260}\) Pāṣādīka emends \textit{kalpaṁ} to \textit{kalyam} (1986: 98).
5.22) In a continuation of the passage mentioned in 5.21, the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* quotes the same *sūtra* passage as Vasubandhu as further proof that the cognition of non-existent objects must be possible.

*bcom ldan 'das kyis ṃan thos g yo med pa ni ṃas gdam g byin te / yaṅ dag par grub na / yod pa la yaṅ yod par śes / med pa la yaṅ med par śes sogs gsun pa gan yin pa de yaṅ mi rui bar 'gyur ro* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; *dzi* 75a4-5); 又諸伽梵說我諸無詮聲聞。如我所說正修行時。若有知有若無知無。此不應道理 (*T.* 1579: 305a16-18).

---

261. There is no corresponding Sanskrit text for this portion or the portion that follows immediately (*Yogācārabhūmi*; *dzi* 75a5-8; *T.* 1579: 305a18-24).
5.23) Referring to his refutation of ātmavāda at the end of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu attributes to the Sautrāntikas the opinion that a result does not directly arise from a past action; instead, it arises due to a *saṃtānaviśeṣa* based on a past action.

\[ \textit{naiva hi sautrāntikā atitāt karaṇaḥ phalotpattiṃ varṇayaṇti / kim tarhi / tatpūrvvakāt samānaviśeṣād ity ātmavādapratiśedhe sampravedayiṣyāmaḥ} \]

(Pradhan: 300.19-21; T. 1558: 106a10-13; Poussin v. 4: 63; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 629b3-5; Poussin 1936-1937: 77-78], refers to the end of Chapter Nine,\(^{262}\) where Vasubandhu gives a longer explanation of *samātātiparināma* [T. 1562: 629b5-17; Poussin 1936-1937: 78], and criticizes it, objecting to Vasubandhu’s identification of the series of thought with the series of actions and to his comparison of the series of actions with the series of seed, sprout, etc. [T. 1562: 629b17-630a11; Poussin 1936-1937: 78-82].)

\(^{262}\) See *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*: 477.7-18; T. 1558: 158c25-159a5; Poussin v. 5: 295-296.
5.23) It is shown in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi and in the Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇi on the Pañcavījñānakāyamanobhūmi that the result of a past action does not arise directly from the action, but rather from a modification of the saṃtati. (See item 5.17. For the sake of convenience, I again include both passages with their summaries.)

The Savitarkādi-bhūmi explains that when the Buddha said that a past action exists, he was really talking about impressions of the action, not the action itself. These impressions endow the saṃtati with the potential to yield results.

yad apy uktam asti atiṣṭha karma yataḥ sattvāḥ savyābaddhā vyābādhāṁ (see note 251) vedayantī tatrāpi tadavasānāyāṁ tadasthitopacāram abhipretvyokṣam / yesu saṃskāreṣu yac chuhbahāṃ karmotpapaniruddhaṁ bhavati tena hetumā tena prayayena viśistā saṃskārasaṇataḥ pravartate sā vāsanetī ucayate / yasyāḥ prabandhapitāyā īśānāśaṭphalāṁ nirvartate iti na yujate / tato 'pi nāstī dōṣāḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 127.19-128.4), 'das pa'i las yod do žes gsun pa gañ yin pa de la yan / bag chags de la / de yod pa'i 'dogs pa la dgoṅs nas gsun pa yin te / 'du byed gañ dag la dge ba dān mi dge ba'i las skies nas 'gags pa yod la / rgyu de dan rkyen des 'du byed bye brag can gyi rgyud 'jug pa de la ni bag chads žes bya ste / de rgyun du gnas pa las sduṅ pa dān mi sduṅ pa'i 'bras bu grub par 'gyur ba'i phyir mi rung ste (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 75b3-5); 又雖説言有過去業。由此業故諸有情受有損害受無損害受。此亦依彼習氣密意假說為有。謂於諸行中。曾有淨不淨業。若生若滅由此因緣彼行勝異相續而轉是名習氣。由此相續所攝習氣故。愛不愛果生。是故於我無過。而汝不應道理(T. 1579: 305b1-6)

The Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇi on the Pañcavījñānakāyamanobhūmi gives a similar explanation, but with the addition of the term *karmabiṇa.

bcom idan 'das kyis las 'das pa ni yod de gal te las 'das pa med du zin ra 'di na la las gnoā pa dān bcas pa dān / gnoā pa med pa'i tshor ba myon ba mi 'gyur žes gaṅ gsunā pa de la dgoṅs pa gaṅ že na / 'das pa'i tshor bas rams su las dge ba dān mi dge ba bskyed ciṅ 'gags pa phyi ma la 'bras bu 'dod pa dān mi 'dod pa mṇon par 'grub par de'i sa bon gyis 'du byed kyi rgyun phyi ma phyi ma yoṅs su bsgom pa las dgoṅs nas (Yogācārabhūmi: zi 20b4-6); 問如世尊言。有過去業。若過去業體是無者。不應今時有一領納有損害受。或復不應有一領納無損害受。此何密意。答過去生中淨不淨業已起已滅。能感當來愛不愛果。此業種子熾受熏習。於行相續展轉不斷。世尊為顯如是相續。是故說言有過去業(T. 1579: 585b7-13)
5.24) Vasubandhu suggests that those who believe in the real existence of past and future are guilty of thinking that results are eternal: if the result always exists, then what efficacy does karma have?

*yasya tv atitānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti tasya phalaṃ nityam evaṣṭīti kiṃ tatra karanāṇah sāmarthyaṃ*

(Pradhan: 300.21-22; T. 1558: 106a13-14; Poussin v. 4: 63; Samghabhadrā in two places identifies this as the objection of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 630a11-13, 634a23-25; Poussin 1936-1937: 82-83, 113] and answers Vasubandhu’s question: karma makes the result produce its special activity; that is, karma brings the result into the present [T. 1562: 630a13-25, 634a25-b9; Poussin 1936-1937: 113-114].)
5.24) In the Savitarkādi-bhūmi, the first of sixteen mistaken theories (among which the third is belief in the real existence of past and future) is hetuphalasadvāda, the belief that the result is always present in the cause. This theory is shown to be mistaken because: 1) if cause and result have the same characteristics, there is no difference between them and hence it is illogical to say that one is present in the other; 2) if they have different characteristics and if the nature of the result is that it has not yet arisen, then it is illogical to say that the result exists in the cause; 3) if they have different characteristics and the nature of the result is that it has already arisen, then it is illogical to say that the result arises in the cause. Therefore, the result is not already present in the cause; rather, there being a cause, the result arises in dependence on conditions.\(^{263}\)

\[sa \text{id}am \text{svād vacanīyaḥ kaccid icchasi hetulaksanaṃ phalalaksanaṃ hetor vā punaḥ phalalaksanaṃ abhinnalaksanaṃ vā / saged abhinnalaksanaṃ / tena nāṣṭi hetuniyama / phalaniyama iti nirvīśṭatvāḥ hetuphalayor hetau phalam vidyata iti na yuyate / saced abhinnalaksanaṃ / tena kaccid icchasi anutpannalaksanaṃ votpannalaksanaṃ vā / saced anutpannalaksanaṃ / tena hetau phalam anutpannam asīti na yuyate / saced utpannalaksanaṃ / tena hetau phalam upadivata iti na yuyate / tasmān nāṣṭi hetau phalam / hetau tu sati pratayam apekṣyotpadyate (Yogācārabhūmi: 119.17-120.3); de la ‘di skad ces brjod par bya ste [ci’i rgyu’i mtshan ŋid dañ ‘bras bu’i mtshan ŋid dañ / rgyu la ‘bras bu’i mtshan ŋid tha dad pa ma yin pa’i mtshan ŋid dam]?\(^{264}\) ‘on te tha dad pa’i mtshan ŋid du ‘dod / gal te tha dad pa ma yin pa’i mtshan ŋid gcig yin na ni / des na rgyu dañ ‘bras bu gnis la bye brag med pa’i phyir / rgyur nes pa dañ ‘bras bur nes pa med pas / rgyu las ‘bras bu yod ces byar mi ruñ no / gal te mtshan ŋid tha da pa žig yin na ni / des na ci ma skyes pa’i mtshan ŋid dam / ‘on te skyes pa’i mtshan ŋid du ‘dod / gal te ma skyes pa’i mtshan ŋid cig yin na ni / des na rgyu la ‘bras bu ma skyes pa žig yod do žes bya bar yān mi ruñ no / gal te skyes žin pa’i mtshan ŋid cig yin na ni / des na rgyu las ‘bras bu skyes žin pa žig skye’o žes byar mi ruñ no / de bas na rgyu la ni ’bras bu med kyi / rgyu yod na rkyen la llos te skye bar ‘gyur ro (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 71b8-72a4); 應審間彼。汝何所欲。何者因相。何者果相。因果兩相。為異不異。若無異相。便無因果二種決定。因果二種。無差別故。因中有果。不應道理。若有異相。便無因果二種決定。因果二種。無差別故。因中有果。不應道理。若有異相。汝意云何。因中果性。為未生

\(^{263}\) Unlike Vasubandhu, the Savitarkādi-bhūmi does not explicitly relate the belief in an eternal result to sarvāstivāda. However, it is highly likely that Vasubandhu’s criticism of sarvāstivāda is borrowed, at least in part, from the criticism of hetuphalasadvāda in the Savitarkādi-bhūmi.

\(^{264}\) The portion in brackets is from the Derge, which agrees more closely with the Sanskrit and the Chinese. The sentence in the Peking appears to be corrupt: ci’i rgyu’i mtshan ŋid dañ rgyu las ‘bras bu’i mtshan ŋid tha dad pa ma yin pa’i mtshan ŋid dam.
Chapter 5 Anuśayanirdeśa
5.24 continued) 相。為已生相。若未生相。便於因中。果猶未生。而說是有。不應道理。若已生相。即果體已生。復從因生。不應道理。是故。因中非先有果。然要有因待緣果生 (T. 1579: 303c25-304a3)
5.25) Vasubandhu accuses the Sarvāstivādins of having the same views as the Sāṃkhya teacher, Vārṣaganya, who says that that which does not exist cannot be produced, while that which exists cannot be destroyed.

vārṣaganyavādaṁ caivaṁ dyotito bhavati / yad asty asty eva tat / yān nāsti nāsti eva
tat / asato nāsti sambhavah / sato nāsti vināśa iti

(Pradhan: 301.1-3; T. 1558: 106a16-18; Poussin v. 4: 63-64; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 634a5-6; Poussin 1936-1937: 112] and claims that it is Vasubandhu’s theory that actually resembles Vārṣaganya’s because for Vasubandhu the present can only be existent, while the past and future can only be nonexistent [T. 1562: 634a6-19; Poussin 1936-1937: 112-113].)²⁶⁵

²⁶⁵ Saṃghabhadra discusses this passage out of order.
5.25) The Savitarkādi-bhūmi attributes to Vāraṇāgya the belief in hetuphalasadvāda, according to which the result exists eternally in the cause.

hetuphalasadvādayaḥ katamaḥ / yathāpiḥaikatyāḥ śramaṇo brāhmaṇo vā evaṃdṛṣṭir bhavaty evamvādi nityāṃ nityakālaṃ dhruvam dhruvakālaṃ vidyata eva hetau phalam iti tad yathā vāraṇāgyaḥ (Yogācārabhūmi: 118.14-119.2); rgyu la ’bras bu yod par smra ba gaṅ že na / ’di lta ’di na dge sbyon nam bram ze kha cig / rtag pa rtag266 pa’i dus dañ / ther zug ther zug gi dus su / rgyu la ’bras bu yod pa kho na žes de lta žin / de skad smra ba dag yod de / ’di lta ste / khyu mchog pa’i tshogs lta bu’o (Yogācārabhūmi; dzi 71a8-b1); 因中有果論者。謂如有一若沙門若婆羅門。起如是見立如是論。常常時恒恆時於諸因中具有果性。謂雨眾外道作如是計 (T. 1579: 303c8-10)

---

266 Corrected from brtag on the basis of the Derge.
5.26) Vasubandhu says that the Sarvāstivādins misunderstand what “all exists” means. He refers to the Buddha’s statement, “‘all exists’ means the twelve āyatanas exist,” and adds that “all” can also indicate the three times, as long as this is understood according to Vasubandhu’s interpretation.

(tasmān naivāṃ sarvāstivādāḥ sāsane sādhur bhavati / yad atitāṅgataṁ dravyatāḥ stīti vadati / evaṃ tu sādhur bhavati / yathā sūtre sarvam āsīty uktam tathā vadati / kathām ca sūtra sarvam āsīty uktam / sarvam āsīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānāḥ / adhvatrayam vā / yathā tu tad asīt tathāktaṃ)

(Pradhān: 301.5-8; T. 1558: 106a22-26; Poussin v. 4: 63-64; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the negation of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 630c14-19; Poussin 1936-1937: 88] and criticizes it, saying that the intention of the sūtra quoted by Vasubandhu was not to say anything about the essential nature of the three times, whereas the sūtras read by Saṃghabhadra affirm the existence of past and future; furthermore, Saṃghabhadra implies that Vasubandhu sides with those who think that all dharmas are either praṇāpti or completely unreal [T. 1562: 630c19-631a3; Poussin 1936-1937: 88-89].)

---

267 Samyuktāgama, sūtra 319 (T. 99: 91a24-b3; see Pāśādika 1986: 99).

268 P’u-kuang identifies Vasubandhu’s statement as a Sautrāntika position, according to which not all of the āyatanas consist of exclusively real dharmas: some include dharmas that are not ultimately real: 如其所有而說有言 經部意說。若假。若實。若曾。若當。如其所說而說有言。非皆實有。猶如現在。過去曾有。未來當有。現在實有。現十二處八處實有。四處少分實有。少分實無。如色處中顯色實有。形色實無。聲處中無記刹那聲實有。相續語業善。惡等聲實無。觸處中四大實有。餘處實無。法處中定境界色。受。想。思實有。餘心所法思上假立實無。及不相應法。三無為法亦是實無 (T. 1821: 314a3-12).
5.26) The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* cites the same sūtra as Vasubandhu in connection with its refutation of past and future. It explains that belief in the real existence of past and future can arise from misunderstanding of sūtras. For example, the Buddha’s statement, “all exists’ means the twelve āyatana exist,” might be taken to mean that the twelve āyatana are real entities.

\[
iha dhārmiko vā punaḥ sūtrāntān ayoniśaḥ kalpayati / tad yathā / sarvam asitī dvādaśāyatanāni / dvādaśāyatanāni lakṣaṇato vidyante (Yogācārabhūmi: 124.2-3); chos 'di pa yān mād sde la tshul bzin ma yin par rogs ste / 'di lta ste / skye mched bcu gnīs po thams cad yod de skye mched bcu gnīs po rnam ni mtshan ŋid kyis yod do (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 73b6); 又在此法者。於如來經不如理分別故。謂如經言。一切有者即十二處。此十二處實相是有 (T. 1579: 304b28-c2)
\]

The *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* later explains that the sūtra has a hidden meaning: some “existent” dharmas are really existent, while others are not. Existent dharmas have a mark that shows they are existent, while nonexistent ones have a mark that shows they are nonexistent. Otherwise, yogins would only be able to know existent dharmas; they would not be able to know nonexistent ones.\(^{269}\) Hence, they would not be able to discern immediately the dharmas that they perceive.

\[
yad apy uktam sarvam asti yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānī tad api sati sallakṣaṇāstītām sandhāyoktām / asati cāsallakṣaṇāstītām / tathāpi sallakṣaṇā api dharmā sallakṣaṇām dhārayanti / asallakṣaṇā api dharmā asallakṣaṇām dhārayanti / tasmād dharmā ity ucyante / anyathā tu sato jñānād asatas cājñānād yogino na nirantarajñeyadharma-parīksā syād iti na yujyate (Yogācārabhūmi: 127.13-18); skye mched bcu gnīs po ji sīn pa thams cad yod do žes gsum pa gan yin pa de yān / [yod pa la yod pa'i mtshan ŋid yod pa dan med pa la med pa'i mtshan ŋid yod pa la dgoṅs nas gsum pa yin te] \(^{270}\) 'di lta rdo yod pa'i mtshan ŋid kyi chos rams kyang / yod pa'i mtshan ŋid 'dzin la / med pa'i mtshan ŋid kyi chos rams kyang med pa'i mtshan ŋid 'dzin te / de bas na chos rams žes bya'o / de lta ba yin du żin na yod pa mi ŋes pa dan / med pa mi ŋes pas rnal 'byor pas šes bya'i chos la rgyud chags sras rtog par mi 'gyur bas mi run no (Yogācārabhūmi: dži 75a8-b3); 又雖說一切有者謂十二處。然於有法密意說有無相。所以者何。若有相法能持有相。若無相法能持無相。是故俱名為法俱名為有。若異此者。諸修行者唯知於有不知於
\]

\(^{269}\) The Tibetan, however, reads differently from the Sanskrit and Chinese: “due to ignorance of that which exists and due to ignorance of that which does not exist.”

