The Resolve to Become a Buddha

A Study of the Bodhicitta Concept in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism

Dorji Wangchuk

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In memory of my mother

g. Yang-sgron

(1931–1989)
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Obeisance to bodhicitta,
That which averts all bad destinies,
Shows the way to good destinies,
And leads [one] to [a state where there is] no aging and dying.

– Maitreyaparipṛcchāsūtra

My interest in Buddhism goes back to my high school days when I was introduced to a Bhutanese commentary on a small text popularly known by its abbreviated title rGyal sras lag len (‘Deeds of a Bodhisattva’). The basic text was authored by the Tibetan scholar dNgul-chu Thogs-med-bzang-po (1295–1369), who is believed to have been the incarnation of the Indian teacher Asaṅga. The commentary by the Bhutanese scholar mGon-po-bstan-'dzin, written in a very elegant rDzong-kha (the national language of Bhutan), was prescribed, however, as a textbook on the Bhutanese language, not on Buddhism. The theme of these texts, the bodhisattva ideals, fascinated me, so much so that it became increasingly clear that what I wanted to study after my high school graduation was Buddhist philosophy (in the broadest sense of the term).

Given the poor prospects back then of pursuing an academic study of Buddhism in Bhutan, the only viable alternative seemed to be to go to India. In the olden days, Tibetans travelled to India and Bhutanese to Tibet to study Buddhism, both of which were precarious undertakings. Ironically, Tibet’s tragedy enabled Bhutanese like myself easy and unrestricted access to the intellectual world of Tibet. The Tibetan Buddhist monastic seminars that made this possible for me is my traditional alma mater, Ngagyur Nyingma Institute (NNI), a stronghold of rNyung-ma academia at Bylakuppe (Mysore District, Karnataka State, South India). It was established and is still being administered by His Holiness Padma-nor-bu (or simply Pad-nor) Rin-po-che (b. 1932), one of the leading rNyung-ma masters of our time. My study in India would not have been possible had it not been for His Excellency Jigme Thinley, the then director general of the Department of Education, Ministry of Social Services, Royal Government of Bhutan, who in 1987 granted me a Government scholarship to study Buddhism at the Ngagyur Nyingma Institute. Until this day, I remain grateful to the

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1 Maitreyaparipṛcchāsūtra (T, fol. 195a4–5; D, fol. 114a4–5):
   ngan 'gro thams cad zlog bgyid cing ||
   mtho ris lam ni rab ston la ||
   rga shi med par 'dren bgyid pa ||
   byang chub sms bs phyag 'tshal lo ||.
Bhutanese Government and His Excellency Jigme Thinley, who is currently the minister of Home and Cultural Affairs.

I have incurred an unrepayable debt to Pad-nor Rin-po-che, who, in his infinite graciousness and compassion, allowed unrestricted access to the spiritual, intellectual, and material resources that abound in the monastic academy founded by him in 1978. I am also indebted to my astute and compassionate teachers at the NNI including mKhan-po Pads-mes-rab, mKhan-po rNam-grol-tshe-ring, mKhan-po Tshe-dbang-rgya-mtsho (alias mKhan-po Gu-ru), mKhan-po dBang-phug-bsod-nams, mKhan-po Tshe-ring-rdo-rje, mKhan-po 'Jam-dbyangs-tshe-ring (alias mKhan-po Kātyāyana), mKhan-po 'Jigs-med-skal-bzang, mKhan-po bKra-shis-tshe-ring (alias mKhan-po Nub-ri), mKhan-po Padma-chos-'pel (alias mKhan-po Ajita), mKhan-po Sangs-rgyas-rang-byung, mKhan-po rDo-rje-dpal-bzang, mKhan-po Kun-bzang-bde-chen, and others who have been instrumental in introducing me to the major Indian treatises translated into Tibetan, centring on Vinaya, Abhidharmac, Pramāṇa, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, Prajñāpāramitā, Tathāgatagarbha, and Tantra, together with their Tibetan commentaries, and a wide range of other traditional fields of knowledge and texts of different literary genres. My gratefulness also extends to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, mKhan-po 'Jigs-med-phun-tshogs (1933–2004), sMyo-shul mKhan-po (1931–1999), Mesmes Bla-ma bSod-bams-bzang-po (1892–1983), sTag-lung rTse-sprul Rin-po-che, sMin-gling Khri-chen, gDung-sras Phrin-las-nor-bu, and Bla-ma Ser-po, from whom I have had the fortune to occasionally receive initiations, teachings, or transmissions, and with whom I could establish the so-called ‘Dharma connection’ (chos 'brel).

I cannot help looking back with a sense of joy and gratitude at my friends, colleagues, and students from monastic academia, too numerous to mention by name, who made my indulgence in the arts of exposition, disputation, and composition a stimulating, enriching, and memorable experience. I take this opportunity to thank dGa'-rab Rin-po-che, sPrul sku 'Jam-dpal, Karma-skru-chen Rin-po-che, Gyang-khang sPrul-sku, Rag-mgo mChog-sprul, sMin-gling mKhan-chen, sMin-gling gDung-sras, Sher-pa sPrul-sku, Zhi-ba sPrul-sku, among other incarnate masters, for their friendship and inspiration. I also owe thanks to my friends and colleagues at the NNI, most of whom now live or work in widely different parts of the world—including Byeng-sems bKra-shis, Lung-bstan-rgya-mtsho (Lungtaen Gyatso, who is currently the principal of the Institute of Language and Cultural Studies, Royal University of Bhutan), mKhan-po bsTan-'dzin-nor-rgyas (the current Ram-sbyar Bla-ma), mKhan-po Sangs-rgyas-dbang-'dus, mKhan-po 'Gyur-med-kun-bzang-bstan-'dzin, mKhan-po mKhyen-brtse-dpal-lidan, mKhan-po bsKal-bzang-nyi-ma, mKhan-po rTa-mgrin-sri-thub, Shing-khar Bla-ma dNgos-grub, Dr. Karma Phuntsho (now a Spalding Fellow, Cambridge), Slob-dpon Phrin-las-rdo-rje (Thinley Dorjee), Slob-dpon Klong-yangs-seng-ge, and Bla-ma Byang-chub-rdo-rje—for their help and friendship.

Just as my desire to study Buddhist philosophy took me to India, so too did my desire to trace the Indian roots of Tibetan Buddhism bring me to the University of Hamburg, Germany, in 1997. In the course of my ten-year interaction in the NNI with Tibetan Buddhism, it became increasingly clear to me that the best way to deepen my understanding of this subject is to read the original Indian Buddhist texts in Sanskrit (from which most Tibetan translations were made) and to analyse Buddhist ideas by employing western academic approaches. The road to western academia has been, however, by no means smooth. Nonetheless, the kindness and assistance of several key individuals made my studies in Germany possible. First and foremost is Prof. Dr. Lambert Schmithausen (now Professor emeritus), my Doktorwater, without whose support I in all likelihood would not have had the privilege to study in Hamburg in the first place. My gratitude to him is profound for his having accepted me as his student, for guiding me, and for helping me to surmount a series of seemingly insurmountable bureaucratic hurdles. I feel honoured to be the last doctoral student of this legendary Buddhist.
I am also indebted to Prof. Dr. David Jackson who supported me in various ways, among others by enabling me to teach the Tibetan language and Tibetan Buddhism at the University of Hamburg from early on, and for being my second supervisor for both the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees. Moreover, I express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Harunaga Isaacson (University of Hamburg) for his support and guidance, and to Prof. Dr. Michael Friedrich (University of Hamburg) and Dr. Martin Delheya (University of Hamburg) for their invaluable suggestions.

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In addition to these acknowledgements, I have also some apologies to offer: to my Tibetan Buddhist teachers for my failure to live up to their expectations—for theorising about Buddhist teachings instead of practising them and for investigating the idea of bodhicitta instead of generating it; and to my teachers in the west and all other perfectionists for not always being able to meet the high standards of scholarship set by them, and for the major and minor mistakes that certainly abound in this work (for which I am solely responsible).

For the sake of transparency, I should perhaps venture a few words about my intellectual background and the methodological guidelines I have attempted to follow. For several reasons, it is not feasible to pursue the study of Buddhism in a western academic setting the same way it is done in a Tibetan monastic seminary, and vice versa. It goes without saying that the priorities and methods of monastic and western academic training differ, although the objective of both may be to gain knowledge of Buddhism. Ideally, the priority of a Tibetan monastic seminary is to train monks and nuns in such a way as to equip them with qualities of erudition, personal integrity, and conscientiousness (mkhas btsun bzang gsum); and with the competence to engage in exposition, spiritual practice, and beneficial tasks (bshad sgrub las gsum). Erudition is attained through learning, contemplation, and meditation (thos bsam sgom
gsum); personal integrity through the practice of the three trainings (bslab pa sgum), namely, higher ethical-moral discipline, higher concentration, and higher insight; while a scholar with conscientiousness can be expected to carry out the tasks of exposition, disputation, and composition (chod rtso rtsom sgum), and thus contribute to the preservation and propagation of the Buddhist teachings so as to put salvific means at the disposal of other sentient beings. The pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's sake, permissible in western academia, would probably be seen as inadequate, although here too there are several Buddhist (particularly Mahāyāna) concepts with which one could legitimise one's unquenchable thirst and quest for knowledge. Perhaps one could say that for traditional Buddhist scholars, knowledge of Buddhism is desirable primarily for its instrumental value (i.e. good as a means), whereas for western academics it is primarily sought for its own intrinsic value (i.e. good as an end).

One of the methodological strengths of the monastic academic system, I find, is the intensiveness and extensiveness of training it can offer in a relatively short period of time. One of the weaknesses of the traditional system of investigation, however, seems to be its tendency to regard texts and ideas as though they were static entities with no history of their own. The strength of the western academic system, by contrast, as exemplified at the University of Hamburg, is its cultivation of historical-philological skills and tools, based on the presupposition that ideas, articulated and transmitted to us in the form of written texts, have a history of their own, just like persons—that they originate and evolve; and that the authors of texts, analogously to ourselves, wanted to convey definite (and not just any) ideas, and that researchers, regardless of religious or ideological affiliations, or other personal predilections, should attempt to determine the authorial intent of a given text by employing historical-philological tools and skills (without, however, ruling out the usefulness of any other tool that bids to bring us a step closer to the goal).

There have been other individuals like myself who studied first in a traditional monastic academy and later pursued their studies in a western university, and there may be many more in the future willing to do the same. For better or worse, such individuals are in a unique position, and thus also face unique challenges, including overcoming inner conflicts—perhaps a natural consequence of the tension generated between tradition and innovation, religion and science, subjective faith and objective reason, and even between Orientalism and Occidentalism—and having often to cope with such preconceived notions as that a Buddhist can never be an objective Buddhologist (or even that only a Buddhist can be a competent Buddhologist!). Surely individuals deal with such challenges in their own unique way.

My ten years in a Tibetan Buddhist seminary in India and now another ten years in Europe have imparted to me knowledge and values which I would have otherwise remained ignorant of. Far from regretting, there are reasons for rejoicing over having had both the privilège to study Tibetan Buddhism as a Tibetan Buddhist monk and the freedom to give up monkhood and pursue further studies in Germany. The information gathered during study in a monastic seminary can indeed be reassessed with the aid of western academic tools. Methodological precision and the reliability of findings may differ owing to several factors, but at least for me, one of (if not the most) reliable ways of gaining knowledge of Buddhism transmitted in the form of written texts seems to be the use of historical-philological tools and methods, which are not, by the way, completely unknown, at least in some form, in the Tibetan tradition. I would go so far as to say that if there were one western method that a judicious traditional Buddhist scholar is likely to find appealing and worth adopting when analysing Buddhist ideas and textual sources, then that would be the historical-philological one. Moreover, if we assume that the goal of western scientific enquiry is to determine states of affairs as precisely as possible, that is, without underplaying or overplaying any factor, I would argue that it is very much in conformity, at least in theory, with the traditional Indian and Buddhist notion of knowing things or reality without superimposition (adhyāropalsamāropa: sgro 'dogs pa) or depreciation (apavāda: skur ba 'debs pa).
Readers may wonder why I chose to study the concept of bodhicitta (i.e. the resolve to become a buddha) in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. The existential significance of the bodhicitta concept in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism, which I hope will become sufficiently clear in due course, is what motivated me to study it. Given the vastness of the literature on bodhicitta (it is in fact overwhelming), I had to be selective in the choice of my materials. Whenever possible I have based myself primarily on Indian texts (in their original, if available, or else in their Tibetan translation). I have also resorted to a great deal of indigenous Tibetan sources, particularly when these discuss bodhicitta from a tantric perspective, but also when the Tibetan tradition has attempted to systematise various positions found in Indian sources. Indigenous Tibetan sources have often been very helpful, and at times even indispensable, in several respects. Unrestrictive use of indigenous Tibetan material on bodhicitta would have been impossible, and I have hence tried to limit myself to the early sources, and drawn on later ones only when I could find no earlier source on a given topic. Two of my criteria for choosing sources have been the accessibility of a given work during the time of writing this thesis and my familiarity with it. In any case, I have tried to present Indian ideas and Tibetan ones (be they of the rNying-ma or gSar-ma schools) as objectively as possible. I have avoided presenting Tibetan ideas as Indian, or rNying-ma ideas as universally valid for all Tibetan schools. Although I have resorted to more Indian sources than Tibetan ones and, in the case of the Tibetan sources, employed more rNying-ma than gSar-ma literature, I believe that this study is, as far as the major issues are concerned, fairly representative of both Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, and hence can rightly be called a study of bodhicitta in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.

This study contains eleven chapters of varying length. In chapter one, I try to provide a general background on the concept of becoming a buddha, against the backdrop of the relevant Buddhological, soteriological, ontological, epistemological, gnoseological, and axiological concepts of Mahāyāna Buddhism. I also try to bring the major themes addressed in this book within the compass of these concepts. The second chapter provides an overview (and when deemed necessary also an assessment) of previous studies done by modern scholars on the theme of bodhicitta. The third chapter seeks to explore the prehistory of the bodhicitta concept and discusses doctrinal foundations that may have contributed to its conception. Chapter four is devoted to the idea of the resolve to become a buddha purportedly made by the historical Buddha for the first time in one of his previous existences. The fifth chapter discusses three concepts that are closely related to each other, namely, Mahāyāna, the soteriological means of awakening; bodhisattva, a sentient being who strives for awakening; and bodhicitta, the resolve to strive for awakening. Chapter six examines the two traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism found in India and systematised by Tibetan scholars—particularly their views of issues related to the generation of bodhicitta. The seventh chapter presents a typology of bodhicitta, namely, ethico-spiritual, gnoseological, ontological (or metaphysical), psycho-physiological, and semeiological (or symbolical) bodhicitta. Chapter eight brings together various traditional classifications of bodhicitta found in Indian and Tibetan sources. The ninth chapter takes a look at the causes and conditions pertaining to bodhicitta. The tenth chapter thematises the observances of Mahāyāna, and particularly the maintenance of bodhicitta as the foundation of a bodhisattva’s ethico-spiritual discipline. The eleventh and last chapter deals with the relapse or loss of bodhicitta and the methods for restoring it. Since I have made profuse use in this study of Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (i.e. the Cittotpādañçala, the chapter on the generation of the resolve to become a buddha), which is one of the earliest pieces of Mahāyāna literature that deals with the theme, and so is an important textual witness to the development of the concept of bodhicitta, I have also included a critical edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of this chapter as, respectively, appendices A and B.

Given the pervasiveness of bodhicitta in Mahāyāna Buddhism and the amount of material found on it, this study cannot claim to have done full justice to the theme. Perhaps I
have been naïve in venturing to take a flight into the domain of Mahāyāna that is said to be as vast as space itself.\textsuperscript{2} To use a simile employed by Candrakīrti, a bird in flight must finally land, not because there is no sky left to traverse but because it has exhausted all its energy.\textsuperscript{3} Similarly, my study comes to an end not because materials on bodhicitta have been exhausted and everything that needs to be said on the subject has been said, but because a limit has had to be set so that the deadline for submitting the dissertation can be met. Nonetheless, I do hope that the present work will be a small contribution towards understanding the concept of bodhicitta, the \textit{élan vital} of tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Dorji Wangchuk

February, 2007, Hamburg

\textsuperscript{2} See, for example, Ratnagunāsāmcaya 1.21.

\textsuperscript{3} Madhyamakāvatāra 11.32ab:
\begin{quote}
\textit{nam mkha' med pas 'dab chags ldog par mi 'gyur gyi ||
'di ni rang mthu zad pas ldog par 'gyur de bzhin ||.}
\end{quote}
Technical Note

When citing Tibetan canonical works from the bKa'-gyur, I have employed both the sTog manuscript (T) and the sDe-dge (Karma-pa)1 xylographic edition (D). For works which are not available in T, such as the rNyin-ma tantras, I have consulted the Peking bKa'-gyur xylograph edition (P). When citing works found in the bsTan'-gyur, I have made use of the Peking edition, the sDe-dge edition,2 and the modern Sichuan (Chengdu) edition (S), which has the sDe-dge xylographic edition as its basis. This recent edition also takes into consideration the Peking (P), sNar-thang (N), and Co-ne (C) editions, and records the variant readings found in them. The variants N and C given by me are based on this edition. Although it is not a critical edition, S records significant variants fairly accurately (except in some cases, where variants seem either to have escaped the notice of the editors or to have been considered insignificant by them). I have not faithfully reproduced all the strokes (shad) while citing Tibetan texts. Whenever possible, I consulted and made use of existing critical editions, versions, translations, or studies of texts that I have cited. It was, however, impossible to discuss the date of composition and authorship in all cases. The respective Sanskrit titles and authors were in most cases adopted from the available bKa'-gyur and bsTan'-gyur catalogues. Nonetheless, as already noted by several scholars, some of them are doubtful. Short titles have been used for citing primary sources in Sanskrit and Tibetan. The bibliography and index have been arranged according to the Roman alphabet, including Tibetan titles and words, in which cases I followed the sequence of the initial letters, not the main letter (ming gshi).

The relevant Sanskrit and Tibetan passages have for the most part been quoted in the footnotes, except for the passages from Bodhisatvabhūmi 1.2 (i.e. Cittotpādapātala). In the latter case, only the paragraph numbers are provided in the notes, referring to the edited text included in the appendices, where lists of the sigla used in the editions are also provided.

Archaic orthographies found in some autochthonous Tibetan works, particularly works of Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po, have been retained. These include the archaic suffix d (da drag), the archaic employment of the suffix 'a, and the inverted vowel gi gu (marked as i). Glosses contained in the cited Tibetan texts have been given within braces.

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1 Although the so-called Karma-pa edition of the sDo-dge bKa'-gyur and bsTan'-gyur is said to have undergone some corrections and hence does not completely represent the original sDe-dge xylographic edition of the Tibetan canon, I hope that variants resulting from those corrections, if they exist at all, are negligible, and do not affect the content of the texts that I have cited.

2 In cases where the works cited by me are not found in the sDe-dge edition, only P and S have been considered.
Chapter One

A General Introduction: On Becoming a Buddha

There has never appeared, will never appear,
And does not appear a buddha
Who does not depend on bodhicitta.
It is thus always worth being joined in reverence with [bodhicitta].

– Khu-nu Bla-ma bsTan-'dzin-rgyal-mtshan (1894/95–1977), Byang sms bstd pa 331

1. Introductory Remarks

Becoming a buddha (‘Awakened One’) under the Bodhi tree (Ficus religiosa) was undoubtedly the most significant event in the career of the historical Buddha, and may be considered the starting point of Buddhism. According to both Mahāyāna (‘Greater Vehicle’) and Hīnayāna (‘Lesser Vehicle’) or non-Mahāyāna, the historical Buddha had sometime in the distant past resolved to become a buddha, thereby launching out on the career of a bodhisattva, that is, a sentient being who strives to attain the highest state of awakening. A major distinction between non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna, however, is that for the former the status of being a bodhisattva or buddha is confined to the historical Buddha (or a few others like him), while the ultimate soteriological goal of a disciple is Arhatship (that is, the final state of a saint who has attained release from the cycle of birth and death) primarily for oneself. For the latter, by contrast, even an ordinary sentient being is capable of undertaking the long and arduous career of a bodhisattva by generating bodhicitta and finally becoming a buddha (just like the historical Buddha himself), primarily for the sake of many other sentient beings. In sum, a person who possesses or has generated bodhicitta is considered to be a bodhisattva, and the form of Buddhism concerned with the theory and practice of a bodhisattva is known as Mahāyāna. The idea of bodhicitta in the sense of the resolve to become a buddha is hence the bedrock of Mahāyāna, and is what distinguishes a bodhisattva

1 Byang sms bstd pa 331:
   byang chub sms la ma brten par ||
   sangs rgyas ma byon mi 'byon zhiung ||
   'byon par mi 'gyur de yi phyir ||
   rtog tu gus pas 'grogs par 'os ||.
from a śrāvaka, Mahāyāna from non-Mahāyāna. It is presupposed by all forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism including Vajrayāna (‘Diamond Vehicle’), or tantric Mahāyāna.

Multiple internal and external factors must have contributed to the formation and further development of the concept of bodhicitta. The psychological need of the Buddhists to make up in one way or another for the demise of the historical Buddha may have been one of the principal internal factors that contributed to the formation of the idea of the resolve to become a buddha. Such an idea would not have lacked the doctrinal justification or legitimisation that it needed, for the non-Mahāyāna sources seem to abound in doctrinal elements that could easily be used to underpin the concept of bodhicitta. In its early phase of development, the idea of generating bodhicitta probably meant only the initial resolve to become a buddha, a momentous decision made by an aspirant seeking Buddhahood (buddhav āya). This was seen as an indispensable but not necessarily a sufficient condition for the attainment of Buddhahood. However, gradually the idea came to encompass the entire theory and practice of a bodhisattva and to be considered not only a necessary but in fact a sufficient condition for such an attainment. In the course of time, even the true reality that a bodhisattva or buddha experiences as a spiritual event, the meditative insight or gnosis by means of which the true reality is experienced, and all conceivable resources or means—be they psycho-physiological, visual, verbal, or visional impulses that could be employed for becoming a buddha—came to be regarded as bodhicitta. It is this idea as found explicated in Indian and Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhism that the present study seeks to examine.

The concept of bodhicitta, regardless of its type, invariably involves in one way or another the idea of becoming a buddha. This in turn involves a host of other concepts pertaining to Buddhology (i.e. the theory of the Buddha or a buddha), soteriology (i.e. the theory of salvation), ontology (i.e. the theory of being or reality as such), epistemology (i.e. the general theory of knowledge)—particularly gnoseology (i.e. the theory of jñāna ‘liberating insight’)—and axiology (i.e. the theory of values, primarily ethicality or morality), all of which are, unsurprisingly, conceived of differently in different Buddhist systems and scriptures. The heterogeneity of the strands of Mahāyāna Buddhism that explicitly or implicitly endorse one or more types of bodhicitta, the diversity of the concepts of Buddhology, soteriology, ontology, epistemology, gnoseology, and axiology proposed in them, and the divergence and convergence of these strands and ideas make a thematic study of the bodhicitta concept a daunting task.

What I shall attempt in this chapter is to provide a general introduction to the concept of bodhicitta by considering the idea of becoming a buddha against the backdrop of the relevant Buddhological, soteriological, ontological, epistemological-gnoseological, and axiological concepts of Mahāyāna Buddhism. I shall, in the process, be trying to bring the major themes addressed in this book under the umbrella of these concepts.

2. Buddhology

The idea of the resolve to become a buddha inevitably raises the Buddhological question as to what or who a buddha is, or rather who the historical Buddha was, for the concept of the historical Buddha seems to be the point of departure for all matters pertaining to Buddhology in all strands of Buddhism. One of the questions that we never seem to stop asking is who or what a buddha is. According to the Anguttaranikāya, one of the earliest Buddhist sources, the

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2 The use of the term gnosis here is not intended in any way to link the Buddhist concept of jñāna with the concept of gnosis in Gnosticism. See SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 35–35 (particularly n. 49), where problems of comparativism (i.e. drawing comparisons between Mahāyāna and Gnosticism and Manichaeism) are discussed. The case of certain concepts clustering around the notion of what I call ‘physiological bodhicitta’ is mentioned there as one example.
Buddha, upon being asked whether he was a god, some kind of celestial being, demon, or human being, answered:  

Just as a blue, red, or white lotus, having sprouted in water, having grown up in water, and having risen above the water, stands unstained by water, even so do I, born in the world and grown up in the world, and having overcome the world, dwell unstained by the world.

Understand that I am a *buddha*.

The Buddha wanted us to understand him as a *buddha*, an ‘Awakened One,’ and not less and not more. The notion of the Buddha found in various schools and strands of Buddhism is, of course, by no means uniform. Perhaps the only consensus within Buddhism among all forms of Buddhism at all times is the appearance of a phenomenon that we call ‘the historical Buddha.’ It is, however, the reflections upon and dissent over the nature of the Buddha, the teacher (*śāstra: ston pa*); the spatial domain (*sthāna: gnas*) and temporal dimension (*kāla: dus*) of his existence, appearance, activities, and influence; his assembly (*pariṣad: khor*) and teachings (*dharma: chos*); and the substratum, nature, and scope of the Buddha’s body (*kāya: sku*), speech (*vāc: gsung*), mind (*citta: thugs*), qualities (*guna: yon tan*), and salvific activities (*karman: phrin las*) that make Buddhism a fascinatingly complex topic. Several studies devoted to various Buddhistological themes have appeared in recent years. I do not, however, intend to probe into the overall subject matter of Buddhistology, a theme as complex and wide-ranging as the history and doctrine of Buddhism itself, but merely to touch upon some aspects of Buddhistology which I believe are relevant to the study of the *bodhicitta* concept.

Several Buddhistological themes, particularly those related to the notions of the historical Buddha, are directly or indirectly addressed in this book. In chapter three, I discuss a number of issues surrounding the historical Buddha and the aftermath of his demise, with the aim of providing possible historical and doctrinal background to the *bodhicitta* concept. I attempt to show how his demise could have created an emotional vacuum among his followers (particularly his lay disciples) and subsequent measures that could be read as ways to fill this emotional gap. One of these subsequent measures could have been to embrace the idea of becoming a *buddha* oneself. As sources of doctrinal justification or legitimisation, I discuss the ideas of a *buddha* as a discoverer and proclaimer of the perpetual true reality; the plurality of *buddhas*; the resolve made by previous *buddhas* to become *buddhas*; the altruism of the historical Buddha; and the prerequisites for becoming a *buddha* as spelled out in non/pre-Mahāyāna sources. The fourth chapter seeks to explore the idea of the major events of the Buddha’s career, namely, the initial resolve to become a *buddha* purportedly made by him in one of his previous existences; his striving to become a *buddha*; and the time and place of his becoming a *buddha*. I also briefly discuss whether the historical Buddha has been

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4 See also the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra* 1.14c (p. 8.3): *jaleruham vā satile na lipyase*. Later on the analogy of a lotus growing in mud and yet remaining unsullied by it is applied also to *bodhisattvas*. See, for example, *Bodhicittavivarana* 89:

\begin{verbatim}
  sems can bskyab pa'i bsam pa can ||
  de dag srid pa'i 'dam skyes kyang ||
  de byung nyid pas ma gos pa ||
  chu yi padma'i 'dab ma bzhin ||
\end{verbatim}

For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 63.

5 The term *buddha* was, to be sure, used by many religions of the Buddha’s time; see NAKAMURA 1980: 83.

6 See, for example, GRIFFITHS 1994; WEBER 1994; MAKRANSKY 1997; SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c; VETTER 2000; STEINKELLNER 2000; and the several related contributions in SCHMIDT-LEUKEL 1998. See also LOPEZ 2005. For a study of traditional Buddhistology in its manifold and complex forms as presented by the eleventh-century Tibetan scholar Rong-zom-pa with special reference to the controversy surrounding the existence of gnosis (*jñāna: ye shes*) at the stage of a *buddha*, see ALMOGI 2006.
retrospectively conceived of as a ‘king-like’ or ‘herdsman-like’ bodhisattva, that is, whether his intention was to become a buddha prior to other sentient beings or only after them. Some of the possible theoretical reflections on Buddhology in Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna are also discussed in chapter seven, where I show, for instance, that the body of the Buddha, once thought of as ‘stinking,’ gradually began to be seen as pure, luminous, and adamantine.

Let us first of all consider the term buddha itself. It hardly bears mentioning that buddha means ‘Awakened One’ and that ‘awakening’ (bodhi, a verbal noun which, like the noun buddha, is derived from ābudh) is a metaphor for ‘eye-opening’ comprehension or realisation. It has been noted that the term buddha is also used in the Jain scriptures to designate an insightful person. In the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition it is customary to explain the term as ‘one who has awakened from the sleep of disorientation’ (mohanidrā: gi mug gi gnyid) or ‘sleep of ignorance’ (avidyānidrā: ma rig pa’i gnyid). The term, according to Candrakītī and others, can be used to designate all three types of Buddhist saints, namely, śrāvaka saints, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas (or, to be precise, samyaksambuddhas). A pratyekabuddha is explicitly referred to as a ‘middling buddha’ (sangs rgyas ‘bring’), and thus, analogously, a śrāvaka saint and a buddha may be described as ‘minor’ and ‘major’ buddhas, respectively. According to the eleventh-century Tibetan scholar Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po (or Rong-zom-pa), however, the term is applicable to a pratyekabuddha, a bodhisattva of the tenth stage, and a samyaksambuddha.

Usually a buddha is described, as in the Tattvasamgrahapaññikā, as one who has known all that is worth knowing, meditatively accomplished all that is worth meditating on, and eliminated all that is worth eliminating. The idea of the Buddha or a buddha as a person who is wide awake from the sleep of ignorance—that is, a buddha of spiritual realisation—seems to be, however, if the fundamental, not the only type of buddha found in Mahāyāna.

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7 SchmithAUSEN 2000: 8 “Ebendeshalb heißt er buddha, ‘der Erwachte’. Erwachen (bodhi, das Verbalnomen zu buddha) ist eine Metapher für ‘augenöffnendes’ Erkennen, Begreifen. ‘See also SiHIRAMATI *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālamkāraavyākhyā (P, fol. 200a3–5; D, fol. 170a4–5; S, vol. 72, pp. 413.16–414.1): ‘di litar sngs rgyas zhes bya ba yang ji svey du yod pa’i chos thams cad kyi don phyin ci ma log par thugs su chud pa la [las P] sngs rgyas zhes bya se’i de bas na sā lu ljang pa’i meld las kyang | de la sangs rgyas bcom ldan ‘das gang zhe na’ | gang gis chos thoms cad thugs su chud pa’i phyir | sngs rgyas zhes bya stey de dang ‘phogs pa’i chos kyi sku dang shes rab kyi spyan gyis byang chub byed pa dang slob pa dang mi slob pas [= pa’i] chos gzigs so zhes gsungs so ||. Cf. also the Dharmaśamgitiśūra (T, fol. 254a1–2; D, fol. 436a–7): byang chub sus kyang ma byin te ||
gang gis kyang ni bzang ba med ||
bdag gi chos nangs yongs shes pas ||
sangs rgyas la ni sngs rgyas brjod ||.


9 Candrakītī, Triśarasaṅgapti 2–4. For the text and a translation, see SorenSEN 1986: 14–17. See also sGra shbor pam gnyis, no. 1. Cf. Acintyastava 41: 
tat tattvam paramārtha’pi tathāta dravyam isyate |
bhūtam ta’c avisamvādi tadbodhād buddha ucyate ||
See Lindtner 1997: 24 (Tibetan text), 25 (English translation).

10 Madhyamakavārābhāṣya (p. 3.18–20): sangs rgyas kyi sgra ‘di sangs rgyas kyi de nyid nyan thos dang rang sngs rgyas dang bla na med pa yang dag par rdogs pa’i sangs rgyas gsum car la yang ’jug ste’.

11 Rong-zom-pa, dKon mchog ‘greI (A, fol. 62b1–5; B, p. 93.7–13).

12 Kamalaśīla, Tattvasamgrahapaññikā ad 3612–3619 (vol. 2, p. 784.26–27)
abhijñātām abhijñeyam bhāvanīyam ca bhāvītam |
prāhātavyam prabhīnām ca tena buddho nirucyate ||
sources. For example, we come across ten types of buddhas in the Lokottaraparivarta of the Buddhāvatamsakasūtra, where they are considered to be the ten worthy things to be discovered (rjes su rongs par bya ba: anugantavya) by bodhisattvas. The ten may be rendered tentatively as follows: (1) a buddha who is totally awakened (mgon par byang chub pa'i sangs rgyas), (2) a buddha who is [awakened in virtue of his] aspirational wishes (smon lam gyi sangs rgyas), (3) a buddha [awakened in virtue of] the maturation of karma (las rnam par smin pa'i sangs rgyas), (4) a buddha [awakened in virtue of] the empowerment [of other buddhas] (byin gis brlabs pa'i sangs rgyas), (5) a buddha who has manifested [in a certain animate or inanimate form or being] (sprul pa'i sangs rgyas), (6) a buddha [in the absolute sense of] dharmadhātu (chos kyi dbyings kyi sangs rgyas), (7) a buddha [inherent in or envisioned by] the mind [of sentient beings] (sams kyi sangs rgyas), (8) a buddha [envisioned through] meditative concentration (ting nge 'dzin gyi sangs rgyas), (9) a buddha by nature (rang bzhi gni sangs rgyas), and (10) a buddha [fashioned] according to one's inclination (bsam pa ji tla ba'i sangs rgyas).

Nāgamitra in his Kāyatrāyāvatāramukha offers his own interpretation of these ten kinds of buddhas. For him, the first set of five pertains to the conventional kāya, namely, the two kinds of rūpakāya (i.e. the nirmanakāya and sambhogakāya), and the second set of five to the absolute kāya, namely, the dharmakāya. This understanding is shared by Jñānacandra in his commentary on the Kāyatrāyāvatāramukha called the Kāyatrāyavṛtti. He, however, maintains that all of the first set of five refers to both the nirmanakāya and sambhogakāya except for the third in the list (i.e. las rnam par smin pa'i sangs rgyas), which cannot apply to sambhogakāya. Clearly the idea that a sambhogakāya should be regarded as the result of karmic maturation must have been unacceptable for him.

The ten types of buddha found in the Buddhāvatamsakasūtra have obviously been interpreted in the light of the idea of a buddha of spiritual attainment. A similar list and explanation of ten types of buddha can be found in the Dharmasamgīti-sūtra, which is cited, for instance, in the bKa' yang dag pa'i tshad ma and in the Maṇjuśrīnāmasamgītiṣṭhikā.

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14 Mahāvyutpatti, no. 7463.

15 Nāgamitra, Kāyatrāyāvatāramukha (P, fol. 7a7–8; D, fol. 6b2–4; S, vol. 63, p. 14.6–8):
sangs rgyas mthun nyid las brtsams nas ||
'jig rien 'das shes [D zhes] bya ba yì ||
mo las sangs rgyas bstan mdzad pa ||
kun rdzob dang ni don čam 'dod ||
tshig ni lnga dang lnga dag gis ||
go rim [DC rims] bzhi du de rig bya ||
sku gnyis po ni dang pos [po'i N] bstan ||
gnyis pa yis ni gsum pa bstan ||.

16 Jñānacandra, Kāyatrāyavṛtti (P, fol. 36a3–8; D, fol. 32a6–b2; S, vol. 63, pp. 78.11–79.3).

17 Dharmasamgīti-sūtra (T, fols. 205a2–206b4; D, fols. 10a4–11a6).

18 bKa' yang dag pa'i tshad ma (P, fol. 87a7–b8; D, fol. 192a4–b3; S, vol. 115, pp. 511.21–513.3). The source, however, is given there as a certain Chos kun 'gro ba'i mdo.
The types of *buddha* listed by Daśabalaśrīmitra are more or less clear, except for the distinction called for between stūpa and caitya, assuming that the Tibetan reading tsi tya (without any variant) points to *citya* or caitya. One wonders, though, whether it should rather read citta, which is not inconceivable, given the concept of *sems kyi sangs rgyas* found in the *Buddhāvatamsaṅgasūtra* (no. 7). Perhaps pratibimba means any representation of a *buddha*, including statues or footprints. The author may not have intended a mentally pictured or meditatively experienced *buddha*, as described, for example, in the *Bhadrapālasūra* or *Pratyutpannabuddhasanmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra*. In any case, the types of *buddha* listed by Daśabalaśrīmitra are quite noteworthy for both historical and doctrinal reasons. Historically, the notions of a *buddha* discussed here can perhaps be best understood on the basis of various approaches taken by Buddhists to compensate for the absence of the historical Buddha, to which we shall return in chapter three.\(^{25}\)

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19 Maṇjuśrīnāmasamgitiśākā (P, fols. 152a5–153a8; D, fols. 131a6–132a6; S, vol. 32, pp. 346.12–349.6).

20 For information on this author and work, see MARTIN 2006, s.v. Daśabalaśrīmitra.


22 Note the expression stūpabimbāṃ recorded in BHSD, s.v. stūpa.

23 See MW, s.v. *citya* and caitya; BHSD, s.v. caitya.

24 Daśabalaśrīmitra states that the body of a bodhisattva is posited as the fifth kind of designatory *buddha* by the proponents of the Bodhisattvayāna (bodhisattvayānikā). He himself was reportedly affiliated to the Abhayagiri tradition (a Theravāda school). See MARTIN 2006, s.v. Daśabalaśrīmitra.
In the Tibetan Buddhist context, it is worth looking at what Rong-zom-pa has to say about the various types of buddhas. He alludes to three kinds in his *Ita 'grel*, which figure in a purely tantric context, during his exposition of the philosophical view (*Ita ba: daršana*) of the Mahāyoga. His explanation may be summarised in the following tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. a buddha by nature (rang bzhin gyi sangs rgyas), i.e. a sentient being</th>
<th>2. a buddha in virtue of realisation (rtogs pa'i sangs rgyas), i.e. a yogin on the spiritual path</th>
<th>3. a buddha in virtue of attainment (grub pa'i sangs rgyas), i.e. a yogin who has attained the spiritual goal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1. the [complex of elemental] causes of one’s birth [envisioned during conception as] a buddha (skye ba rgyu'i sangs rgyas)</td>
<td>1.2. the bases of one’s birth [viewed during conception as] a buddha (skye ba rten pa'i sangs rgyas)</td>
<td>1.3. the attained birth (or ensuing body) [viewed as the body of] a buddha (skye ba mgon par grub pa'i sangs rgyas)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As an aid to the understanding of some of the unusual expressions found here, a translation of the pertinent passage is attempted as follows:26

The philosophical view (*Ita ba: daršana*) of the Mahāyoga: All phenomena are viewed as [already] awakened (sangs rgyas pa: buddha) in [the domain of] [the spontaneously attained] reflectional (or representational) mandala (gzugs bryan gyi dkyil 'khor). A buddha is said to be of three kinds: [1] a buddha by nature (rang bzhin gyi sangs rgyas), [2] a buddha by realisation (rtogs pa'i sangs rgyas), and [3] a buddha by attainment (grub pa'i sangs rgyas). [1] A buddha by nature is the sentient being itself, which is said to [be of three kinds in accordance with its] three states or circumstances: [1.1] The [complex of elemental] causes of one’s birth [envisioned during conception as] a buddha (skye ba rgyu'i sangs rgyas), [1.2] the bases of one’s birth [viewed as] a buddha (skye ba rten pa'i sangs rgyas), and [1.3] the attained birth (or ensuing body) [viewed as the body of] a buddha (skye ba mgon par grub pa'i sangs rgyas). [1.1] The [complex of elemental] causes of one’s birth envisioned during conception as a buddha means that when the seeds (i.e. sperm and ovum) of the parents, the cause of a sentient being’s body being formed, are taken possession of by the element of consciousness (*rnam par shes pa'i kham: viññānadhātu*) [and] when all the intellectual-emotional defilements (*nyon mongs pa: kleśa*), the psycho-physiological complex (*phung po: skandha*), and the sense fields (*skye mchel: āyatana*) exist in [their] incipient and elemental states, they can be viewed as being [already] awakened in [the domain of] the complete divine mandala. [1.2] The bases of one’s birth [viewed during conception as] a buddha means that all the physiological and

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25 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 12–15. The possibility of a connection among the individual approaches is not ruled out (*ibid.,* 12, n. 32).

psychical elements of [one’s] parents are envisioned as being attained in the form of a divine mandala. [1.3] The attained birth (or ensuing body) [viewed as the body of] a buddha means that the very coming into existence of one’s body is [viewed] in that manner (i.e. as the coming into existence of a buddha’s body). [2] Those who are buddhas in virtue of realisation are those who abide at the stage of knowledge-bearers (rig pa ’dzin pa: vidyādhara), that is, who, in doing so, have realised [that all phenomena are awakened in the domain of the divine mandala]. [3] A buddha by attainment (grub pa’i sangs rgyas) is one who has actualised that (i.e. the realisation that all phenomena are already awakened in the domain of the divine mandala). These [types of buddha], it can be maintained, differ in terms of nature and circumstances (or states).

Although the author does not make this explicit, one is tempted to interpret the three kinds of buddha mentioned here as pertaining to buddhas on the three levels of (a) cause (rgyu) or basis (gzhi), namely, the state of still being a sentient being, (b) path (lam), and (c) result or goal (’bras bu), respectively. Interestingly, the author, while describing one who is a buddha by nature (rang bzhi gyi sangs rgyas), does not allude to the idea of an ontological buddha but merely to the meditative visualisation associated with the so-called tantric practices of the generation phase (bskyed pa’i rim pa: utpattikrama) and completion phase (rdo bzogs pa’i rim pa: nispamnakrama) of the Mahāyoga system. The idea of the three types (or rather states) of a buddha by nature may convey the impression that it concerns the actual process of conception and birth of a person, and presupposes the capacity of a Mahāyoga practitioner to remain conscious of these processes. Yet none of these, in my view, could have been the intent of the author.27 The process of conception and birth of a person here should thus be understood as the enacting of the events of conception and birth meditatively, by mimicking those of a fully awakened buddha as a form of mental training (blo sbyong ba) so as to realise and become accustomed to the fact that there is no phenomenon that is not awakened (sangs ma rgyas pa’ichos).

I would suggest that the various types of buddhas may be classified as: (a) historical (i.e. the Buddha Śākyamuni), (b) mythical (e.g. Dipanḍakara, who is said to have lived on earth, like Śākyamuni himself), (c) celestial or transcendent (e.g. Amitābha, who is said to reside in the paradise-like realm of Sukhāvati, or the Medicine Buddha), (d) gnoseological (i.e. nirvikalpajñāna,28 advayajñāna, etc.), (e) ontological (i.e. dharmatā,29 dharmadhātu, bhūtakoṭi, śūnyatā, tathāgatagarbha, etc.), (f) symbolical or representational (i.e. physical symbols or representations, such as relics and footprints of the historical Buddha; verbal symbols or representations, such as letters and mantras; and mentally envisaged buddhas, i.e. through samādhi, (g) manifested or emanated (i.e. as animate beings, such as bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, kings, teachers, hunters, prostitutes, and animals, or as inanimate objects, such as bridges and islands). One also finds the idea of a bud̄ha manifesting himself as dharma and the samgha; dharma manifesting itself as a buddha and the samgha; or the samgha manifesting itself as a buddha and dharma.30

27 It is said that only a buddha (i.e. sambbuddha) is conscious while entering, residing in, and exiting in the womb of his mother. A pratyekabuddha is said to be conscious when entering and residing but not when exiting, and a cakravartin (‘universal monarch’) only when entering. See the Abhidharmakosābhāṣya (p. 128.24–27).

28 Dignāga, Prajnāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha (as cited in STCHEBATSKY 1932: 537, n. 6): prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayam sa tathāgatah. For further information on the Prajnāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha, see MARTIN 2006, s.v. Navaśloka.

29 Lankāvatārasūtra 239cd (p. 296): sarvadharmānavabodhena cittam buddham vadāmy aham ||. For an English translation, see SUZUKI 1932: 245. Cf. the term dharmatābuddha (chos nyid kyi sangs rgyas) also found in the Lankāvatārasūtra (TSD, s.v. chos nyid kyi sangs rgyas). The following famous verse from the Vajracchedikāśūtra, as cited in the Catubhātakāśā (TILEMANS 1990: vol. 2, p. 79), may also be mentioned: dharmato buddhā draṣṭavyā dharmakāyā hi nāyakāḥ || dharmatā cāpy avijñeyā na sā sākyā vijñitum ||.
More studies will be required in order to determine the interrelationship among these concepts and to sort them out according to their different historical and doctrinal layers, if such is possible at all. It is conceivable that one type of *buddha* may have been juxtaposed to or superimposed on another type of *buddha*. But as I noted above, we can at least state, both historically and doctrinally, that the idea of the historical Buddha Gautama (or Sakyamuni) is the point of departure for the idea of all other types of *buddhas*. From a historical perspective, no Buddhist school of thought could ignore or detach itself from the historical Buddha, irrespective of how much it may have doctrinally digressed from early Buddhist thought, for doing so would have undermined its own roots. To be sure, any given school of Buddhist thought—be it Mahāyāna or non-Mahāyāna, tantric or non-tantric Mahāyāna—may have rejected others’ perception of the historical Buddha or relativised his role, but it would never have ignored the historical Buddha himself. For example, although the rdZogs-chen tradition of the rNyin-ma school may give the impression that it has little to do with or say about the historical Buddha, it nevertheless sees the Buddha Śākyamuni as a *nirmāṇakāya* of the Ur-Buddha Samantabhadrā. The various schools of Buddhist thought were all but bound to accept and explain the phenomenon called the historical Buddha, and this has resulted in multifarious Buddhological concepts.

For the question of how one becomes a *buddha*, the concepts of gnoseological and ontological *buddhas* seem to be particularly significant. As paralleled in the case of the typology of *bodhicitta* (which we shall address in chapter seven), one can become a *buddha*, like the historical Buddha himself, by generating (or by revealing) the gnoseological *buddha*, and thereby gain full and direct access to the ontological *buddha*. The rest can be seen as factors conducive to the process of becoming a *buddha*. It is thus understandable why many tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources assert that the quest for Buddhahood is a journey within one’s psycho-physiological complex, one’s own mind, for it is there and there alone that a *buddha* can either be generated or exposed. For example, the *Atyayajñānasūtra* states:

> The mind is the cause of the arising of gnosis (i.e. the gnoseological *buddha*);
> Do not seek a *buddha* elsewhere!

Likewise, the *Hevajra* states:

> Nowhere else in the spheres of the world

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31 The Tibetan Bon religion, if regarded as de facto a form of Mahāyāna Buddhism, may be an exception (although it is said to have its own explanation of the Buddha Śākyamuni).

32 Klön-chen-pa Dri-med-’od-zer (1308–1364), *Yid bzhin nmad ’grel* (vol. 1, p. 24.4–6): *de yang thog mtha’ med pa’i dnos su mngon par byang chub pa’i mgon po ’di ni | chos kyi sku’i gnas skabs na gnyis su med pa’i ye shes de nyid ston pa kun tu bzang po zhes bya’o || longs spyod rdzogs pa sku’i gnas skabs na riggs lnga’i sangs rgyas zhes bya’o || sprul pa sku’i gnas skabs na thub pa bcom ldan ’das zhes bya’o ||

33 *Atyayajñānasūtra*, as cited by Prajñāsāmadra in his *Atyayajñānasūtryāvyākyāna* (P, fol. 208b8; D, fol. 173a6; S, vol. 67, p. 453.3–4):

> sems ni ye shes ’byung ba’i rgyud ||
> sangs rgyas gzhan du ma tshol cig ||

See also *ibid.* (P, fol. 298a8–b3; D, fol. 173a1–2; S, vol. 67, p. 452.6–11). The *Atyayajñānasūtra* itself does not seem to have survived.

34 *Hevajra* 2.4.75:

> na buddho labhhyate ’nyatra lokadhātuṣu kturtlecit |
> cittam eva hi samuddho na buddho ’nyatra darśītaḥ. ||

See also *ibid.* 2.4.69:

> sattvā buddhā eva kim tu ēgantukamalāvīrāḥ |
> tasyāpākṣaraṇāt sattvā buddhā eva na saṁśayaḥ. ||

Cf. *ibid.* 2.4.73a: *abuddho nāsti sattvākāh.*
Can one obtain a buddha.  
Mind itself is a perfect buddha;  
No buddha has been exhibited elsewhere.

This idea is echoed also in the *Guhyagarbhatantra, one of the most important tantras of the rNyung-ma school:35

A perfect buddha cannot be obtained
From anywhere else within the four times and ten directions.
Mind itself is a perfect buddha.
Do not seek a buddha somewhere else!

In short, as propagated in these and similar sources, mind is already a buddha (by ‘nature’); mind is the cause of a buddha (by ‘nurture’). Becoming a buddha means generating or unfolding a buddha from within, from one’s own mind.

3. Buddhist Soteriology

In order to make sense of Mahāyāna soteriology, according to which the highest salvific goal is Buddhahood, it is perhaps worthwhile to look at the basic tenets of Buddhist soteriology in general. We might question the wisdom of employing the term ‘soteriology’ in the Buddhist context, particularly if we recall its Greek etymological roots sōiēr (‘saviour’) and sōzēin (‘to save’),36 and the possible connotations of the term used in theology. Here as elsewhere, however, we should, like Tibetan Buddhist exegetes and logicians,37 be aware of the limitations of etymology. Buddhism in general does not embrace the idea of an external saviour, but if we understand soteriology as a theory or plan of salvation, we cannot deny that it, like any other religion, does have its own such notions. There are a host of words used in Buddhism that more or less convey the meaning of salvation, such as release (mukti: grol ba), complete release (vimukti: nram par grol ba), deliverance (moksha: thar pa), complete deliverance (vimoksha: nram par thar pa), awakening (bodhi: byang chub), complete awakening (sambodhi: rdzogs pa’i byang chub), perfect complete awakening (samyaksambodhi: yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub; abhisambodhi: mgon par rdzogs pa’i byang chub), emancipation (apavarga: byang grol), purification (vyavādāna: nram par byang ba), cessation (nirvāna: 'gog pa), and extinction (nirvāṇa: mya ngan las 'dus pa) (i.e. of the fire of saṃsāra).

(a) *Emic and *Etic Perceptions of Buddhism

Almost a century ago the famous Belgian Buddhologist Louis de La Vallée Poussin, even as he was aware of the risks of general definition, ventured to define Buddhism as ‘a discipline

35 *Guhyagarbhatantra (P, fol. 121a5; D, fol. 123b2):
   dus bshis phyogs bceu gong nas kyung ||
   rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas rnyed mi ‘gurur ||
   rgyas nyid rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas ie ||
   sangs rgyas gzhan na [nas D] ma tshol cig ||.
Cf. Dohāgīti 71 (SNEGLGROVE 1954: 233); Kurulkūkālpā 2:10.1:
   cetasā sarvabuddhatvam cetasāva vimucyate |
   cetasā moksate bandhās cetasā muktimān śhavet ||.

36 Webster’s, s.vv. soteriology and soterial.

37 One Tibetan exegetic or hermeneutic maxim runs as follows: sgra bshad pa la khyab pa med || (lit. “There is no [logical] pervasion (khyab pa: vyāpti) in an etymological explanation (sgra bshad or nges tshig: nirukti) of a word.” This means that in a debate or a dialogue the proponent or opponent cannot count on defending or refuting a thesis on the basis of the etymology of some given term, for etymologies are often inadequate as definitions.
of salvation,' a definition obviously approved by a host of other prominent Buddhologists. Indeed, the various notions of Buddhology and Buddhist physiology, psychology, ontology, epistemology, gnoseology, axiology, cosmogony, cosmology, mythology, and eschatology (here in the sense of the belief concerning the ultimate destiny of the external and internal worlds—the bhājāloka (‘receptacle world’) and sattvaloka (‘world of sentient beings’)—in Buddhism) ultimately make sense only in the context of Buddhist soteriology. In particular, there seems to be no way to understand the idea of becoming a buddha without setting it within the context of Mahāyāna soteriology, which in turn revolves around the bodhicitta concept.

If we were to ask Buddhist scholars of various traditions to explain the teachings of the Buddha (buddhaśāsana: sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa) in a nutshell (i.e., just in one verse), we would probably hear the following verse recited (transmitted with slight variations in the Udānavarga, Prātimokṣaśātra, and Dharmapada):

The avoidance of all unwholesome deeds,
The accumulation of all wholesome deeds,
The purification of one’s own mind—
This is the doctrine of the Buddha.

Although the verse occurs in texts representing a rather conservative strand of Buddhism, I would argue that it is the foundation and nucleus of tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna spirituality as well. The sublime doctrine or the doctrine of the sublime ones, or even the eternally (valid) doctrine (saddhāma: dam pa’i chos), as Buddhist teachings are often described, is primarily defined by its ability to alleviate the suffering and discontent of sentient beings and purify their intellectual-emotional defilements, as the following verse states:

That which eliminates all suffering or discontent (duḥkha) and all obscurations (āvarana) Is the sublime doctrine (saddhāma).

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38 La Vallée Poussin 1917: 1; cf. de Jong 1979: 50: “La Vallée Poussin has defined Buddhism as Nirvāṇa-mysticism. No better definition can be given.” Frauwallner 1956: 1: “The Buddha himself had admittedly taught exclusively a salvific doctrine, and in regard to the philosophical questions of his time he hardly took any stance” (Der Buddha selbst hatte zwar ausschließlich eine Erlösungslehre verkündet und zu den philosophischen Fragen seiner Zeit kaum Stellung genommen). See also ibid. 9; Stcherbatsky 1932: 6: “It (i.e., Buddhism) is a doctrine of salvation.”

39 It has been pointed that “the overriding focus of Buddhist doctrine in soteriological concerns ultimately brought even its eschatology within the purview of soteriology; and it is apparently for this reason that the demise of the dharma was defined in terms of the nirvedhahāgya-s” (Buswell 1997: 598).

40 Udānavarga 28.1:

sarvapāpasāyakaraṇaṃ kuśalasyopasampadak |
svacittaparyavadanam etad buddhasya sāsanam ||.

For an English translation of the corresponding verse from the Prātimokṣaśātra of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins, see Pribish 1975: 110–111. The source of the verse is identified in the IṭTa phreng attributed to Padmasambhava as the Vinaya, and is cited there as a scriptural source justifying the austerities (tapas: dka’ thub) of ōraṇkas. For Rong-zom-pa’s commentary on the verse, see his IṬTa ‘gre’la (A, fols. 262b4–264a1; B, pp. 347.5–348.12). For the Dharmapada version of the verse, see, for example, Gethin 2004b: 190. The popularity of the verse makes it impossible to indicate all the primary and secondary sources.

41 An unidentified verse (cited, for example, in the Bu ston chos ‘byung, p. 11.15–16; Co ne bstan dkar, p. 39.5–6):

sdug bsgal dag ri thams cad dang ||
sgrih kun sel byed dam pa’i chos ||.

Śākyaprabha in his Prabhāvatī, a commentary on the Mūlasarvāstivādaśrāmaṇerakārika, describes the Buddha’s teachings as follows. The wise ones realise that [those teachings]

That are well endowed, [namely,] with three seals, teach three trainings (śikṣātraya), and are wholesome in the beginning, middle, and end are words of the Buddha (buddhayacana). According to the Madhyamaka scholar Āryadeva, the doctrines of the Buddha are in sum the doctrine of non-violence (ahimsā: 'tshhe ba med pa) and of emptiness (śūnyatā: stong pa nyid), which, according to Candrakīrti are meant to lead one to the attainment of a higher destination (svarga: mtho ris; sugati: bde 'gro) and (final) emancipation (apavarga: byang grof), respectively. Tantric Mahāyāna scriptures, such as the Dākinīvajrapañjāratantra, seem to have their own perception of the Buddhist doctrine.

The classification of saddhāma under two headings, scriptural (āgama: lungen) and realisation (adhigama: rtogs pa), is witnessed in Abhidharmakosa 8.39ab, which is a locus classicus for any Tibetan Buddhist scholar dealing with the theme. According to the Ratnagoitraivihāragrayākhyāyā, ascribed to Asaṅga by the Tibetan tradition, the (Buddhist) doctrine is of two kinds, namely, the doctrine of instruction (deśanādhāma: bstan pa ’i chos)

42 A Sanskrit manuscript of the Prabhāvatī is reported to be extant (MARTIN 2006, s.v. Śākyaprabha).

43 Śākyaprabha, Prabhāvatī (P, fol. 188b2-3; D, fol. 161b5; S, vol. 93, pp. 417.21–418.2)

44 The ‘three seals’ alluded to here are: (1) All phenomena are characterised by the absence of a self (nairātmya). (2) All conditioned phenomena are momentary. (3) Nirvāṇa is characterised by quiescence. See the Prabhāvatī (omitted in F; D, fol. 161b3; S, vol. 93, p. 417.15–17):

chos nams thams cad bdag med de ||
‘das byas thams cad skad cig ma ||
mya ngan ‘das zhi de dag ri ||
chos kyi phyag rgya mischan nyid gsum ||.

45 Mahāvyutpatti, nos. 929–932: adhisīla, adhicitta, and adhiprajñā.


dharmam samāsato ‘himsām varuyanitī tathāgataḥ ||
śūnyatām eva nirvāṇam kevalam tād ibhoṣayam ||


47 See, for example, the Dākinīvajrapañjāratantra (cited in DAS Gupta 1958: 93, n. 2 according to the Advayavajrasangraha):

śūnyatākarunābhinnatva cittam prabhāvyate |
so hi buddhastyākarmasanghasaṃghasyā ‘pi hi desanā ||.

For the Tibetan translation of the verse, see the Dākinīvajrapañjāratantra (T, fol. 184b2; D, fol. 54b7–55a1):

stong pa snying rje tha dad med ||
‘di ni sangs rgyas chos dang ni ||
dge’ dun gri yang bstan pa’o ||.

48 Abhidharmakosa 8.39ab: saddhāma dvividhak śāstur āgamicādhiṣṭanamakathā. See also the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (p. 459.10): tattvaṃ sūravavinābhādhiṣṭha adhīgamā bodhipaksya ity eṣa dvividhā sadbhāmaḥ. For an English translation, see PRUDENT 1988–90: 1281. The two types of dharma are also briefly described in SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 29.
and the doctrine of realisation (\textit{adhipamadharma: rtogs pa'i chos}).\textsuperscript{49} The two, therefore, correspond to the theoretical and practical aspects of Buddhist soteriology. This distinction can be useful for relieving or reducing the tension that seems to exist between theory-oriented and praxis-oriented Buddhists in real life. If the \textit{āgama} were self-sufficient \textit{adhipama} would be superfluous, and vice versa, but for Buddhists no \textit{saddharm} can be said to be superfluous. Although theoretical learning is never conceived of as a substitute for (or alternative to) practical realisation, the former is certainly a prerequisite for the latter. Being unduly indisposed to one of the two may lead to the shunning of the \textit{saddharm}, and thereby to retracting the commitment one made while taking refuge in the Three Jewels, and also to violating the \textit{bodhisattva} vow, which from the Buddhist perspective would be like a patient shunning life-saving medicine. We may regard Buddhism as a philosophy or religion (as a religion of reason or of faith; of intellectualism or of mysticism),\textsuperscript{50} but one thing seems to be clear: it is in the end, from both \textit{emic} and \textit{etic} perspectives, a discipline meant to lead one to salvation. Because of its extreme emphasis on the role of the mind, it may justifiably also be called a religion of the mind.\textsuperscript{51}

(b) The Fundamental Features of Buddhist Soteriology

The nature of salvation and those for whose sake one is supposed to seek it is what divides Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna. Generally speaking, the Mahāyāna notion of salvation is universal in its scope, while the non-Mahāyāna notion is personal, although both aspects of universality and individuality of salvation may be found in both traditions. Even in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna, one's salvific breakthrough needs to be made by oneself (regardless of the degree of others' help) and is thus individualistic; and even in the non-Mahāyāna tradition the prospects of salvation are, in principle, not limited in regard to time, place, or person (except perhaps according to the \textit{agotraka} theory of the Yogācāra school). The following verse represents the fundamental outlook of Buddhist soteriology.\textsuperscript{52}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Ratnagotravibhāgavāakyā} (pp 18.14–19.1): dvividhō dharmā|| desanādharmo 'dhipamadharmo ca || tatra desanādharmah sūrādideśanāvo nāmapadavyahijanakāyasyanākhītaḥ || sa ca mārgābhīsamayaparyavasānātvāt kolopama it uktaḥ || adhipamadharmo hetupahalabhedenā dvividhāḥ || yad uta mārgasatyam nirodhasatyam ca.|| For an English translation, see \textit{Takasaki} 1966: 182.

\textsuperscript{50} On the difficulty of employing the term 'mysticism' in the Buddhist context, see \textit{Seyfort Ruegg} 2004: 58.


\textsuperscript{52} See the verse cited in \textit{Prajñāvarman's Udānavargavivarana} (P, vol. \textit{du}, fol. 83a7–8; D, vol. \textit{tu}, fol. 72b5–6; S, vol. 83, p. 158.13–15; \textit{Balk} 1984: 98): thub rnam sbya yis sdi gpa 'khru ëor mi mzdod cing || 'gro ba'i sdu bsgal phyag gis slyang ni selt mi mzdod || blag gis gzhlan la rtsogs [rtog DC] pa sphis pa ma yin te || chos nyid zhi ba gsgs zing zhib tu sgrub pa yin ||. This verse is often cited, though with slight variations. See, for example, the \textit{mChims} \textit{chen} (p. 8.23–25), \textit{Lam rim chen mo} (fol. 24b1–2), and \textit{sPhydro} 'jug tshig 'grel (p. 245.15–17). The \textit{mChims} \textit{chen} cites \textit{Udānavarga} 12.10 preceded by the phrase 'from the \textit{Udānavarga} (ched du brjod pa'i tshoms las). This is followed by the citation of our verse which is introduced by the phrase 'in the commentary on it' (de'i 'grel par). 'The commentary on it'
Sages (*muni: thub pa*) neither cleanse evil deeds (*pāpa: sdi gpa*) with water, Nor do [they] eliminate the sufferings of living beings manually, Nor do they transfer [their] realisation to others. [They] bring about [salvific release] by teaching [them] true reality, which is characterised by quiescence.

The Buddha is said to have taught: 53

I [can merely] show you the means of salvific release;
[Your] salvific release depends on yourselves. Endeavour [accordingly]!

That one is primarily responsible for one’s salvation is made clear also by Nāgārjuna. 54 In the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, it is said that a thousand buddhas are helpless when it comes to rescuing one sentient being from falling into lower existences. 55 That the saddhārma takes clear precedence in Buddhism over persons, including even buddhas, bodhisattvas, or gurus, is perhaps crucial for understanding the spirit of Buddhist soteriology. It is, as the Dharmasamgitiśūra states, not sentient beings who rescue or protect the Dharma but the Dharma that protects them. 56

The Buddhist notion of *curatio et salvatio* (‘healing and salvation’) in the broadest sense of the term is a fascinating theme which cannot be discussed here. What may be merely stated in general is that the saddhārma has often been seen as medicine, and that as with any medication, there are risks involved. Probably the eleventh-century Tibetan teacher sGam-po-pa had this in mind when he stated: 57

Dharma, if not practised in conformity with the Dharma, could be a cause of [one’s] going to lower destinations.

And the Tibetan scholar dPal-sprul ’Jigs-med-chos-kyi-dbang-po (1808–1887) must have been thinking of the people’s growing resistance to Dharma when he wrote the following: 58

53 See the famous (but not yet identified) citation in Klong-chen-pa’s *Shing rta chen po* (vol. 1, p. 261.1):

ngas ni khyed la thar pa’i thabs bstan gyis ||
thar pa rtag la rtags las brtsan par gyis ||.

See also the spkyod ’jug shig ’grel (p. 245.13–14) by mKhan-po Kun-bzang-dpal-Idan or Kun-dpal (1872–1943), Cf. LA VALLÉE POUSIN 1917: 155: “Buddhas do not liberate their fellow creatures. A Buddha is only a preacher, and he teaches men how to liberate themselves.”

54 *Suhrilkekba* 52:

thar pa bdag la rtag las ‘di la ni ||
gzhan gyis grogs byid ci yang ma mchis pes ||
thos dang tshul khrims bsam gyan ldan pa yis ||
bden pa nram pa bzhis la ‘bad par mdzod ||.


55 The adage runs as follows: *sems can geig ngan song du’ gro ba la sangs rgyas stong yang ’u thug*. I have not been able to trace the source of this statement. However, the idea itself can be found in Gro-lung-pa’s bSton rim chen mo (fols. 5a1, 41b5–6).

56 *Dharmasamgitiśūra* (T, fol. 264b4; D, fol. 50b3): *chos ni sems can rnam kyis srung [brung T] ba ma yin gyi chos kyis sems can rnam srung ba ste |.

57 *Kun bzang bla ma’i zhal lung* (fol. 6a6–b1): *mnyam med dwags pos | ‘chos chos bzhin ma spyad na | chos kyis sgar ngan song du’ gro ba’i rgyu iyed | ces pa ltar | .

58 *Kun bzang bla ma’i zhal lung* (fol. 244b6):

sdig can chos kyis thul kyang chos dred chos kyis mi thul ||
gyong po snun gyis thul kyang mar ikog snun gyis mi thul ||.
A sinner (or malefactor) can be disciplined by the Dharma, but one who is resistant to the Dharma cannot be disciplined by the Dharma.

A hardened [piece of leather] can be made supple with oil, but a butter [container made of] leather cannot be made supple with oil.

(c) The Mahāyāna Perception of the Quintessence of Buddhist Teachings

In what has all but become a cliché, several tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources state that 84,000 sets of doctrine (caturāṣṭīsahasradharmaskandha: chos kyi phung po brgyad khri bzhi stong) have been taught by the Buddha as antidotes for the 84,000 intellectual-emotional defilements (klaṣa: nyan mongs pa)—21,000 sets as antidotes for desire (rāga: ‘dod chags), 21,000 for hatred (dveṣa: zhe sdang), 21,000 for disorientation (moha: gti mug), and 21,000 for countrearranging all three equally. This idea can be found, for example, in the Aksāyamatinirdeśasūtra,59 *Guhyagarbhatantra (to which we shall return briefly in chapter five),60 and Kun byed rgyal po, a *rDoogs-chen tantra.61 According to dPal-sprul, the quintessence of all these is bodhicitta.62

59 The Aksāyamatinirdeśasūtra is cited by sKa-bsa dPal-brtses in his gsung rabs rin po che (P, fol. 143a4; D, fol. 239a6; S, vol. 115, p. 652.19–11): ‘dod chags la [om. PN] spyod pa nying khri chig stong de bzhin du zhe sdang dang [daD P] gti mug dang cha mnyam la spyod pa ste spyir bryad khri bzhis stong ngo’. The number 84,000 here refers to types of persons (gang zang). Cf. ibid. (P, fol. 143a2; D, fol. 239a4; S, vol. 115, p. 652.3–4): ndor na chos kyi phung po brgyad khri bzhis stong bstan pa ni tshig ‘bru zhes bya’o’. See also the Vikurvānaraṇāparipṛcchāsūtra (T, fol. 351b2–4; D, fol. 199a5–b2) and the Madhyamakāvātarābhāṣya (p. 332.1–3). The Dhāraniśvarārṇaṇāparipṛcchāsūtra is cited in the latter. Cf. the Tathāgatācintayuḥyaṇirdeśasūtra (T, fol. 197b3–7; D, fol. 134a3–5), that states that the number 84,000 was taught by the Buddha only provisionally and that in fact there is no limit.

60 *Guhyagarbhatantra (P, fol. 111a3–5; D, fol. 113a3–4).

61 Kun byed rgyal po (P, fol. 15b3–6; D, fols. 15b5–16a1): ‘dod chags zhe sdang gti mug gsum byung stey | de ’dul ba yi gnyen por gsgs na ni || chos kyi sgo mo bryad khri bzhis stong stey | ’dod chags zhe sdang gti mug rnam gsum byung stey | de daL ’dul ba’i gnyen por sde snod gsum || ’dod chags ’dul ba’i gnyen por gsum pa ni || ’dul ba nyi khri chig stong gsums pa yin || gti mug ’dul ba’i gnyen por gsgs na ni || mdo sde’i sde snod nyi khri chig stong gsgs || zhe sdang ’dul ba’i gnyen por gsgs na ni || mgon pa’i sde snod nyi khri chig stong gsgs || dug gsum cha mnams ’dul ba’i gnyen por ru || sde snod gsum las nyi khri chig stong gsgs || spyi ru bryad khri bzhis stong gsgs pa yang || dug gsum gnyen [snyen P] pos ’dul phyir gsgs pa yin ||.

The expression caturāṣṭīsahasradharmaskandha can be found elsewhere in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources. See, for example, TSD, s.v. chos kyi phung po, where the Astasāhasrikā and Vimalaprabhā are referred to. In the Abhidharmakośa, however, the number of dharmakāya is put at 80,000. See Abhidharmakośā i.25ab: dharmakāyasahasrānā yānī aśītim jāgau mūniḥ | ; ibid. 1.26ed: caritāpratipakṣas tu dharmakāyadho ‘navaṁrītaḥ | ; Abhidharmakośābhāṣya (p. 17.18–19): evaṃ tu varṇayanty aśīti caritasahasrānā satvānām | rāgadveśamahamānīdicitavatthena | tesaṁ pratipakṣena bhavapatāsitīr dharmakāyasaḥsahasrānā uktaṁ |. For an English translation, see PRUDEN 1988–89: 86–87.

62 Kun bzang bla ma’i zhal lung (fol. 171a4–b2): de lta bu’i byang chub kyis bskyed pa ‘di ni | rgyal las chos kyi sgo mo bryad khri bzhis stong gsgs pa thams cad kyi snying po dril dril ba | yod na des chogs | med na thabs ‘chags kyi = chag gi] gdams pa | nad brya sman gcig | sman dkar po chig thub lta bu yin | gzhan tshogs bsags pa | sgrub pa sbyang ba | lha bsgom pa | sngags bzla ba la sogs chos nyams su len pa thams cad kyang byang chub kyis yid bzhin gyi nor bu ‘di rgyud la skye ba’i thabs tsam du nyams su len pa yin gyi |
This generation of bodhicitta is the crème de la crème of 84,000 salvific means or practices (chos kyi sgo mo) taught by the Victorious One.⁶³ It is an instruction the presence of which [causes the bodhisattva practice to] be self-sufficient, [and] the absence of which [causes it to] be impoverished. It is like a panacea, a single medicine for a hundred ills. All other spiritual practices, such as the gathering of [the two] accumulations (i.e. punyasambhāra and jñānasambhāra), [those aimed at] the purification of obscurations, meditation on deities, and recitation of mantras, are carried out simply as means of [encouraging] the arising of this wish-fulfilling jewel, bodhicitta, in [one’s mental] continuum. Without [this] reliance on bodhicitta, none of the individual paths could [bring about] the attainment of the rank of perfect Buddhahood. But if bodhicitta has arisen in [one’s mental] continuum, whatever spiritual practice one engages in will cause the rank of perfect Buddhahood to be attained.

Indeed bodhicitta is regarded in several Mahāyāna scriptures as the causa sine qua non of becoming a buddha, as will become clearer in chapter five. The Kuśalamālasamparigrahasūtra, for instance, states:⁶⁴

O Ajita, it is as follows: For instance, without butter (ghṛta) the essence of melted butter (ghṛtamāṇḍa) would cease to exist. Similarly, O Ajita, without the generation of bodhicitta a tathāgata would not come into being.

According to Sāntideva, the doctrine of bodhicitta is the fresh butter (navaṇīta: mar gyi nying kantu) extracted by churning the (thickened) milk of saddharmā (saddharmākṣāčāra: dam chos ’o ma).⁶⁵

(d) Buddhist Soteriological Models and Goals

In chapter five I discuss the Mahāyāna view of the various models of mundane and supramundane vehicles or paths (vāna: theg pa) that are said to lead sentient beings to the desired non-soteriological and soteriological goals. There I also point out that the diversity of soteriological models and goals are conceived of as being due to the diversity of sentient beings’ spiritual and non-spiritual dispositions. Atiśa’s Bodhipathapradīpa and Tsong-kha-pa’s Lam rim chen mo clearly delineate three types of persons (skyes bu gsum) and their corresponding soteriological and non-soteriological aspirations—a scheme well grounded in earlier Indian sources.⁶⁶ The most modest type of person merely aspires to secure a happy future state of existence in samsāra; the mediocre type aspires to depart from samsāra (or

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⁶³ By his choice of the expression snying po dril dril ba, the author certainly means to say that bodhicitta is not just the essence but the essence of all essences of the 84,000 salvific means taught by the Buddha. See also the Kun bzang bla ma’i zhal lung (fol. 20b3–4): des na rgyal bas chos kyi sgo mo bryaṅ gkhri bzhis stong gsungs pa thams cad kyang | byang chub kyi sams kyi stong nyid snying rje’i snying po can’i rgyud la skye ba’i thabs su gsungs pa yin |.

⁶⁴ Kuśalamālasamparigrahasūtra (T, fol. 73a2–3; D, fol. 50b5–6): ma pham pa ’di lta ste | dper na mar med pas mar gyi snying khu rgyun chad par ’gyur ba de bzhin du | ma pham pa byang chub tu sams bskyed pa med par | de bzhin gshogs pa mngon par grub par mi ’gyur ro |. This is also cited by sKa-ba dPal-brtseg in his gSung rab rin po che (P, fol. 267b5–6; D, fol. 354a5; S, vol. 115, p. 921.6–8).

⁶⁵ Bodhicaryāvatāra 3.31cd:

saddharmākṣāramānakān navanītaṃ samuḥthitaṃ ||

For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 22.

attain the state of nirvāṇa as soon as possible; and the magnificent type aspires to become a buddha for the benefit of oneself and others by striking a delicate and precarious balance between samsāra and nirvāṇa, a balancing act that a bodhisattva performs on a single pivotal point, namely, bodhicitta, characterised by upāya (or karunā) and prajñā.

bSod-nams-rtse-mo (1142–1182) in his rGyud sde spyi rnam presents four Buddhist soteriological models (tshul) according to Mahāyāna sources,67 namely, those that propose (1) three soteriological paths and three soteriological goals, (2) one soteriological path and three soteriological goals, (3) one soteriological path and one soteriological goal, and (4) three soteriological paths and one soteriological goal. Glo-bo-mkhan-chen bSod-nams-lhun-grub (1456–1532), in setting forth the exegetical methods (bshad thabs) he employs upon Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’-rgyal-mtshan’s (1182–1251) Thub pa dgongs gsal,68 provides some additional information on systems and scriptures that propose these four soteriological models:

(1) According to the three-path-and-three-goal model, there are three separate (and independent) paths, namely, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna/Buddhayāna (which we shall re-encounter in chapter five), and three separate corresponding soteriological goals, namely, śrāvakabodhi, pratyekabodhi, and buddhabodhi,69 which should be sought after by three types of persons (those endowed with the spiritual disposition of a śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva, respectively). A person whose spiritual disposition is not determined or fixed (aniyatagotraka) may try treading one of the paths. According to this model, for someone with no spiritual disposition (agotraka), trying to tread any of the three soteriological paths would be a labour lost. This soteriological model is said to have been advocated by Yogācāra teachers, such as Asanga, on the inspiration of such scriptures as the Samdhinirmocanasūtra.

(2) The one-path-and-three-goal model has the seekers of salvation passing through a single gateway in order to reach their respective soteriological goals. This single passage is termed the gate of emancipation without a second (advitiyaśivadvāra: gnyis pa med pa ’i zhi sgo),70 usually meant in the sense of direct meditative insight into true reality, and this latter often equated with the non-self or absence of self (nairātmya). For Mañjuśrīmitra, as we shall see in chapter five, bodhicitta (in its ontological sense) is itself de facto an advitiyaśivadvāra. This model is said to have been accepted by Candarakīrti and other proponents of Madhyamaka (i.e. Prasāṅgika-Madhyamaka) on the basis of the explicit purport of the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures.

(3) The position and proponents of the one-path-and-one-goal model remain obscure. bSod-nams-rtse-mo does not identify any of its advocates, although he himself holds that it and the fourth model are similar in essence (ngo bo mtshungs pa) and tenable (’thad).71 Glo-bo-mkhan-chen reports that according to earlier teachers (snga rabs pa), this model was proposed by Byang-chub-sems-dpa’-gcig-pur-smra-ba in line with scriptures such as the Akāśagarbhāsūtra. Although Rong-zom-pa did not discuss the soteriological model of the

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67 bSod-nams-rtse-mo, rGyud sde spyi rnam (p. 15.1–2): spyi don gsum pa khyad par du ’phags pa de la dbye na bzhi sde | lam gsum la ’bras bu gsum ’dod pa dang | lam gcig la ’bras bu gsum ’dod pa dang | lam gcig la ’bras bu gcig ’dod pa dang | lam gsum la ’bras bu gcig ’dod pa’o ||.

68 Glo-bo-mkhan-chen, bShad thabs lam bzang (pp. 199.18–200.15).

69 See TSD, s.vv. nyan thos kyi byang chub, rang sangs rgyas kyi byang chub, and sangs rgyas kyi byang chub.

70 See below n. 95.

71 rGyud sde spyi rnam (pp. 15.2–16.1).
gCig-pur-smra-ba (*Ekatvavāda) school, he did explain some of its fundamental tenets. Based on his explanation, we can perhaps assume that this school would have compared sentient beings to gold in its unrefined state and buddhas to gold in its refined state, and pointed out they are actually, therefore, two forms of the same element. There is thus only one path, namely, the process of purification; and one goal, namely, the purified state.

(4) The three-path-and-one-goal model is said to have been proposed by teachers such as Virūpa on the authority of scriptures such as the Saddharmanapundarikasūtra. One might get the impression that this model proposes three equally valid (but separate) paths to the same goal—like three ways of getting to the top of a triangular pyramid. Yet what is actually intended here is the soteriological model of the Tathāgatagarbha school: A śrāvaka and a pratyeke-buddha would walk their respective paths or ride their respective vehicles up until a certain point, but finally they, too, will have to join the bodhisattvas and proceed on until they all become buddhas.

(e) Two Mahāyāna Soteriological Models of Becoming a Buddha

The type of buddha presupposed by a system or scripture determines the model followed for becoming a buddha. One can find several less common Mahāyāna methods of becoming a buddha (some of them closely related or even overlapping), particularly in tantric scriptures—such as those of paying homage or offering to the buddhas, coming into contact with mantras, visualising buddhas through the samādhi of a buddha, uniting with all buddhas

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72 See the Theg chen tshul 'jug (A, fols. 27b2–28a5, 37b1–4; B, pp. 445.16–446.11, 456.10–19), where some of the positions of gCig-pur-smra-ba are described. The gCig-pur-smra-ba, according to these descriptions, is obviously a certain school of Mañjuśrī (probably an offshoot of Yogācāra) thought, which postulates a single cognitive element (shes pa'i 'kham gcig) or a single cognitive nature (shes pa'i ngtan bo ngyid gcig) and is contrasted with what one might call the mainstream Yogācāra school, which postulates eight perceptual-conceptual apparatuses (rnam par shes pa tshogs bgyad).

73 In this regard, it is worth considering the attempts made by traditional Chinese Buddhist scholars to classify the most important Mahāyāna scriptures according to doctrinal hierarchy or profundity, and in terms of soteriological models of simultaneism or gradualism as presented in KAN'NO 2000. A scheme called the ‘five-period classification’ (wasli jiaopan) was devised during the period of the North-South dynasties in China (very likely by Huiguan, a disciple of Kumārajīva). According to this classification, for example, the Saddharmanapundarikasūtra was accorded a higher status than the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, whereas it was subordinated to the Avatamsakasūtra and Mahāparinirvānasūtra. The Avatamsakasūtra is said to propose a soteriology of simultaneism, and the other works a soteriology of gradualism. This scheme was later refuted by the so-called Three Great Masters of the Sui, namely, Jingying Huiguan (523–592), Zhiyi (538–598), and Jizang (549–623), according to whom Mahāyāna scriptures do not differ in how they reveal ultimate reality. See also the small Zen story narrated by Deninger-Polzer in BSTEH 2000: 273 (cf. 280), which seems to encapsulate the soteriological model followed in Zen Buddhism.

74 Kurukulla 2.7:

buddhebyo manasā deyā buddhavaphalakāmksinā | ahaṇa sarvabuddhavāṃ vidvādharatḥ samśīnat |.

See also the Taivasaṃgrahasūtra (HORUCHI 1983: 290):
sarvabuddhahamāhāpānumākāyavākāticātātāsat | aum namAmazonA means buddhavāṃ kṣipram āptavyāt ||.

The Tibetan translation (T, fol. 354b2–3; D, fol. 44b4) reads:
sangs rgyas thams cad bsod nams che ||
sku’gsungs thugs ni [khyi T] rdo rje skyes ||
ṛjes su yi rṣa ba mchod na ||
mnyur du sangs rgyas ’thob [thob T] par ’gyur ||.

75 Kurukulla 2.47:
siddhe sūte ca samśrṣṭo yathā svarno bhaven nidhīḥ | siddhamantreṇa samśrṣṭo budhakāyā hi mantranāḥ ||.
(and thereby becoming equal with them), and practising *buddha* recollection (*buddhānusmṛti*). The various models can all be perhaps subsumed under one of two models, what I call the ‘generation model’ and the ‘revelation model,’ which, borrowing from Seyfort Ruegg, could also be termed the ‘nurture model’ and the ‘nature model,’ respectively. Refuting theories that are based on one soteriological model by appealing to presuppositions of another has been one of the major methodological problems within the Tibetan Buddhist traditions. Recognising the fact that different theories presuppose different soteriological models may help us to better our understanding of the controversies surrounding the issues of gradualism (*rim gyis pa*) versus simultaneism (*cig char ba*) and intrinsic (*rang stong*) versus extrinsic emptiness (*gzhan stong*)—issues that are crucial to Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.

According to the generation model, becoming a *buddha* means generating the two (or more) *buddha* bodies (*kāya*) by means of the so-called two accumulations, namely, the accumulation of beneficial resources (*punasambhāra*) and the accumulation of gnosis (*jñānasambhāra*). The former is said to bring forth the physical bodies (*rūpākāya*), and the latter the body of true reality (*dharma-kāya*). Tibetan Buddhist scholars often cite Nāgārjuna to authenticate this idea. Usually a *buddha* (or perhaps, here, the Budāha) is regarded as the

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77 *Tattvasamgrahasūtra* (HORIUCHI 1983: 138):

*buddhabimamayayam sarvam adhimucya khadhausu*

*sarvabuddhasamādhim tu" buddhatvāya bhavisyati ||* "Perhaps read *"dhis tu?"

The Tibetan translation (T, fol. 335a1-2; D, fol. 29b2) reads:

nam mkha'i dbyings [dbyibs T] ni thams ca'i du ||
sangs rgyas gzugs su dmigs nas ni ||
sangs rgyas kun gyi tig 'dzin las ||
sangs rgyas nyid du 'grub pa 'gyur ||.

78 *Buddhasamāyogatantra*-1 (T, fol. 289b3-4; D, fol. 188b4-5):

*sangs rgyas kun dang mnyam sbyor bas ||
sangs rgyas kun dang mnyam par 'gyur ||
sangs rgyas kun dang mnyam pas na ||
sangs rgyas thams cad rab tu 'grub ['gyur T] ||.

See also *ibid.* (T, fol. 294b1-2; D, fol. 192b2). For an explanation of this verse, see Rong-zom-pa’s *mNyam sbyor 'grel pa* (A, fol. 140a4-6b; B, pp. 613.10-614.4).

77 *Tattvasamgrahasūtra* (HORIUCHI 1983: 149): *buddhānusmṛtisanāsiddhā śīghrama buddhatvam āpnyāt ||*. The Tibetan translation (T, fol. 336b1; D, fol. 30b4-5) reads:

*sangs rgyas rjes su dren grub pa ||
sangs rgyas nyid du myur du 'gyur ||.

79 Note that only the terms ‘nurture’ and ‘nature’ (i.e. without the word ‘model’) are employed by him (SEYFORT RUEGG 1989: 3).

80 For studies on the sudden and gradual approaches to awakening in Tibetan Buddhism, see SEYFORT RUEGG 1989; JACKSON 1994; VAN SCHAICK 2004: 11-19; 71-127. For discussions of the same topic in the context of Chinese Buddhism, see GREGORY 1987.

81 Ratnāvalī: 3.12-13 (no Sanskrit text extant):

*sangs rgyas rnams kyi gzugs sku ni ||
bsod nams tshogs las 'byung ba ste ||
chos kyi sku ni mdor bsdu na ||
rgyal po ye shes tshogs las 'khrungs ||
de lta bas nas tshogs 'di gnyis ||
sangs rgyas nyid ni thob pa'i rgyu ||
de ldor mdor na bsod nams dang ||
ye ses 'di ni riag bren mdzod ||.

See also *Yuktiśaṣṭītā* 60:
father of the bodhisattvas (pitā bodhisattvānām: byang chub sms dpa’ rnams kyi yab), and a bodhisattva as a buddha’s son or offspring (jinaṇputra: rgyal ba’i sras; jinaṇkura: rgyal ba’i mju gu; buddhātmaja/buddhaputra: sangs rgyas kyi sras). In contrast to a śrāvakā or a pratye kabuddha, who are sometimes pejoratively referred to as the buddha’s illegitimate sons, a bodhisattva is regarded as a buddha’s legitimate son (jinauraṇa: rgyal ba’i thugs kyi sras). Occasionally, however, a buddha is said to be born from a bodhisattva. It is also worth recollecting here that in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, Prajñāpāramitā herself is regarded as the mother of all buddhas (jinajanāṇi: rgyal ba’i yun) and other Buddhist saints.

The revelation model is based on the presupposition that sentient beings are by nature buddhas and that the spiritual practices such as those included in the two accumulations merely serve to reveal their true nature. Under this model, the distinctions among a normal sattva, bodhisattva, and (anachronistically) vajrāsattva (i.e. buddha) are not essential ones, but ones that are based merely on the absence or extent of adventitious impurities (āgāntukamala: glo bur gyi dri ma). This model is propagated by specific strands of Mahāyāna, such as the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, and by most Vajrayāna systems. The question as to which model the Madhyamaka school follows would be answered differently by different Tibetan Madhyamaka commentators. These two soteriological models were recognised in Tibet already in the eleventh century, for example, by Rong-zom-pa. He himself followed the revelation model, but did not regard it as necessarily contradictory to the

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82 Mahāvyutpatti, no. 385.

83 At what juncture or stage a person can be called a rgyal ba’i sras (or bodhisattva), that is, the rgyal ba’i sras threshold (rgyal sras kyi sa mtshams), is a contested issue in Tibet. Sāntideva (Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.9; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 5–6) and others take the position that one is born into the Sugata’s family the very first moment one generates bodhicitta, even though one has yet to attain the path of seeing (darṣanamārga). According to another school of thought represented by Candrakīrti (Madhyamakāvatāra 1.5cd), however, a person can become a bodhisattva only upon reaching the darṣanamārga. Tibetan exegesises have attempted to reconcile the two positions. One way is to assume that Sāntideva was employing the conventional bodhicitta as the criterion for Bodhisattvahood, whereas Candrakīrti absolute bodhicitta. Interestingly, these two (apparently) divergent criteria had already been observed (and even harmonised) by Rong-zom-pa, who also explained that in the tantric system a person obtains the appellation rgyal ba’i sras upon receiving abbhiseka and becomes one in fact upon becoming a vidyādhara. See the dKon mchog ’gre (A, fol. 143a2–4; B, p. 178.7–12): de la rgyal ba’i sras zhes bya ba’i ming gang du thob pa ni | theg pa chen po spyi las | bla na med pa yang dag par rdougs pa’i byang chub tu sems bsikyed nas rgyal ba’i sras su ming ’thob bo zhes grags so || bden pa mthong nas dngos gzhi ’thob bo zhes grags so || de bzhin du gsang snags kyi tshul las kyang | dbang thob nas rgyal ba’i sras zhes bya ba’i ming ’thob pas | rig pa ’dzin par ’gyur nas rgyal ba’i sras nyid du gyur pa yin no ||.

84 See TSD, s.vv. sras, sras po, and sangs rgyas sras.

85 Mahāvyutpatti, no. 641. See also TSD, s.v. thugs kyi sras.

86 Candrakīrti (Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya, pp. 4.10–6.6) resorts to logical reasoning (yukti) and authoritative scriptures (āgama) to establish that a buddha arises from a bodhisattva.

87 See, for example, the Abhisamayālaṃkāraavivrti (p. 6.2). Cf. the opening verse of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra.

88 See, for example, Ratnagotavibhāga 1.47:

aśuddho ‘śuddhaśuddho ‘tha saviśuddho yathākramam |
sattvadhātā ti proktō bodhisattvas tathāgataḥ ||

For an English translation, see TAKASAKI 1966: 230–231.
generation model. In commenting on the generation of bodhicitta in the second chapter of the *Guhyagarbhatantra*, Rong-zom-pa explains that although sentient beings are in reality buddhas, they do not realise it, and hence need to generate the two kinds of bodhicitta. Nonetheless, aware of the logic that if something is already inherently existent it cannot be generated, he explains that the process of generating bodhicitta mentioned in the *Guhyagarbhatantra* is merely a revelatory condition and not a generating cause. Therefore, for him, the two accumulations merely illuminate but do not generate Buddhahood. For Rong-zom-pa there is hence no actual contradiction between the two soteriological models, since the generation model, which is, strictly speaking, based on the principle of causes and conditions, is in conformity with the manner in which things appear to sentient beings. This soteriological model automatically implies that the ground (gzhi), path (lam), and result (bras bu) cannot actually be distinguished. The very ground is taken as the path, and the result does not transcend the ground.

4. Ontology

The various Buddhist notions of ontology, a term I use here in the sense of a theory of being or reality such as, are of direct relevance to the study of bodhicitta and the concept of becoming a buddha, for in Buddhism a salvific breakthrough (including the becoming of a buddha) is only possible by gaining direct cognitive access to true reality. As I try to show in chapter three, it is this idea that seems to explain not only the existence and appearance of the historical Buddha but also to doctrinally justify the concept of multiple buddhas and support the theory of oneself becoming a buddha. The idea of an ontological buddha that we have just been considering and that of ontological bodhicitta (which we shall dwell on in chapter seven,

89 dKon mchog 'gre (A, fol. 92a4–6; B, p. 124.1–4); “According to the popular general [system of Mahāyāna], the ‘generation of the resolve to [strive for] awakening’ (bodhicittotpāda) is considered to be the generation of insight (prajñā) and compassion (karunā) in [one’s] mental continuum, in reliance upon [one’s own] spiritual disposition (gotra) and upon the strength of a spiritual friend (kalyānāmitra). However, here [in this system, the generation of bodhicitta] is considered merely a revelatory condition of reality, which is primordial. Thus the expression ‘primordially awakened mind’ has been used” (de yang thun mong du grags pa ni rigs dang bshes gnyen gyi stobs la brtien nas | shes rab dang snying rje rgyad la bsksyed pa ni byang chub kyi sms bskyed pa zhes 'dod de | 'dir ni ye nas yin pa'i don gsal bar byed pa'i rkyen tsam du 'dod de | de'i phyir ye nas sangs rgyas pa'i sms zhe smos pa yin no ||).

90 Teg chen tshul 'jug (A, fol. 24a4–5; B, pp. 441.24–442.2): bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs kyi lus dang spyod yul yongs su dag pa 'dzin cing snang ba'i rgyu dang rkyen du 'gyur ba ni bden mod kyi | snang ba'i dngos gzhi'i rgyu ni ma yin no ||; ibid. (A, fol. 25b3–4; B, p. 443.11–13): de bas pa bsod nams kyi las kyang snang ba dag par byed pa'i rkyen yin yang | dngos gzhi'i rgyu dang rkyen ni ma yin no || ye shes kyi tshogs kyang ma yin te ||.

91 Teg chen tshul 'jug (A, fol. 111a1–3; B, pp. 536.24–537.2): de la tshag pa 'og ma ba'i tshul las rgyu 'bras kyi tshul de skad du bshad pa de dag kyang | 'gro ba boddha la phrul bar snang bar | 'gyur ba'i rgyur bshad pa ni 'gal ba myed de | rgyu rkyen sgya ma las 'bras bu sgyur mar snang ba 'grub pa'i phyir ro || | on kyang 'gro' ba'i don du snang ba boddha kyang | de dag kho na la rag las pa'ang ma yin te | rdzogs pa cchen po'i tshul la de dag bkag pa 'am byed de | thabs rgya mtsho bsam gyes mi khryab pa'i mthun snang ra rgya mtsho 'byung ba zad do || | on kyang sngags rgyas kyi yon thams clas ni | byang chub sms kyi mthu las brtsal ba myed par 'byung steg | de yang rgyan bzhin dang mgon du 'gyur pa'i mthu'o ||.

92 dKon mchog 'gre (A, fol. 165b2–4; B, pp. 201.24–202.3): sngags rgyas sa'i chos thams cad kyang 'di'i gnas skabs su gzhi dang lam da'od 'bras bu'i cho sngags rgyan bzhin byag brag tu gyur pa med de | gzhi nyid lam du byas pa yin la | 'bras bu gzhi las khyad par 'phags pa med pas | 'di ni sngags sngags thams cad kyi gsgang ba'i man ngag nges pa'i don mthar thug pa yin no zhes bstan no ||. See also the Ratnavekṣa (P, fol. 19a4–5; D, fol. 166b–7; S, vol. 20, p. 38.18–19): ... byang chub dang lam yang gsal ba dang mi gsal ba'i gnas skabs su gtags pa'o ||.
where I also discuss synonyms and near synonyms of the term), along with positive-mystical and negative-intellectualist perceptions of ontological reality, seem to be particularly relevant to understanding what it means to become a buddha. They are also, in my view, a key to the understanding of such tantric concepts as Vajrasatva, the Primordial Buddha Samantabhadra, Hevajra, and Kalacakra, for part of the significance of these deities seemingly always lies in the ontological buddha or ontological bodhicitta. Mahāyāna ontology, despite its soteriological neutrality (it tilts neither to samsāra nor nirvāṇa), is of utmost soteriological relevance, since it is nescience or cognisance of true reality, the core of that ontology, that results in a state of bondage or release.

While various Buddhist systems and scriptures may disagree on the nature of ontological reality, they all seem to agree on its perpetual existence; and the idea that the true reality of phenomena exists and endures independently of the appearance of a buddha runs like a thread throughout the various Buddhist systems and scriptures.\(^{93}\) Generally speaking, the principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is what is meant by true reality, and the direct realisation of it is, as we shall see below, seeing the Dharma and hence also the buddhas.\(^{94}\) For most Buddhists (except perhaps for the Vātsīputriyas or Pudgalavādins), true reality, through the realisation of which one attains salvation, is the non-essentiality or selflessness (nairātmya) of the person (pudgala) and of phenomena (dharma), and is called the one and only entrance gate to salvation.\(^{95}\) Another designation for true reality is emptiness (śūnyatā), which is doubtless, in one form or another, universally acceptable to Buddhist traditions. It is also said that seeing śūnyatā is seeing a buddha. As we shall see in chapter seven, there are several synonyms of ontological reality, the most important being the ontological buddha and bodhicitta. However, the demarcation between bodhi, citta, bodhicitta, and buddha seems to dissolve on the ontological level. In Mahāyāna sources, one often encounters attempts to reduce everything to one level. Thus, one particularly interesting aspect of the concept of becoming a buddha is that all phenomena, including sentient beings and buddhas, are levelled out onto a common plane.\(^{96}\) This is perhaps justified if we understand, as Āryadeva did, that the emptiness of one is the emptiness of all.\(^{97}\)

\(^{93}\) See chapter three, n. 24.

\(^{94}\) Suhrlekha 112.


advitiyam sivadvaram kudristhinam dhayanakaram |
visayah sarvabuddhanam iti nairatmyam ucyeate ||

For English translations, see Lang 1986 115 and Tillemans 1990: vol. 1, p. 126: Candrakirti, Catuṣṭātakaṭīkā (Tillemans 1990: vol. 2, p. 39; Suzuki 1994: 268): yad advitiyam sivadvaram tan nairatmyam |. See also the TSD (s.v. zhi ba'i sgo), where references from the Tattvasamgraha and Tattvasamgrahopaniṣṭikā are provided.

\(^{96}\) See, for example, Mahāyānavimśikā, verse no. 9 (Tucci 1956: 201):

svabhāvena na coppanā nirvṛttas ca na tatvatah |
yathākāśam tathā buddhāḥ sattvāḥ caivaikalaksanāḥ ||

For an English translation, see Tucci 1956: 205. Cf. also Acintyastava 42:

buddhānām sattradhistos ca tenābhinnatam arthatah |
āmanas ca pāreṣām ca samatā tena te matā ||

For an English translation, see Lindtner 1997: 27.

\(^{97}\) Catuṣṭātaka 8.16 (Lang 1986: 82):

bhāvasyaikasya yo draṣṭā draṣṭā sarvasya sa smṛtaḥ |
ekasya śūnyatā yaiva saiva sarvasya śūnyatā ||

For an English translation, see Lang 1986: 83.
5. Buddhist Epistemology and Gnoseology

This study deals in part, both directly and indirectly, with a number of issues pertaining to Buddhist epistemology and gnoseology, particularly in chapter seven, where I present a typology of bodhicitta. My main concern is, however, not Buddhist epistemology (i.e. a theory of knowledge) per se but the underlying epistemological foundations and presuppositions of Buddhist soteriology. Gnoseology, here primarily in the sense of a theory of meditative insight or gnosis (jñāna: ye shes) within the Buddhist context, may simply be understood as a kind of ‘higher epistemology.’ In a certain way, if one were to make a distinction between mind (citta: sens; manas: yid; vijñāna: rnam par shes pa) and gnosia (jñāna: ye shes), as is done, for example, in some Mahāyāna and rDzogs-chchen sources, epistemology may be said to encompass the theory of knowledge mediated by the mind, and gnoseology a theory of transcendental knowledge, or gnosis. Soteriologically, as the concept of the four types of reliance (pratīsārana: rton pa) suggests, gnosia is clearly ranked higher than the mind. For a seeker of salvation within Buddhism, the cognitive acuteness of mind is certainly a valuable asset, but it can never take the place and role of gnosia, for the only way to experience ontological buddha, nirvāṇa, bodhi, or bodhicitta in the form of a spiritual event is through gnoseological buddha, nirvāṇa, bodhi, or bodhicitta.

The actual spiritual breakthrough in Buddhism is an intellectual event, inasmuch as a direct cognitive insight is called for, not a physiological or emotional one. We need, then, to ponder the role of cognisance and nescience, the presence and absence of knowledge, within the mechanism of bondage and release. According to Aryadeva, for instance, disorientation (moha: gti mug) or ignorance pervades all other kleśas, even as the tactile sense faculty (kāyendriya) pervades the entire body. Hence, all kleśas can be destroyed by destroying moha. For Aryadeva, moha represents not only a hindrance to mokṣa but also to higher mundane existence. The idea that there is no salvation without the cognition of true reality (i.e., here, śūnyatā), is explicated also in the Bodhicittavivarana and Yuktiśaṭṭikā.

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98 Mahāvyutpatti, nos. 1545–1549.

99 Catuḥsātaka 6.10 (LANG 1986: 66):
lus la lus dbang ji bzhin du ||
gti mug kun la gnas ’gyur te ||
de phyir nyon mongs thams cad kyang ||
gti mug bcom pas bcom par ’gyur ||.

For an English translation, see LANG 1986: 67.

vighnam tatvasya yaḥ kuryād vrto mohena kenaicit ||
kalyāṇādhigatis tasya nāsti mokṣe tu kā kathā ||.

For English translations, see LANG 1986: 113 and TILLEMANS 1990: vol. 1, p. 124. Cf. Ratnavālī 2.22:
durjñātena tathānena vināśam adhigacchati ||
samyagijñātena tu sukham bodhiṃ cāpnoty anuttaram ||.

101 Bodhicittavivarana 72:
gang dag stong nyid mi shes pa ||
de dag thar pa ’i rten ma yin ||
’gro drug srid pa ’i btson ral ni ||
mongs pa de dag ’khor bar ’gyur ||.

For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 69. Cf. Yuktiśaṭṭikā 4:
yod pas rnam par mi grol te ||
med pas srid pa ’di las min ||
dngos dang dngos med yongs shes pas ||
bdag nyid chen po rnam par grol ||.
Samsāra is conceived of as rotating on a single axle, namely, nescience (expressible in a number of ways). Ignorance is ultimately responsible for the evolution and dissolution of the world, which consists of the mundane setting (snod) and its inhabitants (bcud), along with the intellectual-emotional defilements and their undesirable consequences, such as misery and discontentment. The uncontrollable rotation of the wheel of existence (bhavacakra: srid pa'i 'khor lo) can be brought to a momentous halt by putting its axle, ignorance, out of action. In other words, the seemingly formidable and everlasting complex of samsāra can be dismantled, like a house of cards, by undermining nescience. All the remaining work is like clearing up the rubble.

Ultimately, correct perception is the only possible antidote for misperception; and bondage (bandha: being ba), caused by misperception, can only be eliminated or brought to cessation—the actual release (mokṣa/mukti: grol ba)—by correct perception. This notion of release upon seeing true reality (satyadarśana) is found in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources. According to Rong-zom-pa, the idea of release upon seeing true reality is common to all Buddhist systems. Dharmakīrti, too, states that one becomes realised upon seeing emptiness. For Nāgārjuna, there are three ways of dealing with phenomena such as visible objects. It is not by being attached to or detached from them that one is released but by knowing their nature. According to Āryadeva, the seed of existence ceases sprouting upon one’s seeing the non-existence of a substantial self (or phenomena). Similarly, Śāntideva states that kleśas are weaklings to be annihilated by Prajñā’s (mere) glance. The Vajradākinīguhyatantra states:

Upon realising [the nature of] one’s mind oneself,
[One realises that every] sentient being has primordially been a buddha.

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102 See, for example, Bodhicittavivarana 70:
   bde ba'i  sems ni zhi ba nyid ||
   sems zhi ba ni rmongs mi 'gyur ||
   rmongs med de nyid rtogs pa ste ||
   de nyid rtogs pas grol thob 'gyur ||.
   For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 57. Cf. chapter seven, n. 11.

103 Rong-zom-pa, bDen gnis 'jog lshul (A, fols. 163b6–164a1; B, p. 32.6–8): 'di ltar ryan thos kyi theg pa nas gzi bzung nas | rdzogs pa chen po'i mthar thug gi bar du | gang zhig yang dag pa'i don mthong na rnam par grol lo zhes thun mong du grags pa yin la .

104 For references, see chapter seven, n. 10.

105 Yuktiśaṅkī 55:
   bālāḥ sajantī rūpēṣu vairāgyaṃ yānti madhyamāḥ |
   svabhāvajñā vimucyante rūpaśīlantabhuddhayaḥ ||.
   For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 91.