\(^{270}\) The portion in brackets is from the Derge, which agrees more closely with the Sanskrit and the Chinese. The sentence in the Peking appears to be corrupt: yod pa la yan yod pa'i mtshan ŋid yod pa la dgoṅs pa yin te.
Chapter 5 Anuśayanirdeśa
5.26 continued) 無應非無間觀所知法。不應道理 (T. 1579: 305a24-b1)
5.27) The Sarvāstivādin argues that, if the past and future are unreal, it is impossible to explain how one can be bound by a past or future kleśa to a thing (vastu) in the past or future. Vasubandhu answers that one is bound by an anuśaya produced by a past kleśa or by an anuśaya that is the cause of a future kleśa. One is bound to a thing in the past or future due to the anuśaya of a kleśa that has had or will have that thing as its object.

tajjataddhetvanuśayabhāvāt kleśena tadāिंambane kleśānuśayabhāvād vastuni saṃyukto bhavati

(Pradhan: 301.9-10; T. 1558: 106a27-29; Poussin v. 4: 64-65; Samghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 634c9-10; Poussin 1936-1937: 116] and maintains that Vasubandhu is contradicting his own position by calling past and future things vastu when according to him they do not really exist [T. i562: 634c10-19; Poussin 1936-1937: 116-117].)
5.27) The *Yogācārabhūmi* asserts the nominal existence of *anusayas*, which are *kleśas* in the form of seeds (see item 3).

The *Viniścayasaṁgrahani* on the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* also addresses the issue of association with past and future *kleśas*, referring to *anusayas*. It says that one is not associated with past *kleśas*, because one was already associated with them in the past. In the present, one is associated with the *anusayas* of this type of (past) *kleśa*, and, if the *kleśas* are actualized, then one is associated with their *parayavasthānas*. One is not associated with future *anusayas* and *parayavasthānas* because one will be associated with them in the future.

---

271 The Derge adds *kyi nön mons pa’i* here.
5.28) Vasubandhu says that the Vaibhāṣikas, who believe in the real existence of past and future but cannot explain it, say that the nature of dharmas is profound; it cannot be proved logically.

\[ \text{asty eva tv atītānāgatam iti vaibhāṣikāḥ / yaïra netum śakyate tatrātmaśītaṁmanakāśvāṁ veditavyam / gambhirā khalu dharmatāḥ / nāvaśyam tarkasādhya}^{272} \text{ bhavatīti} \]

(Pradhan: 301.10-13; T. 1558: 106b1-4; Poussin v. 4: 65; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 634c19-22; Poussin 1936-1937: 117], criticizes Vasubandhu for attributing to the Vaibhāṣikas words that are not their own, and claims that he has successfully refuted Vasubandhu's (and the Sthāvira's) denial of the existence of past and future [T. 1562: 634c22-635a9; Poussin 1936-1937: 117-118].)

5.28) The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not specifically explain the past and future with reference to the profound nature of dharmas. However, the term *gambhīra*, like *acintya*, appears far more frequently in the *Yogācārabhūmi* than in Sarvāstivādin texts, often to characterize that which is difficult to explain.

The *Cintāmānī Bhūmi* lists four ways in which things are unutterable. One of these is that they are unutterable due to being profound, and one example is the inexpressible nature of dharmas.

*zab pa’i phyir ni ’di lta ste / chos ṅid brjod du med pa daṅ* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; *dzi* 235a6-7); 二甚深故不可說。謂離言法性 (*T. 1579: 363a2*)

The *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi (Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra)* says that the *dharma*-nature of all dharmas is very profound.

*chos rnams kyi chos ṅid kyan zab ste* (*Yogācārabhūmi*; ’i 67b6-7); 諸法法性亦甚甚深 (*T.1579: 721b4*)
5.29) Vasubandhu says that one who has destroyed a kleśa that is to be destroyed by insight into duḥkha is still associated with the remaining defilements that have that as their object, i.e., the other kleśas of the same type as the destroyed kleśa. Yaśomitra gives the following example: even if an adhimātrādhimātra kleśa has been destroyed, one is still associated with the adhimātrādhyā anuśaya, etc. (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 477.33-478.4).

\[\text{prahīne duḥkhadṛgdheye samyuktah śeṣasarvagaiḥ / prāk prahīne prakāre ca śeṣais tadviśayair malaḥ / duḥkhājñāne saṃapanne saṃudayajñāne 'nupanne duḥkha-}

\[\text{dārśanaprahātavyo niκāyaḥ prahīṇo bhavati/tasmin prahīne tadālambanaṁ saṃudaya-}

\[\text{dārśanaprahātavyaiḥ saṃyuktaiḥ sarvatragaiḥ saṃyuktaiḥ}

(Pradhāna: 301.20-302.3; T. 1558: 106b12-16; Poussin v. 4: 66-67; Samghabhadra objects to the phrase tadviśaya, which he thinks is unnecessary [T. 1562: 636c7-11], and examines and criticizes the sūtra-master’s possible reasons for including it [T. 1562: 636c11-21].)
5.29) (I have found nothing in the Yogācārabhūmi corresponding to this argument.)
5.30) In an explanation of four synonyms for anuṣaya, Vasubandhu says that anuṣayas are called yoga when they are not strongly active, and they are called upādāna because due to them one grasps objects of desire.

nātīmatrasaṃudācarīno 'pi yogā vividhaduḥkhasaṃyojanāt / ābhīṣṇyānuṣaṅgato vā / kāmādyupādānād upādānānātī

(Pradhan: 308.20-21; T. 1558: i08b8-11; Poussin v. 4: 80-81; Samghabhadra identifies these as the explanations of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 642a13-19] and criticizes them, saying that, in the case of the first two synonyms (āsrava and ṭhāna), Vasubandhu's explanation is actually the same as that of the Vaibhāsikas, while his explanations of yoga and upādāna are simply wrong: if the anuṣayas were not strongly active, they could not bond beings to suffering; if upādāna were the cause of ṭṛṣṇā, the pratītya-samutpāda formula would be contradicted because upādāna must be the condition for bhava [T. 1562: 642a19-b8].)
5.30) The explanations of the yogas and upādānas in the Vastusamgrahaṇī are perhaps more similar to Vasubandhu’s explanations than to the presumably standard Sarvāstivādin explanations that precede them (Pradhan: 308.16). The Vastusamgrahaṇī states that the yogas are the kleśas operating together without either increase or destruction (or without either duplication or omission).

mtshun gs par spyod pa rnams kyi lhag chad med pa’i ŋon moṅs pa de dag ŋid la ni sbyor ba rnams šes bya’o (Yogācārabhūmi; ’i 224b5); 復次若諸煩惱等分行者非增非減。即上所說一切煩惱。說名為軌 (T. 1579: 803b20-21)

The same passage states that the upādānas function to obtain objects of desire and riches.

gan gi phyir ṅe bar len že na / ’dod pa rnams thob par bya ba’i phyir daṅ loṅs spyod pa’i phyir ni daṅ po’o (Yogācārabhūmi; ’i 224b8); 問何所為取。答為得諸欲及為受用故起初取 (T. 1579: 803b26-27)
5.31) In a discussion of the antidotes (pratipakṣa) to the kleśas, one of which is distance (dāribhāva), Vasubandhu objects to the Sarvāstivādin explanation of temporal distance. According to Sarvāstivāda, past and future things are distant because they have no efficacy. Vasubandhu argues that the asaṃskṛtadharmaṇas would likewise have to be distant because they have no efficacy. The Sarvāstivādin counters that the two nirodhas are not distant since they are possessed at all times. Vasubandhu then states that past and future dharmas (according to Sarvāstivāda) can also be possessed at all times and thus could not, according to the Sarvāstivādin logic, be distant.

\[\text{akāritrāt tarhi tad dūram / asaṃskṛtasya katham antikatvaṃ sidhyātī / sarvatra tat-prāpteh / attānāgata 'pi tat prasaṅgah}\]

(Pradhan: 321.10-11; T. 1558: 111c10-12; Poussin v. 4: 107; Saṅghabhadra identifies this last as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 651c13-14] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu is wrong to apply the same reasoning to the asaṃskṛtadharmaṇas as to past and future [T. 1562: 651c14-21].)
5.31) (I have found nothing in the Yogācārabhūmi corresponding to this argument. But see the next item.)
5.32) In a discussion of four types of distance, Vasubandhu offers his own explanation of temporal distance: the future is distant due to the nature of dharmas because it has not been acquired; the past is distant because it has already departed.²⁷³

\[evan\ tu\ yuktam\ syat/ dharmasvalakshanad\ anagatam\ duram\ asampraaptavat/ atitam\ ca\ pracyutatvad\ iti\]

(Pradhan: 321.14-15; T. 1558: 111c16-18; Poussin v. 4: 107; Samghabhadra identifies this as the statement of the sutra-master [T. 1562: 651c25-27] and accuses Vasubandhu of being prejudiced when he implies that “distance” is equivalent to “lacking svabhava” and thus insists on his theory of the unreality of past and future [T. 1562: 651c27-652a3].)

²⁷³ P'u-kuang says that, according to Vasubandhu, past and future are distant since they have no real existence, while the present, which is real, is near (T. 1821: 325c26-27).
5.32) Unlike the Abhidharmakosābhaṣya, the Yogācārabhūmi does not contain an explanation of four types of distance (dūribhāva), including pratipakṣa. However, the Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇi on the Cintāmayīprajñā Bhūmi, immediately after a discussion of the practice of antidotes (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 230b8-231a4; T. 1579: 667a8-14), explains past dharmas as having causes that are already exhausted and svabhāvas that are already destroyed.

'das pa'i chos rgyu sphyad zin pa ṇo bo ŋid žig pa (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 231a6); 復次云何過去法。謂因已受盡。自性已滅 (T. 1579: 667a20)

The same passage explains future dharmas as not yet having received their causes and not yet having received their svabhāvas.

ma 'ōns pa'i chos rgyu ma sphyad pa / ṇo bo ŋid ma sphyad pa (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 231b5); 復次云何未來法。謂因未受自性未受 (T. 1579: 667b5-6)
5.33) Vasubandhu says that the person who achieves, after becoming detached from kānadhaṭu, the sixteenth and last moment of darśanamārga (mārgānvayajñāna), which is equivalent to the beginning of bhāvanāmārga, gives up the five preceding pariñjās while obtaining avarabhāgiyaprahāṇapariñjā.

paṇca tyajati viṭarāgacūrvi mārgānvayajñāne / sa hy avarabhāgiyaprahāṇapariñjā
lābhe pūrvikāḥ paṇca pariñjās tyajati

(Pradhan: 326.7-8; T. 1558: 113b15-17; Poussin v. 4: 118; Saṃghabhadrā identifies this as the statement of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 657b9-10] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu should have said, “the person who achieves mārgānvayajñānakṣānti [the fifteenth moment of darśanamārga],” because the first five pariñjās are actually given up at this earlier moment [T. 1562: 657b10-14].)
5.33) (I have found nothing in the Yogācārabhūmi corresponding to this argument.)
6.1) Vasubandhu objects to the Vaibhāṣika definitions of the three types of praṇā (śrutamayī, cintāmaya, bhāvānāmaya) and mentions the definitions of “other people”: śrutamayī praṇā is a determination produced by means of the speech of an authoritative person; cintāmaya praṇā is produced by logical reasoning; bhāvānāmaya praṇā is produced by samādhi.

asyaḥ tu kalpanāyāṁ cintāmaya praṇā na siddhyatity apare / yā hi nāmālambanā śrutamayī prāṇāti yā 'ṛthālambanā bhāvānāyāti / idāṁ tu lakaṣṭaṃ nāniravadyaṁ vidyate / āptavacanaprāmāṇya jātiścayāḥ śrutamaya / yuktinidhyānajaś cintāmaya / samādhiyo bhāvānāyāti

(Pradhan: 335.3-6; T. 1558: 116c17-21; Poussin v. 4: 143-144; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 669a12-16], who, according to Samghabhadra, does not understand the Viśhāṣa, and repeats the Vaibhāṣika definition given in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, according to which śrutamayī praṇā is based on name, cintāmaya praṇā is based on both object and name, and bhāvānāmaya praṇā is based only on an object, with no awareness of name [T. 1562: 669a17-b2].)
6.1) A passage from the *Paryāyasamgrahāṇī* concerning the understanding of impermanence suggests definitions of at least the first two types of *prajñā* that are very close to the definitions attributed by Vasubandhu to “other people”: *śrutamayī prajñā* is equated with understanding because knowledgeable people speak thus, and *cintāmayī prajñā* is equated with judgement. However, the definition of *bhāvanā-mayī prajñā*, which equates *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* with investigation or pondering, does not mention *samādhi*.

*kun ṭses par byed pa ni thos pa las byun ba’i ṭses rab kyis te / śes pa gṣun ba ’di skad du gṣun no ṭses bya ba’o / yaṅ dag par śes par byed pa ni bṣams pa las byun ba’o / ŋes par rtog pa ni bṣgoms pa las byun ba’i ste* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: yi 47a5-6); 又解了者。聞所成慧。諸智論者如是說故。等解了者。思所成慧。審解了者。修所成慧 (*T. 1579: 768b25-27*)
6.2) Vasubandhu rejects the Ābhidhārmikas' definitions of \textit{asāntuṣṭī} and \textit{mahecchatā}. According to them, \textit{asāntuṣṭī} is the desire to have more of what one already possesses, while \textit{mahecchatā} is the desire to get what one does not possess. But Vasubandhu says that \textit{asāntuṣṭī} is dissatisfaction with the quantity or quality of what one already possesses, while \textit{mahecchatā} is desire for things of good quality or great number that one does not possess.

\textit{evam tu yuṣyate labdhenāprāṇītenāprabhūtena paritāsāḥ}²⁷⁴ \textit{saṃtuṣṭīḥ labdhapraṇītāprabhūtecchā mahecchatā}

(Pradhan: 335.16-17; T. 1558: 117a9-12; Poussin v. 4: 145-146; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 669c5-7] and rejects it, defending the Ābhidhārmika definitions [T. 1562: 669c8-24].)

---

²⁷⁴ Hirakawa corrects this to \textit{aparidoṣo} (1973-1978, v. 1: 434), but Sakurabe and Odani leave it as it stands (1999: 72 n. 3).
6.2) (The Yogācārabhūmi does not contain any explanation of the differences between asaṃtuṣṭi and mahecchatā.)
6.3) The Buddha taught the four āryavamsas in order to stop the desire for the object of the notions of “I” and “mine.” Vasubandhu equates the object of the notion of “mine” with clothing, the object of the notion of “I” with the body, and desire with thirst.

sa evārthah punah pariśeṣeṇocyate / mamakārvastu cīvarādayo 'haṃkārvasty atma-
bhāvah / taretakah trīnā

(Pradhan: 337.4-5; T. 1558: 117b1-2; Poussin v. 4: 148; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 670c17-19] and discusses but does not attack it, except to say that the last pada of the verse, on which this is a comment, is superfluous [T. 1562: 670c19-27].)
6.3) (I have found nothing relevant in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
Some teachers say that the meditator follows his exhalation all the way to the far ends of the universe. But Vasubandhu objects: since ānāpānasmṛti is attention to things as they really are (tattvamanasikāra), this statement is illogical. (The implication seems to be that a practice such as that ascribed to those teachers would involve imagination, i.e., the adhimuktimanaskāra typically associated with practices like asubhabhāvanā, rather than observation.)

yāved vāyumanḍalam vairambhās ca vāyava ity apare / tad etat tattvamanasikāra-
tvāṁ na yuktam
(Pradhan: 340.4-5; T. 1558: 118b7-8; Poussin v. 4: 155; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 674a12-13] and, after explaining it, disagrees with Vasubandhu’s reasoning, saying that, even if what Vasubandhu suggests is true, the meditator who follows his exhalation to the ends of the universe would not thereby emerge from ānāpānasmṛti because his intention to practice ānāpānasmṛti would not be destroyed [T. 1562: 674a13-17].)
6.4) The Yogācārabhūmi does not specify the maximum distance to which the exhalation can be followed. However, the Vastusamgrahaṇī explains the relationship between ānāpānasmrī and yoniśo manasikāra, which here may be quite similar to tattvamanasikāra: the yogācāra, when he practices the four smṛtyupasthānas on the basis of ānāpānasmrī, recognizes his undestroyed internal ayoniśo manasikāra, thereby being able to destroy it and produce yoniśo manasikāra.

\[ \text{rnal 'byor pa ni dbugs rnub pa dañ 'byuñ ba dran pa la brten nas dran pa ñe bar gzig pa gzi bsgom pa na tshul bzìn yid la byed pa la brten nas nañ gi tshul bzìn ma yin pa yid la byed pa ma spañs par yod pa la yar tshul bzìn ma yin par yar dag pa ji lta ba bzìn du rab tu šes so / tshul bzìn ma yin pa yid la byed pa la tshul bzìn ma yin par šes nas kyañ tshul bzìn ma yin pa yid la byed pa spañs nas de spañ par bya ba'i phyir tshul bzìn yid la byed pa 'ba' žig gcig tu nes par sgom par byed do / de la lam gyi bzì mdo chen po lta bu ni lus la sogs pa'i chos bzì'o / rniul gyi phun po lta bu ni tshul bzìn ma yin pa yid la byed pa ste / mi brtan pa dañ / sñiñ po med pa dañ sems rmoṅs par byed pa'i phyir ro / śar dañ lho dañ nub dañ byañ gi phyogs nas 'onis pa'i 'khyogs dañ bzöm pa dañ / sñiñ rta dañ / sñiñ rta phal pa lta bu ni tshul bzìn yid la byed pa ste lus la sogs pa bzì la dmigs pa'i sgo nas 'di lta ste / rniul gyi phun po lta bu'i tshul bzìn ma yin pa yid la byed pa de gẑom pa'i phyir dañ / thams cad kyi thams cad du rgyud rnam par dag par bya ba'i phyir žugs so (Yogācārabhūmi, 'i 377a8-b4); 復次修瑜伽師。入出息念為所依止修四念住。如理作意以爲依止。於諸未斷內心所有非理作意。如實了知是爲非理。於內所有如理作意。如實了知是爲如理。既了知已於內所有非理作意一向遠離。於內所有如理作意。一向修習。為欲令彼永斷滅故。又於此中身等四法如四大路。非理作意如塵土丘。不堅牢故。不實故。迷亂心故。如理作意如四方來 oggi車車緣。身等四境界門轉能損害彼如塵土丘非理作意。亦令一切相續清淨 (T. 1579: 866c10-20)\]
6.5) Vasubandhu explains that the element dharmajñāna in the term dharmajñānakṣānti expresses the fact that this kṣānti is anāsrava. It is a case of calling something by the name of its niṣyandaphala. He compares it to the appellations “flower tree” and “fruit tree.”

anāsravajñānakṛṣṭa niṣyandena viṣeṣaṇam / dharmajñānakṛṣṭoṃ kṣāntiḥ / puspa-phalavrksavat

(Pradhan: 350.4-5; T. 1558: 121b2-4; Poussin v. 4: 180; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 683a27-29] and criticizes it, saying that Vasubandhu’s comparison is invalid, and insists that the real reason dharmajñānakṣānti is anāsrava is that it is produced immediately after the laukikāgradharmas; since they are the highest sāsrava state, what follows them must be anāsrava [T. 1562: 683a29-b9].)

6.5) (I have found nothing relevant in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
According to Vasubandhu, the kṣāntis are ānantaryamārga because they cannot be impeded from removing the prāptis of kleśas, while the jñānas are vimuktimārga because, for those who are free from the prāptis of kleśas, the prāpti of visāmyoga arises at the same time.

ānantaryamārgāḥ²⁷⁶ kṣāntayaḥ kleśaprāptivicchedaṁ praty antarayitum aśokyatvāt /
vimuktimārgas tu jñānāni / kleśaprāptivimuktānāṁ visāmyogaprāptisahotpādāt
(Pradhan: 352.13-14; T. 1558: 122a14-16; Poussin v. 4: 190; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the definition of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 690a3-5] and criticizes it, saying that, by Vasubandhu’s logic, vimuktimārga should also be called ānantarya; according to Saṅghabhadra, ānantaryamārga is so called because there is no interval between it and vimuktimārga [T. 1562: 690a5-13].)

6.6) (The Yogācārabhūmi contains several explanations that contrast ānantarya-mārga with vimuktimārga. However, these passages do not suggest that ānantarya means “without impediment.”

See the Śrāvakabhūmi:

tasya partiññābhyāsād ānantaryamārga utpadyate / kleśānām prahānāya yena prajahāti / prahiṇe ca punar vimuktiṃ sākṣātkaroti [Śrāvakabhūmi: 504.14-17]; de yons su sê sê goms par byas / ūn mons pa mams spangs pa’i phyir bar chad med pa’i lam skye bar byed ciñ des spon bar byed do / spangs pas na mnam par grol ba mjon sum du byed do [Yogācārabhūmi; wi 232b7-8]; 如是知已數修習故無間道生斷諸煩惱。名修故斷。煩惱斷已證得解脫。名修故證 [T. 1579: 476b29-c2]

tatrānantaryaṁārgabhāvanā yayā prajahāti / tatra vimuktimārgabhāvanā yayā samanantaraprahīne kleśavimuktiṃ sākṣātkaroti [Śrāvakabhūmi: 505.21-506.2]; de la bar cad med pa’i lam bsgom pa ni gan gis ūn mons pa spon bar byed pa’o / de la mnam par grol ba’i lam bsgom pa ni gan gis ūn mons pa spangs ma thag tu mnam par grol ba’i mjon sum du byed pa’o [Yogācārabhūmi; wi 233b1-2]; 無間道修者。謂由此故正斷煩惱。解脫道修者。謂由此故或斷無間證得解脫 [T. 1579: 476c19-21]

See the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇi on the Śrāvakabhūmi:

de ma thag tu spon ba ni lam gnis pa yin no / spangs ma thag pa ni lam gsum pa yin no [Yogācārabhūmi; zi 271a5]; 能無間斷。是第二道。無間斷已。是第三道 [T. 1579: 683a12]

See the Vastusaṃgrahaṇi.²⁷⁷

無間道者。謂正斷惑。解脫道者。謂斷無間心得解 [T. 1579: 881a27-29])

²⁷⁷ This section is not extant in Tibetan.
6.7) Vasubandhu rejects the opinion of “others,” who say that the sābhisaṃskārapariniṃdravāin anāgāmin reaches nirvana by a mārga the object of which is saṃskṛta, while the anabhisamksāraṇarpariniṃdravāin anāgāmin reaches nirvana by a mārga the object of which is asaṃskṛta. Instead, he quotes a sūtra that mentions the anabhisaṃskārapariniṃdravāin anāgāmin before the sābhisaṃskārapariniṃdravāin anāgāmin and says that this order is correct because the anabhisamksāraṇarpariniṃdravāin anāgāmin, being more accomplished, requires less time and no effort to attain nirvana.

sāṃskṛtāsāṃskṛtalambanamārganirvāṇād ity apare / tat tu na / ati prasāṅgāt / sūtre tv anabhisamksāraṇarpariniṃdravāi pūrvaṃ paṭhyate / tathaive ca yuṣyate / vāhyavāhimārgayor anabhisamksāraṇabhisamksārasādhvātvaḥ ayatnayaṭnaprāpitaḥ

(Pradhan: 359.5-7; T. 1558: 124b24-29; Poussin v. 4: 212; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 696c23-24] and comments on it, saying that there are also some sūtras that mention the sābhisaṃskārapariniṃdravāin anāgāmin first; therefore, there is nothing wrong with the traditional Vaibhāṣika order [T. 1562: 696c24-28].)

---

278 A note to the Kokuyaku Issaikyō translation (Bidon bu 26.2: 271 n. 30) identifies this sūtra as Saṃyuktāgama no. 821 (T. 99: 211a1-5).

279 P’u-kuang identifies this as a Sautrāntika explanation (T. 1821: 361a23).
6.7) The Śrāvakabhūmi lists the anāgāmins in the same descending order as Vasubandhu and gives similar definitions of the sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin and anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin anāgāmins.

anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin pudgalah katamah/ yo 'nabhisaṃskāreṇāprayatnenākhedena mārgaṃ saṃmukhiḥṛṣya tatropapannah parinirvāty aham ucyate anabhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin pudgalah/ sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin pudgalah katamah/ yo 'bhisaṃskāreṇa prayatnena khedamārgaṃ saṃmukhiḥṛṣya tatropapannah parinirvāty aham ucyate sābhisaṃskāraparinirvāyin pudgalah (Śrāvakabhūmi; 180.15-181.6); gaṇ̃ zag mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa med pa yoṁs su maṇi 'na ḍa' ba gaṇ̃̃ ņe na / smṛta ba / mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa med pa280 dañ̃ / 'bad pa med pa dañ̃ / ṇal ba med pa281 lam mn̄̄n du byas śiṅ̃ / der skyes nas yoṁs su maṇi 'na ḍa' ba gaṇ̃̃ yin pa ste / de ni gaṇ̃ zag mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa med pa yeōs su maṇi 'na ḍa' ba ḍa' ba žes bya'o / gaṇ̃̃ zag mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa bcas pa yeōs su maṇi 'na ḍa' ba gaṇ̃̃ ņe na / smṛta ba / mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa dañ̃ 'bad pa dañ̃ / ṇal bas lam mn̄̄n du byas śiṅ̃ / der skyes nas yoṁs su maṇi 'na ḍa' ba gaṇ̃̃ yin pa ste / de ni gaṇ̃ zag mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa bcas pa282 yeōs su maṇi 'na ḍa' ba žes bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi, vi 83b8-84a4); 云何無行般涅槃補特伽羅。謂生彼已不起加行不作功用。不由勞倦道現在前而般涅槃。是名無行般涅槃補特伽羅。謂彼生已發起加行作大功用。由極勞倦道現在前而般涅槃。是名有行般涅槃補特伽羅 (T. 1579: 425a24-29)

280 Corrected from mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa on the basis of the Derge.

281 Corrected from ṇal be med pa dañ̃ on the basis of the Derge.

282 The Derge reads gaṇ̃̃ zag mn̄̄n par 'du byed pa med pa, but this is clearly mistaken.
6.8) According to Sarvāstivāda, an anāgāmin who has experienced nirodhashamāpatti is called kāyasākṣin because he experiences it directly with his body, not with consciousness, which is lacking in this state. According to Vasubandhu, however, the anāgāmin, when he emerges from meditation, proclaims that nirodhasamāpatti is like nirvana and acquires a calmness of his conscious body that he has never before attained. He is said to experience this calmness with his body due both to his experience of obtaining a calm body during meditation and to his recognition of this calmness after emerging from meditation.

evaṃ tu bhavitavyam / sa hi tasmād vyutthāyāpratilabhāpūrvām savijñānakām kāya-
sāntim pratilabhate / yato 'syai evaṃ bhavati śaṅtā vata nirodhasamāpattir nirvān-
sadrśī vata nirodhasamāpattir iti / evam anena tasyāḥ śaṅtatvam kāyena sākṣākrtaṃ
bhavati / prāpijñāna-sākṣākriyābhīyām pratyākṣikāro hi sākṣākriyā
(Pradhan: 363.15-18; T. 1558: 126a21-25; Poussin v. 4: 224; Saṁghāthadra identifies
this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 699b12-16] and criticizes it, saying
that the term kāyasākṣin applies to the anāgāmin both during and after nirodhasamāpatti
[T. 1562: 699b16-24].)
6.8) (The *Yogācārabhūmi* does not explain why the *anāgāmin* who obtains *nirodhasamāpatti* is called *kāyasākṣīn*. However, Vasubandhu’s explanation of the term may be related to his rejection, similar to that found in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, of the reality of past and future dharmas: how can the *anāgāmin* be said to “experience directly” that which occurred in the past? The *Viniścayasamgrahāṇī* on the *Savitarkādibhūmi* contains a passage in which a person who, being very calm, has arisen from an *āryavihāra* that is similar to nirvana, is said to have arisen from *nirodhasamāpatti*. The temporal relationship between the meditation and the practitioner’s awareness of it [as indicated by the use of the perfect tense in the Tibetan translation] may be similar to that proposed by Vasubandhu.

*mchog tu rab tu ži žin mya ŋan las ’das pa dañ ’dra ba’i ’phags pa’i gnas pa las laṅgs pa ni ’di lta ste/ ’gog pa’i sṅoms par ’jug pa las laṅs so [Yogācārabhūmi; ži 152b4-5];
三從第一寂靜涅槃樂相似聖住起。謂滅盡等至 [T. 1579: 635c24-25]*)
6.9) Vasubandhu agrees with the Sautrāntikas, who say that one cannot fall from arhatship.

*arthattvād api nāsti parihiṇīr iti sautrāntikāḥ / esa eva ca nyāyaḥ / katham idaṁ gamyate / āgamād yuktītaḥ ca* (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 375.10-11 [but the whole argument continues until 377.5]; T. 1558: 130a16-130c16; Poussin 4: 258 [-265]; Saṃghabhadrā identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 711c2-6] and criticizes it in great detail [T. 1562: 711c6-716a13; I have not distinguished here between his brief quotations of Vasubandhu’s opinions and his lengthy criticisms]; Katō 1989: 78.)

Vasubandhu argues that the definition of an arhat is one whose *kleśas* are completely destroyed. This implies that the seeds of his *kleśas* are likewise destroyed, in which case it is impossible for the *kleśas* to arise again.