106 Catuhṣataka 14.25 (LANG 1986: 134):
   srid pa'i sa bon rnam shes te ||
   yul rnam de yi spyod yul lo ||
   yul la bdag med mthong na ni ||
   srid pa'i sa bon 'gag par 'gyur ||.
   For an English translation, see LANG 1986: 135.

107 Bodhicaryāvatāra 4.46d: kleśāḥ prajñādṛṣṭisādhyā varākāh ||. CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 29 “The defilements are weaklings to be subdued by wisdom’s glare.” See also the Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇītka (p. 47.9–10).

108 Vajradākinīguhyatantra (T, fol. 16a4–5; D, fol. 231a3):
   rang sems rang gis rtogs pa na ||
   sems can gdod nas sangs rgyas so ||.
It is also stated that one who sees dependent origination sees the Dharma, and one who sees the Dharma sees the Buddha. A rNying-ma tantra entitled the ‘Jig rtен snang byed similarly states that one who sees emptiness sees what one calls a buddha (or perhaps the Buddha). In short, one could perhaps, following Rong-zom-pa, say that the nature of [one’s] mind—as it [really] is (sems kyi rang bzhin ji lta ba)—is the fundamental, actual [being] of all buddhas (sangs rgyas thams cad kyi dngos gzhi), and one who sees it sees the faces of all buddhas (sangs rgyas kun gyi zhal mthong).

6. Buddhist Axiology

Regardless of the kind of soteriological model presupposed, it is clear that salvific success in general and becoming a buddha in particular rest on certain sets of modi operandi and modi vivendi. Chapters nine, ten, and eleven are devoted mainly to ethical-moral aspects of bodhicitta, namely, its cultivation, preservation, and restoration, respectively. In the belief that an understanding of Buddhist axiology (particularly of ethics and morality) is crucial for our understanding of Buddhist soteriology, I shall attempt here to consider some aspects of Buddhist axiology in the context of the three vows (trisamvara: sdom pa gsum), namely, the prātimokṣa, bodhisattva, and mantra vows. A detailed analysis of the various tantric and non-tantric vows and their intricate relationship is, of course, beyond the scope of this study. For present purposes, I avail myself mainly of two sources, namely, the Samvarasamgraha (perhaps falsely ascribed to Atiśa) and Rong-zom-pa’s dKon mchog ’grel, which are very probably some of the earliest sources that deal exhaustively with the matter and have not yet been studied. I shall, however, concentrate on those passages that deal with distinctions among the three vows, and it is hoped that the attempted translations will enable us to gain an idea of how the ethical-moral disciplines of all three vehicles (i.e. Śrāvakayāna, Pāramitāyāna, and Vajrayāna) stand in relation to each other.

(a) The Three-Vowel Scheme

In Tibet it is said:

109 Śālistambasūtra (SCHOENING 1995: 392). The Sanskrit text of this famous statement is transmitted in commentaries such as Yasomitra’s Abhidharmakośavyākhyā and Prajñākaramati’s Bodhicaryavatārāpanjikā (ibid. 701–702): yo bhikṣavah praṇīyasamutpādam paśyati sa dharmaṃ paśyati | yo dharmaṃ paśyati sa buddham paśyati |. See also NAKAMURA 1980: 65: “Buddha is the one who sees dharma.” For the Pāli version of this statement, see GETHIN 2004a: 535–536.

110 ‘Jig rtен snang byed (p. 923.5):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{song pa nyid kyi don rtogs na} & \\
\text{sangs rgyas sangs rgyas mthong ba yin} & 
\end{align*}
\]

111 dKon mchog ’grel (A, fol. 162a1–3; B, p. 198.5–10).

112 The term ‘axiology’ is lexically defined as “the theory and study of values, primarily of intrinsic values (as those in ethics, aesthetics, and religion) but also of instrumental values (as those in economics) particularly with reference to the manner in which they can be known or experienced. their nature and kinds, and their ontological status” (Webster’s, s.v. axiology; cf. HWP, s.vv. Axiology and Wertphilosophie). It is also defined as “the philosophical study of goodness, or value, in the widest sense of these terms” (EB, s.v. axiology). Thus the term ‘axiology’ can be used fruitfully in the Buddhist context, mainly, to be sure, in the sense of the Buddhist theory of ethical and moral values.

113 At least two major publications on the study of the three-vowel theories in Tibetan Buddhism are available: RHTON 2002 & SOBISCH 2002.
The root of [the Buddhist] doctrine is Vinaya (i.e. as representative of Śrāvakayāna). The essence of [the Buddhist] doctrine is Pāramitā[yāna]. The quintessence of [the Buddhist] doctrine is Mantra[yāna].

This conventional formulation reflects the true spirit of Buddhist theory and practice among Tibetan Buddhists. The underlying axiological concepts of these three systems are encapsulated in the three vows. The term samvara may be translated as 'restraint,' 'discipline,' or 'vow.' The most conservative conception of the trisamvara seems to be that involving the restraint of body (kāyasamvara: lus kyi sdom pa), restraint of speech (vāksamvara: ngag gi sdom pa), and restraint of mind (manasīsamvara: yid kyi sdom pa). In the Abhidharma-kosa and its commentaries, one finds the concept of three kinds of samvara, namely, prātimokṣasamvara, dhyanasaṃvara, and anāsravasaṃvara. There is yet another useful categorisation of śīla, found (at least explicitly) only in Tibetan sources, namely, (a) ethical-moral discipline [motivated by the desire for] protection ('jigs skyob kyi tshul khrims), (b) ethical-moral discipline [motivated by] desirable [worldly] rewards (legs smon gyi tshul khrims), and (c) ethical-moral discipline [motivated by the sense of] renunciation (nges 'byung gi tshul khrims). These are also called vows (i.e. 'jigs skyob kyi sdom pa, legs smon gyi sdom pa, and nges 'byung gi sdom pa). The last kind of śīla or samvara is identical with the prātimokṣasamvara, which is said to be exclusively Buddhist and relevant to a person's salvific aspirations. It is said that an apparent prātimokṣasamvara would only then become an authentic when a genuine sense of renunciation arises. Based on the solid ground of higher ethical-moral discipline (adhisīla), the aspirant may develop higher meditative concentration (adhisamādhi) and higher insight (adhiprajñā), and finally he or she may indeed attain nirvāṇa or Arhatship.

But what if one's aim is not merely the attainment of nirvāṇa or Arhatship, but Buddhahood itself? Some Mahāyāna sources state that the prātimokṣasamvara does not meet the aspirations of a bodhisattva. Indeed we can see that the scope of śīla has been extended in Mahāyāna Buddhism. The old prātimokṣasamvara is subsumed under what is called samvaraśīla, while kuśaladharmasamgrāhakāśīla and sattvārthakriyāśīla enter as new elements. The idea is that it is not enough to merely refrain from unwholesome deeds. A bodhisattva ought to gather wholesome deeds as well, and actively help other sentient beings. From this perspective, the bodhisattva's ethical-moral discipline does not undermine or replace the śrāvaka's ethical-moral discipline but rather augments it. The ethical-moral discipline of a bodhisattva in turn undergoes further augmentation in tantric Mahāyāna.

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115 Nyang ral chos 'byung (p. 473.10–11): bstan pa'i rtsa ba 'dul ba yin | bstan pa'i snying po phar phyin yin | bstan pa'i nying khu gsang sngags yin....

116 See the citation in the Abhidharma-kosaḥya (p. 208.21–22):

kāyena samvarah sāduḥ sāduḥ vācā 'tha samvarah | manasā samvarah sāduḥ sāduḥ sarvatra samvarah ||.

For an English translation, see PRUDEN 1988-90: 586. See ibid. 716, n. 77, where the sources of this verse are identified as the Samyuktāgama, Dharmapada, and Udānavarga.

117 mTsho tīk (p. 18.6–7). Note the expression nairyanikam śīlam (nges par 'byin pa'i tshul khrims) in TSD, s.v. nges par 'byin pa.

118 The expressions 'jigs skyob kyi sdom pa, legs smon gyi sdom pa, and nges 'byung gi sdom pa, and the respective motivations, namely, 'jigs skyob kyi bsam pa, legs smon gyi bsam pa, and nges 'byung gi bsam pa, are used in the mTsho tīk (p. 70.14–21).

119 TSD, s.v. tshul khrims rnam pa gsum.
(b) Comparing and Contrasting the Three Vows

The *Samvarasamgraha* provides thirteen distinctions among the three vows.\(^{120}\) [1] Of these [three vows],\(^{121}\) the *prātimokṣa* vow accentuates the [adoption and abandonment of] wholesome and unwholesome actions. The *sīṭra* (i.e. *bodhisattva*) vow accentuates compassion. The *mantra* vow accentuates the indivisibility of body (*kāya*), speech (*vāc*), and mind (*citta*). [2] The *prātimokṣa* vow arises from the firm resolve [to strive] for *nirvāṇa*. The *bodhisattva* vow arises from excellent altruistic inclination (*adhyāśāya*). The *mantra* vow arises from *bodhicittavajra*. [3] The *prātimokṣa* vow is [characterised by] seven [kinds of] abandonment.\(^{122}\) The *bodhisattva* vow is [characterised by] ten [kinds of] abandonment. The *mantra* vow is [characterised by] one [kind of] abandonment. [4] In the *prātimokṣa* treatises, both types of reproachable [deeds] (*avadya*) are mentioned. In the *bodhisattva* treatises, only those [deeds] reproachable by nature (*prakrtisāvadya*) are mentioned.\(^{123}\) In the tantric treatises, neither of the two terms is mentioned. [5] The *prātimokṣa* vow, it is maintained, really exists. The *bodhisattva* vow, it is maintained, exists only nominally. In the *mantra* context, neither of the two terms is mentioned. [6] The *śrāvaka* vow is [said to] possess many impediments. The *bodhisattva* vow is [said to] possess a few impediments. No impediments are explicated in [the context of] the *mantra* vow. [7] There is no prospect of retaking the first vow if the *pāraṇīka* offence has occurred. There is the prospect of retaking the middle vow [even] if the *pāraṇīka* offence has occurred.

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\(^{120}\) *Samvarasamgraha* (P, fols. 258b4–259a8; D, fols. 48a6–49a2; S, vol. 41, pp. 701.1–702.14); [1] de la so sor [so PN] thar pa'i sdam pa ni | las dge sdig gtso ston to || mdo sde'i sdam pa ni snying rje gtso ston to || gsang snags kyi sdom pa ni sku gsum thugs kyi mi phyed pa gtso ston to [no P] || [2] de [add. de PN] la so thar pa'i sdom pa ni mya ngan las 'das pa'i bsam pa brtan po las skye'o || byang chub sems dpai' sdom pa ni thag pa'i bsam pa bzang po las skye'o || gsang snags kyi sdom pa ni rdo rje byang chub kyi sems las skye'o || [3] de la so sor [so PN] thar pa'i sdom pa ni spong ba bdun no || byang chub sems dpai' sdom pa ni spong ba bceu'o || snags kyi sdom pa ni spong ba bceg go || [4] so sor [so PN] thar pa'i gzhung du ni kha na ma tho ba gnyi ga brjod do || byang chub sems dpai' gzhung du ni rtag bzhin 'ba' zhig brjod do || snags kyi gzhung du ni de gnyi ga'i tha snyad ma brjod do || [5] yang so sor [so PN] thar pa'i sdom pa ni rtags kyi bdag nyid du yod par 'dod do || byang chub sems dpai' sdom pa ni brtag = btags pa tsam du yod par 'dod do || snags su ni de gnyi ga'i tha snyad ma brjod do || [6] yong nyan thos kyi sdom pa la bar chad kyi chos mang du yod do || byang chub sems dpai' sdom pa la bar chad kyi chos nyung zad cig [geig PN] go || snags kyi sdom pa la ni bar chad kyi chos bshad pa [om. P] mea do || [7] yong sdom pa dang do ni lam pa byung na phyis blang ba'i skal ba med do || bar ma la ni pham pa byung na phyis blang ba'i skal ba med do || thar pa'i sdom pa ni snying rje byang chub kyi sems dang ldan na nang ma pa med do || [8] de la sdom [snon D] pa dang do la ni mkhan po dang slob dpon dgos so || bar ma'i sdom pa la ni bla ma geig pu'am [po'am N] yang na med po' || thar ma la ni thwiki ste || a bla ma'i zhal nas byung ba'i dbang dang || [9] ye shes lha'i byin gyi rhaps kyi dbang dang || [c] rdo rje mkha' 'gro mas lung bstan pa'i dbang dang || [d] rang nyid kyi sems kyi rtsal gyis thob pa'i dbang dang ngo || [9] yong snga ma ni ghon la gnad byod pa las idog go || bar ma ni de'i steng du gzhung la phan 'dogos pa'o' || phyi ma ni de'i steng du sangs rgyas kyi mdzad spnyod nangs su len pa'o' || [10] yong dang po sdom pa ni dgra bcom pa rnam ma kyi rjes su slob pa' || bar ma'i sdom pa ni sngon gyi byang chub sems dpai' rnam ma kyi rjes su slob pa'o || snags kyi sdom pa ni sangs rgyas rnam ma kyi rjes su slob pa'o' || [11] yong dang po sdom pa ni bdag 'ba' zhig gi don to [no PN] || bar ma'i sdom pa ni gzhung ba' zhig gi don to [no PN] || phyi ma'i sdom pa ni gnyi ga'i don to || [12] yong dang po' sdom pa ni ji srid 'tsho'i bar du mnon [gnos PN] so || bar ma'i sdom pa ni snying po byang chub kyi [kyis P] bar du'o' || phyi ma'i sdom pa ni nam mkha' [ka' P] ji srid gnas kyi bar du'o' || [13] sdom pa dang po' 'bras bu nyi mya mngan las 'das pa gnyis so || bar ma'i 'bras bu ni sa bceu'amsa sa bceu bceg pa'o' || thar ma'i 'bras bu ni sa bceu gnyis pa'o' ||.

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\(^{121}\) The remaining occurrences of the particles *de la* and *yang* in these passages will not be translated. They will be expressed as units of enumeration.

\(^{122}\) See the *mTsho ñik* (pp. 30.23–31.2).

\(^{123}\) Two kinds of actions are often mentioned, namely, those that are objectionable or reproachable (*sāvadya: kha na ma tho ba dang bcas pa*) and those that are unobjectionable or irreproachable (*anavadya: kha na ma tho ba med pa*). Those that are reproachable are further subdivided into two kinds, namely, those that are by nature unwholesome and thus by nature reproachable (*prakrtisāvadya: yang bzhin gyi kha na ma tho ba*), and those that are reproachable by agreement/convocation (*prajñāpatisāvadya: bcas pa'i kha na ma tho ba*) or reproachable in virtue of prohibition or decree (*pratikṣepaṇāsāvadya*, also rendered into Tibetan as *bcas pa'i kha na ma tho ba*).
occurred. The last vow does not degenerate if [it is] endowed with bodhicittavajra. [8] For [the assumption of] the first vow, a preceptor (upādhyāya) and a teacher (ācārya) are required. For [the assumption of] the middle vow, only one or no master (guru) is required. For [the assumption of] the last vow, there are four [kinds]: [a] an empowerment that has come into being verbally from a master, [b] an empowerment [received] through the power of a deity endowed with gnosis, [c] an empowerment [received] through the prophecy of a Vajraḍākīṃi, and [d] the empowerment received on the strength of one’s own mental capacity. [9] The former [vow] is characterised by benefiting others. The middle [vow] is, in addition, characterised by benefiting others. The last [vow] is, in addition, characterised by engagement in the activities of a buddha. [10] The first vow is tailored to the practices of arhats. The middle vow is [tailored] to the practices of bodhisattvas. The mantra vow is [tailored] to the practices of buddhas. [11] The first vow [aims at achieving] one’s own benefit alone. The middle vow [aims at achieving] others’ benefit alone. The last vow [aims at achieving] the benefit of both. [12] The first vow is conferred [and persists] as long as one lives. The middle vow [persists] until [one arrives at] the seat of awakening (bodhimanda, i.e. the spot under the Bodhi tree). The last vow [persists] as long as space prevails. [13] The result of the first vow is the two kinds of nirvāṇa (i.e. soppadhiśesānirvāṇa and nirupadhiśesānirvāṇa). The result of the middle vow is the ten stages [of a bodhisattva] or the eleventh stage (i.e. buddhabhūmi). The result of the last vow is the twelfth stage. [14]

The distinguishing features of the three vows as summarised in the Ita 'grel are as follows. [15]

[1] In brief, the śrāvakā vow [is characterised] by the refraining from inflicting injury on sentient beings. The bodhisattva vow [is characterised] by the engagement in benefiting sentient beings in addition to refraining from inflicting injury on them. The tantric vow [is characterised] by the conduct of engaging in benefiting sentient beings in addition to refraining from inflicting injury on them, by practising the activities of a tathāgata. [2] Moreover, for the śrāvakā vow, it is the conscious thought (du shes) and the actual [act] (ngos gshi) that are held to be of prime importance. For the bodhisattva vow, it is compassion (karunā) that is held to be of prime importance. For the tantric vow, it is insight (prajñā) that is held to be of prime importance. [3] Furthermore, śrāvakas follow the former noble arhats. Bodhisattvas follow bodhisattvas who are at high stages (bhūmi). Tantric practitioners follow the tathāgatas themselves. One could go on [in this way] extensively.

The dKon mchog 'grel states that the triad of view, conduct, and assistance (ita spyod grogs gsum) are said to be common to all vehicles. The view (ita ba) is equated with adhiprajñāśikṣā, conduct (spyod pa) with adhicittāśikṣā, and assistance (grogs) with adhīśīlāśikṣā. These three differ depending on the type of vehicle. [16] The work goes on to

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124 According to Rong-zom-pa, the concept of the twelve bhūmis occurs in the Vajrahrdayaūlaṃkāratantra. However, unlike the author of the Samvarasamgraha, who seems to suggest here that the result of the tantric vow is different from and superior to that of the bodhisattva vow, Rong-zom-pa (like many other Indian and Tibetan scholars) holds that the ultimate goal of both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna is Buddhahood and that there cannot be a bhūmi superior to the buddhabhūmi. The twelve bhūmis in the Vajrahrdayaūlaṃkāratantra, according to him, refer to different aspects of the buddhabhūmi itself, namely, the five kāyas/kulas (sku/rigs lnga), five jñānas (ye shes lnga), upāya (thabs), and prajñā (shes rab). For details, see his dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 154b5–155a5; B, pp. 190.18–191.6) and Ita 'grel (A, fol. 260b1–261a6; B, pp. 344.17–345.16).

125 Ita 'grel (A, fol. 265b2–266a1; B, p. 350.2–12); [1] mdor Ḥdsu’ na nyan thos kyi sdom pa ni | sams can la gnod par sbyor ba las log pa’o | byang chub sams dpa’i sdom pa ni | sams can la gnod par sbyor ba las log gi steng du yang | sams can la phan ’dogs pa la zhub sgs pa’o | gsang sngags kyi sdom pa ni | sams can la gnod par sbyor ba las log cing phan ’dogs pa la zhub sgs pa de yang | de bzhin gshegs pa’i mzas spyd nyams su b lunga te spyd pa’o. [2] gzhan yang nyan thos kyi sdom pa ni | ’du sdes dang drgyas gzi’i sgo nas gtsos’ bo yin par ’dod do | byang chub sams dpa’i snying rje gtsos’ bo yin par ’dod do | gsang sngags kyi ni shes rab gtsos’ bo yin par ’dod do | [3] gzhan yang nyan thos kyi ni sngon gyi phogs pa dgra bcom pa rnam kyi rjes su sblab pa’o | byang chub sams dpa’i sa chen po la gnas pa’i byang chub sams dpa’i rnam kyi rjes su sblab pa’o | gsang sngags kyi ni de bzhin gshegs pa nyid kyi rjes su slob pa’o | ha cang spros pas chog go |.
show how the tantric commitment excels the bodhisattva vow in seven ways, and the bodhisattva vow in turn excels the prātimokṣa vow in the same number of ways. The seven ways in which the bodhisattva vow excels the prātimokṣa vow are as follows:¹²⁷

Only the distinction in terms of assistance need be stated here. This is how the bodhisattva vow excels the prātimokṣa vow of the śrāvakas in the context of the non-tantric vehicles. The marks [of distinction] are infinite, but nonetheless, just as [Mahāyāna is] known to excel [Śrāvakayāna] by seven kinds of greatness,¹²⁸ so does [the bodhisattva vow] excel [the prātimokṣa vow] in the following seven ways: [1] Just as the greatness of [Mahāyāna’s] object (ālambanamahātva)¹²⁹ is characterised by the profundity and vastness of the object it seeks to appropriate, so is [that of] the accompanying bodhisattva vow [characterised by] the profundity and vastness [of its object of appropriation]; [it] is not an object [that can be fathomed by] disputants,¹³⁰ and goes beyond the domain of numerical figures. [2] Just as the greatness of practice (pratipattimahātva) [is characterised by] the fulfilment of one’s own objectives and those of others, so is [that of] the accompanying bodhisattva vow [characterised by everything that] is of use in achieving all [these] objectives. [3] Just as the greatness of gnosis (jñānamahātva) [is characterised by] the realisation that all phenomena are selfless, so is the accompanying bodhisattva vow in total harmony with the non-essentiality of phenomena (dharmanairātmya). [4] Just as the greatness of expedient means (upāyakausalyamahātva) [is characterised by] the fixation on neither of the two [extremes of] samsāra and nirvāṇa, so is the accompanying bodhisattva vow a factor conducive to the non-fixation on the two extremes.¹³¹ [5] Just as the greatness of activity (karmamahātva) [is characterised by] the purification of the buddha realms and the ripening of sentient beings, so is the accompanying bodhisattva vow [characterised by] the non-deterioration of these [activities]. [6] Just as the greatness of diligence (vīryamahātva) [is characterised by] the non-abandonment of perseverance for the sake of just one sentient being so long as samsāra [exists], so is the accompanying bodhisattva vow imbued with that [kind of diligence]. [7] Just as the greatness of attainment (samudgāgamahātva) [is characterised by] the perfection of the qualities of buddhas, so does [its] accompanying bodhisattva vow exist

¹²⁷ dKon mchog ‘grel (A, fols. 199b2–200b1; B, pp. 236.12–237.10): grogs kyi khyad par tsam zhig ’dir brjod par bya ste | de la mthsan nyid kyi theg pa’i gnas skabs su nyan thos kyi so sor thar pa’i sdom pa las | byang chub saṃs dpa’i sdom pa ji litar ’phags pa ni | sgo mtha’ yas kyang chen po rnam pa bdun gyi sgo nas ’phags par grags pa de bzhin du ’phags pa ste | [1] ’di litar dmigs pa chen po zab cing rgya che ba’i don la dmigs pa bzhin du | ’de’i grogs su gyur pa byang chub saṃs dpa’i sdom pa’ang zab cing rgya che ba yin te | rtog ge ba rnam kyi yul ma yin zhing grangs kyi spod yul las ’das pa yin no || [2] sgrub pa chen po bdag dang gzhan gyi don sgrub par byed pa bzhin du | grogs kyi sdom pa’ang don ma lus pa sgrub par byed pa la phan par byed pa rnam yin no || [3] ye shes chen po chos thams cad la bdag med par rtags pa bzhin du | grogs kyi sdom pa’ang chos bdag med pa dang mi ’gal ba kho na yin no || [4] thabs chen po ’khor ba dang mya ngan las ’das pa gnis ka la mi gnas pa yin pa bzhin du | grogs kyi sdom pa’ang mtha’ gnis la mi gnas pa yin las gnyis sgrub pa yin no || [5] las chen po sngos rgyas kyi zhih yongs su dag par bya ba dang | sems can yongs su smin par byed pa de bzhin du | grogs kyi sdom pa’ang de dag las yongs su nyams par mi ’gyur ba yin no || [6] brtson ’grus chen pos sams can gcig gi don ched du yang ’khor ba ji srid bar brtson pa mi ’dor ba yin pa bzhin du | grogs kyi sdom pa’ang de nyid kyi yongs su zin pa yin no || [7] yang dag par grub pa chen po sngos rgyas rnam kyi khyob yongs su rdo rtags pa yin pa bzhin du | grogs kyi sdom pa’ang yon tan gi yang chen pos sems can gcig gi don ched du yang ’khor ba ji srid bar brtson pa mi ’dor ba yin pa bzhin du | grogs kyi sdom pa’ang de nyid kyi yongs su zin pa yin no || [8] blo gros chung ba dang snying stobs chung ba rnam kyi yul ma yin no || de bals na byang chub saṃs dpa’i yon tan yin thos las kho ykat par du ’phags pa’i grangs dang tshad gzung bar mi nuds mod kyi | re zhih yul gyi sgo nas mdor bsdu na ’di dag tsam. du ‘du ru rung bar shes par bya’o ||.


¹²⁹ Probably to be equated with greatness of scriptures (dharmanairātmya).

¹³⁰ Cf. Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra 1.17.

¹³¹ The exact meaning of this sentence is not quite clear.
exclusively as a factor conducing to all possible aspects of good qualities. Therefore, the bodhisattva vow is profound and [its] depth difficult to fathom. It is vast and immeasurable. It is not a domain for [people with] meagre intellect and meagre courage. Thus, although one cannot measure the number and mass of the qualities of bodhisattvas [in virtue of which they] excel the śrāvakas, if one provisionally summarises [them] according to [their] objects [of appropriation and so forth], it should be known that they come under precisely these [seven kinds of greatness].

It is quite clear that Rong-zom-pa has used the seven kinds of greatness of Mahāyāna found in Indian sources such as the Mahāyānasūtrasūlamkāra to define the difference between the bodhisattva and prātimokṣa vows. However, it is not clear whether this was his own inspired idea or whether he had inherited it from his predecessors. (At least some Tibetan scholars, such as Kong-sprul Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho (1813–1899), seem to take it as the former. 132) Rong-zom-pa then goes on to show how the mantra vow, too, excels the bodhisattva and prātimokṣa vows in seven ways. But this is not done on the basis of the seven kinds of greatness found in the Mahāyānasūtrasūlamkāra. He has used a passage from the nineteenth chapter of the *Guhyagarbhatantra* on samaya as his textual basis. 133 The seven distinctions that he draws are as follows: 134

Similarly, one cannot count and express [the ways] the tantric samaya [is superior] to the bodhisattva vow, because [the tantric samaya] is much more profound and vast [than the bodhisattva vow]. For the moment, it will be shown here in brief that [the tantric samaya excels the bodhisattva vow] in seven ways. What are the seven? [1] [Persons who adhere to samaya possess] qualities that are spontaneously attained without effort, for [they] are sealed with the seal of Samantabhāra. [2] [They possess] superb power and empowerment, for [they] are

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132 Shes bya mdzod (p. 393.31–32):

theg chen 'og ma'i sblab gzhi mtha' dag las ||
che ba bdun gyis 'phags pa rong zom bzhed ||.

133 *Guhyagarbhatantra* (P, fol. 128b1–3; D, fol. 130a6–b1):

[1] gzhon yang rgyal mchog kun bzang gi ||
thams cad ma lus phyag rgya yi ||
sgrub byed dam pa ma lus 'grub ||
[2] de la sogs pa mtha' yas mchog ||
rgyal ba'i rigs mchog 'dzin pa de ||
'jig rten gsio dang 'khor gyis bkur ||
[3] dam pa mchog dang dam pa yis ||
sras dang spun dgon gs [dgon P] byin gyis rlob ||
[5] 'jigs med kun du [= tu] bzang por sbyor ||
[6] ji bzhin nyid dang 'dal ba'i thabs ||
ji snyed sdom pa bsam yas pa ||
ma lus nram dag lha gyis grub ||
[7] nyams na bsangs pas rdzogs pa dang ||
de la sogs te mtha' yas mchog ||.

134 dKon mchog 'greel (A, fols. 200b1–201a2; B, p. 237.11–24): de bzhin du byang chub sems dpas'i sdom pa las gsang sngags kyi dam tshig cis 'phags pa'i khyad par nram s kun bzang gi ||
del khyad par s par bstan te ||
| bdun gung zhe na ||| kun tu bzang po'i phyag rgya bs tab pes yon tan bzsal = rtso ||
| be med par lhun gyis grub pa dang ||
| 2 | jig rten gyi gso bo lha chen po rams dang de 'i khor ma mo dang ||
| mkha' 'gro ma rams kyis bkur gnas dam par mthong ba mthu dang byin rlaus khyad par du 'phags pa dang ||
| 3 | sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpas' rams kyis nye ba'i sras dang spun du dgon gs pas thugs rje' byin rlaus nyur du 'byang ba dang ||
| 4 | de bzhin gshogs pa nyid dang spyyul mthun pas spyyul yul khyad par du 'phags pa dang ||
| 5 | chos thams cad kun tu bzang po'i zhung di sbyor bas 'jigs pa dang bar tsha ba thams cad med pa dang ||
| 6 | bskri ba byang chub sems dpas' rams kyis nye ba'i sras dang spun du dgon gs pas thugs rje' byin rlaus nyur du 'byang ba dang ||
| 7 | nyams par gyur kyang bsang ba'i thabs yod pa ste ||
de ltar rams pa bdun la sogs pa'i yon tan mthu' yas pas khyad par 'phags so [pa B] zhes sbyar ro ||.
regarded as sublime objects of reverence by the lords of the world (lokajñesha), [namely,] the great deities and their retinues, the mārākas and dākinīs, [3] [They] rapidly acquire the empowerment of compassion, for [they] are regarded by buddhas and bodhisattvas as [their] intimate sons and brothers. [4] [They range over] a superb [domain of conduct], for [their] conduct corresponds to the domain of conduct of the tathāgatas. [5] [They] are without any fear and anxiety whatsoever, for [they see that] all phenomena are one with the realm of Samantabhādra. [6] All vows (samvara) that have been taught in either a provisional or definitive sense are naturally and spontaneously included [in the samaya] of this tantric system. [7] Even when [the samaya] has deteriorated, there is a method of retrieving [it]. In this way, one should understand by implication (lit. ‘apply’ or ‘employ’) that [the tantric samaya] excels [the bodhisattva vow] by an infinite number of qualities, such as these seven kinds [of excellence].

The idea of taking the pertinent verses of the *Guhyagarbha tantra as a basis for distinguishing the bodhisattva and mantra vows seems to be Rong-zom-pa’s own. Each of these seven points are explained in great detail in the dKon mchog 'grel. Since it is in these explanations that we can best see how the three vows are contrasted, we shall consider each of the explanations in turn. The explanation of the first point is as follows:

[1] How are [the observer of samaya] sealed with the seal of Samantabhādra? The śrāvakas are those who are born from the mouth (mukhato jñāha) of tathāgatas and are not [those who possess] the spiritual disposition (gotra) to become samyaksambuddhas, and are hence not sealed by the seal of the buddhas but merely sealed by the seal of the empowerment of buddhas. The bodhisattvas, [on the contrary,] it is taught in the sūtras, are sealed by one or three seals, for they are going to become tathāgatas, but nonetheless no seal of spontaneous attainment is commonly known [among them], and hence [it is] maintained that [they] realise the result with effort, in virtue of [their] spiritual disposition. [According to] the highest (niruttara) tantric system, [the observer of samaya] is said to be sealed with the seal of Samantabhādra, since there is no phenomenon that is not primordially awakened in the madantame mandala of [awakened] body, speech, and mind. Therefore, all qualities of the greatness of the result are [said to be] effortlessly and spontaneously attained.

The following explanation is given of the second point:}

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135 The Tibetan syntax seems to suggest that both mārākas and dākinīs are retinues of the great deities. I am not sure if this is factually correct. For the term mārākā, see TSD, s.v. ma mo, and for a discussion of the term dākinī, see ENGLISH 2002: 397–398, n. 67.

136 This passage has also been cited in the Shes bya mdzod (p. 349.1–11).

137 dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 201a2–b1; B, pp. 237.24–238.9): de la ji tut kun tu bzang po'i phyag rgyas btab ce na | de la nyen thos nram ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i zhal las skyes pa ste | yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas nram su 'gyur ba'i rigs ma yin pas sangs rgyas nyd kyi phyag rgyas ma btab kyi | hyin gyi brlabs kyi phyag rgyas btab pa tsam mo || byang chub sens dpa' nram ni de bzhin gshegs pa nyd du 'gyur ba'i phyir | phyag rgya geig dang gsum gyis btab par mdo sde nyid las gsums mod kyi | 'on kyang 'lhan gyis grubs pa'i phyag rgya thun mong du ma grags pas | rigs las rtshol bas 'bras bu mgon par 'grub [grub B] par 'dod pa yin no || gshang sngags bla na med pa'i [pas A] chos tshams cad ye nas skiu gsum thugs rdo re'i akyil 'khor du sangs ma rgyas pa' ga' yang med pas kun tu bzang po'i phyag rgyas btab ces bya ste || de bas na 'bras bu che ba'i yon tan thams cad rtshol ba med par lhun gyis grub pa yin no ||.

138 Usually an epithet of śrāvaka, but evidently also of a bodhisattva; see Mahāvyutpatti, no. 643, and TSD, s.v. zhal nas skyes pa. In the Tibetan translation of the Madhyamakāvatāra and Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyā, the term used is gsum skyes (in verses). See, for example, Madhyamakāvatāra 1.8, 2.7, 6.225. See also the Madhyamakāvārabhāṣyā (p. 341.18–19): bde bar gshegs pa'i gsum las skyes pa nrams te nyan thos nrams so zhes bya ba'i don no ||.

139 dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 201b1–202a1; B, p. 238.9–22): gnyis pa 'jig rien pa'i gtsos bo dang 'khor rnam kyis bkur gnas dam par gyur pa ni | nyan thos nrams kyang tshangs pa dang bgrya byin la sogs pa nrams yi bkur gnas yin yang sangs rgyas bzhin du bkur ba ni ma yin no || byang chub sens dpa’ nram s kyang de bas ches bkur ba yin mod kyi sangs rgyas bzhin du ni bkur ba ma yin no || yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas nrams ni
The second [point], being the sublime reverential object of the lords of the world and [their] retinues: Although śrāvakas are also reverential objects of [the lords of the world], such as Brahmā and Śakra, they are not revered like the buddhas. Although bodhisattvas are revered much more than them (i.e. śrāvakas), they are not revered like the buddhas. Samyaksambuddhas are to be highly revered. In the same way, people who observe the vow of conduct in their [respective] domains are also seen as reverential objects in a hierarchical order by the guardians who protect the Doctrine (dharmapāla); that is, those upholding the vow of conduct in the domain of śrāvakas are regarded as reverential objects but are not honoured (dam par [byed]) [like those abiding by the bodhisattva and mantra vows]. In the same way, those upholding the vow of conduct in the domain of bodhisattvas are honoured more but not as highly [those abiding by the mantra vows]. In the same way, those upholding the vow of conduct in the domain of buddhas are most highly honoured. Hence all [deities] have committed themselves to follow [their] instructions and to honour [them] as ornaments of [their] crowns. Therefore, on account of their (i.e. the deities’) assistance (sāhāyaka), the power and empowerment [of those upholding the tantric vow] greatly excel [those of the others].

The third distinction is explained thus:141

The third [point], namely, being regarded by buddhas and bodhisattvas as [their] intimate sons and brothers: If a son endowed with the major and minor marks [of a great being] is born to a universal monarch, [the father] thinks: “This [child] is going to be a universal monarch.” Similarly, if a person endowed with the marks of a vow (ṣiksā) that accords with the intent and conduct of buddhas appears, [the tathāgata] think: “This [person] is upholding the line of the tathāgatas.” On account of this, empowerment will occur soon. An alternative [explanation could be]: Just as a reflection appears in clear water to one who is endowed with pure perception, noble conduct, and the power [of an accompanying vow], the empowerment of the buddhas and bodhisattvas occur naturally and swiftly. For this reason [those upholding the tantric vow] are designated so.

Concerning the fourth point, Rong-zom-pa states:142

The fourth [point], a superb domain of conduct: The domain or object of appropriation (i.e. of the upholder of the mantra vow) is the domain of the conduct of a tathāgata; that is, [a tathāgata,] while abiding in the conduct of non-adoption and non-abandonment (all phenomena being primordially pure), does not disrupt the continuity of activities for the benefit of sentient

mchog tu bkur bar bya ba yin te | de bzhin du de rnam kyi spyod yul la zhugs pa'i sdom pa can gyi skye bo rnam la yang | chos skyong ba'i srung ma rnam kyi bkur gnas rim par mthong bar 'gyur te | nyan thos kyi spyod yul la zhugs pa'i sdom pa 'dzin pa rnam la yang bkar gnas su byed kyang dam par ni ma yin no || de bzhin du byang chub sens dpa'i spyod yul la zhugs pa'i sdom pa 'dzin pa rnam la yang de bas dam par byed cing | ches dam par byed pa ni ma yin no || de bzhin du sangs rgyas kyi spyod yul la zhugs pa'i sdom pa 'dzin pa rnam la ni ches dam par byed par 'gyur bas | kun kyang bka' nyan cing spyis gtsug rgyan du bkar bar dam bcas pas | de bas na de dag gi stong [stongs A] grols kyi dbang gis mthu dang byin rlabs lhag par 'phags par 'gyur ro ||

140 TSD, s.v. stong grols; JÄSCHKE 1881, s.v. stong grols.

141 dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 202a1–5; B, pp. 238.23–239.7): gsum pa sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpas nye ba'i sras dang pun du gongs pa ni | ji lha 'khor los sgyur ba'i rgyal po la mtsang dang dpe byad dang ldan pa'i bu skyes par gyur na | 'di las 'khor los sgyur ba'i rgyal po nyid 'byung ngo snyam du gongs pa bzhin du | sangs rgyas nyid kyi gongs gyed dang mthun pa'i bslab pa la mtsang dang ldan pa'i gang zag byung na | 'di ni de bzhin gshes pa nyid kyi gung ne yar 'dzin pa'o || ches gongs pa'i dbang gis mthun rlabs myur du 'byung ngo || rnam pa gcig tu chu dwangs pa la gzugs brnyan 'byung ba bzhin du | dmigs pa dag pa dang spyod pa | 'phags pa dang | grols kyi sdom pa nus pa dang ldan pa can la dang bzhin gis sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa'i byin rlabs myur ba nyid du 'byung bas de [d'Be' skad ces bya'o ||]

142 dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 202a5–b2; B, p. 239.7–14): bzhis pa spyod yul khyad par du 'phags pa ni | gsang sngags kyi spyod yul dang dmigs pa si de bzhin gshes pa nyid kyi spyod yul te | 'di lha chos thams cad gchod ma nas rnam par dag pas blang dor med pa'i spyod pa la gnas bzhin du | sesm can gyi dona yang gzugs kyi sku rnam pa gnyis kyi sgo nas mdzad pa rgyun mi gcod pa | 'di ni spyod yul gcig la mthun par zhugs pa yin no || sdom pa gzhon ni de lha ma yin te | sngon gyi 'phags pa dgra bcom pa rnam kyi rjes su slob pa dang | sa chen po la gnas pa'i byang chub sems dpa'chen po rnam kyi rjes su slob pa yin no ||
beings by means of [his] two kinds of corporeal bodies (rūpakāya). He (i.e. the upholder of the mantra vow) is one who ranges over a domain of conduct identical [with that of a tathāgata] and has entered into [it] in a similar manner. The [upholders of the other two] vows are not so. [The upholder of the prātimokṣa vow] follows the ancient noble arhats. [The upholder of the bodhisattva vow] follows the great bodhisattvas at high [spiritual] stages.

The fifth point is demonstrated with striking examples.\footnote{\textit{dkon mchog 'grel}} (A, fols. 202b2–203b1; B, pp. 239.14–240.11): Inga pa chos thams cad kun tu bsang po'i zhing du sbyor bas bāg tsha ba med pa ni | 'khor ba dang mya ngan las 'das pa'i chos thams cad ni gzdon ma nams par dag pas 'spang zhing [spangs shing A] dor bar bya ba med pa'i phyur kun tu bsang po i zhing yan nor | 'di ltar rtags shing blo gros 'di las ni g.yo ba ni 'khor ba'i sdmug bsgal gyis bāg tsha bar mi 'gyur te | dper na chu klong chen pos khyer ba'i mi dag gug gzhings dang 'phrad par 'gyur na da ni bsdag gis skam sa la phyon pa'i lam nyed do snyam st | chus 'jigs pa med cing dbugs phyin par 'gyur la | gang zhi gmi lam na chus khyer ba rnis pa las | gnyid cung zhig srdab par 'gyur te | de nyid rmi lam yin te shes pa'i blo byung na chur sngag ba ma log kyang 'di snyam du | 'di ni rmi lam yin te dzong su khyer ba med do | sngag ba 'di yang gnyid sad pa'i 'du nas ma mi byung st | de bas na bsdag chus 'chi ba'i 'dus byed pa'i 'jigs pa las log nas | gnyid srong par bya ba'i sbyor ba tsa lam na snying stobs skyes [skyed A] par 'gyur ro | des gnyid sad par 'gyur pa de'i 'ishe chus khyer ba med cing chu las thar pa med pa yang shes la chu yang mi sngag ngos | de bzhin du rnyan thos kyi lam du chongs pa ni gru chung ngu dang 'phrad pa la bu ste | gong zag 'ga' zhig dngos po chung ngu tsam dang 'grogs nas phyo ggcig tu thar bar byas te gnas pa lta bu'o | byang chub sems dpa'i lam du chugs pa ni gru gongs chen po dang 'phrad pa dang 'dra ste | 'gro ba mang po dang bcas don chen po dang bcas nas yul khambs bde bas rgyas par spyod do | gsgs sgrags kyi tshul gya lam la chugs pa ni rmi lam na chus khyer ba gnyid cung zad sras [srasbs A] par 'gyur ba dang 'dra ste | 'khor ba dang mya ngan las 'das pa gnis su med par rtags pas 'khor ba'i 'jigs pa las dbugs phyin te | shes rabs chen pos gnyid sad pa tsa lam la rtsol ba tsa byed do | de la mi mthun pa dang gnyen po spong ba dang bsten pa'i rtsol ba ni mi byed kyi | shes bzhin chen po las mi nyams pa tsa lam du gnas so |.\footnote{It is not clear how yul khambs bde bas rgyas par spyod do is to be understood. My translation is thus a mere attempt to make some sense of the phrase.}
The sixth point is explained in brief as follows.\(^{145}\)

The sixth [point], the inclusion of all vows whatsoever; The bodhisattva vow is not included in and enhanced by the prātimokṣa vow of a śrāvaka. The prātimokṣa vow of a śrāvaka is included in and enhanced by the bodhisattva vow. Likewise, [the same] may be said of the tantric pledge. The manner in which these (i.e. the ‘lower’ vows) are included in and enhanced by [the ‘higher’ ones] have already been explained above extensively while demonstrating superiority.

The seventh and final point is explained as follows.\(^{146}\)

The seventh [point], the quality of [being able to] replenish the [samayā] if it has deteriorated: It is said that there is no means of restoring a prātimokṣa vow of a śrāvaka that has deteriorated on account of [his] attachment to phenomena as if they were substantial and the emphasis he places on entities through his physical and verbal activities. It is comparable to a broken clay vessel. As for the bodhisattva vow, it is said that on account of [a bodhisattva’s] non-attachment to phenomena taken [by others] to be substantial and the emphasis he places on the mind, even broken [vows] can be [restored and] enhanced by relying on a spiritual teacher. It is, for example, comparable to a skilled smith who can turn broken gold and silver vessels into vessels that are even superior to the [vessels that existed] before. As for the tantric pledge, it is said that deteriorated pledges can be revived and thus restored by oneself without having to rely on a spiritual teacher, given the realisation that all phenomena [are characterised by] great equanimity, the main thing being command over awareness of the illusion-like display [of phenomena]. For example, dented gold or silver vessels do not have to be made all over again by the smith. Depending on the extent of the dents, one can gradually repair [them] on the basis of one’s own capacity, and [they] will be straightened out [and assume their] original shape. It occurs in some tantric systems that [a tantric practitioner] who has let [his samayā] deteriorate receives it [new], as a [non-tantric] bodhisattva [receives] empowerments and pledges from a spiritual teacher by entering a mandala. Such [procedures] are, however, merely taught in view of certain aspirants. Here, the former meaning [is preferred]. Therefore, these seven qualities [representative of] [the ability to] replenish [the samayā] if it has deteriorated are only a summary [listing]. It should be known by implication that extensive qualities such as these are limitless.

The gist of Buddhist axiological principles seems to be that according to the prātimokṣa vow, one tries to refrain from inflicting injury on other sentient beings; according the bodhisattva vow, one tries to benefit sentient beings, which presupposes that one has already refrained

145 dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 203b1–3; B, p. 240.11–16): drug pa sdom pa ji snyed pa thams cad 'dus pa ni | nyan thos kyi so sor thar pa'i sdom pa'i nang du ni byang chub sems dpa'i sdom pa ma 'dus shing ma dag go | byang chub sems dpa'i sdom pa'i nang du ni so sor thar pa'i sdom pa 'dus shing rnam par dag ste | de bzhin du gsang sngags kyi dam tshig le yang bshar bar bya'o || de dag ji ltar 'dus shing rnam par dag pa'i tshul ni gong du che ba bs tan pa'i skabs sa rgyas par bshad pa nyid do ||.

146 dKon mchog 'grel (A, fols. 203b3–204a6; B, pp. 240.17–241.10): bdun pa nyams pa bskangs [bskang B] na rdzogs pa'i yon tan ni | nyan thos kyi so sor thar pa'i sdom pa ni chos rnam la dgos po zhen pa'i dbang dang | las ngag gi las kyi dgos po la gtsos bor byung [gsung B] bo yin pas nyams pa rnam slar gso ba'i thabs med de | rdza gyo mo chag pa dang 'dra bar 'byung ngo || byang chub sems dpa'i sdom pa ni chos rnam la dgos po ma zhen pa'i dbang dang | sems gtsos bor ston pas nyams pa rnam kyang dge ba'i bshes gnyen la bren nas shin tu thag par byar rung ste | dper na gser dngul giy snod chag ral du gyur na mgar ba mkar pa sngan ma las khyad par du 'phags pa'i snod dag kyang byar thub pa lla bu'o zhes 'byung ngo || gsang sngags kyi dam tshig ni chos thams cad mnayam pa chen por rtogs pa'i dbang dang | sgyu ma lla bu'i rol pa la rig par rang dbang sgyur ba gtsos bo yiin pas dam tshig nyams pa rnam kyang dge ba'i bshes gnyen la bren mi dgos par bdag nyid kyi gsos pas skong bar 'gyur te | dper na gser dngul giy snod zhom pa ni mgar bas gshis nas bya ma dgos te | zhom pa che chung dang bshar nas bdag nyid kyi rtsol bas rim pa bzhin bcos pas lla lla bzhin sgrangs par 'gyur ba bzhin no zhes 'byung ngo || gsang sngags kyi tshul kha cig las ni byang chub sems dpa' dang mthun par nyams pa rnam dge ba'i bshes gnyen las dkyil 'kor du zhugs shing dbang dang tshig nod par 'byung ste | dle tla bu ang gyur bya la la'i dbang du gsungs par zad do || 'dir ni don snga ma nyid de | de bsa na nyams pa bskangs [bskang B] na rdzogs pa'i yon tan rnam pa bdun isam ni ndor bdus pa ste | de la sogs pa yon tan rgyas pa ni mtha' yas zhes bshar ro ||.
from inflicting injury on them; and that according to the mantra vow, one tries not only to refrain from inflicting injury on other sentient beings but also tries to actively benefit them, and that too in the manner of a buddha.

The question is how one is supposed to know what is really beneficial or detrimental. What if an action executed with benevolent intent turns out to be detrimental to the beneficiary. Is there not the risk of harming others, although one does something with the aim of sincerely wishing to benefit them? As far as I can gather from various sources, this risk will always remain. What a bodhisattva at the most can try to do is to minimise this risk by trying to maximise his compassion (karunā) and foresight or discriminating insight (prajñā). Not all bodhisattvas will have the same degree of karunā and prajñā. Each bodhisattva will make his own decisions. Hypothetically, for example, even if a bodhisattva endowed with intense karunā (which is by nature wholesome) but lacking adequate prajñā (but not on account of moha) were to perform an act that turns out to be detrimental to himself and others, he should be able to bear all the consequences. Because a bodhisattva dreads the sufferings of others, he would gladly and readily tread even the lowest depths of hell (avici: mnar med), as explicated in the Bodhicittavivaraṇa and Bodhicaryāvatāra. The axiological principle is expressed by Nāgārjuna as follows: if it benefits, give even poison; if it does not benefit, do not give even medicine. An attitude can be said to be ethically and morally right if it is characterised by benevolence, and wrong if it is characterised by malevolence; an action can be said to be ethically right if it is beneficial to others, and wrong if it is detrimental to others.

One of the difficulties of bodhisattva ethics is: should and can someone who has taken the bodhisattva vow tolerate those who through maliciousness and perverse ideology perpetrate horrendous deeds? On the one hand, a bodhisattva is not supposed to regard even a single sentient being as his foe and thus make it an object of his aversion, for doing so would mean violation of the bodhisattva vow. On the other hand, how can a bodhisattva regard someone who perpetrates horrendous deeds out of sheer maliciousness or perverse ideologies as his friend? Would not a bodhisattva's show of tolerance indicate his intellectual and emotional consent to such deeds and thereby make himself an accomplice of the perpetrators? Aryadeva seems to offer an answer to this predicament. According to him, just as a physician does not regard a patient possessed with a spirit (bhūta: 'byung po) as his foe, so sages regard

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147 Bodhicittavivaraṇa 86:
gang zhiṅ bsجام pa brian pa ni ||
gzhan gvi sdug bingal gviś bred nas ||
bsam gtan bde la dor nas kyang ||
mnar med pa (!= par?) yang 'jug par 'gyur ||.

For an English translation, see Lindner 1997: 61. See also Bodhicaryāvatāra 8.107:
evam bhāvaśāmayāṁ paraśukhasamapriyāṁ |
ivacim avagāhante hamsāḥ padmavanam yathā ||.

For an English translation, see Crosby & Skilton 1995: 97.

148 Ratnavali 3.63–64:
gang la du ni phan 'gyur na ||
de la dug kyang sbyin par bgyi ||
kha zas mchog kyang mi phan na ||
de la de ni sbyin mi bgyi ||
bsrul gviś zin la ji la bur ||
sor mo bcai la phan bshad pa ||
de bzhin thub pas gzhan phan pa ||
mi bde la yang bya bar gsungs ||.

149 Ratnavali 2.35cd:
parakāntahitam satyam ahitavān mṛṣetarāt ||.
intellectual-emotional defilements (*kleśa: nyon mongs pa*) as their foes, not those who possess them.\(^{150}\)

A final question would be how much a *bodhisattva* should actively dedicate himself to the benefit of others. The answer would be ‘to the best of one’s capacity’ (*yathāśaktyā yathābalam: ci nus ci lcogs kyi*), an expression used often in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. A *bodhisattva* is not culpable for not having done things that he is not capable of, very much according to the dictum: *Ad impossibile nemo obligatur* (“No one is obliged to do the impossible”). The conscience of individual *bodhisattvas* alone would stand witness to whether or not they indeed did their best.

7. Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, one could say that *bodhicitta* is all about becoming a *buddha*. Becoming a *buddha* in turn means directly experiencing the ontological *buddha*, true reality, by means of the gnoseological *buddha*, the profoundest meditative insight. For someone striving to become a *buddha*, any method or resource seems to be acceptable so long as he or she thinks and acts within the bounds of extraordinary *prajñā* and *karuṇā*.

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150 *Catuḥśataka* 5.9 (LANG 1986: 56):

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{khorṣ byung pos bzung pa la} \| \\
& \text{sman pa 'khrug pa min pa ltar} \| \\
& \text{thub pa nyon mongs dgrar gzigs kyi} \| \\
& \text{nyon mongs dang 'bre|l gang zag min} \|.
\end{align*}
\]

For an English translation, see LANG 1986: 57. Cf. also the *Catuḥśatakajāti* (P, fol. 106a2; D, fol. 96b7; S, vol. 60, p. 1163.5–7):

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{'di 'dir sens can skyon min gyi} \| \\
& \text{'di ni nyon mongs rnams skyon zhes} \| \\
& \text{rnam par dpyad nas mkhas pa rnams} \| \\
& \text{sens can dag la 'khrug mi byed} \|.
\end{align*}
\]
Chapter Two

Previous Studies on Bodhicitta

Should one initiate [something], one should initiate [it] with bodhicitta. Should one reflect on [something], one should reflect on bodhicitta. Should one analyse [something], one should analyse bodhicitta. Should one investigate [something], one should investigate bodhicitta.

– Khu-nu Bla-ma, Byang sms bstod pa

1. Introductory Remarks

In this chapter, I attempt to review studies relating to bodhicitta or cittotpāda previously undertaken by modern scholars. For a number of reasons, however, my survey will not be comprehensive. In the first place, I have been selective in my choice of secondary literature, giving preference to books and articles which deal with bodhicitta as the main topic. Furthermore, several relevant studies by Japanese scholars will not be discussed because of either language barrier or inaccessibility. In spite of these restraints, I hope to provide a general review of the previous studies.

The notion of bodhicitta or cittotpāda, conceived as it was as the quintessence of Mahāyāna Buddhism, received great attention among traditional scholars. sGam-po-pa (1079–1153), the famous disciple of the Tibetan yogin Mi-la-ras-pa (1052–1135), for example, thought all Buddhist teachings to be somehow centred around bodhicittotpāda. He stated that some teachings deal with the foundations (meaning perhaps prerequisites) of cittotpāda, some with its object, some with its attributes, some with its observances, some with its benefits, and some with its results. On the other hand, it received relatively less

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1 Byang sms bstod pa 98:

brtsam na byang chub sms las brtsam ||
bsam na byang chub sms nyid bsam ||
dpyad na byang chub sms su dpyad ||
brtag na byang chub sms la brtag ||.

Cf. the English translation in SPARHAM 1999: 59.

2 Dwags po thar rgyan (pp. 44.16–45.3): de yangchos kha cig ni sms bskyed kyi rt endanger kha cig ni sms bskyed kyi dmigs pa | chos kha cig ni sms bskyed kyi chos | chos kha cig ni sms bskyed kyi bslab bya | chos kha
attention among the first scholars of Buddhism in the West. Laurence Austine Waddell (1854–1939), for instance, whose work served as an authoritative source on Tibetan Buddhism for many years, did not even mention the word bodhicitta or cittotpāda. This discrepancy may be explained by the differences in attitude, interests, and priorities between traditional scholars and modern ones. One of the reasons why the theory of bodhicitta has not received much attention among modern scholars seems to be the assumption that bodhicitta is of no philosophical interest.

This tendency, however, is changing. There is a growing interest in Buddhist ethical or moral philosophy, and thus also in the study of bodhicitta. Many scholars have noticed that the term bodhicitta is used with various meanings. To be precise, the concept of bodhicitta found in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna is not uniform within or between either of them.\(^5\) But up to now no one has proposed a comprehensive scheme to explain these differences, and it is thus difficult to create a systematic, coherent picture of the previous studies relating to bodhicitta. I have devised a scheme (described in chapter seven) that I believe spans the entire spectrum of meaning expressed by bodhicitta. The five typologies proposed by me are: (a) ethico-spiritual, (b) gnoseological, (c) ontological, (d) psychophysiological, and (e) semio-logical. In my survey, I shall, whenever necessary, use these typologies to describe the types of bodhicitta studied by previous scholars.

2. The Early Western Knowledge of Bodhicitta

The concept of bodhicitta or cittotpāda probably first became known to a European not through Sanskrit but through Tibetan sources. Francesco Orazio della Penna (1681–1745), an Italian Capuchin,\(^6\) must have learned about bodhicitta from Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa’s (1357–1419) famous Lam rim chen mo, which he translated.\(^7\) As this translation has unfortunately not been preserved, we do not know how he actually treated the theme. Another Italian father, the Jesuit Ippolito Desideri (1684–1733), acquired during his five-year stay (1716–1721) in Lhasa an excellent knowledge of the Tibetan language and religion, and made excerpts of many Tibetan works starting with the Lam rim chen mo. It is possible that he also discussed the theory of bodhicitta in the third book of his Relazione (to which I have no access), which is said to be entirely devoted to a description of Tibetan religions.\(^8\)

\[^3\] WADDELL 1895.

\[^4\] Walpola Rahula, for example, complained that scholars tend to neglect the ethical aspect of Buddhist teachings: “Ethical Conduct (Silā) is built on the vast conception of universal love and compassion for all living beings, on which the Buddha’s teaching is based. It is regrettable that many scholars forget this great ideal of the Buddha’s teaching, and indulge in only dry philosophical and metaphysical digressions when they talk and write about Buddhism” (RAHULA 1974: 46).


\[^6\] Della Penna was only one of the many eighteenth-century Capuchins and Jesuits who acquired good knowledge of Tibetan. He lived in Lhasa from 1716 to 1732 and compiled a Tibetan dictionary (35,000 words), which was later translated into English by F. C. G. Schroeter and published in Serampore in 1826 (DE JONG 1987a: 12).

\[^7\] Della Penna’s translation of the Lam rim chen mo is apparently mentioned (among his other writings) in his chronological summary of Tibetan history published by Antonio Giorgi in his Alphabetum Tibetanum Missionum Apostolicarum Commodo Edidit, Rome, 1762 (DE JONG 1987a: 12).
The study of the Indian sources of Mahāyāna Buddhism in Sanskrit began in the West in 1837, when the Société Asiatique received from Brian Houghton Hodgson (1800–1894), who was then in Kathmandu, eighty-eight Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts. That same year, Eugène Burnouf (1801–1852) started reading the Saddharmaepundarikasūtra, and in 1839 he completed a translation of it, which appeared only after his death. This sūtra expounds the concept of ‘one vehicle’ (okāyāna: theg pa gcig) and one goal (i.e. Buddhahood). As a means of attaining this goal, the realisation of emptiness (śūnyatā: stong pa nyid) and the generation of bodhicitta are taught at the end of the fourth chapter. Unlike L. A. Waddell, Emil Schlagintweit (1835–1904), in his famous book Buddhism in Tibet (first published in 1863), does mention the idea of bodhicitta at least once, when discussing the so-called ‘code of eight specific duties’ drawn up for a more general Tibetan Buddhist public. He based himself on Alexander Csoma de Körös (1784–1842), who in turn must have based himself on Tsong-kha-pa’s Lam rim chen mo.

3. Monographs on the Study of Bodhicitta

I am aware of two monographs on bodhicitta: (a) A Study of Bodhicitta (in Japanese) by Taishū Tagami, published in 1990, and (b) Francis Brassard’s The Concept of Bodhicitta in Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, published in 2000. Taishū Tagami (Komazawa University) has devoted much of his research life to the topic, and his monograph, which is an investigation into the origin and development of the bodhicitta concept, is the product of several years of study and his most important publication on the subject. His works are often mentioned by Hajime Nakamura in his book Indian Buddhism when referring to the concept of bodhicitta. Brassard’s monograph is a study of the nature and function of bodhicitta and its relationship to the spiritual path as delineated by Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra.

(a) Taishū Tagami (1990)

On the basis of a summary and a detailed table of contents in English which Tagami helpfully provides, I shall briefly describe the subject matter of his monograph here. The book contains eight chapters. In addition, there is a general introduction, conclusion, and appendix to the book followed by the summary and table of contents in English. In the introduction, the author discusses the problems connected with the study of bodhicitta and provides an outline of the eight chapters. Two important points are made in the first chapter with regard to non-Mahāyāna Buddhist sūtras: (a) several terms, such as samvega, which correspond to the term bodhicitta, are found in non-Mahāyāna sūtras, but their meanings and functions are different from those of the term bodhicitta found in Mahāyāna sūtras, and (b) terms such as bodhicitta

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1 The manuscript of Desideri’s work was discovered by C. Puini in 1875 but was published only in 1904. Luciano Petech and Giuseppe Tucci praised his study of Tibetan Buddhism as well in advance of his time (DE JONG 1987a: 13).

9 DE JONG 1987a: 19.

10 Otherwise the theory of emptiness (śūnyatā) seldom occurs in the Saddharmaepundarikasūtra. There seems to be some disagreement regarding the relative chronology of the individual chapters of the sūtra. For details, see VETTER 2001: 82–87, where it is maintained that the Saddharmaepundarikasūtra represents a strand of ‘Mahāyāna without Prajñāpāramitā.’

11 SCHLAGINTWEIT 1863: 106: “To form in one’s mind the resolution to strive to attain the highest degree of perfection, in order to be united with the supreme intelligence.”

12 I am grateful to Kazuo Kano (University of Kyoto/Hamburg) for presenting me a copy of this book.

and sambodhicitta are not found in non-Mahāyāna sūtras. Tagami regards the term aññācitta as the original word for what later came to be denoted by bodhicitta. He thus maintains that the concept of bodhicitta (although not the term) was extant already in the non-Mahāyāna sūtras. In the second chapter, Tagami discusses the term bodhicitta in Abhidharma literature. Although two of the three subheadings of this chapter refer to mahābodhicitta (in the Prajñāaptiśāstra) and bodhicitta (in the Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra), it seems that these terms actually do not occur in the respective two works. Furthermore, Tagami states, the word laukikāgrata occurring in the Jñānaprasasthāna is the corresponding Abhidharma term for bodhicitta. I, however, find this proposition very problematic.

The third chapter examines how bodhicitta figures in the Mahāvastu. The fourth chapter contains a discussion of the Chinese translations of the word bodhicitta by fifteen famous translators and an examination of the term bodhicitta in Sanskrit sources, namely, the Vajracchedikā, Kāśyapaparivarta, Aṣṭasāhasrikā, Sūkhāvatīvyūha, Saddharmapundārīka-sūtra, Daśabhūmikasūtra, and Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra. The fifth chapter presents the features and functions of bodhicitta. Among other things, Tagami proposes that bodhicitta has a function similar to that of a mnemonic formula (dhāraṇī: gzungs snyags). He also provides cases where bodhicitta is equated with emptiness (śūnyatā: stong pa nyid). The sixth chapter deals with the nature and development of the bodhicitta concept in some important Mahāyāna sūtras. Bodhicitta is investigated there under the aspect of its being (a) an indispensible precondition for the revelation of the buddhadhātu or tathāgatagarbha, (b) an altruistic practice, (c) an equivalent of śūnyatā, and (d) an equivalent of tathāgatadhātu. The first two apparently correspond to what I call ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, and the latter two to ontological bodhicitta.

The seventh chapter presents the theory of bodhicitta according to various Mahāyāna śāstras, such as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. It also discusses the relationship between the theory of bodhicitta and that of the tathāgatagarbha. The eighth chapter discusses the place of bodhicitta within tantric Buddhism, mainly as exemplified in the Vatrocanaabhisaṃbodhitantra. In sum, Tagami comes to the following four conclusions: (1) The term bodhicitta is uniquely Buddhist but is not found in non-Mahāyāna sources. (2) The term found in non-Mahāyāna sūtras for bodhicitta is aññācitta, and the corresponding non-Mahāyāna term used in Abhidharma sources is laukikāgrata. (3) The term bodhicitta according to the Mahāyāna scriptures means ‘thought of Enlightenment’ and not ‘thought to Enlightenment.’ (The difference between the two is, however, not quite clear to me. It may be that Tagami is making here a case for an ontological or gnoseological interpretation of bodhicitta (i.e. citta whose nature is characterised by bodhi) against an ethico-spiritual interpretation (i.e. citta that is directed towards the attainment of bodhi). (4) The function of bodhicitta is similar to that of a dhāraṇī.

(b) Francis Brassard (2000)

Francis Brassard, in attempting to understand the nature and function of bodhicitta in the Bodhicaryāvatāra, presents two opposing interpretations by Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki and Sangharakshita, compares and contrasts them, and then offers his own interpretation. According to him, Suzuki understood bodhicitta as an ‘instigator of a brute force’ which is

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14 Also noted in Nakamura 1950: 70, n. 74. Cf. also CPD, s.vv. añañācitta and abhiññācitta. Note, however, that the Sārvaṅgahūmi (p. 356.23) has aññācitta (Tib. kun shes par bya ba'i sems). See also the BHS (s.v. aññā, which indicates the Bodhisattvabhūmi as one of the sources), where the term has been translated as ‘a mind disposed to perfect knowledge.’ Presumably, the term aññācitta will have to be examined in the light of the three underfiled faculties, namely, aññāsāyāminādiya (kun shes par byed pa'i dbang po), aññānirādiya (kun shes pa'i dbang po), and aññāśāvānādiya (kun shes pa dang ldan pa'i dbang po), which are among the twenty-two faculties (indriya) discussed in the Abhidharmakosā and elsewhere.
‘totally devoid of knowledge’ and as having a ‘definitive conative connotation,’ and thus he translated it as a ‘desire for enlightenment.’ If this is indeed the case, Suzuki’s notion of bodhicitta would not seem to fit into any of the five typologies of bodhicitta which I discuss in my work. Sangharakshita, on the other hand, interprets bodhicitta as a ‘will to enlightenment,’ or ‘going for refuge,’ and that too on a ‘cosmic scale.’ According to Brassard, Suzuki interpreted bodhicitta in ‘conative,’ ‘purely motivational’ and ‘functional’ terms, and Sangharakshita in ‘metaphysical’ ones. He himself goes on to interpret bodhicitta within what he calls a ‘soteriological context,’ which takes three aspects of bodhicitta (namely, ‘functional,’ ‘metaphysical,’ and ‘ethical’ ones) into consideration, as well as their role ‘in the process of spiritual transformation.’ Bodhicitta, in the context of the spiritual path, can, according to him, possibly assume three functions, that is, it can function as: (1) a ‘desire for enlightenment,’ where desire is an ‘act of will,’ and by extension a ‘commitment,’ (2) an ‘object of concentration,’ and (3) a ‘basis for the cultivation of awareness.’

4. Articles on Bodhicitta

Several articles that deal with bodhicitta or cittotpāda have appeared. In the following few paragraphs, I shall attempt to review some of the most important ones accessible to me.

(a) Kumataro Kawada (1965)

In 1965 the Japanese scholar Kumataro Kawada wrote an article in German about both the transcendent and immanent nature of bodhicitta. Bodhicitta is discussed there in a philosophical context under four points: (1) the problems related to the transcendent and immanent nature of bodhicitta, (2) the relation between bodhicitta and dharmatā, (3) methodological relativisation, and (4) concluding observations.

(1) Under the first point, Kawada states that the transcendent nature of bodhicitta is analysed in great detail and with great precision in both Hinayāna and Mahāyāna sources, thereby suggesting that bodhicitta as an idea is common to both the Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna systems. Kawada’s assumption seems to be based on his usage of the term bodhicitta in a strictly ‘gnoseological’ sense, that is, as the gnosis of a buddha. In any case, the point he goes on to make is that although it might appear as if only the transcendent nature of bodhicitta is important in Buddhism, in reality immanence too figures in, if one but considers the concept of apratisājitamānirvāṇa, which implies that one is able to transcend samsāra (or attain nirvāṇa) and yet remain within samsāra and continue carrying out salvific activities. Kawada also addresses the relationship between the transcendent and immanent nature of bodhicitta, viewing it as a problem that may be resolved in several ways. One of the ways to explain the link between transcendence and immanence is on the basis of the relationship between bodhicitta and the highest reality (dharmatā).

(2) Under the second point, he discusses three matters: (a) the notion that the highest truth or reality (dharmatā) is the ‘master,’ (b) the idea that one becomes awakened by gaining insight into the eternal dharmatā, and (c) the Buddhist claim of the absoluteness of truth. Under the first subpoint, he explains that a buddha, a bodhisattva, and bodhicitta are all dependent on the dharmatā, whereas the dharmatā is eternal and is independent of them. In other words, to use my typologies, ‘gnoseological’ bodhicitta and the beings who possess it are dependent on the ‘ontological’ one. Under the second subpoint, he argues that it is by gaining cognitive insight into the enduring dharmatā that one obtains bodhicitta (in its

15 Cf. SINGH 1977: 31–32, where Suzuki’s positions on bodhicitta, as found in his Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, have been summarised.

16 BRASSARD 2000: 27.
‘gnoseological’ sense) and becomes awakened, and it is at this juncture that both the transcendent and immanent nature of bodhicitta can unfold. Under the third subpoint, he notes that Buddhism, like other religions and philosophies, lays claim to the absoluteness of truth.

(3) Since every philosophy and religion lays claim to absoluteness, it is, according to Kawada, methodologically sensible for each of them to transcend itself, find its own methods of putting itself into perspective, and scrutinise the claims regarding the universality of truth made by it and others; otherwise any mutual understanding among them would give way to narrow-minded mutual depreciation. For Buddhist philosophy, he recommends the transcendent and immanent nature of bodhicitta as a suitable and practical point of reference.

(4) In the concluding part of the article, he refers to the four kinds of śraddhā mentioned in the Mahāyānaśraddhāpāda, namely, those pertaining to the ‘root’ (called paurāṇasthitidharmatā in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra), Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha. According to him, for one who has only the last three in mind, the Three Jewels would remain only immanent, but for one who has all four in mind, the Three Jewels would be transcendent and immanent simultaneously.

(b) Lal Mani Joshi (1971)

The article by Lal Mani Joshi published in 1971 is one of the most useful on bodhicitta. By referring to a number of source texts including the Vajradhāvanavajāsūtra, Aṣṭasāhasrikā, Nairātmyapariprashnāsūtra, Gandavyūhasūtra, Ghyuṣaṃjātantrā, Hevajratantra, Bodhisattvabhūmi, Mahāyānasūtrasāṅkhyā, Bodhicittotpādaśāstra (attributed to one Vasubandhu), Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Dharmasamgraha (attributed to Nāgārjuna), Śiksāsamuccaya, Bodhicaryāvatāra, First Bhāvanākrama, Prajñāpāviniścayāsiddhi (by Anāgavajra), and Jñānasiddhi (by Indrabhūti), the author attempts a historical survey of the bodhicitta concept. He makes it clear that the concept does not occur in the early Pāli literature (i.e. in non-Mahāyāna Buddhism), whereas it is pervasive in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna. He refers to several aspects and types of bodhicitta, including its nature, subdivisions, causes, significance, and benefits, eulogies of it, and similes for it. Apart from the common meaning of bodhicitta, he refers to a ‘highly philosophical and absolutistic’ idea of bodhicitta (i.e. in the sense of what I call ‘ontological’ bodhicitta), the idea of Vajrasattva being bodhicitta, and the designation of the union of emptiness (Śūnyatā: stong pa nyid) and compassion (karunā: snying rje), the union of insight (phrengā: shes rab) and efficient strategies (upāya: thabs), the fluids of virility (ṣukra: khu ba), and great bliss (mahāsukha: bde ba chen po) as bodhicitta. The various notions of bodhicitta, however, have not been placed by him into any historical or doctrinal context, and seem to stand isolated from each other.

(c) S. K. Nanayakkara (1971)

S. K. Nanayakkara’s overview of bodhicitta in the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism published by the Government of Ceylon is one of the most informative such accounts that I have encountered. Nanayakkara maintains that bodhicitta is an important concept common to Theravāda (implicitly) and tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism. He has also showed that in non-tantric Mahāyāna bodhicitta ‘developed along both ethical and metaphysical lines,’ and that in due course these two aspects were blended together. Further, he states that in tantric Mahāyāna bodhicitta came to be regarded as great bliss (mahāsukha: bde ba chen po). One of the strengths of this article is that it gives many important primary sources, which show the historical development of the concept of bodhicitta. However, Nanayakkara makes some problematic comparisons. For example, he states that in non-tantric Mahāyāna
bodhicitta was developed along ‘pantheistic lines’ and came to be ‘analogous to the Brahman concept of the Upanisads.’

(d) Lobsang Dargay (1981)

An article by Lobsang Dargay entitled “The View of Bodhicitta in Tibetan Buddhism” was published in 1981. In this article, Dargay—taking Tsong-kha-pa and Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho (1846–1912) as his test cases—demonstrated how Tibetan scholars attempted to harmonise the divergent views of bodhicitta found in Indian sources. As the basis for his discussion, he employed the commentaries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra by Tsong-kha-pa and Mi-pham. He seems to have chosen these scholars as representatives of the youngest and the oldest schools of Tibetan Buddhism, respectively.

Three topics regarding bodhicitta are discussed: (1) the problem concerning the placement of pranidhīcitta (‘the resolve to aspire’) and prasthānacitta (‘the resolve to set out’) on the different levels of the bodhisattva paths, (2) conventional and absolute bodhicitta, and (3) the issue of whether bodhicitta is mind (citta: sems) or a mental factor (cAITA/caitasika: sems las byung ba). Under the first point, Dargay addresses several issues. He notes that prasthānacitta is said to involve the practice of the six perfections (pāramitā: pha rol tu phyin pa) on the one hand, and to be already active at the intermediate level on the path of accumulation (sambhāramārga: tshogs kyi lam)—that is, while one is still an ordinary person (prthagjana: so so/so'i skye bo)—on the other. Consequently, he raises the following questions: How can a bodhisattva who is still a prthagjana and who has no direct insight into true reality possess the perfection of insight (prajñāpāramitā: shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa)? Do pranidhīcitta and prasthānacitta start simultaneously from the very beginning and continue until the very end, that is, the stage of a buddha? Or do they start and end at different levels of the bodhisattva path? Dargay shows that some Tibetan scholars leave some of these questions unresolved and that various other scholars, even within the same school, come up with different solutions. He shows, for example, that ’Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa (1648–1721), although a dGe-legs-pa, deviates from Tsong-kha-pa, and that Mi-pham, although a rNyin-ma-pa, deviates from ’jigs-med-gling-pa (1729/30–1798). Dargay then goes on to present the explanations of conventional and absolute bodhicitta offered by Tsong-kha-pa and Mi-pham.

The discussion of the third point is based mainly on Indian sources and ends with the conclusion that although Tibetans were aware of divergent Indian views on this issue, they held the view of Haribhadra (who flourished in the later part of the 8th century) and his disciples as authoritative.

(e) Gareth Sparham (1987)

Gareth Sparham’s article “Background Material for the First of the Seventy Topics of Maitreya-nātha’s Abhisamayālaṃkāra,” which appeared in 1987, deals with the meaning of cITotpāda in Abhisamayālaṃkāra 19–20. The aim of the article is to explain ‘what cITotpāda is and how it is to be defined.’ Sparham attempts to do this by (1) supplying the context of the verses in the Prajñāpāramitā tradition in general and in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra in particular, (2) explaining some of the metaphysical implications of the verses according to traditional exegesis, and (3) presenting translations of the pertinent commentaries on the verses, namely, Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṃkāraloka and Tsong-kha-pa’s Legs bshad gser phreng. The issue of whether cITotpāda is citta or caITTA is also discussed in this context. Furthermore,

17 NANAyAKKARA 1971: 184.

18 That is, Tsong-kha-pa’s famous Legs bshad gser phreng and Mi-pham’s mNgON rtogs rgyan ’grel.
according to him, all Indian and Tibetan Mahāyāna writers seem to agree that a fully qualified cittotpāda requires two objects of appropriation: (a) bodhi, which a bodhisattva hopes to attain, and (b) the benefit of other sattvas, which he hopes to accomplish. The first is seen as the means of achieving the second.

(f) Gareth Sparham (1992)

In 1992 Gareth Sparham wrote another article, entitled “Indian Altruism: A Study of the Terms bodhicitta and cittotpāda,” in which he attempted to trace the origin of the cittotpāda doctrine and also to demonstrate how its origin differs from that of bodhicitta. He further goes on to differentiate the meanings of bodhicitta, cittotpāda, and bodhicittotpāda. According to him, the concept of cittotpāda can be traced in a later part of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (named by him the ‘Origin-Passage’), which he cites, translates, and comments upon. Noting that the Origin-Passage is corroborated by the Ratnasamcevayā, he then makes the following observations:

Based on the Origin-Passage, cittotpāda was originally an attitude, construed out of the wilful manipulation of ideas or imagination, that welled up within the person banishing negativism and depression and inspiring further effort. In the earliest formulation of cittotpāda this uplifting of the heart was to be caused by thinking about living beings in a certain fashion: (a) imagining them to be relatives and (b) reflecting on the sameness of them and oneself. Such thoughts or ideas were to make bearable the difficult work of a bodhisattva. Although altruistic sentiments are clearly identifiable in the Origin-Passage there is no unequivocal altruistic message, in the sense of an exhortation urging the bodhisattva to make work for others his primary motivation.

It should be stated that although the Origin-Passage does use the expression cittam utpādayitavyam twice, the term cittotpāda itself does not occur there. This may be because the Origin-Passage indeed represents an early pre-terminological passage, that is, one where the technical term cittotpāda has not yet been fixed. Sparham, however, seems to make no distinction between what one might call the pre-terminological cittam utpādayitavyam and the terminological word cittotpāda, and argues as though the latter can already be found in the Origin-Passage.

Next, Sparham distinguishes the terms bodhicitta and cittotpāda. According to him, the component citta in bodhicitta refers to ‘something more fundamental’ (i.e. prakṛti cittasya prabhāsavārā: sems kyi rang bzhin ‘od gsal ba), and the bodhi in bodhicitta to the ‘Prajñāpāramitā herself.’ On the other hand, citta in cittotpāda (which compound, according to him, occurs in the Origin-Passage) is understood as something that needs to be generated by a ‘set of notions’ (saṃjñā: ‘du shes). He further states that the meaning of cittotpāda in the Origin-Passage underwent transformation and was later divided into conventional and ultimate bodhicittotpāda, as follows: Conventional bodhicittotpāda is ‘concerned with conventional realities such as the needs of other living beings and the attainment of enlightenment,’ whereas ultimate bodhicittotpāda is ‘none other than the original bodhicitta’ (i.e. ‘the non-dual liberating vision and the ultimate reality called Prajñāpāramitā,’ which I call ‘gnoseological’ and ‘ontological’ bodhicitta, respectively). According to Sparham,
bodhicitta and cittotpāda were originally different in meaning, and later bodhicitta became more popular as a shortened form of bodhicittotpāda.

Sparham then goes on to discuss the lineage of the practice of the sameness of self and others (parāmasamatā: bdag dang gzhian du mnayam pa). In this context, he, following La Vallée Poussin, makes the following two observations about the idea of parāmasamatā expressed by Śāntideva: (1) ‘self and other are ultimately undifferentiated,’ and (2) ‘empathy with the plight of others is natural because one shares feelings of happiness and sorrow in common with them.’ The former is said to be a doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, whereas the latter, which is not distinctly Buddhist, is said to be found in pre-Mahāyāna texts. The rest of the article makes an attempt to trace the so-called ‘seven-point lineage’ (rgyu 'bras man ngag bdun) recognised in Tibet and concludes with some remarks about the place of altruism in Mahāyāna Buddhism. I shall return to this article by Sparham in chapter five, where I discuss some of the ideas presented by him in more detail.

5. Studies on Bodhicitta in Specific Canonical Works

Although it is beyond the scope of this study to undertake a survey of all editions, translations, and summaries of Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras dealing in one way or the other with the topic of bodhicitta, there exist several studies each of which makes a valuable contribution to understanding how bodhicitta is used in a specific work, and which should therefore be mentioned here, however briefly. Since numerous publications dealing with bodhicitta are in Japanese, I shall list here some of them, even though it has not been always possible to locate them or to assess them.

Ulrich Pagel has discussed bodhicitta or cittotpāda in his studies of the Bodhisattvapitaka published in 1994 and 1995. The idea that a bodhisattva becomes a buddha at the very instant bodhicitta is first generated—an idea found in the Śatasāhasrikā—has been noted by David Seyfort Ruegg. Likewise the notion that a bodhisattva attains vajrapasamādhi immediately after the generation of bodhicitta, as stated in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, has also been pointed out by him. In 1972 Taishū Tagami addressed the meaning of upāya and cittotpāda in the Saddharma-pundarīkasūtra. The chapter on bodhicittotpāda and vinayacitta in the Daśabhūmikasūtra was dealt with in a 1966 article by Yukinori Tokiya. In 1993 Jens Braarvig discussed prathamacittotpāda, the first of the eighty 'inexhaustible factors' (aksāya: mi zad pa), in his study of the Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra. Just as lotuses grow in mud, so too does bodhicitta grow in the heap of intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa); this comparison, found in

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23 Ibid., 230–232.

24 The expression parāmasamatā is used, for example, in Bodhicaryāvatāra 7.16c.


27 Ibid., 167.


30 BRAARVIG 1993: vol. 1, 20–23 (text); vol. 2, 70–84 (translation). For Mi-pham’s integration of the ‘eighty inexhaustibles’ with the twenty-two cittotpādas, see KAWAMURA 1981: 131–145.
the *Vimalakīrtinirdēsāsūtra*, is briefly mentioned by A. K. Warder.\(^{31}\) The account of Māra’s generation of bodhicitta found in the *Śūramgamasamādhīsūtra* has also drawn the attention of some scholars.\(^{32}\) Chishō Namai wrote an article on svacittādhiṣṭhāna, treating it as an aspect of bodhicitta in the *Gandavyūhasūtra*,\(^{33}\) and another on bodhicittabhāvanā in tantric Buddhism.\(^{34}\) Warder has remarked that the main theme of the *Gandavyūhasūtra* is the quest for awakening, which begins with bodhicitta. He has also taken note of the numerous similes (involving such things as alchemy and a certain gem) used in that sūtra to describe bodhicitta.\(^{35}\) For the entry bodhicitta in his *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, Franklin Edgerton has drawn on the Mahāvyutpati, Lalitavistarasūtra, and *Gandavyūhasūtra*. In particular, he refers to the glorification of bodhicitta in the *Gandavyūhasūtra* (cited in the *Śīkṣāsamuccaya* in abbreviated form).\(^{36}\)

Helmut Eimer, discussing the four caryās and ten bhūmis in the *Mahāvastu*, noted that the work belongs to a period during which the term bodhicitta was formed, and stated that the presentation of the pranidhīcaryā and bhūmis in it reflects the actual meaning of bodhicitta, even though the latter has not yet become a fixed term.\(^{37}\) The technical term bodhicitta, however, does occur in the *Mahāvastu*.\(^{38}\) Seyfort Ruegg, referring to Demiéville, pointed out that the bodhisattva’s non-regression after the first generation of bodhicitta is mentioned in Sartharakaśa’s supplement to the *Yogācārabhūmi*.\(^{39}\) There exist two articles on citotpāda in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, one published in 1971 by T. Tagami,\(^{40}\) and the other in 1981 by K. Ozawa.\(^{41}\) Summaries of the citotpāda chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* have been made by several scholars.\(^{42}\) Wogihara and Dutt’s editions of the text have been valuable contributions as well.\(^{43}\) The citotpāda chapter of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* was translated into Japanese by K. Sōma.\(^{44}\) The edition and translation of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and one of its

\(^{31}\) WARDER 1980: 399.


\(^{34}\) NAMAI 1997. This article (pp. 660, n. 14; 668, n. 43) also alludes to another study by the same author entitled “Bodhaishinge ni kansuru ichi-kōsatsu” (A Study of the Bodhitattvagāthā). *The Mikkyo Bunka*, 1970.

\(^{35}\) WARDER 1980: 427–228.

\(^{36}\) BHSID, s.v. bodhicitta.

\(^{37}\) EIMER 1976: 16, n. 54, 97–110.

\(^{38}\) Mahāvastu (vol. 2, pp. 282.17, 392.9).

\(^{39}\) SEYFORT RUEGG 1989: 151.


\(^{42}\) BENDALL & LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1905: 44–48 (summary by Bendall), 48–52 (notes by La Vallée Poussin). See also the *EoB* (pp. 234–235); *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (DUTT): 9–10; POTTER 1999: 416.

\(^{43}\) WOGIHARA 1930–36 & DUTT 1966.

commentaries published by Sylvain Lévi in 1907 and the edition and translation of the Śīksāsamuccaya published by Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse in 1922 should also be noted here. Deserving mention, too, in this context are a study of citotpāda in the Abhisamayālaṁkāra by Hirofumi Isoda, published in 1970,45 and Naoya Funahashi’s 1988 article on the citotpāda chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra.46

Takasaki, in his study of the Ratnagotravibhāga, has noted that the main theme of the *Mahāyānadhammadvīpiṣeṣaṁśastra, a small work attributed within the Chinese tradition to Sāramati, is bodhicitta, which is presented there under twelve points of view. The author takes it to be synonymous with cittapratīti and tathāgatagarbha.47 Tagami, too, wrote an article on the concept of bodhicitta in the same text.48 Another article in Japanese, by Kyōsen Itō, is about the meaning of bodhicitta and tathāgatagarbha in the Ratnagotravibhāga.49 Tesshū Kaneko has studied bodhicitta in the context of Japanese Buddhism with special reference to the ninth consciousness (i.e. Paramārtha’s amalavijñāna).50 The Bodhicittotpādaśastra attributed to one Vasubandhu, which must have been very popular in China, was studied by Bhadanta Santi Bhiksu51 as well as by Shinten Sakai.52 A study of the Chinese commentary on the Bodhicittotpādaśastra by K. Yamaguchi appeared in 1949.53 Peter Harvey also briefly discussed what I call ‘ontological’ bodhicitta in the context of the ‘shining,’ ‘radiant,’ or ‘brightly shining’ citta and tathāgatagarbha, alluding to several sources such as the Āstasāhārasikā.54

Of all works dealing with bodhicitta, Sāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra has received the greatest attention. One cannot possibly talk about bodhicitta without reference to it.55 Furthermore, the ten kinds of citotpāda, each linked with one of the ten bhūmis and pāramitās in the Madhyamakāvatāra, have been noted by Seyfort Ruegg.56 The praise of

47 TAKASAKI 1966: 45–46.
52 Shinten Sakai, “About the Bodhicittotpādaśastra.” Mikkyō Bunke (Kyonan) 2, 1947, pp. 1–5 [not seen; ref. according to POTTER 1970: 31, no. 542].
53 K. Yamaguchi, “A Study on an Old Manuscript of the Commentary to the Bodhicittotpāda-śastra.” Bukkyō Shigaku i, 1949, pp. 70–80 [not seen; ref. according to CLAUSON 1952: 56, no. 541].
55 The large number of translations into various Western languages is itself testimony to modern scholars’ interest in the Bodhicaryāvatāra. See, for example, the details provided in GÓMEZ 1999 and PFANDY 1986: 18–19. The extent of its use for thematic studies cannot, however, be assessed here.
bodhicitta in the *Caryāgūtikāśa* has also drawn the attention of some scholars.\(^{57}\) Along the same lines, Herbert Guenther wrote an article on the eulogising of bodhicitta.\(^{58}\) It has been noted, too, that the fundamental idea of the *Subhāṣītasamgraha* seems to be *citta* or bodhicitta.\(^{59}\) The notion of bodhicitta in Kamalaśīla’s *First and Second Bhāvanākrama* has been discussed briefly by both Tucci and Seyfort Ruegg.\(^{60}\) An article in Japanese on the two kinds of bodhicitta in the *Bhāvanākrama* was published in 1988 by Morinobu Asano.\(^{61}\) Similarly, Atiśa’s exкурs on bodhicitta in his *Ratnakarandodghāta* was discussed by Izumi Miyazaki in 1994.\(^{62}\) Seyfort Ruegg has drawn attention to the first chapter of Abhayākaragupta’s *Mūnimaṭālāmkāra*, where bodhicitta is treated as the main subject together with the *tathāgatagarbha* and *ekayāna* theories.\(^{63}\) Schmithausen, in his book *Maitreya and Magic*, refers to the occurrence of the bodhicitta concept in the *Mahāmāyūrīṭkā* and notes that the text explicitly states that the emergence of bodhicitta in nāgas entails their friendliness towards other sentient beings.\(^{64}\)

Snellgrove’s introduction to the study of the *Hevajratantra* mentions the various notions of bodhicitta found in that *tantra*.\(^{65}\) The remarkable definition of bodhicitta in the *Guhyasamājatantra* has understandably occupied many scholars.\(^{66}\) The meaning of bodhicitta in the *Vairocanābhīsamodbhītantra* has been discussed by Nobuo Ötsuka, who wrote two articles on the subject in Japanese.\(^{67}\) In this connection, three articles in Hindi should be mentioned, namely, one on the significance of bodhicitta in Buddhist tantric traditions by Chhog Dorjee, one on absolute bodhicitta in Pāramitāyāna and Vajrayāna by Ācārya Gyaltser Namdol, and one on the development of bodhicitta in Vajrayāna by Banārasī Lāl.\(^{68}\) The last one contains several particularly useful citations from tantric sources.

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65 Snellgrove 1959: 25. Tsuyoshi Seki is said to have written an article in Japanese about the concept of bodhicitta in the Hevajratantra. I have, however, not been able to locate the bibliographical details of this article.


The reference to bodhicitta in the early Tibetan work bSam gtan mig sgron as ‘great bliss’ (bde ba chen po) has been alluded to by Samten Karmay.\(^{69}\) Karmay also discusses the idea of bodhicitta found in two Tun-huang manuscripts, namely, those of the Rig pa’i khu byug (along with its commentary) and the sBas pa’i rgum chung.\(^{70}\) He further refers to the different meanings bodhicitta had for early Tibetan masters, as recorded by Rong-zom-pa in his commentary on the lTa phreng.\(^{71}\) The type of bodhicitta thematised in the commentary seems to be of the psycho-physiological type. Karmay also discusses the ‘five excellencies’ (che ba lnga) of the rDzogs-chen ‘gnoseo-ontological’ concept of bodhicitta as presented by Rong-zom-pa in his Theg chen tshu’i jug.\(^{72}\) The importance of bodhicitta in the rDzogs-chen tradition has been discussed briefly by David Germano in his study of Klong-chen-pa’s Tshig don mdzod.\(^{73}\) Finally, Eva Neumaier-Dargay translated the Kun byed rgyal po, an important rDzogs-chen tantra which greatly highlights the concept of ontological bodhicitta.\(^{74}\)

6. On Translating the Term Bodhicitta

Looking at how the term bodhicitta has been translated may be expected to give us an idea of how it has been understood by modern scholars. It has been translated in various ways, some of which were already noted by Dayal in 1932.\(^{75}\) The term was translated as ‘intelligence-heart’ by Suzuki; as ‘primordial essence of mind’ by Masaharu Anesaki;\(^{76}\) and as ‘thought-enlightenment’ by Bendall and Rouse.\(^{77}\) Erich Frauwallner, in his Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, has translated bodhicitta as ‘der Gedanke an die Erleuchtung.’\(^{78}\) Moritz Winternitz has translated it as ‘der Wille zu Erleuchtung.’\(^{79}\) And Herbert Guenther has translated byang chub kyi sems (bodhicitta) in the rDzogs-chen context as ‘intending toward limpid clearness and consummate perspicacity.’\(^{80}\) Furthermore, Brassard records seven

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\(^{69}\) KARMAY 1988: 117.

\(^{70}\) See ibid., 41–59 (for the study of the Rig pa’i khu byug along with its commentary); 59–76 (for the study of the sBas pa’i rgum chung). These studies include both texts and translations.

\(^{71}\) Ibid., 156, n. 88

\(^{72}\) Ibid., 114, n. 40.


\(^{74}\) NEUMAIER-DARGAY 1992.

\(^{75}\) DAYAL 1932: 58–59.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., 58.

\(^{77}\) BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 53. See the comments in VON STAEL-HOLSTEIN 1933: v: “Bendall and Rouse (page 52) translates the expression bodhicitta by ‘thought-enlightenment’ in chapter 3 and 4 of the Kātyāpaparivarta which are quoted in the Cīkṣāsamuccaya. I am sure that all my readers will agree with me in preferring Sthiramati’s explanation, according to which (p. 37) bodhicitta is the fixed purpose, which the words ‘I shall become Buddha’ express.”


\(^{79}\) WINTERNITZ 1930: 51. See also BRASSARD 2000: 7, n. 7, 26, where ‘will of enlightenment’ and ‘will to enlightenment’ are renderings of Sangharakshita’s translation of the term bodhicitta. Perhaps the difference is a matter of style. As I have indicated, TAGAMI 1990: 519 also makes a similar distinction, i.e. between ‘thought to enlightenment’ and ‘thought of enlightenment.’
alternative translations according to various scholars: (1) ‘thought of enlightenment,’ (2) ‘mind of enlightenment,’ (3) ‘desire for enlightenment,’ (4) ‘will of enlightenment,’ (5) ‘mind turned to enlightenment,’ (6) ‘awakening mind,’ and (7) ‘desire for awakening.’ Brassard adds that it is pointless to try to decide which translation is the most appropriate one. In this regard, Luis O. Gómez makes the following remarks.\(^{82}\)

It is, of course, impossible to translate to anyone’s satisfaction the term bodhicitta. I prefer the simple rendering ‘thought of awakening,’ leaving it to context to clarify its many nuances. A full discussion of my argument for this choice would take much space. Suffice to say that when we come to terms such as these, there is even more room for honest, intelligent disagreement.

Schmithauser has, in the context of the ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, translated bodhicitta as ‘the resolve for awakening.’\(^{83}\) He has also explained that there is no connotation of light in the Sanskrit word bodhi and that hence it would be preferable to translate it as ‘awakening’ rather than as ‘enlightenment.’ But he has also made it clear that since the attained insight is occasionally designated as ‘light’ (āloka), it is not erroneous to translate bodhi as ‘enlightenment’ as long as there is no implication of an external higher source of the ‘enlightenment.’\(^{84}\)

It is indeed difficult to find a common translation that covers all five types of bodhicitta, and hence I have, in most cases, refrained from translating it. Nonetheless, I do think that bodhicitta in the sense of the resolve to become a buddha covers the conative, cognitive, and emotive components. By ‘conative component’ I mean the aspect of ‘will’ (chanda: ‘dun pa) or ‘resolve’ to become a buddha. Such a resolve can be driven or accompanied by a ‘cognitive component,’ that is, insight or knowledge (prajñā: shes rab) about the modi operandi and modi vivendi conducive to and necessary for the attainment of such a soteriological goal. By ‘emotive component’ I mean the ethical and altruistic aspects expressed in the form of emotions such as benevolence (maitri: byams pa) or compassion (karunā: snying rje). In my view, all five types of bodhicitta are in one way or another connected with or relevant to the realisation of the soteriological objective by oneself and others, that is, to becoming a buddha.

7. A Study of Bodhicitta: Still a Desideratum

Despite the various studies done on bodhicitta, a systematic and comprehensive study of bodhicitta is still called for for a number of reasons. First, bodhicitta deserves to be studied in all its aspects simply owing to its central importance in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism, for the absence of bodhicitta would render most forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism lifeless and meaningless. Second, even though some studies have already been done on bodhicitta, I am afraid that they are marginal and minimal in proportion to the vast

\(^{80}\) GUENTHER 1984: 257, n. 37. Cf. ibid. (237, n. 22), where it is pointed out that byang chub kyi sems is used in the rdZogs-chen context synonymously with sems nyid, rig pa, and rang byung gi ye shes. For a justification of his translation, see GUENTHER 1975: 257–258, n. 19.

\(^{81}\) BRASSARD 2000: 7.

\(^{82}\) GÓMEZ 1999: 291. See also Luis O. Gómez’s contribution in BUSWELL 2004, s.v. bodhicitta (thought of awakening).

\(^{83}\) SCHMITHAUSEN 1997: 61, n. 148.

unexplored territory. Our understanding of bodhicitta has hitherto mainly been based on the Bodhicaryāvatāra, the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, and the Mahāyānasūtraśāstra, but my impression is that there exists much more material in other—tantric and non-tantric—scriptures and commentaries that await exploration, its surface having so far barely been scratched.

Third, most of the studies that I discussed above are short articles or only brief references often made in passing within very general contexts. Moreover, while acknowledging the contribution of all previous studies done on the subject, I do not necessarily accept all their conclusions. Some of them have treated bodhicitta as though it were an idea shared by both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna sources, despite the fact that, as already made clear by Taishō Tagami, the term itself cannot be traced to non-Mahāyāna sources. In my view, there is no sense in taking bodhicitta as a pure ‘conative’ desire to become a buddha, with no cognitive or ethico-spiritual content. The interpretation of bodhicitta as an ‘instigator of brute force’ devoid of prajñā and karunā, is, I submit, indefensible, at least according to the Mahāyāna ideals of a bodhisattva. Of the two monographs, Brassard’s book concentrates mainly on Sāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, and some may wonder to what extent it actually contributes towards understanding Sāntideva’s idea of bodhicitta. Tagami’s monograph, on the other hand, while providing an overview of the historical development of bodhicitta, unfortunately remains inaccessible to many scholars. Some of his propositions, such as the suggestion that the Mahāyāna concept of (though not the term) bodhicitta can be found in the non-Mahāyāna sources, and his considering the term ājñācāra to be a non-Mahāyāna precursor of the term bodhicitta, and the word laukikāgratā (occurring in the Jñānaprasthāna) as a corresponding Abhidharma term for bodhicitta, seem to be very problematic. Except for Tagami, nobody seems to have attempted a historical treatment of bodhicitta as a concept. Even those studies that follow a chronological presentation are by and large descriptive rather than historical or analytical.

Fourth, no one, as far as I can tell, has explained or devised a scheme to explain the baffling variety of types of bodhicitta pervasive in different degrees throughout tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism. The majority of scholars have studied what I call ‘ethico-spiritual’ bodhicitta, which is the most conservative view of bodhicitta. On the whole, most of the studies deal only with certain aspects from the entire spectrum of meaning expressed by bodhicitta. For instance, many address the concept of bodhicitta current in tantric Buddhism, but even here the term ‘tantric form of bodhicitta’ quite confusingly suggests that there is one single type of tantric bodhicitta, for tantric Buddhism, as we shall see, presupposes all five types of bodhicitta defined by me. For all these reasons, further studies of bodhicitta seem to be fully justified. I cannot, to be sure, claim that my own study of bodhicitta will do full justice to the topic. Nonetheless, it is hoped that it will make some contribution, small though it may be, to the field of bodhicitta studies and raise some awareness of the importance of bodhicitta in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism.

8. Concluding Remarks

The whole sweep of Mahāyāna Buddhism, tantric as well as non-tantric, seems to be permeated with the idea of bodhicitta, which makes an exhaustive assessment of previous studies done on bodhicitta difficult. It is very likely that many studies have escaped my notice, and even those that I have discussed or mentioned may not have received the attention and emphasis they merit. Although they have not been discussed in this chapter, I also tacitly acknowledge several studies on Mahāyāna Buddhism that, while not mentioning the term bodhicitta at all, are still valuable for the study of the concept of bodhicitta.
Chapter Three

The Historical and Doctrinal Background of the Bodhicitta Concept

Which to-be-abandoned is not abandoned through bodhicitta?
Which to-be-attained is not attained through bodhicitta?
Which benefit of others is not done through bodhicitta?
Which benefit of oneself is not done through bodhicitta?

– Khu-nu Bla-ma, Byang sems bstod pa 345¹

1. Introductory Remarks

An attempt shall be made in this chapter to trace the historical and doctrinal background of the bodhicitta concept in early non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, in other words, to identify early ideas or notions which could have been the ‘raw materials’ that went into the formation of the concepts of proto-bodhicitta and later of bodhicitta itself. By ‘proto-bodhicitta’ I mean an archetypal concept according to which even an ordinary sentient being can in principle resolve to become a buddha for the benefit of sentient beings. The first concept of this kind, which historically precedes the term bodhicitta, and which had not yet been put into practice by anyone, can doctrinally be said to hover on the borderline between Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is only when this model becomes prescriptive and begins to be implemented by those ordinary sentient beings wishing to become buddhas that it can be called bodhicitta proper. The latter concept thus figures only within the doctrinal domain of Mahāyāna Buddhism. I therefore regard the initial resolve that the historical Buddha (or any other Buddha, such as Kāśyapa) supposedly made in his previous life to become a budāha, as found in non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, as embodying neither the concept of bodhicitta nor of proto-bodhicitta. While non-Mahāyāna Buddhism may contain doctrinal seeds or even

¹ Byang sems bstod pa 345:
byang chub sems kyi s pangs bya mi spong ci ||
byang chub sems kyi s thob bya mi s thob ci ||
byang chub sems kyi s gzhan don mi byed ci ||
byang chub sems kyi s rtags don mi byed ci ||.
See also the English translation in Sparham 1999: 141.
individual building blocks of proto-bodhicitta and bodhicitta proper, it would be, in my view, inaccurate to state that it actually operates with these concepts.²

In general, while not denying some outside influences, one may assume that the impulse for the major part of the development of Mahāyāna Buddhism can be traced to the Buddhists themselves, particularly to a psychological need on their part to make up for the loss of their teacher, the historical Buddha. It is quite conceivable that the idea of bodhicitta was developed as one of the measures to fulfil this need. Presumably the existing doctrinal reserves found within conservative Buddhism contributed to the development and legitimisation of this concept. Moreover, the rise of the notion of bodhicitta and both the problems and possibilities it generated probably lent impetus to further developments and so unleashed a dynamism of its own.

2. Bodhicitta as a Means of Compensating for the Loss of the Historical Buddha

One popular Tibetan Buddhist maxim runs as follows:³

Whether [one is] a Buddhist or non-Buddhist is a matter of saranagamana ("taking refuge").

Whether [one is a follower] of the greater or the smaller vehicle is a matter of cittotpāda.

The ideas expressed in it, namely, the search for refuge in the Buddha and the wish to become a buddha oneself, are relevant for our discussion. The idea that one could become a bodhisattva by resolving to become a buddha may well have had a historical link with that of becoming a Buddhist by taking refuge in the Three Jewels (ratnatraya/triratna): the Buddha (the teacher), the Dharma (the teachings), and the Saṃgha (the ordained community of monks and nuns).⁴ In some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Lalitavistarasūtra, the function of bodhicitta is indeed conceived as the perpetuation of the lineage of the Three Jewels.⁵ The expression ‘not terminating the continuity of the family of the Three Jewels’ recurs elsewhere.⁶ This suggests that the perpetuation of the Three Jewels has been one of the main concerns in the history of Buddhism.

² Non-Mahāyāna Buddhism may also contain doctrinal elements that have given rise to several other ideas characteristic of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Such doctrinal elements that have the potential to develop into characteristic Mahāyāna views cannot be regarded as yielding exclusively Mahāyāna thought.

³ The Tibetan Buddhist maxim, for which I could not trace a written source, is as follows:

phyi pa nang pa skyabs 'gro'i khyad ||
theq pa che chung sans bsbyed skyad ||

⁴ However, it should be noted here that the ritual and practice of generating the resolve to become a buddha is not a substitute for the historically older ritual and practice of taking refuge, and is in fact almost always preceded by the latter. This is because the Mahāyāna doctrine presupposes that one becomes a Buddhist (at least ‘officially’) before becoming a bodhisattva.