*yadi tāvad arhatas tadrūpaḥ pratipakṣa utpanno yena kleśā atyantam anupatti-dharmatām āpannāḥ / katham punaḥ parihiyate / atha notpannāḥ / katham kṣīnāsravo bhavati / atyantam anayoddhṛtāyām tadbājadharmatāyām akṣīnāsravo vā punaḥ katham arhan bhavatīty evam yuktīḥ* (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 376.17-20; T. 1558: 130c2-4; Poussin 4: 263-264; Saṃghabhadrā identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 715c29-716a4], and, referring to the Vaibhāṣika theory of *samyogaprāpti* and *visamyogaprāpti* [see Cox 1995: 89-92], explains how it is indeed possible to fall from arhatship [T. 1562: 716a4-13; see also Miyashita 1982].)
bcom ldan 'das kyis ji skad du dge slob dag dgra bcom pa yar tu 'di la lhag pa'i sems las byun ba bde bar gnas pa bzi po de dag las ga yin ru'na la las yongs su 'nams par na smra zhes gan gsums pa de la / gal te de'i 'nong monis pa can gyi chos thams cad kyi sa bon dag yin dag par bcom na ni / ji latar de la 'og pa'i 'nong monis pa byun bar 'gyur / gal te mi byun na ni ji latar de yongs su 'nams par 'gyur ze na / yongs su 'nams pa ni gnis po 'di dag yin te / spon ba'i yongs su 'nams pa da'n / gnas pa'i yongs su 'nams pa'o / de la spon ba'i yongs su 'nams pas ni so so'i skye bo kho na yongs su 'nams par 'gyur ro / gnas pa'i yongs su 'nams pas ni 'phags pa da'n / so so skye bo yin yongs su 'nams pa 'gyur ro / de la 'jig rten pa'i lam gyis 'nong monis pa spanis pa yin mnon du byed pa ni spon ba'i yongs su 'nams pas yongs su 'nams pa 'gyur te / gnas pa'i yongs su 'nams pas yongs su 'nams par 'gyur ba yin de yin no / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis 'nong monis pa spanis nas / de la gzan pa'i phral gyi bya ba dag la rab tu chags pa'i blo can yid la ni byed pa'i rgyus de'i mchog thugs su tshe 'di la bde bar gnas pa la sron ji ita bar phyis kyi de bzin du mnon du byed mi nus la / sa 'og pa'i 'nong monis pa ni / mnon du mi byed pa gan yin pa de ni de la na gnas pa'i yongs su 'nams par 'gyur ba yin gyi spon ba'i yongs su 'nams pa ni yin no / gal te dgra bcom pa 'nong monis pa thams cad spanis pa'i 'nong monis pa can gyi chos de dag thams cad kyi sa bon yin dag par ma bcom na ni / ji latar na dgra bcom pa sems sin tu rnam par grol ba da'n / zag pa zad par 'gyur / gal te yin dag par bcom na ni de'i sems kyi rgyud 'nong monis pa can gyi chos thams cad kyi [corrected from kyis on the basis of the Derge] sa bon med pa la tshul bzin ma yin pa yid la byed pa tsam yin 'byun bar mi 'gyur na / 'nong monis pa lta smos kyi ci dgos te / de la bas na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam gyis 'nong monis pa spanis pa la ni yin su 'nams ba med par kho'n du chud par bya'o (Yogācārabhūmi; zi 17b7-18b1); 間如世尊言。我說阿羅漢苾蕓於四種增上心法現安樂住中隨一而退。若彼一切染污種子皆已永害。云何復起下地煩惱。若不復起彼云何退。答退有二種。一者斷退。二者住退。言斷退者唯是異生。言住退者。是諸聖者亦是異生。若世間道斷諸煩惱復起現前。當知爾時斷退故退。亦是住退。若出世道斷煩惱已心營世務。不專修習如理作意。由此不能於其中間。現法樂住數起現前如先所得者亦如是。然其下地已斷煩惱不復現前。如名為住退故退。非是斷退。又若甚一切煩惱成阿羅漢。而彼一切染法種子未永害者。云何名為心善解脫阿羅漢果諸漏永盡。若永已害。於相續中永無一切染法種子。尚不應起不正思惟。況諸煩惱。是故當知由出世道斷煩惱者。定無有退 (T.1579: 584b3-19)²⁸³

²⁸³ See also the Vinīṣcayaśamgraṇaṇi on the Śrāvakabhūmi, which says that one cannot fall from the four śrāmanyaphalas: rnam par byaṅ ba'i phyogs don mthun pa'i chos rnam kyi de yongs su bstan to / dge sbyoṅ gi tshul gyi 'bras bu bzi po dag ni yin phul yin te / de dag las litu ba med pa'i phyir da'n / 'jig rten las 'das pa yin
6.10) The Vaibhāṣikas point out that the Aṅgārakṣaṇapamāsūtra says that the āryaśrāvaka can produce an akuṣāla thought. Since they identify the āryaśrāvaka with the arhat, they say that this sūtra disproves the Sautrāntika idea that one cannot fall from arhatship. Vasubandhu counters that the sūtra is actually talking about śaikṣas, who he admits can fall, not arhats, and therefore does not disprove the Sautrāntika theory.

yāvat tu cāro na supratibaddhas tāvad evaṃ carato ’pi śaikṣasyāsti saṁbhavāh
kleśotpattāv iti śaikṣa-vasthām adhikṛtyaivaṃ vacanād adoṣāḥ / pratijñāyate hi
laukikamārgapratilabdhaḥ phaladvayāt parīhāṇih

(Abhidharmaekṣaṇaḥ: 377.3-4; T. 1558: 130c11-14; Poussin 4: 265; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 719a22-26], explains it further [T. 1562: 719a26-28], criticizes Vasubandhu’s understanding of the sūtra, and concludes that the sūtra in no way undermines the Vaibhāṣika position that arhats cannot fall [T. 1562: 719a28-720a3].)

pa’i phyir ro (Yogaśārambhūmi: zi 281a2-3); 又若顯示清淨品法。謂應稱讚四沙門果。從彼決定無退墮故。或出世間故 (T.1579: 687a17-19)
6.10)  (I can find no similar argument in the Yogācārabhūmi. The Vastusāṃgrahaṇī does not comment on this sūtra.)
Abhidharmakosaḥbhasya

Chapter 6 Mārgapudgalanirdeśa

6.11) Vasubandhu quotes those who deny the possibility of fall from arhatship as saying that, while all arhats possess an immovable, pure liberation, the type of arhat called “immovable” is thus named specifically because he does not fall from meditational states, namely the ārṣṭadharmasukhavihāras. In other words, arhats may be said to be subject to fall, even though they are not subject to fall from arhatship itself. As for the immovable arhat, he is immovable with respect to the spiritual states that he has acquired but not with respect to those that he has not yet acquired or the enjoyment of the states that he has acquired.

sarvasyānāsravā vimuktir akopyā / akopyadharmavyavasthānam tu yathā tathoktam / ata etad acodyam ity aparighānāvādi

(Abhidharmakosaḥbhasya: 378.3-4; T. 1558: 131a7-9; Poussin 4: 268; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, explains it briefly [T. 1562: 721b14-19], criticizes Vasubandhu’s understanding of the various types of arhats, and concludes that Vasubandhu cannot be depended upon regarding the subject of arhats and their fall [T. 1562: 721b19-722a5].)
6.11) The Vastusamgrahani contains a passage that states that, while the only arhats who are not subject to any kind of fall are the immovable arhats, nothing can make any arhat give rise to grief and lamentation by defiling his mind.

de la rnam par grol ba rnam pa gnis ni dus dañ sbyor ba'i sdro pa dañ / bskyod du med pa'i sems rnam par grol ba'o / de la dgra bcom pa dbañ po rtul ba'i phyir 'jig rten pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa las yongs su ñams par 'gyur ba'i chos can gyis\textsuperscript{284} ni sñoms par 'jug pa'i sgrìb pa las rnam par grol ba'i phyir dus dañ sbyor ba'i sdro pa sems rnam par grol ba'ês bya ste / 'di ltar yongs su ñams par 'gyur ba'i chos can yin pas na dus su yongs su ñams par 'gyur žiin mñon sum du yan byed do / tshe 'di la bde ba la rig par gnas pas na sdro pa'ês bya'o / de la bskyod du med pa ni zag pa med pa'i lam thams cad kis rnam par grol ba ste / de ni gtan du yongs su ñams par mi 'gyur ro / gal te dgra bcom pa dbañ po rno ba'i phyir 'jig rten pa'i tiñ ne 'dzin las yongs su ñams par mi 'gyur ba'i chos can žig yin na ni de'i nes pa'i don la dus kyi don 'ês bya bar rig par bya'o / lhag ma ni shas na bzin no / de la len pa med pa dañ / yongs su yi 'chad pa med pa ni gyan la dgra bcom pa'i sems dga' bar 'gyur ba dañ gyan la rnam par 'gyur žiin gzan du 'gyur ba las de'i mya ñan la sogs pa skye bar 'gyur ba'i guqs de gcig kyab mi dmigs pa'o (Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 249a2-b1); 二解脫者。一時愛心解脫。二不動心解脫。若阿羅漢根性純故。於世間定是其退法。未能解脫所有定障故。名時愛心解脫。以退法故。時時退失。時時現前故。說名時。於現法樂有證住故。說名愛。不動心解脫者。謂阿羅漢根性利故。是不退法。一切皆以無漏道力。而得解脫。於一切種都無退失。當知此中決定義。是三昧耶義。餘如前說。無所造作無恐怖者。當知無有異類可得。令阿羅漢心。於中染彼變異故。生愁歎等 (T. 1579: 813a18-28)\textsuperscript{285}

\textsuperscript{284} Corrected from gyi on the basis of the Derge.

\textsuperscript{285} See also another passage in the Vastusamgrahani: \textit{sems rnam par grol ba ñams pa med pa ni rnam par grol ba bla na med pa ste / de rnambs bsdus pa ni ñes pa dañ / spoñ ba dañ / tshe 'di la bde bar gnas pa 'ês bya bar rig par bya'o / slob pa'i ñes pa gyan pa dañ / lam gyan pa dañ / rnam par grol ba gyan pa de dag ni bla na med pa ma yin te bla na yod pa'i phyir ro / dgra bcom pa'i lam thams cad ni mñon par ñes pa sla ba dañ myur bar rig par bya ste / gnas ñan len thams cad bcom pa dañ bya pa'is phyir ro (Yogācārabhūmi; 'i 207b7-208a1); 解脫無上者。謂不動心解脫。當知此中總說智斷現法樂住。有學妙明正行解脫。不名無上。猶有上故。當知一切阿羅漢行。皆得名為禮速通行。一切麤重永滅故。一切所作已故 (T. 1579: 796c26-797a2)
6.12) Vasubandhu says that *samādhi* is called *rddhipāda* because, since it is the fulfillment of all good qualities, it is the basis of the *rddhis*. But he quotes some people\(^{286}\) as saying that *samādhi* is in fact *rddhi*, while the *rddhipādas* are the parts of *rddhi*. Vasubandhu refutes this, saying that this would result in a list of thirteen *bodhi-pakṣyadharmaṣas*, rather than the eleven accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas.\(^{287}\) It would also contradict a *sūtra* definition of *rddhi*, according to which *rddhis* are multifold magical powers.

\[
\text{samādhiḥ kasmād rddhipāda uktāḥ / tatpratिःतपत्तिः sarvaguṇasampatteḥ / ye tv āhūḥ samādhir evaddhiḥ}\(^{288}\) pādāś chandādāya itī / teṣām dravyatas trayodāsa bodhipakṣyāḥ prāpnuvanti / chandacittayor ādikyāt sūtraṃ ca virudhyate / rddhīṃ ca vo bhikṣavo darśāisyāmi rddhipādaṃś ca yāvad rddhīḥ katamā / iha bhikṣur anekavidhām rddhivāṣayaṃ pratyamubhavati / eko bhūvyā bahudhā bhavatīti vistaraḥ (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 384.4-9; T. 1558: 132c6-11; Poussin 4: 285-6; Samghabhadra identifies this as the criticism of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 727a13-18] and refutes it, saying that the opinion referred to by Vasubandhu actually identifies both *rddhi* and the *rddhipādas* with *samādhi* [T. 1562: 727a18-b23; see Poussin 4, 286 n. 1 for a partial translation of this passage].)

---

\(^{286}\) The Vaibhāṣikas, according to the Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (602.7).

\(^{287}\) The Vaibhāṣika list of eleven *bodhipakṣyadharmaṣas* includes: prajñā, viyā, samādhi, snyit, prūt, praśrabdhi, upekṣā, śraddhā, samyaksamkalpa, samyagājīva, and samyagvāc and samyakkarmānta together as one item (Poussin v. 4: 283-284). The four *rddhipādas* are chanda, citta, viyā, and mīmāṃsa. If *samādhi* were equivalent to these four, two extra *bodhipakṣyadharmaṣas* would have to be added to the list, namely chanda and citta. Viyā is already on the list, and mīmāṃsa duplicates prajñā (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 601.31-602.10).

6.12) (I have found nothing directly relevant to this discussion in the Yogācārabhūmi. However, the explanation of the term rddhipāda in the Śrāvakabhūmi seems more similar to Vasubandhu’s than to the Vaibhāṣika explanation, since it suggests that samādhī must be perfected for the rddhis to be experienced.

kena kāraṇena rddhipāda ity ucyate / āha / tadyathā / yasya pāduḥ samvidyate / so 'bhikramapratikramaparākramasamartho bhavati / evam eva yasyaithe dharmāh samvidyante / eṣa ca samādhiḥ samvidyate / paripūrṇah sa evam pariśuddhe citte paryavadāte ana[ṇ]gane vigatopaklesē rjugbhte karmanyasthitē āni[ṇ]yaprāpte abhikramapratikraṃa[parākrama]-samartho bhavati / lokottarānāṃ dharmānāṃ prāptaye sparśanāyai / eṣā hi parā rddhiḥ parā samrddhiḥ / yad uta lokottarā dhārmāṃ tenocyante rddhipāda iti [Wayman 1961: 100; see also Śrāvakabhūmi: 321.5-14]; ci'i phyir rdzu 'phrul gyi rkāṅ pa žes bya že na / smras pa / 'di lta ste / dper na gaṅ la rkāṅ pa yod pa des / 'gro ba daṅ / ldog pa daṅ / pha rol gnon par nus pa de bzin du / gaṅ la chos de dag gaṅ yod la / tīṅ ne 'dzin de dag kyaṅ yongs su rdzog par yod ciṅ / de de ltar sems yongs su dag pa daṅ / yongs su byaṅ ba daṅ / ņon mons pa med pa daṅ / ņe ba'i ņon mons pa med pa daṅ bral ba daṅ / dran por gyur pa daṅ / las su run bar gnas pa daṅ / mi g.yo ba thob par gyur na / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnam thob par bya ba daṅ / reg par bya ba'i phyir / 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa daṅ / pha rol gnon par nus te / 'di lta ste / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos de dag ni / rdzu 'phrul dam pa daṅ / 'byor pa dam pa daṅ yin pas na / de'i phyir na rdzu 'phrul gyi rkāṅ pa žes bya'o [Yogācārabhūmi; wi 144b7-145a3]; 間何因縁故説名神足。答如有足者能往能還勝遊勇健能得證世間所有殊勝之法。世殊勝法說名為神。彼能到此故名神足。如是若有如是諸法有三摩地圓滿成辨。彼心如是清浄鮮白無瑕穢。離隨煩惱安住正直。有所堪能獲得不動能往還勝遊健。能得能證出世間法。由出世法最勝自在。是最勝神彼能證此故名神足 [T. 1579: 444a29-b8]]
According to Sarvāstivāda, *samkṛta vimuktī* is *adhimokṣa*. Vasubandhu objects, saying that, according to “other people,” this contradicts a *sūtra*. Finally, he states their opinion, that *vimuktī* cannot simply be *adhimokṣa* but must be purity of mind resulting from the elimination of rāga, etc., by means of correct knowledge.