⁵ For the so-called ‘eight great treasures,’ see the Lalitavistarasūtra (VAIDYA & TRIPATHI 1987: 342.13–19; T, fols. 318b7–319a3; D, fol. 214a6–b1). See also TSD, s.v. gier chen po bgyad. Mi-pham seems to have been fascinated by the idea of the ‘eight great treasures’ and mentions or describes it on several occasions, namely, in his (a) Sanskrit-Tibetan lexicon (also referred to in TSD, s.v. gier chen po); (b) mkhas 'jug (pp. 321.4–322.4), where the pertinent passage from the Lalitavistarasūtra is cited; (c) mkhas 'jug sdo mdo byang (p. 380.2–4); and (d) Shes rab ral gri'i mchan (pp. 815.3–817.3). The bodhicittiyāmi, which is one of the eight, is said to guarantee the propagation of the family lineage of the Three Jewels. See the Lalitavistarasūtra (VAIDYA & TRIPATHI 1987: 342.17): bodhicittiyāman triratnavamsānupacchedapakramātā | ibid. (T, fol. 319a2–3; D, fol. 214b1): 'kon mchog gsum gyi rigs rgyun mi gcod pas byang chub kyi sams kyi gier dāng |. See also Mi-pham’s mkhas 'jug (pp. 321.5–322.2) and Shes rab ral gri (p. 816.4–5).

⁶ For example, the Sāgaramatipariprcchāsūtra states that a bodhisattva, once having generated his resolve to become a buddha, “is not deterred from the exertion of perpetuating the genealogy of the Three Jewels.” See the citation in the Śīksāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 184.12–13; VAIDYA, p. 103.2): na bhidyate triratnavamsānupacchedapakramātā. Cf. BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 180. See also the Śūrasamuccaya (pp.
Becoming a Buddhist seems to pose no problem so long as the Three Jewels exist, but what if one or more of them ceases? How can one take refuge in the Buddha if he is not present? Does the possibility of becoming a Buddhist then cease? Such questions were probably irrelevant so long as the historical Buddha Gautama Śākyamuni lived, but the sudden demise of this charismatic teacher and mentor sui generis can be expected to have created an emotional vacuum among his ordained and lay followers alike. The difficulty in taking refuge in the Buddha who has gone forever appears all the more acute if we consider the way the Buddha was perceived at the time by his followers: After his complete extinction (parinirvāna) or extinction without remains (nirupadhiśesanirvāna), that is, after his death, the Buddha was thought to be no longer present in the world and to have completely disappeared from it. This notion is also supported by the fact that the Buddha told his disciples that the teachings (dharma) that he gave and the ethical-moral codex (vinaya) should be their refuge after his death. Thus the role of the Buddha was to be taken over by what he left behind, particularly his teaching. The Buddha, who was obviously a very charismatic figure, did not lay down much store by his physical person. It is said that in response to a sick monk’s expression of regret for not having been able to see the Buddha previously, the Buddha stated: “What is the benefit of seeing my stinking body (kāya)? He who sees my doctrine (dharma) sees me.” On at least two occasions, the Buddha stated that the Dharma taught by him is his actual ‘body’ (kāya).

Could and did this solution satisfy the spiritual needs of his followers? Probably it did not satisfy many of them, particularly not his lay followers. Conceivably, taking refuge in an impersonal Dharma was not even half as satisfying as being in the presence of a charismatic teacher, who showed them the way to nirvāna, or at least to a better existence in samsāra, and to whom they could personally relate. In his investigation of the development of the ‘figure’ (Gestalt) of the Buddha, Schmithausen has observed that a considerable part of the development of the Buddhist religion can be explained as attempts made by Buddhists to compensate psychologically in one way or another for the loss of the physical presence of the historical Buddha. These attempts bespeak a need on their part of a person to whom they could relate. The search for direct and effective teaching or guidance on the spiritual path

133.20–134.2): dad pa'i stobs bskyed pa'i mdo las 'byung ba 'jam dpal de la dam pa'i chos yongs su bzungen na 'byang chub sms dpa’ yongs su bzungen ba yin no 'byang chub sms dpa’ yongs su bzungen na dam pa'i chos yongs su bzung ba yin no 'dam pa'i chos yongs su bzungen na 'sms can thams cd yongs su bzungen ba yin no 'sms can thams cd yongs su bzungenna sangs rgyas kyi rigs mi 'chod par byas pa yin no ; Drumakinnaraparaprajñasūtra (p. 131.1–5): 'byang chub sms dpa’ sangs rgyas kyi rigs rgyun mi 'chod par bya ba'i phyir brtson 'grus rtsom pa dang 'chos kyi rigs rgyun mi 'chod par bya ba'i phyir brtson 'grus rtsom pa dang dge 'dun gyi rigs rgyun mi 'chod par bya ba'i phyir brtson 'grus rtsom pa dang....

7 It has been pointed out that the names Siddhārtha/Siddhattha and Śākyamuni/Sakyamuni occur quite seldom in the earlier parts of the Pāli canon and that the name Sakyamuni occurs only in verses of ‘keywords’ (uddāna), which do not belong to the actual text. See SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 7, n. 9.

8 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 11, 14. One of the so-called ‘seven limbs’ (yan lag bdun pa) is requesting buddhas not to pass into parinirvāna. This idea, in my opinion, presupposes that the Buddha once gone is forever gone, or is at least beyond the reach of ordinary beings.

9 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 9, n. 18.

10 See SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 9, nn. 17, 19; GETHIN 1998: 30. In the light of such statements, it is comprehensible why the Buddha was first depicted by way of symbols such as the Wheel of Dharma (dharmaakra), an empty taraone, his footprints, and the Bodhi tree (Ficus religiosa), and why the deceased Buddha was represented only symbolically, such as by a stūpa. See SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 9, n. 20; GETHIN 1998: 30.

11 Schmithausen notes that this is a fascinating theme for the comparative studies of religions, for the same may well be the case, for example, with Jesus and Muhammad.
could have played just as much a role as the desire for happiness, consolation, and safety from the unwholesomeness and dangers of present and future lives.\textsuperscript{12} The spiritual need for a person to relate to could only have intensified upon witnessing the fast deterioration of the Dharma, which was supposed to take over the role of the Buddha. According to Schmithausen, the following six approaches were taken to restore the presence of the Buddha:\textsuperscript{13} (a) the worship of the Buddha’s relics, the stūpas containing them, and sacred places associated with major events in the Buddha’s life,\textsuperscript{14} (b) the practice of ‘thinking of the Buddha’ (buddhānusmṛti) and the attempt to encounter him face-to-face through meditative visualisation, (c) the hope placed in the future Buddha Maitreya, (d) the introduction of portraits of the Buddha for the purpose of paying respect and as a basis for meditative visualisation, (e) the belief that the historical Buddha exists further in a transcendental paradise-like sphere, and from time to time appears as a phantom (nirūma) out of compassion for the world, and (f) the belief in the simultaneous existence of more than one buddha in a cosmos which comprises vast and countless world systems.\textsuperscript{15} The belief in the Buddha as a living presence in monasteries (vihāra) was also surely important.\textsuperscript{16} Given the cause-and-effect or means-and-end relationship between bodhicitta and a buddha, studies on the development of the figure or notion of the Buddha should prove quite useful for understanding the history of the bodhicitta concept. A change in the buddha concept would result in a change in the soteriological model, and thus possibly in the notion of bodhicitta.\textsuperscript{17}

Doctrinally speaking, Buddhist scholars themselves would not deny that a conditioned phenomenon is the result of multiple and complex causes and conditions. Historically speaking, too, we can presuppose that Mahāyāna in general (on which there is no consensus) and the bodhicitta concept in particular did not arise on account of a single self-sufficient cause. Given the supposed multiplicity of causes and complexity of circumstances of the bodhicitta idea, it would be impossible to reconstruct its history of inception and development fully and satisfactorily. Any attempt, including my own, to explain the history of bodhicitta, I am afraid, will have to remain speculative and tentative. What we can at best do is to propose

\textsuperscript{12} SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 11.

\textsuperscript{13} SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 12–15. The possibility of a connection among the individual approaches is not ruled out (ibid., 12, n. 32).

\textsuperscript{14} See SCHOPEN 1997: 86–164.

\textsuperscript{15} The notion that a buddha does not pass away into parinirvāṇa and that the Dharma does not disappear, as professed by the Suvarnaprabhāsottamasūtra—often referred to in later sources, for example, the Rainālokākāmaśāra (P, fol. 342a6–b6; D, fol. 293a6–b5; S, vol. 64, pp. 811.13–812.15)—is perhaps a generalisation of the fifth point. The pertinent verse is as follows (Suvarnaprabhāsottamasūtra 2.30, Skt. p. 19.1–2):

\begin{quote}
na buddho parinirvāṇi na ca dharma ‘ntardhiyate
sattnānām paripākāya nirvāṇāṁ tāpadarśayet;
\end{quote}

Cf. the verse cited in the Caryāmālpakaprādipa (p. 103.2–3):

\begin{quote}
na buddhah parinirvāṇi na ca dharmaḥ parihīyate
sattnānām paripākāya parinirvāṇam nidadarśayet;
\end{quote}

See also the Suvarnaprabhāsottamasūtra (Tib., p. 17.12–15, n. 241). See also the discussion in the Anantamukhanirādhaḥrāṇījīkā (pp. 121.19–123.3). Such a notion can also be found elsewhere, for example, in the Talhāgaitotpattisambbhavasūtra (as cited in the Sūtrasamuccaya, p. 115.3–120.6), Talhāgaitācintiyaugahunīrādhaśāstra (T, fols. 292b5–293a1; D, fol. 193b2–4), *Guhyagarbhaśāstra (P, fol. 111b2; D, fol. 113b2–3), and dGongs pa ‘dus pa’i mdo (P, fol. 89a2–3; D, fol. 94a7–b1).

\textsuperscript{16} SCHOPEN 1997: 258–289.

\textsuperscript{17} For example, a tradition that holds a buddha to be permanent cannot have the same perception of bodhicitta as one that views a buddha as impermanent. The perception or role of bodhicitta may depend on the kind of soteriological model a tradition has chosen.
theories that are possibly quite conceivable. We can assume that there must have been internal and external factors that were responsible for the inception and development of the bodhicitta concept. In my view, one of the most likely internal factor seems to have been the psychological need on the part of Buddhists to somehow make up for the loss of the historical Buddha and to guarantee the durability of the Three Jewels. Probably for some, the best conceivable way to convince themselves of the existence of the Three Jewels was to resolve to become a buddha themselves. “Instead of seeking refuge elsewhere, let me become a refuge for myself and others! Let me ensure the existence of the Three Jewels by becoming a buddha myself.”18 Such an idea must have appeared appealing to many people, and perhaps can be seen as the most innovative step taken in this direction. Although we shall never be able to determine exactly the process of conception, we can state with certainty that the birth of this resolve to become a buddha oneself by first becoming a bodhisattva was the birth of the bodhicitta concept, and that the dawn of such a concept was indeed a milestone in the history of Buddhism. With it we step onto the terrain of Mahāyāna Buddhism, historically as well as doctrinally. Once the idea of bodhicitta was conceived and its bounds fixed, several factors conceivably contributed to its further development.

3. The Doctrinal Foundations of Bodhicitta in Early Buddhism

Although neither the concept nor the term bodhicitta is explicitly documented in the Pāli canon,19 several ideas that may have theoretically been sources of its formation can be detected in early Buddhist texts. I shall attempt here to consider these various ideas from various angles and show that they tendentially laid the foundations for the bodhicitta concept, or at least provided the theoretical conditions for its development.

(a) A Buddha as a Discoverer and Proclaimer of True Reality

The question as to what extent the Buddha’s discovery or awakening was ‘new’ or ‘old’ or ‘timeless’ leads to a dilemma. In the historical setting of the Buddha Gautama, it was indeed something new, and it was considered by him as such. In the course of time, however, the idea arose that the one and the same true reality is repeatedly discovered by successive buddhas.20 Since bodhicitta is primarily about becoming a buddha, it may be worthwhile to take a look at the early Buddhist notion of the perpetuity of truth and the concept of the buddha or tathāgata as its re-discoverer and proclaimer at a given point in time and space. A tathāgata is one who has cognised (gata) the way to salvation in this manner (tathā), namely, exactly as it is (yathābhūtam), even as he himself went along (gata) in this manner (tathā).21

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18 If we think of other later re-interpretations (such as of the term dharmaśāyā), it is not impossible that the notion that ‘one is the protector (or lord) of oneself’ (bādag nyid bādag gi gong yin gyi) stimulated some people to want to become a buddha themselves, although I have not come across such a line of thought elsewhere.

19 See Joshi 1971: 70, where it is reported that the concept of bodhicitta is not found in the Pāli literature. However, it has been occasionally maintained that although the technical term bodhicitta does not occur in Pāli canonical sources, the idea as such is found in non-Mahāyāna Buddhism. For example, the EoB (p. 184) states that bodhicitta “is an important concept common to Theravāda, Mahāyāna and Tantric Buddhism. Though not directly mentioned, the idea is explicit in Theravāda Buddhism.” However, further on it states: “Though the term bodhicitta does not occur in Pali, traces of this concept are found in Pali canonical literature....” Such statements in which the doctrinal foundations that later gave rise to the theory of bodhicitta are ad sensum referred to as bodhicitta, are, however, quite misleading.


However, my primary interest here is the philosophical aspect of the question and the implications it has for the study of the origin of bodhicitta. Understanding the Buddha in this way, in my opinion, presupposes certain philosophical views. The first tacit assumption is that there is a kind of truth, reality, or nature of phenomena (whatever it may be) that is cognisable, timeless, and independent of its cognition, or of the person (e.g. the Buddha) who cognises it. The second tacit assumption is that the correct cognition or insightful penetration of the truth has a soteriological or salvific affect on the person who cognises or penetrates it by means of meditative insight (jñāna). In other words, a person is liberated by gaining a meditative insight into the truth. The third tacit assumption is that, at least in principle, anybody, at any given point in time and space, can gain full access to the truth by means of meditative insight, thereby becoming a fully liberated being, a buddha, a redegressor of the real truth, who can and may (but need not necessarily) proclaim it to others. Speculations regarding the destiny of a buddha after he passes away are of no spiritual or soteriological relevance. Buddhas may come and go, but the truth remains as it is (yathābhūtam), unaffected by its occasional re-discovery or oblivion. This idea can be found in non-Mahāyāna as well as in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna.

What implications does the concept of the perpetuity of truth and the possibility of its repeated discovery have for the study of the origin of bodhicitta? The idea of appearing and disappearing buddhas, and of the discovery of the eternal truth and its proclamation to others, opens up the theoretical possibility of developing the notion of oneself becoming a bodhisattva and a buddha, which is essentially embedded in the bodhicitta concept. Under this premise, the truth would not become quantitatively or qualitatively less if more buddhas happen to discover it, nor would it become better if fewer buddhas discover it. If insightful penetration of the truth has a soteriological impact not only on the discoverer but also on others, it should be in the interest of suffering sentient beings to have more such ‘discoverers.’ As for the sentient beings who suffer in samsāra, there are enough of them, for samsāra is endless. Pondering over such arguments may perhaps help us to understand why at a certain point in the history of Buddhism the notion of oneself becoming a buddha became inevitable.


23 This is perhaps one of the reasons why the idea of a ‘successor’ for the historical Buddha makes no sense in Buddhism. A buddha or his successor cannot be ‘appointed.’ One either becomes a buddha when all the conditions necessary come together, or one does not.

24 Āgama (as cited by Candrakīrti, Prasannapada, p. 40.1): utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā tathāgatānāṃ sthitavaisā dharmaṃnām dharmatā |. For the universality of reality and its being independent of the appearance of a tathāgata in both non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna sources, such as the Sontanikāya, Anguttaranikāya, Lankāvatārasūtra, and Saddharmapundarikāsūtra, seeヤMADA 1980: 282, 291–292, nn. 70–72. See also the Jñānālokaśāmakārāsūtra (p. 138.6–7), Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (pa. 305.19–307.8), Lankāvatāraṇī (P, fol. 188b4–5; D, fol. 164b7–165a1; S, vol. 69, p. 1216.17–19), and Śālistamabakakārikā (F, fol. 22b4–5; D, fol. 18b2; S, vol. 65, p. 775.14–15). For a similar idea in tantric Buddhism, see the Vairocanābhśambodhitantra (as cited in the Cāryāmelāpākapradīpa, pp. 33.3–6, 220.3–8). For an English translation, see HODGE 2003: 131. Cf. also the citation in Rong-zom-pa’s Smgs byas kyi ba (A, fol. 216a3–b2; B, p. 82.6–15). See also the Saviśadatvamputattikā (P, fol. 9b5–6; D, fol. 8b2–3; S, vol. 3, p. 19.16–20); Tāravālā (P, fol. 133b5–7; D, fol. 123b5–3; S, vol. 58, p. 302.9–17); Ratnālokālākāra (P, fol. 338a1–2; D, fol. 289a7; S, vol. 64, p. 802.1–3); Kṣṇayamāritantrapārājikā (P, fol. 169a3–5; D, fol. 141a7–b1; S, vol. 23, p. 1077.14–19); Samdhinirmanocanāsūtra (pp. 52, 158). Cf. Madhyamakāvatāra 6.222. See also the dGongs pa ‘dus pa’i mdo (P, fol. 164a6–8; D, fol. 175a6–7).

25 NORMAN 1983: 77. For a lengthy discussion of the impossibility of buddhas arising at the same time, see VETTER 2001: 67–68, n. 32. See also SKILLING 1996: 155, cf. n. 5.
(b) The Plurality of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in Early Buddhism

The notion of resolving to become a buddha oneself automatically implies the multiplicity of bodhisattvas and buddhas, which became a characteristic feature of Mahāyāna Buddhism. This may prima facie seem to contradict the early Buddhist notion of a single buddha, who was seen as a being sui generis. The early Buddhist view was that only one buddha would appear at a time, and the reason for this, occasionally stated, is that one buddha is enough to ensure that all the necessary tasks of a given time are carried out. This argument, however, seems to presuppose corresponding limited world systems.\(^{26}\) The development of the idea of plural buddhas is thus connected with the development of the Mahāyāna cosmology.\(^{27}\) However, the concept of a plurality of buddhas begins to appear already in the Pāli canon.\(^{28}\) At first, details of six past buddhas who preceded Gautama Buddha are given.\(^{29}\) Later the number increases to twenty-five including Gautama Buddha.\(^{30}\) The fundamental reason for introducing the previous mythological buddhas was, according to Richard Gombrich, to authenticate the historical Buddha (as a discoverer and preacher of the eternal truth).\(^{31}\) Furthermore, post-canonical Pāli sources speak of ten future buddhas including Maitreya, who is, however, mentioned only once in the early Pāli canon.\(^{32}\) It is thus clear that the concept of past buddhas is older than that of future buddhas. This development of several future buddhas in the later non-Mahāyāna traditions is said to be the influence of Hinduism as well as of Mahāyāna.\(^{33}\) Unlike Maitreya, though, the remaining nine future buddhas mentioned in the post-canonical Pāli sources are said to have nothing in common with their Mahāyāna counterparts.

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\(^{26}\) NORMAN 1983: 90–91.

\(^{27}\) See GOMBRICH 1980: 65, where it is stated: "It is important to understand that this cosmology allows the line of Buddhas stretching into the past and the future to be infinite. That it is infinite is certainly the view that developed; it is however not stated in the earliest texts on the subject, though it may be implicit."


\(^{30}\) See GOMBRICH 1980: 68, where it is stated: “At an early stage, however, the number twenty-four became standardised in the Theravādin tradition. This occurred with the composition, perhaps in the third or second century B.C., of the Buddha-vamsa, one of the last books to be added to the Pali canon. This poem, ‘The Lineage of the Enlightened’, gives details of twenty-four Buddhas, with Gautama as the twenty-fifth, in almost identical terms. The first eighteen of these Buddhas we encounter here for the first time.” See also NORMAN 1983: 93. The model and number of twenty-four past buddhas was presumably borrowed from the Jain concept of twenty-four ‘ford-makers’ (tīrthāṃkara). The difference, however, is that the Jain twenty-four include the present Tirthaṅkāra Mahāvīra, whereas the Buddhist twenty-four exclude the present Buddha Gautama (GOMBRICH 1980: 64, 68, 72, n. 24). Yet the buddhavamsa is said to mention the names of twenty-seven previous Buddhas, without, however, giving the details of the first three. The number twenty-eight (including Gautama Buddha) has reportedly become standard in Burmese Theravāda Buddhism (GOMBRICH 1980: 68). For the names of the twenty-five buddhas, see EoB, s.v. bodhisattva; PED, s.v. buddha; SCHUMANN 1995: 123–125. Note that the last seven are identical with the group of seven buddhas.

\(^{31}\) GOMBRICH 1980: 64.

\(^{32}\) SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 13, n. 43; NORMAN 1983: 93, n. 423, 41; KITAGAWA 1980: 94; cf. BHISD, s.vv. maitriya and maitrey. Maitreya is also mentioned as the fifth buddha of this aeon; see NORMAN 1983: 161; LAMOTTE 1988: 699–710. For the development of the story of Maitreya in Pāli sources, see COLLINS 1998: 355–357.

Peter Skilling provides a nuanced account of the development of the idea of multiple and infinite number of past and future buddhas found in Theravāda and other Buddhist schools. He points out that (a) the ‘open plurality’ of past and future buddhas in the earliest texts turn into an ‘open infinity’ of past and future buddhas in the latest texts; (b) the evidence goes against the suggestion that the idea of multiple and infinite buddhas is the outcome of Mahāyāna influence; and (c) the plurality and infinity of buddhas, according to the Theravāda tenet, applies only to past and future buddhas but never to the present, in contrast to Mahāyāna Buddhism.\(^\text{34}\) Later, in Mahāyāna sources, even the Buddha Śākyamuni is multiplied,\(^\text{35}\) an idea which seems to have been inspired by the concept of the domain (kṣetra) of his influence. The six kinds of Śākyamuni Buddhas or, to be precise, Munis (thub pa) found in some rNying-ma tantric systems may have developed from the notion of multiple Śākyamuni Buddhas traceable in some Mahāyāna sūtras.\(^\text{36}\)

If there are multiple buddhas there must also be multiple bodhisattvas who strive to become buddhas. This simple logic made the concept of multiple bodhisattvas possible, which is understandably less archaic than the notion of multiple buddhas. In the Pāli canon, only two bodhisattvas are mentioned:\(^\text{37}\) the bodhisattva who later became Gautama Buddha, and the bodhisattva who will become the future Buddha Maitreya. The notion of the present bodhisattva Maitreya who will become the future Buddha Maitreya is analogous to the notion of the past bodhisattva of the present Buddha Gautama. In my opinion, this concept already lays the theoretical foundations for extending and applying this analogy to other bodhisattvas and buddhas limitlessly in both time and space, that is, to countless buddhas and bodhisattvas in the past, present, and future, and in the ten directions.\(^\text{38}\) Thus the presence of the buddhas Gautama and Maitreya and their respective bodhisattvas in the Pāli canon can be seen as at least two precedent cases for the Mahāyāna notion that an ordinary person can become a bodhisattva and finally a buddha.

**c) The Concept of the Resolve Made by Previous Buddhas**

The resolve to become a buddha made by the historical Buddha in the past is a popular theme (at least from what I know of Tibetan Buddhism), particularly his initial resolve, which I shall discuss in detail in the following chapter. It is, in my view, this initial resolution (whatever term the early sources may have used to express it), that is, the initial step taken by Gautama or any other buddha in setting out on the bodhisattva path, that gave rise to the idea of prathamacittotpāda and prathamacittotpādika. However, the important question here is: Can one trace such a concept, at least in its germinal stage, to the early Pāli canon?

Let us look at one story found in some Pāli sources, which predicates a connection between the Buddha and an earlier buddha called Kāśyapa. It is told that Gautama Buddha was once born as a young brāhmaṇa named Jotipāla who heard the teachings of Kāśyapa and

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\(^{34}\) Skilling 1996.

\(^{35}\) *Buddhadharmakōṣa-sāra* (T 257; D 123); *rGyab chos pad dkar* (p. 910.3); *Mahāmokṣasūtra* (T 153; D 264). Note that the title of the latter work is doubtful.

\(^{36}\) For the expression ‘six Munis’ (thub pa drug) and its various interpretations in the *Gukyagarbhatantra* (P, fol. 111b7; D, fol. 113b7), see the dKon mchog ‘gre (A, fols. 58b5–6, 96a1–b5; B, pp. 89.7–10, 127.21–128.17). It should be noted that not all six Munis mentioned there are conceived of as human beings or monks. For example, the ‘Muni’ in the animal realm takes the form of a lion.


\(^{38}\) Cf. Retnāvalī 2.7ab: aṣamkhayeyā gata buddhās tathaisyanty atha sân pratāḥ |
became a monk under him. This connection between Jotipāla and Kāśyapa becomes closer still in the Mahāvastu, according to which Jotipāla makes a resolution (praniḍhi/praniḍhāna) in the presence of Kāśyapa to attain Buddhahood and receives from him a prediction (vyākaraṇa) of its successful fulfilment. Furthermore, the account of Gautama Buddha’s previous birth as Sumedha and the resolution he made and the prediction he received, according to which he would one day become a buddha called Gautama, is particularly significant. This initial resolution or the prediction seems to be tendentially considered as a prerequisite for Buddhahood. Mahāyāna sources state that bodhicitta consists in an altruistic inclination (āsaya/adyāsaya), and the term āsaya in conservative Buddhism may hint at a precursory stage of bodhicitta. Other Pāli terms such as abhinīhāra (“an earnest wish” or ‘aspiration’) and aṇñācitta (“liberating insight”) and *laukiṅggratā (“summit of the mundane [state]”) in the Jñānaprasthāna have also been suggested as non-Mahāyāna terms corresponding to the term bodhicitta. The question is, of course, whether and to what extent these three terms exhibit a correspondence to the term bodhicitta. One of the meanings of the term abhinīhāra given in A Critical Pāli Dictionary according to the Buddhavamsa is: ‘generally in the sense of an earnest wish, aspiration, resolve, determination (to become a Buddha, a paccekabuddha, etc.),’ and panidhāna (praniḍhāna) and pathanā (prārthana) are given as synonyms. The term aṇñācitta seems to apply to liberating insight in general, that is—also from the perspective of Mahāyāna—to that of a śrāvaka saint, and at best seems to have in common with bodhicitta the nuance of ‘resolve.’ Finally, to what extent Tagami’s *laukiṅggratā corresponds to bodhicitta has yet to be determined. The resolution (praniḍhi)

39 This story is also briefly discussed in GOMBRICH 1980: 68.

40 GOMBRICH 1980: 68, 72, n. 26. The resolution and the receiving of a prediction from an earlier buddha entail a logical regressus ad infinitum. However, the tradition does not seem to have regarded this as a problem, for it was seen as compatible with the Buddhist notion that the world has no beginning (ibid., 69–70). This problem, however, may have contributed to the development of the notion of an ādibuddha.


42 See GOMBRICH 1980: 68. Both the ritual procedure of accepting the bodhisattva precepts and the text recited on this occasion (i.e. for taking the ‘official step’) suggest that the bodhicittotpāda ritual procedure is modelled on a kind of ‘blessing’ in the form of a vyākaraṇa from a previous buddha.

43 See, for example, the Gaganagañjaparipṛchchhāṣṭra (T 160; D 148) cited in the gSung rab rin po che (P, fol. 148b1–2; D, fol. 243b6–7; S, vol. 115, p. 663.3–6) and Bodhimargapradipaparājakī (P, fol. 296a3–8; D, fols. 256b6–257a3; S, vol. 64, pp. 1688.9–1689.1). See also SHERBURN 2000: 102–103. Cf. the Madhyarakaṃvāraṇajīvikā (P, fol. 82a4–5; D, fol. 686b–7; S, vol. 61, p. 165.7–9): lhag pa’i bsam pa ni sams can rnam sdug bsgal dang sdug bsgal gyi rgyu las yang dag par ’dren par ’dod pa’i mishan nying can no ||; ibid. (P, fol. 83a3; D, fol. 69b2–3; S, vol. 61, p. 167.4–6): lhag pa’i bsam pa’i che ba nying khyed par du gyur pa’i bsod nams kyi rgyu byang chub kyi sams dang | snying rje’i stobs khyes ba’i don to ||.

44 Johnston, in his translation of the Buddhacarita, remarked: “It may imply here the Buddha’s resolve in past lives to become a Buddha, something like the bodhicitta of the Mahāyāna” (JOHNSTON 1936: part 2, 38, n. 34). See also CPD, s.v. āsaya.

45 Ebō (p. 184); NORMAN 1983: 173. See CPD, s.v. abhi-nīhāra.

46 TAGAMI 1990: 521–521; NAKAMURA 1980: 70, n. 74. See also CPD, s.v. aṇñācitta. The word laukiṅggratā given by Tagami is apparently a misprint for laukiṅggratā.

47 CPD, s.v. abhi-nīhāra. See also PED, s.vv. panidhāna and pathanā and BHSD, s.vv. praniḍhāna, praniḍhi, and prārthana. See also Bodhisatvardhānā 1.2 (§ 1.1.2–1.1.3).

48 It has been pointed out in BUSWELL 1997: 590 (cf. 592) that the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣa (Taishō No. 1545, vol. 24) divides the path of preparation (prayogamārga)—under which *laukiṅggratā (or perhaps
and prediction (vyākarana) associated with previous buddhas was, in all probability, the actual keystone of both the theory and the ritual procedure surrounding bodhicitta, which later gradually became a conditio sine qua non of Buddhahood.

(d) The Altruism of the Historical Buddha

As we all know, Mahāyāna is principally defined by a new goal of salvation: One should not only seek one’s own freedom from samsāra but should become a buddha, whose task consists in primarily leading others, too, to salvation. One should hence follow the path of a bodhisattva. Because the way to Buddhahood is much longer and arduous than the direct way to nīrūṇa, a strong motivation is required to overcome and endure the difficulties. The Mahāyāna texts often mention compassion (karunā) as a decisive motive for this undertaking. Empathy or compassion is hence seen as the root (mūla) or seed (bijā) of bodhicitta, and bodhicitta as the defining principle of a bodhisattva striving to become a buddha. Moreover, in some Mahāyāna sources a buddha appears to be conceived not only as the end result of compassion but also as an embodiment and source of compassion. And since the historical Buddha, who was once seen as a kind of mentor for his followers, came to be later regarded as a model or prototype for the conception of a buddha in general, it would be worthwhile to take a look at the early notion of the historical Buddha in the light of his compassion and altruism.

Several questions may be asked in this connection: Why, according to the early Buddhist sources, did the Buddha appear? For whom did the Buddha become a buddha? And what was his motive for teaching and founding a community of ordained followers (sāṅgha)? There is no canonical evidence for the theory that the main motive for the Buddha’s appearance in the world was for the sake of others. This idea is found only in the post-canonical literature. The overwhelming majority of the canonical material suggests that the Buddha’s renunciation of worldly life and his search for salvation from samsāra were exclusively or primarily motivated by the realisation that he himself was inevitably affected by aging, sickness, and death, and that he was concerned with his own release (vimukti).

Once he had attained his own release from samsāra, he could have, if he wanted, retreated and acted like a ‘solitary awakened one’ (pratyekabuddha), that is, without propagating his teaching systematically or founding a community of monks and nuns.

What, then, was the Buddha’s motive for setting the Wheel of Dharma into motion? Schmithausen has made it clear that the Buddha’s teaching or his founding of a tradition of teaching and a community of monks and nuns was neither an obligation nor the mechanical

**laukikāgyadhāma** should actually be subsumed—into two aspects, namely, the remote and proximate, consisting of the moksābhāgyaśālamūlas and nirvedhobhāgyaśālamūlas respectively, and that the text, ‘in a provocative passage,’ as he puts it, defines the former in implicitly Mahāyāna terms as follows: “The remote preparatory [stage] refers to the initial [resolve] not to backslide from the bodhicitta, and so forth.” Even according to such an interpretation, however, the correspondence between bodhicitta and *laukikāgyatā, which seems to mean the summit of the mundane factors, is incomprehensible.

49 Apparently compassion is the ‘ideal’ motive for a bodhisattva’s endeavour. Nonetheless other motives have also been suggested. For example, according to Schmithausen (based on Paul Harrison) the prospect of acquiring the status and supernatural powers of the Buddha may also have played some role in this regard (SCHMITHAUSEN 2000b: 438, n. 8, 452, n. 84; SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 16). In the Sūramgamasamādhisūtra, even Märä generates bodhicitta, not out of compassion but out of deceit. See chapter nine, n. 1. See also LAMOTTE 2003: 10; SNELLGROVE 1987a: 65–66.


51 SCHMITHAUSEN 1997: 24, n. 53.

52 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a: 122–123, n. 16.
effect of some earlier impetus. Teaching or similar efforts were obviously not perceived to be a *sine qua non* for awakening or release—not for the Buddha and certainly not for those who followed his instructions. The Buddha's compassion is thus not conceived in early Buddhism as an automatic result of his awakening. There are several indications in the Pāli canon that the Buddha was quite reluctant to share his profound spiritual experience with others. Because of the profundity of his discovery and the inadequacy of the mental capacity of the people, he thought, the latter would not be able to understand him, and teaching would thus be a futile gesture. Therefore, he decided not to commit himself to any special round of activity (*appossukkatā*). It required the intervention of the god Brahmā Sahampati to make the Buddha reconsider his decision. In the Tibetan tradition, the reluctance of the Buddha to teach has often been interpreted as an expedient means of "expressing the excellency of the doctrine" (*chos kyi che ba brjod pa*). Also the fact that precisely the highest god of the Brāhmans is portrayed as asking the Buddha for the teaching can be seen as a type of propaganda aimed at glorifying the doctrine of the Buddha. This, in a way, implies that teachings are given only when asked for. Moreover, even if one is requested to teach, it is considered improper to give teachings to the disrespectful. The practice of requesting a teacher to teach is ingrained in the Theravāda as well as in the Tibetan tradition. The underlying philosophy of teaching is that teaching should be beneficial, not detrimental, to the recipient. This may also explain the apparent secretiveness of the tantric tradition.

In most early sources, however, compassion is given as an additional motive for teaching on the part of the Buddha. The supposition that compassion must have been the Buddha's motive for teaching makes perfect sense particularly if one considers the complete irrelevance and redundancy of the teaching for his own salvation. There are numerous episodes or incidents narrated in the Pāli canon reflecting the Buddha's compassion, even though the word *karunā* does not seem to occur frequently. Instead near synonyms such as care (*anukampā*) and concern (*anuddayā*) are found. Later the Buddha is credited with having not only compassion but even great compassion (*mahākarunā*). However, the word *mahākarunā* as an attribute of the Buddha is not found in the first four *Nikāyas*. It occurs for the first time in a later stratum of the Pāli canon, in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*. In the course of time, this compassionate or altruistic motivation seems to have been increasingly placed

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53 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a: 123.


55 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a: 120 (particularly n. 3, where several sources indicating the Buddha's reluctance to teach are given); MAITHRI MURTHI 1999: 126; SCHMITHAUSEN 2000b: 16, n. 60; VETTER 2000: 15; GETHIN 1998: 24–25, 279, n. 27; NORMAN 1983: 40.

56 For a similar explanation, see *Bodhisattvabhūmi* 1.17 (WOGIHARA, pp. 271.16–272.5; DUTT, p. 184.17–27).

57 See, for example, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 5.88; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 42.

58 GETHIN 1998: 25, 279, n. 28. In the Tibetan tradition, this custom of requesting seems to be extended to include the composition of Buddhist texts.

59 To be sure, in the *Mahāvagga* (*Vinaya I.6*), the word *kāruṇātā* is used. See *DP*, s.v. *kāruṇā*; *PED*, s.v. *kāruṇātā*.

60 See *CDP*, s.v. *anukampā* and *anuddayā*; MAITHRI MURTHI 1999: 125, cf. 166, n. 12. See also Maithrimurthi's comments in BSTEH 2000: 481.

61 MAITHRI MURTHI 1999: 253, n. 112.

62 *EOB*, s.v. *mahākarunā*. 

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further back chronologically: first, after the Buddha’s awakening, then after his renunciation, and then back in the distant past—for example, in the Jātakā nikāya, when the Buddha took birth as Sumedha during the time of the Buddha Dipamkara. As already stated, such an initial resolution (motivated by compassion), said to have been made by the historical Buddha in the past, is of tremendous significance, because with great plausibility it served as a model for the Mahāyāna concept of bodhicitta.

(e) Altruism in Early Buddhism

The altruistic attitude and actions of a bodhisattva crystallised in the form of bodhicitta, which may, as opposed to the altruism found in conservative Buddhism referred to by Maithimurthi as ‘passive altruism,’ be designated as ‘active altruism.’ Active, for a bodhisattva chooses not only to avoid harming other sentient beings (who are all suffering in one way or another in samsāra) but tries his best to be of benefit to them. But where did this principle of ‘active altruism’ found in Mahāyāna come from? How did it arise? In order to answer these questions, perhaps the only sensible thing to do is to look for traces of ‘active altruism’ in early Buddhist spirituality.

There has been disagreement as to which of the two poles of spirituality—the inner detachment from the world expressed by the term upeksā ('spiritual state of equanimity') and the care and concern for others expressed by the term karunā ('compassion')—is central in early or conservative Buddhism. Some have maintained that the state of spiritual equanimity plays the central role, whereas others have contended that it is altruism or compassion. However, both Schmithausen and Maithimurthi have convincingly demonstrated that it is indeed the spiritual equanimity that is pivotal to early Buddhist soteriology, while at the same time showing that compassion, too, is an essential factor in it, with an increasing tendency to gain a dynamism of its own. It is this very dynamism in early Buddhist spirituality that heralds the dawn of the bodhicitta concept.

But let us first return to the essentials of early Buddhist spirituality. The principal goal of spiritual practice in early Buddhism is the release from samsāra, and in the first place one’s own release. Thus striving for or attaining salvation is seen as a private affair, for the Buddha

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63 Vetter 2000: 14; Norman 1983: 78. Cf. Ray 1994: 51, where ‘compassion is identified as a central component of the Buddha’s enlightened personality.’ It would also be interesting to examine how a buddha’s compassion or altruistic motivation is treated in strands of thought where a buddha is conceived to have always been a buddha, that is, an ādibuddha. In such a case, it is quite likely that compassion would be held to have an ontological status. This seems to be the case, for example, in the rDzogs-chen system, where the so-called ‘all-embracing compassion’ ( thugs rje kun khyab) is said to be one of the triad of qualities immanent in the ‘universal ground’ (gchi). For the various notions of the Buddha Dipamkara, see Ratnakaraśaṭṭī’s Ratnālokaśāmkara (P, fols. 355b3–356b1; D, fols. 305b3–306a7; S, vol. 64, pp. 841.9–843.7).

64 Maithimurthi deems the three kinds of ethics named in connection with early Buddhism (i.e. egocentric, altruistic, and hybrid or mixed ethics) misleading (Maithimurthi 1999: 183), and instead uses the term ‘passive altruism’ to describe early Buddhist spirituality (ibid., 184–185).

65 Maithimurthi 1999: 1–2, 161–185, 429; Schmithausen 2000a: 119. See particularly Maithimurthi 1999: 149–152, where the soteriological relevance of spiritual equanimity is discussed. According to Maithimurthi, it is originally not only the most decisive factor on the path to salvation but ultimately the essence of salvation itself.

66 See Schmithausen 2000a: 119, where it is stated: “Ich selbst will versuchen, beiden Polen die gebührende Aufmerksamkeit zuteil werden zu lassen; wenngleich ich den Eindruck habe, daß der Gleichmut im Zentrum der frühbuddhistischen Spiritualität steht, ist doch auch das Mitgefühl ein wesentlicher, zur Eigendynamik neigender Faktor.” See also Maithimurthi 1999: 34, n. 34, and 185, where it is stated: “Eine gewisse Eigendynamik, die sich bei Bedarf in spontaner Hilfeleistung äußern kann, dürfte aber schwer abzustreiten und im Mahāyāna zu voller Entfaltung gekommen sein.”
as well as for his followers. Self-responsibility is stressed in early Buddhism, the Buddha being only a ‘good (spiritual) friend’ (kalyānamitra), or a guide who shows the path, but not a saviour. As for the practice of compassion (karunā), it is primarily recommended for combatting one’s own negative emotions, such as hatred and pleasure in the pain of others. Hence compassion does not play an overly prominent role in early Buddhism. Furthermore, there is no conclusive or otherwise convincing evidence in the Pāli canon to show that active social engagement was prescribed for or expected from the monks and nuns who were its main addressees.

Does this imply that early Buddhism professes an egoistic or exclusivist ethic? The individual monks and nuns, and originally also the Buddha himself, were indeed concerned about their own salvation. Nevertheless, they were not so in an egoistic manner, but rather allowed and wished others the same sort of salvation. Although the inner state of equanimity is the zenith of spiritual perfection, it does not nullify other apramāṇas but merely de-emotionalises or de-personalises them. An altruistic ethic is not categorically ruled out in early Buddhism. One is not supposed to harm the interests of others, at least not in a conscious, direct, and aggressive manner. One can help others after freeing oneself. There is no conflict between one’s own salvation and that of others. Providing help in spiritual matters to others is thus a by-product of one’s own salvation, but not an actual goal. According to Maithrimurthi, the kind of altruism promoted in the Dīghanikāya does not involve rendering immediate practical help but rather placing soteriological resources at others’ disposal and making them available as long as possible. The best way the ordained community can be of help is thus by being a mentor who lends ‘moral support.’ There is also a kind of ‘reciprocal

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67 Maithrimurthi uses the German term Heilsprivatismus (which may be translated as ‘salvific privatism’) coined by S. A. Srinivasan to describe the striving for salvation in early Buddhist spiritual practice. According to Srinivasan, the notion of Heilsprivatismus was readily adopted throughout the entire range of Indian religiosity (with a few exceptions, such as the later Mahāyāna Buddhism); see MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 184, n. 52. One may say that even Mahāyāna Buddhism (including Vajrayāna, despite the immense weight of the role of a guru) tacitly presupposes that one is responsible for one’s own salvation, and thus implies the idea of Heilsprivatismus. (I shall leave it up to the Jōdo-shinshū specialists to answer the question whether and to what extent Heilsprivatismus is applicable also to the Pure Land Buddhist notion of salvation.)


69 MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 120–121.

70 SCHMITHAUSEN 1985: 111. Compassion in the context of the four ‘immeasurables’ (apramāṇa) is more of a meditative practice (described by Maithrimurthi as ‘Gedanken-Ethik’) serving to enhance one’s spiritual development than one’s actions; see MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 117, 120, 127, 137.

71 See MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 115, 146, n. 25, 147, n. 27, 162, 428. Maithrimurthi summarises his own position in the following manner: “I show that the Buddhist lay ethic does have strong social components, and that the practice of the apramāṇas, or at least of maitri and karunā, can promote social engagement, but that this social engagement is, in the normative ethics of the Pāli-canon, not intended for monks” (MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 429). See also NORMAN 1983: 42.

72 For the de-emotionalisation or de-personalisation of compassion and friendliness, see MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 148–149, n. 29.

73 MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 183.

74 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a: 119.

75 MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 180–181, n. 41. For a translation of the pertinent passage from the Dīgharikāya, see ibid. (167, 168, n. 16).

altruism’ in early Buddhism. The lay Buddhist followers offered the ordained community material gifts (āmisadāna) in return for gifts of teaching (dhammadāna). These ‘spiritual gifts’ were important for preventing the criticism that the monks and nuns were parasites on society. Hence the ordained community lives according to the ethical principles of not harming others, of advising others on spiritual matters (in return for material support), and of being a mentor by living in spiritual purity (sōceyya) and wishing others well. Apart from these, it neither meddles in the private affairs of others nor is it held responsible for their actions.

Nevertheless, beside the general notions of ‘passive altruism’ and ‘reciprocal altruism,’ one also finds in the Pāli canon passages to the effect that one who strives for the salvation of oneself and others is esteemed more than one who strives only for one’s own salvation. Such statements, however, were by no means intended to question the legitimacy of limiting oneself to one’s own salvation or to downgrade it, but rather to suggest that while refraining from harming others may be good, actively benefiting them (if one can) is better, and similarly, while there is nothing wrong with not interfering in the affairs of others, it is better to lend a helping hand when they are in trouble. In all probability, it is through the application of such simple ethical common sense that the ‘active altruism’ (recommendable for anyone seeking Buddhahood) in Mahāyāna Buddhism came into being. If the teaching activity of the Buddha can be assumed to have been motivated by his compassion, it can well be seen as the first and foremost instance of active altruism, which, although perhaps only feasible for someone like the historical Buddha, might have served as a model or doctrinal legitimisation for developing the concepts of other forms of active altruism, ones which can be implemented not just by the Buddha, but by any ordinary being resolving to become a buddha.

(f) Prerequisites for Becoming a Buddha in Early Buddhism

According to early Buddhism, the salvation of a buddha, a pratyekabuddha and a śrāvaka saint is qualitatively the same. The difference lies in the fact that while a buddha and a pratyekabuddha make their soteriological breakthrough on their own, that is, without the help of a teacher, a śrāvaka has to depend on a teacher. Furthermore, the difference between a buddha and a pratyekabuddha is that a buddha establishes a tradition of teaching and teaches systematically, whereas a pratyekabuddha cannot or does not want to do so. A śrāvaka saint cannot establish a tradition of teaching, because he already finds himself in an established tradition. With such a doctrinal presupposition, which presupposes the same spiritual goal among all three, the question as to what made the Buddha a buddha would not seem a pressing one. The existing spiritual theories and practices would have adequately explained the soteriological goal aspired to. But as the notion of the Buddha changed and as he was increasingly seen as transcendent or supramundane, the question as to what makes one a buddha must have become increasingly urgent. The spiritual views and practices presented in the early Buddhist canon could not have satisfactorily explained the result of Buddhahood as conceived with later strands of thought. Some Buddhist thinkers must have reasoned: The Śrāvakayāna may be sufficient to produce a śrāvaka saint, but can by no means yield a

77 Schmithausen 2000a: 125, n. 25. See also Schmithausen 2004, where a comparative evaluation of exertions made for the welfare of oneself and others, as found in Anguttaranikāya 7.64, is discussed in detail.


79 The Samayabhedoparac Yadana (attributed to Vasumitra), for instance, states that according to the Mahāsākas, the spiritual path and the salvation of the śrāvakas and buddhas are the same (P, fol. 176a3; D, fol. 146b1; S, vol. 93, p. 1139.4-5): sangs rgyas rnam dang nyan thos rnam [om. PN] ni lam gcig go ||'rnam par grol ba gcig go ||' [om. PN]). See also Bhavya’s Nikāyabhedavibhangavyākhyāna (P, fol. 182a6; D, fol. 150b6; S, vol. 93, p. 1153.20): sangs rgyas dang nyan thos kyi rnam par grol ba si gcig go ||.
buddha. In order to produce a saint who is far superior to a śrāvaka saint, there must be a yāna which is far superior to the Śrāvakayāna. Thus, without the existence of a Buddhayaśa, Bodhisattvayaśa, or Mahāyāna, there is no way one can explain the existence and the appearance of a buddha or a bodhisattva (or mahāsattva). It is precisely such an argument that has been employed by the followers of Mahāyāna. The Buddhist thinkers must have availed themselves of the doctrinal resources embedded in the accounts of the Buddha’s previous lives found in the Jātaka and Avadāna literature. The heroic altruist deeds described in this literature were then probably assumed to be the factors that made the Buddha a buddha, and not a pratyekebuddha or a śrāvaka saint. However, these accounts of the Buddha’s previous lives seem to have served only as a model for the practical deeds expected of a bodhisattva, which are schematised into the six or ten perfections (pāramitā), but not for the theoretical doctrine of bodhicitta. The eight prerequisites necessary for the attainment of Buddhahood listed in the Buddhavamsa (Khuddakanikāya) may have well been the result of an attempt to explain the causes that go into the making of a buddha.

(g) The ‘Golden Rule’ in Early Buddhism

Although one witnesses an ontological (or metaphysical) interpretation of bodhicitta, the concept of bodhicitta seems to have primarily arisen within the contextual framework of ethics or ethical-moral discipline (sīla). If one looks at how the perfection of the ethical-moral discipline (śīlapāramitā) is conceived in early Mahāyāna literature, such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi, it becomes clear that the first sīla (namely, saṃvṛtasaśīla) reflects in essence the ‘passive altruism’ found in early Buddhism, that is, refraining from unwholesome actions so as to attain spiritual purity, whereas the last two sīlas (namely, kuśaladhammasamgrāhakāśīla and sattvārthakriyāśīla) give force to the aims of ‘active altruism.’

If the new Mahāyāna concept of sīla is rooted in the old non-Mahāyāna concept of sīla, the question to be asked is which element of the old sīla the new one is based on. It would appear to be: on the element most fundamental to Buddhist ethics, namely, non-injury (akīmśa). As the infliction of pain on living beings (the ultimate form being the killing of a sentient being out of hatred and anger) is the gravest offence from a Buddhist ethical-moral point of view (for lay followers as well as for the ordained), the practice of non-injury is most

80 Mahāyānasūtraśālaṃkārabhāṣya (p. 3.15–16): śrāvakayānaṃ buddhavacanan na mahāyānam iti na vujvate vinā buddhayānaṃ buddhābhīmā anupādāti ]; ibid. (p. 4.12–13); na ca śrāvakayānenaiva ciraṇāmaḥ bodhau gṛhasthāno buddho bhavītum arhati ].

81 For the difference between Jātaka and Avadāna, see NORMAN 1983: 89.

82 The earliest enumeration of the ten perfections is found in the Buddhavamsa and the Cariyāpiṭaka (VETTER 2000: 14, n. 8; NORMAN 1983: 94–95). The concept of ten perfections was quite likely developed later than that of six (EoB, p. 288). Note, however, that the ten perfections found in the Sanskrit literature do not exactly correspond with the ten found in Pāli sources. For the ten perfections occurring in the Sanskrit sources, see DAYAL 1932: 168. Also note that the term used for ‘perfection’ in the Pāli sources is either pārami or pāramitā (MAITRIKAMURTHI 1999: 169, n. 19). See also SKILLING 1996: 179.

83 Many of the stories in the Jātakas are said to be non- or pre-Buddhist in origin (NORMAN 1983: 79ff.). To the extent that they were adopted by Buddhists prior to the rise of Mahāyāna, however, such an origin does not affect the assumption that they were used as sources of inspiration or as a model for the bodhisattva’s altruistic deeds. On the overall role of the Jātakas, see SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 11.

84 For these terms, see TSD, s.v. dge bo’i chos sdud pa’i tshul khrims.
fundamental to Buddhist ethics. The underlying explanation is the Buddhist version of the Golden Rule. "Just as I wish to be left in peace, so too do others wish to be left in peace."

It is indeed an extension of this same Golden Rule that can probably explain the rise of the concept of bodhicitta along with attendant ethical principles, namely, "Just as I wish to be helped when I am in trouble, so too do others wish to be helped when they are in trouble." The Mahāyāna version of the Golden Rule has been formulated explicitly by Sāntideva, who flourished in the first half of the eighth century. In early Buddhism, for the sake of 'spiritual purity,' one is cautioned not to violate the principle of non-injury, even when inspired by compassion. To be sure, radical acts motivated by compassion can be found in the Pāli Vinaya, where it is narrated, for example, how a monk out of compassion recommends a fellow monk to take his own life, but such conduct is censured. In Mahāyāna the reverse is true: in cases of conflict, compassion and altruism outweigh the principle of non-injury. There are cases where even killing out of compassion is sanctioned. The question is where to set a limit. Perhaps the Golden Rule is applicable even in this extremely exceptional and risky situation. The Golden Rule seems to presuppose free will and self-responsibility. The execution of such an extreme measure as killing out of compassion would demand unusual insight (or foresight) and an extraordinary amount of compassion. Only a bodhisattva would know if he fulfilled both criteria. He would proceed only after considering the givens with both compassion and insight. If he indeed decided to carry the plan out, then he alone would bear all the consequences, whatever they might be. His insight and compassion should guide him not to cause more pain or suffering in samsāra than there already is. This Golden Rule, in my view, is also applicable in the context of Vajrayāna ethics. The Golden Rule, of course, is only applicable if we can presuppose that sentient beings by nature desire to live and live happily, and resist being injured or killed. It can thus be counterproductive in the case of, for examples, an arhat who no longer clings to life, and is, so to speak, indifferent (though still not immune) to suffering and death; one who, for whatever reason, has no regard for the lives of oneself and others; one who is insensitive, indifferent, or immune to the feeling of pain and suffering; one who finds pleasure in inflicting pain (e.g. a sadist) or in it being inflicted upon oneself (e.g. a masochist). Theoretically, a Buddhist saint could allow himself or herself to do anything with unlimited immunity without fearing any kind of karmic retribution, for the very basis of karmic mechanism has been rendered dysfunctional, but nonetheless it is said that it is impossible for a Buddhist saint to deliberately kill a sentient being.

85 See chapter one, n. 46.
86 The notion of a 'golden rule' is also found in non-Buddhist Indian sources (SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a: 127–128, nn. 41, 42).
88 SCHMITHAUSEN 1985: 114.
89 SCHMITHAUSEN 1985: 119. Non-injury in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna would be defined primarily by antitudinal or motivational impulses such as compassion or benevolence, not by physical or verbal action or non-action. This becomes clear in the context of the 'four cases' (ma bzhi) pertaining to 'transgression' (lung ba) and 'non-transgression' (lung med), discussed, for example, in sDom gsum rab dbye 2.30cd–35 and the Rig 'dzin 'jug ngags (pp. 156.16–159.9). For an English translation of the former, see RHOTON 2002: 298–293.
91 See SCHMITHAUSEN 2002: 16.
The question is, of course, what the doctrinal foundations were for such ethically problematic practices prescribed for or expected of a capable bodhisattva or a Buddhist tantric yogin. Even in the conservative Vinaya system, the borderline between transgression and non-transgression is not always clear-cut. Whether or not an ordained monk or nun commits a cardinal transgression (mīlāpattī)—and the severity of the offence—is not dependent on the action alone but also on a number of other criteria. The existence of such criteria leaves room for equivocality. This may have occasioned some followers of tantric or non-tantric Mahāyāna to introduce and legitimise ethically problematic or risky practices.

4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has attempted to provide the historical and doctrinal background to the key Mahāyāna concept of bodhicitta. Although neither the term bodhicitta nor the concept can be traced in the early non-Mahāyāna sources, there seem to be ample doctrinal resources which could have easily contributed to the conception and development of a notion such as bodhicitta. Thus I have argued that the exploitation of doctrinal strands of thought found in the early canonical and post-canonical sources, driven by a psychological need on the part of Buddhists to compensate for the loss of the historical Buddha and to guarantee the durability of the Three Jewels, probably gave rise to the notion of bodhicitta, that is, quintessentially, the resolve to become a buddha oneself by first becoming a bodhisattva.

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92 Bahudhātukasūtra (T. fol. 151a2–b1; D, fol. 30b2–6): gnas ma yin zhing go skabs med pa ni gang lta ba phun sum tshogs pa'i gang zag bsams bzhin du pha dang | ma dang | dgra bcom pa gsod par 'gyur ba dang | dge 'dun gyi dbyen byed par 'gyur ba dang | de bzhin gshegs pa la ngan sems khyis khrag 'byin par 'gyur ba ni gnas ma yin no || 'di ni gnas yin te so so'i skye bo gang yin pa'o || gnas ma yin zhing go skabs med pa ni gang lta ba phun sum tshogs pa'i gang zag bsams bzhin du srog chags kyi srog gcod par 'gyur ba dang | ... 'di ni gnas ma yin no || 'di ni gnas yin te | so so'i skye bo gang yin pa'o ||.

93 See, for example, the Vinayakārikā (P, fols. 8a8–13a3; D, fols. 7a1–11a5; S, vol. 93, pp. 15.19–26.7), where the four pārājikas are discussed. According to some Tibetan sources, a cardinal transgression occurs only if the following four criteria are met: (1) the ‘target’ or ‘object’ (gshi) must be unmistakable, (2) the offender must be compos mentis and must have a corresponding ‘motive’ or ‘intention’ (bsam pa) for carrying out the act, (3) the actual ‘committing’ (sbhor ba) of the act should take place as planned, and (4) the ‘completion’ (mthar thug) of the act must be accompanied by a sense of gratification or lack of remorse. See, for example, the Rig 'dzin 'jug ngogs (pp. 52.13–56.13).
Chapter Four

The Buddha’s First Resolve to Become a Buddha

As for me, [I] generated the resolve to [attain] awakening for the first time
In [one of my] previous lives when I was a physician,
[In the presence of] Tathāgata Śākyamuni, offering [him]

— Bhadrakalpikasūtra

1 Bhadrakalpikasūtra (T, fol. 406a1–2; D, fol. 288a4–5):

nga ni sngon tshe sman par gyur pa na ||
del bzhin gshegs pa shākya thub pa [de D] la ||
jam sgang zhi gni dbul bar [ba T] byas nas kyang ||
dang por byang chub tu ni sams bskyed do ||

Cf. the citation in the mChims chen (p. 450.22–24). See also the rGyab chos pad dkar (p. 888.4–5). Cf. n. 28.
subsequent endeavour came into being or were introduced to explain the very appearance and
existence of the Buddha in the world. That is why these events in the Buddha’s career,
especially his first resolve, are particularly significant in the history of bodhicitta as a concept.

2. The Historical Buddha as One of Many and Yet One of a Kind

Despite the multiplicity of buddhas in Mahāyāna Buddhism, the historical Buddha still seems
to enjoy a status of his own, and is perceived as someone special (at least as far as I can judge
from Tibetan Buddhism). In the Maitreyapariprcchāsūtra, the resolve of the historical
Buddha is contrasted with the resolve of Maitreya. Maitreya resolved to act for the sake of
sentient beings that are easy to deal with, that is, those endowed with scarcely any
intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa), whereas the historical Buddha resolved to do
precisely the opposite. He resolved to deal with difficult sentient beings endowed with intense
intellectual-emotional defilements. The bleak picture portrayed of the sentient beings of our
era and the resolve and readiness of the historical Buddha to come to their assistance make
him look all the more sympathetic and magnificent. This seems to set him apart for many
Buddhists despite his being one of countless buddhas in a limitless expanse of space and time,
for he is the one with whom they have the most immediate ties spatially, temporally, and
emotionally. Tibetan Buddhists thus understandably refer to the historical Buddha as ‘our
teacher’ (bdag cag gi ston pa) or, so to speak, the ‘Buddha of our Destiny.’ It is said that the
buddhas cannot be differentiated qualitatively, that is, on the basis of the quality of their
elimination (spang ba) of obscuration (sgrība), realisation (rtogs pa), or great compassion
(thugs rje chen po). The distinction, if it is made at all, is hence almost always subjective;
that is, whether or not, and how much, one values a buddha depends on the spiritual profit
gained from him or his teaching.

The logic of evaluating the worth of the historical Buddha in this way seems to have
been later transposed or extended to evaluating one’s spiritual friend (kālyāṇamitra) or master
(guru), particularly in Vajrayāna. The spiritual teacher had by then taken on the role of the
historical Buddha himself. The historical Buddha, as benevolent as he might be, had come
and gone. Not everybody had the fortune to be at the right place at the right time, and hence
to experience the presence of the historical Buddha personally. The person one looked to was
now one’s own spiritual teacher, who lived and transmitted the teachings of the Buddha,
which otherwise would have remained inaccessible to ordinary beings. This perhaps also
explains the tremendous importance attached to the role of the bla ma in Tibetan Buddhism
(thus formerly called ‘Lamaism’) —a result perhaps, among other things, of the need to
compensate for the loss of the historical Buddha.

3. Three Events Marking the Career of the Buddha

When and how the historical Buddha resolved to become a buddha for the first time was
perceived differently at different times and places in different texts and traditions. In other

2 Cf. DAYAL 1932: 292: “The doctrine of a bodhisattva’s career was also promulgated in order to explain and
interpret the historic fact of his marvellous virtue and wisdom. In Buddhist philosophy and history, all roads lead
to Gautama Buddha.”

3 Maitreyapariprcchāsūtra (T, fols. 296b4–297b5; D, fols. 115a6–116a2).

4 This point is also made in the rGyab chos pad dkar (pp. 200.2–202.4), where the pertinent passage from the
Maitreyapariprcchāsūtra is quoted.

5 mChims 'Jam-pa'i-dbyangs, mChims chen (p. 690.15–24).
words, the changing view of the nature of the Buddha directly affected how his initial resolution was viewed. The diversity of ways the Buddha was conceived in the various Buddhist systems ranging from Śrāvakayāna to Vajrayāna precludes a one-dimensional presentation of the Buddha’s initial resolve to become a *buddha*. Several questions have to be clarified first: On the brink of becoming a *buddha*—that is, let us say, when Gautama Śākyamuni sat down under the Bodhi tree (*Ficus religiosa*) the night before his awakening—was he a *bodhisattva* (in a non-Mahāyāna sense), albeit an ordinary person subject to birth and death, or was he a *bodhisattva* of the tenth stage (*bhūmi*), or was he already a *buddha*? Had he been an *ādibuddha* in the sense of one who has never experienced *samsāra* as a sentient being? And how could he have made the initial resolution if he had been an *ādibuddha*?

Despite the numerous Buddhist views regarding the true nature of the historical Buddha and the time and place of his awakening, the later non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna sources more or less seem to agree that the Buddha’s career was marked by the three great events mentioned above, also known as the events at the beginning (*thog ma*), the middle (*bar*), and the end (*tha ma*). The following verse from the *Dvādaśakāraṇayāstotra* attributed to Nāgārjuna, for example, describes Buddha Śākyamuni thus:6

\[\text{I extol You, Protector of the world (or living beings),}\\ \text{Who now [engage in] far-ranging [salvific] activities,}\\ \text{Having first generated the resolve to [strive for] awakening,}\\ \text{And gathered the [two] accumulations of beneficial resources (puṇya) and gnosis (jñāna).}\]

Similarly the *Āṣṭamahāsthānacaitiyastotra*, also ascribed to Nāgārjuna, states:7

\[\text{Obeisance to the stūpa (or caitya) [that symbolises or commemorates the event] of the great}\\ \text{awakening [of the Buddha],}\\ \text{Who first resolved to [strive for] the supreme awakening,}\\ \text{[Then] gathered [the two types of] accumulation for three countless aeons,}\\ \text{[And finally] conquered the [four] mūras and became a *buddha* on the seat of awakening}\\ \text{(*bodhimaṇḍa*) [under the Bodhi tree].}\]

It is interesting to note that the deeds of the Buddha as narrated in the *Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā* by the eleventh-century Kashmirian poet Kṣemendra (ca. 1000–1070) are fitted into the framework of these three events.8 Of the one hundred eight ‘sprigs’ (pallava) of the *Bodhisattvāvadānakalpalatā*, the first and the hundredth (i.e. the *Prabhāsāvadāna* and the *Punyaprabhāsāvadāna*) deal with the generation of *bodhicitta* in the past by the historical Buddha.9 In a similar fashion, Śraddhākāravarmān states:10

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6 *Dvādaśakāraṇayāstotra* (P, fol. 95b2–3; D, fol. 82b3–4; S, vol. 1, p. 255.4–6):

\[\text{gang gis dang po byang chub thugs bskyed nas ||}\\ \text{bsod nams ye shes tshogs gnyis rdzogs mdzad cing ||}\\ \text{dus 'dir mdzad pa rgya chen 'gro ba yi ||}\\ \text{mgon gyur khroy la bdag gis bstd pa bgyi ||}.\]

7 *Āṣṭamahāsthānacaitiyastotra* (P, fols. 94b8–95a1; D, fol. 82a4; S, vol. 1, p. 252.5–7):

\[\text{dang po byang chub mchog [om. P] tu thugs bskyed nas ||}\\ \text{bskal pa grangs med gsum du tshogs bsags te ||}\\ \text{byang chub snying por sangs rgyas bsud ni btsu ||}\\ \text{byang chub chen po 'i mchod rten phyag 'tshal lo ||}.\]


9 For the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the 100th pallava, i.e. the *Punyaprabhāsāvadāna*, along with text critical remarks, see DE JONG 1979b: 252–253.

10 MEJOR 1992: 159.
The Well-gone One (sugata), the font of all virtues, at the beginning generated the resolve [to strive for awakening].

In the middle gathered the two [types of] accumulation, and at the end attained
The Body of Reality (dharmakāya), and [for] the purpose of others
Manifested himself in the form of a Material Body (rūpakāya) out of the state of non-
origination.

Kong-sprul cites a certain yon tan yongs su bkod pa'i mdo (perhaps *Gunakārandavyūhasūtra) which also seems to allude to these three events in the career of the historical Buddha. According to Nyang-ral Nyi-ma-'od-zer (1136–1204), the three great events are enacted for the benefit of sentient beings, and are thus the reason why buddhas and bodhisattvas deserve the gratitude of sentient beings. The late non-Mahāyāna and the Mahāyāna traditions may differ in the terminology they employ in this context and in where they draw the borderlines between these three great events, but in essence both traditions seem to presuppose them.

(a) The First Event: The Initial Resolve to Become a Buddha

Of the three great events of the Buddha’s career, the most significant for this study is his initial resolve to become a buddha. It should, however, be remembered that the generation of an initial resolve as such is not limited to the historical Buddha. One can also find accounts of śrāvakas and other bodhisattvas making their own initial resolution. I shall, however, limit myself to the accounts of the historical Buddha’s initial resolve.

As has been already stated, according to both non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna traditions, the historical Buddha made his initial resolution to become a buddha in the distant past. Nevertheless, they disagree, according to Tibetan sources, on how he did so. This is also applicable to the tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources, and thus we are confronted with several versions of the Buddha’s first resolution, which, of course, neither can nor should be interpreted as historical accounts, for doing so would result in irreconcilable contradictions. For the Buddhist traditions, the issue of multiple ‘first times’ is, strictly speaking, rather a doctrinal than a historical problem, and hence the attempts that have been made by traditional Tibetan scholars, for instance, to resolve these contradictions have been exclusively doctrinal in nature. This does not, however, mean that these accounts of legendary character are of no use to us. In fact, such accounts seem to contain traces of ideas that very likely contributed to

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11 Yogāvatārasaṅgrahā (P, fol. 116a2–3; D, fol. 104b3–4; S, vol. 41, p. 279.9–11):

| bde gshigs yon tan kun gvi 'byung gnas kyi s |
| thog mar thugs bskyed bar du tshogs gnis bsags |
| tha mar chos sku brnyes nas gzas don ni |
| skye med ngang las gzugs kyi skor bstan te |.

12 Kong-sprul, Shes bya mchod (p. 149.1–5). I was not able to locate a sūtra in the bKa’-gyur with the title Gunakārandavyūhasūtra, but see the Avalokitēśvaragunakārandavyūhasūtra (Taishō 1050).

13 Nyang ral chos 'byung (pp. 2.13–4.13).

14 Bhadrakalpiśāstra (T, fols. 405b1–474a4; D, fols. 288a1–336b2). See also, for example, DORJE 1998: 29–89, where the names of one thousand and five buddhas occurring in the Bhadrakalpiśāstra have been listed along with the manner in which each buddha is said to have generated bodhicitta for the first time. See also the citation in the Sūtrasamuccaya (pp. 26.3–27.1).

15 See, for example, mKhas-pa lDe'u, lDe'u chos 'byung (p. 26.16–17): '"... sens bskyed par mthun yang bskyed lugs theg pa che chung du byung ngo'.'

16 That there are several versions of the Buddha’s first resolution has already been noted by Har Dayal, who is also quick to point out that “[it] is not possible to reconcile these conflicting accounts” (DAYAL 1932: 293).
the development of the bodhicitta concept, and hence can be valuable for the study of the history of it and related ideas.

The Tibetan tradition considers the account of the Buddha’s initial generation of the resolve to strive for awakening found in the legend of King Prabhāsa (or Suprabhāsa)\(^\text{17}\) and the elephant tamer as the non-Mahāyāna version of this event.\(^\text{18}\) The story can be found in the Vinayavastu of the Mulāsaṃvāti school, upon which traditional Tibetan scholars seem to have mainly drawn\(^\text{19}\) and the Jātaka and Avadāna literature,\(^\text{20}\) and also in the Tibetan version of the *Damamikasūtra* and in the Tibetan supplement to Āryaśūra’s Jātakamālā by Karmapa Rang-Byung-rdo-rje (1284–1339).\(^\text{21}\) As I have stated, the story has been often recounted by Tibetan scholars, albeit with varying details and emphases, and has also drawn the attention of several modern scholars, some of whom have provided summaries of the account.\(^\text{22}\)

King Prabhāsa (who is the Buddha in one of his previous existences) came to realise that while the skilled elephant tamer could train an elephant physically so well that it could even be made to swallow a red-hot iron ball, he is powerless against the surging passion of the elephant. The king was overcome by compassion for the elephant, which was both so wild and so submissive. Analogously, the king then realised that other sentient beings in samsāra also succumb to the power of passion and pain, and thus felt compassion towards them, too. Subsequently, the king wanted to know from the elephant tamer if he had ever seen or heard of anyone who was free from passion and able to tame the passion of sentient beings. The trainer told him that only buddhas are able to do so, and the king, upon hearing this, was

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\(^{17}\) The name of the king is given as Suprabhāsa in the Jātakamālāvadānasūtra and Mahajātatakamālā (Hahn 1985: 31) and as Prabhāsa in other sources. The name of the king is usually translated into Tibetan as ‘Od-Idan (Panglung 1981: 286), perhaps from *Saprabhāsa*, but according to Mi-pham, it also occurs as Rab-snang and Rab-gsal in the Jātaka literature, which he naturally assumed to be synonymous (Mi-pham, rGyabchos pad dkar, p. 887.2): skyes rab gzhan las rgyal po rab snang dang rab gsal zhes gsungs pa ming gi rnam grangs yin par mgon no ||). Cf. the Bu stonchos ’byung (p. 61.1), where the king is called Rab-grags.

\(^{18}\) Vinayavastu (T, vol. kha, fols. 365a5–367b3; D, vol. kha, fols. 273a3–273b5). It has almost become a custom among Tibetan scholars writing on the origin of the Buddha or Buddhism to recount the story of King Prabhāsa and the elephant tamer. The story is told in the context of explaining how the historical Buddha, according to the non-Mahāyāna tradition, first resolved to become a buddha. See, for example, the Bu stonchos ’byung (pp. 60.22–61.16); mChims chen (p. 451.6–12); Gur brka chos ’byung (p. 19.1–13); sDe dge bstan dkar (pp. 40.1–41.14); Co ne bstan dkar (p. 12.4–13.21); Baidūrya ser po (p. 347.15–24); Mi-pham, rGyabchos pad dkar (pp. 882.6–883.3); Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod (p. 142.27–31).

\(^{19}\) While some Tibetan scholars, such as Bu-ston, do not indicate their source for the story, others give it simply as ’Dul ba lung = Vinayāgama (e.g. Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod, p. 142.27) or as ’Dul ba gshi = Vinayavastu (e.g. Mi-pham, rGyabchos pad dkar, p. 884.3), and still others specify it as the sMan gyi gshi = Bhaisajyavastu (e.g. Baidūrya ser po, p. 347.15; Panglung 1981: 223).

\(^{20}\) For example, it is found in the Jātakamālāvadānasūtra (Hahn 1985: 5); Mahajātatakamālā, no. 7 (Hahn 1985: 86–100), Kumāralāta’s Kalpanāmanditā, no. 53 (Panglung 1981: 219), Haribhadra’s Jātakamālā, no. 1 (Hahn 1985: 5), Gopadatta’s introduction to the Jātakamālāvadānasūtra (Hahn 1985: 31); Gopadatta’s Jātakamālā, no. 1 (Hahn 1985: 5); Kṣemendra’s Bodhisattvävadānakalpalatā, nos. 1 & 100 (Mejor 1992: 36, and 48; Panglung 1981: 209; De Jong 1997: 348–349); the Khotanese Jātakastra, no. 1 (Panglung 1981: 214); Damamikātanādānāsūtra, nos. 21 and 49 (Panglung 1981: 218). See also the sources indicated in Panglung 1981: 50.

\(^{21}\) sKyes rabs brgya pa (no. 71, pp. 475.12–480.7). In the Tibetan tradition, the Jātakamālā by Āryaśūra, which consists of thirty-four pāllavas, and Rang-byung-rdo-rje’s supplement, consisting of sixty-seven pāllavas, are called collectively the sKyes rabs brgya pa. See the publishers’ introduction to the sKyes rabs brgya pa (p. 1.12–15). We still, however, need to trace the source/s of Rang-byung-rdo-rje’s compilation.

\(^{22}\) Takakusu 1901; Dayal 1932: 293; Tucci 1949: 442, 529; Schlüngloff 1977. For summaries of the story in German, see Hahn 1985: 30–31 and Panglung 1981: 49–50.
overwhelmed with faith towards the buddhas. These realisations are said to be responsible for prompting the king to resolve to become a buddha.23 In the Vinayavastu, the Buddha narrates the story upon being asked by the sāvakas where he made his resolution to become a buddha for the first time. The Buddha’s answer is summarised as follows:24

Having heard that [only] buddhas are free from passion,
Having seen a proud powerful elephant [overcome by passion],
And [having seen] the suffering of the world,
I generated the resolve to [strive for] awakening [for the first time].

In the Drin lan bsab pa’i mdo, the Buddha, upon being asked when he generated the thought of kindness and benevolence towards monks, narrates the following story:25 Countless aeons ago, the Buddha was once born in hell as a strong man (gyad)26 who, together with a weaker co-worker, had to draw a bullock cart for the torture guard. When the guard tortured his colleague for being unable to pull the cart faster, the Buddha, overwhelmed with compassion, pleaded with the guard to show some sympathy and instead allow him to pull the cart alone. The guard became furious at his audacity and tortured him to death. This is often said to be the first time that the Buddha generated unswerving benevolence. The sūtra itself, however, does not refer to it as the first time. In contrast to many others, mKhas-pa lDe’u considered the account in the Drin lan bsab pa’i mdo to be another non-Mahāyāna version of the story.27

According to the Mahāvastu, the historical Buddha aspired to the awakening (bodhāye pranīhitam) in the presence of the past Buddha called Tathāgata Śākyamuni during his life as a merchant or guildsman (śreṣṭhin).28 The Abhidharmakośa tradition seems to take this as the very first such resolution on the part of the historical Buddha.29 However, there is nothing to this effect in the Mahāvastu. The account of the initial resolution made in the presence of the past Buddha Śākyamuni can also be found in other Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Triskandhakasūtra30 and Bhadrakalpiśāsūtra,31 although the name of the past Buddha occurs

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23 See, for example, Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod (p. 142.25–27): sngon ’das pa’i dus na ston pa’i rgyal po ’od ldan du gyur pa’i tshe | rgyu mthban gsum la brten nas sbyin pa sbyin smon lam bsab cing bla ma med pa’i byang chub tu thugs mchog bsnyed par gsungs te |.

24 Vinayavastu (T, vol. kha, fol. 369b1; D, vol. kha, fol. 276a2):
sangs rgyas ’od chags bral thos shing ||
glang po dregs pa’i shas chen dang ||
jig rten sdu sgal gyur mthong nas ||
ngas ni byang chub sems bsnyed do ||.
The verse is cited also in the mChims chen (p. 451.8–9).

25 The story is narrated in the fourth chapter of the Drin lan bsab pa’i mdo (T, fols. 291a2–292a5; D, fols. 117a3–118a2) and the forty-fourth chapter of the *Damamūkasūtra (T, fol. 229a4–b4; D, fols. 282b4–283a6). Both of these sūtras were obviously translated from the Chinese and hence bear no Sanskrit titles. The story has been retold in varying details in a number of Tibetan works. See, for example, the lDe’u chos ‘byung (pp. 26.18–27.11); Bo ston chos ‘byung (p. 65.13–18); Baidārya sar po (p. 348.13–23); Sun-pa mKhan-po, dPeg bsmam ljon bzang (pp. 44.18–45.4); Mi-pham, rGyab chos pad dkar (pp. 883.3–884.2), Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod (p. 144.4–10).

26 See TSD, s.v. gyad.

27 lDe’u chos ‘byung (p. 26.18). The sūtra is, however, not specified by name there.

28 Mahāvastu (vol. 1, p. 47.12–16): ito mahānaudgalyāna aparimitā asamkhyeyā kalpā yaṃ śākyamunir nāma tathāgato ...|| śākyamunisya khalu punah mahānaudgalyāna kapilavastuḥ nāma nagaraṃ ...|| tadāham śreṣṭhi abhiśī || vyāgṛtaṃ pratyayā bodhāye pranīhitam ||. Cf. n. 1.

29 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (pp. 266.23–267.1): śākyamunir nāma sanyaksambuddhab pārśvaṃ babhūra | yatra bhagavatā bodhisattvabhūtenādyāṃ pranidhānāṃ kṛtam evaṃprakāra evāhaṃ buddho bhaveyam iti...
in the latter as *Mahāśākyamuni. This was perhaps in order to distinguish him from the historical Śākyamuni. According to both the Mahāvastu and the Tristandhakasūtra, the historical Buddha was then born into a merchant’s family. In the Bhdrakalpikasūtra, however, he is born as the son (khye’u) of a poor potter (rdza mkhan). According to the Ajṭāsātrakurukṛtyavindanadāsūtra,32 the Buddha generated his initial resolve to become a buddha at the feet of Tathāgata Mi-thub-pa’i-rgyal-mtshan, as a son of a merchant (śresṭhin) called Dri-ma-med-pa’i-dpung-pa, and at the initiative of Maṇjuśrī, who had taken birth as the Dharma exponent *Jñānarāja.33 According to the Dukṣṭanigrasūtra,34 the Buddha made the resolution to become a buddha at the feet of the Tathāgata gZhan-gyis-mi-thub-pa’i-rgyal-mtshan, forty million aeons after the bodhisattva Maitreyā—then ruling as a universal king (cakravartin)—had made his own such resolution in front of the Tathāgata *Prabhāśa or *Suprabhāśa (Shin-tu’-od). The Karunāṇḍarikasūtra35 narrates that the generation of bodhicitta by Śākyamuni Buddha occurred in the presence of the Tathāgata Ratnagarbha, after the former had been born as Brāhmaṇa Sāmudrareṇu (also referred to as Bodhisattva Mahākārūṇika). The Bodhisattvapitakasūtra,36 too, is referred to as a source, according to which the Buddha, having taken birth as *Vīryacāra (brTson’-grus-spyod), resolved to become a buddha in the presence of Tathāgata *Mahāśākandha (Phung-po-chen-po). Occasionally the Lalitavistarasūtra37 is also drawn upon as a source documenting the Buddha’s initial resolution, here made before the Tathāgata Amoghāsārīś. Finally, Daśabalaśrimitra’s Samskṛtāsamskṛtavinścayā38 records the position of the Sthāvira school,

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30 Tristandhakasūtra (T, fol. 209b3–5; D, fol. 68a6–7): ‘ji litar bcom ldan ’das de bzhin gshegs pa shākya thub pa tshong dpon gyu bu mgon dge gur pa na | bcom ldan ’das de bzhin gshegs pa ndzes chen la brten te | dang po byang chub tu thugs bskyed pa de bzhin du bdag kyang byang chub tu sms par bsnyed par bgyi’o ||.

31 For the pertinent verse from the Bhdrakalpikasūtra, see n. 1.

32 Ajṭāsātrakurukṛtyavindanadāsūtra (T, fol. 289b4–292b1; D, fol. 227b5–229b5). The Sanskrit fragments of this sūtra (HARTMANN & HARRISON 1998) do not contain this story. The story has been narrated in various details in various Tibetan works such as the IDe’u chos ’byung (pp. 27.17–29.11); mChims chen (p. 451.3–5); Mi-pham, rGyab chos pad dkar (pp. 881.6–882.5).

33 Cf. the Medhyamakavatārābhāṣya (pp. 4.20–5.4).

34 Dukṣṭanigrasūtra (T, fol. 400b7–401b2; D, fol. 57b3–58a5). See also Mi-pham, rGyab chos pad dkar (pp. 882.6–883.3).

35 Karunāṇḍarikasūtra (YAMADA 1969: 352.11–18): ‘tat kīṃ manyadhve kulapurāṇyah sa tena kālena tena samayena mahākārūṇika nāma bābhūvā | na cāṇyo draṣṭavyo ḍham sa tena kālena tena samayena mahākārūṇika nāma bābhūvā ratnagarbhaya tathāgatasya pitā | ayaṃ me prathamacittotpādata bhūt anuttarāyāṃ sanyaksambodhau | prathamacittpādāna ca me guṇanātikrāntāḥ sattvāḥ samādāpi bhūt anuttarāyāṃ sanyaksambodhau | ayaṃ me prathamah śūrabhāvāḥ śīvakāryam ca |. For the Tibetan translation, see the Karunāṇḍarikasūtra, (T, fol. 203a7–b3; D, fol. 271a2–4). See also the mChims chen (p. 450.24).

36 Bodhisattvapitakasūtra (T, fol. 349b7–350b3; D, vol. ga, fol. 192b5–193a5). See also the mChims chen (p. 451.1–2).

37 See, for example, Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod (p. 144.13–15): rgya cher rol par | ‘a’hog mar khyod kyi [= kyi] don yod mthong la sā la’i me tog gis ni mchod | ’bso ces de bzhin gshegs pa mngon sum du mdzod nas thugs bsnyed pa’i thog ma du bzhin gshegs pa don yod mthong gi drung du yin par gsungs so ||. * Lalitavistarasūtra (T, fol. 129a7; D, fol. 87a3): ’thog mar khyod kyi don yod mthong [thong T] la sā la’i me tog gis ni mchod ||. The Sanskrit text of the pertinent pada reads (Lalitavistarasūtra, VAIDYA & TRIPATHI 1987: 134.13–16):pravatāma te amoghāsārīś śālapus paraph-yito....

38 Samskṛtāsamskṛtavinścayā (P, fol. 38b1–4; D, fol. 136a7–b2; S, vol. 63, p. 362.9–15): rab tu spros pa ni dga’ ba zhes bya ba’i bskal pa grangs med dang po la bcom ldan ’das lhag pa’i lha zhes bya ba ’khor los [lo PN] sgyur ba mi’i [mi yi P] bdag por gyur pas thog ma med pa’i ’khor ba ru sngon ma mthong ba sangs rgyas
according to which the historical Buddha made his initial resolution in the presence of the Buddha *Brahmādeva.\(^{39}\)

(i) Attempts to Resolve the Illogicality of Several ‘First Times’

The fact that each of these sūtras has its own account of the Buddha’s resolve to become a buddha for the first time (as already mentioned, some are not explicit in this regard) shows that those sūtras originated at varying times and places. The traditions which take these accounts as reflecting the word of the Buddha are thus obliged to explain these contradictions, since logically there cannot be several first times. The historical anachronism and inconsistencies in the authoritative scriptures regarding this event have often been interpreted as efficient strategies employed by the Buddha with the diverse perceptive capacities and predispositions of sentient beings in mind. There are, however, several other attempts at an explanation. Some have tried to interpret the various instances of the initial resolve as pertaining to pranidhičītta and prasthānacittra.\(^{40}\) Others, while noting that the discrepancies are due to the different contexts and mental states of the sentient beings before whom such teachings were given, and that there is no point in insisting on one version of the Buddha’s initial resolve to become a buddha, still suggest interpreting the various views as pertaining to conventional and absolute bodhičītta, and the like.\(^{41}\)

As an example, I shall present here Mi-pham’s attempt to resolve this inconsistency. Mi-pham employed the five causes of samādānasāṃketiκacittotpāda found in Mahāyānasūtraḷaṃkāra 4.7 to explain these several ‘first times.’ It is unclear to me, however, whether this interpretation is his own or whether he adopted it from an earlier Indian or Tibetan source. In any case, the generation of the Buddha’s resolve to strive for awakening for the first time found in the Ajātaśatrūjauktīyaśāvinođanāśātra is explained by him as being the result of the strength of a friend (mītrabala); that is, the Buddha generated bodhičītta at the initiative of his spiritual friend, Mañjuśrī. The initial resolutions spoken of in the Duhśilāganrahāsātra and Drin lan bsab pa’i mdo are said to have been due to the strength of cause (hetubala) or spiritual disposition (gotra). The initial resolve to strive for awakening mentioned in the Bhaisajyavastu is ascribed to the strength of hearing (sṛutabala); and in the Bhadrakalpikāsātra, to the strength of the basis (mūlabala) of virtues (kuśala). Brāhmaṇa Samudrareṇu’s initial resolution, narrated in the Karunāpuṇḍarakīṣāsātra as well as in the Bhadrakalpikāsātra, is explained as being the first extraordinary such resolution made by the Buddha on the strength of the repeated practice of positive (attitudes and actions) (śubhābhyāsa), that is, on account of his readiness to appear in our world system, which is inhabited by the most difficult sentient beings. Such resolve made him special among all

\(^{39}\) See also the Shes bya mdzod (pp. 143.3–8; 145.16–17).

\(^{40}\) See, for example, Sum-pa mKhan-po, dPags bsam ljon bzang (p. 45.10–12): ... sems dang po bskyed par gsungs pa sogs mang yang dmyal ba’i shing rta’i dren pa’i gyad kyi dus su smon sems dang khye’u snang byed kyi dus’ jug sems thog mar bskyed pa yin nam snya mo ||.

\(^{41}\) Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod (pp. 144.15–19): de lta thog mar thugs bskyed tshul theg pa che chung gi khyad par dang | theg chen nyid la’ang mdo rnam su mi’dra ba du mar ‘byung ba rnam ni gzhul bya’i dus skabs bsam pa’i khyad par dang | smon’ jug don dam gyi thugs bskyed pa’i khyad par sogs dgon gszi mang po tha dad du gsungs par mgon pas | thugs bskyed kyi thog ma’di kho na’o zhes phyogs gcig tu mgon par zhen zhing go rim dkrigs char bsgrigs pa la ni snying po med do ||.
bodhisattvas. Mi-pham, however, notes that it is not easy to determine the chronology of such events by employing logical analysis.\(^{42}\)

(ii) Was the Historical Bodhisattva ‘King-Like’ or ‘Herdsmen-Like’?

As we shall discuss in greater detail later, the Tibetan tradition refers to three kinds of bodhisattvas, namely, ‘king-like,’ ‘boatman-like,’ and ‘herdsmen-like.’ Such a distinction is made on the basis of the bodhisattva’s magnanimity as reflected in his attitude or resolve. The immediate question is: What kind of bodhisattva was the historical Buddha? How magnanimous was he, how selfless was his resolve? Tibetan Buddhist scholars have pondered upon such questions and come to different conclusions. According to Klong-chen-pa, the historical Buddha was a herdsman-like bodhisattva and his resolve was the most magnanimous.\(^{43}\) The dGe-lugs-pa historian Sum-pa mKhan-po Ye-shes-dpal-’byor (1704–1788), however, maintained that the resolve of the historical Buddha was that of a ‘king-like’ bodhisattva.\(^{44}\) rDo-grub Kun-bzang-gzhan-phan alias ’Jigs-med-phrin-las-’od-zer (1745–1821), in commenting on ’Jigs-med-gling-pa’s Yon tan mdzod, does not follow Klong-chen-pa and give the bodhisattva that became the historical Buddha as an example of a herdsmen-like bodhisattva, but instead names the so-called ‘Lords of the Three Families’ (rigs gsun mgon po), namely, Mājñuṣṭīra, Avalokiteśvara, and Vajrapāni, who, although they fulfilled all the prerequisites for becoming buddhas, postponed full attainment of their Buddhahood, and have thus remained as bodhisattvas of the tenth stage (bhūmi), and will continue as such for as long as there are suffering sentient beings in samsāra.\(^{45}\)

Klong-chen-pa’s identification of the historical Buddha’s resolve as that of a herdsmen-like bodhisattva seems to be influenced by a passage from the Ratnakūṭasūtra, which states that a herdsmen-like bodhisattva takes three countless aeons, to become a buddha, and indeed the historical Buddha is said to have taken three countless aeons according to both non-Mahāyāna and most Mahāyāna traditions. But such a proposition, if understood as an exact description of the actual course of events, would have undesired illogical consequences, namely: (a) the historical Buddha actually did not become a buddha, because if he had become a buddha, this would imply that there was no suffering sentient being left in samsāra, or (b) the historical Buddha did not keep his commitment. Neither of the two alternatives is, of course, doctrinally acceptable. It seems that it was for this reason

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\(^{42}\) Mi-pham, rGyab chos pad dkar (pp. 893.5–984.4): ‘di dag smon ‘jug sogs sems bskyed pa’i gnas skabs so so la bzhes pa’ang yod mod mdo rang gis ji ltar gsal ba las mtha’ gcig tu ‘di dag gi snga phyi ‘di zhes nges pa dka’ mod | gang ltar kyang thog mar thugs bskyed pa’i tshul ‘di yang je bzang je brran du song nas bram ze rgya msho’i rdul gvis thugs bskyed pa’i tse theg pa chen po la yid ches pa’i dpa’i dad pa drag pos sams con gzhon mang po theg chen la bkod pa dang | bdag nyid kyis snying rje chen pos zhir ma dag pa ced du bzang ba’ti thugs bskyed thog ma yin par mgon no || des na thog mar ’jam dpal gvis bla med byang chub tu thugs bskyed du gzhug pa’i sa bon las theg pa chen po’i rigs sad de phyi ma ’di rnam rim bzhin ’byung yang rong la | khye’us sangs rgyas su sron lam tshab pa’i am | gyal paksi las byams pa’i sams bskyed dang por byas nas ighton dpon gvi bu sogs rim bzhin yin kyang | ‘gal ba med mod lung gis gsal ba med na rigs pas mtha’ gcig tu dpya’ad par dka’o || des na snga ma de dag gi go rim ci ltar byas kyang thugs bskyed pa thog mar gungs pa’i don la ni gnas skabs so so’i dbang gis ‘gal ba med par snang ngo ||.

\(^{43}\) Klong-chen-pa, Shing rta chen po (vol. 1, p. 637.1–6).

\(^{44}\) Sum-pa mKhan-po, DPag bsum ljon bzang (p. 44.12–13): sams bskyed tshul gvis rgyal po mnnyan pa rdzi bo lia bu gsum bshad pa las rang cag gi ston pas sams bskyed tshul dang po yin las ||.

\(^{45}\) rDo-grub Rin-po-che, Yong tar mdzod lde (p. 338.12–17): chen pos sams can thams cad sangs rgyas kyi sa la ma bkod par rang don mi gnyer ba grangs med gsum nes sangs rgyas par gungs pa byang chub mchog tu sams bskyed nas bslab bya la bslabs shing nus pa rdzogs kyang | sa bcu’i sams dpa’i tshul gvis ’gro don mdzad pa la ’khor ba ji srid bar sangs mi rgya ba rigs gsum mgon po lla bu’o ||.
that Sum-pa mKhan-po decided that the historical Buddha had not been a herdsman-like bodhisattva. Apparently, some scholars held the boatman-like or herdsman-like bodhisattva to be impossible and their respective resolutions to be pseudo-bodhicitterotpāda. According to such an interpretation, all bodhisattvas must resolve to become buddhas first, an approach which seems practical and realistic. This interpretation, in my view, reflects the typical dGe-lugs-pa tendency to ‘de-mysticise’ Buddhist thought.

Nonetheless, many Tibetan scholars have understood these three kinds of bodhisattvas, defined by three kinds of corresponding bodhicitterotpāda, as essentially expressing varying magnanimous attitudes rather than a course of events during their career. According to this standpoint, there is no contradiction in the historical Buddha nourishing such a noble attitude and yet becoming a buddha before many other sentient beings have been able to. Such an explanation will become more comprehensible if we examine the actual process of perfection (pāramitā) as presented by Śāntideva in his Bodhicaryāvatāra. For example, the perfection of giving (dānapāramitā) by no means implies the elimination of poverty through giving, for if it were so, such a perfection would be unattainable. The perfection of giving is thus the perfection of the thought of giving or the readiness to give. In principle, therefore, one could attain the perfection of giving without having given even one cent to anybody. In theory, the reverse can also be true: one gives everything and yet has not attained even an iota of the perfection of giving. This is said to be similarly true of the remaining perfections. This point, I believe, is crucial in understanding the essence of bodhisattva ethics in general.\(^{46}\)

(b) The Second Event: Striving to Become a Buddha

The Jātakas, Avadānas, and other related Buddhist literature are said to provide narrative accounts of the efforts made by the historical Buddha in the past to become a buddha. Here, we shall merely look into the different perceptions of the time taken by him to do so. According to the Abhidharmakośa tradition, the historical Buddha, having made his initial resolution at the feet of the past Buddha Śākyamuni,\(^{47}\) rendered service and paid respect to 75,000 buddhas for the duration of one immeasurable aeon. After the elapse of this first aeon there appeared the Buddha Ratnasikhin, and then he proceeded to render service and pay respect to 76,000 buddhas for another immeasurable aeon.\(^{48}\) Thereafter the Buddha Vipāśīya appeared, and then one more immeasurable aeon elapsed, during which he rendered service and paid respect to 77,000 buddhas.\(^{49}\) Now if the Buddha-to-be had indeed accumulated all

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\(^{46}\) The tradition of the Abhidharmakośa also concerns itself with the historical Buddha’s practices of the six perfections. However, the non-Mahāyāna notion of perfection as found in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya is rather modest when compared with the Mahāyāna notion of perfection (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, p. 267.10–17). According to it, one attains, for example, the perfection of giving (dānapāramitā) if one is able to give purely out of compassion and with no expectation of anything in return. Such giving is presupposed in Mahāyāna, but is insufficient to allow it to be designated as a perfection. This perhaps explains why according to the non-Mahāyāna doctrine one can be an ordinary person (prthagjana) and yet accomplish the perfections. According to Mahāyāna, a bodhisattva would begin to accomplish the perfections only from the first stage (bhūmi) onwards, that is, when he is no longer a prthagjana.

\(^{47}\) The past Buddha Śākyamuni is not to be mistaken for the historical Buddha, who is also called Śākyamuni.

\(^{48}\) **Abhidharmakośa** 4.110b–d:

\[...
\text{asamkhyeatrayāntyajāḥ |}
\text{vipāśīyā dipakrd ratnasikhi śākyamuniḥ purā |}.
\]

\(^{49}\) **Abhidharmakośabhāṣya** (p. 266.14–16): **atha bodhisattvabhūto bhagavān hiyato buddhān paryupāsavyām āsa | prathame kalpāsamkhyeve pañcasaptatisahasrāni, dvitiye satasaptātim, tretīye saptasaptātim |; ibid. (p. 266.20–**
the prerequisites necessary for becoming a buddha during these three immeasurable aeons, he must have, according to the Abhidharmakośa, become a buddha sometime shortly thereafter. But since he is said to have become a buddha only much later, this would imply that there was an idle period of time during which he did not exert himself towards his awakening. Such an implication was obviously a problem for Pūṇavarṇdhana, a commentator of the Abhidharmakośa. This he attempted to resolve by specifying that the Gautama Buddha did indeed fulfil (yongs su rdzogs) the prerequisites in three immeasurable aeons, but not in all respects (rnam pa thams cad du). According to Daśabalaśrimitra, this is the position of the Kāśmir-Vaibhāṣika school.

The account in the Vinayavastu is somewhat different. It is said there that the historical Buddha made his initial resolution in front of the past Buddha Śākyamuni and that until the time of the Buddha Rāṣṭrapāla he rendered service and paid respect to 75,000 buddhas for the duration of one immeasurable aeon. From the time of the past Buddha Dipamkara until the Buddha *Indradhvaṇjamuni (dbBang-po'i-rgyal-mtshan-thub), he is said to have rendered service and paid respect to 76,000 buddhas for the duration of another immeasurable aeon. Finally, from the time of the past Buddha *Śādhukārin (Legs-mdzad) until the Buddha Kaśyapa, he is said to have rendered service and paid respect to 77,000 buddhas for the duration of one more such aeon. This position is identified by Daśabalaśrimitra as being that of the Sāṃkritiya school. In addition, he also provides the position of the Sthāvira school, according to which the Buddha took a period of twenty immeasurable aeons and 100,000 aeons to attain Buddhahood.

Kong-sprul considers the Abhidharmakośa and Vinaya accounts to derive from the Vaibhāṣika system, specifying that the former represents the position of the Kashmiri Sarvāstivāda school in particular, while the latter probably reflects positions of other conservative Buddhist schools (nikāya). He further states that according to the Mahāsāṃghika

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21): rnam-'dus i khins i sam-yak-sam-buddhe phrathamo 'sam-hyeyah samāpītaḥ | dipamkare bhagavati dvitiyāḥ | vipāśyini tathāgata triyāḥ | ; see also the mChims chen (pp. 451.12–453.7); mChims chung (fols. 217a3–218a1).

50 mChims chen (p. 452.10–16); mChims chung (fol. 217a6–b2).


sangs rgyas shākya thub pa nas ||
'dren pa yul 'khor skyong gi bar ||
de'i bar bdun khris lnga [bdun T]' stong gi ||
sangs rgyas rnams ni ngas mchod do || ...
sangs rgyas mar me mdzad nas ni ||
dbang po'i rgyal mtshan thub pa'i bar ||
bdun khris drung stong dag gi ni ||
sangs rgyas rnams ni nga yis mchod || ...
sangs rgyas legs mdzad nas bzung ste ||
sangs rgyas 'od srung [srungs T] bar dag tu ||
bdun khris bdun stong nga yis mchod ||

See the Shes bya mdzod (pp. 144.22–27, 144.31–33), where the total number of buddhas (the historical Buddha rendered service to and honoured) is correctly given (i.e. according to the Vinayavastu) as 230,000. Cf., however, Kloč-men-pa's Phyogs bcu'i mun sel (pp. 123.2–124.2) and the mChims chen (pp. 452.21–453.1). That the reading in T must be a scribal error is supported by the fact that a similar verse recurring on some folios later (T, vol. kha, fol. 370a5) indicates the number as 75,000 and not 77,000.

53 Samāskṛtāsamskritavinīścaya (P, fol. 37b1–3; D, fol. 135b3–4; S, vol. 63, p. 360.8–15).

54 Ibid. (P, fols. 38a4–40a8; D, fols. 136a3–138a1; S, vol. 63, pp. 361.16–366.4). Part of the pertinent passage has been translated in SKILLING 1996: 163.
school, the time it takes a person to become a buddha would vary from ten to thirty
immeasurable aeons, but adds that he had seen no sources that give the details.\(^\text{55}\)

In the Mahāyāna sources, it is not always clear whether the description of the time
taken to become a buddha applies only to the historical Buddha or to bodhisattvas
in general. Generally speaking, there are allusions to three, seven, and thirty-three immeasurable aeons
as the required period.\(^\text{56}\) But if we concentrate on the Mahāyāna account of the historical
Buddha’s career, the common perception is that he became a buddha in three immeasurable
eaons.\(^\text{57}\) Some, however, maintain that he took four immeasurable aeons or ‘a little more than
three immeasurable aeons’ (grangs med gsum lhag tsam) to become a buddha.\(^\text{58}\)

It may be mentioned here that the generation of initial resolve is no guarantee of a
successful bodhisattva career. There is always the chance that a bodhisattva will suffer a
relapse. Thus depending on the bodhisattva’s faculties (indriya), the irreversibility is said to
be as follows: a bodhisattva of the first calibre is irreversible from the moment the initial
resolution is made; a bodhisattva of medium calibre, from the path of seeing (darśanamārga)
onwards, and a bodhisattva of lesser calibre only from the eighth stage (bhūmi) onwards.
According to Dharmamitra, the historical Buddha was a bodhisattva of the first calibre and
attained irreversibility from the moment he made his initial resolution to become a buddha.\(^\text{59}\)

(c) The Third Event: The Time and Place of the Buddha’s Awakening

According to the greater part of non-Mahāyāna tradition, the Bodhisattva Siddhārtha, despite
his long and arduous preparation, was an ordinary person (prthagjana) burdened with all the
forms of bondage (sakalabandhana) when he sat down under the Bodhi tree before his
awakening;\(^\text{60}\) that is, he was a bodhisattva in his last birth (antyājanam) who had reached the
greater path of accumulation (tshogs lam chen po), the last phase of the first bodhisattva path
(mārga).\(^\text{61}\) It is said that a buddha-to-be (and pratyekabuddha) can traverse all the remaining
four paths in just one sitting (ekatraivāsane) by taking the fourth meditative state (dhyāna) of

\(^{55}\) Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod (p. 145.11–25).

\(^{56}\) See the Madhyamakapradipa (P, fol. 363b3–5; D, fol. 288a6–7; S, vol. 57, p. 1558.16–19): ... brtson ’grus
dang | dbang po rab kyi bsKal pa grangs med pa gsum gyis sangs rgyas nyid thob la | de las gzhan pa nyid kyi
bskal pa grangs med pa bdun dang | bsKal pa grangs med pa sum cu rtsa gsum gyis so ||; cf. the Bu ston chos
’byung (p. 71.15–17).

\(^{57}\) See, for example, Kong-sprul, Shes bya mdzod (pp. 146.33–147.9).

\(^{58}\) Ibid. (p. 147.9–16).

\(^{59}\) Ibid. (p. 148.1–8).

\(^{60}\) mChims chen (p. 464.25): de ni bye brag tu smra ba so’i skye bor ’dod do ||; Yid bzhi mdzod 'grel (pp.
34.6–35.1): de la tshe lo brgya pa’i ’das ‘dir shākya thub pa byon tshul ni | theg pa chung ngu mams ni so so
skye bo ’ching ba mtha’ dag dang bcas pa gcig gis lam bsgrubs pas sangs rgyas par ’dod la .... See also Kong-
sprul, Shes bya mdzod (p. 148.26): ... rdo rje’i gdan la bzhugs pa tshun chad so so’i skye bo ’ching ba kun ldan
yin le | .... It should be noted that not all non-Mahāyāna schools considered the (‘historical’) Bodhisattva to be
an ordinary person (prthagjana) According to Vinītadeva, the Haimavatas were one such example. See the
Nikāyabhedavibhāṅgaṅavīkhyaṇa (P, fol. 181a3–4; D, fol. 150a2; S, vol. 93, p. 1151.20–21): de la gang sri pa’i
rtsa ba’i dam tshig ni byang chub sems dpa’i so so’i skye bo ma yin [add. pa PN] zhes bya’o ||. Another such
were the Lokottaravādins. See the Nikāyabhodopadeśaṇasamgraha (P, fol. 188a3–4; D, fol. 155a1; S, vol. 93,
p. 1167.9–10): byang chub sems dpa’i la ni ’dod chags la sogs pa skye ba dang | mer mer po la sogs pa las skye ba
med do ||.

\(^{61}\) For details, see the Shes bya mdzod (p. 148.15–31).
the material realm (rūpadhātu) as his mental base. Thus the path of preparation (prayogamārga), path of seeing (darśanamārga), path of practice or meditation (bhāvanāmārga), and path of no more training (aśaiksamārga) were all attained by the Buddha in just one sitting.

According to some Mahāyāna sources, the Buddha, before his awakening, was a bodhisatva of the tenth stage (bhiṃi), that is, a bodhisatva at the last continuum of the ten stages (sa bcu'i rgyun mtha'). Most Mahāyāna traditions maintain that the Buddha actually became awakened (and simultaneously assumed the form of his sambhogakāya) in the Akaṇḍa realm, where the empowerment of great rays ('od zer chen po'i dbang) was bestowed upon him by the buddhas of the ten directions, and then proceeded to perform his remaining deeds in the world. This idea seems to be based on the Lankāvatārasūtra, Ghanavyāhasūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga, the commentary to the Vyākhyauktī and the writings of Vāgīśvarakīrti (Ngag-gi-dbang-phyug-grags-pa). Just what Akaṇḍa means in this context would require a separate study. According to some other tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna traditions, the Buddha became a buddha while already undergoing austerities at the bank of the river Nairaṇjana. The actual awakening, however, did not take place there. Instead he is said to have left his physical body, which was the result of the maturation (vipākakāya) of previous karmic deeds, at the river and went in his body of gnosis (jñānakāya) to Akaṇḍa, where he became awakened, thereby assuming the body of enjoyment (sambhogakāya). He then returned and re-entered his vipākakāya on earth and demonstrated the remaining activities including going to Bodh-Gaya and becoming awakened. This is said to be the position favoured by the rNying-ma tantra sGyu 'phrul bla ma, Buddhajñānapāda's Muktittalaka, Śākyamitra of the Guhyasamāja tradition, some commentators of the Hevajratantra, and Rin-chen-bzang-po. However, according to the Pitāputrasamāgamanasūtra, Saddharmaupūṇḍarīkasūtra, and Tattvasamgraha tantra, the


63 See, for example, Klong-chen-pa's Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel (p. 35.1–2): 'theg pa chen po kha cig dga' ldan nas 'pho ba nas bzung ste dro rje'i gdan du bzhugs nas bsam gtan bshi pa la mnyam par gzhag tshun chad sa bcu pa'i sems dpa' las | de nas sangs rgyas pa'o zhes 'dod cing | ....

64 Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (P, fol. 3b6; D, fol. 3b1; S, vol. 70, pp. 808.20–809.1): sangs rgyas kun gyis 'od zer chen pos dbang bskur byin ||.

Ratnāvalī 5,59:
bcu pa chos kyi sprin yin te ||
dam pa chos kyi char 'bebs phyir ||
byang chub sems dpa' sangs rgyas kyi ||
'od zer dag gis dbang bskur phyir ||.

The corresponding Sanskrit texts are missing in both the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Ratnāvalī.

65 Bu ston chos 'byung (pp. 81.4–82.5).

66 For the various Indo-Tibetan concepts surrounding Akaṇḍa, see the Phyogs bcu'i mun sel (pp. 40.4–50.1); Tshangs dbyangs 'brug sgru (pp. 3.10–14.18); Shes bya mdzod (pp. 151.25–153.8).

67 Bu ston chos 'byung (p. 82.6–11); Shes bya mdzod (p. 150.18–32).

68 Pitāputrasamāgamanasūtra (T, fols. 114b4–119a5; D, fols. 30a3–33a6). See also the Shes bya mdzod (p. 149.7–14); Bu ston chos 'byung (p. 80.17–25).

69 Saddharmaupūṇḍarīkasūtra (p. 269.4–6); kulputrā bhūhīni mama kalpaśaśvatataśahsasrānī anuttaram samyaksambodhinī abhisambuddhasya [...]. Cf. the Tibetan translation (T, fol. 176a4–5; D, fol. 118b1): rigs kyi bu dag nga ni bskal pa bye ba khrags khrig brgya stong mang po nas | bla na med pa yang dag par rdoogs pa'i
historical Buddha had already become a buddha an innumerable number of aeons before, and hence all his three great events were merely a performance for the benefit of sentient beings. Moreover, according to the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (Sanskrit: *Samdhinirmocanaśūtra*) (Pinya: *Samdhinirmocanaśūtra*), all the deeds of the Buddha—beginning with his residence in Tusita and ending with his passing away (including the event of awakening)—were manifested simultaneously. This model seems to presuppose the Ratnagotravibhāga model of a buddha’s activities combined with the presumption that the Buddha had already in the distant past become a buddha. What is perhaps worth mentioning here is that some tantric notions of the Buddha’s awakening seem to be more conservative than other, non-tantric ones. For example, the idea that the Buddha became awakened while undergoing austerities at the bank of the river Nairārjñāṇa suggests that the Buddha had not yet been a buddha before. This idea is obviously more conservative than the idea found, for example, in the *Saddharmapundarikāsūtra*, according to which the Buddha had already become a buddha in the distant past.

4. A Historical Sketch of the Buddha’s Initial Resolve to Become a Buddha

Let us examine the historical background of the Buddha’s initial resolve to become a buddha. In this context, I again find Schmithausen’s statement that a greater part of the development of Buddhist ideas can be explained by the development of the perception of the Buddha very enlightening. Buddhism began with the Buddha. Different Buddhist traditions at different times and places may argue about what or who the Buddha was or is, but what is inarguable is the appearance of the historical Buddha; that is, someone took birth as Gautama, went forth and became a mendicant, became awakened under the Bodhi tree, hesitatingly (for whatever reason) founded a community of monks and nuns, taught for many years and finally passed away. The notion of the Buddha’s initial resolve seems to be one of several outcomes of the attempt to explain this unique person called Gautama Buddha, at the root of which were two questions: What was the driving force behind the appearance of the Buddha? And what motivated him to found a community of monks and nuns and establish a tradition of teaching?

Although rather rare, early canonical sources do mention compassion as the prime motive behind the Buddha’s appearance on the scene and his salvific activities. In the course of time this motive seems to have been increasingly placed further back in time: at first, prior

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byung chub mgon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas so ||. See also the citation in the *Shes bya mdzod* (p. 149.14–15) and Bu ston chos 'byung (p. 81.1–3).

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70 Shes bya mdzod (p. 149.15–17): rgyud de nyid bsdu pa las | bcom ldan 'das bskal pa bsam gyis mi khyab par mgon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas shākya'i rigs su skye ba ston par mzdad do || zhes sogs byung rigo ||. This citation, which Kong-sprul thought to be from the *Tattvasamgrahatantra* (i.e. the *Tattvasamgrahatantravākyā*), is not to be found there; it is nonetheless quoted in Anandagarbha’s commentary, the *Tattvasamgrahatantravākyā* (P, vol. zi, fol. 44a7–8; D, vol. li, fol. 38b2; S, vol. 29, p. 88.12–15): bcom ldan 'das bskal pa bsam gyis mi khyab par mgon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas nas shākya'i rigs su skye ba ston par mzdad do zhes [ces PN] gsungs nas na shākya'i rigs su skye ba bzhes nas zhes bya ba 'di la mi rigs so ||.


72 Nineteenth-century European scholars did not believe that the Buddha was a historical person. For instance, Émile Senart (1847–1928) held that he was a ‘solar god.’ For details, see DE JONG 1987a: 26–29. Very few scholars today would doubt the historicity of the Buddha (see SCHMITHAUSEN 2000c: 6).

73 See *DP*, s.v. kāruṇā: settvesu ca kāruṇātatāṃ paticca…
to the awakening, then prior to his renunciation, and finally back in the distant past. In Mahāyāna sources, not only the initial resolution made by the Buddha is pushed back ever further into the distant past, but also the time of his awakening, until it becomes timeless. The need to close the temporal gap between the first resolve to strive for the highest awakening and the awakening itself is noticed, for example, in the *Buddhāvatāṃsakāsūtra*. The concept of sudden awakening is apparently rooted in such a theoretical base. There are also traces of another line of thought where the closure of this gap is taken a step further: not only the gap between the initial resolve and the highest awakening but also that between the initial resolve and the setting of the Wheel of Dharma into motion is closed; that is, the generation of the initial resolve is immediately followed by (or even occurs simultaneously with) the turning of the Wheel of Dharma. Such an idea presupposes perhaps the notion of ādibuddha. According to Klong-chen-pa, the ādibuddha can still, as an efficient strategy, demonstrate to sentient beings the generation of an initial resolve to strive for awakening.

In the tradition of the *Guhyagarbhatantra*, the Ur-Buddha Samantabhadra generates both conventional and absolute bodhicitta. It is explained that although all sentient beings are in reality already buddhas, he nonetheless generates the two kinds of bodhicitta for the benefit of sentient beings who have not realised this. The event of awakening itself seems to be superfluous in the tradition of the *Guhyagarbhatantra*. Here the generation of bodhicitta seems not to be conceived as an actual resolve to strive for awakening (at least not for the Ur-Buddha himself) but rather as a kind of compassionate impulse to teach.

5. Concluding Remarks

What I have suggested in this chapter is the idea that the bodhisattva’s generation of the resolve (cittotpāda) to seek the highest awakening was possibly inspired by or modelled on the Buddha’s first resolve to become a buddha. I have also attempted to explain the Buddha’s initial resolve by putting it into its historical and doctrinal context; that is, to show that both the history of and doctrine associated with the Buddha’s first resolve to become a buddha seem to largely depend on how the Buddha was perceived at a given time and place, and above all, on questions as when and where the Buddha made the initial resolve, became a buddha, and set the Wheel of Dharma into motion.

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54 Hirakawa 1990: 282. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 166–167, where the idea of attaining vajropamasamādhī immediately after the first cittotpāda or bodhicitta is mentioned, with textual support from the Satasahasrikā and Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā.

55 See Bielefeldt 1992: 491.


57 Yiä bzhin mdzod ‘grel (vol. 1, p. 35:5–6): ‘dir ni de thams cad thog ma med pa’i ’dus su sangs rgyas pa de’i rnam ’phral de ltar bstan par ’dod pas dang po sms bsksmed pa nas sangs rgyas kyi sprul par ’dod pa yin no [[].

58 dKon mchog ‘grel (A, fol. 58a5–b5; B, pp. 88.19–89.7).
Chapter Five

Mahāyāna, Bodhisattva, and Bodhicitta

May the immaculate, excellent bodhicitta,
Which, if present, would be sufficient for procreating a buddha,
[But] which, if absent, would deprive [one] of all means of procreating a buddha—
[May this] unmistakable seed for procreating a buddha arise!

— dPal-sprul ’Jigs-med-chos-kyi-dbang-po (1808–1887)

1. Introductory Remarks

The notions of bodhicitta, bodhisattva, and Mahāyāna are so intricately linked with each other that it seems to be almost impossible to deal with one of them without referring to the others. Doctrinally speaking, there cannot be a bodhisattva without bodhicitta, and no Mahāyāna without a bodhisattva. That bodhicitta is of existential significance for a bodhisattva and that Mahāyāna would be impossible without bodhicitta is reiterated in several Mahāyāna sources. For example, it is said in the Sūtrārthasaṃuccayopadeśa that just as a sattva ("sentient being") cherishes the life-force and depends on it for his existence, so does a bodhisattva cherish and depend on bodhicitta. The Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra states:

1 This famous verse from a small unitled aspirational prayer (smon lam: pranidhāṇa/pranidhi) found in the collected writings of dPal-sprul (PK, vol. ca, p. 956.3–4) reads:
yod na sangs rgyas igrub la des chog cing ||
med na sangs rgyas sgrub la thabs chags [= chag] pa ||
sangs rgyas 'grub[= b/sgrub?] pa'i sa bon ma nor ba ||
rrnam dag byang chub sems mchog 'bskyed par' [= skye bar] shog ||.

2 Sūtrārthasaṃuccayopadeśa (P, fol. 354a6–7; D, fol. 304b1–2; S, vol. 54, p. 1828.10–12): de ltar sens can [add. rnam DC] la srog gces shing srog la brten pa de bzhin du byang chub sems dpa' la yang srog lta bu'i byang chub kyi sems gces shing de la brten pa'o ||.

3 Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra (T, fol. 41b3–5; D, fol. 282a7–b1): shā ri'i bu byang chub sems dpa' chos gcig dang ldan na sangs rgyas kyi chos 'di dag dang gzhon yang dpag tu med pa dag yongs su 'dzin to || chos gcig po [pu T] gang zhe [zhes T] na || 'di lta ste' bsam pa phun sum tshogs pa'i byang chub kyi sems te || shā ri'i bu byang chub sems dpa' [dpa'i T] chos gcig po [pu T] de dang ldan na sangs rgyas kyi chos 'di dag dang | gzhon yang dpag tu med pa dag yongs su 'dzin to ||.
O Śāriputra, if a bodhisattva is endowed with one factor, he would possess these and other infinite qualities of a buddha. What is that one factor? It is bodhicitta, the excellent, altruistic inclination. O Śāriputra, if a bodhisattva is endowed with this one factor, he would possess these and other infinite qualities of a buddha.

In the Sāgaramatipariprecchāsūtra, the bodhisattva Sāgaramati asks the Buddha:⁴

O Venerable One, what are the factors that constitute Mahāyāna?

Thereupon, the Buddha answers:⁵

O Sāgaramati, there is one factor that constitutes Mahāyāna. What is that one factor? It is not forgetting bodhicitta and being vigilant. O Sāgaramati, this is the one factor that constitutes Mahāyāna.

According to the Daśadharmaśāstra, a bodhisattva is said to have properly embarked upon Mahāyāna only if ten criteria are fulfilled, two of them being wishing and bodhicitta and not wishing to pass away into nirvāṇa by means of vehicles that accumulate śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.⁶ Likewise, the Bodhicittavivarana (ascribed to a certain Nāgārjuna) states that bodhicitta is the best factor in Mahāyāna.⁷ According to Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī 2.74 and Candrakirti’s Madhyamakāvatāra 1.1, a bodhisattva is born of three factors, namely, karuna, a mind of non-duality (i.e. non-dual prajñā), and bodhicitta.⁸ According to Ratnākaramānti, one is said to embark upon Mahāyāna after he has generated bodhicitta.⁹ In Jayānanda’s words, the twenty-two cittotpādas which encompass the entire spiritual career of a bodhisattva are called Mahāyāna.¹⁰ Elsewhere, it is said that the bodhisattva’s task is to bring other sattvas to (spiritual) maturity and protect the Sublime Doctrine (saddharma),¹¹ that is, those parts of the doctrine pertaining to the various yānas. Because the concepts of bodhicitta,

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⁴ Sāgaramatipariprecchāsūtra (T, fol. 84a7; D, fol. 58b4–5): bcom ldan ’das thag pa chen po sasd par ’gyur ba ’i chos rnams ni gang legs [).

⁵ Sāgaramatipariprecchāsūtra (T, fol. 84b3–4; D, fols. 58b7–59a1): blo gros rgya mtsho thag pa chen po sasd par ’gyur ba ’i chos gcig ste | chos gcig po gang zhe [zhes T] na | ’di lit ba ste | byang chub kyi sms brjed ’pa med | [par mi byed T] cing bagn yod pa ste | blo gros rgya mtsho ’di ni tseg pa chen po sasd par ’gyur ba ’i chos gcig go ||. Note that this passage is cited in the Stūrasamuccaya (p. 134.13–17).

⁶ Daśadharmaśāstra (T, fol. 243a1–4; D, fol. 165a4–6): rigs kyi bu byang chub sems dpa’ chos bcu dang ldan na tseg pa chen po la yang dag par zhugs pa yin te | bcu gang zhe na | ’di lit ba ste | ... [4] byang chub kyi sms ’dod pa yin | ... [10] nyon thos dang | rang sngags rgyas dang ldan pa i tseg pas yongs su mya ngan las ’da bar ni ’dod pa yin no ||.

⁷ Bodhicittavivarana 105: byang chub sems ’di tseg chen po || mchos ni yin par bshad pa ste || mnyam par gshag pa’i ’bad pa yis || byang chub sems ni bskyed par gyis [].

For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 69.

⁸ See also SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 7.

⁹ Ratnālokālākāra (P, fol. 344a6–7; D, fol. 295a4; S, vol. 64, p. 816.3–4): byang chub tu sms bskyed pa nas tseg pa chen po la zhugs pa’o ||; ibid. (P, fol. 300a1; D, fol. 256a2; S, vol. 64, p. 716.19–20): ... byang chub kyi sms ni tseg pa chen po’i lam du ’gro bar byed pa’i phyir ro ||.

¹⁰ Madhyamakāvatāraṅkikā (P, fol. 20b7–8; D, fol. 17b2; S, vol. 61, p. 41.2–4): byang chub tu sms bskyed pa nyi shu rtṣa gnyis la tseg pa chen po zhes kyang bya la | de nyid la ’bras bu dang bcas pa’i byang chub sems dpa’i lam zhes kyang bya’o ||. See also the Munimaitālamākāra (P, fol. 215a8–b1; D, fol. 168b3; S, vol. 63, p. 1296.3–4).

¹¹ Vikurvanājapariprecchāsūtra (T, fol. 348b1–2; D, fol. 197a4–5): byang chub sems dpa’i las ni rrnam pa gnyis so || gnyis gong zhe na | ’di lit ba ste | sms can thams cad yongs su smin par bya ba dang | dam pa’i chos yongs su ggang ba’o ||. Cf. the citation in the gSung rab rin po che (P, fol. 143b6–7; D, fol. 239b7; S, vol. 115, p. 653.17–18).
bodhisattva, and Mahāyāna were formulated in broadly Buddhist terms, it is essential that we view them not only in their Mahāyāna setting, but in a wider Buddhist context as well. One of the ways to do this would be to consider the general understanding of bodhi, citta, sattva, and yāna in both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, a detailed discussion of which is, however, beyond the scope of this study. This chapter instead seeks to discuss briefly the idea of yāna with special reference to Mahāyāna (including Vajrayāna); the various kinds of sattvas, with an emphasis on bodhisattvas and vajrasattvas; and finally the term bodhicitta and its importance within the bodhisattva doctrine, or Mahāyāna spirituality, more generally.

2. The Concept of Yāna in Buddhism

In the following few sections, we shall first take up the various yānas in general and then discuss in greater detail those yānas that are primarily defined in terms of bodhicitta. The objective of the presentation is, however, merely to put the notion of bodhicitta into perspective, not to treat the topic of yāna comprehensively.

Somewhat hesitantly, I have employed the expression non-Mahāyāna instead of Hinayāna.12 The term Theravāda Buddhism is too narrow since there are other non-Mahāyāna schools that do not belong to it. Although some traditional sources seem to use Śrāvakayāna in the sense of non-Mahāyāna, it, too, is too narrow, particularly if used alongside Pratyekabuddhayāna. I have restrained myself from employing terms such as primitive Buddhism, early Buddhism, and conservative Buddhism owing to their vagueness. And although the expression non-Mahāyāna is not absolutely satisfactory, given its undesired implication that Mahāyāna is the standard for other forms of Buddhism, it seems, nonetheless, to be a relatively better choice.13

Similarly, I have decided to employ ‘non-tantric Mahāyāna’ in juxtaposition to ‘tantric Mahāyāna’ (or ‘Vajrayāna’). The use of ‘Mahāyāna’ as if opposed to ‘Vajrayāna’ is problematic, for this implies that Vajrayāna is not Mahāyāna Buddhism. The term Bodhisattvayāna offered as a contrast to Vajrayāna is not satisfactory either, insinuating as it does that those who practise Vajrayāna are not bodhisattvas. One could use ‘Pāramitāyāna,’ but it tends to be understood in the sense of the Prajñāpāramitā system,15 to the exclusion of the Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha systems. Thus, while not the ideal solution, ‘non-tantric Mahāyāna’ and ‘tantric Mahāyāna’ seem to be reasonably acceptable.

Because one can hardly talk about bodhicitta without alluding to Mahāyāna, it is perhaps imperative that I make clear what I mean by ‘Mahāyāna.’ Mahāyāna may be defined

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12 Cf. SEYFORT RUEGG 1967: 161–162: “It should moreover always be kept in mind that the Buddhist sources attest various uses of the terms ‘Hinayāna’ and ‘Śrāvakayāna,’ and that while some of them may be motivated in polemics, others possess a perfectly evident and valid psychological and soteriological foundation; before these terms can be properly and meaningfully used by a modern scholar in his investigations their application in varying contexts needs to be exactly analyzed with a view to determining what role these expressions can play in studies on Buddhist thought.” For further discussions, see id. 2004: 7–12.

13 For a recent discussion on the various terms pertaining to yāna (viz. Mahāyāna and Bodhisattvayāna in relation to Śrāvakayāna, Hinayāna, and Sthaviravāda/Theravāda), see SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 5–12, cf. 28–31.

14 The term mantramahāyāna is attested, for example, in the Yogaratnamālā (p. 138.36). Note, however, that some Japanese scholars as well as David Snellgrove have distinguished between Mantrayāna and Vajrayāna, and that some Indian scholars such as B. Bhattacharyya (cf. DASGUPTA 1958: 63, 64, 144) have employed terms such as Sahajayāna and Kālacakrayāna, thereby distinguishing them from Vajrayāna, but as pointed out in NEWMAN 1987: 16, n. 2, these terms are ‘neologisms’ and their distinction from Vajrayāna ‘artificial.’

15 Tilmann Vetter had argued that there existed a major difference between Prajñāpāramitā and Mahāyāna at an early time and that the former was connected with the śrāvakas rather than with the bodhisattvas. See VETTER 1994: 1241–1281; id. 2001: 58–89; SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 10, n. 14.
as a form of Buddhism that presupposes that even an ordinary sentient being can generate bodhicitta and become a bodhisattva or a buddha, and advocates that they do so. According to this proposed definition, Mahāyāna would include Yogācāra, Prajñāpāramitā, Madhyamaka, Tathāgatagarbha, 16 Vajrayāna, a combination of two or more of these forms, and any other form of Buddhism that recognises Buddhahood as the ultimate soteriological goal of (many or all) sentient beings.17 With this definition in mind, I shall avoid setting off, for example, Prajñāpāramitā or Vajrayāna from Mahāyāna, for in my view both Prajñāpāramitā and Vajrayāna are forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

(a) The Various Models of Yāna

The term yāna will be employed here in the sense of ‘vehicle’ and ‘way’ (or ‘carrier’ and ‘course’), 18 and as referring to the means or methods that lead one to a desired destination, as explained in the Ita ba’i khayad par by Ye-shes-sde. 19

A yāna resembles a carriage. It carries [passengers] and causes [them] to arrive at different destinations, and hence [it is called] a yāna (‘vehicle’). It is like a bridge, a boat, or a ship. [It is called] yāna, too, because [one] arrives at the other shore of the great river of samsāra by means of the lift and support lent by it.

The ways or means that lead to an undesirable destination are usually not referred to as yāna. 20 One can find multifarious models of yāna in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, although some are certainly more popular than others. Most models describe only yānas pertaining to the Buddhist soteriological goal, but some also relate to desirable human and celestial existences. Although not consistent with the historical development, I shall, for practical reasons, present the various models of yāna in an ascending order, beginning with the ‘one vehicle’ (ekayāna) model and concluding with the ‘no vehicle’ (avyāna) model. It should be

16 Note that some modern Japanese scholars denote the tathāgatagarbha doctrine as non-Buddhist. For a discussion of this issue, see Zimmermann 2002a: 82–84.

17 The notion of becoming a buddha can also be found in what is known as Hinayāna, but in its case, this may be considered an exception rather than the rule since it applies only to a few instances, such as the Buddha Gautama or the future Buddha Maitreya. Hinayāna does not hold to the idea that anyone (with the right spiritual disposition) can become a buddha and thus should generate bodhicitta. I have not included various forms of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism in my discussion. Nonetheless, these forms of Buddhism, too, isofar they presuppose Buddhahood as the ultimate soteriological goal of sentient beings, can justifiably be called Mahāyāna Buddhism. According to the Japanese Buddhologist Susumu Yamaguchi, for example, Pure Land Buddhism (and other schools such as Huayen and Zen) is a part of Mahayana tradition based on Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka and Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra thought; see Kiyota 1978: 252, 254–255.


20 In the Akṣayamatiśrīdeśatīlā (P, fol. 180b2–5; D, fol. 147b2–5; S, vol. 66, p. 358.9–19) it is explained that although unwholesome ways or means that lead to lower destinations can also be called yānas, they are not referred to as such, since they cause suffering and are not a basis conducive to the realisation of the truth.
remarked that some of the terms concerning certain vehicles are found only in Tibetan sources, and these will be identified as such.  

(i) The One-Vehicle Model

The view that there is only one vehicle (ekāyāṇa), namely, the buddha vehicle (buddhayāṇa), is advocated primarily in the Saddharmapundarikāsūtra, and has been upheld by both the Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha traditions. Besides the Saddharmapundarikāsūtra, a number of other Mahāyāna sūtras are cited by the Śūtrasamuccaya in support of this position. However, while maintaining the view of one (final) vehicle, the Śūtrasamuccaya seems to deny neither the diversity of sentient beings nor the existence and legitimacy of multiple (provisional) vehicles. The ekāyāṇa theory is also fleetingly mentioned in Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvali 4.88. This stance was adopted in turn by Candrakīrti, a Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, who referred to both the Saddharmapundarikāsūtra and Śūtrasamuccaya, and attempted to establish it on a logical footing. The gist of his argument is that because there is only one true reality (tattva) as the object (visorṣa), its subject (visorṣya) can be gnosis of only one quality, and hence only one (final) vehicle is possible and not three (with qualitative differences). The doctrine of three vehicles is termed provisional, while the one vehicle is, for him, Mahāyāna. In the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, the argument is that all sentient beings have the same or one spiritual disposition (gotra) and that there is only one (final) nirvāṇa, namely, Buddhahood. The Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha traditions, however, disagree regarding the immanence of positive qualities attributed to the spiritual disposition. Haribhadra, an important commentator of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, belongs to the tradition that interprets the idea of one vehicle as definitive and that of three vehicles as provisional.

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21 Some of the Sanskrit terms pertaining to yānas recorded in the Mahāvyutpatti are: mahāyāna (no. 1250), pratyekabuddhayāna (no. 1251), śrāvakayāna (no. 1252), śrāvakapratyekabuddhayāna (no. 186), hinayāna (no. 1253), prādēśikayāna (no. 1254), ekayāna (no. 1255), tathāgatayāna (no. 1263, in a compound), paramayāna (no. 795, in a compound).

22 See, for example, the Saddharmapundarikāsūtra 2.54 (p. 439–12): ekam hi yānam dvitiyam na visāyate trīyam hi naivāsti kadāci loke | anyat’ upāyā purasottambhūn yad yānānātvi’ upadarśayanti ||. The ekāyāṇa concept, of course, is found in a number of other Mahāyāna scriptures such as the Lankāvatārasūtra (see n. 76). For a discussion, see SUZUKI 1930: 358–361.

23 Śūtrasamuccaya (pp. 126.1–131.20).

24 Ibid. (pp. 132.1–133.17).

25 Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (p. 404.4–9): gang gi phyir de tsar de kha na nyid gcig nyid yin pas | de kho na nyid kyi yul can ye shes tha mi dad pa de’i phyir theg pa gcig kha na bas theg pa gsum yod pa ma yin te’ od srungs chos thams cad mnyam pa nyid du rtogs na mya ngan las ’das pa yin la de yang gcig nyid yin gvi gnys dang gsum ni ma yin no zhes ’byung ba’i phyir ro ||. For the entire discussion, see ibid. (pp. 399.9–402.19). See also SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 6–7, n. 8; 45–46, n. 70.

26 Ratnāgotravibhāga 1.94:

ato ’nāgamya buddhatvam nirvāṇam nādhigamyate |
na hi sakyah prabhārasmi nirvāja prekṣityum ravyiḥ ||.

For an English translation, see TAKASAKI 1966: 266. For the importance of the ekāyāṇa theory in the Ratnāgotravibhāga, see ibid. (p. 38).

27 Abhisamayālaṃkāra (p. 36.9–11): triyānivyavasthānam abhiprāyikam na lākṣaṇikam iti nyāyād anuttararamyaksambodhiparyavasāna eva sarvo jana ity ato viṭarāgetarayoginā buddhavaprāptaye nārgajñātā bhāvanīyeta vyāptiḥ ||.
Kamalasñila, too, a Yogācāra-Mahāyāna, supports the notion of one vehicle in his *Madhyamakāloka*, thereby rejecting the interpretations of vehicles found in some Yogācāra texts such as the *Mahāyānasūtraśālaṃkāra* and *Mahāyānasūtraśālākārabhāṣya*, where the one vehicle is expounded in several ways, and so shown to be of provisional meaning. But at the same time he also seems to reject the position of Candrakīrti (particularly his interpretation of the *tathāgatagarbha* concept). The idea of one vehicle later recurs in the Vajrayāna context, where it is equated with the resultant vehicle.

The notion that there is ultimately only one vehicle has gained universal acceptance in Tibet. I am not aware of any Tibetan author or work that rejects this idea. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that, philosophically, Tibetan Buddhism is principally defined by the doctrines of Madhyamaka, Prajñāpāramitā, Tathāgatagarbha, and Vajrayāna, all of which subscribe to it. Already in the early ninth century, Ye-shes-sde in his *Ita ba’i khyad par* had shown an unequivocal preference for the one-vehicle theory.

The relevance of the one-vehicle theory for the *bodhicitta* concept is that for those who accept that it is of definitive meaning, there is only one ultimate goal, namely, Buddhahood, and only one ultimate way, namely, the Mahāyāna; and everybody can, in principle, generate *bodhicitta* and finally become a *buddha*. For those who interpret the one-vehicle theory to be of provisional meaning, Buddhahood is one of three alternative soteriological goals.

(ii) The Two-Vehicle Model

There are several two-vehicle models, the commonest being the Small Vehicle (*hinayāna*) and the Great Vehicle (mahāyāna). The former includes both the Śrāvakāyāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna, and the latter both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna (at least from the perspective of later Mahāyāna commentators). According to another two-vehicle model, the *yānas* are the Vehicle of Characteristics (*lakṣaṇayāna*) and the Diamond Vehicle.
(vajrayāna).\(^{35}\) The term *lakṣaṇayāna* has, however, not been located in Sanskrit sources. The *Aksayamatinirdesaṭtikā*, attributed to Vasubandhu, also speaks of two vehicles, namely, a Supramundane Vehicle (*lokottarayāna*) and a Mundane Vehicle (*laukikayāna*).\(^{36}\) The former comprises the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna, and the latter the ‘vehicle of celestial beings’ (devayāna) and the ‘vehicle of human beings’ (*manusyasayāya*).\(^{37}\)

While there is probably no disagreement regarding the distinctions between mundane and supramundane vehicles, there seem to be, broadly speaking, divergent positions in India and Tibet regarding what sets non-Mahāyāna apart from Mahāyāna, and non-tantric from tantric Mahāyāna. One significant issue in this regard is whether non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna and non-tantric and tantric Mahāyāna can be distinguished on the basis of *prajñā* (or view of *śūnyatā*), a matter which is beyond the scope of this study. One point, however, upon which possibly all Indian and Tibetan Mahāyāna sources would agree is that the presence of the *bodhicitta* concept distinguishes tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna from non-Mahāyāna.

**(iii) The Three-Vehicle Model**

There are several three-vehicle (vānatraya or triyāna)\(^{38}\) models evincing varying degrees of conservativism and scope. Some three-vehicle models include only non-tantric vehicles, whereas others include also tantric ones. The commonest and certainly the oldest one is the three-vehicle model comprising the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna or Bodhisattvayāna.\(^{39}\) Edgerton observed that the *Mahāvastu* mentions three vehicles, without, however, specifying them by name, and that “it is specifically stated that one can attain *parinirvāṇa* by any of them, and no preference is expressed.”\(^{40}\) Seyfort Ruegg also points out that the *Abhidharmakosābhaṣya* and *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* on the *Abhidharmadāpa* contain references to the idea of the three vehicles.\(^{41}\) In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ten areas of expertise

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\(^{35}\) ITa phreng (pp. 161.4–162.1): ‘*jig rten las ’das pa’i lam la yang rnam pa gnyis te | mshyan nyid kyi theg pa dang | rdo rje’i theg pa po’o ||’. See also the dKon mchog ‘grel (A, fol. 19b5; B, p. 46.23): *yang gnyis te | mshyan nyid kyi theg pa dang | rdo rje theg pa gnyis so ||*.

\(^{36}\) Aksayamatinirdesaṭtikā (P, fols. 179b8–180a1; D, fol. 147a3; S, vol. 66, p. 357.7–9): *de la theg pa thams cad ni bsdu na rnam pa gnyis te | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i theg pa dang | ’jig rten gyi theg pa po’o ||*.

\(^{37}\) Aksayamatinirdesaṭtikā (P, fol. 180a2–3; D, fol. 147a4–5; S, vol. 66, p. 357.11–16): *nyan thes dang rang sangs rgyas dang | byang chub sems dpa’i theg pa ’di gsum ni ’jig rten las ’das pa’i theg pa zhes bya ste | ci’i phyir zhe na khor ba las [la PN] ’byin par byed pa’i phyir ro || ’jig rten gyi theg pa bstan par bzhed nas | gzhan yang theg pa gnyis te | gnyis gang zhe na | lha’i theg pa dang mi’i theg pa po’o zhes bya ba gsungs pa’o ||*.

\(^{38}\) The term *triyāna* is attested, for example, in the *Lankāvatārasūtra* (see n. 76) and *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti* (p. 36.9).

\(^{39}\) See, for example, the *Anavatapatanāgarājaśārayaḥāśātra* (T, fol. 277a3–4; D, fol. 243b4–5): *rigs kyi bu bcom ldan ’das shākyā thub pa de bzin gshegs pa theg pa gsum las [om. T] bhrtsams te chos ston to || gsum gang zhe na | nyan thes kyi theg pa dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang | theg pa gsum po de dag go ||; Madhyamakāloka (P, fol. 158b6–7; D, fol. 146b5–6; S, vol. 62, p. 1164.4–6): *’phags pa blo gros mi zad pas [par PN] bstan pa las kyang ’gsum po ’di dang ni nges par ’byin par byed pa’i theg pa yin te | ’di ita sten nyan thes kyi theg pa dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang | theg pa chen po’o [po DC] zhes gsungs so ||*. See also the ITa ba’i khyad par (P, fol. 254a3; D, fol. 215a2; S, vol. 116, p. 565.8–9): *theg pa gsum ni nyan thes kyi theg pa dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang | theg pa chen po’o ||*.

\(^{40}\) See BHSD, s.v. *yāna*; *Mahāvastu* (vol. 2, p. 362.8–15).

\(^{41}\) See SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 28, n. 38, 30, n. 42.
(kauśalya) of a bodhisattva are enumerated, the last three being expertise in the three vehicles (i.e. Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna).\textsuperscript{42} It is unclear if the term yānatraya is actually employed in this context since the pertinent reading of the Sanskrit text is somewhat uncertain, and it is found elsewhere only in a compound.\textsuperscript{43} In any case, it is accepted in general that a bodhisattva should be proficient in matters pertaining to the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna so that he is capable of assisting śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas in their soteriological endeavours. Also, one of the commitments in Vajrayāna is to uphold the Sublime Doctrine (saddharma) of the three vehicles’ (traiyāniča).\textsuperscript{44} According to the Viśiṣṭacaritamrāṇa, the vehicles are three in number owing to the three different capacities of sentient beings.\textsuperscript{45}

In later Indian sources, the existing three-vehicle model has been reinterpreted in such a way that Vajrayāna can be incorporated into it. This is clearly the case, for example, in Ratnākaraśānti’s Triyānayavavasthāna, where the expression ‘vehicle endowed with profundity and vastness’ (zab cing rgya che ba dang ldan pa ’i theg pa) is used in place of Mahāyāna or Bodhisattvayāna.\textsuperscript{46} The third vehicle is further subclassified into two, namely, Pāramitāyāna (or Pāramitānaya) and Mantrayāna (or Mantranaya).\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, according to Rong-zom-pa, the third vehicle in this three-vehicle model is the Highest Vehicle (bla na med pa’i theg pa).\textsuperscript{48} I have, however, not been able to trace an equivalent Sanskrit term (*niruttarayāna or *anuttarayāna) in Indian sources.

There is one more three-vehicle model, which is known only in rNying-ma tantric literature, such as the dGongs pa ’dus pa’i mdo. It consists of the ‘vehicle [characterised by means] of deliverance [from] the origin (or existence) [of samsāra]’ (kun ’byung ’dren pa’i

\textsuperscript{42} Bodhisattvabṛāmi 2.2 (WOGIHARA, p. 308.9–16): tatra katmad bodhisattvasya kauśalyam | tat samāsato dāśāvidham vedītavyam | ... śrāvakayānakaūṣalam | pratyekabuddhayānakaūṣalam | mahāyānakaūṣalam |. Cf. the readings in DUTT, p. 212.3–8.

\textsuperscript{43} See Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1.8 (WOGIHARA, p. 287.4–5; DUTT, p. 194.14–15): yānatrayavapadesopasamhāreṇa....

\textsuperscript{44} Durdhatīpariśodhanatratra (as cited in TSD, s.v. gsang ba): saddharmam pratīghṛṇām bāhyam guhyam traiyāniča | mahāpādmapakale śuddhe mahābodhisamudbhave ||. Cf. the Durdhatīpariśodhanatratra (p. 288.1–2). See also Prajñāśri’s Abhiṣekaavidhi (P, fols. 48b8–49a1; D, fol. 40a5; S, vol. 5, p. 1037.15–17): byang chub chen po las byung ba || padma ’i rigs mchog dag [dam DC] pa la || phyi nang [= dang] gsang ba ’i theg pa gsam || dam pa’i chos kyang gzung bar bygi ||. Cf. n. 51.

\textsuperscript{45} Viśiṣṭacaritamrāṇa (P, vol. ’i, fol. 16b2; D, vol. zi, fol. 15b1–2; S, vol. 74, p. 779.19–21): dbang po rnam pa gsum yod pa’i phyir theg pa gsum gyis rnam par ’jog ste | theg pa gnyis kyang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub kyi theg pa’i rtsa ba can yin pa’i phyir ro ||.

\textsuperscript{46} Ratnākaraśānti, Triyānayavavasthāna (P, fol. 111a3; D, fol. 100a6; S, vol. 41, p. 266.8–10): theg pa rnam s n gsum nyid du rnam par gzhag [bzhag PN] par mthong ste | nyan thos dang ldan pa’i theg pa dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang | zab cing rgya che ba dang ldan pa’i theg pa o ||.

\textsuperscript{47} Triyānayavavasthāna (P, fol. 112a2–3; D, fol. 101a3–4; S, vol. 41, pp. 268.16–269.1): zab cing rgya che ba dang ldan pa’i theg pa ni rnam pa gnyis te | zab pa’ba’ ’zhi dag dang ldan pa dang | zab pa dang | rgya che ba gnyi ga dang ldan pa o’ || ’di dag nyid la theg pa chen po zhes brjod cing | dbyes ba rnam pa gnyis nyid la slob don snga ma pha rol tu phyin pa’i tshul dang | gsang sngags kyi tshul gyi theg pa chen po zhes kyang gzhag pa o’ ||.

\textsuperscript{48} dKon mchog ’grel (A, fol. 19b4–5; B, pp. 46.24–47.1): theg pa ni gsum du yang bstan te | nyan thos kyi theg pa dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang | bla na med pa’i theg pa o ||. See ibid. (A, fol. 178b4; B, p. 215.6–7) where the term bla med theg pa is equated with the term vajrayāna.
they (pa), ‘vehicle [characterised by] austerity and knowledge’ (dka’ thub rig byed kyi theg pa), and ‘vehicle [characterised by] means of transformation’ (dbang sgyur thabs kyi theg pa). The exact meaning of these expressions is, however, not clear.\(^4\) Each of these three are further subdivided into three, and hence form the basis of the nine-vehicle model (at least for later rNying-ma doxographers), to which we shall later return.

**(iv) The Four-Vehicle Model**

There are several four-vehicle models: In what seems to be virtually a citation from the Kṣitigarbhasūtra, Kṛṣṇapāda mentions four kinds of yānas, namely, *Śvargayāna* (i.e. the vehicle that leads to good destinations), Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna.\(^5\) The four-vehicle model Rong-zom-pa proposes consists of one outer (*bāhya*) vehicle, that is, non-tantric Mahāyāna, and three secret (*guhya*) vehicles, that is, the three tantric vehicles pertaining to kriyātantra, caryātantra, and yogatantra.\(^5\) The Maṇjuśrīnāmasamgiti seems to suggest another four-vehicle model, namely, three causal vehicles (i.e. Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna, i.e. non-tantric Mahāyāna) and one resultant vehicle (i.e. Mantrayāna).\(^5\) Although the idea of a resultant vehicle (‘bras bu’i theg pa) is found in Indian tantric sources, the Sanskrit term (*phalayāna*) does not seem to be attested.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) dGong pa ’dus pa’i mdo (P, fol. 192a8–b1; D, fol. 204a3):

don dam nges pa’i theg pa ni ||
gsum du nges par snang ba ste ||
kun ’byung ’dren dang dka’ thub rig ||
dbang sgyur thabs kyi theg pa’o || .

For mKhan-po’s explanation of these terms, see the Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 13.6–8): theg pa de gsum po sangs rgyas kyi zhi gsum kun tu ’byung zhi gned gyal bya thar par ’dren pa’i lam yin pas kun ’byung ’dren pa’i theg pa zhes kyang bya’o ||; ibid. (p. 15.17–19): de gsum gis phyi’i dka’ thub la brien nas nang gi don rig par byed pas dka’ thub rig byed kyi theg pa zhes bya’o ||; ibid. (p. 21.10–12): de gsum gis nyor mongs thams cad ched du gnyen pos spong mi dogas par rig pa’i ye shes kyi dbang bsgyur te lam du byed pa’i thabs dang laan pas dbang bsgyur thabs kyi theg pa zhes bya’o ||.

\(^5\) Kṣitigarbhasūtra, as cited by Kṛṣṇapāda in his Mahāyānamelapapakapradīpa (P, fol. 234a6–7; D, fol. 2b1–2; S, vol. 41, p. 572.18–21):

gang la ntho ris theg pa yod min ||
de la nyan thos theg pa med de ||
gang la nyan thos theg pa yod min ||
de la rang rgyal theg pa med de ||
gang la rang rgyal theg pa yod mir ||
de la theg pa chert po med de ||.

\(^5\) dKon mchog ‘grel (A, fols. 19b6–20a2; B, p. 47.1–7): theg pa bzhi r yung bstan te | gsang ba’i thig le nor bu’i rgyud la sogs pa’i padma’i rigs kyi sdom pa gzung ba’i skabs las | ophyi ning [= dang] gsang ba’i theg pa gsum || dam pa’i chos kyang rab tu gzung || zhes gsungs pa la bu ste | phyi’i theg pa ni | mshan nyid kyi theg par bsds pa mtha’ dag go || gsang ba’i theg pa gsum ni | bya ba’i rgyud dang | spod pa’i rgyud dang | rnal ’byor gyi rgyud de’ | di gsun ni sku gshung thugs kyi gsang ba’i bstan pa yin te | ’di dog gi don ni ’og nas rgyud kyi dbye ba bskan pa’i skabs su ’chad pas der rig par bya’o ||; cf. n. 44.

\(^5\) Maṇjuśrīnāmasamgiti 9.17cd: yānatātvanirāyā ekayānaphale sthitah ||; cf. n. 58.

\(^5\) He ru ka’i gal po (NyG, p. 225.7):

mshan nyid rgyu yi theg pa yis ||
sems nyid sangs rgyas rgyu ru shes ||
’bras bu sngags kyi theg pa yis ||
sems nyid sangs rgyas nyid du bsgom ||.
(v) The Five-Vehicle Model

In the *Lankāvatārasūtra*, the following five yānas are mentioned:54 (1) Devayāna, (2) Brahmayāna, (3) Śrāvakayāna, (4) Pratyekabuddhayāna, and (5) Tathāgatayāna. It is not clear why Brahmayāna has been treated separately from Devayāna and whether deva in Devayāna is meant to refer only to celestial beings in the celestial realm of desire (kāmadhātu) or to such human beings as kings as well. The *Aṣṭasākhaṁ vinirdeśasūtra* for its part seems to propose the following five vehicles:55 (1) Devayāna, (2) Manusyāna, (3) Śrāvakayāna, (4) Pratyekabuddhayāna, and (5) Mahāyāna. In substance, the concepts *Lokottarayāna* and *Laukikayāna* found in the *Aṣṭasākhaṁ vinirdeśaśāstra*, mentioned above, can be expressed in terms of these five vehicles and vice versa; that is, Devayāna and Brahmayāna can be subsumed under the mundane vehicle and the remaining three under the supramundane vehicle.

A similar division of vehicles is proposed in the *Guhyagarbhatantra*:56 (1) *Devamanusyayāna*, (2) *Śrāvakayāna*, (3) *Pratyekabuddhayāna*, (4) Bodhisattvayāna, and (5) *Mantrayāna*. It goes on to suggest that the first four vehicles are causal vehicles, whereas the last one is resultant.57 The *Guhyagarbhatantra* remarks that the 84,000 sets of doctrine (caturasāṭisahasraśradhāmāyakā) said to be taught by the Buddha as antidotes for the 84,000 intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa) are included in these five vehicles. It may be recalled that bodhicitta is considered by some to be the quintessence of all 84,000 teachings taught by the Buddha.

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54 *Lankāvatārasūtra* 2 203 (pp. 134.16–135.1) and 10.457 (p. 322.13–14):
devayānaṁ brahmayānaṁ śrāvakayānaṁ tathaiva ca
| tathāgatam ca pratyekam yānāṁ eśān vādāmyam ahām |

lha yi theg dang tshangs pa'i theg ||
nyi tshe ba yi theg pa gang ||
thams cad theg pa chen po yi ||
gnas chen 'dir ni 'du bar' gyur ||.

55 *Aṣṭasākhaṁ vinirdeśasūtra* (T, fol. 71a4–6; D, fol. 126b7–127a2): de la byang chub sems dpa'i theg pa 'kun la'
[thams cad D] mkhas pa gang ze na | gsum po 'di dag [om. T] ni theg pa ste 'nges par 'byin pa'o' ['byung ngo T] ||
gsum po gang ze na | 'di la ta ste | nyan thos kyi theg pa dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang | theg pa chen po'o ||
gzhon yang theg pa gnyis te | gnyis gang ze na | lha'i theg pa dang | mi'i theg pa'o ||. Cf. the citation in the gSung rab rin po che (P, fol. 142b5; D, fol. 238b7; S, vol. 115, p. 651.12–13).

56 *Guhyagarbhatantra* (P, fol. 111a3–5; D, fol. 113a3–4): 'du b'i dbang gis lha dang | mi'i theg pa dang
| nyan thos kyi [kys P] theg pa dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang | byang chub sems dpa'i theg pa dang | bla na med pa'i theg pas ma rig pa'i rnam par rtog pa nyon mong pa stong phrag bryad bcu [cu D] rtsa bzh'i 'i gnyen por chos stong phrag bryad bcu [cu D] rtsa bzh'i gsums so || gsum ngo || gsum bar 'gyur ro || See also the dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 16b5–6; B, p. 43.18–20): theg pa lnga ni | lha dang mi'i theg pa dang | nyan thos kyi theg pa dang | rang byang chub kyi theg pa dang | byang chub sems dpa'i theg pa dang | gsum ba bla na med pa'i theg pa'o ||. Note that the term theg pa lnga recurs also elsewhere in the dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 96a4, 97a3; B, pp. 128.2, 129.2).

57 According to a Tun-huang document, mi'i theg pa and lha'i theg pa are included in the nine-vehicle scheme (KARMA 1988: 148, 172).

58 *Guhyagarbhatantra* (P, fol. 111b1; D, fol. 13b1–2):
| theg pa bzh'i yis nges 'byung la ||
| theg pa gis gis 'bras bur gnas ||

Cf. n. 52.
(vi) The Nine-Vehicle Model

The nine-vehicle model is an important doxographical scheme followed in the rNying-ma\(^{59}\) and Bon\(^{60}\) traditions. The scheme of nine vehicles in the rNying-ma tradition, which varies slightly from source to source, has been discussed by Samten Karmay in his rDzogs-chen study.\(^{51}\) According to the ITa phreng, the nine vehicles are as follows:\(^{62}\)

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
1. & \text{nyan thos kyi theg pa} \\
2. & \text{rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa} \\
3. & \text{byang chub sens dpa'	extquoteright i theg pa} \\
4. & \text{bya ba'	extquoteright i rgyud kyi theg pa} \\
5. & \text{gnyis ka'	extquoteright i rgyud kyi theg pa} \\
6. & \text{rnal 'byor phyi pa thub pa'	extquoteright i rgyud kyi theg pa} \\
7. & \text{bskyed pa'	extquoteright i tshul} \\
8. & \text{rdzogs pa'	extquoteright i tshul} \\
9. & \text{rdzogs pa' chen po'	extquoteright i tshul}
\end{array}
\]

Although it is true that the nine-vehicle model as such cannot be traced in Indian Buddhist sources, such a scheme is not completely at odds with the Indian Buddhist traditions, particularly if we consider the numerous models of vehicles found in Indian sources.

The last three vehicles are called the Mode of Generation (bskyed pa'	extquoteright i tshul), Mode of Perfection (rdzogs pa'	extquoteright i tshul), and Mode of Great Perfection (rdzogs pa' chen po'	extquoteright i tshul). The use of ‘mode’ or ‘method’ (tshul) in place of ‘vehicle’ (theg pa) is in agreement with Indian sources, where naya and yāna have been used interchangeably, the former being seemingly even more prevalent than the latter.\(^{63}\) We should perhaps also remember that yāna is

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\(^{59}\) dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 20a2–3; B, p. 47.7–9): theg pa ni rnam pa dgur bstan pa yang yod de | man ngag lta ba'	extquoteright i phreng ['phreng A] ba las gsungs pa ltar | mtshan nyid sde gsum dang | phyi rgyud sde gsum dang | nang rgyud sde gsum mo ||.

\(^{60}\) There are said to be two completely different models of nine vehicles in the Bon tradition, namely, those according to the Central Treasure (dbus gter) and Southern Treasure (lho gter); the latter has been studied by David Snellgrove (KARMAY 1988: 148). See also MIMAKI 1994: 126–132 and KAPSTEIN 2000: 14–15, 16 (table containing the nine-vehicle model according to the Central Treasure of Bon).

\(^{61}\) KARMAY 1988: 146–149, 172–174 (diagrams of various nine-vehicle models). See also MIMAKI 1994: 123–126, EHRHARD 1990: 8–16, and KAPSTEIN 2000: 13–14, 16 (table containing the nine-vehicle model according to the ITa phreng and a Tun-huang document). There seems to be no study devoted exclusively to the various nine-vehicle models.


\(^{63}\) For the employment of the terms pāramitānaya and mantrānaya, see, for example, TSD, s.vv. pha rol tu phyin pa'	extquoteright i tshul and sngags kyi tshul.
employed in Pāli sources for the eightfold Noble Path, and it is by extension of this use that terms such as Mahāyāna and Hinayāna came to be used.\textsuperscript{64}

Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga’-rgyal-mtshan (henceforth Sa-pan) asserted that the view (lta ba) of Atiyoga (in the sense of rDzogs-chen) should be taken as gnosis and not as a vehicle.\textsuperscript{65} In this context, Sa-pan understands ‘vehicle’ (theg pa) as a doxographical position or system and not as an actual path or means of release; hence for him, a vehicle (which is endowed with manifoldness) and gnosis (which is free from manifoldness) are mutually exclusive.\textsuperscript{66} The proponents of the nine-vehicle model, however, understood yāna in a number of ways. For example, Rong-zom-pa states that Mahāyāna can mean path (lam), result (‘bras bu), absolute reality (don dam pa), and treatises or philosophical positions (gzhung).\textsuperscript{67} If ‘vehicle’ is understood in the sense of path, it is clear that Sa-pan would no longer regard a vehicle and gnosis as mutually exclusive, for occasionally a great vehicle is considered omniscient gnosis.\textsuperscript{68}

(vii) The n-Vehicle Model

The notion of an inconceivable number of vehicles, which has occasionally been expressed by terms such as nānāyāna,\textsuperscript{69} is found, for example, in the Lankāvātārasūtra.\textsuperscript{70} The plurality of vehicles, in Ratnakaraśānti’s view, however, does not mean that they cannot be accommodated within the three-vehicle model. For him, a vehicle or view that is not subsumable under the three-vehicle model would be a non-Buddhist view.\textsuperscript{71} Nonetheless, he

\textsuperscript{64} BHSD, s.v. yāna. It has also been pointed out that yāna in early Mahāyāna literature was understood in the sense of ‘path’ or ‘way,’ and this is supported by a very early Chinese translation (VETTER 2001: 64–67).

\textsuperscript{65} See sDom gsum rab dbye 3.282abc:

\begin{verbatim}
 lugs ‘di legs par shes gyar na ||
a ti yo ga’i lla ba yang ||
ye shes yin gyi theg pa min || .
\end{verbatim}

For an English translation, see RHTON 2002: 133; cf. KARMAY 1988: 147.

\textsuperscript{66} If we study the context of sDom gsum rab dbye 3.275–3.282, it becomes clear that the pertinent discussion is about the tantric classification or system (rgyud sde’i rim pa) according to the rNyung-ma and gSar-ma traditions and that ‘vehicle’ is understood by Sa-pan strictly in the sense of a doxographical system. It is important to note that Sa-pan does not categorically reject here the idea of nine vehicles or rDzogs-chen. Cf. the discussion in KARMAY 1988: 147–148.

\textsuperscript{67} dKon mchog ‘grel (A, fol. 66a4–5; B, p. 97.4–5): theg pa chen po'i sgra yang | lam dang 'bras bu dang don dam pa dang gzhung gi tshogs dang bcas pa la 'jug pas rtags kyung de lla bur sbyar bar bya'o || .

\textsuperscript{68} See, for example, the Suvikrāntavikrāntiparipṛcchāsūtra (p. 19.18): katamac ca mahāyānām? sarvam jñānaṃ mahāyānāṃ; Tib. (T, fol. 21a1; D, fol. 31b6–7): theg pa chen po gang zhe na | thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes ni theg pa chen po'o || | Yogaratnamālā (p. 105.7–8): mahājñānānī mahāyānapraniṁ dharmāḥ .

\textsuperscript{69} Maḥūjūraṁṇasamgiti 9.17a: nānāyānanavopāyah.

\textsuperscript{70} Lankāvātārasūtra 2.204 (p. 135.2–3) and 10.458 (p. 322.15–16):

\begin{verbatim}
yānānāṃ nāstī vai nīṣṭhā yāvacy cittaṁ pravartate |
citte tu vai parāyṛṭte na yāṇāṁ na ca yāyināḥ | .
\end{verbatim}

This is also cited in KAPSTEIN 2000: 209. For an English translation of the pertinent verse from the Lankāvātārasūtra, see SUZUKI 1932: 116, cf. id. 1930: 360. See also the dKon mchog ‘grel (A, fol. 20a3–5; B, p. 47.9–13): theg pa mitha’ yas par bstan pa yang yod de | chos kyi sgo mo brgyad khri bzhi stong dang | bsam gyis mi khyab pa dang | gshen yang gsang snaags kyi gzhung las kyang | ‘di nyid las | sros gsum ’gro ba ji snyed pa’i | rtog ‘dul dam tshig de snyed spro | bo zhés gsungs pa lla bu dang | mdo sde langkar [langgar B] gshigs pa las kyang | ‘ji srid sms ‘jug gnas pa'i bar | theg pa'i mitha’ la thug pa med | || ces gsungs pa lla bu’o || .
does state that seventeen vehicles are also taught and that the means of benefiting sentient beings are numerous. As we have already seen, however, it is the one-vehicle model that is for him of definitive meaning (nīrārika). For Rong-zom-pa, too, the number of vehicles is indefinite (and possibly infinite), with the Mode of the Great Perfection (rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul) being the supreme vehicle (paramāyāna). In the dKon mchod 'grel, he maintains that all the inconceivable number of vehicles can be subsumed under the five philosophical tenets (siddhānta).

**(viii) The No-Vehicle Model**

The term ayāna seems to be employed in the sense of both ‘no-vehicle’ and ‘non-vehicle.’ In the Lankāvatārasūtra, where the term is found, it clearly means ‘no-vehicle.’ In the expression yānāyāna, however, ayāna is clearly used as the opposite of yāna, perhaps in the sense of a vehicle or way that leads to an undesirable mode of existence. The logic behind the idea of no vehicle seems to be that vehicles are for delivering different kinds of sattvas (‘sentient beings’) endowed with citta (‘mind’) to the desired (mainly soteriological) destination, and once they arrive there, or once their mind has been transmuted (parāvyutta), there is no longer either an act of travelling or a vehicle. In other words, a vehicle is relevant, and its existence possible, only as long as there are sentient beings. Such a notion echoes the idea that a person, upon reaching the soteriological further shore, leaves behind the dharmas (be they wholesome or unwholesome), just as a traveller leaves behind the boat once the river has been crossed. Rong-zom-pa seems to reserve the no-vehicle model for the metaphysical dimension where the frontiers separating vehicle, traveller, and destination dissolve.

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71 Tivyānayavasthāna (P, fol. 115b2–5; D, fol. 104a4–7; S, vol. 41, p. 276.5–73).

72 Ramālokālakāra (P, fol. 351b3–4; D, fol. 302a1–2; S, vol. 64, p. 832.12–15): de la bas ne thag pa bzu bdun du gsums pa | las kyang gdul bya la phan du dpag tu med pa mdzad pa’i thabs mnag’as [pas P] theg pa gsum du ci ltar nges | nges pa’i don ni theg pa gcig tu snag’gan la pha’o pa bzhin no ||. It is not clear which seventeen vehicles these are.

73 dKon mchod ‘grel (A, fol. 19b2–3; B, p. 46.17–20): theg pa lngar rnam par gzhag pa ‘di ni | dpal gshag ba’i snying po ‘di nyid kyi dbang du bshad par zad kyi | bka’ spyi’i gzhung la grags pa ltar na theg pa la ni grangs nges pa kha na gzung du yod pa ma yin te |

74 See Rong-zom-pa’s explanation of the expression thams cad kyi yang rtse (‘the culmination of all vehicles’) in the Tseg chen tshul ’jug (A, fol. 53a2–b3; B, pp. 473.17–474.3).

75 The five siddhāṇas are grouped as follows: 1. Yogācāra and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, 2. Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka, 3. Kriyātantra, Caryātantra, and Outer Yoga, 4. Mahāyoga, and 5. Guhyagarbhatantra. See the dKon mchod ‘grel (A, fol. 22b4–23b3; B, pp. 50.5–51.5).

76 Lankāvatārasūtra 2.130ab (p. 65.11): triyānām ekāyānām cāyānām ca vadānyān ca

77 See, for example, TSD, s.vv. theg pa gcig, theg pa gsum, and theg pa med pa. For an English translation, see SUZUKI 1930: 359–360; id. 1932: 58.

78 dKon mchod ‘grel (A, fol. 20a5–b3; B, p. 47.13–21): theg pa med par yang bstan te | mdo sde de nyid las | ‘du shes med par gcig na | theg pa med cing ‘gro ba’ang med || ces gsums pa laa bu dang | yang mdo sde dkon cog brtseg pa las | ‘de bzhi gshis pa dge choz med ni || chos kyi sku mchod yin te de la ni || de bzhi nyid med de bzhi gshis pa med || ‘jig rten dag na gzung brnyan kun tu snang || zhes gsums pa laa bu dang | gshis gshis kyi gzhung las kyang | sbyod du med pa lam gyi mchod || ces gsums pa laa bu ste | tshul ‘di lla bu’i don gyi na || theg pa dang | ‘gro ba po dang | sbyod bya ba’i gnas rnam ska ‘dag du gzhag tu [du A] med do || ‘shul ‘dis ni theg pa med par yang ‘dag pa’o ||.
Ruegg observes that the deconstruction or ‘zeroing’ of the very notion of yāna is very characteristic of Mahāyāna thought and that the idea of ayāna is no doubt linked with the idea of the so-called Aryan Silence (āryatiṣṭhābhava).  

(b) Which Vehicles Are Buddhist?

Both Indian and Tibetan scholars have attempted to make sense of the multiple models of vehicles. One of the concerns of these scholars has been where one ought to draw the line between Buddhist and non-Buddhist vehicles. In India, Vajragarbha, the author of the Hevajrapindaḥāraṇīka, stated that the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna are the three Buddhist vehicles, and so a fourth or a fifth vehicle (if it existed) would not conform to the intention of the Sage (and thus would not be Buddhist). In Tibet, this statement has been employed to criticise the rNying-ma concept of nine vehicles. For the rNying-ma-pas themselves, however, all nine vehicles can be subsumed under Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna. In other words, of the nine vehicles, the first two belong to non-Mahāyāna and the remaining seven to tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna. From a Buddhist perspective, the expressions ‘Buddhist vehicle’ and ‘non-Buddhist vehicle’ seem to be vacuous; one should rather speak of vehicles (as we have seen above) in terms of mundane (laukika) and supramundane (lokottara).

Nonetheless, the question whether a doctrine can be accepted as Buddhist is by no means insignificant. Buddhist traditions of different times and places have different answers to this question, a question which is tantamount to whether release from the bondage of samsāra is possible independently of the Buddhist teachings. Schmithausen, in a typically enlightening manner, explains that although sources such as the Utiyaśutta and the ninth chapter of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosabhasya do assert the absoluteness of the Buddhist soteriological means, they premise salvation not upon affiliation with a religious institution but rather upon a certain spiritual practice or theoretical views, thereby leaving some room for ‘anonymous Buddhists.’ Nor is everyone required to tread the Buddhist soteriological path. To be sure, one who does not do so must continue to suffer, and in practice there were naturally problems caused whenever Buddhism was instrumentalised. According to some Mahāyāna sources, such as the Adhyāsayaśaṃcodaṃasūtra, all ‘well-expounded’ (subhāṣita) doctrines are ‘Buddha-expounded’ (buddhabhāṣita) doctrines. According to the Angulimālīyāsūtra, all teachings in the world that are consistent with the teachings of the Buddha should be regarded as his teachings. From a Buddhist perspective, whether a

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79 Sev Fort Rueg 2004: 9, 57-58, n. 103.

80 Vajragarbha, Hevajrapindaḥāraṇīka (SHENDE 2004: 10):
   yānatrātiṣṭanīyāta ekayānaphale sīhitah ||
   śrāvakam pratyekān cātra mahāyānam śrīyakam || 1.39
   caturthāṃ nāsti buddhānāṃ pāncamaṇi ca matam muneh || 1.40ab.

For the critical apparatus, see SHENDE 2004: 257. The Tibetan translation is as follows (ibid., p. 70):
   theg pa gsum gyi nges 'byung las ||
   theg pa gcig gi 'bras bur gnas ||
   nyan thos rang sangs rgyas dang 'dir ||
   theg pa chen po gsum pa ste ||
   sangs rgyas pa la bzhi pa dang ||
   lngs ba [= pa] thub pa 'i dngogs pa min ||.

See also Karmay 1988: 147, n. 55.

81 See Karmay 1988: 147–148. One of the sticking points in such a debate is the question whether the number of vehicles can be fixed.

82 See Bste 2000: 271–272, 305.
doctrine is admissible or not would thus depend on how consistent it is with those said to be taught by the Buddha. Thus on the premise that the Buddha did not sanction, for example, hate-motivated killing, a doctrine that sanctions such a practice would under no circumstances be permissible, not even according to Vajrayāna.

(c) Mahāyāna

In the following passages, a few matters pertaining to Mahāyāna will be discussed, namely, disagreement regarding its origin, its content, and its professed indispensability. My focus will not be on the historical but rather on the doctrinal (and philosophical) aspects of Mahāyāna; my approach emic rather than etic.

(i) Dissent on the Origin of Mahāyāna

The question regarding the origin of Mahāyāna is a highly controversial one, a fact of which I am only too aware, and yet it cannot be left unstated, given the strong link between the underlying idea of bodhicitta and that of Mahāyāna. At the moment, a consensus among Buddhologists on the origin of Mahāyāna is not in sight. What I shall attempt here, however, is merely to draw attention to the difficulties and controversies surrounding the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism and provide a sketch of some of the important positions.

Some scholars have alluded to Asoka’s Eighth Rock Edict as containing the idea of Mahāyāna, but this suggestion has not been widely accepted.\(^84\) According to L. S. Cousins, even in the second century CE, we “do not yet have anything which we can truly call Mahāyāna Buddhism.”\(^85\) The Aṣṭasāhasrīkā is the oldest extant Mahāyāna source to mention the term Mahāyāna.\(^86\) The important question is: Who initiated Mahāyāna, or how did it come into being? Several theses have been proposed, some not very different from each other. According to scholars such as Har Dayal, the bodhisattva (i.e. Mahāyāna) ideal was introduced as a protest against the monastic elitism and in response to the spiritual needs and crises of the laity.\(^87\) The thesis that Mahāyāna arose as a lay movement associated with the

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\(^{83}\) Adhyāsāyasamcudanāśūra cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (Bendall, p. 15,19; Vaidya, p. 12,25); yat kimciṃ maitreyam subhāsītam sarvam tad buddhabhāsītam; Angulimālīyasūra (T, fol. 255a5–6; D, fols. 197b7–198a1); jām dpa’i gnyis gsal pa | bcom ldan ’dus ’jig rten pa ’ang ring zhig tshun [tshud T] chad bdag nying shal za ba la mt gnas so || bcom ldan ’dus kyis bka’ stsal pa | gang ’jig rten pa la sangs rgyas kyi tsig dang ’thun pa yod pa de yang thams cad du thams cad sangs rgyas kyi tsig tu rig par bya’o ||; cf. the dKon mchog ’grel (A, fols. 54b6–55a1; B, p. 85.4–6): mu sogs can gnyis legs par bshad [dpylod A] pa i gzhung yang sangs rgyas rnam kyis byin gnyis brlabs pa dang sprul pas bshad pa yin pa | sangs rgyas nyid kyis lung bstan pa yin… This idea has been employed by Rong-zom-pa to defend the authenticity of the *Guhyagarbhatantra. See Wangchuk 2002: 282–285. For additional information on primary and secondary sources, see Gethin 1998: 47, 281, n. 20.

\(^{84}\) See Vetter 1994: 1243, n. 3, where this suggestion of Arthur L. Basham is treated with scepticism, in view of Schmithausen’s argument that only the idea of attaining heaven occurs in other Asoka edicts. See also a similar discussion in Roth 1982: 372–374, particularly the statement (p. 374): “There are also no traces of the ‘Grand Vehicle’ in Asoka’s inscriptions… The word Bodhisattva, which so dominantly figures in the Mahāyāna texts, is not used once in all the Asoka inscriptions…” Cf., however, Seyfort Ruegg 2004: 13–4, particularly, n. 17.

\(^{85}\) See Cousins 2003: 18, where he states: “We certainly have a literature to which the label Mahāyāna can be attached, but even that is to some extent retrospective. Some of the works which are later to be the core literature of the Mahāyāna certainly exist at this time, but in earliest recensions which do not contain all of the distinctive features of later Mahāyāna.”

\(^{86}\) Nakamura 1980: 152, n. 22. For an explanation of the meaning of Mahāyāna, see the Aṣṭasāhasrīkā (pp. 11.31–12.24); Tibetan translation (T, fols. 18a3–19a5; D, fols. 13a5–14a3).

\(^{87}\) See Dayal 1932: 2–4, particularly the following passage: “The bodhisattva doctrine was promulgated by some Buddhist leaders as a protest against this lack of true spiritual fervour and altruism among the monks of
worship of stūpas has been proposed by Akira Hirakawa\textsuperscript{88} and continued and modified by Tilmann Vetter.\textsuperscript{89} Hirakawa’s theory, however, has been criticised by Richard Gombrich,\textsuperscript{90} while Richard Robinson has criticised the arguments that stress the importance of lay believers.\textsuperscript{91} Reginald Ray has spoken of ‘three kinds of actors in Buddhist history,’ namely, ‘forest renunciant,’ ‘monastic renunciant,’ and ‘lay person,’ and suggested that Mahāyāna Buddhism arose in restricted circles, chiefly those of forest renunciants or meditators.\textsuperscript{92} Paul Harrison for his part answered his self-formulated question “Who gets to ride in the Great Vehicle?” as follows: Judging by the eleven early Mahāyāna sūtras, those who thought they were riding the Great Vehicle were mostly monks (bhikṣu) or other males, and Mahāyāna remained a minority movement in the land of its origin.\textsuperscript{93} Andrew Rawlinson, however, has suggested that a multidimensional model existed in Mahāyāna from the very beginning.\textsuperscript{94} In the view of some scholars, such as Paul Mus and Richard S. Cohen, the Mahāyāna is the legitimate evolutionary successor to the earliest Buddhism.\textsuperscript{95}

(ii) The Content of Mahāyāna

In primary sources, Mahāyāna is rarely understood in the sense of an institution, as it often is in secondary sources. The Āṣṭasāhasrikā explains that Mahāyāna is an appellative (adhibhucana) for immeasurability (aprameyatā).\textsuperscript{96} According to the Lankāvatārasūtra,\textsuperscript{97} the

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that period. ... The bodhisattva ideal can be understood only against this background of a saintly and serene, but inactive and indolent monastic order.... The bodhisattva ideal was taught in order to counteract this tendency to a cloistered, placid, inert monastic life.... The bodhisattva doctrine was promulgated also as a protest against this theory of arhatship, which was regarded as doubly defective.” See also ibid., 45, 222–225. For some additional references to such a position, see Harrison 1987: 87, n. 1. See also Ray 1994: 22, 425, n. 18, where Lamotte is referred to as the proponent of a similar position.

\textsuperscript{88} See Hirakawa 1963. See also Hirakawa 1990: 223–311.

\textsuperscript{89} See Vetter 1994: 1241, where the following thesis has been proposed: “The first [part of the essay] tries to show that lay believers played an important role in what I consider the group of initiators of Mahāyāna buddhism [sic], custodians and visitors of stūpas which were supposed to contain relics of the Buddha. One or more of them is likely to have conceived the idea to become like the Buddha and to imitate, for that purpose, heroic acts of his former lives, as they were told and depicted at such a site.” For detailed arguments, see the same article.

\textsuperscript{90} Gombrich 1998. For the assessment of Hirakawa’s theory, see also Sasaki 1997.


\textsuperscript{92} Ray 1994: 410.

\textsuperscript{93} Harrison 1987.


\textsuperscript{95} For details on this position, see Cohen 2000: 22–23, n. 51. Those interested in keeping track of research on the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism may consult Deleanu 2000 and Aramaki 2003.

\textsuperscript{96} Āṣṭasāhasrikā (p. 12.4): mahāyānam iti subhūte aprameyataḥ etad adhivacanam |; Tibetan translation (T, fol. 18a6; D, fol. 13b1): rab ’byor theg pa chen po zhes bya ba ’di ni gzhal du med pa ’i thig lha dags so ||.

\textsuperscript{97} Lankāvatārasūtra 6.5 (p. 229.6–7) and 16.638 (p. 344.5–6):
\begin{verbatim}
pancadharmāḥ svabhāvāḥ ca vijnānāy aṣṭa eva ca
aṅgataṁ param gṛtṣṇo mahāyānaparīgréhah ||.
\end{verbatim}
See also Suzuki 1930: 33. For an English translation, see id. 1932: 198.
entire (doctrinal content of the) Mahāyāna is included in (the doctrine of) (a) the five dharmas (or vastus),
98 namely, designation (nāma), characteristics (nimitta), concepts (vikalpa/samkalpa), correct insight (samyagīnāna), and true reality (tathātā); (b) the (three) Natures (svabhāva), namely, the imagined (parikalpitasvabhāva), dependent (paratantrasvabhāva), and perfected natures (parinispannasvabhāva); (c) the eight conceptual-perceptual apparatuses (vijñāna), namely, five sense-perceptions, mental perception-or-conception, defiled mind (kiliṣṭamana), and fundamental mind (ālayavijñāna); 99 and (d) two kinds of non-self (nairātmaya), namely, nonexistence of a substantial self or of person (pudgalanairātmya) and non-substantiality or non-essentiality of the phenomena (dharmanairātmya). The Angulimālīyasūtra states that the ‘Middle Way’ (madhyamā pratipat) is an epithet (adhivacana) for Mahāyāna, 100 and according to the Śrīmālavimalānāsāsūtra, saddharma itself is a similar epithet. 101 Sāgaramegha regards both the path and goal of a bodhisattva as definitive of Mahāyāna. 102 For Nāgārjuna, Mahāyāna consists of the six perfections (pāramitā) and two types of accumulation (sambhāra). 103 For Candrakīrti, the various kinds of emptiness (ṣūnyatā) distinguish what is called Mahāyāna. 104 Further, a commentary on the Bhadracaryāprajñādhīna, attributed to Dignāga, states: 105

It is called the ‘Great Way’ 106 because it is the way of the great bodhisattvas. To be precise, the two accumulations (sambhāra) of beneficial resources (puṇya) and gnosis (jñāna), which are the means of attaining the awakening of a buddha (buddhabodhi) are called yānas, and [because]
they are furnished with the perfections (pāramitā), they are called Mahāyāna.

Ratnākaraśānti for his part explains the term Mahāyāna thus: 107

98 For a recent study of the early Yogācāra theory of five vastus, see Kramer 2005.
99 For a monumental study of the concept of ālayavijñāna, see SchmithAUSEN 1987.

100 Angulimālīyasūtra (T, fol. 257b3; D, fol. 199b3–4): dbu ma’i lam zhes bya ba ni theg pa chen po’i bla dags so || sor mo’i phreng ’[phreng A] has smras pa | dbu ma’i lam mi shes pas sems can rnamz dbu ma’i lam gzhon du rtog [tag T] go ||. This is cited by sKa-ba dpal-drags in his gStag rab rin po che (P, fol. 152a2–3; D, fol. 247a1–2; S, vol. 115, p. 670.15–16).
101 Śrīmālavimalānāsāsūtra (T, fol. 413a1–3; D, fol. 263a1–2): bcom ldan ’das dam pa’i chos zhes sgnyi ba de ni theg pa cchen po’i tshig bla dags [add. lags T] so || de ci’i slad du zhe na | bcom ldan ’das nyan thos dang | rang sngos rgyas kyi theg pa thams cad dang | jig rten pa dang ’jig rten las ’das pa’i dge ba’i chos thams cad ni theg pa che ros rab tu phyel ba ’i slad du’o ||. Cf. the citation in the Sūtrasamuccaya (p. 139.3–7) and gStag rab rin po che (P, fol. 177b4–5; D, fol. 270a4–5; S, vol. 115, p. 726.1–5). For an English translation of the passage, see WAYMAN & WAYMAN 1974: 78.

102 Bodhisattvakālamatvabhāsākāra (P, fol. 2a2–b6; D, fols. 1a3–2b1; S, vol. 75, pp. 609.7–610.16).

103 Ratnāvalī 4.80–83.

104 Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (p. 303.16): stong pa nyid ’di rnamz ni theg pa chen po zhes bya’o ||

105 Pratiprasthānasamgrahā (P, fol. 223b5–6; D, fol. 193b6–7; S, vol. 67, p. 1264.16–20): ’byang chub sems dpa’ chen po’i theg pa yin pas na | theg pa chen po ste | dangs su na sangs rgyas kyi byang chub thob par byed pa’i lam bsod nams dang ye shes kyi tshogs gnis la theg pa zhes bya’o ||yang na pha rol tu phin pa rnamz dang bcas pa la theg pa chen po zhes bya’o ||

106 I take yāna here as a near synonym of mārga, that is, the factors (dharma) that constitute the path, as is usually the convention in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra systems.

107 Ratnālokaṃkāra (P, fol. 255b1–4; D, fol. 317a3–5; S, vol. 64, p. 619.2–11): theg pa chen po zhes bya ba la | theg pa’i sgra ni bzhan pa la bya ste | gzhan du khyer bar byed pa’i phyir ro || chen po zhes bya ba ni chos chen po dang ldan pa’o || chos chen po gang zhe na | ’phags pa’i klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas shi’in pa dang ishul khrims dang bzd po dang brtsun ’grus dang bsm gian dang shes rab dang snying rje ni theg pa chen po’o zhes gsungs so || ’dir’ [di PN] ’phags pa thogs med kyi zhabz khyis ni [1] chos chen po la skhin tu rgyas pa’i sde dang |
In the word Mahāyāna, the term yāna refers to a vehicle (or means of transport) (bhūna pa), since [what it denotes] carries [one] to another [place]; the word mahā [refers to] that which is endowed with the great dharmas. What are the great dharmas? Ārya Nāgārjuna\textsuperscript{108} has taught that [the perfections of] giving (dāna), ethical-moral discipline (śīla), patience (ksānti), diligence (vīrya), meditative concentration (dhyāna), discriminative insight (prajñā), and compassion (karuna) are [collectively] called Mahāyāna. Ārya Asanga\textsuperscript{109} has, however, in this [regard], taught that Mahāyāna is that which is endowed with seven kinds of [greatness]: [1] the greatness of the Dharma (dharmamahātva), on account of its vastness (mahāvaiśalya), [2] the greatness of cīcitotpāda (cīcitotpādamahātva), [3] the greatness of trust (adhisthānakāraḥ) in the great doctrine, [4] the greatness of altruistic inclination (adhikārāmahātva), [5] the greatness of accumulation (sambhalanamahātva), [6] the greatness of [the extent of] time (kālāmahātva), and [7] the greatness of arrival or attainment (samudgānamahātva).\textsuperscript{110}

Furthermore, in the Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra, Mahāyāna is described as a yāna that plies against the current of the everyday world:\textsuperscript{111}

This Mahāyāna is a yāna that is opposed to the entire world. How so? The sentient beings of the world follow the current. I, however, claim to attempt [to be moving] against the current.\textsuperscript{112}

For Sthiramati (ca. 510–570),\textsuperscript{113} non-conceptual gnosis (nirvikalpapajñāna) is at the core of Mahāyāna.\textsuperscript{114} Kamalasāla, citing the Gayāśṛṣṭisūtra in his Third Bhāvanākrama, explains that prajñā and upāya constitute Mahāyāna, and that according to the Tathāgataguhyasūtra the entire path of bodhisattva can be subsumed under prajñā and upāya.\textsuperscript{115} Thus, if bodhicitta is

\textsuperscript{108} Ratnakarāśānti is clearly referring to Ratnāvalī 4.81.

\textsuperscript{109} Ratnakarāśānti is evidently alluding to Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.18 (Bodhisattvagunapatāla), where the seven greatnesses (mahātva) are explained (WOGIHARA, pp. 297.7–298.2; DUTT, pp. 201.20–202.9).

\textsuperscript{110} See BHSD, s.vv. samudgama and samudgama.

\textsuperscript{111} Sāgaramatiparipṛcchāsūtra (T, fol. 20a6–7; D, fol. 14a7): ‘di lla ste | theg pa chen po ‘di ni ‘jig rten thams cad dang mi mthun [’thun D] pa’i theg pa’o || de ci’i phyr zhe na | sems can de dag ni rgyun gyi rjes su ‘gro ba dag go || bdag ni rgyun las ldog par rtsol bar [bas T] ‘dod pa’o ||. This passage is cited in the Sūkṣmaśāmacayya (according to the Tibetan translation but the corresponding Sanskrit text is missing. For the Tibetan text and an English translation of the passage, see the Sūkṣmaśāmacaya (BENDALL, p. 185–186, n. 2). Cf. the Dhammasamgitiśūtra (T, fol. 313a6–7; D, fol. 83b6–7): byang chub sems dpa’i yang dag par so sor rtag pas | sangs rgyas kyi byang chub khong du chad do | bcom ldar ’das de ba na byang chub sems dpas [dpa’ T] rgyun las bleg ste | ’jug par par bgyi [bgyi’o T] rgyun gyi rjes su [add. mi T] ’jug par mi bgyi’o ||.

\textsuperscript{112} The idea of the Buddha’s or Buddhist attitude of moving against (and along with) the current of the world found in Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna literature is an interesting theme that would require further studies, and would be particularly relevant to the Madhyamaka system in which one finds both situations of compliance and noncompliance with the worldly norms.

\textsuperscript{113} SEYFORT RUEGG 1981: 61, 69.

\textsuperscript{114} *(Mahāyāna)ṣūtrālaṃkārāvyākhya (P, vol. mi, fol. 83b5; D, vol. mi, fol. 73b3; S, vol. 71, p. 1079.21): rnam par mi rtag pa’i ye shes ni theg pa chen po stey.*
understood as a synthesis of *prajñā* and *upāya*, it would follow that the entire content of Mahāyāna is merely *bodhicitta*. (In the *Guhyasiddhi*, the ultimate sameness of phenomeaa is similarly called Vajrayāna.\(^{115}\))

**(iii) Is Mahāyāna Indispensable? Is Vajrayāna Indispensable?**

There is the tendency to hold one’s own ‘vehicle’ to be indispensable, not only for the attainment of Buddhahood but also for release from *samsāra*. For example, the *Mahāyānavimśikā* attributed to Nāgārjuna maintains:\(^{117}\)

> In the ocean of *samsāra*
> Filled with the water of conceptual thought,
> Who will cross over to the [other] shore
> Without embarking on [the ship] of Mahāyāna!

Similarly, Indrabhūti’s *Jñānasiddhi* states:\(^{118}\)

> In the great ocean of *samsāra*
> Filled with the water of conceptual thought,
> Who will arrive at the [further] shore
> [Without]\(^{119}\) embarking on [the ship of] Vajrayāna!

It is clear that the latter is based on the former. Likewise, Candrakīrti has maintained what one might call ‘soteriological exclusivism,’ namely, that one who deviates from the path of Nāgārjuna has no other means of attaining cessation.\(^{120}\) In the *Lokātātastava* attributed to one Nāgārjuna, however, the argument seems to be that release from *samsāra* cannot be attained unless one resorts to signlessness (virtually a synonym of *śūnyatā*), as has been greatly emphasised in the Mahāyāna.\(^{121}\)

The statement that the Mahāyāna or Vajrayāna is indispensable—not only for the attainment of Buddhahood but also for mere release from *samsāra*—if taken at face value can

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\(^{115}\) Third *Bhāvanākrama* (p. 14.16–19): *etāvat eva ca samkṣiptam mahāyānam yad uta prajñopāyaś ca | yathoktam āryagavyāśīre | «dvāv īmau bodhisattvānām samkṣiptaṁ mārgau | katamau dvau | yad uta prajñā copāyaś ca | āryataḥhāgataḥugyāsvāre coktam | «imau ca prajñopāyaubodhisattvānām sarvapāramitāsamsgrahāyā samvarṣe» iti |.

\(^{116}\) *Guhyasiddhi* 2.11 (p. 13.3–4):

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attyaguptam udghāya vajrayānam anuttaram |
suvadharmasamaikatvam yat tvayā bhāṣitam prabho ||.
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\(^{117}\) *Mahāyānavimśikā*, verse no. 28 (TUCCI 1956: 203):

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kalanājalaṁrūṣya samsārasaṁmahodadheḥ |
anākramya mahāyānaṁ ko vā pāram tarisyai ||.
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Cf. the English translation in TUCCI 1956: 207.

\(^{118}\) *Jñānasiddhi* 11.8 (p. 127.15–16):

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kalanājalaṁrūṣya samsārasaṁ mahodadheḥ |
vajrayānām saṁmāruhyanā ko vā pāram gamisyai ||.
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\(^{119}\) Note that the text has no negation.

\(^{120}\) *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.79 (cited in the *Subhāṣītasamgraha*, Part 1, p. 396.3–6):

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ācāryanāgājirnāpādamārgād bahirgatānāṁ na śivābhuyāpāḥ |
bhraṣṭā hi te samvṛtīsatamārgāt tadbhramātās cāsti na mokṣasiddhiḥ ||.
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The Sanskrit verse is cited also in *MIMAKI* 1982: 164, n. 451.

\(^{121}\) *Lokātātastava*, verse no. 27:

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amimittam anāgamyam mokso nāsti tvam utkavān |
atas tvayā mahāyāne tat sākalyena deśiṃ ||.
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For an English translation, see *LINDTNER* 1997: 11.
cause insurmountable problems historically as well as doctrinally. One of the solutions would be to understand Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna (like bodhicitta itself) in their ontological and gnoseological senses and to interpret them retrospectively, in the way the indispensability of bodhicitta has been interpreted by Mañjuśrīmitra. Under such an interpretation, Mahāyāna or Vajrayāna is understood in the sense of true reality (i.e. ontological) or of insight into it (i.e. gnoseological), and a minimum mandatory dosage of Mahāyāna or Vajrayāna is presupposed for all Buddhist saints. Analogously to Mañjuśrīmitra’s interpretation of bodhicitta, one might propose that a śrāvaka saint partakes of Mahāyāna or Vajrayāna to a small degree; a pratyekabuddha, to an intermediate degree; and a bodhisattva saint, to a greater degree still. This is, however, a purely retrospective interpretation prompted by one current of tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna, and historically inaccurate.

3. The Concepts of Sattva and Bodhisattva

The notion of sattva in general and bodhisattva in particular is of relevance to the study of bodhicitta. Schmithauesen has remarked that the Buddhist position on environmental ethics could be described as ‘sentient-centric’ and not as anthropocentric. We can extend this sentiment and describe Buddhism in general as a ‘sentient-centric’ religion, for its target is not limited to human beings but is in fact all sentient beings (including animals). The significance of ‘sentient-centrism’ becomes more conspicuous in Mahāyāna Buddhism. A bodhisattva is in the first place a sattva, and if there were no other sattvas (i.e. if he were the only sattva), the concept of bodhisattva would serve no purpose. Furthermore, a bodhisattva who disregarded the needs of another sattva would run the risk of breaking his bodhisattva vows (and of severing bodhicitta, which is the tendon that binds a bodhisattva and another sattva). In the following few sections, we shall consider the terms sattva, bodhisattva, and vajrasattva, and their link with the concept of bodhicitta.

According to the Buddhist view, the world comprises the ‘container world’ (bhājanaloke) and its content, that is, the ‘world of sentient beings’ (sattvaloka), which includes not only human beings but also other sentient beings, such as animals. Any being capable of feelings, such as pain, is a sattva. Several virtual synonyms of sattva are used in Buddhist literature, such as prāṇa (or prāṇin), jīva, and bhūta. However, the line of demarcation between sentience and non-sentience in earliest Buddhism was not very clear-cut. Schmithauesen has shown that plants were originally regarded in Buddhism as a borderline case, but practical considerations gradually led to ignoring the sentience of plants and finally to denying it.

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122 See the discussion in chapter seven.


124 See, for example, Nag-tsho Lo-tsa-ba, bsTod pa rgyad bcu pa 045 (EMER 2003: 33): 
khrod ni pha rol phyin pa’i sgor zhus nas ||
lha pa’i bsam pa rnam par dag pa yi ||
byang chub sems kyi ’gro rnam mi gling ba’i ||
blo ldan snying rje can la phyag ’tshal lo ||.

125 I have not been able to locate the Sanskrit term for the Tibetan expression ‘world of content’ (bcud kyi’ jigs rten). Could it simply be an alternative translation for sattvaloka (sems can gyi’ jigs rten)?

126 Schmithauesen in BSTEH 2000: 364.

127 SCHMITHAUSEN 1991: 1–2, n. 7.

128 SCHMITHAUSEN 1991: 69, n. 106. Schmithauesen has thoroughly discussed in this monograph the problem of the sentience of plants in early forms of Buddhism.
Human beings are one among a broad spectrum of sentient beings; a bodhisattva is one among a broad spectrum of sattvas. In this context, we may refer to Schmithauser’s statement that in Buddhism one may speak of not only ‘human dignity’ (Menschenwürde) but also of the ‘dignity of all forms of life’ (Lebewesenwürde). If I may again employ the axiological terminology, a distinction between the various sentient beings cannot be made in terms of their intrinsic value, particularly not if the tathāgatagarbha theory is presupposed. Nonetheless, one could perhaps say that in Buddhism there is a difference in the instrumental value of various sentient beings. Human beings, owing to their possibility and the ability to make the soteriological breakthrough, are conceived of as possessing special value among sentient beings, and in this regard human existence is even more valuable than the state of a celestial being.

(a) No Bodhisattvas without Sattvas

In Mahāyāna, the entire concept of bodhicitta and bodhisattva would collapse or make no sense without sattvas, for a bodhisattva is, in the first place, a sattva whose citta is directed towards attaining the highest state of bodhi for the sake of other sattvas. Not only is the bodhicitta of a bodhisattva dependent on sentient beings, but also his practices of the perfections (pāramitā) are in one way or another connected with them. A bodhisattva becomes a buddha by relying on sentient beings. For Śāntideva, it is impossible for a bodhisattva to possess bodhicitta and yet be unhappy at the well-being of other sentient beings. He also explains in detail why and in what respects sentient beings are equal to buddhas and deserve equal respect. According to Rong-zom-pa, one attains the state of awakening (bodhi) by depending on sentient beings, but one also commits transgressions (āpatti) by doing the same, and hence one must regard them as much as one regards the buddhas. For him, both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna presuppose that great bodhi is attained with the help of sentient beings and the Three Jewels. Thus a bodhisattva, depending on how he interacts with sentient beings, can either flourish or perish.

According to some Yogācāra sources, a bodhisattva respects all sentient beings the way he respects himself (in the sense of the Golden Rule) and assumes the view of a great self (mahātmadṛśī), for he experiences (on the first bhūmi) the sameness and omnipresence of true reality (dharmadhātu), or non-substantiality (nairātmya), in all sentient beings. This experience of the omnipresent true reality, which is the self (ātman) shared by him and other sentient beings, imparts to the bodhisattva a new dimension of self and tears down the barriers

130 Bodhicaryāvatāra 5.80; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 41.
131 Bodhicaryāvatāra 6.83:  
   sa kim necchati sattvānāṃ yas teṣām bodhim icchati |
   bodhicittam kutas tasyād yo ’nyasampadi kupyati ||.
   For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 57.
133 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 151a3–5; B, p. 246.17–21): gzhan yang sms can rnams la brten te skyes pa ’i dge ba dang mi dge ba’ang de bzhin du gsungs te | ji skad du | sms can la brten nas byang chub thob par ’gyur zhim | sms can la brten nas ltung ba ’byung bar ’gyur bas | de bzhin gshogs pa dang ’dra bar sms can yongs su gzung bar bya’o || zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o ||. See also the Māyājñālatantra (T, fol. 71a6–7; D, fol. 134a2): sms can rnams la brten te byang chub thob par ’gyur bas sms can la bṣlu bar mi bya’o || zhes shes par byas nas de bzhin gshogs pa’i lam de nyid la sms can de dag zhyar bar bya’o ||.
134 Theg chen tshul ’jug (A, fol. 76a6–77a1; B, pp. 499.19–500.10).
of the old self, never to be confronted thereafter. Also, for the Tathāgatagarbha tradition, all sentient beings (including animals) should be respected like 2 tathāgata, for they already bear a tathāgata within them (like an embryo in a hidden form or as a potential).135

The idea of tathāgatagarbha is also used as an argument in Vajrayāna ethics. For example, the Dam tshig gsal bkra ascribed to Vilāsavājra, in explaining one of the five primary tantric commitments (samaya) of the *Guhyagarbhatantra tradition, speaks of four kinds of kindred (mched) towards whom one should be benevolent: (1) general kindred (spyi i mched), (2) distant kindred (ring ba i mched), (3) close kindred (nye ba i mched), and (4) intimate kindred (nang 'dres pa i mched). First, all sentient beings are general kindred of the Vajrayāna practitioner, for they are bound by one tathāgatagarbha and are potential future buddhas. Second, all Buddhists are his or her distant kindred. Third, all (Buddhists) who share the same view and conduct are his or her close kindred. Fourth, all those with whom he or she has received tantric empowerment are his or her intimate kindred.136

(b) Faith-oriented and Reason-oriented Sentient Beings

Buddhism in general recognises the diversity of sattvas. This is even true in the case of traditions which maintain that all sattvas possess the same spiritual disposition, namely, the tathāgatagarbota, for they accept that different vehicles are necessary (at least temporarily) for sattvas with different predispositions and that insisting on one model for everyone makes little sense. Broadly speaking, both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna sources seem to recognise two types of sattvas, namely, śraddhānusārin (i.e. faith-oriented) and dharmānusārin (i.e. reason-oriented),137 and correspondingly two different salvific approaches—that is, one that emphasises the component of śraddhā and another that emphasises that of prajñā—until a person can combine or possess both. It is also accepted that, in principle, both śraddhā-generated prajñā and prajñā-generated śraddhā are possible. Such a stance may serve to revise the perception of Buddhism as being either purely rational or purely devotional.

The varying degrees of emphasis laid on the prajñā-oriented and śraddhā-oriented soteriological approaches and the insistence upon only one of the two (from an unwillingness of opposing factions to concede that the authoritative sources upon which they rely contain alternative approaches) seem to have been partly responsible for several of the intra-Buddhist


136 Dam tshig gsal bkra (P, fol. 574a8–575a1; S, vol. 43, p. 1192.1–4):

| bde gshegs snying po 'yun ring | [= can yin?] phyir ||
| ma 'ongs sangs rgyas rang bzhin yin ||
| spyi i mchod | [= mched] de pha tshan bzhiri ||
| sangs rgyas chos zhugs rig ba dang ||
| lla spyod mthun pas nye bar bshad ||
| pha cig | [= gcig] dam tshig nang 'dres pa ||.

See also the Od gsal snying po (p. 164.4–6): spyir mched la bzhiri bshad de | sens can thams cad bde gshegs snying po gcig gis bslus pas spyi i mched | sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa la zhugs pa thams cad ring ba i mched | lla spyod mthun pa nye ba i mched | dbang lhan gcig zhus pa nang 'dres pa i mched dö | yang bzhiri po de steng | bla ma gcig pa mdzes pa i mched | chos lhan gcig nyan pa nye ba i mched gnyis bstan te drug tu yang bshad la | thams cad la yang byams pa i sens btsang bar mi lha'o ||. Cf. the dKon mchog 'gre1 (A, fol. 189a6–190b1; B, pp. 226.3–227.8).

137 See, for example, Jñānagarbha's Anantamukhaniradhrāradhānityā (p. 173.1–2): gsal ba ni rnam pa gnyis te | chos kyi rjes su 'brang ba dang | dad pas rjes su 'brang ba'o ||. See also TSD, s.vv. dad pas rjes su 'brang ba and chos kyi rjes su 'brang ba. Sanskrit sources for the corresponding terms rigs pa'i rjes 'brang (*nyāyānusārin) and lung gi rjes 'brang (*tgamānusārin) used in Tibetan (e.g. Tshig mdzod chen mo, s.v.) have yet to be traced. See also PED and CPD, s.vv. anusārin.
doctrinal disputes. One representative instance in the context of bodhicitta: Is bodhicitta an outcome of the realisation of emptiness (śūnyatā) or is it a cause of such a realisation? In other words, should one first generate bodhicitta or should one first seek the correct cognition of emptiness (śūnyatā)? Not everyone, however, categorically insisted upon one approach and ruled out any other option. For example, Śāntarakṣīta, who apparently did not consider himself a śrāddhānusārin, recognised two alternative approaches in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti, one for reason-oriented sattva and the other for faith-oriented ones. According to him, a reason-oriented sattva should first seek the correct knowledge of true reality (albeit theoretical), then generate compassion towards those who are submerged in wrong views (thereby generating bodhicitta) and engage in the ascetic practice of a sage (munivara) adorned with both prajñā and karunā. A faith-oriented sattva, on the other hand, should first generate bodhicitta and then seek the correct view.

(c) The Term Bodhisattva

As we have already seen, the term bodhisattva is central to Mahāyāna. In the Brahmaviśeṣaśacontiparipṛcchāśūra we can find several reasons listed why a bodhisattva is called bodhisattva. One of the explanations is as follows:

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138 The dispute over which of the two methods of meditation—analytical meditation (dpayad sgom) or non-analytical meditation characterised by keeping (one’s mind in the state of tranquillity and non-conceptuality) (jog sgom)—is, in my view, a typical example.

139 This issue has been thematised in the report of the bSam-yas debate between the Simultaneists (cig char ba) and Gradualists (rim gyes pa). The former maintained that the method of religious practice that included taking refuge and generating bodhicitta in an ordinary way (rang rgyud du) is the approach by ascent (mas ’dzens), contrasted with the approach by descent (mas ’bangs), according to which great compassion (i.e. apparently bodhicitta) arises naturally (rang shugs su) once view (lta ba) is realised, so that one abides in a state of the union of emptiness and compassion (stong nyid snying rje chen po can du gnas). See the Nyang ral chos ’byung (pp. 401.17–402.6).

140 See his Tattvasamgraha (cited in TSD, s.v. dad pa’i rjes su ‘brang ba min): vayam aśraddhānās tu ye yuktiḥ prārthāyāmahe

141 Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti (P, fols. 83b8–84a3; D, fol. 83a4–6; S, vol. 62, p. 973.7–14):

yang dag shes tshol sgon bstan ste ||
don de rnam par nges byas nas ||
lta ngan ’thibs gnas ’jig rten la ||
snying rje kun tu bskyed nas su ||
’gro don byed ’pa pa’ [par dpa’ N] gyur pa ||
byang chub blo rgyas mkhas pa ni ||
blo dang snying rjes brgyam pa yi ||
thub pa’i brtul zhugs yang dag spyod ||
yang dag dad pas rjes ‘brang ba’ [’brangs pa DC]||
rdo zogs pa’i byang chub sems bskyed nas ||
thub pa’i brtul zhugs blang byas te ||
de ni yang dag shes tshol brson ||
blo mig zhib pa’i blo ldan dag ||
lam geng nas ni ’jug ’gyur ba ||
lung dang rigs pa gsal ldan pa ||
de ltar phyogs tsam bstan pa yin || |

142 The bodhisattva ideal, it is maintained, is found also in Jainism. See NAKAMURA 1980: 154: “The ideal of the Bodhisattva is noticed among the Jains also, parallel to that of Buddhism. But in later days this became peculiarly Buddhist.” I shall leave it up to specialists in Jaina studies to assess the textual evidence for this statement. Cf. DAYAL 1932: 7, where it is stated that some scholars have tried to associate the term bodhisattva with the term buddhisattva, used in the system of the non-Buddhist Yogasūtra, but such a connection is
Bodhi stated: “O Venerable One, it is as follows: If a man or a woman does not digress from the ‘eight-limb sabbath’ (astaṅgagopasatda) [vow] and abides by [it], [he or she] will be regarded as one who has assumed the eight-limb sabbath [vow]. O Venerable One, likewise a bodhisattva does not deviate from his bodhicitta, beginning from the generation of the initial resolve until the [arrival at the] seat of awakening (bodhi-maṇḍa). He is for this reason called a bodhisattva.”

The term bodhisattva has been discussed by sundry scholars. Dayal presented seven interpretations of the term bodhisattva in the Buddhist context. I summarise them here, leaving the two components bodhi and sattva untranslated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sattva</th>
<th>Bodhisattva</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. ‘essence’</td>
<td>‘one who has bodhi as his sattva’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ‘sentient being’</td>
<td>‘a sattva who is seeking bodhi’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. ‘resolve’ (citta or abhijñā)</td>
<td>‘one whose sattva is fixed on bodhi’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ‘embody’</td>
<td>‘one in whom bodhi is latent as a sattva’</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. ‘intelligence’ (budhi)</td>
<td>‘one who possesses the sattva of bodhi’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ‘attached’ (sakta)</td>
<td>‘one who is sakta (&lt; sattva) to bodhi’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ‘energy’ or ‘courage’</td>
<td>‘one whose sattva is directed towards bodhi’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the seven, Dayal accepts only two (nos. 2 and 6). Kajiyma has reassessed Dayal’s discussion of these seven interpretations and thereby enhanced our understanding of the term bodhisattva. He agrees with Dayal that interpretations 1, 4, 5, and 7 (except the Tibetan interpretation discussed within no. 7) do not yield a simple and natural sense. However, he disagrees with him on several points: (a) He regards Dayal’s rejection and ridiculing of Ghosa’s interpretation of bodhisattva as ‘one who has sattva and bodhi as his object of appropriation (ālambara),’ which is alluded to under interpretation no. 2, as unjustified. (b) Dayal’s rejection of interpretation no. 3 is also considered by him to be unjustified. (c) He disagrees with Dayal’s inclusion of the Tibetan interpretation of the term bodhisattva under interpretation no. 7 and suggests that it should be subsumed under no. 3.

I find the following note by Schmithausen particularly useful for an understanding of the term bodhisattva, and translate it here into English:

apparently unfounded. Historically, it is important to note, as already stated, that there is no trace of Mahāyāna in Asoka’s inscriptions, the term bodhisattva not occurring even once in them. See ROTHS 1982: 374; VETTER 1994: 1243, n. 3.

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143 Brahmacarīśacintiparipṛchchāsūtra (T, fols. 216b5–220b4; D, fols. 66a2–68b4).

144 Brahmacarīśacintiparipṛchchāsūtra (T, fol. 217a4–7; D, fol. 66a6–7): byang chub kyi gsol pa | bcom ldan ’das ’di lta ste | skyes pa’am [pa ‘am ’t] | bud med ji lta bur bstan pa’i yan lag bshyang dang ldan pa’i gso sbyin [= sbyong] la ma ral ma zhig par nye bar gnas na de yan lag bshyang kyi gso sbyin [= sbyong] yang dog par bhangs pa zhes bygi ba’i grangs su mch’i’o || bcom ldan ’das de bzhi du byang chub sems dpa’ sams dang po bskyed pa nas bzang ste | byang chub kyi snying po’i bar du byang chub kyi sems las ma g.yos pa laugs te | de ni de’i slad du byang chub sems dpa’ zhes bygi’o ||.

145 See PED, CPD, NYANATILOKA 1989, s.v. posathā; BHSD, s.v. posadha.

146 The term bodhisattva has been discussed in great detail in KAJIYAMA 1982; cf. DAYAL 1932: 4–9. For the terms bodhisattva and mahāsattva, see also ZIMMERMANN 2002a: 94–96, n. 10. One fact to be noted is that the term bodhisattva is older than mahāsattva.

147 DAYAL 1932: 4–9. The seven points have been summarised in KAJIYAMA 1982: 253–254.

148 Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇijīkā (p. 200.29); JOSHI 1971: 70.

[The term bodhisattva] is often rendered as ‘enlightenment being.’ However, in the first place, bodhi has metaphoric overtones not of light but of awakening. Secondly, one would naturally associate the expression ‘awakening being’ with a being characterised by awakening, that is, the Buddha himself after his awakening. According to autochthonous explanations, [the term] bodhisattva is understood as ‘one whose energy, or heroic attitude, is directed towards awakening’ (cf. also Tib. byang chub sems dpa’), which is fine as far as content is concerned, but has the disadvantage that sattva (or Middle Indic satta) does not seem to be attested in this meaning in the old canon (where the term bodhisattva already occurs). What is plausible, in my view, is the assumption of an ahistorical Sanskritisation of Middle Indic bodhisatta < *bodhisakta ‘clingning to awakened’ in the sense of ‘striving for awakening,’ traces of which can indeed still be found in the exegetical tradition. That this meaning was given up early on can be explained easily by the fact that saktu underwent a negative development in meaning, and later on only meant ‘clingning to’ in a spiritually negative sense.