\[\text{tasmān nādhimokṣa eva vimuktīḥ / kim tarhi / tattvajñānāpaniṭeṣu rāgādiṣu cetaso vaimalyaṇaḥ vimuktir ity apare}\]

(Pradhan: 388.13-14; T. 1558: 133c27-29; Poussin v. 4: 298; Samghabhadra identifies this statement and the appeal to *sūtra* that precedes it as the opinion of the *sūtra*-master [T. 1562: 731b5-13] and criticizes it, arguing that the Sarvāstivādin position does not contradict *sūtra* and insisting that *vimuktī* is not purity of mind but rather that which makes the mind pure and that it is in fact *adhimokṣa* [T. 1562: 731b13-c2].)
6.13) The *Bodhisattvabhiṣṭi* explains *cetovimuktī* and *prajñāvimuktī* as being the complete destruction of all impurities.

sarvāsraṇām aśeṣaṇuṣṭayaprabhāṇād yat tatpratipaksikaṁ anāśravanī cittam anāśravaṇī prajñā paramādhipitām prajñāsamgrhitā āśravātanām kṣayād anāśravā cetovimuktiḥ prajñāvimuktār ity ucyate (*Bodhisattvabhiṣṭi*: 392.8-11); *zag pa thams cads kyi bag la ŋnal ma lus par spaṅs pa’i phyir/ de’i gnen por gyur pa *zag pa med pa’i sens daṅ/ *zag pa med pa’i šes rab lhag pa’i sens daṅ/ lhag pa’i šes rab mchog gis bsduñ pa’i nag pa *rnams zad pas/ *zag pa med pa’i sens rnam par gröl ba daṅ/ *šes rab rnam par gröl ba ŋes bya’o* (*Yogācārabhūmi*: 233a2-3); 一切諸漏所有隨眠無餘永斷。達得能治勝漏心勝無漏慧。是其最勝增上心攝增上慧攝。由漏盡故說名無漏心慧解脫 (*T.* 1579: 570c18-20)
7.1) The Vaibhāsikas say that defiled (kliṣṭa) thought must be unconcentrated (asamāhita), while good (kusala) thought must be concentrated. Vasubandhu argues that this contradicts a sūtra that mentions two types of internal thought that are collected (saṃkṣipta): thought that is accompanied by both mūḍha and styāna and internal thought that is accompanied by suppression but that does not possess insight. External uncollected thought, on the other hand, is dispersed among the five objects of pleasure. Vasubandhu’s reasoning is that this sūtra mentions a type of thought that is defiled, yet concentrated.

evaṃ tu sūtraṃ nānulomitaṃ bhavati / eśāṃ ca padānāṃ nārthaviṣeṣa ukto bhavati / kathāṃ sūtraṃ nānulomitaṃ bhavati / sūtre uktam kathāṃ cittaṃ adhyātmaṃ saṃkṣiptaṃ bhavati / yac cittaṃ styānamidhīhasahagatam adhyātmaṃ saṃniruddhasahagatam no tu vipaśyayā samanvāgatam / kathāṃ bahir vikṣiptaṃ bhavati / yac cittaṃ pañcasu kāmaaguṇeṣv anuvikṣiptaṃ bhavati anuvīrtam iti

(Pradhan: 397.10-14; T. 1558: 136a21-24; Poussin v. 5: 20-21; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 739b16-19], mentions that the Pāścātvyas also refer to a sūtra\(^{289}\) that is contradicted by the Sarvāstivādin position [T. 1562: 739b19-22], and criticizes both Vasubandhu’s and the Pāścātvyas’ interpretation of sūtra [T. 1562: 739b22-c6].)

\(^{289}\) See Pradhan: 396.17-18; T. 1558: 135c27-28; Poussin v. 5: 18.
7.1) I can find no similar argument in the *Yogācārabhūmi* concerning the moral value of concentrated or unconcentrated thought. However, there is a passage in the *Asamāhitā Bhūmi* that contrasts distractedness, defined as the flowing out of thought toward the five objects of pleasure, with collectedness, defined as internal collected thought associated with *styāna* and *middha*.

\[
g\text{yen} \text{ ba'\text{i} phyir mñam par ma bžag pa'\text{i} sa yan yod de} \ '/ \text{di lta ste las danh po pa tīn ne} \\
\text{'dzin la brtson pa rnam}s \ 'dod pa'\text{i} yon tan līa \ iā sens rnam par g\text{yen} \text{ žin rjes su} \ 'jug \\
pa lta bu'o / bsdus pa'\text{i} phyir mñam par ma bžag pa'\text{i} sa yan yod de \ 'di lta ste / las danh \\
po pa tīn ne \ 'dzin la brtson pa rnam s kyi sens nañ du bsdus na / rmugs pa danh gñid \\
kys ron pa lta bu'o (Yogācārabhūmi,: dzī 182a4-5); \text{或有極散亂故名非定地。謂初} \\
\text{修定者。於妙五欲。心隨流散。或有太略聚故名非定地。謂初修定者。於内} \\
\text{略心惛睡所蔽 (T. 1579: 344b26-29)}
\]
7.2) The Vaibhāṣikas say that the sixteen aspects (ākāra) of the four truths are praṇā by nature. Vasubandhu disagrees, arguing that if they were praṇā, then two praṇās would exist simultaneously (the aspect and the praṇā that knows it), which would be impossible. Instead, he says that ākāra is the mode of perception of objects on the part of all citta and caittas. 290

evaṃ tarhi praṇā sākāra na bhaviṣyati / praṇāntarāsāmyayogā / evaṃ tu yuktān syāt / sarveṣām cittacaitānām ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra ākāra iti

(Pradhan: 401.18-19; T. 1558: 137c2-4; Poussîn v. 5: 39; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master, who, he says, is relying on “another school” [T. 1562: 741b4-5], and criticizes it, arguing that this definition of ākāra is unreasonable whether ālambanagrahaṇaprakāra is understood as the discrimination of the types of marks of objects or as the ability to grasp the distinctive marks of the object [T. 1562: 741b5-13].)

---

290 Yasomitra identifies this as a Sautrāntika opinion (Abhidharmakośavyākhyā: 629.6). In the Madhyāntavibhāgaṭikā, Sthiramati gives an almost identical definition of ākāra in a completely different context, namely an argument to the effect that things and beings have no real ākāra and thus cannot be real objects of consciousness: ākāro ālambanasyānityādīrūpeṇa grāhaṇapraṇakārah / sa cānayaḥ nāstī grāhyarūpeṇa prákhyānāt / āto 'nākāratvād agrāhakarvād ity arthaḥ (Madhyāntavibhāgaśāstra: 16.6-8; see Kochumuttom 1982: 52).

291 Corrected from praṇāntarāsāmyayogā (Sakurabe, Odani, and Honjō 2004: 14).
7.2) (The sixteen ākāras are not discussed in the Yogācārabhumi.)
7.3) Vasubandhu says that *saṃvrtijñāna* pertaining to *kāmadhātu* is wisdom produced by hearing or considering, while *saṃvṛtijñāna* pertaining to *rūpadhātu* is wisdom produced by hearing. *Saṃvṛtijñāna* is not wisdom produced by meditation because the object of wisdom produced by meditation must belong to a particular *bhūmi*. (But this *saṃvṛtijñāna* is the realization that all dharmas are *anātman*; therefore, it must encompass objects of different *bhūmis* simultaneously.) If this *saṃvṛtijñāna* were wisdom produced by meditation, it would be possible to gain detachment with respect to all *bhūmis* in a single moment, because wisdom produced by meditation has the power to produce detachment.\(^{292}\)

\[ tac ca kāmāvacaram śrutacintāmayam rūpāvacaram śrutamayam na\(^{293}\) bhāvanāmayam / tasya vyavachinnabhūmyālamabhatvat / anyathā hi yugapat sarvato vairāgyam syāt \]
(Pradhan: 405.4-6; T. 1558: 138a27-28; Poussin v. 5: 46; Saṅghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 742c21-22] and criticizes it, saying that wisdom produced by meditation gives rise to joy, not detachment, with respect to higher *bhūmis* [T. 1562: 742c22-26; see Poussin v. 5: 46-47 n. 1 for a translation of Saṅghabhadra’s opinion].)

\(^{292}\)This passage is very difficult to understand. I have relied heavily on the explanation in the note of *Kokuyaku Issaikyō* (Bidon-bu 26.2: 372 n. 120).

\(^{293}\)This *na* is missing in Pradhan’s text. I follow Hirakawa (1973-1978, v. 1: 436). All the translations include *na*.\]
7.3) (I have found nothing relevant in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
7.4) Vasubandhu objects to the Vaibhāṣika explanation that abhisamayāntika samvṛti-jñāna is “obtained because it is obtained,” and he says that this does not explain the practice of samvṛti-jñāna. Instead, he approves of the opinion of the pūrvācāryas that samvṛti-jñāna is produced due to the force of darśanamārga and is realized after emerging from darśanamārga. That is to say, in darśanamārga one obtains an āśraya that can realize samvṛti-jñāna.

yasmāl labdham tasmāl labdhām ity apūrvaiṣā nirdeśajātiḥ / tasmān naivam bhāvanā sidhyati / evaṁ tu sidhyati yad āhuḥ pūrvācāryāḥ / kathāṁ ca pūrvācāryā āhuḥ / lokottaramārgasāmarthāyām samvṛti-jñānām bhāvyate yad vyutthitaḥ satyālabdamanām viśīṣṭaram laukikam jñānam saṁmukhikaroti / esa eva ca tasya lābhō yaśoṭi sammukhi-bhāvasamar

thyuśrayalābhah / gotre hi labdhe labdham gotrikam bhavati

(Pradhan: 406.19-407.1; T. 1558: 138c2-7; Poussin v. 5: 52; Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 743b29-c4] and criticizes it, saying that obtaining an āśraya is not equivalent to realization; furthermore, such an āśraya would not persist for long enough for realization to occur [T. 1562: 743c4-13].)

294 Corrected from yat (Sakurabe, Odani, and Honjo 2004: 14).
7.4) The Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī on the Śrāvakabhūmi explains that at the time of entering darśanamārga, the seeds of good samṣaṭṭhījñāna that has previously been practiced are perfumed by īdh (darśanamārga?) and become pure. Therefore, this is called abhisamayāntika samṣaṭṭhījñāna. When one emerges from darśanamārga, one gives rise to this knowledge and one obtains liberation from the darśanaheya dharmas.²⁹⁵

²⁹⁵ Hakamaya does not identify a passage in the Yogācārabhūmi that corresponds to the position attributed to the pūrṇācāryas by Vasubandhu but suggests the possibility that a corresponding passage might be found in the Yogācāra literature (1986: 99). I believe that this is such a passage.
Abhidharmakosabhāṣya

Chapter 7 Jñānanirdeśa

7.5) Vasubandhu says that two abhijñās, namely pūrvanivāsānusmṛti and āsravakṣayajñānasākṣākṣākriyā, have the nature of all four smṛtyupasthānas.²⁹⁶

anirdhāraṇāc chese cauḥsmṛtyupasthānasvabhāve iti siddham
(Pradhan: 423.8-9; T. 1558: 143b11 Poussin v. 5: 106; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 753c22-23] and criticizes it, saying that pūrvanivāsānusmṛti only has the nature of dharmasmṛtyupasthāna [more specifically, of dharmasmṛtyupasthāna with a "mixed" object, e.g., both the nature of dharmas and the vedanā of a past life], while āsravakṣayajñānasākṣākṣākriyā can have the nature of either dharmasmṛtyupasthāna or of all four smṛtyupasthānas [T. 1562: 753c22-27].)²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶ Hsüan-tsang adds an explanation: 通縫五蘊一切境. Poussin takes this as a general explanation for both abhijñās; "because they have all five skandhas as their objects" (Poussin, v. 5: 106 n. 5). P'u-kuang, on the other hand, thinks that there are separate explanations for each abhijñā: pūrvanivāsānusmṛti is included in all four smṛtyupasthānas because its object is the five skandhas, while āsravakṣayajñānasākṣākṣākriyā is included in all four smṛtyupasthānas because its object is "everything" (宿住通四念住境. 通縫五蘊故. 潛盡通四念住境. 通縫一切境 [T. 1821: 411c2-3]). However, it is not clear to me whether P'u-kuang is accurately interpreting Vasubandhu's intention.

²⁹⁷ As P'u-kuang points out (T. 1821. 411c12-18), Saṃghabhadra's argument is based on the Vibhāṣā's refutation of Ghośaka's opinion, according to which pūrvanivāsānusmṛti has the nature of all four smṛtyupasthānas (T. 1545: 518b12-18).
7.5) (I have found nothing relevant in the Yogācārabhūmi.)
7.6) According to Vasubandhu, the two abhijñās, divyaśrota and divyacaksus, are morally indeterminate (avyākṛta) because they are wisdom associated with aural and visual consciousness. An objection is made: if these two abhijñās are associated with these two types of consciousness, they cannot pertain to all four dhyānas (and the fact that they do pertain to all four dhyānas has already been established).\footnote{298} Vasubandhu responds that the two abhijñās can be said to pertain to the four dhyānas because the sense organs on which they are based are present in the dhyānas. Or one can say that the ānantaryamārga of these abhijñās pertain to the four dhyānas.

divyacaksuḥśrotrābhijñā avyākṛte / te punaś cakṣuḥśrotravijñānasamprayuktaprajñā / katham tarhi te caturdhyānabhūmike sidhyataḥ / āśrayavaśena tadbhūminirdēsāt / tadāśraye hi cakṣuḥśrotre caturdhyānabhūmike / ānantaryamārgavaśena vā
(Pradhan: 423.6-8; T. 1558: 143b12-17; Poussin v. 5: 107; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 753c29-754a5] and criticizes it, saying that wisdom associated with aural and visual consciousness is not abhijñā, but rather is caused by abhijñā [T. 1562: 754a5-10].)

\footnote{298 See Chapter Seven verse 43cd: pañca dhyānacatuṣṭe (Pradhan: 422.1).}
According to the Vinīścayasaṅgrahāṇī on the Śrāvakabhūmi, divyaśrotra is the name for the prasādarūpa that comprises the aural sense organ that is the result of practice. The knowledge that is associated with the consciousness based on that aural sense organ is called “divyaśrotra knowledge.” The realization of that knowledge is the continuation and growth of the stream of the seeds of that knowledge, which comprise the cause of its arising.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ The Ch’eng wei-shih lun says that the scriptures say that these two abhiṣijñās are knowledge associated with visual consciousness and knowledge associated with aural consciousness (T. 1585: 29a23-24). According to the Shindōjōyuishikiron (230), the reference is to this passage in the Yogācārabhūmi. See Poussin 1928-1929: 317.

³⁰⁰ Corrected from rtag on the basis of the Derge.
8.1) Vasubandhu defines one-pointedness of thought (cittaikāratā = samādhi) as the fact that thoughts have a single object.\(^{301}\)

*keyam ekāgratā nāma / ekālambanatā*  
(Pradhan: 432.16; T. 1558: 145b1; Poussin v. 5: 128-129; Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the definition of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 756b25-26] and criticizes it, saying that it would imply that if cakṣuṣvijñāna and manovijñāna had the same object, this would be ekāgratā. According to Saṃghabhadra, samādhi is actually that which, due to its predominance, keeps in operation the continuity of good cittas and caittas [T. 1562: 756b26-c4].)\(^{302}\)

\(^{301}\) Sthiramati’s definition in the *Trīṃśikābhāṣya* echoes Vasubandhu’s: *samādhir upaparikṣye vastuni cittasyaikāratā / upaparikṣyaṁ vastu gunato doṣato vā / ekāgratā ekālambanatā* (26.5-6).