The compound bodhisattva, which was very likely Sanskritised ahistorically from the Middle Indic bodhisatta, is open to more than one interpretation. Modern scholars have taken note of the Tibetan translation of the term according to the common understanding of it, such as the one recorded in the sGra sbyor bam po gnys pa. The works of Rong-zom-pa, however, reveal that several other ways of construing the compound bodhisattva have also been explored. Explaining the term Bodhisattvayāna in his dKon mchog ’grel, Rong-zom-pa states:

150 Schmithausen has often rendered bodhisattva into German as nach dem Erwachen Streben. He states: “[Der Begriff Bodhisattva wird] oft als ‘Erleuchtungswesen’ wiedergegeben. Aber zum einen schließt bodhi keine Lichtmetaphor ein, sondern die des Erwachens, zum anderen würde man den Ausdruck ‘Erwachens-Wesen’ doch natürlicherweise auf ein durch Erwachen charakterisiertes Wesen beziehen, also auf den Buddha selbst nach seinem Erwachen. Einheimische Erklärungen verstehen bodhisattva als ‘den, dessen Energie, oder heroische Gesinnung, auf das Erwachen gerichtet ist’ (vgl. auch Tib. byang chub sems dpa’), was inhaltlich treffend ist, aber den Nachteil hat, daß sattva (bzw. mittelindisch satta) in dieser Bedeutung im alten Kanon (wo der Begriff bodhisatta bereits vorkommt) nicht belegt zu sein scheint. Näherliegend ist m.E. die Annahme einer unhistorischen Sanskritisierung von mittelindisch bodhisatta < *bodhi-sakta ‘am Erwachen hängend’ im Sinne von ‘nach dem Erwachen strebend’, wovon sich in der Tat in den Auslegungstraditionen noch deutliche Spuren finden. Daß diese Deutung schon früh aufgegeben wurde, läßt sich leicht mit der Tatsache erklären, daß sakta eine negative Bedeutungsentwicklung durchlaufen hat und später nur noch ‘haftend an’, in spirituell stets negativem Sinne, bedeutet” (Schmithausen 2002: 13, n. 40).


See also the explanation of bodhisattva and mahāsattva in the Āṣṭasāhasrikā (pp. 9.22–10.22); Tibetan translation (T, fols. 14a4–15b7; D, fols. 10b2–11b4).

sGra sbyor bam po gnys pa (no. 65): bodhisattva zhes bya ba bodhastu satvasava yangs te bodhisattvā zhes bya ba ste | bodhi ni byang chub | sarva ni sams dpa’ | ba’ am snying stobs che ba la bya | blu na med pa’i byang chub sgrub pa la gcig tu brutul zhing mi nur bas na byang chub sams dpa’ |

See also the Samdhinirmanasūtra dharmakīrti (P, fols. 34b2–3; D, fols. 28b6–7; S, vol. 115, p. 1076.12–16); byang chub sams dpa’ zhes bya ba’i [ba ni PNg] tshig gi don ni bla na med pa’i byang chub dang sams can thams cad la dmigs te sams bskyed pa’o | yang gcig [cig PNg] tu na byang chub ces bya ba ni rtags pa dang ldan pa yin la | sams dpa’ zhes bya ba ni snying stobs dang ldan pa la bya’o |

Why is bodhisattva called [so]? [Of the two components of] the term bodhisattva, bodhi is [semantically identical with] avabodhi,\textsuperscript{155} which means [cognitive] penetration and realisation. Bodhi also refers to the purification and cleansing of all imperfections, and hence [the Tibetan term] byang chub (lit. ‘purification and [cognitive] penetration’) [was coined].\textsuperscript{156} The [term] sattva is applied in six senses: (1) ‘vital energy’ or ‘vesselment,’ (2) ‘courage’ and ‘firmness,’ (3) ‘resolution,’ (4) ‘consciousness,’ (5) ‘sentient being,’ and (6) ‘essence.’\textsuperscript{157} Whence, in this [system], [someone] is called a bodhisattva on account of his having a steadfast and unyielding\textsuperscript{158} resolve to [attain] bodhi, and his fixing on bodhi and sattva as his objects. According to the [system] of Prajñāpāramitā, however, [someone] is called bodhisattva because [he] is a sattva characterised by bodhi.\textsuperscript{159}

A similar explanation can also be found in his commentary to the ITa phreng.\textsuperscript{160}

Within the word byang chub sems dpa’, the [first two syllables] byang chub, [used to translate the Sanskrit word] bodhi, mean the ‘purification and exhaustion of all defilements’ and ‘correct realisation and [cognitive] penetration,’ [respectively]. This is the reason why the term byang chub is applied. As for the word sams dpa’, it is derived from [the Sanskrit] word sattva, which signifies [1] ‘desire,’ [2] ‘courage,’ [3] ‘stable and unwavering resolve,’ [4] ‘sentient being,’ [5] ‘consciousness,’ and [6] ‘compendium.’ Here, it is called so because of one’s desire [to attain] awakening, or the stability of [one’s] resolve [to attain] awakening, or one’s possessing [the resolve that] is directed towards awakening and sentient beings, as stated in the following [verse].\textsuperscript{161}

Awakening, the characteristic [of which is similar to that] of space,
Is free from all [dualistic] conceptions;
One who desires to realise this
Is called a bodhisattva.

The Prajñāpāramitā [texts], however, explain that ‘it is because sentient beings are awakened that they are called bodhisattvas.’ This would imply a realisation that sentient beings are of an awakened [nature]. Furthermore, in the phrase ‘a sentient being [resolved to attain] awakening,’

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\textsuperscript{155} Mahāvyutpatti, no. 2885; BHSD, s.v. samyagavabodhi. However, note that only avabodha is recorded in Pāli and classical Sanskrit.

\textsuperscript{156} To render the Sanskrit bodhi, Tibetans have coined the technical term byang chub, which actually contains two components, namely, byang and chub (JĀŚCHKE 1881, s.vv. ‘byang ba and chub pa’).

\textsuperscript{157} Cf. PW, s.v., where nine meanings of sattva are given (cf. also MW, s.v. satva).

\textsuperscript{158} JĀŚCHKE 1881, s.v. nūr ba.

\textsuperscript{159} Ānandagarbha, Paramādhyātikā (P, vol. li, fol. 29b2; D, vol. i, fol. 26b1; S, vol. 31, p. 61.13): byang chub kyi rang bzhin gyi sems dpa’ ni byang chub sems dpa’ o ||. See also the following translation from the ITa ‘grel.


\textsuperscript{161} This verse is from the Vairocanābhisasambhítantra (T, fol. 153b6–7; D, fol. 251a2). Compare the English translation of the verse in HODGE 2003: 378.
a sentient being is a ‘living creature’ (prāṇin), and a living creature who possesses bodhicitta is called a bodhisattva. In Bodhicitta, in short, is the union of insight (prajñā) and compassion (karunā).

Jñānagarbha states that one who is endowed with prajñā and upāya is a bodhisattva. It has been pointed out that bodhicitta is sometimes used as an equivalent of bodhisattva. In such a case bodhisattva should perhaps be understood as ‘one whose citta is [directed towards] bodhi.’ To sum up, the term bodhisattva may be explained in the following ways: (1) one who is attached (sakta) to awakening (bodhi), (2) one whose energy (sattva) is directed towards awakening, (3) one who has sentient beings (sattva) and awakening as objects of concern, (4) a sentient being (sattva) who possesses [the resolve to strive for] awakening, and (5) a sentient being (sattva) who is characterised by awakening. The meaning of bodhi obviously affects the way the compound bodhisattva is understood. For example, it would be impossible to explain the compound bodhisattva according to no. 5 if we only allow the conservative Buddhist notion of bodhi, but it would not be if bodhi is understood in a metaphysical or ontological sense. Following Schmithausen, we can assume that meaning no. 1 is the original one and hence also the oldest. Nos. 2–4 may be grouped together as belonging to the non-tantric Mahāyāna in general. And no. 5 is perhaps exclusive to selected Mahāyāna traditions, both tantric and non-tantric.

(d) Synonyms of Bodhisattva

Fifteen synonyms (or more accurately perhaps: metonyms) of bodhisattva are given in Bodhisattvavācārya 1.165 and Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra 19.73–74.166 (1) bodhisattva (byang chub sms pa’), (2) mahāsattva (sms pa’ chen po), (3) dhīma(n) ti (blo) (gros) ldn (pa), (4) uttamentuyit (gsal ba’i mchog), (5) jīnaputra (rgyal ba’i sras), (6) jinādhāra (rgyal ba’i gzhi), (7) vijeyt (rgyal bar byed pa’ / rnam par rgyal bar byed pa’), (8) jinānakura (rgyal ba’i myu gu), (9) vikṛnta (rtsal ba dang ldn pa), (10) paramārya (phags pa’i

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165 A similar explanation can be found, for example, in the Bodhisattvavācārya (T, fol. 43a5; D, fol. 283b2): shā ri’i bu byang chub sms pa’ bsam [bsams T] pa dang | byang chub kyi sms de lia bu dang ldn pa | ni byang chub sms pa’ zhes bya’ o |.

166 Anantamukhirnadhāranītikā (p. 117.22–25): shes rab dang thabs dang ldn pa ni byang chub sms pa’ zhes bya ba ste | sgra ’di gnyis ni shes rab dang thabs la bya bar don yod zhags pa’i mdo las ’byung ba’i phyir ro |.


168 Bodhisattvavācārya 1.18 (WOGHARA, p. 299.17–20; DUTT, p. 203.10–12). It is interesting to note that the Tibetan lo tsā bas translated the pertinent prose passage in the Bodhisattvavācārya into verses almost identical with the translation of the corresponding verses in the Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra.

169 Mahāyānasūtraśālākāraḥāṣa (p. 174.2): bodhisattvaśāmānyanivibhāge aṣṭau ślokaḥ |; ibid. (174.7): etāni sūdasa sarvabodhisattvānī anvarthanāmāni sāmānyena |; see also the Ratnālokālamkāra (P, fol. 261a3–5; D, fol. 222a2–3; S, vol. 64, p. 631.8–13). See also Mahāvuyuttī, nos. 625–643.

167 For the usage of the word mahāsattva in the Astasāhasrikā, see VETTER 2001: 69.

168 See TSD, s.vv. blo gros ldn pa and ldn, where several Sanskrit equivalents (such as buddhimān, dhīman, prājñā, maitrīn, bodhīna, and dhīra) are given.


For commentary on the verse, see the Tarkajñālā (P, fol. 50b5–7; D, fol. 47b1–3; S, vol. 58, p. 120.11–17); Ratnāvalīpaṇijākā (p. 13.12). See also Bodhicittavivaranā 103.
(e) Types of Bodhisattvas

One necessary preamble to a discussion of bodhisattva and bodhicitta is distinguishing between the various types of bodhisattvas. The different kinds of bodhisattvas in Mahāyāna are analogous to the various kinds of bhikṣus in the Vinaya tradition. It may be assumed that in the beginning there were not many kinds of bodhisattvas. However, these gradually burgeoned, reflecting the historical development of the concept, and in particular such things as gender, mode of life, degree of magnanimity, background, and spiritual maturity. Reginald A. Ray, in his *Buddhist Saints in India*, classified bodhisattvas into three types: those of forest, city, and monastery. We find numerous other ways of classifying bodhisattvas, some of which I shall discuss below.
(i) Historical, Celestial, and Earthly Bodhisattvas

From the point of view of the historical development of the concept of bodhisattva, the following three types may be distinguished: (1) the Bodhisattva who was the historical Buddha prior to his awakening (found also in the Pāli canon and presupposed by the Mahāyāna systems), (2) celestial bodhisattvas such as Maitreya, Avalokiteśvara, Vajrapāni, and Mañjuśrī, and (3) those sentient beings who aspire to become buddhas. These three types of bodhisattvas will be referred to here as ‘historical,’ ‘celestial’ and ‘earthly’ bodhisattvas, respectively. It is the latter that we are particularly concerned with in this study.

While it may be possible that the idea of celestial bodhisattvas came into existence under outside influence, I hold the idea of a bodhisattva endowed with bodhicitta to be uniquely Buddhist. We have seen that only two bodhisattvas are mentioned in the early Pāli sources: the bodhisattva who later became Gautama Buddha, and the bodhisattva who will become the future buddha Maitreya. However, the bodhisattva Maitreya is mentioned only once in the early Pāli canon. Elsewhere he is mentioned as the fifth buddha of this aeon. According to Mahāyāna, Maitreya is a celestial bodhisattva, like Mañjuśrī, but according to the non-Mahāyāna tradition, he belongs to the category of historical bodhisattvas, like Gautama Buddha prior to his awakening. It is conceivable that, for an earthly bodhisattva, a celestial figure may be a more attractive ideal or model than a historical one. This may perhaps explain why some celestial bodhisattvas, such as Avalokiteśvara, Vajrapāni, and Mañjuśrī, occasionally play a more important role than the historical Buddha himself.

The concept of historical bodhisattvas is undoubtedly older than that of celestial and earthly bodhisattvas. Nevertheless, as we can assume that the concepts of the various celestial bodhisattvas came into existence gradually over a fairly long period of time, some of them may be older than that of earthly bodhisattvas. Historical and celestial bodhisattvas are perhaps possible without the notion of bodhicitta, but the concept of earthly bodhisattvas is

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180 According to the conservative tradition, the historical Buddha had been a bodhisattva not only in his previous lives but also in his last earthly life before he became a buddha, which implies that he was not born as a buddha. For additional sources on the bodhisattva concept in the Pāli canon and Theravāda tradition, see Seyfort Ruegg 2004: 11, n. 15.

181 Note that some earlier scholars, including Sir Charles Eliot and A. Basham, have maintained that the idea of a future buddha (Maitreya) came into being under Zoroastrian influence (Kitagawa 1980: 93–94).

182 The classification of bodhisattva into these three types has been, as far as I am concerned, not made explicit by previous scholars. Nonetheless, it has been in one way or another implied, for example, in Snellgrove 1987a: 58–79 and id. 1957b.


184 Cf., however, Nakamura 1980: 152, where it is stated: “In early Buddhism there was only one Bodhisattva (singular) who was regarded as the Śākyamuni in his previous existences. The Bodhisattva idea was fused later into Jātaka stories.” See also Vetter 2001: 69.


188 For a general outline of such a development, see Snellgrove 1987a: 59–61.
clearly not, either historically or doctrinally. Nevertheless, it may be presumed that the idea was later retrospectively imposed upon all three types of bodhisattvas, thereby creating a uniform concept according to which, doctrinally, bodhicitta serves as the universal mark of a bodhisattva.  

It is noteworthy that celestial bodhisattvas are identified with proper names, whereas earthly bodhisattvas are commonly anonymous. We may consider, for example, the Vimalakirti of the Vimalakirti-nirdeśasūtra, as a named bodhisattva belonging to the category of earthly bodhisattvas, but we do not know whether such a person ever existed. Such a model was perhaps felt necessary in order to forestall the social problems that might ensue as a result of individuals claiming themselves to be bodhisattvas. To be sure, a person with altruistic traits might be designated as a bodhisattva by others, but to my knowledge, rarely would a person advertise himself or herself as one. Doing so would be blatant self-praise in contradiction of the very norms of a bodhisattva. Yet have not historical persons made that claim for themselves? Śāntideva states:

Today my birth is fruitful.
My human life is justified.
Today I am born into the family of the Buddha.
Now I am the Buddha’s son.

From both the tone and context of the verse, however, it is clear that Śāntideva is here celebrating the arising of bodhicitta in himself with joy and extreme humbleness. He compares himself to a blind man who happens to stumble upon a precious jewel in a heap of rubbish. In stating that he is fortunate to be born into the buddha-family, he manages to assign more weight to the buddhas than to his being a bodhisattva. This may thus be seen as an attempt to avoid or lessen such intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa) as arrogance. The first two kinds of bodhisattvas are meant to serve as models for the third kind. For example, Mañjuśrī—who is seen as a paragon of insight and the father of all buddhas, and who is invoked with songs of praise, mantras, mudrās, and samādhī—is ultimately explained (particularly in the tantric context) as nothing less than bodhicitta itself.

(ii) Human and Non-human Bodhisattvas

It has been stated above that Buddhism may be designated as a sentient-centric religion and that sentient-centrism is conspicuous in Mahāyāna Buddhism. It is hence not surprising to find the presence of non-human bodhisattvas in Mahāyāna literature. There are several Mahāyāna scriptures where non-humans are portrayed as generating bodhicitta or conceived as highly developed bodhisattvas. This is in keeping with the notion that it is the attitude (i.e. bodhicitta) that makes one a bodhisattva and not one’s temporary physical frame. We shall see, however, when discussing the two bodhicittotpāda traditions, that the more conservative-practical Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition rejects non-human candidacy for bodhicittotpāda, whereas the more liberal-idealistic Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition admits such

189 See also Ray 1994: 261.
190 Schmithausen has remarked on the bodhisattva ideal and the tension caused in society by it; see BStEH 2000: 388–390.
191 Bodhicaryāvatāra 3.25:
  adya me saphalam janma sulabdho mānuṣo bhavah
  adya buddhakule jāto buddhapatro ‘smi sāmpratam [= ‘stum] ||.
  The English translation is according to Crosby & Skilton 1995: 22.
192 For example, see the Rāṣtrapālaparipṛcchāsūtra (p. 59.17–19): asmin khalu punar dharmaparyāye bhāsyaṁśe trīṃśatām niyutānām sādevamānusāsārūyāya ca prajāyā anutpadantapūrvāy anuttarasyāṃ sanyāsāṃ bodhau cittāny utpannāni |.
candidates. Interestingly, the idea that a bodhisattva can be non-human can be traced back to non-Mahāyāna sources. The Buddha, while still a bodhisattva, is said to have assumed various forms of life, including those of different animals, as illustrated in the Jātaka stories. Thus even the historical bodhisattva is not always conceived as a human being. It is, however, maintained that in his last incarnation, in which he attains Buddhahood, he is inevitably a male human being.

(iii) Male and Female Bodhisattvas

It is beyond the scope of this study to delve into gender issues in Buddhism, but because the question as to whether a woman can be a bodhisattva or not is indeed pertinent to the study of the bodhisattva—and thus also of the bodhicitta—concept, a brief treatment of the issue seems called for. There is, however, no single position on (or interpretation of) the matter that is binding for all Buddhist traditions. In general, it has been claimed that a female cannot attain the following statues: (1) a universal king (cakravartin), (2) Śakra, (3) Brahmā, (4) the four guardian gods, (5) Mára, the evil one, (6) a solitary awakened one (pratyekabuddha), (7) a bodhisattva who is irreversible (avinivartaniya), and (8) a perfectly awakened one (samyakṣaṁbuddha). Of the eight, the Kāranaprajñapti, a non-Mahāyāna text, indicates that it requires extraordinary will (chanda: ’dun pa), strength (bala: stobs), and faculties (indriya: dbang po) to attain the status of a universal king, Indra, Brahmā, Mára, a pratyekabuddha, and a buddha, and because only a male is endowed with these qualities, only a male can attain these statuses.193 In the Saddharmapundarikasūtra, a Mahāyāna text, Śāriputra tells the daughter of Śāgara, the Nāga king, that there are five stations a female cannot occupy, namely, those of Brahmā, Indra, the four guardian gods, a cakravartin, and an irreversible bodhisattva. The Nāga princess nonetheless becomes a buddha by transforming herself into a male.194 The ability of a woman to attain Arhatship, however, has never been questioned.195

Peter Harvey, who discusses sexual equality in his book on Buddhist ethics, devotes several passages to the issue of whether a woman can be a bodhisattva or not.196 In my view, the question as to whether an earthly bodhisattva can be female is especially pertinent, and thus it is imperative that the concept of historical, celestial, and earthly bodhisattvas be taken into account. For the non-Mahāyāna traditions that do not recognise the three types of bodhisattvas, a bodhisattva (understood in the sense of the historical bodhisattva) can be said to be invariably a male.197 While there is some doubt as to whether the idea of a female historical bodhisattva can be traced in the Mahāyāna sources,198 the existence of female celestial and earthly bodhisattvas seems to be simply taken for granted.199

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193 Kāranaprajñapti (P, fols. 166b8–167a5; D, fol. 139a6–b3; S, vol. 78, pp. 980.18–981.10); Harvey 2000: 371–372.

194 Kajiyama 1982: 56.

195 See, for example, Harvey 2000: 357–361.

196 Harvey 2000: 373–376.

197 Hence the expression ‘... no Bodhisattva can be female’ in Gombrich 1980: 70, refers only to the non-Mahāyāna idea of bodhisatva. In the Jātaka stories of the Pāli canon, there indeed seem to be no female bodhisattvas. See also Harvey 2000: 373.

198 I have not been able to trace a Mahāyāna source where the historical Buddha (as the Bodhisattva) is said to have taken birth as woman. But there is an idea prevalent in Tibet that the historical Buddha had taken five hundred pure births (dag pa’i skye ba lnga brgya) and five hundred impure births (ma dag pa’i skye ba lnga brgya). See, for example, the Nyang ral chos ’byung (p. 62.15–16): ’becom ldan ’das kyi gis dag pa’i skyes rabs
However, the fact that certain sources concede the ability of a female to become a bodhisattva does not automatically imply that such sources concede her ability to become a buddha. For example, Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.7 does not rule out the Bodhisattvahood of female aspirants, but it does explicitly state that they cannot attain bodhi (clearly meant in the sense of the samyakasambodhi of a buddha). This statement of Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.7 and the statement in the Kāranaprajñāapti that a female cannot attain the status of a buddha are perhaps based on the idea that a historical bodhisattva in his last existence, during which he is destined to become a buddha, must be a male human being, and that too a full-fledged monk (bhikṣu: dge slong)—an idea which is probably professed by both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna traditions.

This gender inequality is, of course, subject to scrutiny and interpretation, an example of which can be found in the aforementioned book by Peter Harvey, and in an article by Yuichi Kajiyama.²⁰⁰ It is perhaps up to the modern Buddhists to resort to creative and constructive interpretations, without, however, denying the historical past by failing to acknowledge the fact that some of the sources indeed contain elements of androcentrism that are unacceptable by modern standards.

It is necessary to make a distinction between the ways a woman is perceived in non-Mahāyāna, tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna, and try to determine how and why a woman is perceived in a certain way in the ethico-spiritual context of the prātimokṣa, bodhisattva, and mantra vows. It may be that some of the alleged misogynistic components are not so misogynistic as they first appear to be, or some of the apparently feministic images depicted in a number of tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources so feminist as we would like to have them.

I do not believe that the sexual disparity in the Vinaya has much to do with machismo, misogyny, or misogamy, but may be best understood in its socio-cultural and spiritual contexts. In a culture or society where a woman who chose not to commit herself to a marital relationship could easily be perceived as having chosen immorality or infidelity instead, the difficulty in gaining the respect of a society, without whose support she could not live as a nun, is not at all difficult to comprehend. Perhaps the only viable way for a full-fledged Buddhist nun (bhikṣuṇī: dge slong ma) to win a degree of acceptance, support and respect from the society in which she lived, and thus be able to pursue her salvific quest, was to set a standard of integrity higher than that of her male counterpart, a full-fledged Buddhist monk (bhikṣu: dge slong pha). This seems to have been indeed the strategy of the Buddha, and it serves to explain, too, why a bhikṣuṇī has more vows to keep than a bhikṣu.

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(iv) Ordained and Lay Bodhisattvas

The historical bodhisattva in his last existence, like a pratyekabuddha, is conceived of as a self-ordained monk. Interestingly, a celestial bodhisattva is never regarded as a monk or nun, but as a princely male or female, such as Mañjuśrī or Tārā (although these are mainly thought of as buddhas). One of the reasons perhaps for not portraying a celestial bodhisattva as a monk or nun is that according to the Vinaya tradition a non-human bhikṣu or bhikṣunī is impossible. This, however, does not rule out the possibility of a celestial bodhisattva manifesting as a monk or nun, just as a nāga sometimes does. The fact that an earthly bodhisattva can be either a householder (grhapati) or ordained mendicant (pravrajīta) is confirmed by a number of tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources. One, however, also occasionally comes across references where the distinction between the laity and mendicancy of a bodhisattva is played down. The Aśokadattavāyākaranaśūtra, for instance, states that a bodhisattva should not be viewed in terms of a householder (i.e. living in family surroundings) or ordained mendicant (i.e. homeless), for a bodhisattva is defined not on the basis of livelihood but on that of altruistic inclination (āśaya), discerning insight (prajñā), and gnosis (jñāna). In theory, a bodhisattva could dwell anywhere, in a forest, city, or monastery, or may not have a fixed place of residence at all. However, a bodhisattva who apart from observing his bodhisattva vows also observes full prātimokṣa vows is more esteemed than a lay bodhisattva who observes only bodhisattva vows.

(v) Bodhisattvas with Different Backgrounds

As already stated, according to the Yogācāra school, which considers the plurality of spiritual dispositions (gotra) and vehicles (yāna) as definitive, an individual who possesses the gotra of a śrāvaka would follow the Śrāvakayāna, and one who possesses the gotra of a bodhisattva the Bodhisattvayāna. Even those whose gotra has not yet been fixed or decided may follow one of the vehicles. But according to the Madhyamaka and Tathāgatagarbha traditions, which postulate the singularity of gotra and yāna as definitive, even the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas will have to one day enter the Bodhisattvayāna. It is under this doctrinal presupposition that three kinds of bodhisattvas are theoretically possible: (1) a bodhisattva with a śrāvaka career behind him, (2) a bodhisattva with a pratyekabuddha career behind him, and (3) a bodhisattva who began his career from the very outset as a bodhisattva. In the Tibetan tradition, the first and the second are collectively called ‘bodhisattvas who have a

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201 For example, see the Vairocanābhisambodhiṭhantra (T,fol. 208b2–3; D, fol. 220b1–2): gsang ba pa'i bdag po de la byang chub sens dpa' ni rnam pa gnyis te | gnyis gang zhe na | 'di 'ta ste [Itar D] khyim pa dang | rab tu byung ['byung D] ba'o ||. For an English translation, see HODGE 2003: 341. This is cited also in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 160a1; B, p. 257.5–6). See also NAKAMURA 1980: 151.

202 Aśokadattavāyākaranaśūtra (T, fol. 394a6–7; D, fol. 236a7–b1): btsun pa rab 'byor byang chub sens dpa' sens dpa' chen po la ni khyim pa'am | rab tu byung ba zhes gzung bar mi bya'o || de ci'i phyir zhe na | de dag ni bsam pas phyie ba yin | shes rab khyis phyie ba yin | ye shes khyis phyie ba yin pa'i phyir ro ||. The passage is also cited by sKa-ba dPal-brtsegs in his gSung rab rin po che (P, fol. 153a6–7; D, fol. 248a3–4; S, vol. 115, p. 673.7–10).

203 The Bodhisattvabhūmi, while recognising both ordained and lay bodhisattvas, also clearly recognises the hierarchical difference between the two. See, for example, Bodhisattvabhūmi 2.2 (WOGHARA, pp. 310 10–311.4; DUTT, p. 213.12–24). See also Ratnākaraśānti’s Ratnālokālokākāra (P, fol. 300b6–7; D, fol. 256b5–6; S, vol. 64, p. 718.15–18). In SKILLING 1997: 605–606 attention is drawn to an issue taken up in Bhavya’s Tarkajāvalī and Candrakīrti’s Trisārasaṃpastīti regarding whether a monk abiding by prātimokṣa vows should show his respect to a bodhisattva who is a householder, and to the practical ramifications of the controversy, as exemplified in the biography of Chag Lo-tsā-ba Chos-rje-dpal (1197–1263/64). Cf. the account of King Khrī-srong-lde’u-btsan’s encounter with Sāntarakṣīta and Padmasambhava in the dba’ bzhed (pp. 40–41, 54, n. 152).
lesser path behind them' (dman lam sngon song gi byang chub sms dpa’), and the third a ‘bodhisattva whose spiritual disposition has been certain [from the very beginning]’ (rigs nges kyi byang chub sms dpa’).204

(f) The Śrāvaka-Bodhisattva Distinction

Understanding how the difference between the śrāvaka and bodhisattva is conceived of in Mahāyāna literature will help us to better understand the concept of bodhisattva, and hence also of bodhicitta. In general, it may be stated that in India the Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha tradition played up the difference between a śrāvaka and a bodhisattva, whereas the Prajñāpāramitā tradition played it down. The position of the Madhyamaka tradition is varied and open to debate.

The Vinīścayamangrahaṇī, before discussing at length the śrāvaka-bodhisattva distinction, mentions four kinds of śrāvakas:205 (1) manifested śrāvakas, (2) conceited śrāvakas, (3) śrāvakas who have turned to the supreme awakening, and (4) śrāvakas who are on a single-track journey to cessation. It is clear from the explanations that follow that the first kind is in reality a bodhisattva who has manifested in the form of a śrāvaka; the second kind is one who merely knows the non-existence of a substantial self or person (pudgalavairāmya) and has a misconceived notion of the non-substantiality of phenomena (dharmanairāmya); the third kind is one who has been a śrāvaka before and is now striving for the attainment of the supreme awakening; and the fourth kind is a main-stream śrāvaka.206

The fourth kind is compared with a bodhisattva on the basis of thirteen points:207

Suppose that there are two princes born in similar circumstances and equal in terms of royal luxury. Of the two, one is skilled in the fields of royal administration, science, and art; the other one is not. The two would be distinguished merely on this basis, and the distinction would not be on account of [their] royal luxury. So should the distinction in the undeveloped sphere between a bodhisattva and a śrāvaka who is on a single-track journey to cessation be understood. The distinction between the two should be understood on the basis of the following: [1] inclination

204 These two terms, which require verification, seem to correspond to two other types of bodhisattva (or mahāyānik), namely, one whose spiritual disposition is certain (rigs nges pa) and one whose is not (ma nges pa). See the Tsheg mchod chen mo (s.v. theg chen pa gnyis). That two such kinds of bodhisattvas are presupposed can be deduced from the context of several Tibetan controversies, such as the ones regarding the status of a bodhisattva with a śrāvaka career behind him and whether a third category of Buddhist saint (phags pa phung gsum pa) is possible. See, for example, the Yid bzhin mchod 'gre (vol. 2, p. 541.1–4) and Grub mtha’ mchod (pp. 160.2–161.2).

205 Vinīścayamangrahaṇī (P, vol. ’i, fol. 127b3–5; D, vol. zi, fols. 113b7–114a1; S, vol. 74, p. 1015.5–10): nyan thos ni du | ... nyan thos ni rnam pa bzhis o || ... sprul pa ’i nyan thos dang | mgon pa’i nga rgyal can gyi nyan thos dang | byang chub tu yongs su’ ’gyur pa’i ’[gyur ba’i PN] nyan thos dang | zhi ba’i bgsod pa gcig pa’i nyan thos so ||.


The Vinīścayasaṃgrahanī then goes on to explain the thirteen features distinguishing a śrāvakā from a bodhisattva as follows:208

[1] A śrāvakā is characterised by the inclination to abide alone in [the state of] cessation for [he] is not predisposed to impulses (samskāra) or intellectual-emotional defilements or to the welfare of sentient beings. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, is opposed to it (i.e. cessation), despite [his] attainment of cessation.209 [2] A śrāvakā is endowed with a few wholesome qualities that cause his own happiness to increase. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, is endowed with countless wholesome qualities that cause the happiness of all sentient beings to increase.210 [3] A śrāvakā renders himself free (lit. ineffective or hollow) of [his] intellectual-emotional defilements through [his] insight into the non-conditioned (i.e. nirodha). A bodhisattva, on the other hand, [renders the intellectual-emotional defilements of] all sentient beings of the four directions [ineffective].211 [4] A śrāvakā, despite having arrived (samudāgata) [at his soteriological goal] by focusing his attention on the supreme qualities of complete release (vimukti), is not the son of the Buddha. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, despite having arrived [at his soteriological goal] by focusing his attention on impulses (samskāra), sentient beings, and negative phenomena, is the son of the Buddha.212 [5] A śrāvakā may have exerted himself, be skilled in the [four noble] truths (satya), and [be able to] properly place the mind in meditative equipoise, but lacking the characteristics of a buddha’s spiritual disposition (or lineage), he is, unlike a bodhisattva, not embraced (parighrita) by the buddhas. With a bodhisattva, however, the case is just the opposite.213 [6] A śrāvakā, despite [having acquired] matured faculties, is afterwards incapable of carrying out the activities of a buddha, since [he] has come to the ultimate end [of his career].

A bodhisattva, on the other hand, is capable [of doing so] the very instant he generates his initial resolve.214 [7] A śrāvakā, despite having come to the ultimate end [of his career], is not worthy of the tributes and praise of gods or humans, [not even] like a beginner bodhisattva who has [just] attained upon [his] practical undertaking. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, is [worthy of] such tributes and praise.215 [8] A bodhisattva, despite not having come to the ultimate end [of

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208 Vinīścayasaṃgrahanī (P, vol. ‘i, fols. 128a8–129b2; D, vol. ‘i, fols. 114b3–115b2; S, vol. 74, pp. 1016.20–1019.3). The Tibetan text has been numbered and inserted as separate footnotes after the corresponding translations.

209 [1] nyān thos ni ‘du byed dang nyon mongs pa dang | sems can gyi don la mi phyogs pa’i phyir gcig tu zhi bar gnas pa’i bsam pa can yin gyi | byang chub sems dpa’i zhi ba thob kyang de las bzlog pa yin no ||.

210 [2] nyān thos ni bdag nyid kyi bde ba yang dag par ’phel bar byed pa dkar po’i chos chung ngu dag dang ldan pa yin gyi | byang chub sems dpa’i sems can thams kad kyi bde ba yang dag par ’phel bar byed pa dkar po’i chos tshad med pa dang ldan pa yin no ||.

211 [3] nyān thos ni ‘dies ma byas kyi shes pas bdag nyid nyon mongs pa rnams kyi gsog dang gsob tu byed par zad kyi | byang chub sems dpa’i phyogs bzh’i sems can thams cad do ||.

212 [4] nyān thos ni rnam par grdu’i chos mchog la dmigs pa’i yid la byed pa las yang dag par grub kyang sangs rgyas kyi sras su mi ‘gyur gyi | byang chub sems dpa’i ’du byed dang | sems can dang | chos nang pa la dmigs pa’i yid la byed pa las yang dag par grub kyang sangs rgyas kyi sras su gyur pa yin no ||.

213 [5] nyān thos ni btrson ‘grus brtsems shing bden pa la mkhas pa dang | sems legs par mnyam par gzhag kyang sangs rgyas kyi rigs kyi mchud nyid dang mi ldan pa’i phyir byang chub sems dpa’i’itar sangs rgyas rnams kyi yongs su mi gzung gi | byang chub sems dpa’i de las bzlog pa yin no ||.

214 [6] nyān thos ni mthar thug par gyur pa yin pa’i phyir dbang po yongs su smin pa yin yang phyis sangs rgyas kyi madzad pa byed mi nus pa yin gyi | byang chub sems dpa’i skad cig de la dang po sems bskyed pas kyang nus so ||.
his career], is [able to] overwhelm all śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas by [his] splendour (prabhāva) and knowledge.216 [9] A śrāvaka, despite having obtained the medicine of insight to heal the disease of intellectual-emotional defilements, does not heal the disease of intellectual-emotional defilements of sentient beings. The case of a bodhisattva, however, is just the opposite, for [he] is one who engages in benefitting other [sentient beings].217 [10] A śrāvaka, despite having come to the ultimate end [of his career], is not like a bodhisattva, who has not [yet] exhausted [all] intellectual-emotional defilements [and yet] is worthy of the offerings of the world [of sentient beings], including gods, because [he] provides the light of insight to sentient beings. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, is [worthy of such offerings].218 [11] The tathāgatas greatly transcend śrāvakas at all times. Bodhisattvas transcend them both even more, since the latter originate among them (i.e. bodhisattvas). It should be known that [bodhisattvas] greatly transcend [tathāgatas and śrāvakas] for two reasons, namely: [i] they cause sentient beings to mature completely and [ii] cause the qualities of a buddha to mature completely. For these [two reasons], a result, awakening, is attained. They [also] make [other] sentient beings attain release according to the manner in which they have caused them (i.e. sentient beings) to mature. For example, a sense of amazement (or admiration) arises towards one who arranges and prepares [delicacies], not towards one who eats. It should be known that this case is similar.219 [12] A śrāvaka, despite having correctly taken on and supported the cause of the absolutely pure dharma (i.e., perhaps, nirvāṇa) and having been taken care of by many [spiritually] favourable companions, will not accomplish the result, namely, great awakening. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, will accomplish [it] even under the opposite [conditions].220 [13] Śrāvakas arise on account of bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas do not arise on account of śrāvakas.221

(g) The Concept of Vajrasattva

The idea of vajrasattva is particularly relevant to the concept of ontological bodhicitta, as we shall see in chapter seven. Although vajrasattva is commonly depicted and understood as a tantric deity, it is the adamantine true nature of all sattvas (including bodhisattvas), of all

215 [7] nyan thos ni mthar thug par gyur kyang ji ltar byang chub sems dpa’ las dang po pa’i sbyor ba la zhugs pa de ltar lha dang mi rnam kyis mched par bya ba dang bstod par bya ba’i ’os ma yin gyi | byang chub sems dpa’ ni yin no ||.

216 [8] byang chub sems dpa’ ni mthar thug par gyur pa ma yin yang mthu dang shes pa dag gis nyan thos dang rang sngas rgyas thams cad zil gyis gnon pa yin no ||.

217 [9] nyan thos ni nyon mongs pa’i nad zhī bar byed pa ye shes kyi sman yongs su grub pa yin yang sams can rnam kyi nyon mongs pa’i nad zhī bar byed pa ma yin gyi | byang chub sems dpa’ ni zhan gyi don la zhugs pa’i phyir de las bzlog pa yin no ||.

218 [10] nyan thos ni mthar thug par gyur pa yin yang ji ltar byang chub sems dpa’ [dpa’i DC] nyon mongs pa ma [om. DC] zad pa sams can rnam la ye shes kyi sman ba byed pa’i phyir lha dang bcas pa’i jrig rten gyi sbyin gnas kyi ’os nyid du gyur pa de lta bu ma yin gyi | byang chub sems dpa’ ni yin no ||.

219 [11] de bzhin gskyegs pa rnam ni dus rtog tu nyan thos pas ches khyad par du ’phags pa yin la | de dag bas kyang chub sems dpa’ rnam s ches shin tu khyad par du ’phags pa yin te | de dag las de dag dang dag par ’grub pa’i phyir ro | de dag ni rgyu gnyis kyis [om. DC] na ches shin tu khyad par du ’phags pa yin rig par rig pa bya ste | ’di ltar de dag gis cans can yongs su smin par byas pa dang | sangs rgyas kyi chos yongs su smin par byas pa’i phyir te | de las byang chub kyi ’bras bu bnyes pa dang | ji ltar [add. na DC] yongs su smin par byas pa’i sams can rnam rnam par gol bar rdzad de | ’di lta ste dper na sgrub pa po dang gyos mkhan la ngo mtskar gyi blo ’byang ba ltar | za ba po la de lta ma yin pa de bzhin du ’di la yang rig par bya’o ||.

220 [12] nyan thos ni gcig tu rnam par dag pa’i chos kyi rgyu yang dag par bhangs te gnas shing dge ba’i bshes gnyen du mas yongs su gzang yang | byang chub chen po’i ’bras bu mgon par ’grub par mi ’gyur gyi | byang chub sems dpa’ ni de las bzlog pas kyang ’grub par byed do ||.

cittas (as understood bodhicitta, as understood in its conventional sense), and, in fact, of all phenomena. In other words, vajrasattva is conceived of as a new and deeper metaphysical dimension of satvas, bodhisattvas, and bodhicitta, as something which transcends all manifold divisions, and yet is the indivisible and universal foundation of all manifold existence. In the world of Vajrayāna, all conceivable phenomena are expressed and viewed in terms of their adamantine vajra-like nature, and vajrasattva forms the common substratum and common nucleus of everything. There are various principal deities in Vajrayāna Buddhism, but all of them are expressed either implicitly or explicitly as vajrasattva. Perhaps one could call vajrasattva the ‘grandfather’ of all principal deities in Vajrayāna. The one and the same vajrasattva is given different names and appearances in different tantric systems.222

The Bodhicittabhaṁavānānirdeśa attributed to Mañjuśrimitra explains the term vajrasattva in the following manner.223

(łt) is not destroyed by anything in any place or time, and if one realises it, the nets of obscuration are cut away. Hence [łt] is called ‘diamond’ (vajra), while the non-erroneous cognition of the reality (dharmatā) of the mind (citta) is called vajrasattva. [łt] is also called bodhicitta. On account of the non-cognition of the characteristics (laksana) of the mind, [things] appear wholly as defiled phenomena, but then when one realises the unmistakable diamond-like (vajra) nature of the mind, [they] appear as a cluster of the excellent results of liberation (vimukti).224

Rong-zom-pa provides a very comprehensive and systematic explanation of vajrasattva—something rather rare. Given the difficulty in identifying his sources, a translation of the entire passage will, however, not be attempted here. I shall merely summarise his presentation. He basically seems to classify vajrasattva into two parts, namely, the signified and the signifier (without, however, employing these terms). The expressions he uses are the ‘intrinsic nature of reality’ (don rang gi ngo bo) and ‘its appearance [in the form] of symbolic signs’ (de ’i rtags kyi phyag rgyar snang ba). The signified vajrasattva is nothing but bodhicitta, designated by him as bodhicitta par excellence (samantabhadram bodhicittam), an expression also found in Indian sources.226 The signifier vajrasattva is the representation of bodhicitta par excellence in forms of deities, explained by him according to Mahāyoga, Yogatantra, Kriyātantra, and non-tantric Mahāyāna. What is interesting is that the bodhisattva Vajrapāni is considered the signifier vajrasattva according to the non-tantric Mahāyāna. In the tantric context, one also encounters terms such as samayasaṭṭha, samādhisaṭṭha, and jñānaṣṭha,227 and it remains to be seen if these are in one way or another related to the idea of vajrasattva.

222 See, for example, Yogaratnāmāla (p. 105.7–8): vajrasattva iey evam kathito dharmakāyo |; Guṇavatī (pp. 27.19–28.5): vajrasattvāh śriherukāh, tena somaḥ saddrāḥ |; Ratnāvalīpiṇākā (p. 44.17): vajrasattva eva krṣṇa iti krṣṇā....

223 Bodhicittabhaṁavānānirdeśa (P, fol. 57b2–5; D, fol. 46b4–6; S, vol. 33, p. 185.13–19): dus dang gnas kun tu cis kyang mi [ma PN] shigs ‘a | de rtogs na sgrib pa ’i dra ba good pas rdo rje ste | sens kyi chos nyid ma nor bar rig pa la rdo rje sens dpa’ zhes kyang bya | byang chub kyi sens zhes zhes kyang bya ba ste | sens kyi mthsan nyid ma rig pa’i bla thabs kyi [kiyis PN] sgo nas | kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos thams cad du snang la | sens kyi rang tshin ma nor bc’i rdo rje la sens pa [dpa’ PN] de’i tshe | ‘rnam par gro la ’i ’bras bu phun sum tshogs pa ‘rnams su yang snang....

224 See also Hevajratantra 1.1.4:

| abhedaṃ vajram iey iktaṃ sattvaṃ trihavasyaikaīd | anayā prajñhayā yuktyā vajrasattva iti smṛtaḥ ||

225 dKon mchod ‘grel (A, folcs. 24b6–26b4; B, pp. 52.14–54.11).

226 Cāryāmālāpakapradīpa (p. 43.1): ... samantabhadram bodhicittan.... See also the Samayasamgraha (P, fol. 258b3–4; D, fol. 48a6; S, vol. 41, pp. 700.19–701.1).

227 For a long note on these terms, see ENGLISH 2002: 470–472, nn. 411–413.
One cannot help but wonder if these three terms correspond to śīla, samādhi, and prajñā, respectively.

4. The Term Bodhicitta and Its Definition

Terminologies and ideas often go hand in hand, and hence an attempt will be made in the following passages to understand the development of the concept of bodhicitta on the basis of its terminological development. Two early Mahāyāna sūtras (the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and Drumekinnarājaparipṛcchāsūtra) and one early Mahāyāna sāstra (the Bodhisattvabhūmi) will be considered here. I shall argue that the concept of bodhicitta in the Bodhisattvabhūmi is more archaic and conservative than the one found in the two early Mahāyāna sūtras.

(a) The Term Bodhicitta in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā

The Aṣṭasāhasrikā and its metrically corresponding Ratnagunasamcaya are generally regarded as the oldest extant Mahāyāna scriptures. The relative chronology of the two has, however, not yet been fixed. In any case, the Ratnagunasamcaya is the only known Prajñāpāramitā text composed in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, and according to some scholars its first two chapters, which represent the initial phase of Prajñāpāramitā thought, may well go back to 100 BCE. The first chapter of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, in which the term bodhicitta appears, may be the oldest part of the text and thus significant for the study of the development of the bodhicitta concept. However, as Schmithausen has demonstrated, the textual history of the first chapter of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā is full of incoherencies and other complex problems. What is more, the term bodhicitta lies at the very centre of these textual problems.

The decisive question is whether the term bodhicitta featured at all there ab initio or was a later interpolation. Which of the two readings—*bodhisattvacitta (in Chinese translations) and bodhicitta (in the Sanskrit text)—is authentic? According to Schmithausen, neither of the two is without its problems. It is conceivable that either the original but incoherent reading tenāpi bodhicittena was replaced by the smoother reading tenāpi bodhisattvacittena; or that the original but non-terminological *bodhisattvacitta was replaced by the later terminological bodhicitta. If tenāpi bodhicittena is the authentic reading, then the first chapter of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā can be regarded as one of the earliest Mahāyāna sources (if not the earliest) that documents the term bodhicitta.

The Aṣṭasāhasrikā—assumed to be the earliest Mahāyāna scripture to mention the term bodhicitta—seems to represent a stage of development where the process of de-emotionalisation of bodhicitta was seen to be necessary. The Aṣṭasāhasrikā professes that a bodhisattva should practice the prañāpāramitā in such a way that he or she, by relying on bodhicitta, does not fall into a misconceived haughtiness. The reason given is that citta in reality is not citta at all, its true nature being luminously pure.


229 Nakamura 1980: 162.

230 See, for instance, the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (p. 10.5); Tibetan translation (T, fol. 15a3–5; D, fol. 11a4).

231 SCHMITHAUSEN 1977b: 47ff.

232 The term bodhicitta occurs also in the Ratnagunasamcaya but, as already stated, its chronological relation to the Aṣṭasāhasrikā has not yet been determined.

(b) The Term Bodhicitta in the Drumakinnararājāpariprcchāsūtra

Although no Sanskrit text of the Drumakinnararājāpariprcchāsūtra is extant, on the basis of the Chinese and Tibetan translations it can confidently be asserted that the sūtra must have explicitly mentioned the term bodhicitta. The sūtra belongs to a small group of Mahāyāna scriptures translated into Chinese in the second half of the second century CE (i.e. 170–196 CE) by the Indo-Scythian Lokakṣema. Lokakṣema’s translation of the sūtra is therefore one of the earliest datable literary sources for the study of Mahāyāna. The second Chinese translation is by Kumārajiva from the early fifth century. The sūtra was translated into Tibetan roughly six centuries after Lokakṣema’s Chinese translation. A comparison of the three versions made by Paul Harrison has yielded the following results: the two Chinese versions are very close, and they do not vary substantially from the Tibetan.234

The first occurrence of the term bodhicitta in the Drumakinnarājāpariprcchāsūtra is at the very beginning of the sūtra, where numerous attributes of the bodhisattvas gathered there to listen to the pertinent teaching are listed:235

... [those who] themselves do not abandon bodhicitta, [those who] cause other sentient beings to assume bodhicitta....

The position of these two attributes associated with bodhicitta in the list is noteworthy, given that the list is not arranged randomly but obviously follows a certain (if not strict) sequential pattern. The two attributes are preceded by āśaya, adhyāśaya, and prayoga, and followed by the pāramitās. My impression is that already at this stage bodhicitta roughly corresponds to both āśaya and adhyāśaya, and prayoga to the pāramitās. The fact that one or more near synonyms of certain elements are given by way of explanation can be noticed elsewhere in the list.

The second occurrence of the term bodhicitta is in the context of ethical-moral discipline (śīla). One of the several questions the bodhisattva *Divyamukṣa (Lha’i-cod-pan) asks after paying homage to the Buddha is:236

How are bodhisattvas adorned with the ornament of impeccable ethical-moral discipline (śīla)?

The Buddha answers:237

O Son of a noble family (kulaputra), bodhisattvas are adorned with the ornament of impeccable ethical-moral discipline (śīla) if [they are] endowed with four attributes. What are the four? [1] Being endowed with the ornament of bodhicitta [even] while being a universal king (cakravartin), [2] being endowed with the ornament of bodhicitta [even] while being Indra, the king of gods, [3] being endowed with the ornament of bodhicitta [even] while being Brahma, the lord of the world (sahāpati), [4] being endowed with the ornament of bodhicitta [even] while taking birth as gods or human beings once they have terminated all lower destinations. O Son of

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235 Drumakinnararājāpariprcchāsūtra (p. 4.6–8): bdag nyid byang chub kyi sanss mi ‘dor ba | sanss can gzhan byang chub kyi sanss yang dag par ‘dzin du ‘jug pa |.

236 Drumakinnararājāpariprcchāsūtra (p. 19.11–12): ji ltar na byang chub sanss dpa’ tshul khrims kyi rgyan gyis brygan pa rnamz lags |.

237 Drumakinnararājāpariprcchāsūtra (pp. 27.12–28.8): rigs kyi bu byang chub sanss dpa’ chos bzhis dang ldan na | tshul khrims kyi rgyan gyis brygan pa rnamz yin te | bzhis gang zhe na | ’khor lo sgyur ba’i rgyal por ’gyur zhiṅ | byang chub kyi sanss kyi brygan pa dang | lha’i dbang po brya byin du ’gyur zhiṅ | byang chub kyi sanss kyi brygan pa dang | mi mjet kyi bdeag po tshangs par ’gyur zhiṅ | byang chub kyi sanss kyi brygan pa dang | ngan ’gro thams cad yang dag par bcad nas lha dang mir skye ba yongs su bsng bar gyur [= ’gyur] cing | byang chub kyi sanss kyi brygan pa yin te | rigs kyi bu byang chub sanss dpa’ chos bzhis po ’di dag dang ldan na | tshul khrims kyi rgyan gyis brygan pa rnamz su rig par bya’o ||.
a noble family, know that bodhisattvas endowed with these four attributes are adorned with the ornament of impeccable ethical-moral discipline. It should be noted that the term bodhicitta is obviously not understood here as the initial generation of the resolve to strive for awakening, but rather as its maintenance.

The third occurrence of the term bodhicitta is the Buddha’s answer to the following question:  

In what way are bodhisattvas those who never fail to see the tathāgatas?

The Buddha answers:

O Son of a noble family (kulaputra), bodhisattvas are those who never fail to see the tathāgatas if [they are] endowed with four attributes (i.e. if they fulfil four criteria). What are the four? They are the following: [1] causing sentient beings to take on themselves [the meditative practice of] encountering buddhas, [2] causing sentient beings to take on themselves [the practice of] listening to the teachings, [3] causing sentient beings to assume bodhicitta, and [4] not parting from the meditative absorption (samādhi) of recollecting or visualising buddhas (buddhānusmṛti). O Son of a noble family, those bodhisattvas endowed with these four attributes never fail to see the tathāgatas.

Associating bodhicitta with the practice of buddhānusmṛti is from a historical perspective significant, for we have seen in chapter three that one of the measures taken by Buddhists to meet their psychological need to compensate for the absence of the historical Buddha was the practice of buddhānusmṛti, and that the conception of bodhicitta, too, could have been triggered by a similar motive, namely, to propagate the lineage of the Three Jewels so as to guarantee their continual felt presence in the world.

The questions and answers conclude with two more references to bodhicitta, one while presenting the idea that those sentient beings who do not part from bodhicitta are under no circumstances endowed with inferior basic wholesome virtues (kuśalamāṇḍa), and the other while stating that after the teaching bodhicitta arose in 84,000 gods and human beings.

The chapter that follows begins with a piece of ‘propaganda,’ in which the Buddha tells the bodhisatta *Divyamukuta that those who uphold and teach such a sūtra are endowed with eight qualities. Although the term bodhicitta is not explicitly mentioned, near synonyms of it, such as āsaya, are listed among the attributes. The next occasion bodhicitta occurs is in a somewhat polemical context. The spectacular arrival of the powerful bodhisattva Drumakinnarājā with thousands in his retinue and the demonstration of their magnificence, miracles, and music unsettle the śrāvakas, causing them to shake and quiver like small children. The bodhisatta *Divyamukuta asks Mahākāśyapa the cause of their nervousness.

238 Drumakinnarājāparipṛcchāsūtra (p. 21.8–9): ji lta ra byang chub sams dpa’ de bzhin gshogs pa rnams mthong ba dang mi ’bral ba rnams lags |.

239 Drumakinnarājāparipṛcchāsūtra (pp. 40.9–41.1): rigs kyi bu byang chub sams dpa’ chos bzhin dang Idan na | de bzhin gshogs pa mthong ba dang mi ’bral ba rnams yin te | bzhin gan ghe na | di lta ste | sms can rnams sangs rgyas la lta ba yang dag par ’dzin du ’jug pa dang | sms can rnams chos nyan pa yang dag par ’dzin du ’jug pa dang | sms can rnams byang chub kyi sms yang dag par ’dzin du ’jug pa dang | sms can rnams byang chub kyi sms yang dag par ’dzin du ’jug pa dang | sms can rnams yin no |.

240 Drumakinnarājāparipṛcchāsūtra (p. 45.7–8): byang chub kyi sms dang mi ’bral ba’i sms can de dag ni dge ba’i rtsa ba ngan ngon dang Idan pa ma lags te |.

241 Drumakinnarājāparipṛcchāsūtra (p. 46.5–6): lha dang mi’i srog chags brgyad khri bzhhi stong ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu sms skyes so |.

242 Interestingly, the sūtra is not referred to here as the Drumakinnarājāparipṛcchāsūtra (or any similar name) but as the *Tathāgataparinirvānasūtra (Drumakinnarājāparipṛcchāsūtra, p. 47.8–9).

243 Drumakinnarājāparipṛcchāsūtra (pp. 47.8–48.12).
Kāśyapa explains that the aspirations (pranidhāna), beneficial resources (puṇya), and meditative insight (jñāna) of the bodhisattva King Drumakinnarāja far surpass those of the śrāvakas. In response the bodhisattva *Divyamukuta tells Mahākāśyapa: 244

O Venerable Mahākāśyapa, the music of the viṇā cannot move or sway the irreversible bodhisattvas, on account of their glory (śrī), splendour (ojas/tejas), and power (bala). Therefore, O Venerable Mahākāśyapa, who would not [then] generate the resolve for the sake of the highest perfect awakening (samyaksambodhi)! Why [should one do] so? Just consider that this music from a viṇā [is able to] overshadow the power and splendour of those endowed with limited insight [but] is not able to overshadow the power and splendour of those who have set out on the path of Mahāyāna.

It is interesting to note that the power and splendour of a bodhisattva are obviously portrayed here as incentives (if not as primary motives) for the generation of bodhicitta. 245 It is clear from the context that it is the pranidhāna, puṇya, and jñāna of a bodhisattva that lend him his power and splendour, and not vice versa.

Further on in the sūtra, Drumakinnarāja requests the Buddha to give teachings on the samādhi of the bodhisattvas called the ‘Jewel Mine’ (ratnākara). The Buddha proceeds to talk about eighty jewels of cittaotpāda (*cittaotpādaratna), beginning thus: 246

O Drumakinnarāja, a bodhisattva observes these eighty cittaotpāda jewels in order not to allow a break in the continuity of the Buddha Jewel, the continuity of the Dharma Jewel, and the continuity of the Samgha Jewel. What are the eighty? They are: [1] not forgetting the jewel thought of omniscience, [2] not abandoning the jewel thought of altruistic inclination (āsaya), ... [58] the jewel thought of remembering ethical-moral discipline (śīlānasmrti) in order not to deviate from bodhicitta....

All eighty jewels of cittaotpāda are seen to be measures that the bodhisattvas take to guarantee the continuity of the Three Jewels (triratna). The eighty ‘jewel thoughts’ include major Buddhist topoi found elsewhere in the Mahāyāna literature. (The eighty ‘inexhaustible’ in the Akṣayatīrīnirdeśasūtra may be related to them.) It may be noted that our list apparently begins with the idea of bodhicitta, although the term is not explicitly used there, but first occurs in the fifty-eighth item—again, in the context of remembering ethical-moral discipline (śīlānasmrti). The term bodhicitta also occurs several times in the later part of the sūtra, but these instances will not be discussed here. 247

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244 Drumakinnarāja pariprcchāsūtra (pp. 59.9–60.4): btsun pa ’od srungs chen po phyin mi ldog pa’i byang chub sms dpa’ rnam kyi dpal dang | gzi brjod dang | stobs la gang gi phyin pi wang gi sgra des bsgul ba’am | bskyod par mi nus pas | btsun pa ’od srungs chen po su zhi gla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu sms mi skyed | de c’i phyin zhe na | gang nya tse ba’i ve shes dang ldan pa rnam kyi stobs dang | gzi brjod de ni pi wang gi sgra’ dis zil gyis nton to | gang phyin pa chen po la yang dag par zhus pa rnam kyi stobs dang | gzi brjod de la ni zil gyis gnow par mi nus pa la ltos |.

245 Various motives for becoming a buddha seem to be implied.

246 Drumakinnarāja pariprcchāsūtra (pp. 77.7–82.12): mi ’am c’i bdag po ‘di la byang chub sms dpa’ ni sangs rgyas dkon mchog rgyun mi ‘chad pa dang | chos dkon mchog rgyun mi ‘chad pa dang | dge ’dun dkon mchog rgyun mi ‘chad par bya ba’i phyin | sms bskyed pa rin po che brcya’ cu po ‘di dag la ‘jug go | brcya’ cu gang zhe na | ‘di lla ste | de thams cad mkhyen pa’i sms rin po che mi brjed pa dang | lhag pa’i bsam pa’i sms rin po che mi gton gc’ang ba dang | ... byang chub kyi sms las mi g.yo ba’i phyin | shul khrims rjes su dran pa’i sms rin po che dang |.

247 In addition to the passages already discussed, the term bodhicitta (byang chub kyi sms) is found in the Drumakinnarāja pariprcchāsūtra (pp. 96.10, 120.9–10, 134.11, 147.12, 152.7–10, 153.2–5, 161.13–16, 190.5–6, 259.8–10, and 284.4). Likewise the expression byang chub tu sms bskyed can be found in ibid. (pp. 150.7–8, 173.5–7, 185.11–12, 205.1, 225.2–9, 247.11–14, 251.6, 256.11–12, 274.7, and 276.1–6).
(c) The Term Bodhicitta in the Bodhisattvabhūmi

The Bodhisattvabhūmi belongs to the earliest strata of the Yogācārabhūmi. It must have already been in existence in the early third century CE. There are reasons to believe that, within the Bodhisattvabhūmi itself, the first part (yogasthāna), containing the chapter on cittotpāda, may well be the oldest. 248 However, since we do not know how long it took to compile the entire Yogācārabhūmi, we do not know to what extent the oldest material of the Bodhisattvabhūmi goes back to before the third century.

The term bodhicitta does not seem to be attested in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. All three instances in which the term bodhicitta occurs certainly do not represent the original reading. 249 The absence (or the rarity) of the technical term bodhicitta in the Bodhisattvabhūmi suggests that, at this stage, it had not yet been fixed or established. We cannot, however, assume that the compiler (or compilers) did not know or was not concerned with the theory of bodhicitta. In fact, one whole chapter is devoted to the idea of cittotpāda, the generation of bodhicitta. It seems that the idea of bodhicitta in its rudimentary stages merely entailed a verbal (or conceptual) formulation of the aspirational wish (pranidhāna) to become a buddha, but that formulations such as cittam utpādyate bodhāya and bodhāya cittaṃ pranidadhā 250 in particular contributed to the eventual crystallisation of the compound bodhicitta.

(d) The Relative Chronology of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and the Bodhisattvabhūmi

Virtually nobody contests the chronological anteriority of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā to the Bodhisattvabhūmi. However, in view of the history of the bodhicitta concept, this chronology can be called into question. If we assume that the term bodhicitta indeed stood ab initio in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā, we shall have to conclude that the concept of bodhicitta was already fixed terminologically in the milieu in which that work was compiled (or composed), whereas it had just begun to form in the milieu in which the Bodhisattvabhūmi was compiled.

What conclusion if any can one draw from this? One possibility would be to challenge the hitherto assumed relative chronology of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and the Bodhisattvabhūmi and propose that the former is in fact not older than the latter. Such a proposition, however, would cause insurmountable problems and needs to be ruled out. The other possibility is to assume that although the Aṣṭasāhasrikā is indeed older than the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the parts of the text containing the term bodhicitta are a later interpolation. This is conceivable, but how could one then explain the fact that other Mahāyāna sūtras that are older than the Bodhisattvabhūmi also contain relatively developed ideas of bodhicitta. The third and perhaps best solution may be to assume that although the redaction of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā took place earlier than that of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the Bodhisattvabhūmi contains elements or strata that are even more archaic than those of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā. At least this seems to be the case in the context of the development of the bodhicitta concept.

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249 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.7 (NAKAMURA 2004: 28): yasminn eva divase pakṣe māse saṃvasese ekena' bodhau cittaṃ pranihitam | tasminn eva divase pakṣe māse saṃvasese sarvaih |. 4 Note that the readings of several manuscripts (recorded by NAKAMURA 2004: 28) tell against the reading bodhicitta in WOGIHARA, p. 92.12–15. This is also the case in Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§1.2.1 and §4.6.0), where the reading bodhicitta in some versions of the text is opposed by other readings.
250 See below, n. 255 and BHSI, s.vv. pranidadhāti and pranidhēti. See also, for instance, the Aṣṭasāhasrikā (p. 52.3): ... prasannacitto bodhāya cittaṃ utpādyā ... The Tibetan translation reads (T, fol. 77a6; D, fol. 57b1): ... sems dang bas byang chub tu sems bskyed nas |.
(e) The Terms Cittotpāda, Bodhicitta, and Bodhicittotpāda

We have seen in the chapter on previous studies of bodhicitta that Gareth Sparham attempted to differentiate cittotpāda, bodhicitta, and bodhicittotpāda in terms of their origin and meanings. According to him, the origin of the term cittotpāda is what he calls the Origin-Passage of the Astasāhasrikā. He does not specify the origin of the term bodhicitta, but merely states that the opening verses of the Ratnagunasamcaya ‘refer explicitly to bodhicitta,’ without, that is, asserting that these verses or the passage in the Astasāhasrikā containing the term bodhicitta coined it. For Sparham, bodhicittotpāda is the outcome of a later systematisation of the early notions of cittotpāda and bodhicitta, with the original cittotpāda being designated as conventional bodhicittotpāda and the original bodhicitta as absolute bodhicittotpāda. Later, however, bodhicittotpāda came to be used (in a historically inappropriate way) as an abridged form of bodhicittotpāda. Sparham’s attempted explanation, if not quite convincing, is certainly food for thought.

In the following few paragraphs I intend to assess Sparham’s discussion of these terms and point out where I agree or disagree. Firstly, I find it necessary to distinguish between the idea as such and the corresponding technical term for it (cittotpāda, bodhicitta, and bodhicittotpāda), which Sparham does not seem to do. For example, although the term cittotpāda (i.e. a noun) does not occur in what he calls the Origin-Passage, he treats it as if it does. In general, it can be presupposed that the attempt to express an existing idea in words gives rise to a technical term and not vice versa. That is, a certain idea may be extant for some time before a technical term for it is coined.

Secondly, it is useful to distinguish technical terms from their non-terminological counterparts. This seems to be particularly necessary in the case of the term cittotpāda. (As far as I can tell, the terms bodhicitta and bodhicittotpāda are employed in the Mahāyāna context only terminologically, and hence there does not arise the need to distinguish them from non-terminological expressions.) The term cittotpāda is apparently not used in non-Buddhist sources, and, according to Franklin Edgerton, it is a common Hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit term, 251 its Pāli equivalence being cittuppāda. 252 However, even in the Buddhist context it need not necessarily mean an ‘act of generating the resolve to strive for awakening,’ but can also refer to the resolve to attain any profane goal driven by any profane motive. Also, even if the term is employed in a soteriological sense, it does not necessarily mean generating the resolve to become a buddha, since three kinds of bodhi are presupposed, namely, those of a śrāvakā saṅgha, pratyekabuddha, and buddha.

Must generating the resolve to strive for perfect awakening (samyoṣhañcchidhadhi), then, necessarily mean cittotpāda in its technical Mahāyāna sense? Not necessarily. As I have tried to make clear in the chapter on the doctrinal and historical background of the bodhicitta concept, the non-Mahāyāna traditions have their own idea of the historical Buddha (and also of other buddhas, such as the Buddha Dipāmarūpa), and accordingly their own idea of the initial resolve to strive for perfect awakening supposedly made by them in the past. I differentiate such ideas found in non-Mahāyāna sources from those found in Mahāyāna sources. The former may have been the historical or doctrinal precursors of the latter, but the two cannot be treated as though they were identical. I thus contend that cittotpāda in its Mahāyāna technical sense always denotes the resolve to become a bodhisattva or a buddha, which can be generated by ordinary individuals equipped with the correct and sufficient emotive, cognitive, and conative prerequisites.

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251 BHSD, s.v. cittotpāda.
252 PED, s.v. cittuppāda.
Some Tibetan scholars, such as Sa-paṅ, felt the necessity to distinguish between various kinds of cittotpāda, even when used in the Buddhist soteriological context. Sa-paṅ classifies cittotpāda into two categories: non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna. He further classifies non-Mahāyāna cittotpāda into three types, namely, those of a śrāvaka saint, pratyekabuddha, and buddha, and the Mahāyāna cittotpāda into those of the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra traditions. Particularly noteworthy is his distinction between generating the resolve to strive for the supreme awakening according to the non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna traditions. It is clear that for him, too, such generation according to the non-Mahāyāna traditions should be understood primarily as involving the resolve to become a buddha made by the historical Buddha sometime in the distant past, whereas according to the Mahāyāna as involving the resolve to become a buddha that can be made by any sentient being with the right prerequisite.

Given the multiple applications of the term cittotpāda, it was perhaps necessary to specify it as bodhicittotpāda. Occasionally generating the resolve to become a śrāvaka saint or pratyekabuddha is also referred to as bodhicittotpāda, but such cases should be considered to be non-terminological. Apparently the term bodhicittotpāda came to be used in these senses only retrospectively, and in analogy to the bodhicittotpāda of a bodhisattva. If this were not the case, we ought to find the term also in non-Mahāyāna sources, where it is, to my knowledge, not attested.

Thirdly, although Sparham somehow makes clear that the original terms cittotpāda and bodhicitta are more archaic than the term bodhicittotpāda, he does not specify which of the former two is more archaic. It is perhaps reasonable to assume that the technical term cittotpāda is more archaic than the term bodhicitta. Having said that, I hasten to recall that a terminological archaism need not necessarily correspond to the age of a text, for even a recent work may contain very archaic terms and conservative ideas.

Fourthly, Sparham has sought to point out the difference in origin, and the original meanings, of cittotpāda and bodhicitta, as if they had originally nothing to do with each other. Examination of the conventional-absolute classification seems to indicate that there existed two strands: Strand A (represented by texts such as the Bodhisattvabhiṣṇu and the Mahāyānasūtraśāstra), which conspicuously employs terminologies such as pāramārthikacittotpāda and sāṃkṣetikacittotpāda, and Strand B (represented by the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka literature), which rather employs terms such as pāramārthikabodhicitta and saṃvṛtibodhicitta in making this particular distinction (see chapter eight). The two strands seem to have conceived the conventional-absolute classification differently, at least in the beginning. However, in some later texts the two strands have converged, or else the distinctions between them have become less pronounced.

In addition, I find the implication that the term bodhicitta from the very beginning had a gnoseological and ontological connotation quite problematic. My own hypothesis is that the terms cittotpāda, bodhicitta, and bodhicittotpāda have enjoyed varying degrees of

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253 sDom gsum rab dbye 2.1–2:
    sems bskyed la ni nyan thos dang ||
    theg pa chen po'i lugs gnyis yod ||
    nyan thos rnam la sems bskyed gsum ||
    dgra bcom rang rgyas sangs rgyas so || ...
    theg pa chen po'i sems bskyed la ||
    dbu ma sems tsam rnam pa gnyis ||.

For an English translation and comments, see RHOTON 2002: 81, 90–91, n. 1.

254 For example, Rong-zom-pa on one occasion employed the expression byang chub tu sems bskyed pa (bodhicittotpāda) in these senses. See the lTa 'grel (A, fol. 232b4–5; B, p. 313.6–8): rnam pa gcig du byang chub sems dpa'i litar sems can mang po'i phyir byang chub tu sems mi bskyed ky'i | bdag gcig pu grol bar bya 'ba'i phyir' [ba'i phyī] A] sems bskyed pas de skad ces bya'o ||.
terminological predominance in various Mahāyāna texts and traditions, but semantically they have always been associated with the resolve to become a buddha or a bodhisattva, that is, even in cases where citta is described as acitta, as in the Āṣṭasāhasrikā. The fact that bodhi and citta (like all other phenomena) are deconstructed in the context of the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) is, in my view, by no means an indication that bodhicitta has a different origin and meaning in the Prajñāpāramitā. On the contrary, it is an indication that even such traditions have presupposed the conservative idea of bodhicitta. Thus we can regard the attempts made by the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka traditions to establish all phenomena as empty (śūnya) as attempts to expose the underlying essencelessness of all phenomena, so that the deconstruction, or rather de-emotionalisation, of bodhicitta is in itself an indication of the basic presupposition regarding bodhicitta.

Fifthly, Sparham’s claim that cittotpāda in its original sense was later called conventional bodhicittotpāda, and bodhicitta in its original sense was later called absolute bodhicittotpāda requires further investigation. What I merely want to point out here is that both cittotpāda and bodhicitta seem to have each been subdivided into conventional and absolute forms, while, as already mentioned, the technical term cittotpāda (if not always explicitly) seems to have meant bodhicittotpāda. I argue that the terms cittotpāda (in the sense of the generation of the resolve to become a buddha), bodhicitta, and bodhicittotpāda all owe their formation to expressions such as: cittam utpadyate bodhāya. In any case, bodhicitta and cittotpāda came to be understood synonymously. For instance, the Madhyamakāvātārabhāṣya (at least in the Tibetan translation) equates bodhicitta with cittotpāda. In the pre-commentary to verses 1.4cd and 1.5ab, it states:

Desiring to explicate the ten types of bodhicitta of the bodhisattvas [and] taking into consideration the first [type of] bodhicitta....

The post-commentary of the same verses goes on:

The bodhisattva stage (bhūmi) of Utter Joy (pramuditā) is the first [type of] cittotpāda of the bodhisattvas, and the Cloud of Dharma (dharmameghā), [which is] the last, is the tenth cittotpāda.

The fact that the ten stages of the bodhisattvas are designated by Candrakīrti as either bodhicitta or cittotpāda suggests that, for him too, the two terms are synonymous. No semantic distinction between the two is made either among Tibetan scholars, as can be seen in various writings on the topic.

(f) Some Definitions of Bodhicitta or Cittotpāda

There is no formal definition of bodhicitta or cittotpāda given in the Bodhisattvabhūmi or its two commentaries. However, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, in explaining the (intentional) aspect (ākāra) of cittotpāda, states:

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255 See, for example, Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§ 1.1.2, 2.2.0 and 4.5.0); see also ibid. 1.11 (WOGIHARA, p. 191.26; DUTT, p. 132.7–8): ... bodhāya cittam utpādayatā....

256 Madhyamakāvātārabhāṣya (p. 11.15–16): byang chub sms dpas’ rnam spyi byang chub kyi sms kyi dbye ba rnam pa byu brjod par ‘dod pas j fe [= de] byang chub kyi sms dang po’i dbang du byas nas....


258 See, for example, the Thig chen lshul ‘jug (A, fol. 77a4–5; B, p. 500.16–17): de la byang chub kyi sms ni ’dir shes rab dang snying rjes bsdu’i sms bskyed pa’o ||.

259 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§1.1.2).
Furthermore, the bodhisattva, when fixing his thought on awakening, collects [his] thoughts and articulates [his] words thus: "Oh, may I be perfectly awakened unto the highest, perfect awakening, may I be the benefactor of all sentient beings and may I establish [them] in the absolutely perfect (or firm) extinction and in the insight of the tathāgata!" In this way, one generates the resolve [to become a buddha] when striving for one's own awakening and for the welfare of sentient beings.

And in explaining the objective support (ālambara) of cittotpāda, the Bodhisattvabhūmi states:²⁶⁰

Furthermore, one strives to generate the resolve [to become a buddha] by taking this awakening and the welfare of sentient beings as an [objective] support for it (i.e. the resolve) [and] under no circumstances without taking [them] as [an objective] support. Thus generation of resolve [to become a buddha] has awakening [as its objective] support, and the welfare of sentient beings [as its objective] support as well.

The Bodhisattvabhūmiivṛtti by Gunaprabha (only on Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1–1.9) and the Bodhisattvabhūmivāyāhī by Sāgaramegha contribute little to the definition of cittotpāda. What is striking in the latter work is that, while some significant developments can be noticed in it, the term bodhicitta is not employed by Sāgaramegha. The Mahāyānasūtrālāmākāra states:²⁶¹

The arising of the resolve [to become a buddha, comprising] two objectives,

Is the will of the bodhisattvas,

[Characterised by] great enthusiasm, great endeavour,

Great purpose, [and] great outcome.

The Mahāyānasūtrālāmākārabhasya makes it clear that the verse deals with the definition of generating the resolve (cittotpādalakṣana):²⁶²

A verse concerning the definition of generating the resolve [to become a buddha]:

...[Mahāyānasūtrālāmākāra 4.1]... [The generation of the resolve] is characterised by: [1] great enthusiasm (mahotsāha), in view of [the preparatory] perseverance in [putting on] the armour (śāmāhāvīrya), knowing that [it] will withstand serious (gambhīra), difficult (duskara), and long-lasting (dirgākāla) obstacles (pratipakṣa); [2] great undertaking (mahāraṃbha), in view of [his] persevering in practical application in accordance with [the preparatory putting on of] the armour; [3] great purpose (mahārtha), in view of [his being dedicated to] the benefit of oneself and others; and [4] great outcome (mahodaya) due to the complete attainment of the great awakening (mahābodhi). The following three merits are elucidated in this [verse]: the merit of exertion (puruṣakāra),²⁶³ as expressed by two words (i.e. mahotsāha and mahāraṃbha), and the merit of salvific activity [for the sake of others] (arthākriyā) and that of accepting the result (phalapariprajñā), as expressed by two [other] words (i.e. mahārtha and mahodaya, respectively). [The generation of resolve is] characterised by a twofold purpose, for [it has] the great awakening and activities for the welfare of sentient beings as its objective supports. Thus a

²⁶⁰ Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§1.1.3); JOSHI 1971: 71.

²⁶¹ Mahāyānasūtrālāmākāra 4.1:

mahotsāha mahāraṃbha mahārtha mahodaya |

Cetana bodhisattvānāṃ dvāyārtha cittasambhavah ||

For a French translation of the verse, see LÉVI 1911: 32; see also JOSHI 1971: 71.

²⁶² Mahāyānasūtrālāmākārabhasya (pp. 13.18–14.4): cittotpādalaksane slokaḥ ... [Mahāyānasūtrālāmākāra 4.1]:... mahotsāha śamāhāvīrya gambhīraduskara dirgākālāpratipakṣa sahaṇaḥ | mahāraṃbhā yathāśamāhānacaraprayogavīrya | mahārtha ātpararāhādikārī | mahodaya mahābodhisamudāgamanatvā | so 'yam trividho guṇah paridīpitaḥ purṣakāragunov dvāyābhym padābhvāṃ arthākriyāyugunah phalapariprajñāganac ca dvāyābhym | dvāyārtha mahābodhisattvārthākriyālambanavatvā | iti triguṇā dvayañālambanā ca cetana cittotpāda iti ucyate.

²⁶³ The term puruṣakāra is called so because of the resemblance to manly activity. See the Abhidharmakośabhāsya (p. 95.2–4): puruṣabhāvavatī rekā puruṣakāraḥ puruṣa eva | tasya phāsim puruṣam | ko 'yam puruṣakāro nāma | yasya dharmasya yat kāritram | puruṣakāra iva hi puruṣakāraḥ |. See also PRUDEN 1988–90: 288; COX 1995: 357, n. 25.
will which possesses the three merits and two objective supports is called generating the resolve (cittotpāda) [to become a buddha].

What is noteworthy here is that the Mahāyānasūtraāłamkārabhāṣya still does not use the term bodhicitta. However, *Asvabhāva does seem to use the expression bodhicittotpāda at this point. He also correctly takes cittasamabhava in the verse to be semantically equivalent to cittaotpāda.264 Shiramati for his part used the term bodhicitta profusely, to judge by the Tibetan translation of the *(Mahāyāna)sūtraāłamkārayākyāśyā.

The Abhisamayālamkāra, the locus classicus for the definition of bodhicitta not only for traditional exegetics but for modern scholars as well, defines the generation of bodhicitta as follows:265

To generate the resolve [to become a buddha]
Is to desire perfect complete awakening for the sake of other [sentient beings].

The Abhidharmasamucchaya does not mention the term bodhicitta, unlike the Mahāyānasamgraha, which mentions it in the context of the thirty-two attributes of a bodhisattva.266 However, one cannot deduce from this fact that the author of the former work did not know of the concept or was opposed to the theory associated with it. The Abhidharmasamucchaya indeed presupposes the concept of bodhicitta, the reason for not mentioning the actual term having to do with the immediate purposes of the work itself. The work, as its title shows, is not meant to be a typical discourse on the theory and practice of a bodhisattva, unlike the Mahāyānasamgraha, which, again as its title shows, is precisely such an exegesis.

The first chapter of the Madhyamakahrdaya deals with the non-abandonment of bodhicitta (bodhicittāparityāga). The pertinent verses that contain the term bodhicitta shed light on the concept of bodhicitta in this Madhyamaka work, and the status assigned to it. It states:267

Not abandoning bodhicitta,
Seeking support in the discipline of the Sage,
And questing for the knowledge of reality
Are the [three] practices leading to the achievement of all goals.

It again states:268

Bodhicitta is the seed of Buddha[hood] (buddhabija),
Which has great friendliness (maitri), compassion (karuna)
And gnosis (jñāna) as [its] ornaments (bhūṣana).
Therefore the wise exerts himself not to abandon it.

The Tarkajvālā provides the following explanation of this verse.269

264 Mahāyānasūtraāłamkārajñā (P, fol. 60b3; D, fol. 53b3; S, vol. 71, p. 135.3–4) states: sems 'byung ba zhes bya ba la | 'byung ba dang ḍskyped pa zhes bya ba ni don tha dad pa ma yin no ||.

265 Abhisamayālamkāra 1.18ab: cittotpāda parāthāya samyaksambodhikāmatā |.

266 Mahāyānasamgraha 2.§34 (p. 45.18–19): spyod lam thams cad du byang chub kyi sems yongs su spyod par byed pa... See also ibid. (p. 46.3): byang chub kyi sems de sngon du 'gro ba....

267 Madhyamakahrdaya 1.5:
\[ \text{bodhicittāparityāga munivratasamāśrayah} \]
\[ \text{tattvajñānaisaṇḍha ceti caryā sarvārthasiddhav} \].

268 Madhyamakahrdaya 1.6:
\[ \text{bodhicittam mahāmaitrīkarunājñānabhūsanam} \]
\[ \text{buddhabijam yato vidvāms tadatāmāpyāga yujvayate} \].

What is so-called bodhicitta? ...[Madhyamakahrdaya 1.6]... ‘[Endowed with] great friendliness’ means having the [following] four [reasons for] generating resolve (cittotpāda): [1] all sentient beings are to be rescued [from samsāra], [2] [I am] rescuing (or going to rescue them), [3] [I will] cause [them] to become fully awakened, and [4] [cause them to] attain complete extinction (parinirvāṇa). ‘[Endowed with] great compassion’ means having the [following] four [reasons for] generating resolve (cittotpāda): [1] carrying out [beneficial activities] for the sake of all sentient beings, [2] protecting [them] from lower destinations, [3] retrieving [them] from lesser vehicles (hīnayāna), and [4] establishing them in the correct path. ‘Great gnosis’ is of two kinds: the gnosis of strategic means (upāya) and the gnosis of discriminating insight (prajñā). Of the [two], the gnosis of strategic means implies perfecting the three [kinds of] accumulation [by, for example], generating all basic wholesome virtues endowed with the total purity of the ‘three circles’ (trimandala), sharing [them] with all sentient beings, dedicating [the anticipated beneficial resources] to [the attainment of] the highest perfect awakening, confessing misdeeds, rejoicing at beneficial resources, and so forth. The gnosis of discriminating insight (prajñā) implies the generating of gnosis (jñāna), both [of the type] characterised by analytical investigation and [that] endowed with one moment (ekaskaṇa or ekaskaṇacitica),72 for all factors of existence (dharma) are imperceptible, without signs of appearance (nimitta), without agitating impulse, unborn, without substance, and wholly non-existent. The seed of Buddha[hood] adorned with these is bodhicitta. [As for] bodhi, [it] is the knowledge, perfect in all respects, of all factors of existence. Bodhicitta is resolve (citta) [gathered up] for the sake of awakening (bodhi). Because it is the seed of Buddha[hood], it is judicious on the part of the wise, who have [the welfare of] sentient beings in view, not to abandon [altruistic] inclination (aśaya), superior [altruistic] inclination (adhyāśaya), confidence (adhimoksha), and great confidence.

Later exegetics discussed whether bodhicitta is mind (citta) or a mental associate (caitita), but this will have to be dealt on another occasion.

(g) How Indispensable Is Bodhicitta for a Bodhisattva?

The importance of bodhicitta has been expressed in numerous ways: through logical reasoning, authoritative scripture, similes, and eulogies. Although it is by no means conceived

su mya ngan las 'de' ba'i sens bskyed [bskyad P] pa bzhī dang ldan pa'o || snying rje chen po zhes bya ba ni [1] sens can thams cad kyi don bya ba dang || [2] ngan 'gro las vongs su bskyab pa dang || [3] theg pa dman pa las bslang ba dang || [4] yang dag pa'i lam du dgod pa'i sens bskyed ba bzhī dang ldan pa'o || shes pa chen po zhes bya ba ni rnam pa gnyis te || thabs kyi shes pa dang || shes rab kyi shes pa'o || de la thabs kyi shes pa ni 'khor gsum vongs su dang pa dang ldan pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba thams cad skyped [bskyed PN] cing || sens can thams cad dang thun mong du byas shing || bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub tu vongs su bsngo ba dang || sdig pa' 'chas pa dang || bsod nams kyi rjes su yi rang ba la sogs pa dang || tshogs [shigs P] gsum vongs su rdzogs par byed pa'o || shes rab kyi shes pa ni chos thams cad dmigs su med pa dang || mtsan ma med pa dang || mgon par 'da bya ba med pa dang || skye ba med pa dang || dngos po med pa dang || vongs su ma grub pas so sor riog [rtogs PN] pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi shes pa skad cig cing dang ldan pa bskyed pa'o || de dag gis bryan pa'i sangs rgyas kyi sa bon ni byang chub kyi sens yin te || byang chub ni chos thams cad rnam pa thams cad du [da P] vongs su mkhyen pa'o || byang chub kyi sens ni byang chub kyi phyir sens pa'o [dpa' o PN] || gang gi phyir de sangs rgyas kyi sa bon yin pa de'i phyir mkhas pa sens can la bla bsas bsam pa dang || lhag pa'i bsam pa dang mos pa dang mos pa rgya chen po de mi giang [btang PN] bar bya ba'i rigs so ||.

270 It is not clear what the three kinds of accumulation (sambhāra) are.

271 See RHSD, s.v. trimandala. From a Mahāyāna perspective, the practice of giving (dāna), for example, is only pure (or supramundane) if the giver, act of giving, and recipient can be viewed as empty (śūnya) and if there is no attachment to the three. See, for example, Madhyamakāvatāra 1.16, 2.9, 3.10.

272 I do not understand the meaning of this expression, but I should guess that jñāna characterised by analytical investigation is conceptual gnosis (perhaps in the post-meditative state of a bodhisattva) and jñāna endowed with one moment (ekaksana) the non-conceptual gnosis that is the direct perception of true reality in the meditative state. For the occurrence of terms such as ekaksana, see, for example, Abhisamayālamkāra 7.5.
of as the only (i.e. a self-sufficient) cause of Buddhahood, it is considered to be virtually an indispensable cause—a sine qua non. It determines the very nature of a bodhisattva. The question is: Is bodhicitta really indispensable in all forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism? I shall contend that the concept of bodhisattva is accentuated or presupposed in all forms of Mahāyāna, and that the idea of bodhicitta is as well. In other words, it will be argued that bodhicitta is explicitly or implicitly considered to be indispensable, both within traditions that propose or presuppose the validity of multiple spiritual dispositions and vehicles, and within others that propose or presuppose the validity of one ultimate spiritual disposition and one ultimate vehicle. The Bodhisattvabhūmi, which propounds the theory of five spiritual dispositions and three vehicles as final and valid, states explicitly that the generation of bodhicitta is indeed indispensable for the attainment of Buddhahood:

Moreover, by generating that resolve, a bodhisattva gradually awakes completely unto the highest, perfect awakening, and by failing to do so does not, under any circumstances.

Therefore, this generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] is the basis of the highest, perfect awakening.

If we view the structure of the Bodhisattvabhūmi as encapsulated in its synoptic verses (uddāna), we see that the work is conceived in such a way that its ten topics encompass the entire bodhisattva path (mārga) and its fruition (phaṭa). In particular, gotra, cittaśāda, and bodhisattvacaryāpravṛtyoga (‘exertion in accomplishing the deeds of a bodhisattva’) form an integral part of the first topic, called the ‘stratum’ (ādhāra). The gotra is conceived as indispensable for cittaśāda, cittaśāda indispensable for bodhisattvacaryāpravṛtyoga, and bodhisattvacaryāpravṛtyoga indispensable for Buddhahood. The Bodhisattvabhūmi, however, makes unequivocally clear that while the presence of the right gotra is no guarantee for the attainment of Buddhahood, the absence of such a gotra totally undermines the possibility of

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273 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§1.2.2).

274 Cf. Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.18 (WOGIHARA, pp. 290.24–291.2; DUTT, p. 197.10–13), where the generation of the resolve to become a buddha for the first time is counted as one of the five things a bodhisattva aspires to complete awakening to do without.

275 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1 (DUTT, p. 1.1–6): daśe dharmāḥ saphalasya bodhisattvamārgasya mahāyāṇasya samgrahāḥ samaṃvarante | katame daśa | ādhāra lingaṃ pakṣo ‘dhyāsayo vihāra upapattih parigrhao bhūmiś caryā pratisēthā ca | uddānaṃ | ādhāra lingaṃ pakṣo ‘dhyāsayo vihāra upapattih | parigrhao bhūmiś caryā pratisēthā paścimā bhavet ||

a lingaṃ] em., linga DUTT; b pakṣo ] em., pakṣādhyāsayavihāra WOGIHARA, DUTT. Note that the metre of pādas a and b in the uddāna verse is obviously an Aryan, but as it stands it is flawed. Gustav Roth has asked the question why this uddāna, which introduces the whole text, is of such an aberrant type. According to him, the structure of the introductory uddāna seems to be closely linked with the history of the composition as a whole (ROTH 1975/76: 171–172). Note that the Sanskrit text at the beginning of Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1 does not appear in WOGIHARA.

276 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1 (DUTT, p. 1.7–8): “What is the [one] among these [called] the substratum? [It is] one’s own spiritual disposition (i.e. that of a bodhisattva), the first act of generating the resolve [to become a buddha]; and all the factors having to do with the awakening are here called the substratum” (tatrādhārāh katamah | iha bodhisattvasya svagotraṃ prathaṃsaṃ cittaśādaḥ sarve ca bodhipakṣyā dharmā ādhāra ity ucyaṭe ).

277 See Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1 (DUTT, pp. 1.8–2.3).

buddha. According to it, the excellence of the spiritual disposition (gotrasampad) is the first of the four prerequisites (hetu) for the arising of the resolve to become a buddha. It also makes clear that the first of the four causes (kārana) of the relapse (vyāvṛtti) of cittotpäda is not being endowed with the spiritual disposition (gotrasampanna) of a bodhisattva. This shows that a person without the bodhisattvagotra may generate bodhicitta and may temporarily even follow the path, but he or she is prone to relapse. What is important to note here is that works such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi do not question the validity of the bodhi of a śrāvaka saint or a pratyekabuddha, nor do they contend that the generation of bodhicitta is mandatory for all who seek release from samsāra.

Other forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism, such as Madhyamaka, Prajñāpāramitā, Tathāgatagarbha, and Vajrayāna, all of which propose the validity of one ultimate spiritual disposition and one vehicle, would not reject the indispensable role of bodhicitta for the attainment of Buddhahood either. Those who maintain the immanence of buddha qualities in all sentient beings (and follow the revelation or nature model of soteriology) and those who do not accept the immanence of buddha qualities (and follow the generation or nurture model), may disagree in regard to what bodhicitta is or how it is brought about, but none of them would deny the indispensability of it. Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvali states that those who wish to attain Buddhahood should rely on bodhicitta. Likewise, the Bodhicittavivarana ascribed to Nāgārjuna asserts that the very best feature of Mahāyāna is bodhicitta and that other than bodhicitta no means of benefiting oneself and others has ever been discovered by the buddhas. Occasionally we may get the impression that the notion of bodhicitta is undermined in the Prajñāpāramitā sources, but, as already pointed out, if we consider the bodhisattva ideals proposed there, it should become clear that such a process is not meant as a denial of bodhicitta, but rather as an attempt to de-emotionalise the attitudes and actions of a bodhisattva. I may, however, point out what seems to be an anomaly. In the Aṅgulimālīyasūtra, one of the Mahāyāna sūtras expounding the tathāgatagarbha theory, it is

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280 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§3.1.2).

281 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§3.2.0).

282 Ratnāvali 2.73ed–74ab:
bdag nyid dang ni ‘jig rten ‘dis ||
bla med byang chub thob ‘dod na ||
de yi rtsa ba byang chub sms ||
ri dbang rgyal po ltar brtan dang |.
No Sanskrit text of these verses has survived. Cf. also ibid. 3.86.

283 Bodhicittavivarana 105–106:
byang chub sms ‘di theg chen po ||
mchog ni yin par bshad pa ste ||
manyam par gzhag pa ‘i ‘bad pa yis ||
byang chub sms ni bskyed par gyis ||
rang dang gzhon don bsgrub don du ||
srid na thabs gzhon yod ma yin ||
byang chub sms ni ma gtags pas ||
sangs rgyas kyi sngar thbs ma gzigs |.
The Sanskrit text is said to be extant in Tibet (or China) but not accessible. For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 69. See also Bodhicaryāvatāra 4.3; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 25.
stated that one can become a \textit{bodhisattva} by merely hearing the name of Buddha Śākyamuni.\footnote{\textit{Angulimālīyasūtra} (T, fol. 249a7; D, fol. 193b4); \textit{gang de bzhin gshegs pa shākya thub pa'i mtshan} [add. de T] \textit{thos pa tsam gyis kyang sens ma skyes} [bskyed D] \textit{pa yang byang chub sens dpar} [dpa' T] \textit{gyur ro ||}.}

By merely hearing the name of Tathāgata Śākyamuni, one in whom the resolve [to become a \textit{buddha}] has not [yet] arisen\footnote{According to the reading in D, “one who has not [yet] generated the resolve [to become a \textit{buddha}].”} will become a \textit{bodhisattva}. Such a statement gives the impression that there is an alternative to \textit{bodhicitta}, and if taken at face value could be problematic within the general Mahāyāna system. However, we know quite well that the main concern of such texts is not \textit{bodhicitta} (in a conservative sense) but rather the \textit{tathāgatagarbha} doctrine, and that their tone is fairly propagandistic. The firm conviction is that even if those who condemn the theory of \textit{tathāgatagarbha} doctrine were to hear the name of Śākyamuni Buddha, they would become \textit{bodhisattvas} and ultimately \textit{buddhas}, on account of the aspirational wish made by him in the past. One may, of course, interpret this statement as meaning that hearing the name of Śākyamuni would cause \textit{bodhicitta} to arise in one, for being a \textit{bodhisattva} automatically implies possession of \textit{bodhicitta}. This is essentially the same as in the cases where the resolve to become a \textit{buddha} is made possible by hearing about the excellent qualities of a \textit{buddha}. In any event, it will be instructive to collect more such passages, which seemingly bypass or subordinate the role of \textit{bodhicitta}.

In general, the extent to which the role of \textit{bodhicitta} is relativised or absolutised seems to depend on how narrow or broad \textit{bodhicitta} is defined. If \textit{bodhicitta} is understood in the narrow sense of the resolve to become a \textit{buddha} (sometimes even oblivious of the need for compassion and discriminating insight), as apparently in \textit{Madhyamakāvatāra} 1.1cd (where \textit{bodhicitta} is juxtaposed to \textit{krpācitta} and *\textit{advayamati})*, its role is accordingly relativised. But if it is understood in such a way as to incorporate all conative, emotive, and cognitive components, and as both the initial resolve and the resolve that accompanies all of the \textit{bodhisattva}'s attitudes and actions at all stages of the path, then its role is absolutised, and it is regarded as the single necessary and sufficient condition for attaining Buddhahood. The idea of \textit{bodhicitta} as such a condition is perhaps best demonstrated by dPal-sprul’s comparison of \textit{bodhicitta} to a panacea, a single medicine for a hundred ills, which we encountered in chapter one.\footnote{dPal-sprul’s use of the metaphor of the ‘sufficient white remedy’ (\textit{dkar po gcig thub}) recalls the Tibetan controversies surrounding the issue of awakening by a single means (studied in \textit{Jackson} 1994 and 1999), and one cannot help but feel a subtle sense of irony. He seems to suggest that if there is any necessary and sufficient remedy in Mahāyāna Buddhism at all, it is \textit{bodhicitta} and nothing else.}
reason-oriented soteriological models. According to some Tibetan scholars, the generation of bodhicitta is considered to be one of the criteria for entry into Sukhāvati.\(^{287}\)

The indispensability of bodhicitta (in its most conservative meaning of the resolve to become a buddha) is also presupposed in Vajrayāna Buddhism. The Subāhūparipṛcchātantra states that one will be ruined if magical formulas (mantra) are recited without having obtained knowledge formulas (vidyā) and tantric commitments (samaya), without having compassion (karunā), without having generated bodhicitta, without having respect for buddhas, and by relying on other deities.\(^{288}\) The Vajrapāṇyabhisekatantra states.\(^{289}\)

O Maṇjuśrī, only those bodhisattvas who are engaged in the practice of bodhicitta and have become accomplished in bodhicitta should, O Maṇjuśrī—if they wish to resort to bodhisattva practices [involving] the methods (sgo) of Mantra[yāna]—be permitted into this mandala of mnemonic formulas (dhāraṇī) [employed] for initiating [candidates] into the great gnosis [or empowering them with it]. Those whose bodhicitta has not been perfected should not be permitted into the mandala, and they should not even be permitted to look at it. They should not be shown the mādras and mantras either.

Rong-zom-pa adds that the foundation stone (rdo gzhi) for the recipient of tantric teachings is endowment with bodhicitta.\(^{290}\) He also notes in passing that relying on bodhicitta in the effort to harness one’s body, speech, and mind to the yogic practice associated with tantric deities is the actual (çāngos gzhi) tantric commitment (samaya)—an idea shared by both the Kriyā and Yoga tantric systems—and that the Vajrapāṇyabhisekatantra seeks to reinforce this point by appealing to three authorities, namely, valid instructions (man ngag tshad ma), valid scriptures (lung tshad ma), and valid logical reasoning (rigs pa tshad ma).\(^{291}\) The Subāhūparipṛcchātantra for its part avers that the practitioner, having generated bodhicitta, should not resort to worldly deities in order to obtain the fruits of tantric accomplishment (siddhi);\(^{292}\) in order to obtain such fruits the practitioner should rather be the bearer of a stable

\(^{287}\) SCHWIEGER 1978: 78–79, 119–120.

\(^{288}\) Subāhūparipṛcchātantra (T, fol. 391a4–5; D, fol. 119a5):

\begin{itemize}
  \item ‘rig dang [rigs dad T] dam tshig ma tho[h] [mthong T] snying rje med ||
  \item de bzhin byang chub sems ni ma bskyed cing ||
  \item sungs rgyas ma dad [dang T] lha gzhan la bren pas ||
  \item nga yi [yis T] gsang sngags bzhas na phung bar ‘gyur ||.
\end{itemize}

These verses are also cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 185b5; B, p. 287.13–15).

\(^{289}\) Vajrapāṇyabhisekatantra (T, fol. 224a3–6; D, fol. 149b4–6):

\begin{itemize}
  \item ‘jam dpal gang dag byang chub kyi sems sgom pa la zhugs pa dang [om D] gang gi tshe de dag gi byang chub kyi sems grub par gyur ba de’i tshe || ‘jam dpal byang chub sems dpa’i spyod [spyad D] pa gsang sngags kyi sgo spyod pa’i byang chub sems dpa’i de dag ye shes chen por dbang bskur ba’i gsungs sngags kyi dkyil ‘khor ‘dir [du D] gzhug par bya’i || gang dag gi [gis T] byang chub kyi sems rdzogs par ma gyur pa de dag ni gzhug par mi bya sde || de dag ni [gis T] dkyil ‘khor yang ltar mi gzhug go || de dag la ni phyag rgya dang gsang sngags kyang bstan par mi bya’o ||; cf. the text cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 201b1–2; B, p. 305.17–21). See also the citation in Tsong-kha-pa’s Lam rim chen mo (fol. 222a1–2) and the corresponding English translation in LAMRIM TRANSLATION COMMITTEE 2002: 87.
\end{itemize}

\(^{290}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 201b2–3; B, p. 305.21–22): gsang ba bstan pa’i snod kyi rdo gzhi yang byang chub kyi sems dang ldan pa nyid yin no ||.

\(^{291}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 201a5–6; B, p. 305.13–17): mdor na byang chub kyi sems la bhrten nas rang gi las ngag yid gsam lha’i mal ‘byor du bya ba’i di ni dam tshig thams cad kyi dngos gzhir gyur pa bya ba’i rgyud dang rnel ‘byor gyi rgyud gnyis gar than mong du grags par gyur pa [ba B] yin ye || man dang ngang dang lung rig [= rigs] pas grub pa o’i zhes lung nyid las gsangs pa’o ||.

\(^{292}\) Subāhūparipṛcchātantra (T, fol. 412b6–7; D, fol. 135a4–5):

\begin{itemize}
  \item gang zhig byang chub sems ni blangs pa las ||
  \item rnyongs pas ‘jig rten lha shogs phyag byas na ||
  \item de dag de la mi dagar gyur nas su ||
\end{itemize}
The Vajraśikharatantra also makes it clear that in order to attain siddhi, the practitioner must generate bodhicitta, be without doubt, follow instructions, and have faith (śraddhā). A commentary on the Vairocanābhisambodhitantra states that even those who are proficient in the tantras should be initiated only after practising bodhicitta. The stability of bodhicitta is considered by the Trisamayarāja to be one of the factors responsible for the success of mantras, although Sāntideva clarifies that the stability of bodhicitta as a prerequisite for the attainment of the goal is meant for worldly people (prthagjana), not for those on the bodhisattva stages. He further states that the force of bodhicitta (bodhicittavega) along with the force of faith (śraddhāvega) and similar factors is more important than the precision of mantra recitation. Indeed, not generating bodhicitta is often seen as one of the hindrances to the attainment of tantric accomplishments.

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See also the citation in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 194b6; B, pp. 297.24–298.2).

Subhūpariprcchāntara (T, fol. 415b1–2; D, fol. 137a4–5):

gang zhiṅ theg mchog rgya chen klog pa dang ||
de la dad cing de nyid 'chad par spro ||
brtsön 'grus che zhiṅ byaṅ chub sems brtan pa ||
de la nga yi gsang sngags mchog sbyin mdzad ||

See also the citation in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 194a4–5; B, p. 299.14–16).

Vajraśikharatantra, as cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 220b3–4; B, p. 328.2–3):

byaṅ chub sems ni ma bskyed dang ||
the thosm yod pa nyid dang ni ||
gang zhiṅ bka' stsal mi byed dang ||
ma dad pas ni mi 'grub bo ||

See also the dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 141a1–2; B, p. 176.2–4). Cf. the Vajraśikharatantra (T, fol. 565b; D, fol. 182b1):

dad pa med par gnas pa dang ||
gang tshe the thosm za 'gyur ba ||
de nī rnal 'byor params par 'gyur ||
byaṅ chub sems ni yongs ma bzung ||

*Vairocanābhisambodhitrantrabhāṣya (P, fol. 134b1–4; D, fol. 109b7–110a1; S, vol. 35, p. 288.8–13): rgyud la sogs pa rnam la ni mkhas kyang | byaṅ chub kyi sems ma bsgoms pa na | byaṅ chub kyi sems sgom du bcug ste phiyis dbang bskur bar bya'o || de las gzhan [add. rams PN] phal rnam kyi ni [add. sa nas kyang PN] rgyud kyang mi shes | byaṅ chub kyi sems kyang ma bsgoms phiyis kyang shes par mi 'gyur | byaṅ chub kyi sems kyang mi sgom pa na [om. PN] phal rnam te | dus gnyis kar yang dbang mi bskur gyi | byaṅ chub kyi sa hon du 'gyur ba'i phiyir dkyil 'khor du gzung nga ||

Trisamayarāja, as cited in the Śīksāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 140.2–3; VAIDYA, p. 77.28–29):

bodhicittam drdham vasya nihsamgā ca matir bhaver ||
vicikitsā naiva kartavyā tasyedam siddhayati dhrvam ||

For an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 137.

Śīksāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 140.4–5; VAIDYA, p. 77.30–31): bodhicittadṛḍhataḥ cātā prthagjanacācācittāyā niyamārtham uktā na tu bhūmipraviṣṭam adhiḥkṛtya ||. 6 Note that the Tibetan translation of the Śīksāsamuccaya (P, fol. 92b1; D, fol. 79a2–3; S, vol. 64, p. 1191.1–3) reads: so so [so'i DC] skye bo 'i sems stobs dang ldan par, suggesting that the Tibetan translators read bala instead of cala.

Śīksāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 140.10–12; VAIDYA, p. 78.2–3): kim tu śraddhāvegam bodhicittavegam sarvotsargavegam ca pramāṇākṛtyavivekarāt pravartitavyam avasyaṃ buddhahodhisattvam* ihaiva yatṛṣaṣṭisiddhi ca bhavati ||. 6 The Tibetan translation suggest here a different reading, perhaps bodhisattvadarianam (byaṅ chub sems dpa’ mthong ba). The exact meaning of the passage is, however, not clear to me. For an English translation of the passage, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 137–138.

One of the four hindrances to the attainment of tantric accomplishments is not generating bodhicitta. See the mNyam sbyor ‘grel pa (A, fol. 25b1; B, p. 485.8–9): dngos grub kyi ggegs kyi rtsa ba byaṅ chub kyi sems ma
(b) Benefits and Functions of Bodhicitta

Countless positive effects are attributed to bodhicitta. The Bodhisattvabhūmi, for example, presents six pairs of such effects that accrue to the bodhisattva from having generated bodhicitta. The first pair is the so-called two unique (lokāsādhārāna) qualities:300

These two are the unique, amazing, [and] extraordinary qualities of a bodhisattva who has firmly generated the initial resolve [to become a buddha]. What are the two? [a] [He] embraces301 all sentient beings as [though they were his] wife, and [b] yet is not tainted by the fault of having taken a wife. In this regard, the fault of taking a wife is this: the defiled gratification or hostility (klīṣṭānurodhavirodha) that comes from the benefit [received or] detriment [sustained by one's] wife. But these two are not found in a bodhisattva.

The second pair of benefits attributed to the bodhisattva who has generated bodhicitta is the two kinds of altruistic inclination (adhyāśaya):302

These two sublime altruistic inclinations of a bodhisattva who has firmly generated the initial resolve [to strive for] awakening [that are directed] towards the sentient beings originate-and-continue. [What are the two]?303 [a] An altruistic inclination [aimed at] benefiting (hitādhyāśaya) [sentient beings], and [b] an altruistic inclination [directed towards] the happiness (sukhādhyāśaya) [of sentient beings] as well.304 The altruistic inclination [aimed at] benefiting [sentient beings] consists in [his] being desirous of establishing [them] in a wholesome state (i.e. a state characterised by wholesome attitudes and activities) after first lifting [them] up out of an unwholesome state.305 The altruistic inclination [directed towards] the happiness [of sentient beings] consists in being desirous of providing gratifying things—

bskyed pa |. See also the Trisamayavvūhātantra (T, fol. 383b7; D, fol. 216b1): 'grub par mi 'gyur ba ni gnyis te | dad pa [ma T] med pa dang | byung chub tu sems ma bskyed pa'o | ].

300 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§4.1.0).

301 The choice of the verb parighnāti is noteworthy here because it means not only 'to embrace' and 'to assist' (among many other things), which fit the context better when sentient beings in general are the object, but also means 'to take (a wife)' or 'to marry' (MW, s.v. pari-vyāraha). The pun, which is certainly intended, conveys the idea that a bodhisattva cares for all sentient beings as a man does for his wife but still remains unaffected by the worldly aspects of such a bond. This issue is addressed once again in Bodhisattvabhūmi 3.2 (WOGIHARA, p. 362.5–10; DUTT, p. 249.5–7): "Every upon his having first generated the resolve [to become a buddha], all sentient beings are embraced by a bodhisattva as [though they were his] wife. [He will make the following resolution:] 'For them, all types of [resources required for] their benefit and happiness will be gathered by me to the best of [my] ability and to the best of [my] power.' And [he indeed] does just that. This is the bodhisattva’s simultaneous embracing of all sentient beings" (prathama eva cittaṭūpe bodhisattvata sarvāḥ sattvadhātuh kalaṭrakāvena parighāhi | evam mayā yathāsakti yathābalam sarvākāraḥitasukhopasamāhāra karanīya iti | tathaiva ca karoti | ayaṃ bodhisattvasya sak śtrasvasattvaparīgraḥah | ). This simile was already noted by DAYAL 1932: 63.

302 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§4.2.0).

303 The Tibetan translation adds the question gnyis gang zhe na (*katamau āvau) which is not found in any of the Sanskrit manuscripts.

304 The terms hitādhyāśaya and sukhādhyāśaya seem to be, respectively, synonymous with the terms hitāśaya and sukhāśaya, which are enumerated as two of the fifteen adhyāśayās in the Adhyāṣālaṭa in Bodhisattvabhūmi 2.3 (WOGIHARA, p. 314.1–3; DUTT, p. 215.12–13). The two are defined there in the following manner: "The desire to confer wholesome virtues upon sentient beings is called benefit-directed altruistic zeal. The desire to confer favours (in matters concerning the present life) upon sentient beings is called happiness-directed altruistic zeal (sattvaṃ kuṣalopasamhartukāmatā hitāśaya iva ucye | sattvaṃ anurgrahopasamhartukāmatā sukhāśaya iva ucye | )."

305 Note that the relative pronoun yaḥ is used here and in the following paragraph (i.e. §4.2.0) as a periphrastic idiom and hence is not rendered in the English. See SPEIJER 1886: 352–353.
excluding defiling ones (i.e. things that lead to unwholesome attitudes or activities)—for sentient beings who are needy (vighāti), helpless (anāthāna), or without protection (apratisaraṇāna).  

The third pair of benefits is the two kinds of exertion (prayoga):  

These two are the exertions (prayoga) of a bodhisattva who has firmly generated the initial resolve [to become a buddha]: [a] the exertion entailed by altruistic inclination (adhyāyasayaprayoga), and [b] the exertion entailed by conduct (pratipattiprayoga). The exertion entailed by altruistic inclination is the daily enhancing of exactly the same altruistic inclination [just mentioned], [aimed at] benefiting [others] and [advancing] their happiness. The exertion entailed by conduct is the daily exertion of ripening one's own buddha qualities (buddhadharmaparipākaprayoga) and the exertion of conferring benefit and happiness (hitasukhopasamāhāraprayoga) upon sentient beings by simply relying on the altruistic inclination to exert oneself to the best of [one's] ability [and] with all [one's] power. 

The fourth pair of benefits is the two sources of income (āyavāra) in the form of wholesome factors:  

These two are great sources of income (āyavāra) in the form of wholesome virtues (kuśaladharma) in a bodhisattva who has firmly generated the initial resolve [to become a buddha]: [a] exertion for one's own sake (svārthaprayoga), so that [one] completely attains the highest, perfect awakening, and [b] exertion for others' sake (parārthaprayoga), so that all sentient beings are freed from all types of suffering (sarvādukhkhanirnokṣa). Just as the two sources of income have been explained, so too should the two great gatherings of wholesome virtues, the two immeasurable (aprameya) heaps of wholesome qualities (kuśaladharmaskandha), and so forth [be understood]. 

The fifth pair of benefits is the two kinds of superiority in terms of possessing wholesome virtues (kuśalaparigrahavaiśesya), which is explained as follows:  

These two are the two kinds of superiority in terms of acquiring wholesome virtues (kuśalaparigrahvaiśesya) [required] for the awakening—even since the initial generation of the resolve [to become a buddha]—of a bodhisattva who has [firmly] generated the initial resolve [to attain the state of] awakening, [the attainment of which stands out] when compared to the acquiring of wholesome virtues (kuśalaparigraha) other than that. [The two are]: [a] the

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306 The Sanskrit text of these two definitions has been cited and translated into German by MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 238–235, n. 64, where he also discusses the term upasāṃkarana at length. 

307 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§4.3.0). 

308 Both Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.6 (Paripākapāṭalā) and the ninth chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra are devoted to the theme of ‘ripening’ (paripākā). According to the former, one of the twenty-seven strategies directed towards ripening (paripākapāya) is that of exertion (prayoga). 

309 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§4.1.0). 

310 The Tibetan has yang here. 

311 According to Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. peyāla), the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit word peyāla (probably an accusative adverb) occurs regularly, whereas the instrumental form peyālena is rarely found. He assumes peyālam to be a Middle Indic form (Pāli peyālam, for which see PED, s.v.) for the classical Sanskrit paryāya (in the accusative case). Following Edgerton, I have translated peyālam here as the equivalent of et cetera. However, the Tibetans have regularly translated it as sbyar ba ‘apply’ (e.g. Mahāvīryuttāttī, no. 5435). Thus, de bzhin sbyar ba ‘applying similarly,’ gong ma bzhin du sbyar ba ‘applying as [stated] above,’ snga ma bzhin du sbyar ba ‘applying as [stated] earlier.’ 

312 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§4.5.0). 

313 WDN read upanidhāya; W颖 reads upadhāya. In Sanskrit, the former reading means ‘having put down near to’ (MW, s.v.), and the latter ‘having placed or rested upon’ (MW, s.v.). Contextually, the reading upanidhāya, which is both Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (BHSD, s.v. upanidadhātī) and in Pāli means ‘comparing or drawing a comparison between,’ is definitely preferable here.
superiority of the cause (hetuvaīśeya) and [b] the superiority of the result (phalavaīśeya). This very acquiriung of wholesome virtues (kusālaparigraha) by a bodhisattva is the cause of the highest, perfect awakening—and this [highest, perfect awakening] is the result of it. [An acquiring] other than that, [that is, the acquiring of all the wholesome virtues by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, is not [the cause of the highest, perfect awakening], and how much less (prāg eva) [the acquiring of the wholesome virtues] by sentient beings other than them! Therefore, the acquiring of wholesome virtues by bodhisattvas is distinguished from the acquiring of all wholesome virtues other than that [definable] in terms of causality and fruition.

The sixth pair, which is explicitly referred to as the two ‘benefits of generating resolve’ (cittotpādānuśaṃsa), is explained as follows: These two are the benefits of generating the resolve of a bodhisattva who has firmly generated the initial resolve [to become a buddha]: [a] On the one hand, immediately after the generation of the resolve, [he] becomes a [worthy recipient] of reverential offerings (dakṣinīṭabhūta), a venerable [person] (gurūbhūta), a field of beneficial resources (punyakṣetra) for all sentient beings, and like a father (piṭkālpa) for the people, and [b] on the other hand, [he] comes into possession of beneficial resources that produce invulnerability.

Note that WDN read na tadanyah, whereas P reads na tv anyah.

I am not certain if sarva in the compound sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhakuśalaparigraha should be construed with kuśala or with śrāvakapratyekabuddha, as the Tibetan translation apparently does: nyan thos dang rang sams rgyas thams cad kyi dge ba yongs su ‘dzin pa.

Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§4.6.0).

Cf. Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.9; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 5.

In general, the so-called ‘field’ (kṣetra) in such Buddhist contexts seems to be the domain (usually sentient beings, ordinary or transcendent) in which one can sow the seeds of either positive or negative thoughts or actions and from which one would consequently reap the corresponding benefit or unpleasant fruits. Vasubandhu (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, p. 271.10) defines it thus: “[The object] upon which [the thoughts or acts of] benefit and harm are exercised is called the field” (kṣetram nāma jatvā kāraṇākāraṇa kriyante ). Four types of ideal ‘fields’ are mentioned (Abhidharmakośa 4.17ab): “The field is distinguished on account of the state of existence, suffering, benefit, and quality” (gatidukkhopakāritvagunaṁ kṣetram viśisyaṁ ). Hence one may use the terms ‘field with reference to state of existence’ (gatiṣṭhata), ‘field with reference to suffering’ (dukkhaṣṭhata), ‘field with reference to benefit’ (upakārakṣetra), and ‘field with reference to qualities’ (guṇakṣetra), as is done by Yaśomitra (Abhidharmakośavacāya, p. 435.9; gatidukkhopakārīguṇakṣetra). The compound guṇopakārikṣetra also occurs in Bodhicaryāvatāra 5.81cd. For the use of the terms sūkṣetra and kuṣkṣetra, see the Abhidharmakośavacāya (p. 463.23–29). In our passage, a bodhisattva is said to become the punyakṣetra of all sentient beings. However, it is equally true that all sentient beings may conversely be considered the punyakṣetra of the bodhisattvas, although the term used is sattvākṣetra (‘sentient beings who are the fields’) in contradistinction to jīnakṣetram (‘the Victorious Ones who are the fields’). See Bodhicaryāvatāra 6.122ab: sattvākṣetram jīnakṣetram ity ato munīnoditam |; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 61. The term buddhaṣṭheta used in the Dharmasamgītiśūtra (cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, BENDALL, p. 153.7–8; VAIDYA, p. 85.8–9) does not seem to be semantically identical with jīnakṣetra: “For a bodhisattva, the sentient beings [who are] the fields are the field of a buddha, and it is [that] field of the buddha from which buddha qualities are obtained” (sattvākṣetram bodhisattvasya buddhakṣetram yataṣ ca buddhakṣetraṁ buddhadharmanāṁ lābhāhame bhavati ). Here, buddhaṣṭheta does not seem to mean a ‘field [that is] a buddha’ but rather a ‘field [from which] buddha [qualities] can be obtained.’ Cf. BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 152. One also comes across other related terms elsewhere, such as siddhiṣṭheta in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 155.7; VAIDYA, p. 86.15): “There is no field of attainment [of Buddha qualities] in the world other than sentient beings” (siddhiṣṭhetram nāyat sattvebhya vidyate jagati ). Cf. also Bodhicaryāvatāra 6.113–118; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 60–61.

See also Mahāyānasūraśāntakāra 19.12–13, where a bodhisattva is said to be like a father to all sentient beings on account of five actions engaged in by him: “[1] On account of planting [seeds of] faith in all sentient beings at all times, [2] coaching [them] in ethical-moral discipline and so forth, and [3] directing [them] to freedom, [4] appealing to the buddhas [on their behalf], and [5] freeing them from hindrances. [In playing these five kinds of roles, the Sons of the Victorious One are like a father to sentient beings] (śraddhāyāḥ sarvasattvesvā sarvadā cāvaropanāt | adhīśādīśāsādyāṃ vimuktagā ca nīyojanāt || buddhādhyeyaṁ nātā caivaṁ avṛtē ca)
The beneficial resource that produces invulnerability is [i] the one thanks to which a bodhisattva endowed with [it] is protected (lit. by a protection) twice as strongly as a universal king (cakravartidvignenārakṣaṇārakṣita). The protection [provided] by it (i.e. punya) being always present, wild animals (vyāda), malignant beings (yakṣa), demons (or perhaps ‘inhuman beings’) (amanuṣya), or monsters (naivāsika) are not able to do [him] any harm, even during sleep, insanity, [or] carelessness.

[ii] Further, this bodhisattva, who has exchanged [his] life [for another] (i.e. in his next and following lives), [will.] possessing as he does the beneficial resources, become someone who hardly suffers from disease, [someone who] is healthy by nature and [will] never be affected by either long-term or severe disease. And when he strains [himself] bodily for the sake of sentient beings, concerning the affairs of sentient beings, and expounds the teachings

vivarjanāt | paścabbhi karmabhī satvāpiśkalpā jināmajāḥ ||]. See also the gunādhikāra of the Mahāyānasūrāśaṁkāra, where a bodhisattva is compared to a mother (mātṛ), a relative (bandhu), a friend (mitra), a servant (dāsa), a teacher (ācārya), and a preceptor (upādhyāya) of sentient beings, based on corresponding sets of five roles that he plays.

320 For the term avyābādha, see CPD, s.v. avyāpajja, where two meanings are provided: (a) ‘not (to be) injured,’ and (b) ‘not injuring.’ Cf. also BHSD, s.v. avyābādha. In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, avyābādha has been used to refer to beneficial resources (punya) (as in this case), to happiness (sukha), and to a bodhisattva. See Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.3 (WOGIHARA, pp. 25.11–13, 26.9–12, 27.6–8; DUTT, pp. 17.14–15, 18.3–4, 18.17–18), ibid. 1.5 (WOGIHARA, p. 73.20–21; DUTT, p. 51.20–21).

321 In my division of the passage (i–v), I follow here Sāgaramegha’s Bodhisattvabhūmiavākhyā (P, fol. 35a5–6; D, fol. 30b7; S, vol. 75, p. 679.15–16), who comments under five points on the advantages for a bodhisattva in possessing beneficial resources that produce invulnerability. According to him, such a bodhisattva enjoys: (i) invulnerability in this lifetime and the next, (ii) indefatigability (i.e. experiencing neither mental nor physical exhaustion), (iii) ideal physical and mental bases (i.e. being free from baseness), (iv) effectiveness of speech (i.e. mantras used by him are effective), and (v) magnanimity of mind (i.e. tolerance and benignity).

322 It should be noted that the text does not intend to imply here that a universal king (cakravartin) is defended or protected (ārakṣita), or neeča protection at all. On the contrary, a universal king is portrayed as being invincible. He is said to be accompanied by a spontaneous presence of his armed forces at all times. See SCHMITHAUSEN 1999a: 55a.

323 W and MS N add ‘or human’ (manuṣyā vā). Nevertheless, its omission by D and MS P, and by both Chinese and Tibetan translations as well, is too significant to be brushed aside. I have the impression that manuṣyā vā could well be a secondary reading. The phrase could have been added by the scribe as a result of the erroneous presumption that manuṣyā vā must be preceded by its antithesis manuṣyā vā (as is commonly the case when listing classes of sentient beings). Contextually, however, the text obviously does not intend to provide such a list but rather to express the notion that a person who has generated the resolve to become a buddha is immune to harm caused by yakṣas or any potentially dangerous non-humans, even when in the most vulnerable states, such as sleep, insanity, or carelessness.

324 The word naivāsika as an adjective of nivāsa (PW, s.v. naivāsika)—also recorded by BHSD, s.v. naivāsika, PED, s.v. nevāsika and CPD, s.v. āvāsika—means ‘resident.’ Especially when referring to Buddhist monks, naivāsika is used in contradistinction to āgantuka ‘visiting.’ See CPD, s.v. āgantuka and āvāsika. In the present context, however, naivāsika is used to denote a category of beings explained by Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. naivāsika) as ‘some sort of monster, python or the like.’ This meaning does not need to be known in Pāli or in classical Sanskrit. The Tibetan translation does not appear to have taken naivāsika as a category of beings but rather as an adjective qualifying other categories, which may indicate that the manuscript(s) used by the Tibetans translators did not read vā after naivāsika: dgu pā’ am gnod sbyin nam | mi ma yin pā gnyug mar gnas pa’ rnam kyi gtshe bar mī nus pa’ o|. The Chinese translation has characters for ‘house spirit.’

325 Cf. Ramāvalī 3.17–18; Bodhicaryavatāra 1.19:

tataḥ prabhṛtya saptasya pramattasyāpya anekasah |
| avicchinnāḥ punyadhārāḥ pravarantie nabhayasmāḥ |

For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 41.
(dharma) verbally, [his] body does not become at all exhausted, or [his] attention lax, [and his] [concentrative] thought (citta)\textsuperscript{326} does not deteriorate.

[iii] A bodhisattva who abides in [his] spiritual disposition (gotrastha) is, in the first place, of lesser baseness by [his] very nature. However, [a bodhisattva] who has generated the resolve [to become a buddha] (utpādācittā)\textsuperscript{327} becomes of much less baseness, [as far as] the baseness of body (kāyadauṣṭhulya),\textsuperscript{329} the baseness of speech (vāgadauṣṭhulya),\textsuperscript{330} and the baseness of mind (cittadauṣṭhulya) [are concerned].

[iv] And even those magical formulas (mantrapada) [and] formulas of knowledge (vidyāpada)\textsuperscript{331}—[namely], the pacifiers of plague, calamities, [and] contagious diseases [that affect] sentient beings—[that were previously] ineffective in the hands of sentient beings other than that [bodhisattva], become effective [once they] have come into his hands. What need is there to speak of [formulas being] effective [in the hands of other sentient beings]!

[v] And [he] happens to be endowed with additional patience [and] benignity (kṣaṁtisaurotya).\textsuperscript{332} [He] is someone who endures the pain caused by others but who does not inflict pain on others. [He] is extremely distressed upon perceiving someone being hurt by somebody else. And [even if] his defilements, such as wrath, jealousy, deviousness, and evasiveness, occasionally arise in him, yet [their] impetus is impeded, and being weakened, [they] soon recede. And in what[ever] locale in the village [he] resides, the hitherto unarisen hazards of danger, terror, [and] famine and calamities caused by non-humans do not arise there, while [those that have already] arisen become pacified. Moreover, if a bodhisattva who has generated the initial resolve [to become a buddha] happens to be (re)born in the hell realms, the

\textsuperscript{326} Contextually, the term citta here does not seem to stand for bodhicitta or to be used in a technical sense (set off against caïta) but rather is a virtual synonym of samādhī.

\textsuperscript{327} Cf. W and D\textsuperscript{i} which read bodhicittas.

\textsuperscript{328} The comparative form mandatara (as read by PDW\textsuperscript{K}) is perhaps contextually preferable to manda\textsuperscript{c} (read by W and D\textsuperscript{i}). MS N, too, though badly damaged, seems to have the same reading as PDW\textsuperscript{K}.

\textsuperscript{329} See the explanation of kāyadauṣṭhulya given in the Daśadharmaśūra (cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, BENDALL, pp. 116.16–17; VAIĐYA, p. 66.14–15): “[This has] also been taught in the Daśadharmaśūra. The shaking of hands, the shaking of legs, running, roaming, and jumping—this is called the baseness of body” (tathā daśadharmaśūre ‘pi desītam | hastavikṣepah pādavikṣepo dhāvanam paridhāvanam langhanam plavanam idam ucyate kāyadauṣṭhulyam iti |). According to this explanation, kāyadauṣṭhulya seems to mean ‘physical hyperactivity’ or the ‘lack of bodily control.’ However, it can also mean ‘physical heaviness or stiffness.’

\textsuperscript{330} Note that vāgadauṣṭhulyena has been omitted in MSS P and N. Wogihara remarks that it was also omitted in both the Chinese and Tibetan translations. However, in the case of the Tibetan, this is not quite precise. Although the Tibetan translation indeed omits vāg. it does not seem to have omitted dauṣṭhulyena (if not this very form), for it reads sems kyi gnas ngan len gyi gnas ngan len for the immediately following cittadauṣṭhulyena. It is unclear whether the original reading had vāgadauṣṭhulyena, which was later mistakenly omitted (first partially, provided the MS/S used for the Tibetan translation had dauṣṭhulyena three times, and later wholly, as in MSS P and N) or whether it had nothing corresponding to vāgadauṣṭhulyena at all, which would mean that the phrase may be a later interpolation (possibly first mistakenly adding dauṣṭhulyena and later deliberately adding vāg, assuming that all three—body, speech, and mind—are contextually relevant here).

\textsuperscript{331} Perhaps it is necessary to note that the occurrence of the terms mantrapada and vidyāpada here by no means implies any affiliation with Vajrayāna. The belief in the power of mantras and their use for non-soteriological purposes seem to be a common pan-Indian phenomenon (within both Buddhist and non-Buddhist traditions). See SCHMITHAUSEN 1997, where a detailed study of aspects of the Buddhist attitude toward what by nature is dangerous, particularly the use of friendliness (maitrī) and magical formulas as methods of self-defence. See also SKILLING 1992: 109–182. In non-tantric Mahāyāna sources, then, there are various references to mantra, vidyā, and dhārani, which cannot be discussed here (Mālamadhyamakakārikā 24.11; Bodhicaryāvatāra 3.19; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 21). The various mantras prescribed in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, pp. 138.14–142.15; VAIĐYA, pp. 77.8–79.5), for example, are obviously all meant for non-soteriological purposes.

\textsuperscript{332} For the word sauratya (Pāli soracca), see BHSD, s.v. sūrata.
lower destinations, he is freed from hell very quickly, experiences the feeling of suffering less vehemently and generates intense agitation (samvega) (i.e. a great sense of renunciation) and compassion in his heart (karunācittā) towards these sentient beings, in virtue of possessing the beneficial resources that produce invulnerability.

In this way, a bodhisattva who has generated the initial resolve [to become a buddha] experiences many such benefits, because he possesses the beneficial resources that produce invulnerability.

One finds similar eulogies of bodhicitta in several other Mahāyāna sources. For example, it is said that all the remaining bodhisattva practices are ancillaries of bodhicitta. According to Atiśa, bodhicitta is that which causes the erosion of all lower modes of existence, release from all obstructions, and bestows the state of complete awakening. According to the Ratnakūṭasūtra, as cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, bodhicitta precedes all courses of actions of a bodhisattva. The Bodhicittavivarana states that the benefit of meditating upon bodhicitta even a moment cannot be estimated even by the Buddha, while precious bodhicitta free from intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa) is the only supreme wealth that can be neither damaged nor stolen by any robber like Māra who takes the form of intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśamāra). In the Bhadrakalpikāsūtra, it is stated that

333 Note that the Tibetan translation does not have an equivalent for the term narakebhyah.

334 The term samvega translated as ‘perturbation’ (BHSD, s.v.) or ‘eine heftige Gemüthsaufregung’ (PW, s.v.) does not seem to mean in a Buddhist spiritual context such as this any kind of normal agitation, but rather a specific sense of agitation at what Johnston calls ‘the inherent rottenness of the world’ (JOHNSTON 1936: 32. n. 4), and one which causes a person to renounce worldly aspirations and to seek spiritual goals such as Buddhahood. Note, however, that all editions of the Tibetan translation consulted read skye ba, which makes no sense. This faulty reading does not seem to reflect a mistake made by the translators, for in the preceding chapter (Gosrapaṭala) the contextually relevant expression adhimāram samvegam upādayati (bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1, WOGHARA, p. 10.16–17; DUTT, p. 7.4) has been correctly translated as shas cer skyo ba bskyed par ‘gyur ro. Thus the misreading of the word skyo ba as skye ba, which can easily be explained onographically, must have been made during the textual transmission, and that too, perhaps, at a relatively early stage, for all editions unanimously read skye ba. Repeated occurrences of words like skye ba and bskyed in the neighbouring text may have been the main reason why the editors of the various Tibetan editions did not become aware of the misreading. The reading skye ba does not make sense here, but since expressions such as skye ba’i skye ba (jātījāti) and skye ba skye ba (upāda upadaye) are not unknown to Tibetan scholars, they may have interpreted the adverb shin tu in the sentence skye ba yang shin tu skye bar ‘gyur ro as ‘repeatedly,’ thus reading ‘birth is also taken repeatedly.’ Having an acceptable, if improbable, reading, the editors doubtless felt no need to emend the text, let alone look for similar readings elsewhere in it.

335 Bodhicittavivarana 100:
   gzungs rnam dang ni sa rnam dang ||
   sangs rgyas pa rol phyin gang dag ||
   de dog byang chub sms kyi char ||
   kun mkhyen rnam kyi gsungs pa yin ||.
For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 67.

336 Cittotpādasamvaravidi (P, fol. 284a2; D, fol. 245a7; S, vol. 65, p. 667.5–7):
   ngan song thams cad ‘ig pa dang ||
   sgrub pa thams cad ias grol zhing ||
   rdzogs sangs go ‘phang stisol mdzad pa ||
   byang chub sms la phyag ‘tshal lo ||.


338 Bodhicittavivarana 108–109:
   skye bu gang zhig skad cig tsam ||
   byang chub sms ni sgom byed pa ||
the amount of merit acquired by generating bodhicitta once would surpass even the amount of merit accrued by providing happiness to all sentient beings for thousands of aeons. The generation of bodhicitta is also praised as one of the three best ways to honour and render service to the Buddha. The following stanza from the Viradattapariprercchasūtra has often been cited by Indian and Tibetan authors to demonstrate the potentiality of bodhicitta to generate an immeasurable amount of merit:

If the beneficial resources [accrued] from bodhicitta were material,
They would fill the sphere of space, and would [even] exceed [it].

5. Concluding Remarks

The sum and substance of this rather long chapter is that bodhicitta—fundamentally, the desire to become a buddha for the sake of other sattvas—is what defines a bodhisattva and sets him apart from a normal sattva, and that the vehicle in which a bodhisattva (or a sattva with bodhicitta) advances is called Mahāyāna. We have also considered various models of vehicles corresponding to sentient beings with various predispositions and alternative destinations. According to the general Mahāyāna perception, the only way to Buddhahood is through Mahāyāna, the only person eligible to enter Mahāyāna is a bodhisattva, and the only factor that makes one a bodhisattva is bodhicitta. I have also tried to argue, albeit only briefly, that analysing the concept of vajrasattva may reveal at least a piece of the underlying philosophy of Vajrayāna or tantric Mahāyāna. Specifically, the notion that the quest for bodhi

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339 Bhadrakalpaśūtra (T, fol. 25b5–6; D, fol. 18a2):
gang gis bskal pa bye ba stong tshang bar
sems can kun la bde ba byin pa bas
la las byang csub mchod smsgs gcig bskyed pa
‘de yi’ [de’i T] bsod nams dper yang bsod mi ’gyur ||

340 Sāgaramatipariprercchasūtra, as cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 313.6–7; VAIKYA, p. 166.18–19);
trīṃśaḥni śāgaramate tathāgatasya niruttarāni pūjopāsthāni | katamāṁ trīṇi | yac ca bodhicittam utpādayati
yac ca sattvesu mahākāruncittam utpādayati || For an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 279. Such an idea is expressed also in the Tathāgataścintyayugānirdeśasūtra (T, fol. 305b1–4; D, fol. 201b1–3). For some additional sources, see ZANGMO & CHIME 1993: 8–9, n. 2.

341 Viradattapariprercchasūtra, as cited in the First Bhāvanākrama (p. 192.10–11):
bodhicittād vai yat punyam tac ca rápi bhaved yadi
ākāśādhūtum sampūrya bhūyās cōtārītam bhavet ||
The verse is found also in the Tathāgataścintyayugānirdeśasūtra (T, fol. 192a4–5; D, fol. 130b5–6), which is cited in the Śūtrasamuccaya (p. 24.8–13). See also the Rim gis ’jug pa’i sgom don (P, fol. 401a5–6; D, fol. 343b5; S, vol. 64, p. 963.9–12); Theg pa’i bye brag (A, fol. 172a6–b1; B, p. 40.11–14). Cf. also Bodhicittavivarana 107:
byang chub smsgs bskyed tsam gis ni
bsod nams phung po gang thob pa
gal te gzugs can yin na ni
nam mkha’ gang ba las ni lhag ||

For an English translation, see LINDTNER 1997: 69. Cf. Mañjuśrīmitra’s Bodhicittabhāvanā (P, fol. 5a8–b1; D, fol. 4b2; S, vol. 33, pp. 815.20–816.1):
de phyor byang chub smsgs kyi bsod nams de ’a gzugs yod na
nam mkha’ bar snang de yang snod du chungs [chugs D] ’ches rgyal bas mtshungs par gsungs ||
in a *sattva’s citta* itself, and that the true nature of *bodhi, citta*, and *sattva* is one, indivisible, and indestructible, like a diamond (*vajra*), seems to be crucial for understanding the concepts of Vajrayāna, *vajrasattva*, and *bodhicittavajra*. An attempt has been made to trace the historical roots of the term *bodhicitta* and discuss its definitions, benefits, and functions on the basis of some of the most important Mahāyāna sources.
Chapter Six

The Two Bodhicittotpāda Traditions

Those who hold the reins of logical reasoning (nyāya)
While riding the chariots (ratha) of the two systems (nāya).
Would, for that [very] reason,
Earn the meaningful [appellation] ‘Mahāyānika.’

— Śāntaraksita, Madhyamakālāṃkāra 93

1. Introductory Remarks

Sa-pan raised three important issues concerning the generation of bodhicitta by ritual procedure (vidhi).\(^2\) Firstly, he made a case for recognising the existence of two ritual traditions relating to bodhicittotpāda, namely, that of the Yogācāra and that of the Madhyamaka, and argued for clearly distinguishing them from one another. Secondly, he critically examined the authenticity of generating absolute bodhicitta by means of ritual. Thirdly, Sa-pan criticised what he called the tradition of the ‘dream-based cittotpāda [rite]’ (sems bskyed rmi lam ma) attributed to dGe-bshes Phyag-sor-ba.\(^3\) The two traditions of bodhicitta (or cittotpāda) seem to be of great significance for the theory and practice of the

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\(^1\) Madhyamakālāṃkāra 93 (ICHIGO 1989: 222):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{tshul gnyis sking rta zhon nas su} & || \\
\text{rigs pa'i sras skyogs 'ju byed pa} & || \\
\text{de dag de phyir ji bzšin don} & || \\
\text{theg pa chen po po nyid 'thob} & ||
\end{align*}
\]

Cf. the English translation in ICHIGO 1989: 223. See also below n. 7.

\(^2\) For a brief discussion of the expressions ‘ritual’ and ‘ritual procedure,’ see §5.

\(^3\) sDom gsum rab dbyer 2.5:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{la la skye bo 'ga' zhig gi} & || \\
\text{rmi lam gyi ni rjes 'brangs nas} & || \\
\text{sens can kun la sens skye' byed} & ||
\end{align*}
\]

For an English translation, see RHOTON 2002: 81. The ‘some’ (la la) in the verse has been identified by Go-rams-pa bSod-nams-seng-ge (1429–1489) as dGe-bshes Phyag-sor-ba (RHOTON 2002: 92, n. 3; JACKSON 1994: 167–168, n. 343).
Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna doctrine. I shall, therefore, attempt to present in this chapter an account of the Tibetan perceptions of the two bodhicittotpāda traditions, with particular reference to the ritual procedures of each. In the process, I shall demonstrate how some Tibetan scholars have sought to distinguish or pry apart the two traditions, whereas others have tried to harmonise or synthesise them.

2. The Two Bodhicittotpāda Traditions

It has widely been accepted in Tibet that two traditions of bodhicittotpāda once existed in India, and were designated, for example, by Sa-paṅ, as the Madhyamaka tradition (dbu ma’i lugs) and Cittamātra tradition (sems tsam pa’i lugs). Some Tibetan authors have made a case for the need to keep these two traditions separate by emphasising their differences, whereas others have argued for a syncretism of the two by de-emphasising the same. Did two such traditions, however, indeed exist in India, or were they purely Tibetan inventions? While I am not sure whether the Indian authors actually employed the terms ‘Madhyamaka tradition’ and ‘Cittamātra tradition’ (which, although certainly justifiable, have for doctrinal reasons been found problematic by some Tibetan scholars), they clearly recognised the existence of two bodhicittotpāda traditions often associated with two distinct groups of textual authorities, such as the Bodhicaryāvatāra and Bodhisattvabhumi, and personal authorities, such as Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. Moreover, the Tibetan attempts to segregate or syncretise the two traditions also seem to have their Indian antecedents.

Broadly speaking, two traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhism have existed in India, namely, Prajñāpāramitā-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Tathāgatagarbha. Following Tibetan and some modern scholars, we may designate these traditions as the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna ‘negative-intellectual’ and the Maitreya-Asaṅga ‘positive-mystical’ school, respectively, around which the entire history of the Tibetan reception and systematisation of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism (including Vajrayāna) is, in one way or another, centred. For Indian scholars such as Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the entire Mahāyāna doctrine can be contained in the dual systems (naya: tshul) of Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, which by and large correspond to the two pioneering Mahāyāna traditions designated by Tibetans (and probably based on Madhyamakālaṃkāra 93 cited above) as the ‘Two Chariots’ (shing rtsa gnyis).

In the context of bodhicitta or cittotpāda, too, as I have indicated in chapter four and shall show in chapter seven, two strands of Mahāyāna can be traced in Indian sources—designated by me as Strand A and Strand B—each of which seems to differ in its

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4 It will be interesting to know whether any comparable doctrinal issue has been raised in other Mahāyāna traditions, such as Chinese or Japanese Buddhism.

5 sDom gsun rab dbya 2.2cd:
   theg pa chen po’i sems bskyed la ||
   dbu ma sems tsam rnam pa gnyis ||.

6 For a discussion of the ‘negative-intellectual’ and ‘positive-mystical’ currents in India and Tibetan ways of dealing with them in the context of the tathāgatagarbha theory, see WANGCHUK 2004: 191–203.

7 See n. 1 and the Madhyamakālaṃkāraavṛtti (P, fols. 79b7–80a3; D, fols. 79b7–80a3; S, vol. 62, pp. 964.20–965.10), where Lankāvatārāsūtra 6.5 and 10.638 (see chapter five, n. 97) is also mentioned in this regard. See also Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakālaṃkārapaṇījikā (P, fol. 138b7; D, fol. 129b6; S, vol. 62, p. 1094.9–10) which states: tshul gnyis zhes bya ba ni dbu ma pa dang rnal ’byor spyod pa zhes bya’o ||. The attempt to harmonise the positions of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga can be seen, for example, in Ratnākarasānti’s Ratnālokālaṃkāra (P, fol. 340b6–b1; D, fol. 291b2–3; S, vol. 64, p. 807.8–12). See also SEYFORT RUEGG 1981: 122–124.
terminological preferences, perhaps also in regard to the place and time of inception and in its degree of conservatism. Strand A seems to more or less correspond to the Cittamātra tradition, and Strand B to the Madhyamaka tradition. This is particularly conspicuous if one compares the criteria for candidates as prescribed in the two traditions, a point to which we shall return. It is said that according to the Madhyamaka tradition one does not even need to be a human being in order to generate bodhicitta, whereas according to the Cittamātra tradition one is required to have taken some sort of prātimokṣa vow as a prerequisite. I believe that, disregarding the various Tibetan interpretations for the time being, this point simply shows that Strand A, which corresponds to the Cittamātra tradition, is conceived along less idealistic lines and is indeed quite realistic and down-to-earth in its approach. For example, the Bodhisattvabhūmi (which I said represents the textual tradition of Strand A) was very likely compiled for human beings who wanted to become bodhisattvas; the possibility of a nāga-king reading it was not entertained! I have, however, also mentioned that the two strands do not seem to have run parallel to each other all the way along, but merged at a certain point in time.

We should certainly like to know when and where the two traditions of bodhicittotpāda are explicitly spelt out for the first time in Tibet. Although Sa-paṅ was indeed responsible for emphasising the distinction between the two traditions, neither he nor his Indian teacher Śākyasrībhadrā (1140–1225) appear to have been the first scholar to introduce or thematise them. The position that Sa-paṅ criticised in his sDom gsum rab dbye must have existed even before his time. If the dating of bKa’-gdams-pa dGe-bshes Sha-ra-ba Yon-tan-grags (1070–1141) is correct, and if the relevant citations from his Lam rim are reliable, then there must have been a position that is similar to, if not identical with, the one proposed by Sa-paṅ, for it is precisely such a position that Sha-ra-ba seems to reject. We shall, however, return to this point later. Sha-ra-ba’s own position may be traced back to the works of Atiśa (or works ascribed to him), for Sha-ra-ba was a direct disciple of Po-to-ba Rin-chen-gsal (1031–1105), who in turn was a disciple of ’Brom-ston rGyal-ba'i-'byung-gnas (1005–1064), one of the three main Tibetan disciples of Atiśa. But what about the position that Sa-paṅ himself maintained? Although Śākyasrībhadrā influenced Sa-paṅ in these matters, he had apparently not been his only source. In fact, Sa-paṅ’s response to the query of Chag Lo-tṣā-ba Chos-rje-dpal, or simply Chag-lo (1197–1264), suggests that while Śākyasrībhadrā recognised the existence of the two traditions in India and disproved the mixture of the two, he did not in fact properly transmit either of them, for he had forgotten to bring the relevant manuals with him to Tibet. This suggests that the local Tibetans were already knowledgeable about the two traditions. Sa-paṅ seems to have thus thematised and systematised the two traditions of bodhicittotpāda known to his Indian and Tibetan predecessors.

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8 For some bibliographical details of Śākyasrībhadrā, see Jackson 1987: 183. n. 24, and for accounts of Sa-paṅ’s studies with Śākyasrībhadrā and his disciples, see ibid. 26–27, 107–112; Rhoton 2002: 11–12.

9 Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 26. See also Tshig mdzod chen mo, s.v. sha ra ba.

10 This may be what is also known as the Be'u 'bum dmar po (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 25–26). Cf. Tshig mdzod chen mo, s.vv. Be'u bum khra bo and Be'u bum sngon po.

11 In his response to the next query, Sa-paṅ once again underscores the differences between the two traditions. For the pertinent queries, see the Chag lo'i zhu ba (pp. 456.5–457.2). For Sa-paṅ’s responses, see the Chag lo'i zhus lan (pp. 463.1–466.5; 473.4–475.4). For an English translation, see Rhoton 2002: 215–218.

12 Sa-paṅ’s uncle Grags-pa-rgyal-mtshan (1147–1216), in his skYabs sems cho ga (p. 438.3–5), discusses the custom of two lineages (bgyud pa gnis kyi lugs) in regard to the bodhicittotpāda ritual procedures. It is clear, however, that the two lineages in question are those of the Nāgārjuna-Nāropa and the Virūpa-Gayādharā lineages, and not to be equated with the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra traditions. Kong-sprul also notes that the
3. Tibetan Assessments of the Two Bodhicittotpāda Traditions

As I have just pointed out, the two strands of the bodhicittotpāda tradition had probably existed in Tibet prior to Sa-paṅ, although it was clearly he who spelled out the differences for the first time and thus left an indelible mark on the history of the bodhicitta doctrine in Tibet. This, however, by no means implies that Sa-paṅ’s view of this issue was received with unanimous approval. On the contrary, it received mixed reactions from various Tibetan scholars, whom I categorise into three groups:

(a) The first group comprises mainly mainstream Sa-skya-paṅ along with scholars from other traditions including the rNying-ma scholars Klong-chen-paṅ13 and mNga’-ris Paṅ-chen Padma-dbang-rgyal (1487–1542) who looked upon Sa-paṅ’s proposition approvingly, and so for the most part followed the Madhyamaka tradition. Let us call this group, which emphasised the qualitative distinctions and other differences between the two bodhicittotpāda traditions, ‘Group A’.14

(b) Another group, which judged the two traditions of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga to be of equal rank, seems to have viewed Sa-paṅ’s position with a certain degree of ambivalence. In principle, they probably had no difficulty with the distinction between the two traditions as such, only with the basis upon which the distinction was made, namely, the philosophical view (lta ba). Thus this group, while accepting the distinction, attempted to harmonise them. The shift of terminology from dbu ma’i lugs and sms pa’i lugs to zab mo lta ba’i srol and rgya chen spyod pa’i srol, respectively, is, in my view, not coincidental. We shall call this group ‘Group B’.

(c) The third group represents the rival position towards which Sa-paṅ’s critique was directed, namely, the followers of the bKa’-gdams-pa tradition (such as Sha-ra-ba) and their successors, primarily the dGe-lugs-pas. Sha-ra-ba argued that if the bodhicittotpāda ritual taught by Asaṅga had been exclusively according to the Cittamātra tradition, the Madhyamikas would not have followed it, but Atiśa, who was a Madhyamika, did. In addition, Kamalaśīla, who was also a Madhyamika, explained in his Second Bhāvanākrama the generation of the resolve to solve for awakening according to the ritual taught in the Śīlapaṭala of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (ascribed to Asaṅga). Therefore, for Sha-ra-ba, the difference between the two traditions is unclear or superfluous.15 One of the main concerns of this group seems to be to associate Atiśa and the bKa’-gdams-pas with the Cittamātra tradition. This group obviously makes a case for the syncretism of the two traditions by adopting two strategies, namely, (i) by arguing that the two traditions are essentially the same and that the claims regarding the dissimilarities between them is not justified, for they see no

Sa-skya-paṅ have yet another Madhyamaka-like bodhicittotpāda tradition transmitted from Virūpa and Nāropa. which is, however, not counted as a third tradition. See the Shes bya mdzod (p. 354.18–20): yang grub chen bi rū pa dang nā ro pa’i gdams ngag rje btsun sa skya pa chen po la bka’ bohs pa dbang gi sngon ’gro i sms bskyed kyi cho ga dbu ma dang cha mthun pa zur de bzhugs kyang shing rta’i ring srol logs su mi bgrang ngo ||.

13 It must be said, however, that although Klong-chen-paṅ mainly followed the Madhyamaka tradition, a slight tendency to harmonise the two bodhicittotpāda traditions can be noticed in his writings.

14 Shes bya mdzod (p. 354.13–15): bod ’dir klu thogs rnam gnyis dbu sms lta bu’i rkang btsugs mkhan du bzhed pa mang bas sms bskyed lugs gnyis kyang dbu sms kyi lugs gnyis zhes shin tu tha dad cing menog dman che bar mdzad la…

15 sPryod ’grel bum bzang (pp. 130.22–131.3): lugs de gnyis la dbu ma lugs dang sms tsam lugs kyi tha snyad mdzad pa sogs mi ’thad par dge bshes sha ra ba’i lam rim du bshad do | de nyid las | ola ba tha dad pas kyang khyad par de dag sgrub par mi nus pas dbu ma pa dang sms tsam gyi sms bskyed pa gnyis mi mthun par ’dod pa gzhung gi dgongs pa ma yin no || zhes dang ’u phugs pa thogs med kyis gsun pa’i cho ga sms tsam kha na’i lugs su nges na dbu ma pas de mi byed par ’gyur na | jo bo rje dbu ma pa yin yang cho ga de’i lugs su mdzad pa dang | shob dpon ka ma la shi las sgom rim bar pa las tshul khrims le’u las bstan pa’i cho gas sms bskyed par bshad pas lugs nges pa med par gsal l5 zhes gsun s.
basis of such dissimilarities, and (ii) by pointing out that such a syncretic tradition has its Indian antecedent, which, according to them, was practised by various Indian masters such as Bodhibhadra, Abhayākaragupta, and Atiśa. The line of demarcation that Sa-paṅ drew between the two bodhicittotpāda traditions seems to have put this group into a state of doctrinal discomfiture, and it wanted this line deleted. We shall call the third group ‘Group C.’ Followers of sGam-po-pa such as Kun-mkhyen Padma-dkar-po (1527–1592) and dPa’-bo gTsug-lag-phreng-ba (1504–1564/1566) also belong to this group, which rejects any difference as far as both terminologies and contents are concerned. Padma-dkar-po even resorted to authoritative scriptures and logical reasoning to establish the uniformity and equality of the two traditions and to criticise the position which held the two traditions to be separate and qualitatively different. In the following few paragraphs, we shall take a closer look at each of the attributed distinctions between the two traditions and see how each is assessed, broadly speaking, by these three different groups of scholars.

4. The Names of the Two Bodhicittotpāda Traditions

The first issue I should like to discuss is the terminology used to designate the two traditions, which, as I have already noted, may vary from one group to another. As indicated above, it is doubtful whether any of the terminologies employed by Tibetan scholars to do so can be traced as such to Indian sources. Group A, represented by Sa-paṅ, labelled the two as the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra traditions. This is easily justifiable if, as one is very inclined to accept, the Bodhicaryāvatāra by Śāntideva is regarded as a Madhyamaka work, and the Bodhisattvabhūmi, attributed to Asaṅga by the Indo-Tibetan tradition as a Yogācāra work. However, it seems that the designation of the Maitreyas-Asaṅga tradition as Cittamātra was found by Group B to be imprecise, or perhaps denigrating, since the Cittamātra or Yogācāra system is considered only second in rank in the fourfold Buddhist doxographical schema. The less-favoured term ‘Cittamātra tradition’ was therefore replaced by the term ‘Tradition of Vast Conduct’ (rgya chen spyon pa’i srol), while the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition came to be called the ‘Tradition of the Profound View’ (zab mo lta ba’i srol). Group C rejected the terms ‘Cittamātra tradition’ and ‘Madhyamaka tradition’ in deference to dGe-bshes Sha-rab’s Lam rim, according to which Atiśa (in his commentary on the Bodhipathapradīpa) made a distinction between the ritual procedure of bodhicittotpāda and that of the bodhisattva vow,

16 Tsong-kha-pa is said to have maintained that the Indian masters Bodhibhadra and Abhayākaragupta performed the bodhicittotpāda ritual as a mixture of the two traditions. See the sPyod ’grel ’bum bzang (p. 131.4–5): gzhan yang slob dpon byang chub bzang po dang mkhas pa chen po a bhyā [= bha yā] ka ras shing rta chen po gnyis kyi lugs bsres nas mzdad pa dang ]. Cf. the Shes bya mdzod (p. 354.16): slob dpon a bha yas [= yās] de gnyis khyad par med par bzhed la ].

17 Shes bya mdzod (p. 354.16–18): kun mkhyen pad dkar zhas sogs kyi de mtshungs su sgrub cing snga ma la tung rigs kyi ’gog par mzdad ] dpal ldan gtsug lag phreng ba sogs kyang rje sgam po ba’i rjes su ’brang ngo []). Padma-dkar-po’s discussion of the two bodhicittotpāda traditions in general can be found in his sDom gsum snying po (pp. 538.5–558.2); sDom gsum rgyan (pp. 604.3–611.3); sDom gsum rgyan ’grel II (pp. 6.6–99.2). The position of gTsug-lag-phreng-ba regarding the two traditions can be found in his sPyod ’jug rnam bshad (pp. 52.2–55.1).

18 These designations are, for example, by mNgag-ri-paṅ-chen. See his sDom gsum rnam rgyas (p. 20.1–2): ‘jam dbyangs bka’ bsdus klu sgrub sogs kyi bkral || zhi ba lhas spel zab mo lta ba’i lugs || byams pas bka’ bsdus thogs med sku mchod bkral || jo bo rjes spel rgya chen spyod pa’i srol ||. Padma-dkar-po (sDom gsum rgyan, p. 604.3–4), however, uses terms such as the ‘Two Traditions of the Great Chariots’ (shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis), specified in his sDom gsum snying po (p. 538.5–6) as the ‘Route of the Vast Conduct’ (rgya chen spyod pa’i phyogs) and the ‘Route of the Profound View’ (zab mo lta ba’i phyogs).
but since his own tradition in this regard accords with the traditions (lugs) of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Śāntideva, there is in reality (don la) no difference between the bodhicittaotpāda ritual procedures of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga.\textsuperscript{19} This is why the terms ‘Tradition of the Profound View’ and ‘Tradition of Vast Conduct’ are preferable from the standpoint of Group C. It will be interesting to find out when these terms were used for the first time in Tibet, and whether they can be traced in Indian literature.\textsuperscript{20}

Gro-lung-pa Blo-gros-'byung-gnas (fl. the second half of the eleventh century and early twelfth century), in his bsTan rim chen mo,\textsuperscript{21} obviously recognised these two traditions of the bodhicittaotpāda ritual procedures, but he did not use the terms ‘Cittamātra tradition’ and ‘Madhyamaka tradition.’\textsuperscript{22} This is also the case in the Dwags po thar rgyan.\textsuperscript{23} Both Gro-lung-pa and sGam-po-pa have apparently followed the Bodhimmārgaprādpāpañjikā (ascribed to Atiśa)\textsuperscript{24} in this regard. Gro-lung-pa, however, mentions Atiśa in the lineage of the Maitreya tradition. In the following, I shall employ the terms ‘Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition’ and ‘Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition’ instead of the designations ‘Tradition of the Profound View’ and ‘Tradition of Vast Conduct’ or the designations ‘Madhyamaka Tradition’ and ‘Cittamātra Tradition’ employed by Tibetan scholars.

\textsuperscript{19} sPyod 'grel bum bzang (p. 130.19–21): jo bos sens bskyed dang sdom pa'i cho ga so sor mdzad la de yang shing rta chen po klu sgrub thogs med gnis dang rgyal sras zhi ba'i lha dang gsum ka'i lugs yin par lam sgron 'grel par gdungs pas na klu thogs gnis sdom pa len pa'i cho ga la don la khya'd par med do ||. Atiśa outlines positions of several Indian masters in the Bodhimārgaprādpāpañjikā (P, fols. 287b2–288b3; D, fols. 249b3–250b1; S, vol. 64, pp. 1670.21–1673.3; SHERBURN 2000: 72–73), and adds that, according to his masters, one should follow the traditions one has received from one's guru and that since his own gurus, Bodhichadra and Suvarṇadvipa, followed the traditions of Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Śāntideva, he does the same. He explicitly states that the bodhicittaotpāda ritual procedure he has written is in accordance with the traditions of these three masters. See ibid. (P, fol. 288b3–7; D, fol. 250b1–4; S, vol. 64, p. 1673.3–14).

\textsuperscript{20} Of course, compounds such as gambhirōdāra (zab cing rgya che ba) and gambhirōradharmā (zab cing rgya che ba'i chos) are attested in Indian sources (TSD, s.v.). Interestingly, bodhicitta may even be equated with gambhirōradacitta (zab cing rgya che la'ba'i sens) inasmuch as it is understood as a citta directed towards gambhirōradharmā having the nature of emptiness and compassion (śāntaśāntakarunāmaka). See the Vimalaprabhā ad 3.4 (vol. 2, p. 7.12–13, TSD, s.v. zab cing rgya che la sens: iti gambhirōradharān śāntaśāntakarunāmaka cittam yasya sa gambhirōradacitta iti... Also note that Mahāyāna has already been described as extremely vast and profound by Nāgārjuna (Ratnāvali 4.79):

\begin{quote}
   atyauḍāyātīgamabhūyād visāṇṇām akṛtaṃmabhīk | 
   nindye 'tāya mahāyānam moḥāḥ svaparāvaśīrībhī |.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{22} bsTan rim chen mo (fol. 205b4–5): 'di la dam pa'i skye bo mkhas pa dag gis lung so so la brten pa bla ma bsgyud pa'i man ngag cho ga'i tshul tha dad pa du ma snang ste | slob dpon rje bsun dpal mar me mdzad ye shes kyi ni mgon po byams pa nas bla ma gser gling pa la thug pa'i man ngag bsgyud pa la... See also ibid. (fol. 206a2): slob dpon byang chub sinds dpa' zhi ba las ni bde'n pa gzig pa'i slob dpon klu sgrub nas bsgyud pa'i man ngag las..."

\textsuperscript{23} sGam-po-pa speaks about the Śāntideva tradition transmitted in succession from Nāgārjuna and the Suvarṇadvipa tradition transmitted in succession from Maitreya and Asaṅga. See the Dwags po thar rgyan (p. 145.12–18): byeng chub kyi sinds de blang ba'i cho ga ni | bla ma mskas pa dag gi bsgyud pa'i man ngag las | tshul lugs tha dad pa du ma snang ngo | de lha snang yang ni | 'dir 'phags pa 'jam dpal nas slob dpon klu sgrub na ma la bshungs pa slob dpon zhi ba lha'i lugs dang | 'phags pa byams pa nas slob dpon thogs med na mar bsgyud pa | jo bo gser gling pa'i lugs dang gnyis su shes par bya'o ||. See also the Shes bya mdzod (p. 354.15–16): rje bla 'od gzhon nas dus sinds kyi ming ma btags |.

\textsuperscript{24} See SEYFORT RUEGG 1989: 104, where it is stated that the Bodhipatapradipāpañjikā [= Bodhimārgaprādpāpañjikā] is perhaps incorrectly ascribed to Atiśa.
5. The Two Bodhicittotpāda Traditions: The Basis of the Distinctions

Let us now consider what the distinctions made between the two traditions are based on. Group A, again represented by Śa-pan, maintained that the philosophical-doctrinal view (lta ba) was the basis for distinguishing between the two traditions. Group B has rejected this claim, either implicitly or explicitly. For it there is no qualitative difference between the philosophical-doctrinal views of the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna and the Maitreya-Asanga traditions. In this context, mkHän-po Yon-tan-igya-mtsho (b. nineteenth century), (who, I believe, represents Group B) notes that the rNyin-ma philosophical-doctrinal view accords with the Madhyamaka view professed by both traditions. That is, according to him, Asanga, too, had maintained a Madhyamaka view. He adds that this does not contradict the fact that Asanga mainly taught Yogācāra doctrines. For Sha-ra-ba (who in retrospect represents Group C), the two traditions may differ in their philosophical-doctrinal views but not in their bodhicittotpāda ritual. The philosophical-doctrinal view has always been a complicated and sensitive issue. All three groups would agree, though, that the philosophical-doctrinal view of the Yogācāra or Cittamātra system takes second place to the Madhyamaka view. The dispute is, therefore, not really about 'rescuing' or promoting the status of Yogācāra.

Varying motives seem to be behind these disputes, and often it is the pursuit of subtle doctrinal agendas. The reason why Group B cannot accept the philosophical-doctrinal view as the basis of the distinctions between the two traditions is that such a basis implies a qualitative difference between the philosophical-doctrinal views of the two traditions. That is, if Asanga’s tradition is regarded as the Yogācāra tradition, this would imply that his tradition is qualitatively inferior to that of Nāgārjuna. The motive of Group B, therefore, is to preserve the prestige of Asanga’s view by detaching it from the Yogācāra view and thus give it due place of honour alongside Nāgārjuna’s view, namely, Madhyamaka. The question now comes down to what the Madhyamaka view is—a question representing the tip of the iceberg of the complex Tibetan controversy over ‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ emptiness (rang stong and gzhan stong). The primary motive of Group C for rejecting the basis of the distinction seems to be still another: not to raise the status of Asanga’s view but rather to preclude any association of Atiśa’s bodhicittotpāda tradition with Asanga’s, and thus with Yogācāra.

6. The Two Bodhicittotpāda Traditions: Personal Authorities

A second distinction between the two traditions can be made on the basis of the pertinent personal authorities in India and their followers in Tibet. The ‘Tradition of the Profound View’ is said to have come down from Mañjuśrī and been transmitted to the Sa-skya-pas. Thus it is quite justifiably designated as the ‘Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition.’ The ‘Tradition of Vast Conduct’ is said to go back to Maitreya and Asanga and to have been passed down to the

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25 sDom gsum rab byes 2.3: 
   de gnyis lla ba tha dad pas ||
   cho ga yang ni tha dad yin ||
   ltung ba dang ni phyir bcos dang ||
   bslob par bya ba'ang so sor yod ||.
   See also RHOTON 2002: 81.

26 Rigs 'dzin 'jug ngogs (p. 120.9–13): lla ba ni srol gnyis ka dang mthun par snang ngo || de yang rgya chen spyon pa'i srol 'byed pa por grags pa'i 'phags pa thogs med sogs kyi lla ba dbu mar nges kyang grub mtha' gdul bya rnam s kyis ngor sems tsam du bkral ba shas che yang 'gal ba med do ||.

27 Skyes bya mdzod (p. 354.7–9): dang po ni | rje btsun 'jam dbyangs nas 'phags pa klu sgrub yan sras la brgyud de rgyal sras zhi ba tsha'i phyag srol jo bo pu nye [= nña] shi'i las byung ba rje btsun sa sbya pa rnams kyi phyag len du mzdad pa 'di nyid yin la |.
bKa’-gdams-pas and Dwags-po bKa’-brgyud-pas. Thus the designation ‘Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition’ is from this traditional point of view also quite justified. mNga’-ris Paṅ-chen states that the tradition inspired by Padmasambhava conforms to Nāgārjuna’s tradition. He is, it is clear, making a fine distinction here. He is not claiming that Padmasambhava’s tradition is identical with Nāgārjuna’s. There is good reason for this intended nuance. The issue of lineage in the rNying-ma tradition is, in general, a delicate one. Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho also explains that the rNying-ma bodhicittotpāda tradition, that is, the bodhicittotpāda ritual prescribed in the rNying-ma tantras, along with most of the precepts that follow from it, is in conformity with Nāgārjuna’s tradition. The distinction between the two traditions in terms of personal authorities and followers may be expressed thus in tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Authorities</th>
<th>Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna Tradition</th>
<th>Maitreya-Asaṅga Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mañjuśrī →</td>
<td>Maitreya →</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nāgārjuna &amp; Āryādeva →</td>
<td>Asaṅga &amp; Vasubandhu →</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Śāntideva →</td>
<td>Candragomin →</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan'yasrī →</td>
<td>Atiśa →</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa-skya-pas. →</td>
<td>bKa’-gdams-pas &amp; Dwags-po bKa’-brgyud-pas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Group C, consisting of the followers of or other persons connected with the Old and New bKa’-gdams-pas traditions, cannot, of course, accept the distinction presented above, particularly in view of the fact that the proposed distinction excludes Atiśa from the ‘Tradition of the Profound View.’ As already stated, according to this group, Atiśa inherited the traditions of both Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga.

7. The Two Bodhicittotpāda Traditions: Scriptural Authorities

In the bsTan-’gyur, we find some practical manuals describing the ritual procedure for conferring bodhisattva vows. One such manual is attributed to Nāgārjuna, one to Bodhibhadra, one to Jetāri, one to Atiśa, and one to Abhayākaragupta. There is also one manual by Mañjuśrīmitra and one by an anonymous author. Furthermore, short

28. Shes bya mdzod (p. 354.11–13): gnyis pa ni | 'phags pa byams pa nas thongs med sku mched la brgyud de slob dpon tsandra go mi'i (= mi'i) phyag srol jo bo rje las byung ba bka’-gdams pa dang mnyam med dwags po bka’ brgyud pa rnams kyi phyag len du mdzad pa 'di nyid yin la |

29. sDom gsun rnam nges (p. 20.2): padma'i ring lugs nā ga [= gā] rdzu na mthun ||

30. Rig 'dzin 'jug ngogs (p. 120.6–9): padma sam (= sam) bha ba'i rjes su 'jug pa snga 'gyur gvi ring lugs pa rnams ni sngags kyi rgyud sde rnams las guungs pa'i byang sdom gvi thob tshul dang | de'i bslab bya'i rkang grangs phal che r nā gā rdzu na'i lugs dang mthun pa i gnad kyi de dang mthun la…

31. Bodhicittotpādavidhi (P 5361; D 3966; S 3197, vol. 65).

32. Bodhisattvasamvaravidhi (P 5362; D 3967; S 3198, vol. 65).

33. Bodhicittotpādasamādānavidhi (P 5363; D 3968; S 3199, vol. 65). According to Sa-pa’i’s answer (no. 8) to the query of Chag-lo, this must be Jetāri’s manual of bodhicittotpāda rites (in accordance with the Madhyamaka tradition), which Sākyasribhadra forgot to take with him to Tibet (Rhoton 2002: 216).

34. Citotpādasamvaravidhi (P 5403; D 4490; S 3200, vol. 65).

35. Bodhisattvasamvaragrahanavidhi (P 5365; D 3970; S 3201, vol. 65). This must be the ritual text which Chag-lo said was used by Abhayākaragupta to confer the bodhisattva precepts upon all people, and which was not seen by Sa-pa’. See the eighth question posed by Chag-lo to Sa-pa’ (Rhoton 2002: 215–216).
manuals can be found imbedded in other works. The *dbu ma'i lugs kyi sms bykyed kyi cho ga* by Sa-paṅ may be one of the earliest among the numerous ritual manuals for bestowing and taking the *bodhisattva* vow composed in Tibet (all of them cannot be mentioned here). It must be said that, strictly speaking, most of these manuals are not compositions but rather compilations, for the greater part of such texts merely consists of passages or verses found in Indian sources, the most popular being verses from Śāntideva’s *Bodhicaryāvatāra*.

There are several reasons why we cannot find one uniform and standardised *bodhicittoṭpāda* manual, the most important being variations in the performance of the rituals. Occasionally such texts would consist of only the minimum necessary components of the procedure. The *bodhicittoṭpāda* ritual prescribed in the *Bodhisattvacāhāmi* may be one of the oldest, if not the oldest, of its kind. The scriptural authorities associated with the two traditions are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scriptural Authority</th>
<th>Mañjuśrī-Nāgarjuna Tradition</th>
<th>Maitreya-Asaṅga Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>śūtras</td>
<td>Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra</td>
<td>Bodhisattvacāhāmi (attrib. Nāgarjuna)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bhadrakalpikasūtra</td>
<td>Bodhicaryāvatāra (Śāntideva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Akāśagarbhāsūtra</td>
<td>Śikṣāsamuccaya (Śāntideva)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ṛṣṇakūṭasūtra</td>
<td>Bodhicittoṭpādasamādānavidhi (Jetāri)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kājāvādakasūtra</td>
<td>Bodhipathapradīpa (Atśa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. The Historical Background of the *Bodhicittoṭpāda* Ritual

Before I move on to discuss the likely doctrinal and historical background of the *bodhicittoṭpāda* ritual, it is perhaps necessary to devote a few words to the term ‘ritual procedure’ or ‘ritual.’ I use the expression ‘ritual procedure’ in the sense of the Sanskrit term *vidhi*, which can (among other things) mean ‘method, manner or way of acting’ or ‘any prescribed act or rite or ceremony.’ The term *vidhi* has been translated into Tibetan as *cho*

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36 Mañjuśrimitra’s *Cittotpādavidhi* (P 3388; D 2561; S 1467, vol. 33) is found in the tantric section of the bsTan-gyur. The names of the translators are not given in the colophon.

37 The Cittotpādasankṣiptavidhi (P 4743; S 2619, vol. 43) by an anonymous author is not found in the sDe-dge bsTan-gyur. Cf. the *Phang thang ma* (p. 33.10), where a certain *Byang chub tu sms bykyed pa* (containing forty-seven ślokas) is mentioned.

38 See, for example, the *Trisamvarakrama* (P, fol. 304a7–b4; D, fol. 258a1–5; S, vol. 65, pp. 714.14–715.8) and the *Caturangadharmacaryā* (P, fol. 298a2–8; D, fol. 258b1–4; S, vol. 65, p. 718.7–11).

39 JACkSON 1987: 57, works nos. 8 and 17.

40 sDom gsum rab dbye 2.10–2.11; RHTON 2002: 82.

41 The śāstra sources are mentioned by Kong-sprul in his *Shes bya mdzod* (p. 354.9–10): *de’ang klu sgrub kyi sms bykyed kyi cho ga dang* [dza tā ri’i yi dam blangs pa’i cho ga dang] *zhi ba lha’i spyod jug bslab btsus sogs las ’byung ba ltar ro* ||. Note that Sa-paṅ did not mention the *Bodhicittoṭpādavidhi* attributed to Nāgarjuna and the Śikṣāsamuccaya explicitly by name but simply stated that the Madhyamaka tradition relating to *bodhicittoṭpāda* can be found also in the writings of Nāgarjuna and Śāntideva (sDom gsum rab dbye 2.11cde; RHTON 2002: 82).

42 *Shes bya mdzod* (p. 354.13): *de’ang byang sa dang sdom pa nyi shu pa sogs las ’byung ba ltar ro* ||.

43 *MW*, s.v. *vidhi*. See also the *PW* (s.v.) particularly in the sense of (b) ‘Verfahren, Weise, Art’ or (e) ‘ein feierlicher Act, Ceremonie.’
which commonly means ‘the way or method of doing a thing.’ Jäschke, however, expressed doubt as to whether the term can be used safely to mean religious rites or ceremonies in general. The term ‘ritual’ is defined or described in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* as ‘the performance of ceremonial acts prescribed by tradition or by sacerdotal decree.’

Buddhism in general is not a ritual-oriented religion. It has been already pointed out that early Buddhism (according to the canonical texts) rejected Vedic-Brahmanical ritualism. Buddhist criticism was directed particularly against two aspects of ritualism: (a) the externality of ritual performances such as washing and their ineffectiveness regarding the post-death state or salvation, and (b) the killing of living animals, felling of trees, and razing of grass, which are incompatible with Buddhist ethics. Two types of reaction occurred: (1) the introduction of bloodless rituals (including ‘non-injury of plants’) as substitutes, and (2) the ethicising or spiritualising of rituals in the sense that the word ‘sacrifice’ (*yañña*) has been retained but *de facto* the ritual has been replaced by such practices as donations, the observation of moral codes and spiritual practices on the actual path of salvation. The former reaction led, in course of time, to more and more ritual elements gaining admission in or toleration by Buddhism. It may have also even led, in certain strands of development, to a reverse process. That is, contrary to the old tendency of replacing rituals with moral and spiritual practices, moral and spiritual practices have been ritualised or even repressed. Thus several kinds of ritual can be found in the Vinaya tradition, not to mention ones in Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly in Vajrayāna. Several types of texts that are entitled ‘ritual procedure’ (*vidhi*) can be found in the bSTan-’gyur, including ritual procedures for the confession of transgressions (*āpattideśanavidhi*), consecrations (*pratiṣṭhāvidhi*), [tantric] configurations (*mandalavidhi*), sacrificial fires (*homavidhi*), [offerings of] sacrificial cakes (*balividhi*), [tantric] initiations (*abhisekavidhi*), [ritual] baths (*snānavidhi*), and feast [offerings] (*ganacakraavidhi*).

For our purposes here, I shall define the ‘ritual procedure for the generation of the resolve [to strive for] awakening’ (*bodhicittotpādavidhi*) as ‘a *modus operandi* for formally generating *bodhicitta* or for taking the *bodhisattva* vow (*bodhisattvasamvara*)—individually or collectively, with or without an officiant, for the first or nth time—which has a beginning (or preparatory phase), a middle (or main phase), and an end (or concluding phase), and during which the candidate is involved mentally, verbally, and physically.’ The middle or main part may be seen as the compact nucleus of the ritual. The whole may be incorporated into other tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna rituals, and may even take place in totally unrutualised or minimally ritualised contexts. Rituals are, I believe, tendentially spontaneous and simple by nature, although they may start off complex and be simplified or otherwise modified. One may categorise *bodhicittotpādavidhi* into two types: (a) one that is self-contained and complete in itself, whether used for the generation of *bodhicitta* or the bestowal and assumption of the *bodhisattva* vow, and (b) another which has been incorporated into and become an integral part of a whole ritual of much broader dimensions. The one we are concerned with here is the former kind.

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44 Of course, several synonyms and near synonyms of *vidhi* (e.g. *vidhāna*, *saṃvidhāna*, *kalpa*, *ācāra*, *cāritra*, *upacāra*, *prayoga*, and *tantra*) have also been translated into Tibetan as *cho ga* (see TSD, s.v.).

45 See JÄSCHKE 1881, s.v. *cho ga*.

46 For an outline of the leading theories of ritual over the past century and a discussion of the role of ritual in Zen Buddhism, which has long been regarded as the least ritualised form of Buddhism, see SHarf 2005.

Like the concept of bodhicitta itself, the bodhicittotpāda ritual must have a history of its own. The ritual of taking the bodhisattva vow may have been modelled on the procedure of taking the prātimokṣa vows of the Vinaya tradition. The Vinaya sources known in Tibet speak broadly of two kinds of procedures for ordination: (a) the previous ritual procedures (purākalpa: sngon gyi cho ga) and (b) the present ritual procedure (da ltar gyi cho ga).\(^{49}\) However, only the one said to have been devised by the Buddha himself and conducted by a committee of monks consisting of five or ten members depending on the remoteness of the place in which it is conducted, and which is found in both previous and present ritual procedures, is regarded as a ritual by definition.\(^{50}\) The first of the ten kinds of previous ritual procedures is a sort of self-ordination. Indeed, most of the ten cases are characteristically spontaneously effectuated in the presence of the Buddha. They are simply the result of an unpremeditated decision to become a bhikṣu upon encountering the Buddha and obtaining his immediate consent. Such procedures were, of course, possible only as long as the Buddha still walked the earth. We can perhaps reasonably assume that not only the formalised ritual of taking the bodhisattva vow of ethical-moral discipline (śīlasamvara) was inspired by or modelled on the formalised Vinaya ordination (as found in the Pravrajyāvastu); the ritual procedures for confession (as in the Pośadhaṃvastu) and the restoration (pratikriyā) of broken vows, along with the Mahāyāna conventions relating to cardinal (or mortal) transgressions (mūlpattī) or cardinal offences (pārājika), were also styled according to the corresponding Vinaya conventions. The idea of taking the bodhisattva vow on one’s own, that is, without an officiant, may be compared to, and indeed was probably modelled on, the self-ordination of pratyekabuddhas and of the historical Buddha himself, who is, by the way, conceived in the Vinaya tradition as the bhikṣu par excellence. Similarly, the Buddha’s first five disciples are said to have become bhikṣus in virtue of their glimpse of true reality (dhammatā).\(^{51}\)

Some Tibetan scholars have realised that a formalised ritual procedure for taking the bodhisattva vow of ethical-moral discipline (śīlasamvara), which is equated by some with the assuming of prasthānacitta, can be found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, but not the corresponding ritual procedure of assuming pranidhicitta. They knew, of course, that Atiśa had explained the ritual procedure of assuming pranidhicitta according to the Maitreya-Asanga tradition—a procedure for which there seemed to exist no scriptural evidence. In order to resolve this discrepancy, somebody seems to have conjured up a new explanation: The tradition of conferring the vow of pranidhicitta was initiated by Maitreya and transmitted orally (snyan brgyud) down to Atiśa.\(^{52}\) Nevertheless, the actual reason why the ritual procedure of assuming pranidhicitta is not found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi or any other work attributed by the Tibetans to Asanga seems to lie elsewhere. I have already stated that the terms pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta are not typical of Strand A (represented by the Bodhisattvabhūmi) but rather of Strand B (later represented by works such as the Bodhicaryāvatāra). Having said

\(^{48}\) The fact that the generation of bodhicitta has been incorporated into most ritual procedures in Tibetan Buddhism has been, in my view, adequately demonstrated by Stephan Beyer in his studies on the cult of Tārā. See the index in BEVER 1973: 537–538, under the entry ‘Thought of enlightenment.’

\(^{49}\) While the Sanskrit term for sngon gyi cho ga is attested (e.g. Mahāvyutpatti, no. 928); TSD, s.v. sngon gyi cho ga; cf. MW, s.v. purākalpa), the Sanskrit term for da lta'i cho ga has not been traced. For a detailed discussion of sngon gyi cho ga and da lta rgyi cho ga, see the mTso īk (pp. 46.3–61.21).

\(^{50}\) See, for example, the Rig 'dzin 'jug ngogs (p. 37.6): sngon chog mthson ngyid pa ni gsal bzhi'o ||; ibid. (p. 39.10–11): sngon chog gi rjes su bcas pa'i gsal bzhis'i cho ga' khor bcas da lta'i cho ga dangs yin gzhi |.

\(^{51}\) Such a precedent could be used by a lay tantric practitioner to claim the status of not only a normal bhikṣu but indeed of a bhikṣu par excellence.

\(^{52}\) Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.7–8): len pa'i cho ga thogs med sogs kyi gzhung du smon sems len pa'i sgros mi gsal yang jo bo rjes gsal bar gsungs pa byams mgon nas brgyud pa'i man ngag snyan brgyud du bzhad....
that, this does not mean that the \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi} of Strand A has no parallel for the terms \textit{pranidhīcitta} and \textit{prasthānacitta}. In fact, \textit{pranidhīcitta} can be equated with or subsumed under the \textit{prathamacittotpāda} of the \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi}, which is defined there as the most excellent of the \textit{pranidhīnas}, while \textit{prasthānacitta} can be equated with or subsumed under \textit{prayoga} or \textit{caryā}, which includes the \textit{śīlasamvara} formally taken by a \textit{bodhisattva} as part of the ritual procedure (explicitly described in \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi} 1.10). The candidate taking the \textit{śīlasamvara} is spoken of as either a householder or an ordained \textit{bodhisattva}.\footnote{Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.10 (WOGIHARA, p. 152.22–23; DUTT, p. 105.8).} It is significant that he is further described as someone who has already made a resolution (\textit{kṛtapraniḥdāna}) to strive for the highest awakening.\footnote{Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.10 (WOGIHARA, p. 152.24–25; DUTT, p. 105.8–9).} The question now is: at what point does the \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi} teach about formally becoming a \textit{bodhisattva}?

The complex ritual procedure for the generation of \textit{pranidhīcitta} according to the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition said to have been transmitted by Atiśa may have been based on \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi} 1.2 (§1.1.2), where the method for formally becoming a \textit{bodhisattva}, that is, for generating the initial resolve (\textit{prathamacittotpāda}) to become a \textit{buddha}, is given in clear and simple terms, which in turn may be, as I have already tried to show, modelled on the initial resolve said to have been produced by the historical Buddha in the past. But although such initial resolve can be made during or by means of a ritual, I do not contend that the method of generating \textit{bodhicitta} taught in \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi} 1.2 (§1.1.2) is a full-fledged \textit{bodhicittotpāda} ritual, at least not in the sense of what we know from later manuals. What is perhaps worth recollecting here is that the initial resolve to become a \textit{bodhisattva} seems to be less formal or even less significant in the \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi} than in the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition, probably because, according to its theory of spiritual disposition (\textit{gotra}), only those who by nature possess the spiritual disposition of a \textit{bodhisattva} can become \textit{bodhisattvas}.

\textbf{9. What Is Actually Generated by the Ritual?}

There does not seem to be one simple answer to the question what is actually generated by means of the ritual. Prajñākaramati, in commenting upon the expression \textit{sugatāṃṣamvarāvātāra} (in \textit{Bodhīcaryāvatāra} 1.1c), obviously distinguishes two consecutive processes, namely, ‘taking hold of \textit{bodhicitta}’ (\textit{bodhicittagrahana}) and ‘fully accepting the \textit{bodhisattva} vows’ (\textit{bodhisattvaśīksāsamādāna}).\footnote{Bodhicaryāvatārāraṇājīkā (p. 2.17–18): \textit{teṣām samvarāvātāraṃ | samvaranāṃ samvariyate vā aneneti samvarah, bodhicittagrahanaṇāvākṣam bodhisattvaśīksāsamādānam |}.} In other words, the generation of \textit{bodhicitta} and the formal commitment to keep the \textit{bodhisattva} vow are considered by him to be two different consecutive steps. According to some, it is only the ‘conventional’ \textit{bodhicitta} that is generated by ritual, whereas according to others the ‘absolute’ \textit{bodhicitta} is too. We shall return to this controversy below. Even among those who maintain that ‘conventional’ \textit{bodhicitta} is generated by means of ritual, there does not seem to be a consensus. According to Kong-sprul’s understanding of the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition and of Śāntideva, the arising of the ‘mere thought of attaining \textit{bodhi}’ (\textit{byang chub ‘thob par ‘dod pa’i blo tsem}) is not dependent on ritual, whereas \textit{pranidhīcitta}, identified with the actual \textit{cittotpāda}, and \textit{prasthānacitta}, identified with the actual vow (\textit{samvarā}), are both dependent on ritual procedures.\footnote{Shes bya mdzod (p. 352.30–33).} The Sa-skya-pas are said to make distinctions between \textit{pranidhīcitta} and \textit{pranidhīcittotpāda}, and between \textit{prasthānacitta} and \textit{prasthānacittotpāda} as well. Mere \textit{pranidhīcitta} and \textit{prasthānacitta} are, according to them, not vows (\textit{samvarā)},
whereas *praniḥcittotpāda* and *prasthānacittotpāda* are. Kong-sprul himself distinguishes three kinds of *bodhisattva* vow taken in accordance with ritual procedures: one common (taken together with *prātimokṣa*), one uncommon, and one undergone in the tantric context. In any case, we can take for granted that what is hoped will be generated by means of the ritual is resolve to become a *buddha*. In reality, as ’Jigs-med-gling-pa puts it, what is decisive here is not the act of generating *bodhicitta* but the actual arising of it.

### 10. The Optionality of an Officant in the Two Traditions

An officant is not considered indispensable for either tradition. If no officant is available, one can perform the rites on one’s own before a reverential object that represents the *buddha*’s body, speech, or mind, such as a statue, scripture, or *stūpa*, respectively. If something like this is not available, one should visualise *buddhas* and *bodhisattvas* in the space in front of and above oneself. Although the absence of an officant is permissible in both traditions, the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition is stricter in its definition of situations in which this exception is made. There, one can proceed without an officant only after searching far and wide for one, or if one’s life or celibacy (in case of ordained monks and nuns) is at risk.

It is said that according to Bodhibhadra and others an officant may be absent only during conferral rites, and not, therefore, during rites of restoration. The difficulty is that there seem to be several kinds of restoration depending on the nature and extent of the damage, and it is not quite clear what kind of restoration is meant here. In any case, the ritual procedure for the initial *bodhisattva* vow is described in the *Bodhisattvabhaṃī* in such a way that it seems impossible to perform without an officant. By contrast, for the ritual of reconfirming the *bodhisattva* vow, the optionality of an officant is there made explicit. Klong-chen-pa offers an alternative explanation of the optionality and obligation of an officant. According to

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57 Shes bya mdzod (pp. 352.33–353.4).
58 Shes bya mdzod (pp. 353.32–354.4).
59 Yon tan mdzod (p. 44.3–4): sems mchod bskyed pa mi gtso skyes pa gtso ||.
60 The optionality of an officant in both traditions is made clear in the *Bodhimārgapradīpapanjikā*. For the text and translation of the pertinent passage, see SHERBURN 2000: 154–155. See also the *Yid bzhin mdzod* (p. 77.2–3):

\[ \text{ji ltar bskyed tshul rnam pa gnyis yin te ||} \]

\[ \text{bla ma mchod dang dkon mchod drung du len ||} \]

sDom gsun rnam nges (p. 21.4):

\[ \text{rgyal ba'i rien la'ang rung bar srol gnyis mthun ||} \]

See also the *Shes bya mdzod* (pp. 355.1–3, 358.3–4).
61 To authenticate this statement, Kong-sprul (*Shes bya mdzod*, p. 358.4–6) cites a passage from the *Bodhisattvabhaṃī*, which I have not been able to locate, at least not in the *Śūlapatāla*.
62 Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.6–7): *nyams na gso ba la bla ma nges pa [*= par?]* dgos pa gnas brtan byang bzang sogs bzhed do ||. The position of Bodhibhadra, however, seems to be rather more complex and requires further verification.
63 See *Bodhisattvabhaṃī* 1.10 (WOGHIARA, pp. 152.22–155.21; DUTT, pp. 105.7–107.5).
64 *Bodhisattvabhaṃī* 1.10 (WOGHIARA, p. 181.15–18; DUTT, p. 124.25–27): *etad api bodhisattvasamvarasamadānāṃ | yadi tair guṇair | yathā pūrṇaḥ svayam eva bodhisattvāśīlasamvarasamadānāṃ karanīyam | tato bodhisattvendra tathāgatapratimāyāḥ puruṣaḥ svayam eva bodhisattvasālāṃ varasamadānāṃ karanīyam |. The fact that the optionality of an officant here applies to the reconfirmation and not the initial acceptance of the *bodhisattva* vow is clear from the context. See *ibid.* (WOGHIARA, pp. 180.21–182.5; DUTT, p. 124.10–16).
him, some superior individuals from the very outset take the bodhisattva vow before the Three Jewels on their own. As for average people, they take it from a master (guru) for the first time, but later, at the time of restoration or while repeating the acceptance of the bodhisattva vow, they can do so without a master before the Three Jewels. However, Yontan-rgya-mtsho adds that the practice of performing ritual oneself (if one is capable of doing so) is in accordance with Atisa’s Bodhipathapradipa, which explains this practice according to the Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetramālakārastūra. The optionality of an officiant in the bodhicittotpāda ritual mentioned in some sources is traditionally interpreted in such a way as to bring it into harmony with the obligatoryness of an officiant expressed in other sources. If, however, we ignore such interpretations, the practice seems to reflect the historical background of the bodhicitta doctrine, for it is reminiscent of self-ordination in the Vinaya tradition. In the later systematised ritual procedure of the prātimokṣa vow, a committee of ten (or five) members chaired by the leading officiant is indispensable. The only cases of self-ordination mentioned in the Vinaya context are that of a pratyekabuddha and that of the Buddha himself. Since bodhicitta is fundamentally the resolve to become a buddha, it is historically conceivable that the generation of such resolve was originally not envisaged along the lines of a ritual dependent on an officiant, but as in the case of the Buddha or of a pratyekabuddha in the Vinaya context. Nevertheless, for traditions that insist on the continuity and indispensability of a lineage and on dependence on a master (guru), the optionality of an officiant would be counterproductive, for it would render a transmission lineage redundant. In my view, it is for similar reasons that a pratyekabuddha came to be later reinterpreted as one who had once been a śrāvaka of special calibre and who, in his last existence, awakened independently, without, that is, any formal teacher and in the absence of an established teaching tradition.

11. Qualifications for Officials in the Two Traditions

The Tibetan discussions of qualifications for teachers according to the Vinaya and the tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna require a separate study. One may consult the writings of Klong-chen-pa, where the various qualifications are discussed in great detail. What we shall look at here is the qualifications of the officiant performing the bodhicittotpāda rites. The qualifications are more or less the same within the two traditions. The following verse from the Bodhicaryāvatāra is often cited in Tibetan sources as the scriptural authority of the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition relating to the criteria for an officiant.

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65 Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel (vol. 2, p. 824.4–6): gang zag dam pa kha cig dkon mchog drung du rang gis len pa yin la | phal pa dag bla ma las len to || len tshul 'dra'o || phyis gso dus sam yang nas yang du bskyed dus bla ma las gzhan dkon mchog gi drung du byed pa yin no ||.

66 Rig 'dzin 'jug ngogs (p. 128.7–9): rang stobs kyi nus pa yod na rten med kyang rgyal ba sras bcas mdun mkhar bsam la de'i drung du len par yang 'jam dpal zhing bkod kyi mdo las gsungs pa ltar lam sgron du bshad do ||. See Eimer 1978: 116–117; First Bhāvanākrama (p. 193.8–9): yathā mañjuśrīyā mbaraṛājabhūtena bodhicittam utpāditam tathotpādāniyāḥ |

67 See, for example, the Yid bzhin mdzod (pp. 38.3–44.4); Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel (pp. 204.2–272.3); Sems nyid ngal gso (pp. 38.5–49.3); Shing rta chen po (vol. 1, pp. 369.5–421.2). See also the Shes bya mdzod (pp. 303.9–310.24).

68 Bodhicaryāvatāra 5.102: sadā kalyāṇamitram ca jīviṭārthe 'pi na tvaJet | bodhisattvavratadharām mahāyānārthakovidam ||.
Never, even at the cost of one’s life, should one forsake a spiritual friend who upholds the bodhisattva vow and is skilled in the meaning of the Mahāyāna.\(^69\)

Correspondingly within the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, the following verse from the \textit{Bodhipathaprādīpa} is often cited:\(^70\)

One who is skilled in the ritual of the vow—
Who himself abides by the vow,
Shows readiness to confer the vow, and is compassionate—
Should be known as a good master.\(^71\)

Generally, it is agreed that the spiritual friend or teacher who confers the vow should have taken the bodhisattva vow himself, be an expert in the ritual procedure, have no material interests and be benevolent.\(^72\)

12. The Eligibility of Candidates in the Two Traditions

Tibetan scholars, in discussing the eligibility of candidates, often speak about two kinds of receptacles (\textit{rten}), namely, the receptacle for the arising (\textit{skyed ba’i rten}) and the receptacle for the subsistence (\textit{gnas pa’i rten}) of bodhicitta or the bodhisattva vow. The former is further subdivided into a physical receptacle (\textit{lus kyi rten}) and mental receptacle (\textit{bsam pa’i rten}).\(^73\) It is very clear that according to the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition it is the mental receptacle, that is, the mental receptivity, that is decisive, and not the physical receptacle, or the physical form of life. In other words, being a woman, a lay person, a non-Buddhist, someone who has committed one of the five heinous deeds, or even a non-human being is in principle no barrier to the generation of bodhicitta or to the acceptance of the bodhisattva vow.\(^74\) The notion that even non-humans can generate bodhicitta is based on \textit{sūtra} references where gods (\textit{deva}), nāgas, demigods (\textit{asura}), and so forth are said to have generated the resolve to strive for the highest awakening.\(^75\) According to the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, the physical receptacle

\(^{69}\) The English translation given here is according to CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 43.

\(^{70}\) \textit{Bodhipathaprādīpa} 23 (EIMER 1978: 116.1–4):

\begin{verbatim}
sdom pa’i cho ga la mkhas dang ||
bdag nying gang zhiig sdom la gnas ||
sdom pa’ bogs bzod snying rjer ldan ||
bla ma bzang por shes par bya ||.
\end{verbatim}


\(^{72}\) See, for example, the \textit{sDom gsum rnam nges} (p. 21.2); \textit{len iṣṭula sdom gnas dge ba’i bshes gnyen la}}. See also the \textit{Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs} (pp. 125.18–126.6); \textit{Shes bya mdzod} (p. 358.1–3).

\(^{73}\) \textit{Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs} (pp. 155.10–156.4). See also the \textit{Dwags po thar rgyan} (pp. 132.17–133.5).

\(^{74}\) \textit{Grub mtha’} \textit{mdzod} (pp. 190.5–191.2): \textit{du ba ma’i lugs kyi theg chen la mos shing sangs rgyas thob ‘dod can gyi lha dang klu la sogs pa la’ang skyed bar ‘dod de} | \textit{shes rab kyi pta rol su phyin pa bryad stong pa las} | \textit{rgya mthos zhus pa la} | \textit{... skyes zin gnas pa’i rten ni ‘gro ba rigs inga gang la’ang rung ngo} |. \textit{sDom gsum rnam nges} (p. 21.2): \textit{theq chen snod gyur dad ldan slob ma...} Cf. also \textit{ibid.} (p. 24.4–5):

\begin{verbatim}
skyed ba’i rten ni lha klu ’phrog ma sogs |
sdag can la yang skyed bar klu sgrub bzhes ||
\end{verbatim}

See also \textit{ibid.} (p. 24.5–6), where reference to the verse from the \textit{Ratnolkādhāraṇī} cited in the \textit{Śikṣāsamuccaya} (BENDALL, p. 2.16–17; VAIĐYA, p. 4.22–23) is made.
must be under at least one of the seven kinds of prātimokṣa vow (i.e. must be a human being who is a lay or ordained Buddhist). All the criteria a candidate for the prātimokṣa vow is expected to fulfil according to the Vinaya tradition are thus automatically presupposed here. Needless to say, according to both traditions there must be a mental receptacle that is saturated with the desire to become a buddha for the sake of all sentient beings. Unlike the prātimokṣa vow, which is automatically annulled after death, the bodhisattva vow is supposed to persist. And hence, according to Klong-chen-pa, any of the five forms of existence can be the ‘receptacle for the subsistence’ of the bodhisattva vow. This, however, presents a problem for the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, especially when it insists on the need for the physical receptacle to be under a prātimokṣa vow.

One of the Tibetan scholars who attempted to harmonise the two traditions regarding the eligibility of candidates was Klong-chen-pa. I take the two traditions to be non-contradictory in essence for the following [reasons]: When one generates the resolve [to strive for awakening], [it] may not be called a prātimokṣa vow, but in reality it must be something essentially similar, such as the capacity to pledge not to kill sentient beings. Hence, from this standpoint, the similarity of the receptacles is ascertained. In fact, [bodhicitta in both cases] is certain to arise [only in an individual whose] mind has turned away from [the thought of] injury. [According to both traditions, the candidate] must be someone who is capable of observing one of the prātimokṣa vows; otherwise [bodhicitta] cannot arise in [the continuum of] anybody, inasmuch as [the non-observance of the prātimokṣa vow] contradicts the cīttotpāda vow.

The point Klong-chen-pa is trying to make is that there cannot possibly be a bodhisattva who is incapable of observing at least one of the prātimokṣa vows. This notion is very much consistent with the ethical-moral discipline of the three vehicles (vāna), according to which a śrāvaka strives to refrain from harming or injuring others, a bodhisattva not only refrains from harming or injuring others but even tries to benefit them, and a practitioner of Vajrayāna not only tries to benefit other sentient beings, but attempts to do so in the manner of a buḍḍha. And therefore, so long as there is the thought of injuring others, there cannot be the thought of benefiting others, these two thoughts being simply incompatible.

Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho who to a great extent followed Klong-chen-pa and incorporated his method of harmonising the two traditions, recorded an alternative way of resolving the apparent contradiction between the two traditions: The criteria prescribed by the Mañjuśrī-Nāgarjuna tradition for candidates are interpreted as applying merely to the generation of

75 See, for example, the Samādhīrājasūtra (according to Rēgāmye 1938: 48–49): aprameyānām ca satvānām devamānusaśīyāḥ prajāyāḥ anuttarāyām samyaksambodhau cītānā uppanāṇi. ... See also the Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 154.17–155.1).

76 See Bodhipathapradīpa 20. For text and translations, see Eimer 1978: 114–15; SHERBURN 2000: 8–9.

77 Grub mtha’ mdzod (p. 190.4): dang po ni sems tsam pa i ltar na so sor thar pa rigs bdun dang ldan pa ni lus kyi rten du ’dod de | lam sgron las ... Cf Shing rta chen po (vol. 1, pp. 538.4–539.2). See also the sDom gsam nnam nges (p. 24.5): thogs med de ’i rten so thar dgos zhes gsungs ||.

78 Cf. the Grub mtha’ mdzod (p. 191.4): bsam pa ’i rten ni dad sogs bsod nams kyi blo khyad par can dang ldan pa ’o ||; Shing rta chen po (vol. 1, pp. 539.4–5): dad sogs bsod nams kyi blo khyad par can ni bsam pa ’i rten yin te | dkon mchog ta la la’i mdo las ....

79 Shing rta chen po (vol. 1, p. 539.6): gnas pa ’i rten ni yang | gang la skyes pa de ’i rten la nyams pa ’i rgyu ma byung gi bar du gnas so ||.

80 Shing rta chen po (vol. 1, p. 539.2–6): lugs ’di gnay kyang don gyis mi ’gal bar go ste | ’di itar sems bskyed dus so sor thar pa ’i sdom par ming ma btags kyang | don ’dra bar srog mi gcod par dam ’cha’i nus pa la sogs pa dgos pas | de ’i cha nas rten ’dra rung du nges te | don la gnod pa las blo log pa zhig la skye nges so || so sor thar pa ’i sdom pa gagg rung sdom nus pa zhig med na gang la ’ang mi skye ste | sems bskyed de nyid kyi bslab pa dang ’gal ba’i phyir ro ||.
pranidhicitta, not, that is, to the generation of prasthānacitta. Conversely, the criteria prescribed by the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition are interpreted as applying merely to the generation of prasthānacitta, not to the generation of pranidhicitta. In this way, even by the standards set by the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition, a candidate must be a human being who abides by at least one of the prātimoksa vows in order to qualify as a candidate for the generation of prasthānacitta. Likewise, by the standards set by the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, a candidate need not be a human being who abides by at least one of the prātimoksa vows in order to generate merely pranidhicitta. And therefore, according to this solution, although the two traditions may appear to differ in regard to the range of the receptacles (rt'en rgya che chung), the flexibility of admission ('jug sgo yangs dog), and so forth, they are, in reality, of the same quintessence (gnad gcig).

Thus Tibetan scholars have, exegetically speaking, made quite ingenious attempts to harmonise the two bodhicittotpāda traditions, namely, the naïve or idealistic Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition and the rather pragmatic and realistic Maitreya-Asaṅga one. I offer my own assessment of the two traditions in terms of the receptacle (rt'en). These idealistic and realistic perceptions of the receptacle seem, in my view, to be rooted in doctrinal or philosophical differences between the two traditions as regards sentient beings, particularly in their theories of the spiritual disposition (gotra). The reason why the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition professes a rather idealistic view of the receptacle is probably due to its ekagotra theory, according to which there is only one universal spiritual disposition, which implies that there is no sentient being that does not possess the capacity or potential to become a buddha. The universal spiritual disposition presupposed by it was not, however, understood in a positive sense, as was done in the Tathāgatagarbha tradition.

The pragmatic and realistic notion of the receptacle in the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, on the other hand, seems to be rooted in the Yogācāra theory of five kinds of spiritual dispositions, according to which not all sentient beings possess the same desire and capacity to reach the goal of Buddhahood, and certain sentient beings possess no spiritual disposition at all. The Bodhisattvabhūmi, representing the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, makes it unequivocally clear that while the presence of the right gotra is no guarantee that Buddhahood will be attained, the absence of such a gotra (in spite of all attempts to generate the resolve to strive for awakening) totally deprives one of the chance to become a buddha. Thus the differences in the perceptions of the eligibility of a bodhicittotpāda candidate in the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna and Maitreya-Asaṅga traditions is, in my view, doctrinally connected with the differences in their perceptions of gotra. This explanation not only supports my theory of different grades of conservatism in the two strands of bodhicittotpāda traditions but also supports Sa-pan's proposition that the differences of the two traditions rest on the differences in their philosophical view (la ba). However, later Tibetan scholars seem to have understood Sa-pan as referring to philosophical views only in connection with reality or emptiness. If my assessment here holds, it would imply that Sa-pan's designation of this

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81 Rig 'dzin 'jug ngogs (p. 155.1–10).

82 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1 (DUTT, p. 1.19–20): sa cet punar gotrasṭaḥs ca itam notpādayatī bodhicaryāyaṃ na pravuyate na kṣipram bodhim ārāgyatī [= ārādhayati?]. . . . . . . The Tibetan translation (WOGIHARA, p. 2.20–23) here reads byang chub myur du 'gro par mi 'gyur ro and seems to indicate na kṣipram bodhim ārādhayatī. See also ibid. (WOGIHARA, p. 11.2–18): caturbhīṣā kāraṇāḥ evam gotrasampanno 'pi bodhisattvāḥ na śaknyūt anuttarāṃ sanyāksamodbhīṃ abhissamboddhīṃ ....

tradition as the ‘Cittamātra tradition’ is justified purely from the viewpoint of the gotra theory, especially if one takes works such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi as the scriptural authority of this tradition.

13. The Preparatory Procedures of the Bodhicittotpāda Ritual

The bodhicitta ritual traditionally consists of three steps, namely, the preparatory procedures (sbyor ba), main procedures (dgnos gzhi), and concluding procedures (rjes or mjjug), collectively referred to as sbyor dngos rjes (or mjjug) gsum. For several reasons, it is quite difficult to form a clear and comprehensive picture of the supposed differences between the ritual procedures of the two traditions. Nonetheless, in order to convey an impression of how at least some Tibetan scholars have perceived these distinctions, I shall attempt to present them mainly along the lines of Yon-tan-rgya-mlcho’s Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna Tradition</th>
<th>Maitreya-Asāṅga Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pranidhicittra and Prasāhānicaittra</td>
<td>Pranidhicittra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Rectifying one’s attitude (blo bcos pa) through three special instructions (gdaams ngag khyad par can gsum), i.e. three methods of generating enthusiasm (spro ba bskyed pa’i thabs gsum) for bodhicitta</td>
<td>(1) Verifying the receptacle (rten nges par bya ba), i.e. rectifying one’s attitude (blo bcos pa) on the basis of three instructions (gdaams ngag khyad par can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Making a mandala offering to the special referential object (yul khyad par can), i.e. the officiant</td>
<td>(2) Executing preparatory procedures, consisting of three steps, i.e. (a) making a mandala offering and request, (b) taking refuge in the special receptacle (rten khyad par can), and (c) accumulating beneficial resources by special methods (thabs khyad par can)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Taking refuge in the special receptacle (rten khyad par can), i.e. the Three Jewels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Accumulating beneficial resources (punya) by special methods (thabs khyad par can), i.e. the seven-limb supplication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pranidhicittra and prasāhānicaittra vows are bestowed on the same occasion according to the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition, but separately according to the Maitreya-Asāṅga tradition. The three methods of generating enthusiasm for bodhicitta mentioned in the table above are (1) generating a sense of discontent with the extreme of samsāra (’khor ba’i mtha’ la skyo ba bskyed pa), (2) putting a stop to the attachment to the extreme of nirvāṇa (zhi ba’i mtha’ la zhen pa bkag pa), and (3) avoiding the two extremes of samsāra and nirvāṇa (mtha’ gnyis spong ba). The preparatory procedures (sbyor ba) of the bodhicittotpāda ritual seem to differ from source to source. I have followed Yon-tan-rgya-mlcho’s Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs both

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84 sDom gsum rnam nges (p. 21.2–3):
yan lag bdun mthar smon ’jug stabs gcig tu ||
len cing rang gshen nga’ ba sgom pa rnam ||
lcu sgrub lugs yin….
Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 126.18–19): … smon ’jug gnyis stabs gcig tu len….

85 sDom gsum rnam nges (p. 21.3–4): … thogs med bzhad pa ni | … smon ’jug cho ga so s’i sgo nas len ||.

86 Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 126.12–14).
for the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition and for the pranidhicitta of the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, and Kong-sprul’s Shes bya mdzod for the prasthānacitta of the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition. Some of the preparatory processes of the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, such as the candidate’s initial request, can be found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi.

14. The Main Procedures of the Bodhicittotpāda Ritual

The most significant part of the ritual is of course the main procedure (dngos gzhi), in regard to which the two traditions again differ. The differences may be summarised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna Tradition</th>
<th>Maitreya-Asaṅga Tradition</th>
<th>Prasthānacitta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pranidhicitta and Prasthānacitta</td>
<td>Pranidhicitta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (1) Training one’s mind (blo sbyong) by practising the exchange of one’s happiness for the sufferings of others (bde sdug gong len) | (1) Assuming pranidhicitta (a) on one’s own strength (rang stobs), by awakening one’s spiritual disposition (gotra), (b) on the strength of others (gzhan stobs), by witnessing the benefit of perfect awakening and so forth, (c) on the strength of preparatory practice (sbyor ba’i stobs), which involves the generation of three notions (’du shes gsum bskyed) | The officiant asks the candidate three times if he or she wants to take the vow of ethical-moral discipline (śīla), and each time the candidate answers: “Yes, I want to take it.”
| (2) Drawing the attention [of buddhas and bodhisattvas] three times (dgongs gsoł gsum) | (2) Drawing the attention [of buddhas and bodhisattvas] three times (dgongs gsoł gsum) | |
| (3) Reciting the ritual text (chos ga’i tshig) which contains the ritual words for generating both pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta three times | (3) Reciting the pertinent ritual text three times | |
| (4) The vow is complete at the end of the third recitation | | |

The three notions are, according to Kong-sprul, discontentment with samsāra (’khor ba la skyo ba), detachment from nirvāṇa (myang ’das la mi zhen pa), and enthusiasm for bodhicitta (byang chub kyi sems la spro ba). We have seen that the three are also called three

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87 Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 126.11–16). Cf. the Shes bya mdzod (p. 355.3–4). See also the Grub mtha’ mdzod (p. 198.3–6): sbyor ba ni dkon mchog gi drung du mchod pa bsam ste slob mas phyag dang mandal phul la slob dpon gyis sems bskyed pa’i phan yon la sogs pas blo bcos te sems tsam pa ltar na bar chad dri ba dang bslab pa khas blang pa la sogs pa byas nas sems bsnyed ‘bogs kyang ‘dir dbu ma pa’i lugs kyi s ... yan lag bdun pa rgyas bsdu dang rung byas la |.

88 Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 127.6–10). Cf. the Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.11–12).

89 The preparatory procedures (sbyor ba) are presented here according to the Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.16–18). See also the Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 127.15–17).

90 The candidate approaches a qualified bodhisattva teacher and requests conferral of the bodhisattva vow. See Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.10 (WOGHARA, p. 153.2–5; DUTT, p. 105.11–12): tāvāham kulaputrāṃśākāh bodhisattvāśīlasanātaramādānām akāṃśāmy ādātum | tad arhasya anuparodhena mūhūrtam asmākam anukampayā dātum śrotum ca |.

91 Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 126.16–19). Cf. the Shes bya mdzod (p. 355.4–5).

92 This step is included in the Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 127.12) but excluded in the Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.12–13).

93 Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 127.17–20); Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.18).

94 Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.14–15).
instructions (gdams ngag gsum) or three efficient strategies (thabs gsum). The procedure of reciting the pertinent ritual text three times is omitted by Kong-sprul but included by mKhan-po Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho who cites the beginning and end of the ritual text read out during the proceedings.