\(^{302}\) There is nothing startling about Vasubandhu’s definition here. However, Saṃghabhadra seems to be particularly sensitive because it precedes the controversy over whether samādhi is a separate dharma. His purpose here seems to be to emphasize that samādhi is more than the mere fact of the mind’s having a single object: rather, it is a separate dharma that keeps the mind focused on the object.

Poussin, following Saeki (1978: 1168), who was probably following P’u-kuang (T. 1821: 417b23), portrays the controversy as a debate between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. Nishi interprets it the same way (Kokuyoku Issaikyō Bidon-bu 26.2: 412-413). However, while Paramārtha attributes the unorthodox position that samādhi is not a separate dharma to the Sautrāntikas, both the Sanskrit and Hsüan-tsang simply mention “others.” Moreover, although Saṃghabhadra does not further discuss this issue here, elsewhere (T. 1562: 390b24-c4) he attributes the opinion that samādhi is not an independent dharma to the Sthavirins (see Katō 1989: 204). The same opinion is favored by the *Tatvasiddhiśāstra* (T. 1646: 334b29-c13). Therefore, it might be more accurate to identify this as a Dārśāntika position.

The question remains whether Vasubandhu agrees with the Sarvāstivādin position or the non-orthodox position here. He gives the last word to the Sarvāstivādins, who explain how samādhi can be a cittamahābhūmika dharma, despite the obvious fact that most moments of consciousness are not what we call samādhi. However, he does not explicitly approve or disapprove of either position.
8.1) The *Manobhūmi* defines *samādhi* as one-pointedness of thought based on reflection corresponding to an object that is to be considered.

\[\text{samādhīḥ katamāḥ} / \text{yat parikṣye vastuṇi [tatra tatra]}^{303} \text{ tad anugam upanidhyāna-} \text{samniśritaṁ cittaikāgryaṁ (Yogācārabhūmi: 60.6-7); tiṅ ne 'dzin gaṅ že na / gaṅ brtag pa'i dņos po de daṅ de la de'i rjes su'gro Ȝiṅ Ṉes par sens pa la brten nas sens rtsa gcig pa'o (Yogācārabhūmi: dzi 34a5); 三摩地云何。謂於所觀察事。隨彼彼行審慮所依心一境性 (T. 1579: 291c3-5)}\]

---

303 Added by Bhattacharya on the basis of the Tibetan.
8.2) Vasubandhu mentions the opinion of “others,” who say that there is no mental sukhenādriya in kāmabhūtā and the first three dhyānas, only physical.\(^{304}\) The Vaibhāśikas, on the other hand, say that the sukha in the first two dhyānas is not really sukhavedanā, but rather praśrabdi. This sukha cannot be bodily sukha because the five sense consciousnesses are lacking there. Nor can it be mental sukha, because prīti is already included in these states, and prīti, which is defined as saumanasya, cannot coexist with sukha. In the third dhyāna, however, sukhavedanā exists.\(^{305}\)

At the end of the long discussion of the dhyānāngas, of which the above forms a part, Vasubandhu points out that the opinions later attributed by Yasomitra to the Dārśāntikas are different from those of the pūrva-cāryas and should be examined further (Abhidharma-kosabhāṣya: 440.4-5). Yasomitra adds, “according to the teaching of the Yogācārabhūmi” (Abhidharma-kosavyākhyā: 676.7).

**apare punar āhuḥ nāsty eva caitaikam sukhenādriyam triṣv api hi dhyāneṣu kāyikam eva sukham āṅgāṃ vyavasthāpitam iti**

(Pradhan: 439.1-2; T. 1558: 147a6-7; Poussin v. 5: 151; Saṃghabhadra says that the sūtra-master, in describing the opinion of “others,” is quoting someone else’s opinion provisionally or for the sake of argument\(^{306}[T. 1562: 760b7-9])\(^{307}\)

---

\(^{304}\) Yasomitra attributes this position to the Dārśāntikas: dārśāntikānāṃ kilaiṣa paksah/teṣām hi na dvibhūmikam eva sukhenādriyam/kāmapratīnaadhyānabhūmikam iti/kim tarhi/caturbhūmikam apī sukhenādriyam bhavati/kānāvacaram yāvat trīyadhyānabhūmikam iti (Abhidharma-kosavyākhyā: 673.6-9; Poussin, v. 5: 151 n. 3). P’u-kuang, however, attributes this to Sautrāntika (T. 1821: 423a28).

\(^{305}\) See Pradhan: 438. 18-21; Poussin, v. 5: 150-151.

\(^{306}\) chia yin 假引.

\(^{307}\) Later in the same discussion (T. 1562: 761b21), Saṃghabhadra presents the Sthavira’s argument that praśrabdhī cannot be called sukha, and he concludes that this argument can be refuted in the same way as the one quoted by Vasubandhu here.
8.2) In the Samāhitā Bhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi, sukha in the first dhyāna is said to oppose dauṣṭhulya, while pṛīti is said to be the experience of a (mental) object. This seems to be in accord with the Vaibhāṣika explanation of sukha in stages lower than the third dhyāna.

*de la bṣam gi dza po'i rtsogs pa dza dpyod pa ni dmigs pa 'dzin pa'i don du'o / tin ne 'dzin de dag gi rten gyi don du'o / dga' ba ni dmigs pa myon ba'i don du'o / bde ba ni gnas rnam len bsal ba'i don du'o (Yogācārabhūmi; dзи 143b1-2)*; 初静慮中。尋伺為取所緣。三摩地為彼所依。喜為受境界。樂為除麁重 (T. 1579: 330c19-21)
8.3) Vasubandhu says that, in general, the *abhidharma* he has explained is the teaching of the Kāśmīra Vaibhāṣikas. However, he adds that he may have made mistakes in including certain things because only the Buddhas and the “sons of the Buddha” are authoritative concerning the interpretation of the Dharma.

\begin{quote}
\textit{prāyena hi kāśmīravaibhāṣikāṇāṃ nītyādisiddha esa ‘smābhīr abhidharma ākhyātaḥ / yad atrāsmābhīr durgrhiṇām so ‘smākam aparādhaḥ / saddharmanītā tu punar buddhā eva pramāṇam buddhapatrāś ca}
\end{quote}

(Pradhān: 460.1-3 T. 1558: 152b13-16; Poussin v. 5: 223; Saṁghabhadra identifies this as a statement of the general principle of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 775b18-20] and expands on it [T. 1562: 775b20-c2; see Poussin v. 5: 223 n. 1 for a translation].)\footnote{Vasubandhu mentions both the Buddha and the great disciples as authority. Saṁghabhadra says that really only the great munis, not the śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas, can judge dharmas correctly; therefore, the abhidharma must be the word of the Buddha. (But we know that Vasubandhu does not agree [Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: 3.1; Poussin, v. 1: 5-6; Abhidharmakośavākyā: 11.23-12.1].) Fa-pao explains that, for Vasubandhu, the canonical abhidharma texts are authoritative, since they were produced by the great disciples, but the Vibhāṣā, which was produced neither by the Buddha nor by the great disciples, is not (T. 1822: 803a2-7).}
8.3) The *Vivaranasaṃgrahāṇī* contains a definition of *upadeśa* in which *mātrkā* is explained and is equated with *abhidharma*.\(^{309}\) According to this passage, the Buddha’s teaching of the characteristics of *dharmas*, as well as the teaching of *śrāvakas* who are established in an understanding based on insight into the truths, are considered to be *mātrkā* and hence *abhidharma*. These *mātrkā* are necessary for a correct understanding and propagation of the characteristics of *dharmas*.\(^{310}\)

\[\text{de la gtan la bab par bstan pa}\(^{'i}\ sde)\ dag ni / mdö sde las nes par dran\(\text{pas}\(^{'i}\) ma mo gaṅ dag yin pa ste / de la nes pa\(^{'i}\) don gyi mdö sde thams cad ni ma mo žes bya’o / gaṅ du bcom ldan ‘das kyi mtshan ńid bstan pa daṅ gaṅ du ŋan thos gzi mthon bas rtops pa la gnas pas choš kyi mtshan ńid mnoṅ bar bstan pa de yaṅ ma mo yin te chos mnoṅ pa yaṅ yin no / jì ltar yig ’bru daṅ bso’i bstan bcos mams kyi da(ṅ) po yi ge’i phyi mo yin pa ltar choš kyi mtshan ńid rnam par bzaṅ pa yaṅ (dag par) rig par bya’o / jì ltar yi ge’i phyi mo med pa’i yi ge mnoṅ par mi gsal ba de bzin du mdö sde la sogs pa yaṅ lag bcu gniṅs kyṣā chos kyi mtshan ńid rnam par ma bzaṅ na mnoṅ par mi gsal ba yin gyi rnam par bzaṅ na mnoṅ par gsal bar ’gyur ro / mtshan ńid tha mi dad par brjod pa’i phyi ma mo de ŋid choš mnoṅ pa žes bya’ste / ma mo de la brten nas mdö sde gzan dag rnam par bzaṅ par byed pa gaṅ yin pa de ni gtan la bab par bstan pa’i sde žes bya’o (*Yogācārabhūmi*; yi 64b5-65a2);\(^{311}\) 論議者。謂諸經典循環研覈摩廬理迦。且如一切了義經皆名摩廬理迦。謂是處世尊自廣分別諸法體相。又於處諸聖弟子已見諦跡。依自所證無倒分別諸法體相。此亦名為摩廬理迦。即此摩廬理迦亦名阿毘達磨。猶如世間一切書算諸法等皆有摩廬理迦。當知經中循環研究諸法體相。亦復如是。又如諸字若無摩廬理迦即不明了。如是契經等十二分聖教。若不建立諸法體相。即不明了。若建立已即得明了。又無雜亂宣說法相。是故即此摩廬理迦。亦名阿毘達磨。又即依此摩廬理迦。所餘解釋諸經義者。亦名論義 (*T*. 1579: 753b9-21)

---

\(^{309}\) See item I.1.

\(^{310}\) For a similar definition of *upadeśa*, see *Abhidharmasamuccaya*: li 120b5; *T*. 1605: 686b23-24; *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*: 96.11-97.12.

\(^{311}\) Portions in parentheses are added from or corrected on the basis of the Derge.
Concordance of Passages from the Yogācārabhūmi

\( YBh \) = Bhattacharya’s text of the first five bhūmis of the Yogācārabhūmi
\( Sr Bh \) = Shukla’s text of the Śrāvakabhūmi
\( Bo Bh \) = Wogihara’s text of the Bodhisattvabhūmi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 4.15-17 )</td>
<td>dzi 3a4</td>
<td>279b6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 5.2 )</td>
<td>dzi 3a6</td>
<td>279b8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 5.12-15 )</td>
<td>dzi 3b3-6</td>
<td>279b18-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 11.14-21 )</td>
<td>dzi 6b5-7a3</td>
<td>280b13-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 14.18-15.6 )</td>
<td>dzi 8b8-9a4</td>
<td>281a22-b2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 18.16-20 )</td>
<td>dzi 11a2-4</td>
<td>282a7-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 25.20-26.2 )</td>
<td>dzi 14b3-5</td>
<td>284b19-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 26.18-20 )</td>
<td>dzi 15a5-6</td>
<td>284c10-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 50.9-16 )</td>
<td>dzi 27b3-8</td>
<td>289b13-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 53.9-15 )</td>
<td>dzi 29b4-8</td>
<td>290a17-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 60.6-7 )</td>
<td>dzi34a5</td>
<td>291c3-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 60.13-14 )</td>
<td>dzi 34b1</td>
<td>291c11-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 106.6-9 )</td>
<td>dzi 63b5-7</td>
<td>301b1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 107.20-108.2 )</td>
<td>dzi 64b5-8</td>
<td>301b28-c3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 109.19-110.7 )</td>
<td>dzi 66a3-b1</td>
<td>302a2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 110.8-12 )</td>
<td>dzi 66b1-4</td>
<td>302a10-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 111.4-5 )</td>
<td>dzi 67a3-4</td>
<td>302a25-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 118.14-119.2 )</td>
<td>dzi 71a8-b1</td>
<td>303c8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 119.17-120.3 )</td>
<td>dzi 71b8-72a4</td>
<td>303c25-304a3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 122.12-129.4 )</td>
<td>dzi 73b3-76a7</td>
<td>304b24-305b26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 124.2-3 )</td>
<td>dzi 73b6</td>
<td>304b28-c2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 127.8-13 )</td>
<td>dzi 75a1-4</td>
<td>305a10-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 127.13-18 )</td>
<td>dzi 75a4-5</td>
<td>305a16-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 127.19-128.4 )</td>
<td>dzi 75a5-8</td>
<td>305a18-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( YBh : 128.2-4 )</td>
<td>dzi 75a8-b3</td>
<td>305a24-b1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