15. The Concluding Procedures of the Bodhicittotpāda Ritual

The following chart shows the concluding steps of the bodhicittotpāda ritual according to the two traditions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concluding Procedures (ges)</th>
<th>Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna Tradition</th>
<th>Maitreya-Asaṅga Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Rejoicing to oneself (rang dga' ba gsum pa)</td>
<td>Pranidhīcitta and Prasthānacittap</td>
<td>Pranidhīcitta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Letting others rejoice (gzhan dga' ba gsum du gzhug)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Requesting that notice be taken (mkyen par gsol ba)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Explaining precepts in brief (bslab bya mdo tsmi bshad pa)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Explaining the benefits (phan yon bstan pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Offering some gifts of thanks (gtang rag 'bul ba)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(3) Counselling to be discreet (gsan bar gdams pa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Observances and Offences Presented in the Two Traditions

As Ratnakarasānti’s Ratnālokālaṃkāra suggests, there must have been various positions in India regarding the precise number of mūlapattis taught in the ākāśagarbhasūtra, which has been cited by both the Śūrasanuccaya and the Śikṣāsamuccaya. In order to show how bodhicitta was cultivated in the broader context of bodhisattva ethical-moral discipline, I here briefly present, primarily following the Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs, the cardinal transgressions and venial offences (duskṛta) according to the two traditions. It should be noted in general that according to the Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs, these transgressions are relevant only for bodhisattvas (humans and non-humans) who are still worldly beings (prthagjana), that is, those who have not yet attained the path of seeing (darsanamārga), since the bodhisattva saints are considered to be ethically and morally incorruptible. This is reminiscent of the non-

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95 Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs (p. 126.12–14).
96 Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.12–13).
97 Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs (p. 127.12–14): “From ‘I, who am called by name so and so, in this lifetime and …’ until ‘will liberate [them] into the state of nirvāṇa’” (… bdag ming ’di zhes bgyi ba skye ba ’di dang | zhes pa nas mya ngan las ’da’ bar bgyi’o zhes pa ’i bar…).
98 Shes bya mdzod (p. 355.5–6); Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs (p. 126.19–20). Note that whereas Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho places ‘offering gifts of thanks’ at the end, Kong-sprul has ‘explaining precepts in brief.’
99 Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.14–15); Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs (p. 126.19–20).
100 Shes bya mdzod (p. 355.18–20); Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs (pp. 127.20–128.2).
101 Ratnakarasānti, Ratnālokālaṃkāra (P, fols. 319b5–320a4; D, fol. 273a4–b2; S, vol. 64, pp. 760.17–761.17).
102 Rig ‘dzin ‘jug ngogs (p. 134.15–17): de dag byang sems kyi spyod pa la zhung pa yan chod [= chad] la rsta ltung ’byung ba mi srid pas so skya’i [= skye’i] gang zag mi dang gnod sbyan [= sbyin] sogs gang yang rlung
Mahāyāna notion that an *arhat* is incapable of deliberately hurting another sentient being. The infallibility (or fallibility) of the ethical-moral discipline of Buddhist saints is in itself an interesting theme, but one which cannot be elaborated in this study. The cardinal transgressions and venial offences, as presented in the Rig 'dzin jug ngogs, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cardinal Transgressions (mulīpatī)</th>
<th>Maṇjuśrī-Nāgarjuna Tradition</th>
<th>Maitreya-Asāṅga Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scriptural Authorities</td>
<td>Liable to occur to</td>
<td>According to Faculty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Akāśagarbhasūra  
(18 nominal transgressions) | kings | 5 | 6 | Sharp | 18 | abandoning 4 white practices or adopting 4 black practices |
| | ministers | 5 | 8 | Sharp | 18 | 4 cardinal transgressions |
| | citizens | 8 | 8 | Sharp | 18 | 4 cardinal transgressions |
| Upāyakausalyasūtra  
(1 transgression) | 1 (abandoning pranidhicitta) | Dull | 1 | 4 cardinal transgressions |
| Ratnakūta  
(1 transgression) | 1 (abandoning prsthānacītta) | Medium | 4 | 4 cardinal transgressions |
| Total | 20 | | | |
| Mortal | 1 (abandonment of pranidhicitta) | |

(a) The Cardinal Transgressions in the Maṇjuśrī-Nāgarjuna Tradition

The Rig 'dzin jug ngogs lists twenty cardinal transgressions in the Maṇjuśrī-Nāgarjuna tradition. Eighteen out of the twenty are cited according to the Akāśagarbhasūtra in the Siksāsamuccaya by Sāntideva. The number eighteen is, however, not explicitly mentioned in the latter. For the sake of convenience, Sāntideva has summarised these cardinal transgressions in verses. An additional cardinal transgression, found in the Upāyakausalyasūtra, is also cited by Sāntideva without being termed the ‘nineteenth cardinal transgression’ (described by Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho as the abandonment of pranidhicitta). The twentieth cardinal transgression, which is apparently not mentioned by Sāntideva, is drawn from the Ratnakūtasūtra and described by Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho as the abandonment of prsthānacītta.

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103 Siksāsamuccaya (BENDALL, pp. 66.15–67.13; VAIKYA, p. 41.1–18); for an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 70–71.

104 See the Siksāsamuccaya (BENDALL, pp. 66.9–14; VAIKYA, p. 40.25–30); for an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 70. See also the Rig 'dzin jug ngogs (pp. 134.17–135.1).

105 Rig 'dzin jug ngogs (pp. 134.17–135.3). Cf., however, SOBISCH 2002: 91, n. 249: “... they are nineteen or twenty roots according to the Mādhymikas. They are nineteen according to Sāntideva’s Siksāsamuccaya, which quotes the Akāśagarbhasūtra, and twenty according to the Ratnakūta...” There seems to be some confusion here. Sāntideva’s citation of the Akāśagarbhasūtra does not contain all nineteen cardinal transgressions. According to the Tibetan tradition, it contains only eighteen. The nineteenth cardinal transgression is drawn from the Upāyakausalyasūtra, and the twentieth (and not all twenty!) from the Ratnakūtasūtra.

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*ba'i byang sans kyi sdom ldan la ltun ba yin par gsungs so |. Cf. the Siksāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 64.17–18; VAIKYA, p. 40.1–2): tasyādhikarmikasā bodhisattvavasya yathā samuṭhitaś tā āpattīḥ pratideśayati |.*
The five cardinal transgressions liable to be committed by (or occur to) kings (*rgya po la 'byung nye ba*)\(^{106}\) may be summarised as follows:\(^{107}\) (1) plundering or causing to plunder the property of the Three Jewels, (2) denouncing the Buddhist doctrine (be it Mahāyāna or non-Mahāyāna) and causing it to be destroyed, (3) causing any member of the ordained Buddhist community (*samgha*) to be disrobed, assaulted or killed, (4) committing one of the five deeds of immeasurable gravity (i.e. patricide, matricide, killing an *arhat*, causing a schism in the *Samgha*, and malevolently causing a *tathāgata* to bleed), (5) holding false views (such as the denial of the principle of cause and effect and future existences) and causing other sentient beings to exhibit unwholesome attitudes or actions.

Of the five cardinal transgressions liable to be committed by ministers, the first four are identical with the first four relating to kings. The fifth cardinal transgression is the extermination of villages, towns, and cities out of malevolence.\(^{108}\) The eight cardinal transgressions liable to occur to normal citizens may be paraphrased as follows:\(^{109}\) (1) prematurely giving teachings on emptiness (*śūnyatā*) to other beginner *bodhisattvas* and thereby provoking fear in them and thus causing them to abandon *bodhicitta*, (2) discouraging other beginner *bodhisattvas* by telling them that since they are incapable of practising the six perfections (*pāramitā*) and attaining Buddhahood, they would do better to generate resolve according to the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna so as to be released from *samsāra* soon, (3) discouraging a beginner *bodhisattva* from observing *prātimokṣa* and the Vinaya ethical-moral discipline in favour of the Mahāyāna precepts, (4) discouraging a beginner *bodhisattva* from reading the scriptures of the Śrāvakayāna and encouraging him instead to read and teach only scriptures of the Mahāyāna, (5) disparaging others and praising oneself out of jealousy and attachment to worldly concerns (e.g. possessions and admiration), (6) glorifying oneself with lies about one's spiritual achievements, (7) creating discord between powerful laity and ordained individuals and exploiting the situation for one's benefit, and (8) depriving practitioners (of meditation) of their daily necessities and giving them to those studying, or else causing them to abandon their spiritual practices, such as *śamatha*, by introducing adverse political rules.

Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho explains that the eighteen cardinal transgressions are based merely on the likelihood of committing them, so that one type of person may commit a cardinal transgression applicable to another type. In fact, all eighteen cardinal transgressions can be committed by all types of persons. He also clarifies that the number eighteen is only nominal (*ming du*) and that actually (*rdo rje su*) there are only fourteen, since the first four cardinal transgressions liable to occur to kings are identical with the first four liable to be committed by ministers. The cardinal transgressions also reflect the faculties of *bodhisattvas*.

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\(^{106}\) The expressions 'liable to occur to kings' (*rgyal po la 'byung nye ba*) and so forth are not employed in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*.

\(^{107}\) See the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (BENDALL, pp. 59.10–60.8; VAI DY A, p. 37.1–16; for an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 61–62); *Śūtrasamuccaya* (pp. 82.13–84.3; Buddhaghoša’s *Dhūtagunanirdeśa* (P, fol. 202a5–b7); D, fol s. 165b2–166a2; S, vol. 93, pp. 1202.12–1203.15); Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 131.17–132.14). The five cardinal transgressions kings have to answer for are explicitly enumerated in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and the *Śūtrasamuccaya*.

\(^{108}\) Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 132.14–20). Cf. the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (BENDALL, p. 60.8–9; VAI DY A, p. 37.16–17); for an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 62; *Śūtrasamuccaya* (p. 84.4–26). All five cardinal transgressions liable to occur to ministers are enumerated in the *Śūtrasamuccaya* but not in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* and the *Dhūtagunanirdeśa* (P, fol s. 202b7ff.; D, fol s. 166a2ff.; S, vol. 93, pp. 1203.15ff.).

\(^{109}\) *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (BENDALL, pp. 60.9–64.13; VAI DY A, pp. 37.17–39.31); for an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 62–68. The eight cardinal transgressions are explicitly enumerated in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* but not in the *Śūtrasamuccaya*. See also the Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 133.1–134.10).
Those with sharp faculties are expected to refrain from all eighteen, while those with medium faculties are to refrain from the four cardinal transgressions mentioned also in the Śīksāsamuccaya, and those of dull faculty only from the abandonment of pranidhicitta.\(^{110}\)

(b) The Cardinal Transgressions in the Maitreya-Asaṅga Tradition

There are commonly said to be four cardinal transgressions according to the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition. Candragomin’s Samvarāvimśāka\(^{111}\) is given as the scriptural source, which is in turn said to be based on the Bodhisattvabhumī.\(^{112}\) The four are: (1) praising oneself and disparaging others out of a desire for material gain or admiration, (2) not affording (or giving) teachings and wealth to those who are in need or in pain, (3) beating sentient beings despite pleas by others not to do so, and (4) abandoning Mahāyāna and teaching spurious Buddhist doctrines. The Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs, however, considers these four to pertain to prasthānacitta and analyses them as four in terms of attitude (kun slong gi sgo nas bzhi), namely, attachment (zhen pa), greediness (ser na), fury (kho ba), and confusion (gti mug), and ‘eight in terms of actions’ (sbyor ba’i sgo nas brgyad), namely, praising oneself, disparaging others, not affording others teachings and wealth, scolding and beating others, and abandoning Mahāyāna and propagating pseudo-doctrines. The four cardinal transgressions pertaining to pranidhicitta are the engaging in the so-called ‘four black practices’ (nag po’i chos bzhi) or the failure to engage in the ‘four white practices’ (dkar po’i chos bzhi).\(^{114}\) The four black practices are: (1) deceiving those worthy of respect, (2) having regrets about things that are

\(^{110}\) Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 135.3–17).


\(^{112}\) Bodhisattvabhumī 1.10 (WOGHARA, pp. 158.2–159.8; DUTT, pp. 108.11–109.2). See the Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 138.7–9): ’jug sens kyi mi mthun pa’i phyogs rtsa ba’i ltung bar gyur pa mdo sde na ’thor ba rnam thogs med kyi byang sar bs dus pa... Explicit references to the Bodhisattvabhumī are made by Sāntarakṣita in his Samvarāvimśakavṛtti (P, fol. 193a3; D, fol. 167b1; S, vol. 78, p. 451.8–9): ’di byang chub sens dpa’i sdom pa nod pa’i cho ga bs tan te ’[[PN byang chub sens dpa’i sa las de skad [ad. du PN] ’byang ba’i phyir ro ||. See also ibid. (P, fol. 198a6; D, fol. 171b7; S, vol. 78, p. 462.17). See also SOBISCH 2002: 91, n. 249. Although I have not been able to consult it for this present study, I should mention here Mark Tatz’s study of the Śīlapatala of the Bodhisattvabhumī (i.e. Mark Tatz, Asaṅga’s Chapter on Ethics with Tsong-kha-pa’s Commentary. Lewiston, New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986).

\(^{113}\) Samvarāvimśāka 6–7 (P, fol. 192a5–7; D, fol. 166b4–5; S, vol. 78, p. 448.1–5):

\begin{align*}
\text{rnyed dang bkur sti chags pa yis} & ||
\text{bdag bston gzhon la smod pa dang} & ||
\text{sdug bsgnai mgon med gyur pa la} & ||
\text{ser snas chos nor mi ster dang} & ||
\text{gzhon gyis bshogs kyang mi nyan par} & ||
\text{khros nas gzhon la tshog pa dang} & ||
\text{theg pa chen po spong byed cing} & ||
\text{dam chos 'drar snang ston pa' } & ||
\end{align*}

Cf. the verses cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 159a1–6; B, pp. 255.22–256.11) and the dKor mchog 'grel (A, fol. 181b1–3; B, p. 218.4–7). For comments on these verses, see the Samvarāvimśakavṛtti (P, fols. 197b2–198a2; D, fol. 171a6–b4; S, vol. 78, pp. 461.8–462.8) and the Samvarāvimśakapāṇīka (P, fols. 231a2–233a2; D, fols. 200b1–202a4; S, vol. 78, pp. 537.2–541.5). See also the Shes bya mdzod (pp. 358.24–359.1). For an English translation of the pertinent verses, see TATZ 1982: 370; id. 1985: 28, 33–34 (commentary).

\(^{114}\) Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 137.1–138.20).

\(^{115}\) sDom gsum rnam nges (p. 23.1–2):
not regrettable, (3) disparaging sublime personalities, and (4) deceiving sentient beings. The textual source is the Ratnakīrtisūtra, which is cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya. The expressions ‘four black practices’ and ‘four white practices’ are, however, not employed in these citations. We shall return to these qualities in chapter eleven.

(c) The Venial Offences in the Two Traditions

The following table contains an enumeration of venial offences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Venial Offences (dūkha)</th>
<th>Mañjuśrī-Nāgarjuna Tradition</th>
<th>Maitreya-Asanga Tradition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Disregarding the pain and pleasure of others: 2 (not removing pain and grief of others despite the ability to do so &amp; not engendering well-being and happiness of others despite the ability to do so) x 2 (physical &amp; mental pain) x 2 (pertaining to the present &amp; future) x 3 (striving physically, verbally, and mentally)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>(a) 34 opposed to kusala-dharmasamgraha: (i) 7 opposed to dīna (ii) 9 opposed to śīla (iii) 4 opposed to kṣānti (iv) 3 opposed to vīrya (v) 3 opposed to dhvāna (vi) 8 opposed to prajñā</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Disregarding the practice: (i) 2 (not engendering small antidotes for greater pain and grief) x 2 (in this &amp; the next life) x 2 (in the continuia of oneself &amp; others) = 8 (ii) 2 (letting small prerequisites for greater well-being and happiness decline) x 2 (of this &amp; the next life) x 2 (in the continuia of oneself &amp; others) = 8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(b) 12 opposed to sattvārthakriyā: (i) 4 pertaining to slackening of the effort to strive for the welfare of others (ii) 6 pertaining to having not benefited others (iii) 2 pertaining to not censuring when necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The thirty-four lapses opposed to the accumulation of wholesome virtues (kusaladharmasamgraha) in the table above are said to be in accordance with the Samvaravimsāka.\(^{116}\) It is, however, not the Samvaravimsāka but Bodhibhadra’s commentary that explicitly mentions the number of venial offences, forty-six, indicated above.\(^{117}\) Concerning the twelve lapses opposed to striving for the welfare of the sentient beings (sattvārthakriyā). Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho notes that in the various commentaries the degree of accountability in each case can be classified under one of three possibilities, depending on the underlying cause: (a) If the failing occurs as a result of lack of respect (probably for the precepts and sentient beings) or slothfulness, it is a defiled failing (nyon mongs pa can gyi nyes pa); (b) If the failing occurs as a result of forgetfulness, it is an undefiled failing (nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa’i nyes pa); (c) If the failing occurs as a result of a disturbed state of mind (sams ‘khrugs pa), it is, in reality, not a failing, the bodhisattva being in such a case innocent.\(^{118}\)

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\(^{116}\) Samvaravimsātha 9–20b (P, fol. 192a7–b7; D, fol. 166b6–167a5; S, vol. 78, pp. 448.7–449.8). These verses are paraphrased in the Rţig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 139.1–142.2). For an English translation of the pertinent verses, see TATZ 1982: 370–371; id. 1985: 28–29, 34–38 (commentary).

\(^{117}\) See the Samvaravimsāka-paṇḍita (P, fol. 236a2ff.; D, fols. 204b6ff.; S, vol. 78, pp. 547.14ff.).
Some sources explicitly count the abandonment of bodhicitta as one of the four cardinal breaches of the bodhisattva vow. Even according to the tradition that does not explicitly count the abandonment of bodhicitta as one of the cardinal transgressions, it is contextually clear that loss of it can remove the very foundation upon which all other bodhisattva vows are based. In fact, the very existence of a bodhisattva hinges on his bodhicitta.

17. Reestablishing a Broken Vow in the Two Traditions

Most vows of a bodhisattva can either be invalidated or damaged. According to the Mañjuśrī-Nāgarjuna tradition, the vow is completely nullified if the bodhisattva loses or renounces his pranidhicitta, which is the whole basis (rten gzhi) of his vow, or if he violates or repudiates the vows. Should one of these two occur, the bodhisattva is faced with the choice of whether to reestablish the bodhisattva vow. If a cardinal transgression other than the abandonment of pranidhicitta occurs, he must apply the appropriate antidote within the following period of four hours (thun). Otherwise such a transgression is called a ‘transgression whose deadline has expired’ (thun ’das kyi ltung ba) or a ‘transgression [resulting in] deterioration’ (nyams pa’i ltung ba). A particular restoration procedure is called for in this case. It is said, however, to depend on the person’s faculties. A person with weak faculties (dbang po dman pa) restores the vow by confessing on the basis of the four strengths (stobs bzhi). A person with average faculties (dbang po ‘bring) restores it by confessing in front of the bodhisattva Ākāśagarbha. A person with superior faculties (dbang po rab) restores it by confessing verbally before all buddhas and bodhisattvas in a dream-like manner and by abiding in the meditative state of true reality. Moreover, the recitation of the Triskandhakasūtra is recommended for the recovery from venial offences (duskrta).

According to the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition, the primary cause leading to pranidhicitta being abandoned is an unequivocal sense of resignation as far as other sentient beings are concerned, and the secondary cause is the perpetrating of four black practices (nag po’i chos bzhi). The abandonment of pranidhicitta would of course automatically entail the abandonment of prasthānacitta. According to this tradition, the transgressions are classified under three categories, namely, transgressions caused by fetters (paravyavasthāna) which are excessive (adhimātra), medium (madya), or mild (mrda). A transgression is major if four criteria are fulfilled, namely, perpetrating the four black practices (a) constantly, (b) shamelessly, (c) with great delight, and (d) indeed even cherishing the quality of such acts. A

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118 Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 141.17–142.2).

119 Ibid. (p. 159.10–17).

120 Ibid. (p. 160.13–19). The four strengths are: the strength of reproaching (one’s misdeeds’) (rnam par sun ’byin pa’i stobs or sun ’byin pa’i stobs), (2) the strength of support (rten gyi stobs), including taking refuge in the Three Jewels and not abandoning bodhicitta, (3) the strength of applying antidotes (gnyen po kun tu spyod pa’i stobs), and (4) the strength of recovering from (one’s) transgressions (sor chud pa’i stobs or nyes pa las slob pa’i stobs). The Caturdharmaṅkasūtra cited in the Śīkṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 160.4–11; VAIYYA, pp. 89.28–90.3) is the common source text on the four strengths. For an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 158–159. Of the four, only two are attested in the form of compounds, āśrayabala and pratipattibala.

121 Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 159.17–160.13).

122 Ibid. (pp. 160.19–161.4).

123 Ibid. (p. 161.4–7).

124 The three kinds of fetters (paravyavasthāna) are explicated in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (WOGIHARA, pp. 189.26–181.11; DUTT, p. 124.14–22).
transgression is medium if one of the four criteria is fulfilled and if the bodhisattva, being ashamed, gives up his deeds at the suggestion of others. A transgression is minor if one of the four criteria is fulfilled and if the bodhisattva, being ashamed, immediately gives up his acts on his own. If a transgression caused by major fetters occurs, a bodhisattva invalidates his vow and must take it anew by confessing and by performing acts of purification before at least four bodhisattva teachers. The vow, according to the Maitreya-Asäṅga tradition, cannot be reassumed more than three times. If a transgression caused by medium fetters occurs, a bodhisattva should confess and perform acts of purification before at least three bodhisattva teachers. If a transgression caused by minor fetters occurs, a bodhisattva should confess before at least one bodhisattva teacher. The Samvaravimśaka is here cited as scriptural authority. Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho adds that the vow and the methods of restoring it within the Maitreya-Asäṅga tradition are meant for beginners (las dang po pa) and are hence very strict.

18. Concluding Remarks

What I have attempted in this chapter is to present the two traditions in terms of their bodhicitta doctrine, and particularly in regard to their bodhicittotpāda ritual. I have argued that there are two bodhicittotpāda traditions in India and tried to describe the way Tibetan scholars have systematised and assessed these two traditions. The two traditions are seen to differ in a number of ways, including the categorical distinctions they make and the scriptural and personal authorities they follow, above all in regard to their ritual procedures, precepts, and definition of transgressions, and in the methods they employ to restore broken vows. I have also tried to show how several Tibetan scholars attempted to harmonise or synthesise the two traditions.

125 For the methods of restoring vows according to the Maitreya-Asäṅga tradition, see the Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (pp. 161.14–163.4).

126 Rig ‘dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 163.4–6).
Chapter Seven

A Typology of Bodhicitta

By seeing the Dharma, one sees the Buddha. By seeing the Buddha, one sees all sentient beings. By seeing all sentient beings, one sees causes and conditions. By seeing causes and conditions, one sees emptiness. Seeing emptiness is not seeing [any phenomenon]. O Illustrious One, not seeing any phenomenon is the correct seeing!

– Subhūti in the Dharmasamgītisūtra

1

1 Dharmasamgītisūtra (T, fol. 291a5–7; D, fol. 69b5–6): chos mthong bas sangs rgyas mthong ngo || sangs rgyas mthong bas sms can thams cad mthong ngo || sms can thams cad mthong bas rgyu dang rkyen mthong ngo || rgyu dang rkyen mthong bas stong pa nyid mthong ngo || stong pa nyid mthong ba ni mthong ba ma mchis pa’o || bcom ldan ’das [add. gang de ltar T] chos thams cad ma [mi T] mthong ba ni yang dag par [pa D] mthong ba’o ||.

1. Introductory Remarks

Anyone who has worked with the concept of bodhicitta in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism can easily be baffled by the diverse employment of the term. Although the primary, standard meaning of bodhicitta is the resolve (citta) to attain the highest state of awakening (boññi), that is, the resolve to become a buddha, one sees, particularly in the later tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources, that bodhicitta can also mean other, sometimes even unexpected things. For example, śūnyatā and tahāgatagarbha are referred to as bodhicitta. Occasionally, the gnosis or insight of a bodhisattva or buddha is also referred to as bodhicitta. In the tantric systems that contain sexual-yogic practices, the seminal fluids of ‘virility’ and ‘fertility’ are designated as bodhicitta. In addition, tantric deities such as Kālacakra and Hevajra are called bodhicītā.

These facts raise a number of questions: Are these various meanings of bodhicitta at all related to each other? Is it sheer coincidence that different things, most of which have nothing to do with the original term and its meaning, are called bodhicitta? Are they, that is, related to each other only nominally, and hence can be dismissed as irrelevant to the study of the concept of bodhicitta? I for my part believe that the various kinds of bodhicitta are doctrinally and historically related to each other, and that a study of bodhicitta that does not take all these types into consideration will not be complete. Several modern scholars have
taken note of most types of bodhicitta. None of them, however, as far as I can tell, has come up with a typology that can explain their entire spectrum of meaning. I have therefore made an attempt to devise a typology which accounts for the concept of bodhicitta in all its phases of historical development and doctrinal usage. The typology proposed here lays no claim to being perfect, and may certainly require much improvement or refinement. Nonetheless, it is hoped that this attempt will stimulate the interest of other scholars working in this field.

2. An Overview of the Five Types of Bodhicitta

I have categorised bodhicitta under the following types:
(a) ethical-spiritual
(b) gnoseological
(c) ontological
(d) psycho-physiological
(e) semeiological

I shall first of all explain what I mean by these terms: (a) ‘Ethico-spiritual’ bodhicitta is the idea of bodhicitta in its most basic sense, that is, the resolve to become a buddha out of compassion or altruism, that is, for the sake of other sentient beings. It is only in this sense that the word bodhicitta can be translated as ‘resolve [to strive] for awakening.’ Unless specified otherwise, the term in this study has been employed primarily with this meaning. (b) Occasionally knowledge (vidyā: rig pa), discriminating insight (prajñā: shes rab), or meditative insight or gnosis (jnāna: ye shes) is considered to be bodhicitta. I call such a type of bodhicitta characterised by cognitive insight ‘gnoseological’ bodhicitta. (c) By ‘ontological bodhicitta,’ I mean the concept of bodhicitta in its deepest sense, that is, cases in which the very ultimate reality or ‘being as such’ (i.e. śūnyatā, tathatā, dharmaḥ, bhūtakoti, etc.) is considered to be bodhicitta.² (d) By ‘psycho-physiological’ bodhicitta I mean ‘semen’ (skra: khu ba) and occasionally also female ‘blood’ (sonita or rakta: khrag), referred to as ‘white’ and ‘red’ bodhicitta, respectively, and closely associated with the sensation of ecstasy or bliss (sukha: bde ba). (e) ‘Semeiological’ bodhicitta denotes a visual, vocal (verbal) or visionary sign or symbol which expresses one or more of the four preceding types of bodhicitta. I have borrowed the term ‘semeiological’ from semiotics or the study of science of signs. Unlike in semiotics, however, I make no distinction between sign and symbol. Although semeiological bodhicitta, as a representative of the other four types, is not exactly on a par with them, it can nonetheless be considered a ‘type’ of bodhicitta because it, like psycho-physiological bodhicitta, is conceived of as an effective means of access to gnoseological bodhicitta, and in a certain sense even as a visual, verbal, or visionary expression of ontological bodhicitta itself.

Since I have not been able to locate any Indian source that suggests these five types of bodhicitta in one place, I shall present here a translation of a passage from Rong-zom-pa’s commentary on the *Guhyagarbhatantra, which seems to do so:³

² As for my preferring the term ontological to the term metaphysical, see the EB (s.v. ontology) where ontology is described as “the theory or study of being as such; i.e., of the basic characteristics of all reality,” and where it is also stated that “though the term was first coined in the 17th century, ontology is synonymous with metaphysics or ‘first philosophy’ as defined by Aristotle in the 4th century BC. Because metaphysics came to include other studies (e.g. philosophical cosmology and psychology), ontology has become the preferred term for the study of being.”

³ dKon mchog ’gre (A, fol. 111a5–b1; B, p. 144.2–5): de la spyi phreng chub sems zhes bya ba stong pa nyid dang sning rje ’brel ba la yang ’jug | dbyings dang ve shes gnyis su med pa i don ma nor ba rogs pa ’i rig pa ’byung ba la yang ’jug | sms kyi rang bzhin ji bzhin pa la yang ’jug ste | de ’i raugs kyi phyag rgya dang sgor gyur pa ni lha gpa ’i byang chub sems so ||.
The term bodhicitta is generally employed [1] [to designate] the union of emptiness (śūnyatā: stong pa nyid) and compassion (karunā: snying rje). [2] [It is] also employed [to designate] the arising of knowledge (vidyā: rig pa) of properly realising the reality consisting in the oneness of the sphere [of reality] (dharma: dbyings) and gnosis (jnāna: ye shes). [3] [It is] also employed [to designate] the nature of mind as it actually is. [4] The symbolical signs (mudrā: phyag rgya) corresponding to these and [5] the means of access [to them] are called ‘surplus bodhicitta’ (*adhibodhicitta: lhag pa'i byang chub kyi sans).

Broadly speaking, one can describe most types of bodhicitta as being characterised by the union of emptiness and compassion. However, in the passage above, the expression is obviously employed in a narrow sense to refer to only ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, and thus the first three types mentioned there seem to correspond to our ethico-spiritual, gnoseological and ontological bodhicitta, respectively. The fourth and fifth, which Rong-zom-pa designates collectively as *adhibodhicitta, can be perhaps equated with our semeiological and psycho-physiological bodhicitta, respectively. As for the term *adhibodhicitta, I have not been able to trace it in Indian sources. It is, however, obvious from the context that it does not mean ‘superior bodhicitta’ but rather ‘surplus bodhicitta.’ In any case, the last two types of bodhicitta are, for Rong-zom-pa, obviously not on the same level as the first three types.

3. Ethico-Spiritual Bodhicitta

The term bodhicitta is primarily understood in its ethico-spiritual sense, that is, as an earnest, compassion-driven wish to become a buddha, which is unique to Mahāyāna or the bodhisattva doctrine. Whether bodhicitta or cittotpāda is mind per se (citta: sans) or a mental derivative (caitasika or caitta: sans las byung ba) has been spiritedly argued over in India and Tibet. Some scholars have maintained that it is a principal mind and some a mental derivative or factor. Others have attempted to resolve the issue by contending that a mind and its mental factors, as a rule, never arise in isolation from each other, and thus the two positions are not contradictory. Accordingly, this would mean that bodhicitta possesses components of both mind and the mental factors. Indeed we have seen in the second chapter that ethico-spiritual bodhicitta should be viewed as possessing conative, cognitive, and emotive forces corresponding to the elements of will (chanda: 'dun pa), discriminative insight (prajñā: shes rab), and compassion (karunā: snying rje), respectively.

An attempt was made in chapter three to present a number of factors that could have contributed to the conception of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta. The idea of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta in its early historical phase was probably limited to the initial resolve to become a buddha, but in the course of time not only the altruistic inclination (āsaya: bsam pa) but also the actual undertaking (prayoga: sbyor ba), including the spiritual practice of the six perfections (pāramitā: pha rol tu phyin pa), came to be regarded as part of bodhicitta or cittotpāda. Such a development doubtless went hand in hand with subclassifying it into various double sets, namely, into the resolve characterised by aspiration (pranidhācitta: smon pa'i sans) and the resolve characterised by (or present during) the act of setting out (prasthānacitta: 'jug pa'i sans); into generation of the resolve that is gestural (or indicatory) (sāmketi-cittotpāda: brdam byo pa'i sans bskyed) and generation of the resolve that is actual or ultimate (pāramārthikacittotpāda: don dam pa'i sans bskyed); or into conventional bodhicitta (samvitbodhicitta: kun rdo rje byang chub kyi sans) and absolute bodhicitta (pāramārthikabodhicitta: don dam pa'i byang chub kyi sans). Such a traditional classification of bodhicitta would accommodate not only ethico-spiritual bodhicitta but the proposed ontological and gnoseological types of bodhicitta as well. Attempts were obviously also made to interpret entire theories and practices, including the paths and attainments of a bodhisattva, in terms of bodhicitta or cittotpāda.
Ethico-spiritual bodhicitta remains essential even in highly developed forms of tantric Buddhism. However, the underlying idea of it may vary according to the soteriological model followed; that is, the notion of the resolve to ‘become’ a buddha is no longer applicable in a system that presupposes that all sentient beings already ‘possess’ the Buddha Nature or ‘are’ already buddhas. In such cases, one resolves merely to ‘expose’ the buddha within or to ‘recognise’ one’s state of being a buddha.4

4. Gnoseological Bodhicitta

It is not possible to do full justice here to such a weighty topic as gnosis, upon which the concept of gnoseological bodhicitta is largely based. What I shall merely attempt instead is to explain what I mean by gnoseological bodhicitta and to discuss some of its potential synonyms or near synonyms, its salient features and the question regarding who actually possesses it. In addition, the difference that gnosis exists in the body—particularly relevant to psycho-physiological bodhicitta—and the different modes of its emergence as prepondered in some rNying-ma sources will be presented.

(a) What Gnoseological Bodhicitta Is

One may say in general that a Buddhist saint is primarily defined by gnosis (jñāna: ye shes). It is, however, necessary to determine an exact relationship between gnosis itself and gnoseological bodhicitta. Not all kinds of gnosis will be regarded here as gnoseological bodhicitta. If no qualitative difference is recognised between the gnosis of a śrāvaka saint, pratyekabuddha, and a buddha, one could, theoretically and retrospectively, designate the gnosis of non-Mahāyāna saints as gnoseological bodhicitta, but I see no benefit in doing so, because, in the first place, the term bodhicitta is not applicable to non-Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nor should the so-called ‘subsequently obtained gnosis’ (prsthalaabhajñāna: rjes las thob pa’i shes)—that is, gnosis which is present only during the post-meditative state of a bodhisattva who has gained direct meditative access to reality, or ontological bodhicitta—be considered gnoseological bodhicitta. In some specific non-tantric Mahāyāna sources (such as the literature dealing with the tathāgatagarbha theory) and related tantric sources, gnosis is conceived of as being immanent or innately present in all sentient beings. Such gnosis in a subliminal state will not be regarded as gnoseological bodhicitta either, but rather as the ontological type. In short, by gnoseological bodhicitta I mean a kind of gnosis, be it generated or merely exposed, that has ontological bodhicitta as its veritable and immediate object. A subject-object dichotomy is, however, not posited.

(b) Some Synonyms of Gnoseological Bodhicitta

There are several references where bodhicitta is understood in its gnoseological sense. For example, in the commentaries of the Mahāyānasūtraśāstra, what is known as absolute bodhicitta in the traditional sources is defined in its gnoseological sense, and concretely as non-conceptual gnosis (nirvikalpañāṇa: rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes). Likewise, the Bodhicittavivaranaṭīkā explains that bodhicitta is a ‘diamond-like gnosis,’ which cognises all phenomena correctly.5 In one tantric commentary, the knowledge of the non-substantiality of

4 See, for example, the dGongs pa ’dus pa’i mdo (P, fol. 152a5–6; D, fol. 162b5):

bdag cag mtha’ yas sms cp gnams ||
don gyi sugs rgyas yin mod kyang ||
rtog pa’i dbang gys ‘khor ba la ||
byang chub mchog tu sms bs kyed do ||.
phenomena (dharmāntiya: chos kyi bdag med pa) is also identified as bodhicitta in its gnoseological sense. In some other tantric sources, the mirror-like gnosis seems to be equated with bodhicitta. In the Madhyamakapradipa, the self-arisen gnosis (svayambhūhāna: range byung gi ye shes) is apparently used in apposition to bodhicitta in its gnoseological sense.

Not only bodhicitta but also any term in Mahāyāna that is understood in a gnoseological sense can be regarded as a synonym of it. In the non-tantric Mahāyāna, so long as terms such as bodhi, buddha, prajñāpāramitā, and madhyama pratipat imply a veritable non-conceptual gnosis that cognises true reality (i.e. śūnyatā, tathatā, etc.), they can be equated with gnoseological bodhicitta. In the tantric context, too, several terms that denote direct cognition of true reality, such as the term tantra itself, can be considered synonyms of gnoseological bodhicitta.

(c) Some Salient Features of Gnoseological Bodhicitta

The concept of gnoseological bodhicitta is based on the general Buddhist notion that the actual soteriological breakthrough comes in the form of an intellectual event, gnosis, and not an emotional one, no matter how positive, such as benevolence (maitri: byams pa)—a point which has been explicated by the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti. It is one’s view of or insight into śūnyatā, then, which actually releases one from the fetters of samsāra. This notion of release upon seeing true reality is found in several Mahāyāna sources, such as the Abhisamayālamkāra and Ratnagotravibhāga. According to the Hevajra tantra, one is called

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5 Bodhicittavivaranañīkā (P, fol. 461a3–4; D, fol. 122b3; S, vol. 18, p. 1099.7–8): de la byang chub sems ni stong pa chen po rdo re la bu’i ye shes te | cho thams cad phyin ci ma log par lhag par rtags pa’i phyir ro |.
6 Catrangasādhanāñīkā (P, fol. 283b7–8; D, fol. 88b6–7; S, vol. 22, p. 20.11–13): rdzogs pa’i byang chub sems ni zhes bya ba ni rdzogs pa’i byang chub kyi rang bzhin du zhugs pa’i byang chub kyi sems techos bdag med par shes pa zhes bya ba’i don to |.
7 Vairocanayāmābhāsismaya (P, fol. 79b3–4; D, fol. 65a6; S, vol. 24, p. 197.5–7): sangs rgyas rdo rje rtog pa’i dpal || me long ye shes byang chub sems || ’od gsal rdo rje kun zhi ba || gti mug rdo rje la phyag ’ishal ||.
See also Buddha guhya’s *Vairocanābhāsambodhitāntrarāhāsya* (P, fol. 92a2–3; D, fol. 76b7–77a1; S, vol. 35, p. 208.10–11): de bzhin du gzhung gzhin las kyang | ye shes bzhis nnyams pa nyid kyi ye shes ni byang chub kyi sems su bshad ||.
8 See n. 86.
9 Pramāṇavārttika 1.211–212:
   ātmagrahaikayonināt kāryakāraṇabhavataḥ |
   rāgapratighayor bādāh bhide ’pi na parasparam |
   mohāvirodhanā maitryādeḥ nā tvaṃtaman dosanigrhaḥ |
   tannālās ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam ||
For a German translation and detailed notes, see VETTER 1990: 111–114.
11 Abhisamayālamkāra 5.21; Ratnagotravibhāga 1.154: nāpaneyam atah kimcid upaneyam na kimcana |
a \textit{buddha} because of one's understanding of phenomena. The \textit{Caturdevīpariprcchātantra} states that all the 84,000 teachings of the Buddha will be fruitless if one does not know true reality. Correct cognition always seems to imply the notion of knowing true reality without superimposition (\textit{adhvāropa/samāropa}: sgro 'dogs pa) or depreciation (\textit{apaśāda}: skur ba 'debs pa), although here too the concept of superimposition and depreciation differs from system to system.

Since a detailed analysis of the salient features of gnoseological bodhicitta is not possible here, I shall merely summarise them as follows: (1) Gnoseological \textit{bodhicitta} is non-conceptual (nirvikalpa: \textit{rnam par mi rtog pa}) by nature. (2) It is undefiled (anāsārava: zag pa \textit{med pa}). It is no longer subject to the ills of \textit{samsāra}. (3) It is a direct yogic perception and hence a valid cognition (\textit{pramāṇa}: \textit{tshad ma}). Thus it neither superimposes qualities on its object nor denies it the ones it has. In other words, it is fully objective. (4) It is born of meditation (\textit{bhāvanāmaya}: sgom pa \textit{las byung ba}), that is, the combined practice of quietude (\textit{śamatha}: \textit{zhi gnas}) and superior insight (\textit{vipāśaṇā}: \textit{lhag mthong}). (5) It has ontological \textit{bodhicitta} as its object and is free from the subject-object dichotomy. (6) Its \textit{aśaya} has a soteriological impact on the person who possesses it. (7) It is by nature stronger than the factors opposed to it, and thus never succumbs to them. (8) Its soteriological effect is irreversible. (9) It destroys the very foundations of immoral attitudes and actions. Thus a person who possesses it is incapable of deliberately inflicting pain on others. (10) It is the only means of access to ontological \textit{bodhicitta}. Without it, ontological \textit{bodhicitta} will never be experienced as a spiritual event.

\begin{quote}
draṣṭavyām bhūtato bhūtāṃ bhūtadarśā vimucyate ||
See also the \textit{Caryāmelāpakapradīpa} (p. 102.11–12); the \textit{Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya} (P, fol. 166a5–6; D, fol. 146b6; S, vol. 57, p. 403.4–6); \textit{Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayayākyāna} (P, fol. 168b2–3; D, fol. 149a1–2; S, vol. 57, p. 410.7–9); \textit{Abuddhabodhaka} (P, fol. 169b5–6; D, fol. 150a2; S, vol. 57, p. 414.15–17); \textit{Madhyamakapradīpa} (P, fol. 354b1–2; D, fol. 281a5–6; S, vol. 57, p. 1542.4–5); Candrāraṇīpāda's \textit{Ratnāmalā} (P, fol. 69b5–6; D, fol. 71b3; S, vol. 63, p. 1046.12–14); SEYFORT RUEGG 1973: 132, n. 1. Cf. also the \textit{Rin chen bskod pa'i rgyud} (pp. 854.7–855.1):
\begin{quote}
mtha' bral ye shes phyogs cha bral ||
gzung 'dzin rtog pa ka nas dag ||
yang dag nyid la yang dag lta ||
yang dag mthong na rnam par gral ||
\end{quote}
\end{quote}

12 \textit{Hevajra tantra} 2.2.37b: \textit{buddho 'ham vastubodhanād}; \textit{Marmakalikāpaṇijikā} (p. 8.4–5). Cf. \textit{Hevajra tantra} 1.1.11ab: bhāvanabhāvabhāvahena mucyatate taparipāya; \textit{Marmakalikāpaṇijikā} (p. 7.21): bhāva eva param mitrām bhāva eva param ripuḥ; \textit{ibid.} (p. 7.19).

13 \textit{Caturdevīpariprcchātantra}, as cited in the \textit{Caryāmelāpakapradīpa} (p. 2.9–10):
caturaśīṣṭhāsre dharmaskandhe māhāmuneḥ|
tattvam vai ye na jānanti sarve te nisphalāya vai ||.

14 See also \textit{Acintyastava} 50:
\begin{quote}
jñāne sati yathā jiyeṃ jiyeṃ jñānam tathā sati ||
yatrobhavyam anutpannam iti buddham tadāsti kim ||
\end{quote}
\begin{quote}
dus rnam kun du de bzhin gshegs pa ni ||
dbyings dang ye shes gnyis med rang bzhin gvyis ||
chos kyi sku ste....
\end{quote}
This verse is apparently a quotation.

15 For an analogy drawn with eliminating darkness through light, see, for example, Kānḍa's \textit{Yogaratnamālā} (p. 137.5–8); \textit{naru sāgaropamāḍ vipaksaraśeḥ katham devatāyogonātṛat samiturām | yathā giriguhāyam sakād jvalito vahniḥ | ciraṅkālam upāvatā tamassvandham upahanti | tathāyam api nairātmāhevajrabhāvanāvīṣeṣa iti bhāva }.
(d) Who Possesses Gnoseological Bodhicitta?

The question regarding who possesses gnoseological bodhicitta is tantamount to the complicated Indian and Tibetan issue of who realises the non-substantiality of phenomena (dharmamārāmya: chos kyi bdag med pa), or in other words, to the issue regarding whether the śrāvaka saints and pratyekekabuddhas realise dharmamārāmya, a question that is answered differently in various scriptures and systems. In keeping with my definition of gnoseological bodhicitta, it will be argued that only those bodhisattvas (including tantric yogins) who have direct access to true reality as defined in the Mahāyāna—that is, bodhisattvas who have at least attained the path of seeing (darśanamārga: mthong ba’i lam)—will be regarded as bearers of gnoseological bodhicitta.

Two different viewpoints traceable in certain Mahāyāna sources may prima facie suggest that bodhicitta is common to all Buddhist saints. The first one is that śrāvaka saints, pratyekekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and buddhas arise from bodhicitta. It can be assumed that bodhicitta in such a context is to be understood in its ethicospiritual sense. The second viewpoint is that Buddhist sainthood is possible only through realisation of bodhicitta, obviously here understood in its ontological sense. According to this position, one who does not realise bodhicitta even to the smallest degree has not the slightest chance to attain release (mokṣa: thar pa).¹⁶ Both of these viewpoints may be used to argue that all Buddhist saints indeed possess both ethicospiritual and gnoseological bodhicitta.

Nonetheless, a closer look at the explanation of the first point of view reveals that ethicospiritual bodhicitta is not attributed to all Buddhist saints. It is not presupposed that śrāvaka saints and pratyekekabuddhas must generate ethicospiritual bodhicitta in order to attain their soteriological goal. The rationale behind such a perception is that ethicospiritual bodhicitta gives rise to a bodhisattva, a bodhisattva to a buddha, and a buddha to śrāvaka saints and pratyekekabuddhas, and hence the origin of all Buddhist saints can be traced back to ethicospiritual bodhicitta.¹⁷ This is, of course, by no means the same as contending that one must generate ethicospiritual bodhicitta to become, for instance, a śrāvaka saint. In the Prajñāpāramitā systems, all Buddhist saints are born from the Prajñāpāramitā—a position

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¹⁶ Mañjuśrimitra, Bodhicittabhāvanā (P, fol. 2b1–3; D, fol. 2a1–2; S, vol. 33, p. 810.3–7); Bodhicittabhāvanānirdesa (P, fol. 57a2–b2; D, fol. 46a5–b3; S, vol. 33, pp. 184.12–185.9).

¹⁷ Vajrāskhararatantra (T, fol. 120a7–b2; D, fol. 230b2–4):

byang chub smsi ni ma rtags par ||
thog ma med ldan ‘khor ba las ||
‘byung ba cung zad yod ma yin ||
nyan thos dang ni rang rgyal dang ||
byang chub smsi dpa’i rnam ’phrel ni ||
byang chub kyi ni smsi med par ||
‘gas kyang mya ngan ‘da mi nus ||
gal te sngs rgyas ‘byung med na ||
nyan thos dag ni ga las ‘byung [byung D] ||
sangs rgyas ‘byung ba yod min na ||
rang rgyal de ni ‘byung mi ’gyur ||
gal te byang chub smsi dpa’i med ||
sangs rgyas rnam si gngan las ‘byung ||.

Cf. also Madhyamakāvatāra 1.1 (p. 1.12–15):

nyan thos sngs rgyas ‘bring rnam sthūb dbang skyes ||
sangs rgyas byang chub smsi dpa’i las ’khrungs shing ||
nying rje’i smsi dang dngiis su med blo dang ||
byang chub smsi ni rgyal sras rnam kyi rgyu ||.

See also the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (pp. 2.1–7.14).

which is prone to all kinds of interpretations and is bitterly disputed in Tibet. Similarly, for Mañjuśrīmitra, all Buddhist saints arise from the realisation of (ontological) bodhicitta, but this does not mean that all those who realise ontological bodhicitta automatically become bodhisattvas. For him, realisation of (ontological) bodhicitta to a small, medium, or great degree gives rise to a small, medium, or great degree of soteriological attainment, respectively. One who does not realise it at all will not attain even the least soteriological goal. Mañjuśrīmitra has, in this way, clearly attempted to reinterpret the entire non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna Buddhist soteriology in terms of ontological and gnoseological bodhicitta. Thus, for him, it would be correct to maintain that a śrāvaka saint possesses a small dose of gnoseological bodhicitta, a pratyekabuddha an intermediate dose, and a Mahāyāna saint a greater dose still.

(e) Gnosis as Abiding in the Body

The idea that gnosis abides in the body is widespread, and is particularly interesting in the context of psycho-physiological bodhicitta. The underlying reason seems to be this: Gnosis can be elicited from the body by manipulating the latter skilfully, just as oil and butter can be gained from sesame and milk, respectively, inasmuch as gnosis pervades the body. The idea of gnosis abiding in the body can be found in several Mahāyāna sources. For example, the Dharmadhātustava attributed to one Nāgārjuna states:

For example, in a container
Water is mixed with milk;
A swan drinks the milk
And the water remains as it is.
Similarly, gnosis abides in the body
Wrapped in kleśas;
A yogin receives the gnosis
And the ignorant one rejects [it].

According to the Hevajratantra, the great gnosis abiding in the body is devoid of all conceptual thought; it abides in the body and yet is not born in it. The Caryāmelāpakapradīpa cites two verses (apparently a rough citation from the Dharmadhātustava), which state:

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19 Cf. also Ratnagunāsanamcaya 5.5–8.
20 Cf. the Tattvasamgrahapañjikā ad 2843–2846 (vol. 2, p. 639.8–9; also cited in TSD, s.v. til mar): na hy asanto vyomakusumādayah kvacic api śakyante kartum, sīkātāsu vā tāilam |. Note, however, the context. For an English translation, see JHA 1937/39: 1284.
21 Dharmadhātustava (P, fol. 76a2–3; D, fol. 66a2–3; S, vol. 1, pp. 183.19–184.2):

   ji ltar 'o ma dang 'dres chu ||
   snod gcig la [na DC] ni gnas pa las ||
   ngang pas [pa DC] 'o ma 'thung byed cing ||
   chu ni ma yin de bzhin gnas ||
   de bzhin nyon mongs kyi g.yogs nas ||
   ye shes lus 'dir gcig gnas kyang ||
   rnal 'byor pa yis ye shes len ||
   mi shes pa ni 'dor bar byed ||.

22 Hevajratantra 1.1.12:

dehastham ca mahājñānam sarvasamkalpavarjītam |
vyāpakāḥ sarvacastūnām dehistho 'pi na dehajah ||.

23 Cited in the Caryāmelāpakapraddipa (p. 61.7–10):
yathā dīpo ghaṭāntahāsṭho bāhye naivāvabhāsate |
For example, a lamp inside a pot
Will not shine outside [the pot];
But if that pot is broken,
The flame of the lamp will then shine.
In the same way, one’s body is like a pot,
And reality is like a lamp;
If [the former is] broken completely by the master’s organ of speech,
The gnosia of a buddha will become manifest.  

In some sources, it is said that also the Prajñāpāramitā exists in the body. The Guhyasiddhi states that the supreme pure gnosia that exists in one’s body can be realised with effort, by the grace of a master. In the Caturdeviṣpariṣcchāṭantra, the role of psycho-physiological bodhicitta in the evolution of the psycho-physical world is underscored. All elements are called dharmaḥū, and from them arises what is apparently psycho-physiological bodhicitta. The Yoganaratnamālā states that there is no bliss without physicality and no physicality without bliss. According to the Hevajratantra, ecstasy (or inexplicable bliss) and gnosia should arise from within.

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>bhinne tu tad ghaṭe paścād dīpajvālāḥbhīsāñate ||
svākāya eva hi ghāto dīpa eva hi tatvākam |
guruwakṛtānena sambhinne buddhājñānām sphaṭam bhavet ||.

Cf. the Dharmadāhūstava (P, fol. 73b2–4; D, fol. 64a1–2; S, vol. 1, pp. 178.10–179.4).

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24 Cf. Vanaratna in his Rahasyadipikā (p. 85.17–18): … samvrtam api suviśuddhadharmadhātuḍāṇān svadehe sthitam vadanti buddhā iti…. The Tibetan translation (pp. 151.12–152.2): kun rdzob tu yang rang gi lus la gnas pa’i ye shes chen po ni shin tu rnam par dag pa’i ye shes su sangs rgyas rnam gsung bar mdzad do zhes bya ba… presupposes “suviśuddhadhānān mahājñānām”.

25 Guhyasiddhi 1.31 (p. 8.5–6):
	tad viditvā pratyanena svadehe samvyavasthitam |
	bodhicittam param siddham garupādaprāśataḥ ||.

27 Caturdeviṇaparīṣcchāṭantra (T, fol. 257b3–5; D, fol. 280a4–6):
gzugs dang sgra dang dri dang ni ||
de bhin ro dang reg la sog ||
kham bco [bcwa D] brgyad po de dag kyang ||
chos kyi dbyar vses bya ba Ô [ba’o D] ||
de dag nyid las byung ba ni ||
byang chub sms zhes shes bya ba ||
byang chub sems las gong bu skye ||
gong bu las kyang yid skyes do ||
yid las nam mtha’i kham kyang ni ||
kham rnam dang ni skye mched rnam ||
dbang po phung po ‘byung ba rnam ||
de ltar dbyar vses bsdu [bsdu T] pa ste ||
bsdu ba de ni bstan byas pa ||
chos kyi dbyar kyi sgrub pa yin ||.

28 Yoganaratnamālā (p. 139.14–15): yathā sukham vinā na dehādi, tadvad deham vināpi na tad iti ||.

29 Hevajratantra 2.5.70a-d:
paścād utpadyate jñānaṃ kumarṣīrṣaṇatmaḥ yathā |
kim api utpadyate tatra mūrkhasya hi svapnaṃ yathā ||.
(f) The Three Modes of Emergence Open to Gnosis

Kuddālapāda, one of the eighty-four mahāsiddhas, states in his Acintyādvaśakramopadeśa: 30

Gnosis, a great mystery comprising insight [and] efficient strategy,
Having compassion [and other] inconceivable characteristics,
[And] beyond [expression] by verbal means,
Arises on its own [spontaneously].

Some rNying-ma sources, such as Mi-pham’s bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (which is apparently based on much older sources), allude to three modes of emergence open to gnosīs (ye shes 'char lugs gsum), namely, (a) the emergence of gnosīs posteriorly (ye shes chen po rgyab nas 'char ba), (b) the emergence of gnosīs anteriorly (ye shes chen po mdun nas), and (c) the emergence of gnosīs interiorly (ye shes chen po khong nas 'char ba). To put the concept of gnosīs and gnosīological bodhicitta into perspective, a translation of the pertinent passage from the bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad is presented here. Firstly, the posterior emergence of gnosīs is described as follows: 31

The mode of emergence of gnosīs pertaining to the three causal vehicles of characteristics ('lakṣanāvyāsa) is called the ‘emergence of great gnosīs posteriorly.’ How does it come about? It is maintained that just like the emergence of a reflection upon the clearing up of turbid water, omniscience [emerges] upon one’s becoming a buddha at the [eleventh] stage of ‘Total Radiance’ (saṃantaraprabhā) at the end of the ten stages and after the dregs of conceptuality, consisting of intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa), have been gradually cleared away. Because such a gnosīs is said to arise after three countless aeons and so forth, [the arising of gnosīs according to these three systems] is called the ‘emergence of gnosīs posteriorly.’

Secondly, regarding the emergence of gnosīs anteriorly, the bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad states: 32

[According to the] three outer tantric systems of the Mantra[yāna], it is called the ‘emergence of great gnosīs anteriorly.’ That is to say, [according to these systems], the Victorious Ones, comprising three or five families (kula), together with their entourage—[all] residing at present in Akanīṣṭha—are invited and seated in front of the space [above oneself] and elsewhere, and then after homage is paid and the [appropriate] offerings are made, the tantric attainments (siddhi) are received. Thus the view [of these tantric systems] is that tantric attainments are bestowed by these deities. And because the way of those who maintain that the ultimate result is achieved in seven or sixteen human life spans and so forth is swifter— as far as achieving the result is concerned—than the causal vehicles of characteristics, due to the employment of profound methods of producing a favourable constellation of oneself, deities, and substances, [the arising of gnosīs according to these three systems] is called the ‘emergence of great gnosīs anteriorly.’

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30 Acintyādvaśakramopadeśa 2 (p. 195.5–6):
prajñāpāramahāghuyam karunācintyalakṣanam | 
svayam upadayate jhânam vâkapthâtitagocaram ||.
Cf. also ibid. 15 (p. 196.15–16).

31 bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 43.6–44.3): rgyu mtshan nyid kyi theg pa gsum gyi ye shes ‘char lugs ni ye shes chen po rgyab nas ‘char ba zhes bya ste | ji lta na chu nrog pa dwangs pa las gzugs bryan ‘char ba lta rnam par mi rtsog pa la yun ring gnas par byas pas rim gys par mons pa’i rnam rtsog snyigs ma dwangs nas sa bcu’i mthar kun tu ‘od kyi sa la sangs rgyas nas thams cad mkhyen par ’dod pa ni | ye shes de lta bu bskal pa grangs md gsum sogs nas phyis ’byung bar ’dod pas ye shes rgyab nas ‘char ba zhes bya’o ||.

32 bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (p. 44.3–5): sngogs phyi rgyud sde gsum ni ye shes chen po mdun nas ‘char ba zhes bya ste | da lta ngyen du ’og min na bzhugs pa’i rgyal ba rigs gsum mam rigs lnga ‘khor bcas spyan drangs te mdun mka’ sogs su bzhugs pa la phyag ’shal zhung mchod pa phul la dangs grub nod par byas pas lha des dangs grub ster bar lta zhung | bidag dang lha dang rdo’ras kyi rten ’brel zab mo’i thabs kyi bsgrub [= sgrub?] pas | mi ishe bdu dang bcu drug la sogs pas mthar thug gi ‘bras bu’ grub par ’dod pa de dag gi lam rgyud mtshan nyid kyi theg pa las ‘bras bu thob pa la myur ba’i phyir ye shes mdun nas ‘char ba zhes bya’o ||.
Thirdly, the emergence of gnosis interoially is described as follows: [According to] the three vehicles of means (*upāyayāna) of the inner Mantra[yāna], [the arising of gnosis] is called the ‘emergence of great gnosis interioily.’ Because no phenomenon [ever] diverges from the nature of self-arisen gnosis (svayambhuñāna), [gnosis] becomes manifest in this very lifetime, there being no need to seek [the state of] a buddha elsewhere, for the state of one’s own mind abides in the nature of the great bliss. Thus [the arising of gnosis in these three systems] is called the ‘emergence of gnosis from the interior.’

I have not been able to locate any Indian source for such an idea.

5. Ontological Bodhicitta

In the following few paragraphs, an attempt will be made to explain the concept of ontological bodhicitta. The term bodhicitta is very pregnant and expressive, particularly if one thinks of Buddhism as a ‘bodhi-oriented religion’ or as a ‘citta-oriented religion.’ As has already been pointed out, the compound bodhicitta allows fundamentally of two interpretations: (1) as citta that is aimed at the attainment of bodhi and (2) as citta which is characterised by bodhi (or citta which is in essence bodhi). The latter understanding of the compound combined with the philosophical reflection on the deeper meanings of citta and bodhi may have contributed to the formation of the idea of ontological bodhicitta. For example, the Bhadrapālasūtra explicitly states that one’s own citta is in essence bodhi. Similarly, the Vairocanābhisambodhitāntra states: Bodhi is the complete knowledge of one’s citta just as it is. In other Vajra[yāna] contexts, bodhicitta is explicitly explained as citta characterised by bodhi. The Kosālālāmkāra states that it is because it is both bodhi and citta that it is called bodhicitta (implying that the compound has been taken as a karmadhāraya). This is also primarily the stance taken in the rDzogs-chen system. In addition, the words bodhi and citta can be employed conveniently in a number of ways to express pithily various aspects of Mahāyāna philosophy. For example, bodhi is nothing other than the correct knowledge of one’s citta or its nature. One should seek one’s bodhi in one’s citta. One should recognise

33 bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 44.6-45.1): sngags nang pa thabs kyi theg pa gsum ni ye shes chen po khong nas ‘char ba zhes bya ste’ cho thams cad rang bying gi ye shes bdag nyen chen po ’i ngang las ma ’das pas na | rang gi sams nyid bde ba chen po ‘i de nyid la gnas bzhin du sangs rgyas gzhan du tshol mi dgos pa tshe ‘di nyid la mngon du ‘char bas na ye shes khong nas ‘char ba zhes bya’o’ ||.

34 Bhadrapālasūtra (p. 37.13–20):

- sams kyis sangs rgyas byed pa ste ||
- sams nyid kyis kyang mthong ba ’o ||
- sams nyid nga yi sangs rgyas te ||
- sams nyid de bzhin gshegs pa ’o ||
- sams nyid nga yi las yin te ||
- sangs sgyas sams kyis mthong ba ’o ||
- sams nyid nga yi byang chub ste ||
- sams nyid rang bzhin med pa ’o ||.

35 Vairocanābhisambodhitāntra, as cited in the Caryāmelāpapradāpā (p. 38.11–12): svacittasya ‘yatābhāvaṁ pariñānāṁ’ bodhiḥ ||. Perhaps to be read as a compound.


37 KosaLālāmkāra (P, fol. 23b1; D, fol. 20b6; S, vol. 28, p. 50.6–7): byang chub kyang yin la sams kyang yin pas na byang chub kyi sams te [ta P] ||.

one’s citta as being bodhi at its core. One attains bodhi by penetrating one’s citta with insight. Citta when bound is called saṃsāra; a citta free from all fetters—intellectual-emotional defilements and conceptual thought—is called nirvāṇa (or bodhi). Of course, bodhicitta yields to interpretation depending on how bodhi and citta, and the correlation between them, are understood. It is only when it refers to true reality, not the cognition of true reality, that the given type of bodhicitta can be called ontological bodhicitta.

(a) The Conception of Ontological Bodhicitta

Already in the non-tantric Mahāyāna sources bodhicitta is described as luminously pure. For example, the Sāgaramatipariprechāsūtra states:  

One could [hypothetically] defile space [with intellectual-emotional defilements];
One could [hypothetically even] leave behind [one’s] footprints there (i.e. in space).
One could, however, never defile the perfect bodhicitta,
Which is by nature luminous.

Such a statement is, of course, open to more than one interpretation. For example, the type of bodhicitta referred to here may be simply understood as ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, which has been described as luminous because of its pure altruistic nature, free from negative emotions such as hatred. If the term sambodhicitta is interpreted as the buddha’s omniscience, it would qualify as gnoseological bodhicitta but not necessarily ontological bodhicitta.

Nonetheless, there are instances where the nature or luminous nature of the mind is referred to as bodhicitta, and where it can only be interpreted as ontological bodhicitta. For example, the Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra explains:

Moreover, O Śāriputra, the mind (citta) is what has awakening (bodhi) as [its] nature, and hence it is called bodhicitta.

In the eleventh century, Ratnākarasānti in India and Rong-zom-pa in Tibet explicitly described the luminous nature of mind as bodhicitta. Ratnākarasānti in his Guhyasamājamanḍalavidhiṭikā states:

That which is by nature luminous
Is the unsurpassable bodhicitta.

Rong-zom-pa, too, explains:

Because the nature of the mind is primordially free from all stains, it is called bodhicitta. It transcends the domain of thoughts, in [its] profundity and vastness is the source (or foundation) of the inexhaustible attainment of bliss, and is unyielding like a diamond (vajra). Therefore, it is vajrasattva.

39 Sāgaramatipariprechāsūtra (T, fol. 19a6–7; D, fol. 13b4):

ji ste nam mkāa ’nyon mongs bya bar nus ||
de la rjes kyang bstan par nus srid kyi ||
rang bzhin ’od gsal rdzogs pa’i byang chub sems ||
de ni nam yang ’nyon mongs byar mi nus ||.

See also the ’Od gsal snying po (p. 197.3–4), where this passage is cited.

40 Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra (T, fol. 43a3; D, fol. 283b2): yang skā ri’i bu sems de nt byang chub kyi rang bzhin te |
de’i phyir byang chub kyi sems zhes bya’o ||.

41 Krodhārājasarvantrangvuyhutantra, as cited in the Guhyasamājamanḍalavidhiṭikā (P, fol. 420b3; D, fol. 113b5–6; S, vol. 22, p. 282.4–5):

rang bzhin ’od gsal gang yin de [te P] ||
byang chub sems ni bia med yin ||.

42 mNyam sbyor ’grel pc (A, fol. 21b3–5; B, p. 481.3–6); sems rnams kyi rang bzhin ni gdod ma nas dri ma thams cad dang bral bos byang chub kyi sems zhes bya ste | de nyid bsam pa’i yul las ’das te zab cing rgya che ba la bde ba’i dngos grub zad pa’i med pa’i gzhis gyur pas rdz rje ltar brtan pa’i phyir rdz rje sems dpa’ yin no ||.
The question now is: how did the luminosity of the mind come to be regarded or described as bodhicitta? We know that the concept of luminous mind is pervasive in Śrāvakayāna, Pāramitāyāna, and Vajrayāna. Not all non-Mahāyāna Buddhist schools that can be subsumed under Śrāvakayāna, however, accepted the concept. In two different articles Eli Franco has brought to our notice the issue of whether consciousness is luminous by nature (prakṛtiprabhāsva), as debated in the so-called Spitzer Manuscript,43 which according to him is ‘the earliest philosophical manuscript that has come down to us,’ being datable palaeographically to the Kuśāṇa period.44 Although he has had to base himself on only scanty fragments, Franco has managed to piece together some of the intricate arguments for and against the concept of natural luminosity of mind, and so shed some light on the historical development of the concept among non-Mahāyāna schools. The fact that an entire chapter was devoted to the controversy suggests that the issue was quite significant.45 Jikido Takasaki identified four non-Mahāyāna schools which accepted this concept, namely, Sthāvira (or Theravāda), Vaiśāhikā, Vātsīputrīya, and Mahāsaṃghika.46 Johannes Rahder added to the list a fifth school, the Vibhayavāda.47 The concept of purity of mind can be traced in several Pāli sources, such as the Aṅguttaraniyā48 and Samyuttaṇiyya. There are also several scriptures of the Pāramitāyāna, including the Aṣṭasāhasrikā,49 Drumakinnarājāpariprcchāsūtra,50 Jñānālokaṃkārasūtra,51 and Bhadrapālasūtra,52 where the nature of mind is described as luminously pure. The concept seems to have become even more pronounced in the Vajrayāna, as can be seen, for example, in Nāropa’s Sekoddeśatīkā.53 However, in Mahāyāna sources such as the Bhadrapālasūtra54 and the


44 Franco 2001: 2.

45 Franco 2000: 98.

46 Takasaki 1966: 34, n. 57.


50 Drumakinnarājāpariprcchāsūtra (p. 69.7–10): gang mi ‘jig pa de dang ba’o || gang dang ba de dag pa’o || gang dag pa de dri mo med pa’o || gang dri ma med pa de ‘od gsal ba’o || gang ‘od gsal ba de sems kyi rang bzhin no ||.

51 Jñānālokaṃkārasūtra (p. 86.4–6): prakṛtiprabhāsvaram cittan tαc cāgantukair upakleśair upakliśyate | na ca prakṛtiḥ samkliśyate | yā ca prakṛtiprabhāsvaratāḥ [= “tā”] | sā asamkleśatā |; ibid. (p. 102.2–4): bodhir maṇjuśrīḥ prakṛtiprabhāsvaratāḥ [= “prabhāsvarā”] | citta-prakṛtiprabhāsvaratāya tena kāraṇacaye | prakṛtiprabhāsvaretī | yā sā prakṛti sā asamkliṣṭā akāśasamā | akāśapraṇiti akāśasamavasaranā akāśopama atyantaprabhāsvaratrā prakṛti |; ibid. (p. 130.2–6): bodhir maṇjuśrīḥ ... anāgānāś tatra maṇjuśrīḥ ... katamaḥ anānāḥ ... prabhāsvaratā anānānaṃ |.

52 Bhadrapālasūtra (p. 78.5–8):

sangs rgyas byang chub sems kyi brtags pa yin ||
sems sagni nram dag rang bzhin ‘od gsal zhung ||
nyog med ’gro ba kun dang ma ’dres par ||
gang gis shes pa byang chub mcchog tshang rgya ||.

53 See Seyfort Ruegg 1971: 466, n. 82.

54 Bhadrapālasūtra (p. 131.23–24): chos ‘di dag thams cad ni rang bzhin gyis ‘od gsal bas mya ngan las ‘das pa dang mnyam pa’o ||.
Ajātaśatrukṛtyavinodanāśūra, it is not simply the nature of mind which is described as luminously pure but the nature of all phenomena.

The concept of luminosity is pervasive in Buddhism but it is by no means homogeneously so. And not all allusions to it can be regarded as allusions to the concept of ontological bodhicitta. If this were the case, one could posit that the idea of ontological bodhicitta is found already in non-Mahāyāna sources, such as the Aṅguttaramnikāya—a thesis that would be, in my view, hard to defend. Thus the luminous nature of the mind as understood on the relative level of momentariness—for instance, in the Pramāṇavārttika—cannot be designated as ‘ontological’ bodhicitta, for it is obvious that only the luminosity or purity of mind in the sense of absolute reality, as understood in certain Mahāyāna traditions, can fulfill the criterion of ontological bodhicitta. It will thus perhaps be necessary to classify the luminosity of the mind under two types, namely, one that is conditioned (or momentary) and one that is unconditioned (or not momentary), being the latter that came to be equated with ontological bodhicitta. One other important point is that both these types of luminosity seem to be presupposed on the level of sentient beings, that is, to refer to the nature of mind of any sentient being.

For the sake of discussion, let us designate the luminosity characterised by momentariness as ‘luminosity on Ground A’ and the luminosity that is not characterised by momentariness as ‘luminosity on Ground B.’ The question that needs to be addressed is how the luminosity on Ground B has come to be regarded as ontological bodhicitta, whereas the luminosity on Ground A not. Did the idea of luminosity on Ground A, found in the non-Mahāyāna and in certain conservative Mahāyāna systems, directly lead to the formation of the concept of ontological bodhicitta in tantric and some non-tantric Mahāyāna systems? In other words, can we assume a direct historical link between the two concepts of luminosity? I would like to propose the following hypothesis: The idea of ontological bodhicitta or the luminosity on Ground B, traced only in some Mahāyāna traditions, does have a historical link with the idea of luminosity found in the non-Mahāyāna sources, but this link seems to be only an indirect one. That is to say, the original or conservative idea of luminosity on Ground A does not seem to have given rise to the idea of the luminosity on Ground B directly, but rather seems to have been first attributed to the Buddha as one of his several supreme qualities—to the level of the ultimate result, as it were—and this development in turn led to the formation of the idea of ontological bodhicitta.

Thus I hypothesise that the extension of the idea of luminosity on Ground A to that of luminosity on Ground B is connected with the development of the notion of the historical Buddha or of any buddha. The original idea of luminosity is that the nature of the mind is such that it is capable of clearing up the intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa: nyon mongs pa), for these are merely adventitious and actually do not belong to the inherent nature of mind, just as muddied water is capable of clearing up because mud does not belong to the inherent nature of water. Such an idea could have also implied that in becoming a buddha, one has eliminated one’s intellectual-emotional defilements, with one’s pristine and immaculate mind being what remains behind.

Theoretical reflections on the nature of the Buddha have been carried out systematically, particularly in Mahāyāna Buddhism. Nevertheless, one can find decisive steps in this direction being taken already in some non-Mahāyāna Buddhist schools. The old

55 Cited in the Sūtrasamuccaya under the title Ajātaśatruparivarta (p. 149.20–23): rgyal po chen po chos thams cad rang bzhin gys ‘od gsal bas ’brel ba med pa’o || rgyal po chen po chos thams cad dag pas ’rang bzhin gys ’od gsal ba’o ||; ibid. (p. 150.13–15): rgyal po chen po chos thams cad rang bzhin gys ’od gsal ba’i phyir sbug pa’o ||.

56 Pramāṇavārttika 1.208ab; prabhāsvaram idam cittam prakṛtyā ‘gantavo malāḥ || VEITER 1990: 108. For an English translation and discussion, see FRANCO 1997: 85–93.
canonical texts, especially those of the Theravādins, still present a human picture of the Buddha that is relatively close to that of a historical person. What was crucial, however, according to the Buddha himself (and his disciples) was that he was able independently to gain liberating insight into the four Noble Truths and thereby to stifle the seeds of future births in samsāra and pass away into nirvāṇa without remain (nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa). Liberating insight and nirvāṇa were accessible to other human beings, too, but this required the teachings of the Buddha. It also presupposed an exceptional strength of mind, as characteristic of the Buddha himself, whose distinct supremacy over other sentient beings imparted to him a sense of uniqueness. Still, he did not keep his insight to himself but—however reluctant in the beginning—taught his fellow human beings. These teachings, the liberating truth transmitted in them, and the practices are what is essential; the Buddha as a person often retreats into the background. The fact that the Buddha disappears with his death from the world is insignificant. His visible material body is meaningless, and it, like all conditioned phenomena, is subject to impermanency and repulsiveness. It is merely a ‘stinking body’ (pūtikāya), and nothing is lost with it. What is essential in the Buddha is the salvific insight contained in his teachings. He who comprehends the teachings sees the Buddha, and the essential part of him. He sees the actual—the essential—‘body’ of the Buddha, the dharmakāya. In short, it is the ‘mind’ (citta) of the Buddha characterised by liberating insight and his salvific activities (karman) or teachings expressed in the form of his speech (vāc) that are crucial, and not his physical or material body (kāya).

The development of Buddhology, however, did not stop here. Already during the lifetime of the Buddha, despite counsel against it, there must have been a tendency among many of his disciples, particularly among the lay ones, to transpose the dignity the teachings were treated with onto the teacher, thereby destining the Buddha to become an object of reverence in his own right. This tendency, in the course of time, led to ever increasing supramundane qualities being ascribed to the Buddha, particularly in the school of the Mahāsāṃghikas, where he is extricated from the earthly domain and divinised into a transcendent realm. In the process, magical and paranormal powers were attributed to him—which he used (contrary to Brahmancial ascetics) for salvific purposes—and his knowledge reinterpreted. Originally, his knowledge was considered superior to that of others only because he had won his liberating insight (into the wholesome und unwholesome) by dint of personal capacity. Now his knowledge was elevated to total omniscience. While other non-Mahāyāna schools saw in the Buddha’s omniscience merely the ability to cognise any desired object at any time, just as a fire has the ability to burn all kinds of fuel without having to burn perpetually, the Mahāsāṃghikas went so far as to postulate that every moment the Buddha is cognisant of each individual phenomenon. It is understandable, in view of the fullness of power and knowledge attributed to the Buddha, that his physical body could no longer be allowed to retain an impure character. The image of a stinking body was no longer befitting. His physical body, recognised as the result of an extraordinary richness of wholesome virtues accumulated by him during his previous existences, must thus be distinguished from the bodies of other, ordinary beings. To his body were attributed the so-called ‘thirty-two major signs of a great man’ and the ‘eighty minor signs.’

There had often been attempts to summarise the multiple excellent qualities of the Buddha, one of which was to express them in terms of the body (kāya), speech (vāc), and mind (citta). It is not surprising that the mind of the Buddha is now described as luminously pure and immaculate.57 What is surprising is that even his body, once described as stinking, is

57 Samādhīrajāsūtra (p. 55, verse no. 27):

| yasya ca mṛduki samjñā nāmarūpasmi vartate |
| agriddham nāmarūpasmi cittam bhoji prabhāsvaram ||

See also ibid. (p. 55, verse no. 29a): anāsravam ca me cittam; for an English translation, see RÉGAMEY 1938: 91–92.
now considered luminously pure. The speech or voice of the Buddha is also considered luminously pure. The body, speech, and mind of the Buddha (and sometimes also of a bodhisattva) came to be regarded as the ‘Three Inconceivable Secrets (or Mysteries)’ (gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa gsum), namely, as the ‘Secret of the Body’ (kāyaguhya: sku yi gsang ba), the ‘Secret of the Speech’ (vāgguhyā: gsung gi gsang ba), and the ‘Secret of the Mind’ (cittaguhya: thugs kyi gsang ba). There is also the tendency to describe the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha as being ‘endowed with all excellent features’ (sarvākāravarogetā: rnam pa kun gyi mchog dang ldan pa). This is significant because the concept of ‘emptiness endowed with all excellent features’ (sarvākāravarogetā śūnyatā: rnam pa kun gyi mchog dang ldan pa'i stong pa nyid) seems to have thereby assumed an ontological sense, particularly in the Tathāgatagarbha and Vajrayāna traditions. The primary motive for laying extreme emphasis on the positive qualities of the body, speech, and mind of the Buddha seems to have been to contrast them sharply with those of ordinary sentient beings. The body, speech, and mind of ordinary beings are imperfect, impermanent, and unreliable, and hence are not worth the striving done in their name, whereas the Buddha’s body, speech, and mind are perfect, permanent and reliable, and hence are worth such effort. In short, sentient beings were therefore motivated to generate ethico-spiritual bodhicitta and thus become buddhas.

Such an emphasis on the perfection and permanency of the Buddha’s qualities, however, seems to have led to unanticipated historical and doctrinal consequences. If the perfect qualities of the Buddha are permanent, he must have had them already when he was an ordinary sentient being endowed with intellectual-emotional defilements. If, as an ordinary sentient being, had all these perfect permanent qualities, why cannot we, as ordinary sentient beings, also possess them now? Such reflections could have easily contributed to the development of the idea that all sentient beings possess the perfect permanent qualities of the Buddha here and now. This tendency to attribute the resultant qualities of the Buddha, such as the luminosity, to ordinary sentient beings may be given here as an example of the ‘process of ontologisation.’ In my view, such a process may have contributed to the formation of not only the idea of ontological bodhicitta but also several other notions usually considered identical with it.

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58 Samādhīrūjasūtra (p. 53, verse no. 14):

punyanirjātu buddhasya sūddhah kāyah prabhāsvarah |
sameti so 'ntariṣeṇa nānāyaṃ nāya labhyate ||.

See also ibid. (p. 58, verse no. 49):

aprameyā hi te dharmā kālajñātvo niśevisiḥ |
tena acintiyaḥ kāya nirvṛto'me prabhāsvarah ||.

For an English translation of these verses, see RÉGAMEY 1938: 89 and 96, respectively. See also the Tathāgatācintayuganirdeśasūtra (T, fol. 160a5; D, fol. 109b6): rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba'i sku |. Perhaps better nirvṛto (Tib. grub).

59 For example, see the Daśabhūmikasūtra (p. 87.5–6; TSD, s.v. thugs kyi gsang ba): samyaksaṃbuddhānām guhyasthānāni yad u tā kāyaguhaven vā vāgguhyam vā cittaguhyaṃ vā. See also the Tathāgatācintayuganirdeśasūtra (T, fol. 185b2–3; D, fol. 126b1–2): zhi ba'i bco gros gsum po 'di dag ni de bzhin gshegs pa'i gsang ba'o || gsum gang zhe na 'di lia ste | sku'i gsang ba dang | gsung gi gsang ba dang | thugs kyi gsang ba'o ||.

60 For the expression sarvākāravarogetā śūnyatā, see SEYFORT RUEGG 1981: 84, 97, 98; id. 1989: 184, 190. See also id. 2004: 54.

61 Note that the idea of the adamantine body (vajrasāraśarīra: rdo rje snying po'i sku) can be found also in the Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.15 (WOIGHARA, p. 229.9–10; DUNT, p. 157.15–16).
(b) An Outcome of a Philosophical Quest?

The historical Buddha is said to have discouraged pure philosophical speculation as being irrelevant or obtrusive to soteriological aspirations. It may be assumed, however, that to certain inquisitive Buddhist thinkers some philosophical enquiry did appear to be of relevance. Perhaps the role of human beings’ curiosity and quest for new and more satisfactory explanations should not be underestimated either. The various kinds of bodhicitta, particularly ontological, gnoseological, and psycho-physiological bodhicitta, suggest that there had been a continuing enquiry into the origin of existence, that is, the receptacle-world or habitat (bhājana-loka: snod kyi 'jig rten) and the world consisting of sentient beings or inhabitants (sattva-loka: sems can gyi 'jig rten).

According to Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, which is representative of the non-Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions, the diversity of the world arises from karma, that is, the volition and volition-driven actions of sentient beings. As karma in turn is not possible without intellectual-emotional defilements (klesa: nyon mongs pa), the root (mūla: rtsa ba) of existences (bhava: srid pa) is the underlying defilements (anuśaya: phra rgyas), namely, passion (rāga: dōd chags), anger (pratigha: khong khrö), pride (māna: nga rgyal), ignorance (avidyā: ma rig pa), (false) views (dṛṣṭi: lta ba), and doubt (vīcikīśa: the tshom). These are identified the way a disease is diagnosed, so that one can be treated and cured as soon as possible. From a purely practical and soteriological point of view, such a diagnosis seems to be adequate. From a philosophical point of view, however, the question as to where these underlying defilements come from still remains unanswered.

For the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism, for one—according to the Viniścayasaṃgrahani—the so-called ‘fundamental mind’ (ālayavijñāna: kun gzi rnam par shes pa) is said to be the root cause of the physical world and its inhabitants. It needs to be made clear that ālayavijñāna is understood as a substratum only of mundane phenomena pertaining to samśāra and not of supramundane phenomena pertaining to nirvāṇa. Thus, when one becomes a buddha, ālayavijñāna is either eliminated or transmuted. Candrakīrti, who represents the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school, has stated:

Mind alone designs the extremely manifold
World of sentient beings and the receptacle-world,
For the entire world is taught as having arisen from karma;
But once the mind has been discarded, karma no longer exists.

Leaving aside the problematic issues regarding Candrakīrti’s stance on the external world and ālayavijñāna, it is clear that he regards mind, however one defines it, as the shaper of the world and as an entity that ceases or is emptied upon one’s becoming a buddha. The question regarding the origin of mind itself, however, is not addressed. These Buddhist


64 SCHMITHAUSEN 1987: 203.

65 Madhyamakāvatāra 6.89 (cited in the Bodhicaryavatārapaṇijā, p. 52.4–5; Subhāṣitasaṃgraha, p. 19): sattvālom atha bhājana-lokaṁ cittam eva racayat aticitram | karmajām hi jagad uktam aśeṣaṁ karma cittam svadhāya ca nāsti ||. See also SEYORT RUEGG 2002: 204.

66 See also Madhyamakāvatāra 11.2.8d (p. 361.14): sems ’gags pas de sku yis mngon sum mdzad ||.
systems apparently limit themselves to identifying the origin of samsāra, comprising the physical world and its inhabitants. The Ratnagunasamcaya states that the root of samsāra is ignorance (avidyā: ma rig pa), and the root of nirvāṇa the ‘Perfection of Insight’ (prajñāpāramitā).  

Some Mahāyāna sources, however, apparently go a step further. For example, in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra Vimalakīrti tells Mañjuśrī that no phenomena are based on any substratum.

[Mañjuśrī] asks: “What is the root of wholesome and unwholesome [attitudes and actions]?”
[Vimalakīrti] replies: “The root is the assemblage of [perishable] existences.”
[Mañjuśrī] asks: “What is the root of the assemblage of [perishable] existences?”
[Vimalakīrti] replies: “The root of the assemblage of [perishable] existences is desire and attachment.”
[Mañjuśrī] asks: “What is the root of desire and attachment?”
[Vimalakīrti] replies: “The root of desire and attachment is incorrect conceptual thoughts.”
[Mañjuśrī] asks: “What is the root of incorrect conceptual thoughts?”
[Vimalakīrti] replies: “The root of incorrect conceptual thoughts is wrong notions.”
[Mañjuśrī] asks: “What is the root of wrong notions?”
[Vimalakīrti] replies: “The root of wrong notions is the lack of a substratum.”
[Mañjuśrī] asks: “What is the root of the lack of a substratum?”
[Vimalakīrti] replies: “O Mañjuśrī, what root could there be of what has no substratum! Thus all phenomena subsist on a root which has no substratum.”

In the Ratnagotravibhāga it is stated:
Earth is supported by water,
Water by air, and air by space;
Space has, however, no support
Either in air, or in water, or in earth.
Similarly, the psycho-physical complex, elements, and faculties
Have their substratum in karmas and kleśas.
And karmas and kleśas always have their substratum in erroneous conceptual thoughts.
The erroneous conceptual thoughts have their substratum in the purity of the mind.
The nature of the mind has no substratum in any phenomena.

A similar idea can be found also in the Ratnagunasamcaya. Despite the textual difficulties, I attempt an interpretative translation of the pertinent verse as follows.

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68 Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra 6.5–6 (p. 68.4–16):  "āha | kuśalasyākusālasasya ca kim mūlam | āha | satkāyo mūlam | āha | satkāyas ca punah kim mūlam | āha | satkāyasyecchālohbhau mūlam | āha | icchālohbhayoh kim mūlam | āha | icchālohbhayor abhūtapařikalpo mūlam | āha | abhūtapařikalpasya kim mūlam | āha | abhūtapařikalpasya viparyastā samjñā mūlam | āha | viparyastāyāh samjñāyāh kim mūlam | āha | viparyastāyāh samjñāyā apratisṭhā mūlam | āha | apratisṭhāyāh kim mūlam | āha | van mañjuśrīṃ apratisṭhānam tasya kim mūlam bhavijñāti | iti hy apratisṭhānamīlaapratisṭhitāḥ sarvadharmāḥ |. Cf. the citation in the dKon mcphog 'grel (A, fols. 14b5–15a1; B, p. 41.11–17). Note that this samdhi (after a vocative case) is not supplied by the editors.

69 Ratnagotravibhāga 1.55–57:
prthivyambaujalam vāyavās vāyuvās vīmanti pratiṣṭhītaḥ |
apratīṣṭhītam akāśam vāyambuśikītiḥ ātmanau |
skandhadhāvindriyā’n tadvat karmaśeṣapratīṣṭhaḥ |
karmanāśeṣaḥ saddayonimānāśapratīṣṭhaḥ |
ayonimānāśaḥ cittāsuddhipratīṣṭhaḥ |
sarvadharmāṃ cittasya prakṛtiṣ tv apratiṣṭhītaḥ |.
Cf. the English translation in TAKASAKI 1966: 236.

70 Ratnagunasamcaya 20.5 (YUYAMA 1976: 75; Tib. p. 177):
ākāśa niśrayi samārtha āpaskandho tahī niśrītā ima mahāpravī ṣa ca |
satvāṇa karmaupadhihganidānam evam ākāśasthānu kutu cintayi etam arthāṃ |
In space rests air, in the latter rests the mass of water,
In the latter rests this great earth, in the latter rests the world.
Such is the cause of (or motive for) sentient beings’ engagement in [their] karma.
Where does space stand? Reflect on this meaning!\(^{71}\)

The idea that the absence of a concrete substratum is the substratum of phenomena can also be found in tantric texts such as the *Guhyagarbhatantra, where mind itself, which has no root, is said to be the root of all phenomena.\(^{72}\) The Guhyasamājatantra, too, states that all phenomena are based on the mind, mind on space and space on nothing.\(^{73}\)

The development of the concept of a substratum for nirvāṇa seems to have played a part in the development of the idea of a common substratum for both pollution (sāmkleśa: kun nas nyon mongs pa) and purification (vyavādāna: nam par byang ba). The seeds (bijā: sa bon) of phenomena—either with defilements (sāsrava: zag pa dang bcas pa) or without defilements (anāsrava: zag pa med pa)—may be particularly relevant in this regard, but they are beyond the scope of this study. It has been pointed out that the role of ālayavijñāna as a substratum of samsāra seems to have been extended, and later on even to have assumed the role of a substratum for nirvāṇa too. The kind of ālayavijñāna envisioned as the common substratum of samsāra and nirvāṇa may be seen as a doctrinal transition from Yogācāra to the Tathāgatagarbha system. Thus, for certain schools of thought, such as the rdzogs-chen tradition in Tibet, it was inevitable that they should differentiate between the two kinds of ālayavijñāna or ‘universal substratum’ (ālaya: kun gzhi), namely, one that is a substratum for only samsāra and one that is a substratum for both samsāra and nirvāṇa. Of the two strands of non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, namely, negative-intellectual and positive-mystical,\(^{74}\) one would expect that the former would posit no concrete substratum, whereas the latter would. Nonetheless, both strands reached a point where they could no longer posit any substratum. For instance, even for the Ratnagotrivibhāga tradition, which clearly represents the positive-mystical strand, the purity of the mind, which is the substratum of everything, itself has no substratum anywhere. In certain tantric texts, however, the non-dual gnosis is positively affirmed to be the origin of all individual existence.\(^{75}\) Further, in the Kun byed

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\(^{71}\) I follow one of the two completely different interpretations found in the Tibetan translations (see YUYAMA 1976: 76, n. 5d).

\(^{72}\) *Guhyagarbhatantra (P, fol. 113a4; D, fol. 115a5):

\[\text{rtsa ba med pa'i sms nyid ni} \quad |\]
\[\text{chos rnam kun gyi rtsa ba yin} \quad |\]

Cf. ibid. (P, fol. 113b2; D, fol. 115b4):

\[\text{gzhi [bzhi P] rtsa med pa'i sms nyid ni} \quad |\]
\[\text{pho mo ma yin ma ning min} \quad |\]

\(^{73}\) The ITa phreng attributed to Padmasambhava states (p. 167.3-4): *ji skad du | chos rnam thams cad ni sms la gnas so | sms ni nam mkha' la gnas so | nam mkha' ni ci la yang mi gnas so | zhes 'bri ng ba dang |*. Rong-zom-pa identifies the source of this citation as the Guhyasamājatantra. See the ITa 'gre (A, fol. 258b2–3; B, p. 340.2–4). The Sanskrit text of the pertinent passage from the Guhyasamājatantra (p. 85.4–7) reads: sarvatathāgatadharmā bhagavan kuta sīhitāḥ kva vai saṁbhūtāḥ | vajrasattva aha | svakāyavākṣitasamsthītāḥ svakāyavākṣitasamsthītāḥ | bhagavantaḥ sarvatathāgatā āhūḥ | svakāyavākṣitavajraṃ kuta sīhitam | ākāśaṃ kuta sīhitam | na kvacit |. For the Tibetan translation, see the Guhyasamājatantra (T, fol. 61a1–3; D, fol. 132b2–4; NyG, p. 888.1–3).

\(^{74}\) I have elsewhere alluded to these two currents in both non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism in India in regard to the background to the Tibetan interpretations of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine—there drawing on the works of Lambert Schmithausen, David Seyfort Ruegg, and Louis de La Vallée Poussin; see WANGCHUK 2004: 191–201.
rgyal po and other such rDzogs-chen tantras which lay great emphasis on the idea of ontological bodhicitta, bodhicitta is called the all-creating king (kun byed rgyal po) and regarded as the ultimate origin of all phenomena.

(c) Synonyms and Near Synonyms of Ontological Bodhicitta

The commonest description of ontological bodhicitta is the one given in the Bodhicittavivarana,76 namely, as being unconditioned and devoid of any defining characteristics or signs, like space and bodhi itself. It is further described as tranquil, because it undergoes no change in regard to the three times and exhibits no characteristic marks or manifoldness.77

Ontological bodhicitta has several common synonyms or near synonyms which I should like to discuss briefly. It may be assumed that not all these synonyms were conceived as such from the very outset or at the same time, but rather that their number increased gradually as similar ideas with originally different backgrounds began to overlap. The Caryāmelāpapradīpa provides almost one hundred synonyms or near synonyms (nāmaparyāya: ming gi rnam grangs) of the absolute truth (paramārthasāya: don dam pa'i bden pa), such as prabhāsvara, buddhajñāna, vajrajñāna, nirvāna, dharmakāya, bhūtakoṭi, dharmadhātu, prajñāpāramitā, tathatā, and samatā, all of which could be taken as synonyms of ontological bodhicitta.78 Similarly, a number of synonyms of ontological bodhicitta can be found in rNying-ma tantras, such as the Kun byed rgyal po. Dharmadhātu, svayambhūjñāna, and dharmakāya are mentioned amongst several others.79 The Bodhicittavivaranaṇaṭiṅkā makes

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75 Acintyādavyakramapadeśa 83–85 (p. 203.13–18).

76 Bodhicittavivarana 46: alaṃśaṇam anutpādam asamsthitam avānmayam | ākāśam bodhicittam ca bodhir adhyāvālakṣanā ||. Lindtner 1997: 173 (Sanskrit text), 48 (Tibetan text), 49 (English translation). * Cf. the citation in the Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇiṅkā (p. 200.27–28), which reads asamskṛtan. See also Bodhicittavivarana 71: de bzhin nyid dang yang dang mtha’ || mtshan ma med dang don dam nyid || byang chub sems mchog de nyid dang || stong nyid du yang bshad pa yin ||. For an English translation, see Lindtner 1997: 57.

77 mNyam sbor ’gre pal (A, fol. 125a3; B, p. 596.16–17): byang chub kyis nis ni dus gsum du ’gyur ba dang spros pa’i mtshan ma med pas zhi ba’o ||.

78 Caryāmelāpapradīpa (pp. 64.11–65.8); cf. the Tarkajñā (P, fol. 44a–5; D, fol. 41a–5; S, vol. 58, p. 105.5–9): de nyid ces bya ba ni khyad par dag bstan du zin kyang | khyad par gvi gzhi’i ming ma bstan na de mi rtogs pas de’i phyir | de nyid ces smos te | ’jig rten pa dang | ’jig rten las ’das pa’i drogs po de dag gi de nyid de | de bzhin nyid dang | chos kyis dbiyings dang | stong pa nyid ces bya ba dag gi rnam grangs so ||; mNyam sbor ’gre pa (A, fol. 24a3–4; B, p. 483.22): byang chub sems ni de kho na bzhin te ’gyur ba med pa’i de kho na nyid do ||.

79 Kun byed rgyal po (P, fol. 54b2–6; D, fol. 58a5–b1): kun byed nga yi dang bzhin gcig pu’ [pcig bu P] la || ’khor gyi ’dog pa rnam kyi ming biags [rtags P] pa || la las byang chub sems su ming biags la || la las chos kyis dbiyings su ming yang biags || la las nam mkha’i kkams su ming yang biags || la las rang ’byung ye shes ming yang biags || la las chos kyis sku ru ming yang biags || la las longs sphyod rdzogs par ming yang biags || la las sprul pa’i sku [skur P] ru ming yang biags || la las sku gsungs thugs su ming yang biags ||
explicit that śīyātaś is the best bodhicitta. The commentary on the *Guhyagarbhaśastra ascribed to Sūryaprabhasaśrī interprets tathāgatagarbha as absolute bodhicitta. The Middle Way (madhyamā pratipat: dbu mā'i lam), which is devoid of appearances (snang med), has also been equated with ontological bodhicitta in the Bodhicittabhaśāna. The notion of self-arisen gnosis (svayambhūjñāna) is of particular interest in the context of ontological bodhicitta. The term svayambhūjñāna can be found in some of the earliest Mahāyāna sources. However, its meaning seems to have undergone change in the course of time. Very probably svayambhūjñāna originally meant the gnosis or insight of a self-arisen buddha (svayambhūbuddha), a self-arisen buddha being either a buddha or a pratyekabuddha. The idea that buddhas and pratyekabuddhas attain gnosis or make their soteriological breakthrough on their own is an old concept, which continued to figure in the Mahāyāna tradition. In fact, according to the non-Mahāyāna tradition, this is what

See Neumaier-Dargay 1992: 164; Chos dbang mdzod (fols. 22a, 23b). Klongchen-pa, probably inspired by the Kun rgyed rgyal po, also equates ontological bodhicitta with the nature of the mind, which is identical with prajñāpāramitā, madhyamaka, zhi byed, mahāmudrā, and rdzogs chen. Shing rta rnam dag (p. 119.3–5): sems nyid gshis kyi don mthong ba la [om.], shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa dag | dbu ma dang | zhi byed dang | phyag rgya chen po dang | rdzogs pa chen po la sogs ming ci biags kyang | don [add. du] ngo bo gcig ste rig pa byang chub kyi kyi sems don byed nam mkha’ /Ita bu’ /]. See also Ehrhard 1990: 255; n. 10. Mi-pham even interpreted Padmasambhava to be, in terms of definitive reality (niṭṭhāra), (ontological) bodhicitta, samantabhadra, aśībuddha, dharmadhūta, bhūtakoti, tathātā, paramārthaśatya, svayambhūjñāna, tathāgatagarbha, and the so-called “Three Great Ones” (chen po gsum): the Great Middle Way (dbu ma chen po), the Great Seal (phyag rgya chen po), and the Great Perfection (rdzogs pa chen po). See his rNam bshad pad dkar (pp. 320.3–321.2): nges pa don gyi sngags rgyas padma ’byung gnas nyid ngos ’byung ba’o’ | de’i mthshan gyi rnam drags gzhvan yang | ’byung so’i ’byung pas dbang gis biags pa | kun tu bzang po dang | dang po’i sngags rgyas dang | chos kyi dbyings dang | sbyar dang pa’i mtha’ dang | chos nyid byang chub kyi sems dang | de’i byin nyid dang | don dam pa’i bden pa dang | rang byung gi ye shes dang | bde gshogs snying po dang | sril zhi kun khyab kyi ye shes dang | rang bzhin ’od gsal gnug ma’i sems dang | ’da’i dka’ thugs kyi ye shes dang | lhun skyes bde ba chen po dang | 'rgyu’i he ru ka dang | dbu ma chen po dang | phyag rgya chen po dang | rdzogs pa chen po ste chen po gsum gyi gian la phab pa’i mthar thugs gi don dang gzhvan yang mdo rgyud rnam nas mthshan gyi rnam drags ma bstan pa’i don ’di nyid kho na’o’.

80 Bodhicittavivaranaṭṭā (P, fols. 475b8–476a1; D, fol. 135b5–6; S, vol. 18, p. 1129.16–18): ... byang chub sems mchog de nyid ni stong pa nyid ces rab tu gsungs te | rang bzhin med pa’i stong pa nyid ni byang chub sems kyi nang na rab tu gsungs pa’i phyir ro |

81 *Guhuyagarbhatkā (P, fol. 263a2–3; S, vol. 43, p. 534.4–7; NyK, p. 184.3–4): sems can thams cad la de bzhi gshes pa’i snying po byang chub kyi sems ’sangs rgyas kyi ye shes’ [sangs chung rgyas pa’i P] ye nas rang la yod pa [pas P] de lta ma rtogs te rang gi phyin ci log gi rtog pa’i las kyi [kyl P] sprul zhes gsungs |; ibid. (P, fol. 264a3–4; S, vol. 43, p. 536.6–9; NyK, pp. 187.6–188.2): sems can thams cad ni de bzhi gshes pa’i snying po can yin no zhes so | de la de bzhi gshes pa’i snying po ni gang la bya na | de ni don dam pa’i byang chub sems la bya ste | rang gi sngags kyi chos nyid la hya’o’ |; cf. the Glang chen rab’i yog (p. 257.4–5): bde gshogs snying po byang chub sems | thams cad bskyed pa’i sa bon nyid |]

82 Bodhicittabhaśāna (P, fol. 4b2; D, fol. 3b6; S, vol. 33, p. 814.4–5): snang med dbu ma’i lam de byang chub sems zhes bde gshogs gsungs [gsung P] |}

83 For example, see the Tathāgataagarbhasūtra (Zimmermann 2002a: 338–339) where the expression rang byung sngags rgyas myur du ’gyur occurs. For a translation and remarks, see ibid. 151–152, n. 277. See also Takašaki 1966: 296, where the Buddha is referred to as svayambhū.

84 For example, see Takašaki 1966: 202, n. 24, where pratyekabuddha is called svayambhū.
distinguishes a buddha or pratyekabuddha from a śrāvaka. The difference between a buddha and pratyekabuddha is that the former founding a systematic teaching tradition and the latter does not. Of course, later on, a later increasing qualitative distinction was made between śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas. It appears that the term svayambhūjñāna, although originally used for the gnosis of both buddhas and pratyekabuddhas, came to be used dominantly in the sense of a buddha’s gnosises. For example, it is clear that the term svayambhūjñāna that occurs within a long compound in the Bodhisattvabhūmi refers to the gnosises of the Buddha. The Madhyamakapradipa not only mentions svayambhūjñāna but does so in the context of bodhicitta, in its gnoseological sense. What it seems to be suggesting is that the Madhyamikas cannot be charged with postulating the extreme view of annihilationism, for they posit svayambhūjñāna, despite the fact that nothing that may be called absolute prajñā or non-conceptual gnosises (nirvikalpajñāna) is perceived. Since they maintain that all phenomena are illusion-like on the conventional level, they cannot be charged with postulating the extreme view of eternalism. The term svayambhūjñāna appears in the Madhyamakapradipa in another instance, where it is stated that once the vajropamasamādhi is attained, a buddha is always in a meditative state, because his bodhicitta, equated with svayambhūjñāna, undergoes no change, inasmuch as it neither advances nor retreats. In the course of time, svayambhūjñāna took on additional meanings. Having formerly been conceived as applicable only at the stage of a buddha, it was now admitted on the level of sentient beings. The question that still remains is what svayambhūjñāna immanent in ordinary sentient beings really means.

(d) Two Distinct Perceptions of Ontological Bodhicitta

The list of synonyms mentioned above may create the impression that the idea of ontological bodhicitta is, in principle, acceptable to all Buddhist schools and that there is general consensus on the issue of what true reality is. Such an impression is, however, deceptive. The various schools may agree that true reality can be designated as śūnyatā, tathatā, dharmatā, tathāgatagarbha, and so forth. But one and the same term can be interpreted differently in different texts and traditions. It comes as no surprise, then, that ontological bodhicitta, although accepted as true reality, should be interpreted in several ways. Ontological bodhicitta can be broadly categorised under two types, namely, one as perceived within the so-called positive-mystical current of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India, and the other as perceived within the negative-intellectualist current. The negative-intellectualist current

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86 Madhyamakapradipa (P, fol. 329a6–7; D, fol. 261b7–262a2; S, vol. 57, p. 1493.9–13): yang kun rdzob kyi bden pa snang ba’i phreng ba ’di dag ji lta ba bzhi du kun rdzob kyi bden pa sgyu ma lta bur ’dod pas skyon gyi dri ma gang gi kyang bdag caq la gnod pa med do || gzhan yang don dam pa’i bden pa’i [pa DC] shes rab ces bya ba rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes chos nyid byang chub kyi sems rang byang gi ye shes chen po’i mdun na ci yang med pas chad par smra ba yang ma yen te |.

87 Note, however, that the reading in P and N is rang byang chub kyi ye shes.

88 Madhyamakapradipa (P, fol. 356a4–6; D, fol. 282b3–4; S, vol. 57, p. 1545.5–9): gang gi tshe sangs rgyas kyi sa rdo rje lta ba’i ting nge ’dzin brnyes par gyur nas ni | rjes las thob par mi mnga’ ste | rnal ’byor gyi dbang phyug chen po dus rtog tu mnyam par bzhaq [gzhac DC] cing rang ’byung gi’ [byang chub kyi PN] ye shes chos nyid byang chub kyi sems chen po la ‘gyur ba mi mnga’ zhih ’byung ba dang ’jug pa med pas so ||.
apparently ascribes no positive qualities to ontological bodhicitta, whereas the positive-mystical one does. Ontological bodhicitta is perceived by both currents to be constant. Both currents would also agree that ontological bodhicitta is directly realised by means of gnoseological bodhicitta. In other words, for both currents, the immediate soteriological goal is gnoseological bodhicitta, although the existence and persistence of gnosis at the stage of a buddha would be viewed by them differently.