391
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>Tibetan</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 166.16-18</td>
<td>dzi 97a8-b2</td>
<td>314b14-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 167.6</td>
<td>dzi 97b8-98a1</td>
<td>314b25-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 170.17-19</td>
<td>dzi 99b5-6</td>
<td>315a18-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 182.9-14</td>
<td>dzi 105b5-8</td>
<td>317b22-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 184.1-5</td>
<td>dzi 106b7-107a2</td>
<td>318a14-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 189.15-16</td>
<td>dzi 110a5</td>
<td>319b3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 189.19-190.1</td>
<td>dzi 110a8</td>
<td>319b7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 190.6-7</td>
<td>dzi 110b4</td>
<td>319b13-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 198.17-19</td>
<td>dzi 115b3-4</td>
<td>321a17-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 199.5-7</td>
<td>dzi 116a1-2</td>
<td>321a29-b1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 204.1-212.3</td>
<td>dzi 119a1-124a6</td>
<td>322b2-324a15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 204.10-15</td>
<td>dzi 119a5-8</td>
<td>322b11-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 214.7-10</td>
<td>dzi 125b5-7</td>
<td>324c3-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 219.8-11</td>
<td>dzi 128b7-8</td>
<td>325c10-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YBh: 221.16</td>
<td>dzi 130a6-7</td>
<td>326a27-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 139b8-140a3</td>
<td>329b22-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 143b1-2</td>
<td>330c19-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 182a4-5</td>
<td>344b26-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 211a5-6</td>
<td>354c20-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 235a6-7</td>
<td>363a2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 236b3-4</td>
<td>363a27-b1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 238a4-6</td>
<td>364a27-b1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 269a2-4</td>
<td>375b13-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 283a5-8</td>
<td>380b3-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 292a5-7</td>
<td>383c7-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 302a4</td>
<td>387b14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzi 303a7-8</td>
<td>387c19-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wi 2b1-3</td>
<td>395c24-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wi 2b6-8</td>
<td>396a6-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 18.11</td>
<td>wi 9a5-7</td>
<td>398b9-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 51.4-8</td>
<td>wi 25a6-b1</td>
<td>404c1-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 142.3-11</td>
<td>wi 68a7-b3</td>
<td>419b16-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 143.4-16</td>
<td>wi 68b6-69a4</td>
<td>419b28-c9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 180.15-181.6</td>
<td>wi 83b8-84a4</td>
<td>425a24-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 321.5-14</td>
<td>wi 144b7-145a3</td>
<td>444a29-b8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 339.16-340.1</td>
<td>wi 151b6-8</td>
<td>447a2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 341.10-12</td>
<td>wi 152a7-8</td>
<td>447a19-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 448.9-13</td>
<td>wi 203a4-5</td>
<td>467a26-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrBh: 504.14-17</td>
<td>wi 232b7-8</td>
<td>476b29-c2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śr Bh: 505.21-506.2</td>
<td>wi 233b1-2</td>
<td>476c19-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 64.23-25</td>
<td>zi 42a4-5</td>
<td>493b6-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 98.6-7</td>
<td>zi 62a6</td>
<td>501a27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 102.20-24</td>
<td>zi 65a1-3</td>
<td>502b4-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 159.3-23</td>
<td>zi 96b4-97a3</td>
<td>515c7-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 180.26-181.2</td>
<td>zi 108b2</td>
<td>521a22-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 252.19-20</td>
<td>zi 152a4-5</td>
<td>538a7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 279.6-11</td>
<td>zi 167b1-2</td>
<td>544b17-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo Bh: 392.8-11</td>
<td>zi 233a2-3</td>
<td>570c18-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 4a24</td>
<td></td>
<td>579c17-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 9b6-7</td>
<td></td>
<td>581c12-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 16a2-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>583c2-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 16b4-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>583c7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 16a6-b1</td>
<td></td>
<td>583c11-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 17a1-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>584a2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 17a5-7</td>
<td></td>
<td>584a10-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 17b7-18b1</td>
<td></td>
<td>584b3-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 19a2-b4</td>
<td></td>
<td>584c18-585a8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 20b4-21b1</td>
<td></td>
<td>585b7-c8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 20b4-6</td>
<td></td>
<td>585b7-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 21a1-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>585b19-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 21a4-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>585b27-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 21a6</td>
<td></td>
<td>585b29-c1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 21b1-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>585c9-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 21b1-24b7</td>
<td></td>
<td>585c9-586c25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 21b2-22a4</td>
<td></td>
<td>585c10-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 22a2-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>585c24-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 22a3-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>585c27-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 22a4-b1</td>
<td></td>
<td>585c29-586a8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 22b6-7</td>
<td></td>
<td>586a16-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 23a1</td>
<td></td>
<td>586a21-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 23a1-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>586a22-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 24a2</td>
<td></td>
<td>586b26-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 24a4-5</td>
<td></td>
<td>586c2-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 24b7-8</td>
<td></td>
<td>586c25-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 25a5-b2</td>
<td></td>
<td>587a10-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 25b2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>587a21-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 26a1-2</td>
<td>587b7-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 26b1-2</td>
<td>587b25-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 26b3-4</td>
<td>587b29-c2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 27a3-4</td>
<td>587c15-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 29b1-2</td>
<td>588c10-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 31a6-b4</td>
<td>589b24-c11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 31b1-4</td>
<td>589c3-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 32b2-8</td>
<td>590a13-28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 33b1-3</td>
<td>590b23-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 34a7-b4</td>
<td>590c24-29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 34b7-35a2</td>
<td>591a9-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 38a7-b1</td>
<td>592b29-c3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 38b4-6</td>
<td>592c13-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 39a3-6</td>
<td>593a1-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 39b2-5</td>
<td>593a9-25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 39b1-2</td>
<td>593a14-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 41a4-6</td>
<td>593c18-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 51a5-7</td>
<td>597b1-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 51a7-b1</td>
<td>597b4-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 51a8-b1</td>
<td>597b6-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 51b1-3</td>
<td>597b9-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 53b1-2</td>
<td>598a25-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 55a5-8</td>
<td>599a9-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 55b4-5</td>
<td>599a23-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 56a1-3</td>
<td>599b7-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 56a3</td>
<td>599b11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 58a4-6</td>
<td>600a18-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 62b1</td>
<td>602a2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 63b8-64a2</td>
<td>602b22-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 76b7-8</td>
<td>607b15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 77a8</td>
<td>607c8-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 80a4-5</td>
<td>608c16-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 83a6-b3</td>
<td>610a19-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 86b4-7</td>
<td>611b19-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 88a4-b2</td>
<td>612a15-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 97b2-8</td>
<td>615c20-616a3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 98a2</td>
<td>616a6-7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 100b3-5</td>
<td>616c26-617a1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 111b4-112a1</td>
<td>621a4-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 112b6-113a1</td>
<td>621b6-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 115b2-3</td>
<td>622a26-28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 116a3-4</td>
<td>622b15-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 118a8-b3</td>
<td>623a20-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 118b8-119a3</td>
<td>623b6-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 121a4-b3</td>
<td>624a15-28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 121b3-122a2</td>
<td>624a29-b14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 122b8-123a2</td>
<td>624c12-15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 144a8-b1</td>
<td>633b27-29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 152a3-4</td>
<td>635c5-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 152b4-5</td>
<td>635c24-25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 153b3</td>
<td>636a29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 174b3-4</td>
<td>644c8-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 179a3</td>
<td>646c9-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 189b1-3</td>
<td>651b13-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 208a1-2</td>
<td>659a7-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 208a4-6</td>
<td>659a12-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 208a7</td>
<td>659a16-17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 215a5-6</td>
<td>661b26-29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 229a3-b1</td>
<td>666b13-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 230b8-231a4</td>
<td>667a8-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 231a6</td>
<td>667a20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 231b5</td>
<td>667b5-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 267b7-268a3</td>
<td>681c5-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 270b4-5</td>
<td>682c20-23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 271a5</td>
<td>683a12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zi 281a2-3</td>
<td>687a17-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’i 67b6-7</td>
<td>721b4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’i 74b6-75a3</td>
<td>724a3-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’i 100b6-101a1</td>
<td>733c16-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’i 101a2-3</td>
<td>733c23-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>751a24-b1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yi 64b5-65a2</td>
<td>753b9-21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yi 64b6-7</td>
<td>753b10-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yi 47a5-6</td>
<td>768b25-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yi 51b3-52a2</td>
<td>770b9-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yi 54b2-6</td>
<td>771b26-c8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’i 162a5-7</td>
<td>779c10-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’i 201a2-b2</td>
<td>794b6-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>’i 204b8-205a4</td>
<td>795c22-29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanskrit</td>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 207a3-4</td>
<td>796c2-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 207b7-208a1</td>
<td>796c26-797a2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 249a2-b1</td>
<td>813a18-28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 269a3-270a3</td>
<td>821a19-b21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 269a8-b1</td>
<td>821a29-b2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 282b4-283a1</td>
<td>826b12-23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 285b7-286a1</td>
<td>827c29-828a2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 287b5-6</td>
<td>828c9-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 299b8</td>
<td>833c9-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 314b2-315a2</td>
<td>840a12-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 340b5-8</td>
<td>851a3-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'i 377a8-b4</td>
<td>866c10-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>869b6-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>879a5-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>879a14-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>879a18-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>880c14-16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography

Chinese Sources

A p’i-t’an hsin lun 阿毘毘心論 (*Abhidharmahṛdaya or *Abhidharmasāra). T. 1550.
A p’i-t’an hsin lun ching 阿毘毘心論經 (*Abhidharmahṛdaya[sūtra]). T. 1551.
Ch’eng shih lun 成實論 (*Tattvasiddhiśāstra). T. 1646.
Chü-she lun chi 俱舍論記. By Pu-kuang 普光. T. 1821.
Chü-she lun shu 俱舍論疏. By Fa-pao 法寳. T. 1822.
Chüeh-ting tsang lun 決定藏論. Translated by Paramārtha. T. 1584.
I pu-tsung lun lun 異部宗輪論 (Samayabhedoparacanacakra). By Vasumitra.
Translated by Hsüan-tsang. T. 2031.
Shih-sung lü 十誡律 (Sarvāstivādavinaya). T. 1435.
Tsa a-han ching 雜阿含經 (Sāṃyuktāgama). T. 99.
Tsa a-p’i-t’an hsin lun 雜阿毘毘心論 (*Sāṃyuktābhidharmahrdaya). T. 1552.

Sanskrit and Pāli Sources


397
Abhidharmaśavyākyā. Edited by U. Wogihara. Tokyo: Sankibo Buddhist
Abhidharmasamuccaya: "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga."
Edited by V. V. Gokhale. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society: Bombay
Bodhisattvabhūmi: A Statement of Whole Course of the Bodhisattva (Being Fifteenth
Section of Yogācārabhūmi). Edited by Unrai Wogihara. Tokyo: Sankibo
Madhyānta-vibhāga-sāstra: Containing the Kārikās of Maitreya. Bhaśya of
Vasubandhu, and Tīkā by Sthiramati. Edited by Ramchandra Pandeya. Delhi:
Yogācārabhūmi. Edited by Vidhushekara Bhattacharya. Part I. Calcutta: University
of Calcutta, 1957.

Tibetan Sources (Cited by Sanskrit title)

Abhidharmaśabhyāsa. Peking Bstan 'gyur 5591 (mdo 'grel gu).
Pañcaskandhaparakarana. Peking Bstan 'gyur 5560 (mdo 'grel si).
SamdhinirmocanaSūtra: L’explication des mystères. Edited and translated by Étienne
Lamotte. Recueil de travaux publiés par les membres des Conférences
d’Histoire et de Philologie 2/34. Louvain: Université de Louvain, 1935.
Yogācārabhūmi:
Peking Bstan 'gyur 5536-5543 (mdo 'grel dži, wi, źi, 'i, yi)
Derge Bstan 'gyur (University of Tokyo edition) 4035-4042 (tshi, dži, wi, źi, 'i)

Miscellaneous

Kokuyaku Issaikyō 国譯一切經. Bidon-bu 25-26 (Japanese translation of
Abhidharmaśabhyāsa).
Kokuyaku Issaikyō 国譯一切經. Bidon-bu 27-30 (Japanese translation of
*Nyāyānusāra).

Modern Works


“Rūpa and the antarābhava.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 28. 3 (June 2000): 235-272. [2000a]


----------


----------


----------


----------


----------


----------


----------


First Indian edition (First edition: Japan, 1980).


Index

Several terms, such as Abhidharmaśabhaśya, *Nyāyānusāra, Poussin, Pradhan, Samghabhadra, sūtra-master, Vasubandhu, and Yogācārabhūmi, occur very frequently in the body of the book. Therefore, only occurrences in the introduction have been indexed.

Ābhāsvara gods 136-137
abhidharma xiii, xvii, xix-xxi, xxvi, xxx, xxxvii, 2-3, 154, 224, 388-389 407
Abhidharmadīpa xxi, xxv, xxvii, 36, 42
*Abhidharmaḥṛdaya xxi-xxii, 48
*Abhidharmaḥṛdayasāstra xxi
Abhidharmaśabhaśya vii, xii, xx-xiii, xxiv-xxxii, xxxiv, xxxvi
Abhidharmaśavyākhyā xxi, xxiv, xxxv, 44, 126, 160, 162, 164, 186, 196, 202, 204, 230, 250, 256, 284, 302, 336, 368, 374, 386, 388
Abhidharmāṃṣṭa 48
abhidharmapīṭaka 2
Abhidharmasamuccaya xii, xiii, 77, 103, 389
Abhidharmasamuccayahāṣṭya 262, 389
Ābhidhārmika 132, 154, 202, 206, 240, 348
abhidyā 250-251
abhijñā 380, 382-10
abhikṣa 230
*abhiniṛvṛtti 75
abhisaṃvyāntikasamvyṛtijñāna 378-379
abhisaṃskāralakṣaṇa 185
abhūtapaṇikaṃśa xiii, xviii
acintya 335
Acittikā Bhūmi xv
adhimokṣa 370
adhımuktimanaskāra 352
adhipatipāhala 267
adhiṣṭhāna 314
ādhiṣṭhānikiṛddhi xxxvii, 140
advēṣa 47
ährikya 48-49
ājñātāvṛndīrya 36, 38-39
ājñendriya 36, 38-39
ākāra 374-375
ākāśa 19, 32, 115-117
akśīṣa 258
akṣiṣṭāvyākṛta mithyājñāna 292
ākṣepaheta 132-133
ākṣualayā 128, 131, 292-293, 364
ākṣurala dharma 128
ākṣulamāla 248
ālambanagrahaṇapakāra 374
ālayavijñāna xiii, xvii-xix, xx-xxx, xxxiv, xxxvi-xxxvii, 21, 67, 145, 203
alobha 47
anohā 47
anabhisamkāraparatanirvāyin anāgāmin 358-359
anāgāmin 360-361
anājñāamājñāsyamānīrya 36, 38-39
ānantarya 356-357
ānantaryaṅkāra 220
ānantaryāmārga 38, 356-357, 382
ānāpānasmṛti 352-353
anapatrāpya 48-49
anāśra 130, 145, 188-189, 354
anāśravacitta 204
anāśravindriya 36-38
anāśravadharma 108
anāśravaratā 188
anātman 376
āṅga 152
Angārakarsūpasūtrasūtra 364
anityatā 82-83
anitagrāhārṣṭi 149, 290
antarābhava xxvii, 136, 142-143, 186
daññika 172
darśana 280
darśanaheya 38, 63, 206, 208, 280-281, 379
darśanaheyaakteśa 38, 281
darśanamārga 344, 378-379
Dārṣṭāntika xxvi-xxix, 32, 250, 312, 384, 386
Daśabhūmikaśāstra xxiv
daśṭhulya 387
Deleanu, Florin xi
Dessein, Bart xxi-xxii
dharma 128
Dharmadharmatāvibhāga xii, xxiv
dharmadhātu 38-29
dharmajñāna 354
dharmajñānakāśānti 280, 354
dharmakāya 221
dharmapavicaya 2, 212
Dharmaskandha xx
dharmasāṁtyupasthāna 380
Dharmaśīri xii, 48, 270
dharmaśītyatā xi
dharmatāta 190-191
dharmatāyukti 191
Dharmatatrāta 2, 32
dhātu 12, 16-18, 22
Dhātukāya xx
dhyāna 129, 210, 212, 382, 386-387
dhyānabhūmi 210
dhyānāṅgā 212, 386
dhyānasamvara 211, 244-245
dīghāgabbha 35
Dīpakāra xxxvii
dīvacyākṣyas 382
dīvyaśrotra 382-383
dravya 182, 272
dṛṣṭadharmasukhavīhāra 38, 39, 366
dṛṣṭam 252-253
dṛṣṭi 131, 263, 284, 290, 292
duḥkha 284, 286, 336
duḥkhasaṭya 284
dūrībhāva 340, 343
Ekāgathābhāṣya xxvi
ekāgratā 384
Fe-pao 法寶 xxii, 164, 388
Frauwallner, Erich xx, xxiv-xxv
Fukuda Takami xxv, 122, 145
Fukuhara Ryōgon xx, 5, 15
Funahashi Issai xx, 198, 228, 230, 244, 252, 254

gambhīra 335
gandha 22
gandhadhātu 22-23
Gāthārthasaṁgrahaḥāstātra xxvi
Gāthāsāṁgrahaḥ xxv
Gāthāsāṁgrahaḥāstātra xxv-xxvi
gati 136
Ghoṣaka 380
ghrāṇa 22
ghrāṇavijñānadhātu 22
goṭra 237
graha 126
Griffiths, Paul xxiv-xxv

Hakamaya Noriaki xii, xvi-xvii, xix, xxv, xxvii, 190, 252, 293, 379
Harada Wasō xxv, xxvii-xxviii
Harivarman xxvii
hetū 108, 139
hetupalasadvāda 323, 327
Hirakawa Akira xiv, xvii-xix, 3, 5, 70, 154, 228, 252, 254, 334, 348, 354, 356, 368, 376
Hinayāna xi, xxvii
Honjō Yoshifumi xx, 318
hri 22
Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun 顯揚聖教論 xii-xiii, 77, 103, 105, 119, 267
Hsüan-tsang 玄奘 xii, xiv, xx, xxii, xxvi, xxxi-xxxii, 110, 204, 295, 380, 384
Hui-hsiang 慧祥 xxiv

indriya 36-37, 39, 65, 176, 246
I-pu-tsung lun lun 異部宗輪論 xxvi
Iwamoto Akemi xxv

Jaini, P.S. xxiv-xxvii, 42
jana[kaprataya 308
jarā 79, 83, 87, 92-93
jāti 71, 73, 75, 79, 82-83, 86-87, 169, 297
jihvā 22
jihvāvijñānasadhvātu 22
Jinaputra xvi
jīvātendriya xxxvi, 42-43, 68-69, 132-133
jñāna 356
Jñānaprasthāna xx-xxi, 104, 106

Kajiyma Yuichi xxiv-xxv
kāmadhātu 129, 145, 256, 290, 344, 376, 386
kāmavairāgya 128
Kandō Abidatsumakusharon 冠導阿毘達磨倉舍論 xxii
kārita 88, 92, 122-123, 294-296
karma xix, xxvii-xxix, xxxvi, 42, 68-69, 111, 133, 184-185, 191, 199, 204, 250-251, 266-267, 322
*karmabija 305, 321
ekarmapatha xxix, 198, 251, 256, 258, 260, 262
Karmasiddhiprakaranā xii, xxiv-xxvi, xxviii, 185
kāryakāraṇayukta 123
kaśāya 170-171
Kāśmīra Vaibhāsika xxi, xxx, 230, 240, 388
Kathāvatthu 42
Katō Junshō xi, xxvii, 32, 362
Kātyāyanīputra 2
kavaḍikārāhāra 22
kāya 185, 282
kāyābhīṣaṁskāra 185
kāyakarma 184-185
kāyasākṣin 360-361
kāyavijñānapī 182-184
kāyendriya 36
Keenan, John xiii
kīla 32
kleśa xix, 38-39, 52, 119, 129, 148, 203,
klīṣa 136, 372
klīṣṭamanas xix, 293
Kochumuttom, Thomas xxiv-xxv, 34, 374
Kośākāra xxv-xxvi
kṣaṇa 168-169, 172
*kṣaṇajāti 169
kṣaṇika 172, 175
kṣaṇi 354, 356
kṣetra 139
K'uēi-chī 寂基 xxiv, xxvi
Kumāralāta xxvi
kuśalajñāta 164
kuśala 136, 204, 372
kuśalacātita 130-131
kuśaladharmaḥchanda 39
kuśalamahābhūmikā 46
kuśalamūla 54-55, 126-127, 245, 248, 262
La Vallée Poussin, Louis de xx, xxii, xxviii-xxx
*lakṣaṇārthā 95
Lamotte, Étienne xxviii
laukika 166
laukkacita 222
laukkāgradharma 354
laukkamārga 52, 129, 364
laukkasamādhi 189
lokottara 63
lokottarasamādhi 189
Māḍhyamika xxvi
Madhyāntaviḥāga xii, xxiv-xxv
Madhyāntaviḥāgaśāstra 374
Madhyāntaviḥāgaśāti 374
mahābhūmikā āṭhāna 47
mahābhūta xxxv, 10-11, 44-45, 65, 189
Mahāsāṃghika 42, 136, 158
*Mahāvibhāṣā xxi
Mahāyāna xi-xii, xvii, xix, xxi-xxii, xxiv-xxvii, xxix, xxxiv, xxxvii, 32, 42
Mahāyānābhidharmasūtra xii
Mahāyānasamgraha xii-xiii. xxiv
Mahāyānasūtrakārikā xii, xxiv mahācchātā 348-349
Mahāsāṃghika xix-xx
Maitreya xii-xiii, xvii-xviii, xxvi
Majjhimagātā 235
māna 149
manas 21
manaskāra 46-47
manovijñāna 308
Manobhūmi xv, xxvii, xxxiii, 21, 35, 47, 55, 111, 127, 185, 253, 279, 385
manopavicāra 166
manovijñāna 21, 24, 47, 309, 384
manovijñāpati 184
marana 73
mārga 130, 212, 246, 284, 286, 358-359
mārgadāsīn 236-237, 242
mārgāṅga 212
mārgāṅgavaiṣṭāna 344
mārgāṅgavaiṣṭānasāntī 344
matam 154, 162, 186, 252-253
māṭrīka 3, 389
*Māṭrēkāvastu xvii
Mātanga Kazunobu xiii-xiv, xvi, xxv, 5, 187, 189
Maulī Bhūmi xiii, xv-xviii, xxxiii-xxxiv, 267
Mejor, Marek xxii, xxiv-xxv
middha 372-373
mimāṃsā 368
mithyādṛṣṭi xix, 149, 208, 250-251, 262-263
mithyājñāna 290
Miyashita Seiki xxvii, 265, 362
Mochizuki Shinkō 214, 230
Mukai Akira xvii, 85, 139, 161, 298, 305, 309, 317
mula-ccheda 248
Mūlasarvāstivādin xi
muni 388
Muroji Gijin xxv
Nagao Gijin xxv
nāma 94, 96-98, 100, 102
nāmakāya 95, 103
nāmāraṇā pa xxxv, 58
Nanda 84
nikāyasabhāga 68, 120, 132-133, 244
nirodhā 286, 340
nirodhasamāpatti 66-67, 360-361
nirodhasatya 289
nirukti portion of the pratitya-
samutpāda exposition 159
Nirupadhiṅkā Bhūmi xv
nirupadhiṅkāsamirvāna 39, 111
nirvāna 108, 308, 358, 360-361
Nishi Giyū xx, 384
nityandaphala 262, 266-267, 354
nītārtha 156, 230
nitya-drṣṭi 290
*Nyāyānusāra xii, xxi-xxii, xxxi-xxxii
Odani Nobuchiyo xx
ogha 338
pada 94, 102
padakāya 95, 103
pākā 110
Pañcasāntikā xii, xxiv-xxvi, 22, 48
Pañcacāvijñānākāya samprayuktā Bhūmi xii, xxxiii, xxxv, 47, 177
Pañcopādānasandhika 282
pārajika 231, 233, 235, 240-241, 245
Paramārtha xi, xvi, xx, xxii, xxiv-xxv, xxvii, 36, 110, 204, 295, 384
paramārtha 220
Paramārthagāthā xxxvi, 33
Paramārthasaptatikā xxiv
Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra 304-305
paraṭantra-svabhāva xix
parijñā 344
parikalpitasvabhāva xix
*parikalpitasvabhāvalakṣāṇa 95
parināma 190
parināmaviśeṣa 190
parinīṣpattasvabhāva xix
paryavasthāna xxxv, 55, 127, 231, 233, 272-273, 276, 333
Paryāyasamgrahaṇi xvi, xxxiii, 29, 239,347
Pāsādika (Bhikkhu) 44, 84, 235, 304, 318, 328
Pāścattya 372
pen-wu-ku-hu 本無今有 83
P'o-su-p' an-tou-fa-shih chuan 婆蘇槃
dō fāshí tí xii
Poussin See La Vallée Poussin, Louis
P'u-khuang 普光 xxii, 12, 136, 158, 164, 185, 220, 244, 252, 260, 328, 342, 358, 380, 384, 386
phala 110-111, 154, 246, 322-323
*phalaprajñāpti 119
Pradhan, P. xx, xxii, xxviii-xvi
prahiṇakleśa 52
prajñā 119, 164-165, 263, 346-347, 368, 371, 374
prajñāpti xxxiv-xxxv, 5, 12, 19, 51, 54, 66-67, 69, 95, 102, 117, 121, 133, 169, 176-177, 180-183, 187, 218, 273, 328
Prajñāptiśāstra xx
prajñāvimuktii 371
prajñendriya 37
Prakaraṇapāda xx
prapañca 189
prāpti xxxiv, 38, 50-51, 126, 128, 356
prasādarāpa 383
praśrādhi 368, 386
pratīgha 149, 180
pratimoksassamvara 231
pratipakṣa 340, 343, 362
pratipannakamārga 246
samskrtadharma 5, 72-73, 77, 80, 83, 87-88, 93, 95, 133, 154, 169, 194
samsktalakṣaṇa 70-73, 75, 79-81, 84, 86, 88-89, 169, 174, 297
samsțhānaratop 176, 176-183, 188
samtina 194, 196, 198-199, 240, See also samatati
samtinaviśeṣa 198
samtatati 62, 190-191, 304-305, 321
samtatiparināma 198, 320
samtatiparināvīśeṣa xxi, xxviii-xxx, 60, 110, 198
*samtatishiti 75
samuccchinnakusalamūla 54-55, 127
samudaya 286
samudayasyataya 287
samvara 210, 215, 226, 228, 245, 248
*samvararūpa xxxiv, 5, 187
samvitiṇāna 376, 378-379
samagajīva 200, 368
samagṛhiṣṭi 202, 212
samagṛhiṣṭa 200, 202, 368
samagrhāta 200, 368
samyaksamkalpa 368
samyogaprapti 362
Sāmyukta-gama 139
*Sāmyukta-bhūmikā-samadhyāya xx, xxvii, 28, 48
Sāmyukta-gama xvii, 44, 84, 139, 161, 209, 304, 318, 328, 358
Sāṅgītīparīyāya xx
sapradesa 35
śarīra portion of the prātiṣṭhī-
samutpāda expositions 153
Sarvāstivāda xi-xii, xix-xii, xxvi-
xxxii, xxxvii, 122, 186, 214, 256,
286, 340, 360, 370
sarvāstivāda x, xxxiv, 298, 323, 328
Sarvāstivādin xix-xxii, xxvi, xxviii, xxx, xxxii, xxxiv, 50, 90, 97,
99, 118, 151, 154, 178, 182, 184,
186, 188, 190, 196, 198, 200, 208,
212, 214, 218, 220, 226, 228, 230,
240, 250, 252, 270, 276, 278, 284,
286, 290, 298, 308, 312, 314, 316,
326, 328, 332, 335, 339-340, 370,
372
Sarvāstivādin Vinaya 235
sāsra 189, 204, 210, 354
sāsra āryamārga 237
sar 282, 318
Sataśāstra xxiv
sattkāya 282
sattvadṛṣṭi 131, 149, 282-283, 290,
292-293
sattvadhṛṣṭi 290
saumanasya 386
Sauryodayika xxix
Sautrāntika xi-xii, xxi-xxii, xxv-xxx,
xxxii, xxxvi, 12, 32, 36, 44, 62,
70, 114, 117, 136, 176, 182, 184,
186, 190, 200, 220, 240, 250, 252,
272, 298, 320, 328, 358, 362, 364,
374, 384, 386
Savitarkā Savicārā Bhūmi xiii
Savitarkādi-bhūmi xiii, xv, xxvii-xxix,
xxxiii-xxxv, 29, 61, 111, 123, 131,
133, 145, 149, 153, 155, 157, 159,
161, 163, 185, 191, 251-252, 267,
273, 281, 287, 289, 293, 298, 305,
315, 317, 319, 321, 323, 327, 329,
333, 361
Schmithausen, Lambert xi-xiii, xv-
xxix, xxiv-xxv, xxix, xxxiv, 21, 29,
67, 111, 131, 135, 145, 149, 203,
279, 293
Shastri, Swami Dwarkidas xx, 70
Shen-t’ai 神泰 xxii
Shih-sung lü 什謙律 235
Shindōjōyuishikiron 新導唯識論 267,
383
Shukla, Karuneshya xv, 25, 237, 239
śikṣā 245
śīla 242
śīlasamvara 233
śīlavrataparāmarśa 149, 284, 286-287,
289
Silk, Jonathan xv
skandha xxxv, 12-19, 148, 150-151,
282, 380
Vasubandhu the elder xxiv
Vasumitra xi, xix, xxvi
Vasumitra (traditional abhidharma
teacher) 154, 294
vedanā 166, 380
Vibhāṣa xx-xxii; xxvii-xxviii, 10, 14,
18, 20, 22, 28, 32, 36, 42, 44, 48,
102, 140, 154, 204, 235, 237, 240,
262, 346, 380, 388
vicāra 24-25
vicikitsā 149
vijñāna 65, 138-139
Vijñānakāya xx
vijñānakṣanda 138
vijñānasthiti 136, 138-139
vijñāpāta 8, 95, 196, 206, 208, 256
vijñāpattikarma 204, 206
vijñāpattinātra xvii, xxviii, xxxvii
vijñāprīpta xxvii, 8
vijñāśāst 252-254
vikalpita satkāyadrṣṭi 292
Viṃśatikā xii, xxiv-xxvi, xxix, 34
vimukti 357, 370
vimuktimārga 38, 356-357
Vinaya 230, 233
*Vīnayasaṃgrahāṇi xvi-xvii
*Vīnayavastu xvii
viniścaya xvi
Viniścayasamgrahaṇī xiii-xiv, xvi-
xix, xxvii-xxviii, xxxiii-xxxvi, 5,
13, 15, 19, 21, 23, 33, 35, 37, 39,
43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 57, 59, 63,
65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 83, 87, 93,
95, 101, 103, 111, 117, 121, 123,
129, 131, 133, 143, 145, 147, 155,
165, 169, 175, 177, 181, 185, 187,
189, 199, 203, 211, 215, 221, 227,
245, 251, 263, 267, 273, 279, 281,
287, 289, 293, 295, 297-299, 303,
305, 309, 315, 321, 333, 335, 343,
357, 361, 363, 379, 383
vipāka xxvii, 42-43, 110
vipākahetu 108, 110
vipākājajīva 204
vipākaphala 111
vipākaviṇāṇa 111
viparyāsa 149
viparyāsāma 149
viparyāsanīvyande 149
virodhahetu 267
vīrya 46-47, 368
visamyojaprāpti 38, 356, 362
viśaya 28
viśeṣa 190
viṣṭā satkārasantaḥ pravartate 61,
191
vītartha 24-27, 185
*Vivaranasaṃgrahāṇi xvi, xxxiii, 3, 95,
389
Vyākhyāyukta xii, xxiv-xxvi
vyāna 94, 100, 102
Vyaṇjanakāya 103
vyājanakāya 95
vyāpāda 250-251
vyāya 82, 86-87, 169, 297
Vṛddhācāra Vasubandhu xxiv
vīrendriya 37
wai-ko chu shih 外國諸師 240
Waldron, William xix
Wayman, Alex xiii, xv-xix, xxiv-xxv,
25, 33, 123, 193, 369
Willemen, Charles 48
Willemen, Dessein, and Cox xx-xxii
wo-ko chu shih 我國諸師 240
Yamabe Nobuyoshi xi, xix, xxvii, xxix,
xxxiv, 59, 61, 65, 117, 214, 217,
230, 252
Yamaguchi Susumu xx
Yaśomintra xxi, 44, 70, 126, 164, 250,
304, 336, 374, 386
yoga 186, 188, 338-339
Yogācāra xi-xii, xviii-xix, xxii, xxiv,
xxvi-xxx, xxiii, xxvii, 47, 190, 379
yogācāra 188, 353
yogācarāh 186
Yogācārabhūmi vii, xii-xx, xxvi-xxxvii
yoniṣo manasikāra 353
Yü-ch‘ieh shih-ti lun shih 瑜伽師地論
释 xvi
yü-ch‘ieh lun 瑜伽論 252
Yü-chieh-lun chi 瑜伽論記 xxix