However, the means of generating gnoseological bodhicitta depends on the respective soteriological model presupposed by the two currents. In this regard, it should be recalled that two soteriological models are presupposed in Mahāyāna Buddhism, namely, the generator model and revelation model, or the nurture model and nature model. Although one might think that the negative-intellectualist current would, as a rule, follow the nurture model, and the positive-mystical current the nature model, this does not seem to be necessarily the case. While it is true that the positive-mystical view tends to follow the nature model, not all those who belong to the negative-intellectualist persuasion necessarily follow the nurture model. In any case, according to the nurture model, gnoseological bodhicitta has to be generated from scratch. According to the nature model, by contrast, it is nothing other than ontological bodhicitta revealed or exposed. In other words, gnosis, which lies latent in ontological bodhicitta, is made patent through spiritual practice. In neither of these two models is ethico-spiritual bodhicitta dismissed as redundant. Under the nurture model, it is a generating cause of gnoseological bodhicitta, and under the nature model, an exposing or revealing cause.

(e) Some Salient Features of Ontological Bodhicitta

Of all the various features of ontological bodhicitta, the following two seem to be particularly significant: (1) It remains constant and independent of verbal expressions, concepts, persons, and cognition. It remains unaffected by spatiality and temporality, and can neither be increased nor decreased. The buddhas may come and go but ontological bodhicitta remains.

(2) It is soteriologically neutral, and yet the ability or inability to penetrate it with gnoseological bodhicitta correlates with one’s freedom or bondage. Thus it is said that it is neither samsāra nor nirvāṇa, and yet can cause both.

6. Psycho-Physiological Bodhicitta

Psycho-physiological bodhicitta is a fascinating topic, one which would require much more study than can be devoted to it here to be able to do it justice. What I shall attempt to do in the following few paragraphs is, first of all, to explain the expression ‘psycho-physiological bodhicitta’ and to justify the employment of such an expression. Secondly, and more importantly, I should like to discuss not details of the practical aspects of sexual-yogic exercises associated with psycho-physiological bodhicitta, but rather the doctrinal background, and to propose a plausible historical development.

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89 This is the reason why the dharma-kāya can be said to be revealed or exposed ontological bodhicitta, as is apparently propounded, for example, in the Bodhicittabhāvanānirdeśa (P, fol. 56b4–5; D, fol. 46a1; S, vol. 33, p. 183.17–19): shes rab kyi blo dang ldan pa byang chub kyi sems mgon du gyur pa de la longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku la sogs te | sku gsum gyi nang na mchog tu gyur pa chos kyi sku zhes byang chub kyi sems de la bya ste |.

90 Cf. Mūlamadhyamakārikā 16.10: na nirvānasamāropo na samsārāpamārasam | yatra kas tatra samsāro nirvāṇam kim vikalpyate ||.
(a) What is Psycho-Physiological Bodhicitta?

We already know that in certain Vajrayāna sources semen virile (śukra: khu ba) is called bodhicitta. We also know that the great bliss (or ecstasy) (mahāsūkha: bde ba chen po) invariably associated with sexual-yogic practices is likewise called bodhicitta. Semen virile is so designated, for example, in the context of the destruction or loss of bodhicitta (bodhicittapraṇāśa: byang chub kyi sems nyams pa), which is the fifth cardinal transgression (mūlāppati: rtṣa ba'i ltung ba) of the mantra vows according to several tantric systems in which bodhicitta is identified as semen virile.\(^{91}\) It is true that bodhicitta in its physiological sense is predominantly used for semen virile, male reproductive seed, but it is also true that occasionally both male seed and female menstrual blood are referred to as bodhicitta\(^ {92}\)—sometimes designated in Tibetan sources as ‘white’ and ‘red’ bodhicitta, respectively.\(^ {93}\) The expressions ‘white’ and ‘red’ bodhicitta, however, seem to be alternative renderings of the Sanskrit terms śukra and śonita (or rakta), respectively, since śukra means both ‘semen fluid’ (khu ba) and ‘white’ (dkar po), and śonita or rakta both ‘blood’ (khrag) and ‘red’ (dmar po).\(^ {94}\)

The quality or function attributed to white and red forms of bodhicitta suggests that they are fluids of virility and fertility, respectively, and thus the identification of red bodhicitta with blood (rakta: khrag), or specifically with menstrual blood (stṛipūṣpa: zla mtshan),\(^ {95}\) can be explained perhaps by what one might call Buddhist or Indian metaphysiology. The type of bodhicitta under consideration here seems not to be limited purely to the physiological realm but to include, more importantly, a psychological aspect. Thus sexual-yogic practice culminates in the production of physiological bodhicitta in the form of fluids potent with virility and fertility, and psychological bodhicitta in the form of the accompanying sexual bliss or ecstasy (mahāsūkha). In order to capture both of these meanings, I have used the expression psycho-physiological bodhicitta. The fact that this type of bodhicitta has both psychological and physiological components has been made explicit by an Indian tantric commentary.\(^ {96}\)

The nature of the great bliss connected with psycho-physiological bodhicitta has been disputed in India and Tibet. Some have identified it as a ‘mere sensation of bliss of the [sexual] union’ (snyoms 'jug gi tshor ba bde ba tsam), ‘mind free of [sexual] desire’ (chags bral gyi sems), a ‘mere correlate of the understanding of emptiness’ (stong pa'i go yul tsam), the ‘notion of grasping emptiness’ (stong 'dzin gyi 'du shes), and so forth.\(^ {97}\) For some,

\(^{91}\) Vimalaprabhā ad 3.102 (vol. 2, p. 97.21); iha bodhicittam śukram, tasya vināśād acyutasukham na bhavati |; Yogaratnamālā (p. 134.35): bodhicittam śukram. See also TSD, s.v. byang chub sems.

\(^{92}\) See MW, s.v. śukra, where one of the meanings of śukra is given as ‘seed of animals (male and females).’

\(^{93}\) mChod bsgrai' rnam bshad (A, fol. 183a6; B, p. 51.5–6); gsang bar thabs shes rab kyi byang chub sems dkar dmar gnyis rdo rje'i chu dang sbyar nas | yi ge gsum gys yin gvis brlab pa'o ||; ibid. (A, fol. 183b3; B, p. 51.10–11): gsang ba ni yab yum gyi byang chub sems las dri byung ba'o ||; ibid. (A, fol. 184a1; B, p. 51.19): gsang ba ni yum gyi byang sems so ||.

\(^{94}\) See MW, s.vv. śukra, śonita, and rakta.

\(^{95}\) See, for example, the Yogaratnamālā, as cited in the TSD (s.v. khrag): raktaṃ iti stṛipūṣpam....


\(^{97}\) All of these explanations are rejected by Mi-pham. His discussion in the 'Od gsal snying po (pp. 9.4–10.1) actually deals with the 'gnosis of the fourth' (bṣhi pa'i ye shes), that is, the gnosis brought forth during or by means of the 'fourth empowerment' (caturthabhīṣeka: dbang bṣhi pa). Cf. the Marmakelikāpāñjikā (p. 25.13–
the great bliss in question is not just ordinary sexual bliss but undefiled (anāśrava: zag pa med pa) great bliss—undefiled, that is, by intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa). The cause of the dispute seems to lie in the fact that those traditions that presuppose the revelation model of soteriology posit a gnoseological component of psycho-physiological bodhicitta, and unlike common sexual bliss, glossis, by definition, cannot be defiled. For these traditions, the physiological and psychical components are perceived as the bearers of the great bliss that undefiled gnosis is. For those traditions that presuppose the generation model of soteriology, however, psycho-physiological bodhicitta seems to include only the psychical and physiological components, and so not gnosis (i.e. gnoseological bodhicitta), which is regarded as the goal of psycho-physiological bodhicitta.

In addition, there seems to have been a debate as to whether psycho-physiological bodhicitta, when understood as possessing a cognitive nature, is a principal or a secondary mental factor. As we have seen, such a discussion among Indian and Tibetan scholars occurred also in the context of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta. The Itā phreng attributed to Padmasambhava suggests that psycho-physiological bodhicitta emerges when three factors, namely, a sense organ of the body (kāyendrā: lus kyi dbang po), a perception (vijñāna: rrnam par shes pa), and an object (viśaya: yul), interact. It is in this connection that the commentators of the *Guhyagarbhatantra in Tibet thematised the nature of psycho-physiological bodhicitta, as is evident from Rong-zom-pa’s report:

Earlier teachers (pravaracarya) have explained that ‘object’ (viśaya: yul) refers to the [awakened] body (kāya: skt), ‘sense organ’ (indriya: dbang po) to the [awakened] thought (vāc: gsung), and ‘perception’ (vijñāna: rrnam par shes pa) to the [awakened] mind (citta: thugs). The Popular Tradition of Khams (yongs grags kham lugs pa) maintains that [the phrase] ‘the [psycho-physiological] bodhicitta that has arisen from them’ refers to the element of mind (manodhātu) that arises subsequently to bodily perception (kāyavijñāna). The Tradition of Central [Tibet] (dubs lugs pa) maintains that [psycho-physiological bodhicitta] refers to the sensation that arises from bodily contact (kāyasamsāparsatā vedanā). Thus it is asserted [that psycho-physiological bodhicitta] is the experience of bliss [arising from or associated with] the union of efficient strategy (upāya) and insight (prajñā). In general, [I] see no contradiction in [taking] it as mind (citta) or a mental factor (caittā) that arises from the coming into contact of a bodily sense organ (kāyendriya), an object (viśaya), and a perception (vijñāna).

The same discussion can be found in Rong-zom-pa’s commentary on the *Guhyagarbhatantra, and reinforces our understanding of the issue. For instance, it

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15], where three types of bliss—meagre (mrdrumātra), mediocre (madhyamātra), and excellent (adhimātra)—associated with psycho-physiological bodhicitta are mentioned.

98 Guhyendutilakatantra, as cited in the Jñānasiddhi (p. 141.18–19):

    bodhicittād rte nānyāt saukhyām asti tridhātuke
    bodhicittām ayaṃ saukhyām sarvasaṃkhyāprasarpān

99 Itā phreng (p. 166.4–5): lus kyi dbang po dang | rrnam par shes pa dang | yul dang de las byung ba'i byang chub kyi sems ni khro bo bzhi'i rang bzhi |. For a discussion of this matter, see KARMAY 1988: 156, n. 156.

100 Itā 'grel (A, fols. 255b4–256a2; B, p. 339.5–12): yul sku | dbang po gsung | rrnam par shes pa thugs | zhes sngon gyi [kyi A] slob dpon rrnam kyi [kyi A] bskad do | de las byung ba'i byang chub kyi sems zhes bya ba ni | lus kyi rrnam par shes pa'i rjes su skyes pa'i yid kyi khams la bya zhes yongs grags kham lugs pa' gsung ngo | lus kyi 'dus te reg pa'i rkyen gyis [ gyi] tshor ba la bya zhes | dubs lugs po gsung [gsungs A] ste | de lta na yang thabs dang shes rab gnis su myed par [bar A] sbyor ba'i bde' [bde A] ba myong ba'i byang chub kyi sems yin no zhes 'chad | yong ni 'di' lus kyi dbang po dang | yul dang | rrnam par shes pa gsum phrad pa' las skyes pa'i | sems dang sems las byung ba gang yin yin 'gal ba ma mthong [mthang B] ngo |.

dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 87a4–b2; B, pp. 118.23–119.7): lus kyi rrnam par shes pa dang | dbang po dang | yul rrnam ni dngos su bstan par zad | reg shes zhes bya ba ni | man ngag lta phreng ['phreng A] las | de las byung ba'i byang chub kyi sems zhes bshad de | de gsum las skyes pa'i sems su bshad pas | khams dang skye mched du sbyar na yid kyi dbang po la sbyar bar rigs so zhes yongs grags pa kha cig gsung ngo |.
specifies perception (vījñāna) in the indicated triad as bodily perception (kāyavījñāna). It also makes clear that, for some proponents of the Popular Tradition of Khams, the reason for considering the psycho-physiological bodhicitta as a faculty of thought (manāindriya), which is identical with the element of mind (manodhātu: yid kyi kham), is that the Ita phreng has explained it as mind (citta: sems) that arises from the interaction of the triad, and that if expressed in terms of the eighteen elements (dhātu: kham) or the twelve senses and sense objects (āyatana: skye mchug), it is logical to consider it as the element of mind. It should, however, be pointed that, following the Abhidharma systematists, manodhātu and mana-āyatana are not coextensive, for all seven elements of perception (vījñānadāthātu)—the seventh being manodhātu or manāindriya—are subsumed under mana-āyatana. Thus, for some, psycho-physiological bodhicitta is a principal mental element (i.e. manodhātu, which follows kāyavījñāna), while for others it is a secondary mental element (i.e. kāyasamsparsājā vedanā). Rong-zom-pa’s own stance is that there is not much of a contradiction—showing a subtle attempt to reconcile the two positions. He does not, however, provide any reason for this. 102

(b) Some Salient Features of Psycho-Physiological Bodhicitta

Before attempting to trace its historical route, it is perhaps useful to look at some of the salient features of psycho-physiological bodhicitta: (1) It is found only in the tantric context, and that too, only in certain Vajrayāna scriptures or systems that presuppose sexual-yogic practices. It must be, historically, the last kind of bodhicitta to be recognised as such, in contrast to ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, which is, beyond doubt, the oldest type. (2) Originally it seems to have been conceived as having two components, namely, psychical and physiological ones, but later, as a result of a shift in preference for a certain soteriological model, a gnoseological component entered into too. In order to understand the psychical component, it is useful to consider passion (rāga), particularly sexual passion, within the Buddhist soteriological context; and in order to understand the physiological component, to consider the treatment of ‘metaphysiology’—particularly the role of fluids of virility and fertility, and also the body-mind relationship—in Indian sources. (3) It is, in several respects, conceived parallel to ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, and often the term bodhicitta is consciously employed as a double entendre, denoting simultaneously both ethico-spiritual and psycho-physiological bodhicitta. (4) Its function is soteriological and its goal, like that of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, is always gnoseological bodhicitta (i.e. a buddha’s gnosis). Thus psychical and physiological elements and sexual experiences that are of no soteriological relevance have nothing to do with it.

(c) Probable Motives for the Conception of Psycho-Physiological Bodhicitta

The theory of psycho-physiological bodhicitta is intricately linked with the sexual-yogic practices prevalent in certain forms of Vajrayāna Buddhism. My concern, however, is not the issue regarding the origin of sexual-yogic practices, but rather questions such as why and with what doctrinal justification such practices could gain admission into the existing Buddhist theories and practices. The most intriguing questions in this regard are why and how the male and female fluids of virility and fertility came to be designated as bodhicitta. In this case, as

dbus lugs pa nams ni | kun la khyab pa'i spa ri sha zhes bya ste | lus kyi 'dus te reg pa'i rkyen gyes tshor ba la sbyar bar bya ba yin la | de [da A] yang gtos bor gyur pa thabs dang shes rab gnyis su med par sbyor ba'i byang chub kyi sems bde bo chen po nams su myong ba niyid yin no zhes gsung ngo || yongs ni 'di lta bu dag ni gang ltar sbyar yang thag par 'gal ba ma mthong ngo ||

102 Klong-chien-pa has, in a similar manner, attempted to resolve the apparent problem in the context of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta by stating that there is no contradiction, since secondary mental elements always arise in association with a principal one.
in the history of Buddhist ideas in general, multiple and complex factors must have been involved, and hence forming a plausible picture of the course of events would require intensive study on various fronts. What I intend to do here is merely to consider some of the possible motives for the introduction of sexual-yogic practices, along with some of the non-tantric Mahāyāna doctrinal foundations that could have served as justification for doing so.

In attempting to understand the conception and development of psycho-physiological bodhicitta, or any Buddhist idea for that matter, it is always valuable to keep in mind that Buddhism is, in the first place, a religion which sets nirvāṇa—regardless of how it is defined—as its primary soteriological goal, which in any case involves shaking off the shackles of samsāra so as to be no longer subjected to it. The immediate problem facing a Buddhist concerns intellectual-emotional defilements (such as ignorance, hatred, and desire) that seethe from within and the pain and discontent that one experiences and sees around oneself. In other words, Buddhism sees samsāra as a problem and nirvāṇa as the solution. What samsāra basically consists of are kleshas and karmas, and their undesirable consequences, including pain and discontent. Practising the teachings given by the historical Buddha would by itself have sufficed to solve one’s problems. Why, then, did certain Buddhists at a certain point in history adopt or resort to sexual-yogic practices? One explanation, in my view, lies in the tendency of human beings to attempt to gain the same old objective by newer, quicker, easier, and more effective means. The problems of Vajrayāna practitioners and the soteriological goal remained the same as in non-tantric Mahāyāna. It was only their outlook and approaches that were now dramatically augmented or otherwise modified. This fact is expressly confirmed by authors within the tradition of tantric Buddhism. In addition, it has been pointed out that the development of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta can be explained as one of the attempts made by Buddhists themselves to bolster the staying power of the Three Jewels. In a similar way, the idea of psycho-physiological bodhicitta may have been introduced as one of several measures taken by innovative Buddhists to speed up the process of accomplishing the goal set by ethico-spiritual bodhicitta.

One of the questions that comes to mind in this regard is: To what extent were innovative Buddhists able to absorb or adapt practices that had their origin in non-Buddhist traditions and yet retain their Buddhist identity or character? The answer seems to be that as long as one abided by the Mahāyāna guidelines of insight (prajñā) and compassion (karunā), there were no restrictions on the employment of one’s mental, verbal, or physical impulses as means of attaining the soteriological goal.¹⁰³ In other words, all means, regardless of whether they are in origin Buddhist or non-Buddhist, are, in principle, acceptable to Mahāyāna followers as long as they can contribute to the attainment of the soteriological goal. Precisely such an attitude seems to have paved the way for the theory and practice of psycho-physiological bodhicitta.

(d) The Problems of Physicality and Sexuality in Buddhism

In general, the conservative Buddhist traditions consider the psycho-physical complexes (skandha) of a person as impure, impermanent, painful, and non-substantial. Mistakenly holding on to the impure as pure, the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasurable, and the non-self as self has been considered to be the root cause of samsāra. In particular, passion and pleasure, especially those types associated with physicality or sexuality, are considered a problem—a hindrance to spiritual progress—and are to be combatted by

¹⁰³ See, for example, the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 245b1–2; B, p. 357.9–11): sangs rgyas thams cad kyi lam gcig po ni shes rab dang snying rje yin te ’gzhain du lus dang ngag dang yid kyi ’du byed thams cad la ’di la mi brten du mi rung ngo zhes ris su chad pa med do ||.
adopting a negative or at least a neutral stance towards them. A bodhisattva who happens to be an ordained monk could combat desire in general and sexual desire in particular by distancing himself physically from the objects of desire. But the problem of physicality or sexuality threatened to become acute in the case of lay bodhisattvas. Can a lay bodhisattva indulge in sexual passion and yet at the same time pursue his soteriological goal? Or is it possible to engage in sexual acts without sexual desire? From the point of view of Buddhist spirituality, this seems to be a serious problem. However, historically speaking, precisely such difficulties may have given an impetus to the development of new Mahāyāna soteriological theories, thus enabling the innovators to look at the psycho-physical complexes (skandha) from a new perspective.

How can one best make use of the psycho-physical resources that one has at one’s disposal? Already in the context of non-tantric bodhisattva practices, one finds traces of the wish to extract an essence (sūtra: snying po) from one’s essenceless body. In some Mahāyāna sūtras the five skandhas are called the five tathāgatas, and the five klesas the progenitors of the tathāgatas. In particular, passion, like compassion, is seen not any longer as a hindrance but rather as being indispensable for guaranteeing the physical presence of a bodhisattva. It is said that just as a lotus grows only in a marshy land full of waste material, so tathāgatas grow from a heap of klesas. From a tantric point of view, however, the treatment of klesas as soteriologically positive has been merely theorised in the non-tantric Mahāyāna systems, and it is only in the tantric Mahāyāna that the practical aspects of such belief are taught. Thus, from a tantric perspective, one could argue that the employment of klesas for soteriological purposes is not only doctrinally justifiable but also historically inevitable. Such a change of attitude or perspective seems to have enabled a bodhisattva (a) to find solutions in the problems themselves, (b) to break the spiritual taboos associated with dualistic concepts such as those pertaining to purity and impurity, and (c) to experiment with one’s physicality and sexuality in such a way that they can be used for soteriological purposes.

Perhaps it should be stated unambiguously that I neither contend nor wish to imply that sexual-yogic practice is an organic inner-Buddhist development. Some scholars have maintained that anticipations of sexual-yogic practices can be found already in non-tantric Mahāyāna sources such as Nairātmyaparipṛcchā 11 and Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra 9.46, a position which I do not share. It has been already pointed out that the expression svargamahāsukha in Nairātmyaparipṛcchā 11 is not identified with sexual bliss but rather juxtaposed to it and that Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra 9.46 does not speak about sexual practice, but rather about the bodhisattva’s self-extrication from such a practice.

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104 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (p. 452.7–9): aṣubhoṣaṇoḥ kāma-arāg-pratipaśatva ko viśeṣaḥ | varṇa-rāgasya-subha maithunārāga-yopakṣeti vaibhāṣikāḥ | evam tu yuyate | maithunārāga-yasubha mātāpiṣputrajñātārāga-yopakṣeti |. See also Schmithansen 1982: 62, 66.

105 Cf. Śīksāśamuccaya (Bendall, p. 26.2; Vaidya, p. 18.26): aṣārūtā kāyāt sāram ādātukāmo…. See also ibid. (Bendall, p. 200.17; Vaidya, p. 111.5–6): lábhā me sulabhā yasya me ’sārūtā kāyāt sāram ādattam bhavisyati |

106 See, for example, the Vimalakirtinirdeśasūtra 7.82 (pp. 77.23–78.7). See also the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 241a3–5; B, p. 352.5–9); dKon mchog ’grel (A, fol. 52a2–b6; B, p. 82.1–23); Theg chen chisul ’jug (A, fol. 106a2–4, 106b3–5; B, pp. 531.12–17, 532.5–10); Wangchuk 2002: 280–282.

107 See Isaacs 1998: 27, n. 10, where it has been pointed out that sexual-yogic practices were meant ‘to get rid of the ordinary concept of impure and pure.’

108 For a discussion of the expression svargamahāsukha in Nairātmyaparipṛcchā 11 and Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra 9.46, see Schmithansen 1980: 444. Cf. Snellgrove 1988: 1373; Dasgupta 1962: 17–19. For Tibetan scholars such as Mi-pham, the component of great bliss was taught in Vajrayāna in order to combat the clinging to emptiness. See the NgEs shes sgron me (p. 90.1):
(e) Psycho-Physiological Bodhicitta in Yogic Practices

In order to understand the rationale behind the employment of psycho-physiological bodhicitta in yogic practices, it is perhaps useful to take a look at how such practices are conceived. Vajrayāna practices may with justification be subsumed under what is known as two phases or stages (krama: rim pa), namely, a generation phase (upatikrama: bskyed pa'i rim pa) and completion phase (upannakrama/nispannakrama: rdzogs pa'i rim pa). This scheme of two phases is obviously based on the two-truth model of the non-tantric Madhyamaka tradition. This would perhaps explain why upatikrama is referred to as possessing provisional meaning (neyārtha) and nispannakrama as possessing definitive meaning (niṃārtha). In content and function, however, the two are very probably meant to denote quietude (samatha) and superior insight (vipaśyanā), respectively. The question as to whether the yogic practice of upatikrama is sufficient in and of itself (i.e. independently of nispannakrama) for bringing about soteriological attainments may be answered positively or negatively depending on how the two phases are understood and defined in the first place. As a justification for the practices of upatikrama, which involve various kinds of visualisations and the like, it is maintained that manifold or discursive proliferation (prapañcā) can be eliminated or pacified by making use of it, so to speak, homeopathically. This and similar ideas suggest the soteriological self-efficacy of the upatikrama practices. For scholars like Mi-pham, however, the practice of upatikrama, like that of samatha, is not capable of autonomously bringing about salvation. Obvious attempts were also made to link the two stages with the two accumulations (sambhāra), namely, the accumulation of beneficial resources (punyasaṃbhāra) and the accumulation of gnosis (jñānasambhāra), both indispensable prerequisites for the attainment of Buddhahood. The practices of Five Phases (pañcakrama) of the Guhyasamājatantra tradition and those of the Six-Limb Yoga (śādaṅgayoga) of the Kālacakratantra tradition (and also found in the Guhyasamājatantra), are nispannakrama practices. rDzogs-chen practices are regarded by

stong par zhen pa bzlog phyir du ||
snang las bde ba chen po bstan ||

For an English translation, see PETTIT 1999: 209. Mi-pham, however, rejects the interpretation of great bliss as mere sexual bliss.

109 Guhyasamājatantra 18.84; Hevajra tantr 1.8.24cd–25ab. For improved readings of the pertinent verses and a discussion of Ratnākaraśānti’s understanding of the two phases, see ISAACSON 2001: 467–472. See also the Yogaratnamālā (pp. 104.16–18, 20–21); Muktiālaka (P, fol. 62b1–2; D, fol. 52a1–2; S, vol. 21, p. 973.19–21); Rim pa gnyis pa (P, fol. 210a4–5; S, vol. 44, p. 481.1–2); Pañcakrama 1.2; cf. ibid. 5.20.

110 That the two phases are in a way analogous to the two truths propounded in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.8 has been pointed out and discussed in ISAACSON 2001: 469, particularly, n. 92.

111 See, for example, the bKa’ brgyud rnam bshad (p. 94.2); drang don bskyed rim dang | nges don rdzogs pa’i rim par sbyar ba’i tshul gyis bzhed pa’i dra min yod pa shes par bya zhin...".

112 Hevajra tantr 2.2.29;

  upatikramayogena prapañcām bhāvyād vratī ||
  prapañcām svapnavat kētvā prapañcācār niḥprapañcācayet ||.

113 'Od gsal snying po (p. 44.5–6): … bskyed rim rgyang pas ’og min gyi bar gyi ’jig rien pa’i dngos grub kun sgrub nus kyi ’das lam mgon du bya ma nus… See also ibid. (p. 221.2–4): … bskyed rim rgyang pa rags pa dang phra ba’i gsal snang mthar phyin pa’i tshe na snags dang phyag rgya la sogs pa grogs su ldan pa’i sgo nas ’og min gyi bar gyi ’jig rien pa’i dngos grub mtha’ dag ’grub nus so ||.

114 Vimalaprabhād 4.112 (vol. 2, p. 207.5–6);

  pratyāhāras tathā dhāṇyān prāṇāyāmas ca dhāranā ||
  anusmṛṭih samādhiḥ ca śadango yoga ṣyata ||.
rNying-ma scholars as signless (nimitt/animit: mtshan ma med pa) nispannakrama practices. The so-called Yoga of Seminal Drops (binduyoga: thig le'i rnal 'byor) and Subtle Yoga (sūkṣmayoga: phra mo'i rnal 'byor)\textsuperscript{115} can be regarded as special kinds of nispannakrama practices that directly deal with psycho-physiological bodhicitta.

In the rNying-ma tantric tradition there is another way of looking at the various Vajrayāna methods, namely, (1) the thabs lam (‘Way of Efficient Strategy’) and (2) the grol lam (‘Way of Release’). Such a convention has yet to be traced in Indian sources. The thabs lam uses special yogic techniques called ‘striking at the core’ (marmaprahāra: gnad du bsnun pa)\textsuperscript{116} of the physical bases (ādhāra: rten), namely, the channels (nādi: rtsa), vital winds (vāyu: rlung), and seminal drops (bindu: thig le), as a result of which the gnosis ‘to be kindled’ (ādheya: brten pa) emerges inevitably (hatheya: bstan thabs su). The alchemic procedure of transforming iron into gold instantly by the efficient manipulation of a mineral called māksika\textsuperscript{117} is given by analogy with the thabs lam technique. The latter is subdivided into two parts, namely, one involving (a) the upper aperture (ūrdhvadvāra: steng gi sgo) and one (b) the lower aperture (adhodvāra: 'og gi sgo).\textsuperscript{118} These are also called that which uses one’s own body as an efficient strategy (svadehōpāyasamuyukta: r Stanton thabs ldan) and that which uses the body of others as an efficient strategy (*paradehōpāyasamuyukta: gzhan lus thabs ldan), respectively.\textsuperscript{119} The grol lam, on the other hand, uses special yogic techniques to

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See also Guhyasamājatantra 18.141, which reads slightly differently. This verse is cited in TSD, s.v. sbyor ba yan lag drug. The Six-Limb Yoga is explained also in Rong-zom-pa’s Teg chen tshul ‘jug (A, fols. 120a1–122a6; B, pp. 547.3–549.22).

\textsuperscript{115} Vimalaprabhā ad 4.110 (vol. 2, p. 204.18–19): bodhicittābindunispattir binduyogah | sukacyavanat sukhopalabdhih sūkṣmayogah |. This is cited in TSD, s.v.v. phra mo'i rnal 'byor, thig le'i rnal 'byor, thig le, rnal 'byor, and damgs pa.

\textsuperscript{116} TSD, s.v.

\textsuperscript{117} MW, s.v.

\textsuperscript{118} The terms ūrdhvadvāra and adhodvāra are attested in Sanskrit sources, for example, in Kṛṣṇācārya’s Vasantaśaṅkā (p. 22.4) and Varanarā’s commentary on it, the Rahasyādipikā (pp. 23.10). However, ūrdhvadvāra and adhodvāra in the tantric context do not seem to mean the ‘gate opening into heaven’ and the ‘anus’ (as in MW, s.v.), but rather the openings of two of the three principal channels (pradhānā: gsto mo gsum), namely, rasanā (ro ma) and lalana (brkhyang ma), respectively; the third and the middle channel is avadhūti (kun 'dar ma). See the Hevajratantra 1.1.13 (cited also in TSD, s.v. gsto mo): tāsām medhye tisro nādāyat pradhānāḥ; see also TSD, s.v.v. rtsa, kun 'dar ma, ro ma, and brkhyang ma. The expressions steng sgo and ‘og sgo can be found in several rNying-ma tantric sources, for example, in the sGyu 'phrul 'rgya mtsho (pp. 10.7–11.1; also cited in the Phyoṣ ḍrgra 'i mun sel, p. 453.2):

\begin{itemize}
  \item bye brag rlung las gyur pa ni ||
  \item ye shes 'byung ba steng 'og sgo ||
\end{itemize}

See also the \textit{*Prajñāpraveśa} (P, fols. 413a5; S, vol. 43, p. 836.12–13):

\begin{itemize}
  \item thabs dang shes rab lam gnyis kyi
  \item nges byed sngon [sdon P] la steng 'og thabs ||
\end{itemize}

See also the bSam gtan mig sgron (p. 15.5–6); steng 'og gi sgo'i man ngag,…; ibid. (p. 220.2): mdor steng 'og gi rlung 'jug gi phye ba'o ||; ibid. (p. 210.3): 'og gi sgo la rten pa ni ||; ibid. (p. 222.5): rten can ni steng 'og gi gnyis te | steng gi sgo la brten pa ni || Teg chen tshul 'jug (A, fols. 122a4; B, p. 549.18). Cf. also the sGyu 'phrul 'rgya mtsho (p. 25.6):

\begin{itemize}
  \item steng 'og rlung la dbang thob nas ||
  \item bar ma'i rkyen gys blsa ba med ||
\end{itemize}

 Cf. also the Dam tshig gsal bkra (P, fols. 577a7–8; S, vol. 43, p. 1196.17–18):

\begin{itemize}
  \item thabs kyi lus la brten shes na ||
  \item yon tan brjod las 'das pas [sic?] gsungs ||
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{119} The expression svadehōpāyasamuyukta can be found, for example, in the Guhyasiddhi (pp. 22.19–20, 23.7–8), but I have not been able to trace its counterpart *paradehōpāyasamuyukta.
strike directly at the core of the gnosiss to be kindled so that the innate gnosiss inevitably emerges without having to depend on the nādi, vīyu, or bindu. The alchemic procedure of transforming iron into gold gradually by efficiently manipulating a jewel called kaustubha\(^{120}\) is given by analogy with the grol lam technique. The main distinction between thabs lam and grol lam is their emphasis on upāya and prajñā, respectively. However, it is maintained that each path is endowed with both upāya and prajñā, and is self-sufficient. It is also said that in general those who practise the thabs lam achieve swifter results than those who practise the grol lam, but a simultaneist engaged in the grol lam is said to be even swifter than a simultaneist engaged in the thabs lam.

The sexual-yogic technique, which involves a skilful manipulation of psycho-physiological bodhicitta, is thus relevant only for those who practise a specific kind of thabs lam. For those tantric traditions that endorse such options, sexual-yogic practices are neither indispensable nor are they meant to be interpreted only symbolically. It is also comprehensible why sexual-yogic practices, although in principle permissible even for fully ordained monks, may in practice be extremely difficult, simply owing to the great risks involved. For the Dwags-po bkā’-brgyud tradition in Tibet, the Six Teachings of Nāropa (na ro’i chos drug)\(^{121}\) make use of the thabs lam technique, and Mahāmudrā the grol lam technique.\(^{122}\) In sum, all yogic techniques mentioned here seem to be, in one way or another, concerned with causing gnoseological bodhicitta to emerge.

7. Semeiological Bodhicitta

As stated above, I take semeiological bodhicitta to be a visual, verbal, or visionary representation or symbol of the other four types of bodhicitta. Not being a specialist in Indian or Buddhist symbolism, I have relied on Adrian Snodgrass’s The Symbolism of the Stupa for some general understanding of this field. The primary aim of this discussion is to supplement our understanding of the concept of bodhicitta and not of symbolism per se.

(a) General Features of Bodhicitta Symbolism

Adrian Snodgrass remarks that in the Indian view, “the symbol has a horizontal reference that is indefinitely extended and a vertical reference that is truly infinite.”\(^{123}\) That is to say, a symbol can have more than one referent, and a single referent can be represented by a number of different symbols, and itself have a plurality of meanings. Snodgrass also states that symbols can produce interlocking and inter-reflecting patterns. All of this seems to be true, in particular, of the symbolism of bodhicitta. A single symbol, such as a vajra, can have more than one referent, including bodhicitta. Similarly, the single referent bodhicitta can be represented by a number of symbols—a lotus, the moon, and so forth. It is also true that bodhicitta symbolism ranges over the visual (or physical), verbal (or vocal), and visionary (or mental). In what seems to be typically tantric, a single symbol can have a single referent, but that referent will have at least three dimensions, namely, outer (phyi), inner (nang), and secret (gsang ba), and the secret dimension, in turn, may yield other multidimensional patterns. A

\(^{120}\) MW, s.v.

\(^{121}\) For a list of the Six Teachings of Nāropa, see, for example, Tshig mdzod chen mo, s.v. nā ro chos drug.

\(^{122}\) Shes bya’i mdzod (p. 832.4): thabs lam chos drug | grol lam phyag rgya chen po’i gdam s pa’o ||; ibid. (p. 833.24): ... thabs lam nā ro chos drug tu grags pa....

\(^{123}\) SNODGRASS 1985: 8.
symbol of *bodhicitta*, then, does not exist in isolation but is connected with other symbols and referents. Moreover, which symbol represents which theme depends on given roles of importance in the given context. One may also assume that new symbols can be superimposed on an existing referent such as *bodhicitta*, and an existing symbol can be reinterpreted as representing one or more types of *bodhicitta*.

(b) **Putting Symbolism in a Buddhist Philosophical Context**

One question that comes to mind is how the primary sources designate symbolical or semiological *bodhicitta* and what they mean by it. In this regard, it is interesting to note how such primary sources approach the distinction between that which expresses (*abhidhāna*: *rjod byed*) and that which is expressed (*abhidheya*: *brjod bya*), that which signifies (*laksana*: *mshon byed*) and that which is signified (*lakṣya*: *mshon bya*), and so forth, corresponding, one might say, to imitation (or replication) and the genuine (or actual), respectively. When the symbols are verbal, the former always takes the form of ‘words’ (*vyanjanā*: *tshig*) and the latter that of ‘meaning’ (*artha*: *don*). For example, in the *Abhidhammakosā*, Abhidharma itself is subdivided into ‘designatory’ (*sāṃkṣetika*: *brdar bya’s pa*) and ‘actual’ (*pāramārthika*: *don dam pa*), which can be equated with ‘form’ and ‘content’ or with ‘signifier’ and ‘signified.’ This method is later on extended to explain *madhyamaka*, *prajñāpāramitā*, and *tantra*. For example, Ratnakarāsānti, in his commentary on the *Mahāmāyātantra* called the *Gunavatī*, clearly uses the expressions ‘causal tantra’ (*hetutantra*: *rgyu’i rgyud*), ‘resultant tantra’ (*phalatantra*: *bras bu’i rgyud*), and ‘tantra of means (or ways)’ (*upāyatantra*: *thabs kyi rgyud*), clearly based on the *Guhvasamājatantra*. Such a scheme can be found also in the *Yogaratnamālā*. In the rNying-ma tantric exegeses, *tantra* is divided into two: (a) ‘the expressed meaning’ (*brjod bya don*) and (b) ‘the words that express’ (*rjod byed tshig*). The former is subdivided into basis (*gzhi*), path (*lam*), and goal (*bras bu*), and the latter also into three, namely, ‘verbal appearance’ (*sngar snang ba*), ‘verbal resonance’ (*sngar grags pa*), and their ‘symbols’ (*brdar gyur pa*). Apparently, these three correlate with the vision, verbal, and visual symbols of *tanira*, respectively. In a similar way, it is clear that of the five types, semiological *bodhicitta* is merely designatory, or the signifier, while the remaining four are the signified or the designated, and can be subsumed under *bodhicitta* as it figures on the basis, path, and goal levels of a *bodhisattva*.

One particular underlying Buddhist philosophical idea seems to be relevant to the understanding of Buddhist symbolism in general and semiological *bodhicitta* in particular. On the whole, it is assumed that the thing-in-itself, or rather reality-in-itself, is always and by nature independent of our conceptions, perceptions, and designations, and that there is in fact no connection between the designation and the designated. Nonetheless, communication is possible because of conceptual thought, which establishes a false but still effective association between the designation and the designated, thereby enabling mental, verbal, and physical communication to occur. Hence, from a Buddhist philosophical point of view, the connection between semiological *bodhicitta* and its referents may be a rather arbitrary but nonetheless useful means of gaining access to actual *bodhicitta*. Genuine *bodhicitta* cannot be expressed or represented adequately or correctly by means of concepts, words, or images. But it is

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124 *Gunavatī* (p. 2.11–12): trividhaṃ tantrām—hetutantram, phalatantram, upāyatantram ca | ; ibid. (p. 3.4–5): ... hetutantram phalatantram upāyatantram vā | tad etat trividham tantram prabhakṣye |. See *Guhvasamājatantra* 18.34–35.

125 *Yogaratnamālā* (p. 105.20–23): tantram iti prabandhoḥ | tac ca tridhā, hetutantram phalatantram upāyatantraḥ ca |.

126 *Od gsal snying po* (pp. 15.1–17.5).
perhaps precisely because of this limitation that Buddhists dealing with the bodhicitta idea have attempted to symbolise it in various ways.

(c) Three Kinds of Semeiological Bodhicitta: Visual, Verbal, and Visional

Sometimes bodhicitta is symbolised by such objects as the full moon, or—to express its two components, upāya and praṇā— the sun and moon. In the context of sexual-yogic practices, a female is praṇā and the male upāya, and in meditative practices involving the visualisation of deities, the sun is the seat of efficient strategy (upāyāsana) and the moon the seat of insight (praṇāsana). Bodhicitta is also symbolised by a flaming jewel, jewel banner (ratnaketu), lotus, and water in a vase. The ritual sceptre (vajra), too, is said to symbolise bodhicitta, in this case, as efficient strategy (upāya), along with a bell (ghanta), which represents insight (praṇā). In the Buddhhasamāyogatantra, the tantric deity Śrīheruka is represented as wearing a crown (dbu rgyan) representing bodhicitta. In fact, jewel crowns of tantric buddhas are generally taken to be symbols (rtags) of bodhicitta. According to a recent Tibetan source, the parasol (gdugs: chatra), which is one of the so-called Eight Symbols of Auspiciousness (bkra shis rtags brgyad), is supposed to symbolise bodhicitta. I have not, however, been able to trace this idea in Indian sources.

127 Dhñôntarapatâîjî (P, fols. 18b8–19a1; D, fol. 16a6; S, vol. 36, p. 38.8–9): sems zhes bya ba ni byang chub kyi sems kyi mthsan nyid zla ba'i dkyil 'khor gyi rnam pa'o || Guhyasamâjamaññalavidhûtikâ (P, fol. 420a8; D, fol. 113b3; S, vol. 22, p. 281.18): zia ba ni byang chub kyi sems so ||.

128 dKon mchog 'gre (A, fol. 67b5; B, p. 98.18–19): nyi zla ni thabs dang shes rab rang bzhin gyis 'od gsal ba'i phyag rgya'o ||.

129 Hevajraotantra 1.8.28ab (also cited in TSD, s.v. thabs): yoštâ tâvad bhavet praṇā upâyah púrâsah smrâh ||.

130 Vimalaprâbhâ ad 3.60 (vol. 2, p. 61.21–22): upâyâsanâm sûryâh | praṇâsanaṁ candraḥ ||. This is also cited in TSD, s.v. thabs kyi gân.

131 SNODGRASS 1985: 173, 204, 349.

132 Durgatiparisodhanatantra (p. 286.23): yaw bodhicittâm tad vajram praṇâ haṁantâ iti smrâ ||. See also the Vajraśikharatantra, as cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 211a2–3; B, pp. 316.23–317.1):

    rdo rje dril bu phyog rgya yang ||
    blo gros chen po khyod kyi gzung ||
    byang chub sems gang de rdo rje ||
    shes rab dril bu zhes su bcod ||.

See also the citation in ibid. (A, fol. 219b5–6; B, p. 327.4–5).

133 mNyân sbyor 'gre (A, fol. 104a6–b1; B, p. 574.5–7): dpal he ra ka la ni byang chub sems kyi dbu rgyan gsungs ts [ta A] | de bas na thig 'di dag kyung 'og nas ston pa'i dbu rgyan don gyi byang chub sems kyi rang bzhin bstan pa'o ||; ibid. (A, fol. 105a1–2; B, p. 574.20–22); de la ihom pa'i dbu rgyan ni | byang chub kyi sems gisar [gtsob or A] bstan pa'i phyir te | dbu rgyan kun kyung byang chub kyi sems kyi rtags yin mod kyi gang du geng gisar gsungs pa de khyad par du sbyar bar rigs so ||; ibid. (A, fol. 101a3–5; B, p. 570.17–23): dbu rgyan gyi don gsungs pa | 'chos kyi rgyal srid rab bsgrub pa || rin chen chos las thag pa med || | de kas theg chen byang chub sems || | rgyal ba rin chen rdo rje can || | zhes bya ba ste || | 'dir rgyal srid kyi mchog kyung chos kyi rgyal srid yin la | rin po che'i mchog kyung chos rin po che yin te | de bas na theg pa chen pa'i chos bla na med pa'i byang chub kyi sems kyi bsgrya pa la mnag brnyes pa'i phyir rin [rin B] po che'i dbu rgyan rdo rje phyed pas mthsan pas dbu bsgryan zo || | zhes bya ba'i don to ||.

134 Ri mo spvi'i rnam gzhag (p. 454.5–8): "As for what these symbols (i.e. the Eight Symbols of Auspiciousness) represent, there are several different positions among the various schools. However, the commonly accepted position is that what is symbolised by the parasol is bodhicitta, characterised by [the thought of] benefiting others (parahita). [It is] white in colour, [its] handle is made of gold, [and it is] adorned with soaring, fluttering
The syllables *man* and *tra* in the word *mantra* are said to represent the oneness of *śīnyatā* and *karunā*, and hence *bodhicitta*. The vowel *a*, which is called the supreme letter, is also said to represent *bodhicitta*. Sometimes the vowels *u* and *ū* are said to stand for *bodhicitta*. At other times, the syllable *ḥum* is presented as the essence of *bodhicitta*. The *anusvāra* sign, too, is at times considered the seed of *bodhicitta*. The letter *ka*, finally, is said to stand for either *karunā* or *bodhicitta*.

Sometimes *bodhicitta* is visualised as a ball of light, in what seems to be a case of visonary symbolism. More often it is personified (either in its gnoseological or ontological sense) as deities such as *Samantabhadra*, *Vajrasattva*, *Vajradhara*, *Mañjuśrī*.

silk streamers of different [colours] and with a jewel top' (*di'i mtshon byed la grub mtha' so so'i 'do ma pa mthun pa 'ga' re snang yang | thun mong gi 'do ma ni | gdugs kyi mtshon bya ma gzhan phan byang chub kyi sems te | kha dog dkar po yu ba gser las grub pa | dar sna tshogs 'phur lding rtse zning rin po che'i tog gis brgyant pa can ni |)

135 dBang yon tan rim pa, as cited in the sDe dge bstan dkar (p. 194.8–11): ma ni stong pa mthosan ma bral || rdo rje sms dpai dbugs dbhyung ba || shes rab chen po dbag gis bshad || tra ni skyob par byed pa'i don || de bzhin bshegs pa'i dbugs dbhyung ba || stong pa dang ni snying rje nyid || gnyis su med dang snying kyi tsul ||

136 mTshan brjod 'gre'la pa (A, fol. 293a4; B, p. 284.10): de ni dam pa'i yi ge'o || byang chub kyi sems so ||; dKon mchog 'gre'la (A, fol. 118b2; B, p. 151.22–23): a shes brjod pas byang chub sems kyi rang bzhin a dkar por gsal bar bya'o ||; ibid. (A, fol. 118b3–4; B, p. 152.1–3): ... byang chub kyi sems a las zla ba'i dkyil 'khor gyi steng du | mthosan bzang po'i sa bon sgra yig bcu drug gi phreng ba rim pa gnyis su bskor ba a'i snying po can bsam par bya'o ||

137 mTshan brjod 'gre'la pa (A, fol. 298a4–5; B, p. 289.21–22): u ū ni byang chub kyi sems kun tu bzang po stε | sems nyid sms dpai' chen po'i rang bzhin no ||

138 Muktiśāti (P, fol. 283a8–b1; D, fol. 238b7; S, vol. 2, p. 1351.17–18); mTshan brjod 'gre'la pa (A, fol. 283a4–5; B, p. 273.5–6); dKon mchog 'gre'la (A, fol. 125b5; B, p. 159.18); GOVINDA 1956: 218.

139 dKon mchog 'gre'la (A, fol. 124b5; B, p. 158.16–17): klad kor rnam s ni byang chub sems kyi thig le ste sa bon gvi don no ||

140 dKon mchog 'gre'la (A, fol. 109b6; B, p. 142.11–12): ka ni thugs rje chen po'i sgo ste | snying rje byang chub sems kyi rnam par thar pa'o ||

141 dKon mchog 'gre'la (A, fol. 121a3–4; B, p. 154.18–19): dkyil 'khor gvi dbus kyi gdan steng na byang chub sems kyi rang bzhin 'od kyi gong bu tsam zhig dmigs pa....

142 dKon mchog 'gre'la (A, fol. 120b2–4; B, p. 154.2–7); mTshan brjod 'gre'la pa (A, fol. s. 283a4–5; 297a1–2; B, pp. 273.5–6, 288.11–15).

143 Bodhicittavivarana 1:

byang chub sems kyi dbag nyid dngos || dpal ldan rdo rje rnam bshad de || byang chub sems kyi bsgom pa ni || srid pa' jigs de dbag gis bshad ||

144 Māyāvatī (P, fol. 218a6; D, fol. 176a6; S, vol. 13, p. 482.14):

byang chub sems ni rdo rje 'chang ||

145 Bodhicittabhāvanānīrdeśa (P, fol. 56a5–8; D, fol. 42b2–5; S, vol. 33, pp. 182.16–183.6): de la de bzhin gshegs pa rnam byang yang rung ma byung yang rung | chos rnam kyi chos nyid ni ye nas gnas pa'i chos kyi snying por gyur pa ni | 'jam dpal gzhon nu zhes bya ste | ci'; phyir 'jam zhe na | zug rngu med pa'i phyir
Kālcakra, Hevajra, Vajrayogini, and Vajradakini. As such, it is associated with all kinds of colours and features, both peaceful and wrathful forms, and the male and female gender. The reason why such types of bodhicitta have been symbolised in the forms of wrathful, demonical deities seems to lie in the gradually emerging notion among some Buddhist traditions that passive and peaceful means are not always effective enough when it comes to engaging in the activities of a buddha and that it is necessary to resort to more aggressive means. The Buddhhasamāyogatatantra explicitly states that those who are extremely malignant (duṣṭa: gdug pa) and ferocious (canda: gtum po) cannot be benefited by resorting to peaceful means, and hence when necessary all the tathāgatas assume the forms of wrathful deities endowed with insight and efficient strategies. It goes on to state that if an ill-tempered individual can fly into a rage and burn down Tripura, then of course all buddhas, by doing the same, can burn down Tridhātu. According to the Tattvasamgrahasūtra (which is actually classified as a tantra), although buddhas are peaceful, they assume wrathful or unruly forms as part of their great efficient strategies.

The iconography of peaceful and wrathful deities

'jam pa dang | de rtogs na sms can kun gyi dpal du gyur pa dang | gzhon [gzhom DC] pa ni gtsang ba'i don te | skyon dang dri mas ma gos pa'i phyir ro || snying po gong [gang N] du bstar pa nyid chos rnams kyi snying po yin pa'i phyir ro || 'jam dpal zhes bya ba | byang chub kyi sms ni mthshan nyid ma nor bar rtogs pa ni | sangs rgyas ma lus pa'i 'byung gnas yin pa'i phyir | bder gshogs ma lus yum du gyur pa rgyal ba kun gvi lam gcig go || zhes smos te | lam 'di ma rtogs [gtogs N] par lam gzhon gyis 'tshang ni rgya ba'i phyir ro ||; mTshan brjod 'grel pa (A, fols. 268b1–269a2; B, p. 257.2–9).


Māyāvati (P, fol. 211b2–3; D, fol. 170b6; S, vol. 13, p. 469.15–16): byang chub sms ni rdo rje nyid || rdo rje mkha' 'gro zhe gsungs so ||.

Buddhasamāyogatatantra-1 (T, fol. 273a5; D, fol. 176a1): shin tu gdug cing drag po la || zhi bas phan par mi 'gyur te || shes rab thabs kyi sbyor ba ni || rnams par rgyal phyir rab tu drag ||. See ibid. (T, fol. 249a2; D, fol. 157b3–4): shin tu gdug par gtum po la || zhi bas phan par mi 'gyur te || shes rab thabs kyi ngo bo yi || khrab bor de bzhin gshogs kun mzad ||. See also the mNyam sbyor 'grel pa (A, fols. 66b2–3, 81a6–b1, 104a4; B, pp. 532.4–6, 548.20–22, 573.24–574.1).

Buddhasamāyogatatantra-1 (T, fol. 249a2–3; D, fol. 157b4–5): khrab bo'i tshul can khras pas kyang || jig rten gsum dag sreg byed na || sangs rgyas thams cad khras pa yis || khangs gsum ma lus smos ci sgo ||. It is very clear that the author of the text is alluding to the legend of Śiva (or Mahādeva) burning down, with fire shot from a bow and arrow, the mythical city of Tripura built of gold, silver, and iron by Maya for the Asuras in the sky, air, and earth (MW, s.v. triputra). All the buddhas, when enraged, can similarly burn down the Three Spheres (tridhātu or traiḥśati: khams gsum) of saṃsāra with their arrow of insight. Such a comparison is made also in the non-tantric context. See, for example, Udbhāsatisṭhāvīrīn's Viśeṣastava 4 (in SCHNEIDER 1993: 52–53; NAGA 1998: 53, 62, 71, n. 5). For the Tibetan text and a German translation of Prajñāvarman’s commentary on the verse, see SCHNEIDER 1993: 88–89. See also id. 1995.

Tattvasamgrahasyāra (T, fol. 319b2; D, fol. 17b3): e ma'o bdag ni sangs rgyas rnams || thugs rje can gyi thabs chen te || zhi yang sms can don du ni || ma rungs par ni ston par 'gyur ||.
may well have been influenced by the theory of Indian dramaturgical aesthetics (rāsa: nyams).

The Tatvasamgrahasūtra states that buddhas assume the form of a woman for the benefit of aspirants.151 Such an idea is not foreign to the non-tantric Mahāyāna systems either. For example, in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra, buddhas are said to deliberately manifest as prostitutes in order to lead men with the hook of passion (rāgānkuṣa: ’dod chags kyi lcags kyu) to the gnosis of a buddha.152 One may wonder how the semio logical bodhicitta manifesting as male and female deities in union came into being? There are ample references where the efficient strategy (upāya: thabs) and discriminating insight (prajñā: shes rab) have been allegorically designated as respectively ‘father’ and ‘mother’—for example, in the Drumakinnarājaparipṛccāsūtra.153 Similarly, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra states that prajñāpāramitā is the mother of the bodhisattvas and upāyakauśalya their father, and that the buddhas are born from them.154 The same kinship metaphor can be found in the Gandavyūhasūtra.155 According to Ratnakarasānti, some scholars considered upāya and karunā, again equated with father and mother, to be the progenitors of the Three Jewels.156 In the so-called ‘subsequent tantra’ of the Buddhāsāmyogatāntra too, prajñāpāramitā and upāyakauśalya are referred to as mother and father.157 Kamalaśīla cites the Paramādīyatāntra where prajñāpāramitā is designated as mother and upāyakauśalya as father.158 In the dGongs

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151 Tatvasamgrahasūtra (T, fol. 342b5–6; D, fol. 35b5):
   e ma’o gang phyir byang chub sems ||
   sems can kun la phan ’zhed pa ||
   ’dul ba’i dbang gis dpa’ bo gang ||

152 Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra 7.32 (p. 82.13–14):
   sāmcintya ganikā bhonti pumsam ākāsaṇāya te |
   rāgānkuṣena lobhervas buddhājñāne sthapenti te ||.
   See also STUDY GROUP 2004: 33. Cf. the Śīkṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 326.1–2; VAIDYA, p. 173.19–20), where the verse is cited. For an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 291.

153 Drumakinnarājaparipṛccāsūtra (p. 165.8):
   ma ni shes rab pha ni thabs ||.

154 Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra 7.1 (p. 79.20–21):
   prajñāpāramitā mātā bodhisattvānā mārīṣa |
   pitā copāyakauśalyāṃ yato jāyanti nāvakāh ||.

155 Gandavyūhasūtra (p. 526.2–3): prajñāpāramitā kulaṇḍa bodhisattvānā mātā, upāyakauśalyaṃ pitā…
   See also MARTIN 1987: 191.

156 Ratnakarasānti (P, fol. 280b7–281a1; D, fol. 239b1–3; S, vol. 64, pp. 674.18–675.5).

157 Buddhāsāmyogatāntra-2 (T, fol. 315a6; D, fol. 208a5):
   ma ni shes rab pha rol phyin ||
   pha ni thabs la mkhas pa ste ||.
   See also the mNyam sbyor ‘grel pa (A, fol. 10b4–11a6; B, pp. 468.23–469.17).

158 See the Second Bhāvanākrama (pp. 106.16–107.1): ‘phags pa dpal mchog dang po las kyang | «shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ni ma yin no || thabs la mkhas pa ni pha yin no ||» zhes bka’ stsal to ||. See the ‘Sanskrit restoration’ in NAMDOL 1985, pp. 216.25–217.1: *āryaśṛṣṭhaparamādye ‘pi uktaṃ—upajñāpāramitā tu mātā astī, upāyakauśalyaṃ ca pitā asti ||. The Sanskrit original, however, probably did not have astī. The line has been cited by Tsong-kha-pa in his Lam rim chen mo (fol. 224a2), apparently from the Second Bhāvanākrama (as suggested in LAMRIM TRANSLATION COMMITTEE 2002: 89–90, 262, n. 157). However, as pointed out in NAMDOL 1985: 106, n. 10, it cannot be traced in the Paramādīyatāntra found in the bKa’-’gyur.
pa 'das pa'i mdo, one of the main tantras of the Anuyoga class of the rNying-ma school, Vajrasattva identifies his father as the ‘unfathomable supreme upāya’ and his mother as the ‘inexpressible praṇāṭa’.\(^{159}\)

The Vajrapānyabhisekatantra clearly states that one should not only realise the indivisibility of one’s own body, speech, and mind but also those of the deity, the uniting (sāmyyoga: mnayam par shyor ba) of one’s triad with the deity’s triad being called the mantrin’s meditative absorption. When this happens, all bodily movements and verbal expressions reveal themselves as mudrās and mantras, respectively.\(^{160}\) Under such doctrinal presumptions, the gap between visual, verbal, and visational semeiological bodhicitta is bound to close, with semeiological bodhicitta no longer being seen as mere symbolisation of the other four types of bodhicitta, but rather as their visually, verbally, and visionally expressive dynamism.

(d) Vajrayāna Symbolism and Literalism

In connection with semeiological bodhicitta and the father-mother metaphor mentioned above, a few words may be devoted to an interpretation of Vajrayāna. There is a tendency to approach Vajrayāna by swinging from the one extreme of literalism to the other extreme of symbolism. This is true of both modern and traditional students of tantric Buddhism. The harsh judgement passed on the Buddhist tantras by scholars of the nineteenth century, described by John Newman in his doctoral dissertation,\(^{161}\) seems to have been the result of a too literal interpretation of tantric texts. Nowadays, most modern scholars who orient themselves to the dGe-lugs-pa tantric tradition tend, by contrast, to overemphasise the symbolic interpretation of tantric Buddhism.

Seyfort Ruegg, in discussing the imagery of yab yum (‘male’ and ‘female,’ or ‘father’ and ‘mother’) as a symbol of the union of karunā (or upāya) and praṇāṭa, has pointed out the need to distinguish between ‘an iconic sign and a symbolic or conventional sign’\(^{162}\) and between the ‘form and content’ of the image of the union of yab yum in Vajrayāna Buddhism, saying that a failure to do so inevitably leads “to confusion and to missing the dimensions, philosophical as well as psychological etc., in the culture in which it was created and used.”

\(^{159}\) dGongs pa ‘das pa’i mdo (P, fol. 87a6; D, fol. 92a7):
\[\text{pha ni thabs mchog dpag tu med} \parallel\]
\[\text{ma ni shes rab brjod las ‘das’} \parallel\]
Cf. Klong-chen-pa, Mon ngag mdzod (fol. 44b2):
\[\text{pha yi dam par chos dbyings ‘gyur med tshol} \parallel\]
\[\text{ma yi dam par rang byung ye shes tshol} \parallel\].

\(^{160}\) Vajrapānyabhisekatantra (T, fol. 175a4–b3; D, fol. 117b6–118a3):
\[\text{’jam dpal de la rigs kyi bu’am} \mid \text{rigs kyi bu mo dkyil ‘khor mthong ba} \mid \text{byang chub tu sems bskyed pa} \mid \text{yid snying rje dang ‘dan pa} \mid \text{thabs la mkhas pa} \mid \text{gsang sngaags kyi sgo ge’i tshul bstan pa la mkhas pas} ‘\text{di snyam du ngag ma gtogs par yid med} \mid \text{yid ma gtogs par ngag med} \mid \text{yid ma gtogs par lha'i gerugz sred de} \mid \text{yid nying ngan yin la ngog ngyid yin ’no}’} \parallel\]
\[\text{zhing D lha’i gerugz ngyid kyang yin yin la} \mid \text{ngag ngyid kyang lha’i gerugz yin no snyam du bsam par bya’o}’} \parallel\]
\[\text{de lta’r dad du bya ba med par mos na} \mid \text{sngags pas yid nram par dag pa tshob bo} \parallel\]
\[\text{yid nram par dag pa dang ldan pa de gang gi tsho} \mid \text{nnam pa thams cad du rtug par bdag gi lus dang lha’i gerugz su} \mid \text{bdag gi ngyag dang lha’i ngag tu} \mid \text{bdag gi yid dang lha’i yid du mthungs par mthong ba du’i tsho mnyam par gzhag pa yin no} \parallel\]
\[\text{gang gi tsho kun tu} \mid \text{[du D tshams cad du]} \mid \text{sngags pa mnyam par bzhag [gzhang] gyur pa [na D]} \mid \text{de’i tsho las sogs pa yi [yis T]} \mid \text{mnyam ngyid gnas la zhugs par ‘gyur [gyur T]} \mid \text{mnyam ngyid gnas la gnas pa yi [yin T]} \mid\]
\[\text{yan lag bskyod pa ji snyed dang} \mid \text{lshig tu brjod pa ji snyed pa} \mid \text{de snyed ‘sngags dang’ [gsang sngaags D] phyag rgya yin} \parallel\].

\(^{161}\) See Newman 1987: 29–32.

\(^{162}\) Note that he here employs the terms ‘iconic’ and ‘symbolic’ in a semeiological sense.
While not ruling out the historical possibility that such images were derived from pre-Buddhist or non-Buddhist images, he argues that the interpretation of a ‘symbolic’ yab yum image (which actually stands for a deeper lying ‘content,’ i.e. the syzygy of karunā/upāya and prajñā) as ‘iconic’—as having a sexual referent with a material ‘form’—would be misguided.\(^{163}\) And indeed, by taking literally what is meant to be understood symbolically, we risk distorting the intent of the tantric texts, and this would have undesirable practical implications for the tantric traditions themselves.

While there are certainly some tantric elements which are meant to be understood symbolically, there are plenty of instances where a practice is meant to be taken literally—for example, the consumption of substances which we normally find repulsive. Interpreting such an idea symbolically would again mean distorting the purport of tantric texts. In my view, it is completely legitimate for a tradition to interpret symbolically. Such interpretation, however, should be seen as a pragmatic expedient adopted by a fully ordained monk in order to deal with the problems and risks faced when attempting to combine both tantric and non-tantric practices. The most we can do is to try to find out why a certain tantric text or tradition proposes or prescribes an unusual theory or practice.

8. A Concluding Assessment of the Five Types of Bodhicitta

The five types of bodhicitta are certainly of varying antiquity and may have first been formulated under varying circumstances and milieus. In terms of relative chronology, it is beyond doubt that the idea of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta is the oldest, while the concept of psycho-physiological bodhicitta is very probably the most recent one. The concept of gnoseological bodhicitta is probably older than that of ontological bodhicitta. This is based on the supposition that in the history of Buddhist ideas the formation of the concept of nirvāṇa (or bodhi) as a spiritual event normally precedes that of the concept of nirvāṇa as a metaphysical entity, and not vice versa. In the case of bodhicitta, it can be assumed, then, that gnoseological bodhicitta, which is a spiritual event in the career of a bodhisattva or a buddha, should have surfaced historically prior to ontological bodhicitta, which is considered a metaphysical entity or reality. As for the relative chronology of the idea of semiological bodhicitta, it would be reasonable to assume that the use of a sign or symbol such as a lotus to signify ethico-spiritual bodhicitta could not have preceded the idea of ethico-spiritual bodhicitta itself. Since semiological bodhicitta is the signifier of the other four types, any determination of its relative chronology would depend on the individual signs or symbols that stand for a certain type of bodhicitta.

The proposed relative chronology of these five types of bodhicitta does not mean that the older types are replaced by the more recent ones. The older types are in fact never relinquished as the newer types come into their own. Hence it is important to note that ethico-spiritual bodhicitta, which is the most archaic, remains an indispensable core throughout all phases in the history of the bodhicitta concept. Thus to expound the tantric concept of bodhicitta without taking all five types into consideration would be misleading, for although psycho-physiological bodhicitta is uniquely tantric, the concept of bodhicitta found in tantric Buddhism reflects the entire spectrum of ideas pertaining to bodhicitta.

All five types are set in a Mahāyāna soteriological framework, and are always soteriological in their nature and function. Ethico-spiritual bodhicitta is the resolve to attain the Mahāyāna soteriological goal, namely, Buddhahood, for the benefit of oneself and others. It is through gnoseological bodhicitta, that is, liberating insight, that a buddha or bodhisattva experiences ontological bodhicitta as a spiritual event. Gnoseological bodhicitta is, as it were,

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\(^{163}\) Seyfort Ruegg 1976: 26–27.
the very heart of Mahāyāna soteriology. Psycho-physiological and semeiological bodhicitta can be seen as additional means and resources acquired to increase, enhance, facilitate, and accelerate the soteriological process, and hence the designation supra-bodhicitta (*adhibodhicitta: lhag pa'i byang chub kyi sens) seems to be quite apt. Of the five types, it is also clear that ontological bodhicitta is seen as providing the space where the crucial event of Mahāyāna soteriology takes place. Although ontological bodhicitta is independent of the other four types of bodhicitta, it is of utmost soteriological relevance and value, for it is only by penetrating through to it by means of meditative insight that one becomes a buddha. The generation or revelation of gnoseological bodhicitta is the objective of ethico-spiritual, psycho-physiological, and semeiological forms of bodhicitta. There is a striking parallelism between ethico-spiritual and psycho-physiological bodhicitta, with primarily psychical elements being employed to generate gnoseological bodhicitta in the former case, and psycho-physiological elements being skillfully directed towards the same end in the latter. Furthermore, it is philosophically interesting that, according to certain strands of thought, the boundary between ontological and gnoseological bodhicitta seems to evaporate, with gnoseological bodhicitta coming to enjoy an ontological status, in which case it could rather be described as onto-gnoseological. Likewise, if psycho-physiological bodhicitta is understood in the sense of a type of gnosis characterised by great bliss (*mahāsukhaññāna: bde ba chen po'i ye shes), it in turn may be seen as special kind of gnoseological bodhicitta. Within certain Buddhist traditions that presuppose the revelation model of soteriology, there seems to be a tendency to attribute an ontological status not only to gnoseological bodhicitta but also to ethico-spiritual and psycho-physiological bodhicitta, thereby leading to the notion of what one might call primordial bodhicitta, a universal basis for both samsāra and nirvāṇa. In short, one could say that a tantric or non-tantric Mahāyāna aspirant gains direct insight into ontological bodhicitta by means of gnoseological bodhicitta, which has been attained through the practice of ethico-spiritual or psycho-physiological bodhicitta with the assistance of semeiological bodhicitta.
Chapter Eight

Traditional Classifications of Bodhicitta

A perfect *buddha*, a source of benefit and well-being, is born from a Son of the Victorious One; A Son of the Victorious One is born from *bodhicitta*, Which is characterised by compassion and [insight into] emptiness.

~ Sa-skya Pañḍita Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan (1182–1251), *Thub pa dgongs gsal*¹

1. Introductory Remarks

Indian and Tibetan scholars have classified *bodhicitta* in a number of ways. One of the favourite practices has been to classify *bodhicitta* in an ascending numerical order beginning with one.² This is clearly an attempt to systematise all possible classifications under one umbrella. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to approach the idea of *bodhicitta* by considering the numerous ways of classifying it.

2. Bodhicitta as a Fusion of Śūnyatā/Prajñā and Karuṇā/Upāya

*Bodhicitta* is often perceived as a single entity, namely, a synthesis or fusion of śūnyatā (‘emptiness’) and karuṇā (‘compassion’) or of prajñā (‘discerning insight’) and upāya (‘efficient strategy’) — a perception that is prevalent in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism. Often, too, śūnyatā is equated with prajñā, and upāya with karuṇā, as in Kāṇha’s *Yogaratnamālā*.³ The term śūnyatā in such a context does not seem to refer to śūnyatā per se

¹ *Thub pa dgongs gsal* (p. 3.1):
   
   `phan bde’i ’byung gnas rdzogs pa yi ||
   sargs rgyas rgyal ba’i sras las ’khrungs ||
   rgyal sras stong nyid snying rje yi ||
   bdag nyid byang chub sms la’ ’khrungs ||.`

² Such a practice can be witnessed, for example, in the *Yogācārabhūmi* (pp. 62.9ff.).

³ *Yogaratnamālā* (p. 117.13–14): *sarvadharmaśūnyatā prajñā, upāyo mahākaruṇā*.
but rather to prajñā, which cognises sūnyatā. The idea of the fusion of sūnyatā/prajñā and karunā/upāya may differ from system to system, but for all systems it always seems to mean a certain type of bodhicitta. In the following few paragraphs, we shall consider the key expressions, such as sūnyatākarunāgarbha and sūnyatākarunābhinna, and finally also the role of prajñā and karunā as conceived in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna Buddhism.

(a) The Term Śūnyatākarunāgarbha

When bodhicitta is classified as one, it is equated with the union or synthesis of insight (prajñā: shes rab) and either compassion (karunā: snying rje) or efficient strategies (upāya: thabs), a union often expressed by the key term śūnyatākarunāgarbha. We may begin by examining some of the non-tantric and tantric sources where this expression occurs. Perhaps one of the earliest popular sources in which the expression śūnyatākarunāgarbha occurs is Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī:4

[To some he teaches Dharma] not based on duality;
To some [he teaches] a profound [Dharma] terrifying to the fearful;
To others the means of awakening that has emptiness and compassion as its essence.5

Śāntideva employs the expression in two of the verses (kārikā) of his Śikṣāsamuccaya:6

Know that the purity of prosperity
Is [brought about] by purifying right livelihood;
The purification of beneficial resources is [brought about] by a course of action (or manner of life)
That has [the cognition of] emptiness and compassion as [its] essence.

The next verse of the Śikṣāsamuccaya that contains the expression śūnyatākarunāgarbha is as follows:7

What [can bring about] the increase of one’s welfare?
An increase of vigour and non-lassitude [can].
The increase of prosperity is caused by an act of giving
That has [the cognition of] emptiness and compassion as [its] essence.

Śāntideva’s employment of the expression in these two verses suggests that the bodhisattva’s ethico-spiritual practices are always necessarily accompanied by conative, cognitive, and emotive factors. The conative vigour will lend him impetus, the cognitive knowledge of

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4 Ratnāvalī 4.96:
   tvayāniśrītaṃ ekeśāṃ gambhīram bhūrabhiṣanam |
   śūnyatākarunāgarbham ekeśāṃ bodhisādhanaṃ ||. 5 kesāṃ LINDTNER 1997: 329.
   Cf. ibid. 3.98, 4.78, 5.37b–d.

5 The English translation is according to LINDTNER 1997: 329. Cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 2000b: 445, n. 54: śūnyatākarunāgarbham ... bodhisādhanaṃ “[der Weg.] mittels dessen man das Erwachen (d.h. die Buddha schaft) erreicht, Leerheit und Mitleid umfasst.” See also Gyal-tshab-rje’s slying po’i don gsal (pp. 276.10–277.3).

6 Śikṣāsamuccayakārikā 21 (BENDALL, p. xlv):
   bhogasuddhiṃ ca jñāṇāt samyagājñāvasodhānāt |
   śūnyatākarunāgarbhahaceśitūt punyāsodhanaṃ ||.

   The first two pādas are cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 262.11; VAI DY, p. 143.3), and the last two pādas in ibid. (BENDALL, p. 270.8; VAI DY, p. 144.9). Cf. the English translation in BENDALL (p. xlv) and BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 245, 247.

7 Śikṣāsamuccayakārikā 23 (BENDALL, p. xlvii):
   ātmabhāvasya kā vṛddhīr balānālaya vardhanaṃ |
   śūnyatākarunāgarbhad dānād bhogasya vardhanaṃ ||.

   The first two pādas are cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 273.16; VAI DY, p. 146.5), and the last two pādas in ibid. (BENDALL, p. 275.10; VAI DY, p. 146.25). Cf. the English translation in BENDALL, p. xlvii, and BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 251–253.
śūnyatā will keep him emotionally detached from the whole process of spiritual practices, and the emotive component will help him not to lose sight of his objective. Without the conative component, a bodhisattva would not have the will to carry on with his practices; without the cognitive component, he would risk getting carried away by emotions, such as passion and pride; and without the emotive component of karunā, the very status of a bodhisattva would be called into question. Thus even when a bodhisattva is practising the perfection of giving (dānapāramitā) purely out of karunā, he should view all factors involved in the process, such as the giver, recipient, object, action, and motive, as being empty, as if it were all taking place in a dream. Thus an ethic-spiritual practice of a bodhisattva that unfolds in this way can, according to Sāntideva, be described as being characterised by śūnyatākarunāgārtha.

The expression śūnyatākarunāgārtha occurs in both the First and Third Bhāvanākrama by Kamalasāla. The given context seems to make it quite clear that a bodhisattva, after meditating, should in the post-meditative state exert himself towards a punyasambhāra (‘accumulation of beneficial resources’) that has the combined cognition of śūnyatā and karunā as its garbha (‘essence’). That is to say, even as a bodhisattva practises generosity, he should see to it that his motive is compassion, and all the while make himself aware of the fact that all phenomena are empty and illusory, like a dream. In principle, any ethic-spiritual practice or aspect of a bodhisattva could be said to be characterised by śūnyatākarunāgārtha. It is thus not astonishing to find that bodhicitta is also described as being characterised by śūnyatākarunāgārtha, for example, in Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālaṃkāraloka and in his Ratnaguṇasamacayapañjikā. The idea of śūnyatākarunāgārtha is explained by Dharmamitra in his Prasphutapadā as follows:

The reason for mentioning bodhicitta is the following: It has been mentioned in order to demonstrate that since [the bodhisattva practices], commencing from the beginner’s stage to the buddha’s stage, are never [performed] without bodhicitta, either in [its] causal or resultant form, the pāramitās, such as that of giving, are also endowed with it (i.e. bodhicitta). If [the pāramitās] such as giving were not followed by bodhicitta characterised by śūnyatākarunāgārtha, [they] would not be practices that [lead to] attaining [the desired objectives]. [It is] primarily for this reason that [bodhicitta] has been mentioned.

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8 See the First Bhāvanākrama (p. 221.3–4): tatāḥ śūnyatākarunāgārtha eva sakaladānādipuṣṭa[ñā]ṃ sambhāropārāṇa pravartate ]; Third Bhāvanākrama (p. 13.13–14): tatāḥ śūnyatākarunāgārthabāhunattarasambhāropārāṇa bhaṅgū pravartate [.

9 Abhisamayālaṃkāraloka (p. 24.4): gotrādiṣaṃbhāvyena bodhisattvasaṃvarasamādānādinaśūnyatākarunāgārtham bodhicittam upādya.... See also CONZE 1975: 2; SCHMITHAUSEN 2000b: 445, n. 54. Note that the expression śūnyatākarunāgārtha occurs in the Abhisamayālaṃkāraloka on several occasions (see KEIRA & UEDA 1998: 1057).

10 Ratnaguṇasamacayapañjikā (P, fol. 6b1–3; D, fol. 5a1–2; S, vol. 52, p. 11.18–20): ... rnam pa thams caṅ mkhyen pa nyid thob par ’dod pas | thoṅ mar byang chub kyi sems stong pa nyid dang | snying rje’i snying po can bskyed par bya ba yin pas...; ibid. (P, fol. 7b4; D, fol. 5b7; S, vol. 52, p. 14.1–2): stong pa nyid dang snying rje’i snying po can gyi byang chub kyi sems bskyed de |; ibid. (P, fol. 35b3; D, fol. 29b3–4; S, vol. 52, p. 70.11): ... byang chub kyi sems stong pa nyid dang snying rje’i snying po can...; ibid. (P, fol. 36a1; D, fol. 29b7–30a1; S, vol. 52, p. 71.4): byang chub kyi sems stong pa nyid dang snying rje’i snying po can...; cf. ibid. (P, fol. 45a2; D, fol. 37b1; S, vol. 52, p. 89.11): stong pa nyid kyi rnam pa’i snying po can ye shes kyi rang bzhin....

11 Prasphutapadā (P, fol. 28a6–8; D, fol. 25a2–4; S, vol. 52, pp. 762.17–763.2): byang chub kyi sems smos pa ni las dang po pa’i [po’i PN] sa nas sangs rgyas kyi sa’i bar du rgyu dang ’bras bu’i ngo bshol byang chub kyi sems dang nam yang mi ’bral bas na shpyin pa i phu rol tu phyin pa la sogs pa [add. dag la D; bdag la C] yang de dang ldan par bstan pa’i phyin smos te | stong pa nyid dang snying rje’i snying po can gyi byang chub kyi sems des byin gvis ma bslabs par gnyur na shpyin pa la sogs pa yang bsgrub pa’i [om. PN] spyod pa mi ’gyur ba’i phyin de gtsos bshes smos so ||. 
The idea of bodhicitta as a fusion of praṇā and upāya is reconfirmed in the discussion found in Abhayākaragupta’s Munimatālakāra:12

Regarding bodhicitta, it should be generated [in such a way that it has] praṇā and upāya as [its] very nature. Of these, praṇā is the realisation that all phenomena are devoid of manifoldness (nispraṇāca). As to upāya, [it] is the Venerable Mother (bhagavati), great compassion (mahākaruṇā).

After briefly explaining the three kinds of karuṇā, namely, one that has sentient beings as its object (sattvālambana), one that has phenomena as its object (dharmālambana), and one that has no object (anālambana), Abhayākaragupta goes on to say that the fusion of praṇā and karuṇā is possible only in the meditative state of compasssion without object (anālambana karuṇā), during which praṇā and upāya are meditated upon simultaneously, and that the two are of one nature, any possible distinction between them being made only on the basis of exclusion.13 For Ratnākaraśānti, sūnyatā and karuṇā are the spiritual disposition of the Three Jewels.14 For Tibetan scholars, too, such as Rong-zom-pa, bodhicitta is the union of sūnyatā and karuṇā.15

(b) The Term Śūnyatākaruṇābhinnā

The term śūnyatākaruṇābhinnā seems to be preferred in the tantric sources, although it is virtually semantically identical with śūnyatākaruṇāgarbha. The Guhyasamājatantra and the Hevajra tantra both describe bodhicitta as śūnyatākaruṇābhinnā.16 The Sekoddesaṭṭikā also identifies bodhicitta with śūnyatākaruṇābhinnā.17 Altruistic inclination (adhyaśaya), all but a synonym of bodhicitta, is said to be endowed with the indivisibility of śūnyatā and karuṇā.18

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13 Munimatālakāra (P, fols. 205b8–206a3; D, fol. 162b4–5; S, vol. 63, pp. 1279.18–1280.2): de la dmigs pa med pa'i snying rje sgom pa'i gnas skabs na [thabs dang shes rab dag de'i [di DC] bdag nyid du sgom la snying rje'i cig shos] sgom pa'i gnas skabs na ni ma yin te | de ni dngos po'i rang kzin du dmigs pa' nyid kyi spros pa med pa nyid med pa'i phyir shes rab kyi rang kzin du skye ba med pa'i phyir ro || de'i phyir de'i [om. DC] bdag nyid du' sgom [bsgom PN] pas na lhan cig sgom [bsgom PN] pa kho na ste' shes rab dang thabs kyi tha snyad tha dad pa ni rdog pas [pa DC] byas pa'o' ||. For the notion of objectless compassion, see BSTEH 2000: 477–478. * gloss in PN: sems can la dmigs pa dang chos la dmigs pa; * gloss in PN: dag ni; * gloss in PN: rtogs pa; * gloss in PN: te bdag gcig tu; * gloss in PN: de la; * gloss in PN: zhes so.

14 Ratnālokālakāra (P, fol. 280b5; D, fol. 239a7; S, vol. 64, p. 674.14–15): dkon mchog gsum kyi [gri P] rigs ni stong pa nyid snying rje'o' ||.

15 Ita 'greł (A, fol. 233b2; B, p. 314.2): byang chub kyi [kyi A] sems ni mdor bsdu' na shes rab dang snying rje zung du 'brel ba'o' ||. See also the Theg chan tshul 'jug (A, fol. 77a4–5; B, p. 500.16–17), cited in chapter five, n. 258.


17 Sekoddesaṭṭikā (cited in DASGUPTA 1958: 68. n. 4): śūnyatākaruṇābhinnam bodhicittam yad akaram | tena seka me nātha praśādām kuru sāṃpratam ||.
In the Kālacakra commentary entitled Vimalaprabhā, true gnosis is one in which sūnyatā and karanā are undivided. For the accomplishing of one’s own objective and that of others, there is no gnosis other than the lord of the Three Spheres, [in whom] sūnyatā and karanā are undivided.

Even tantric deities have been identified with sūnyatākarunābhinna. The Sekoddeśaṭīkā associates it with Kālacakra, while according to the Abhisamayamaṇḍari of Śubhākaraṇagupta, Vajrayoginī is conceived of as having the nature of sūnyatā and karanā. Similarly, Vajrasattva also stands for the nonduality of upāya and prajñā. The Yogaratnamālā for its part defines mantra in terms of the non-duality of sūnyatā and karanā. In the tantric context, yoga is primarily defined as the union of upāya and prajñā, as has been made very explicit in the Vimalaprabhā.

(c) The Importance of Upāya and Prajñā

Mahāyāna literature is full of importance to the importance of upāya and prajñā. A few selected passages are presented here to demonstrate the indispensability of the two components of bodhicitta. The role of upāya and prajñā has been accentuated in the Ratnagunāsamsācaya, one of the earliest works of Prajñāpāramitā literature. One well-known statement from the Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra, often cited by Indian authors, runs as follows:

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18 Ratnālokākāśā (P, fol. 267b4; D, fol. 227b5–6; S, vol. 64, p. 646.3–4): stong pa nyid dang snying rje mi phyed pa [om. PN] dang ldan ’pa ni lhag [om. PN] pa’i bsam pa’o ||.


This verse is cited in TSD, s.v. stong nyid snying rje db.yer med pa.

20 See the introductory part of the Vimalaprabhā (vol. 1, p. 8.7–8): karunāsūnyatāmūrtih kālāḥ samvitrīpniḥ | sūnyatā cakram ity uktaṁ kālacakra’dvayo mataḥ ||.


21 Abhisamayamaṇḍari (p. 1.2–3): namo ’stu vajrayogini vai sūnyatākarunātmane | bhīharti mūrtivaiciyaṁ yo jagadbhūvabhvedataḥ ||.

22 According to a citation in the Buddhhasamāyogatikā (P, fol. 350a3–4; D, fol. 312a3; S, vol. 13, p. 1656.1–2): thabs dang shes rab gnyis med pa’i || dpal ldan rdo rje sems dpa’i sugs ||.

23 Yogaratnamālā (p. 109, 14, 15): mantram eva tatvaṁ | mananāt trāṇanāc ca mantrāḥ | sūnyatākarunāvavasvabhāvam bodhicittaṁ ||

24 Vimalaprabhā ad 5.9 (vol. 3, p. 7.8–9; TSD, s.v. rnal ’byor): yogo nopāyakāyena naikayā prajñāyā bhavet | prajñāpāyasamāpattir yoga uktaḥ tathāgataḥ ||.

See also Vimalaprabhā ad 2.97 (vol. 1, p. 222.4–5; TSD, s.v. rnal ’byor ldan pa): yogah sūnyatākarunābhinnaṃ viśuddhatattvaṃ viśuddhacittam | tena uktaḥ iti yogayuktaḥ ||.


26 Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra 4.4.16 (p. 51.20–22): amūpayasamgrhītā prajñā bandhah, upāyasamgrhītā prajñā mokṣah | prajñāyā samgrhīta upāyo bandhanam, prajñāsāṃghīta upāyo mokṣah || Cf. the citation in the First
Prajñā not embraced by upāya is bondage; prajñā embraced by upāya is release. Upāya not embraced by prajñā is bondage; upāya embraced by prajñā is release.

In the Anavataptaṇāgarājaṇiparipchāṣūṭra, it is said that resorting to prajñā devout of upāya and upāya devout of prajñā is a deed of Māra.  

Furthermore, there are two [kinds of deeds typical of Māra]. What are the two? The two are [the acts of resorting to] prajñā devout of upāya and upāya devout of prajñā. Of these, [the act of resorting to] prajñā devout of upāya is as follows: considering [striving after] the unconditioned phenomenon (i.e. probably nirvāṇa) while disregarding [the plight of] all sentient beings. Upāya devout of prajñā is as follows: [employing] the four articles of attracting [sentient beings] (samgrahavastu), being steeped in a view [obsessed with] objective support. These two are the deeds of Māra, and they should be abandoned by a bodhisattva.

The Drumakinnarājaṇiparipchāṣūṭra also professes that a bodhisatta views sentient beings by means of his upāya, recognises them (and other phenomena) to be empty (śūnya) by means of his prajñā, and brings them to maturity by means of his compassion (karunā).

The role of upāya and prajñā has been underscored also in the Gayāskiṣhāṣūṭra. Following the Gaganagaṇaṇaparipchāṣūṭra, a bodhisattva’s abandonment of the intellectual-emotional deficiencies of sentient beings is possible through the gnosia of prajñā (prajñājñāna) and the non-abandonment of sentient beings through the gnosia of upāya (upāyajñāna). The indispensability of prajñā and upāya and the need for a fusion of the two have been emphasised in the Suvikṛantaṇiparipchāṣūṭra and several other sūtras. The Brhatīṣṭa attributed to one Dāmāṣṭrasena states.

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Bhāvanākrama (p. 194.6–11); the Third Bhāvanākrama (p. 22.10–14); Advayavajra’s Kuḍāṣṭirīgāthāana (Study Group 2004: 38). See also the Lam rim chen mo (fol. 223b3–6); LAMRIM TRANSLATION COMMITTEE 2002: 89.

27 Anavataptaṇāgarājaṇiparipchāṣūṭra (T, fol. 257a1–3; D, fol. 228b3–5): gzhan yang gnyis te | gnyis gang zhe na | thabs dang bral ba’i shes rab dang | shes rab dang bral ba’i thabs te gnyis po de dag go || de la thabs dang bral ba’i shes rab ni ‘di lta ste | sms can thams cad la mi lta zhiṅ [bar T] ‘dus ma byes pa’i chos la rtag po’o || shes rab dang bral ba’i thabs ni ‘di lta ste | dmigs par [= pa’i lta bar lhung ba’i bsdu ba’i dngos po bzh’i’o || gnyis po de dag ni bzhud kyi las te | de dag byang chub sms dpa’o yongs su spang bar bya’o ||.

28 For a discussion of the term samgrahavastu, see BHSD, s.v.

29 Cf. the expression upalambhādṛṣṭi, which occurs in the Raṣṭrapalāparipchāṣūṭra (pp. 18.18–19.1; TSD, s.v. dmigs pa lta ba can): upalambhādṛṣṭi raṣṭrapāla [add. pudgalo TSD] bodhisattvena na sevītavayaḥ.

30 Drumatinnaṇāgarājaṇiparipchāṣūṭra (p. 167.13–16):

| shes rab kyis ni stong par rtags ||
| thabs kyis sms can nams la lta ||
| snying rjes yongs su smin par byed ||
| des ni mya ngan ‘das par ‘gro ||.

31 Gayāskiṣhāṣūṭra (T, fols. 103b7–104b1; D, fols. 288b6–289a4). See also the First Bhāvanākrama (Skt. p. 194.11–15): āryagāyaśīrye coktam | advā imau bodhisattvānim samāsptu mārgau | dvāhyām mārgābhāyām samanvāgata bodhisattvā mahāsattvā kṣipram anuttarām samyaksambhodhīṃ yante | kātaman dvau | upāyaḥ ca prajñā ca | iti | (see also Tib. p. 239.4–9). Cf. Tsong-kha-pa’s Lam rim chen mo (fol. 224a1–2); LAMRIM TRANSLATION COMMITTEE 2002: 89. Cf. also Klong-chen-pa, Yi’d bzhiṅ mchod ’grel (vol. wam, fol. 138b5–6): gs grags go [mgo] ri’i mdo las | thabs dang bral ba’i shes rab ni gol sa’o || shes rab dang bral ba’i thabs ni go’o sa’o shes pa dang |. This citation as it stands is, however, not to be found in the Gayāskiṣhāṣūṭra.

32 See also the Gaganagaṇaṇaparipchāṣūṭra cited in the Sūkṣmaṇaṃcayya (BENDALL, p. 271.1–2; VAIĐYA, p. 144.21): prajñājñānena ca sarvasattvavādāparājyāvah | upāyajñānena ca sattvārthaśāyāvah |. Cf. BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 247. In the citation in the gSüng rab rin po che (P, fol. 148a4–5; D, fol. 243b2–3, S, vol. 115, p. 662.10–12: shes rab kyi ye shes kyi ni sems can thams cad kyi nyon mongs pa thams cad yongs su ’dor | thabs kyi ye shes kyi ni sems can thams cad mi gton [btang PN] ba ste |.

33 Suvikṛantaṇiparipchāṣūṭra (T, fol. 409a2–4; D, fol. 133a4–5):
Karunā produces conduct that causes the full maturation of sentient beings. Prajñā produces conduct that causes the full maturation of the qualities of a buddha.

And:36

A bodhisattva, having first performed all activities with karunā, purifies [them] later with his prajñā. Thus [he] accomplishes [what is to be accomplished] by means of karunā; [he] purifies [the same] by means of prajñā. [He] purifies [his] attitude [or altruistic inclination] (āśaya) by means of karunā; [he] purifies [his] actions (prayoga) by means of prajñā. [He] operates by means of karunā while on the conventional level; [he] purifies by means of prajñā while on the absolute level. Karunā is included in the accumulation of beneficial resources (punyasaṃbhāra), for all activities performed [by means of it] are [performed] for the sake of all sentient beings. Prajñā is included in the accumulation of gnosis (jñānaśaṃbhāra), for all activities performed by means of it are performed for the sake of awakening (bodhi).

The Bodhisattvabhūmi makes it clear that without both accumulations a bodhisattva would not become a buddha.37 The two accumulations are, according to Sthiramati, contained in prajñā and karunā, the two essential components of bodhicitta.38 In the Bodhicittavivaranañjīka, the realisation of śūnyatā is said to be for one’s own sake (svārtha), and karunā for the sake of others (parārtha).39 Sthiramati states:40

Bodhisattvas, being endowed with prajñā and karunā, do not fully abandon samsāra, out of karunā; and although [they] abide in samsāra, [they] ensure by means of prajñā that [they] are not tainted with intellectual-emotional defilements. For example, although a lotus grows in mud, thabs dang mi ldan shes rab kyis || ma byung 'byung bar 'gyur ba med ||
shes rab med pa'i thabs kyis ni || mkhas pa rab tu zhi mi 'gyur ||
shes rab dang ni thabs shes pa ||
de gnyis kun tu 'dres 'gyur cing ||
gnyis ka zung du 'jug 'gyur na ||
de ni dam pa rtogs par 'gyur ||.

34 See the Sūtrasamuccaya (pp. 182.15–187.3), where passages from the Vimalakīrtinirdesāsūtra, Māradamanasūtra, and Aṣṭamahinirdeśasūtra dealing with prajñā and upāya are cited.

35 Brhatājīka (P, fols. 46b8–47a1; D, fol. 42b4–5; S, vol. 55, p. 741.12–14): snying rjes ni sams can yongs su smin par byed pa'i spyod pa 'grub po || shes rab kyis ni sangs rgyas kyis chos yongs su smin par byed pa'i spyod pa 'grub po ||.

36 Brhatājīka (P, fols. 47b7–48a2; D, fol. 43b2–4; S, vol. 55, p. 743.10–18): byang chub sams dpal 'ni dang por snying rjes las thams cad byas nas | phyis shes rab kyis yongs su sbyong ngo || de bas na snying rjes ni sgrub par byed do || shes rab kyis ni dag par byed do || snying rjes ni bsam pa dag par byed do || snying rjes ni sbyor ba dag par byed do || snying rjes ni kun rdzob la gnas nas sgrub par byed do || shes rab kyis ni don dam pa la gnas te sbyong [sbyor DC] bar byed do || snying rjes ni las thams cad sams can gyi don du byas pa'i phyir bsod nams kyis tsvogs su bgrang ngo || shes rab kyis ni byang chub kyis don gyi phyir 'byas pas' [om. DC] ye shes kyis tshogs su bgrang ngo ||

37 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.3 (WOGHARA, p. 35.3–5; DUTT, p. 23.23–24): punyajñānata-dananyata-ra-vai-kalyāḥ ayam bodhisattvamuttarām samyaksambhomi nādhigacchet |

38 See n. 162.

39 Bodhicittavivaranañjīka (P, fol. 483a3–4; D, fol. 141b3; S, vol. 18, p. 1143.7–9): nyon mongs pa spangs pa'i rang bzhin can stong pa nyid kyi ye shes rang don no || snying rjes [rje'i P] gzhon sdug bingal las thar bar [par P] byed pa ni gzhon don no ||

40 * (Mahāyāna) sūtrāḷamkārvāṇyākhyā (P, fol. 252d4–6; D, fol. 218a6–b1; S, vol. 72, p. 525.4–8): byang chub sams dpal 'nams ni shes rab dang snying rje dang ldan pas | snying rjes 'khor ba yongs su mi gtong la | shes rab kyis ni 'khor bar gnas kyung 'khor ba'i nyon mongs pa mis ges par byed de | dper na padmo 'dam las skyes kyung 'dam gyi ryes pas mi ges pa bzhin du gnas pas na thabs mkhas pa che'o zhes bya'o ||
[it is] not tainted with mud stains. Because [bodhisattvas] abide [in samsāra] in a similar way, [they are] said to be highly efficient in [carrying out] strategies. According to Candrakīrti, it is only when one’s view of śūnyatā is saturated with karunā that one is bound to become a buddha.  

In the Bodhisattvabhūmi, it is said that a bodhisattva roams around unsullied in samsāra for the sake of sentient beings without giving up his inclination for nirvāna. The Mahāyānasūtraśāstra states that the accumulation of gnosis (jñānasambhāra) enables a bodhisattva to transcend samsāra, while the accumulation of beneficial resources (punyasaṃbhāra) enables him to remain immersed in it without being sullied by intellectual-emotional defilements (klesā). The aim of a bodhisattva is hence to strike a balance, by means of prajñā and karunā, between being a normal sentient being, who is trapped in samsāra, and a śrāvakā, saint, who is trapped in nirvāna. It is only on the basis of upāya and prajñā that unconventional or problematic practices of a bodhisattva—for example, indulging in the five objects of desire—have been justified, in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna sources. Such practices, however, are said to be suitable only for bodhisattvas who are fully ordained monks or nuns. The notion that meditating only on śūnyatā leads one to the śrāvakaniṃbhāra is found also in the tantric context. The concept of the union of upāya and prajñā, too, is reflected in tantric sources, such as the Pañcakrama, and in the yogic hymns. It has also been recognised by Tibetan scholars such as Rong-zom-pa:

One whose prajñā does not generate karunā

Is in a state of [dogmatic] views.

Similarly, Klong-chen-pa states:

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41 Madhyamakāvatāratībhāṣya (p. 79.10–11): stong pa nyid kyi lta ba snying rjes yongs su zin pa ni sangs rgyas nyid ‘dren par byed pa yin gyi gzhan du ni ma yin no zhes snying rje bren par byed do ||.

42 Bodhisattvabhūmi 2.3 (WOGIHARA, p. 315.4–6; DUTT, p. 216.3–5): tattvārthādhyāstāyānāsamskīśāś ca samsāre sattvahetoh samsaramti | avinirmuktanirvānādhyāstāś ca bhavanti |.

43 Mahāyānasūtraśāstra 18.38:

    sambhāro bodhisattvānāṃ punyaiñānaṃayo ‘samah |
    samsāre ‘bhuyadāyāvikāhaḥ anyo ‘samkīśāsamsrītav ||.

44 *(Mahāyāna)*sūtraśāstraśārayāvyākhya (P, vol. tsi, fol. 36b6–7; D, vol. tsi, fol. 31b5; S, vol. 72, p. 77.1–3): shes pas zin pa ni ‘khor bar ma lhung [ltung DC] ba’i phyir so so ‘i [so PN] skye bo bzhin du mi zad do || snying rje chen pos zin pas na nyen thos bzhin du mya ngan las ‘das pa’i dbyings su mi zad de ||.

45 Ratnakūlaśāstra (P, fol. 279a–b 2; D, fol. 238a5–6; S, vol. 64, p. 671.15–21): stong pa nyid dang snying rje ‘i khyad par gyis sangs rgyas dang sms pa’i bsam pa mi phyed pa dang ldan pa ni ‘dod pa lnga spyod du zin kyang | spyod pa rnam par dag pa’i tshul khrims can yin pas bsngags pa ni dbul yang bkur ro zhes bya ste | ji skad du | gal te byang chub sms dp ‘od don yonga spyod kyang || sangs rgyas chos dang ‘phags pa’i dge ‘dun skyabs song ste || sangs rgyas ‘grub bya snyam du kun mskhyen yid byed na || mchas pa tshul khrims pha rol phyin gnas rig [rigs PN] par bya || zhes bstan pa lta bu’o ||.

46 Ratnakūlaśāstra (P, fols. 279b4–5, 279b6–280a3; D, fols. 238b1, 238b2–6; S, vol. 64, pp. 672.7–8, 672.12–673.6).

47 Yogarainamālā (p. 122.35–36): kevalayā śūnyatābhāvanayā kadācic chārvakādinarvāṇena nīrāvīḥ syāt ||.

48 Pañcakrama 5.8.


50 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 272a1; B, p. 388.3):

    snying rje bskyed par mi phyed pa’i ||
    shes rab de yang bla [= lta] gnas nyid ||.
Upāya with prajñā will cause one to be released,
Just as poison charmed by a mantra [causes one to be detoxified].
Upāya without prajñā will cause one to be bound,
Just as medicine that has become poisonous [will cause one to] suffer.

(d) Tension Between the Two Poles of Emptiness and Compassion

A discussion of the tension between the two complementary poles of śūnyatā and karunā is unavoidable when dealing with the idea of bodhicitta, particularly since the primary sources emphatically maintain that bodhicitta is a union of both. This issue, culminating in the need to strike a balance between the two, in both non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism, is a fascinating and complex matter. It has been treated with all due exactitude by Lambert Schmithausen in the two separate articles to which I referred earlier. His first article, entitled “Gleichmut und Mitgefühl: Zu Spiritualität und Heilsziel des älteren Buddhismus,” deals with upeksā (‘spiritual state of equanimity’) and the care and concern for others expressed by the term karunā from the standpoint of early (or non-Mahāyāna) Buddhism, while his second article, entitled “Mitgefühl und Leerheit: Zu Spiritualität und Heilsziel des Mahāyāna,” deals primarily with the tension between the two complementary poles of śūnyatā and karunā in Mahāyāna, a topic of direct relevance to our discussion. It is in order to put the Mahāyāna notion of the two poles of spirituality into historical context that these articles are consulted together.

In the non-Mahāyāna tradition, there is an allusion to the tension between the salvific state characterised by disengagement, on the one hand, and being dedicated to the welfare of others, on the other. A similar tension is said to exist, at least in a latent form, between upeksā, characterised by detachment from the world, and concern for the world. This tension is conceived differently depending on how upeksā and karunā are understood. The tension between the two poles is fully relieved if upeksā is taken in the sense of impartiality. Even in this case, though, the tension is released by balancing the two. This happens, for instance, when upeksā is explained as a neutral acceptance of the fact that an attitude such as karunā has no practical influence on the happiness or misery of a sentient being, since these are dependent on an individual’s own karma; or when it is said that the Buddha teaches all śrāvakas out of compassion but remains unaffected by their positive or negative reactions. The tension becomes acute when upeksā is understood as a state of total release, which is beyond the reach of any form of pain, and karunā as an equally strong emotional grasp of someone else’s pain. From this standpoint, even the Buddha, while capable of actualising both upeksā and karunā in their supreme forms, does not actualise them simultaneously but only successively, given the enormous tension between them. From a Mahāyāna standpoint, too, karunā is not an automatic outcome of the experience of śūnyatā. They represent two poles which, on the one hand, are indispensable for the attainment of Buddhahood, and on the other give rise to tension that needs to be balanced out, yielding a kind of coincidentia oppositorum.

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51 Sems nzig ngl og so (p. 73.4–5):

*shes rab ldan pa thabs kyi sgot ’gyur te ||*
*ji liar dug la sngags kyi btab pa bzhi ||*
*shes rab med na thabs kyi ’chung ’gyur te ||*
*sman nyid na du song bas gdu ’ba bzhi ||.*

52 SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a; 2000b. Unless specified otherwise, the presentation that follows is based on these two articles.

53 See chapter three on the historical and doctrinal background of bodhicitta.
It has often been maintained that karunā is an inevitable outcome of the experience of śūnyatā (or nairatmya ‘non-substantiality’). Schmithausen has shown that in neither non-Mahāyāna nor Mahāyāna contexts, and for neither the Buddha, a bodhisattva, nor a śrāvaka, is the direct experience of śūnyatā (or any experience of awakening) conceived of as entailing an automatic outflow of karunā. This is, of course, not to imply that the experience of śūnyatā can have no such effect. For a śrāvaka, such an experience would destroy the roots of certain egoistic emotions, but not automatically trigger off positive altruistic feelings or impulses. For a bodhisattva, too, such an experience would remove any form of clinging to worldly phenomena and the fear of samsāra. The actual emergence of karunā from the experience of śūnyatā presupposes that karunā has been present or practised for a long period of time, and thus disposed to continue during the experience of śūnyatā as objectless. At least some of the texts that intimate that karunā is a spontaneous outflow of the experience of śūnyatā may be interpreted in this way. It cannot be ruled out that some texts indeed intended to allow karunā as an outcome of the experience of śūnyatā, not, however, exclusively so, for that would contradict the assertion that karunā accompanies the bodhisattva path from the very beginning; rather, the experience of śūnyatā provides karunā with a new and deeper foundation. Such a possibility would unfold only if śūnyatā is not understood in the sense of the nullity or insignificance of appearance but rather, as in the Tathāgatagarbha tradition and some Yogācāra texts, as the true nature (i.e. Buddha Nature) or true self (ātman) of all sentient beings, and thus all sentient beings deserve equal respect and the great benevolence (mahāmaitri) that makes no distinction between oneself and others.

Beside these explanations offered by Schmithausen, there is perhaps also another way to elucidate how karunā may ensue from śūnyatā: positive emotional elements such as karunā and śraddhā (‘faith’) may arise from the experience (or even a correct theoretical understanding) of śūnyatā, not, however, as a direct and automatic reflex of such an experience or conviction, but rather as an indirect result of reflecting on how a person can be released from samsāra by experiencing śūnyatā (or ontological bodhicitta) as a spiritual event, and how others who cannot or do not do so remain bound in samsāra and suffer. In such a case, karunā would arise in view of those who have not realised śūnyatā or those who are indisposed to it; śraddhā, in view of those who have realised or taught the doctrine of śūnyatā. Such an explanation, however, neither implies that śūnyatā is a necessary

54 See Schmithausen’s comments in BSTEH 2000: 475–476, 503–504. Cf. EB, s.v. mysticism: “Mystical experience is flanked with a communication hazard, a ‘polar identity.’ The linguistic liberties and extravagances are part of the logical impossibility of having to describe one order of experience in terms of another. Hence, the rhetoric of mysticism is largely one of symbols and paradoxes. The most striking of the strategies, as the medieval Christian scholar Nicholas of Cusa put it, is coincidentia oppositorum (‘union of opposites’). Since the opposites coincide without ceasing to be themselves, this also becomes an acceptable definition of God, or the nature of the Ground. God, said Heracleitus, is day and night, summer and winter, war and peace, and satiety and hunger—all opposites.” See also HWP, s.v. Coincidentia oppositorum.

55 See SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a: 127, n. 40 and 2000b: 444, n. 48, where a number of proponents of such a stance are mentioned.

56 Such texts include the Bodhicittavivarana ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the Ratnakarandakodghāa by Atiśa, and the Samyutibodhicittabhāvanopadeśavarnasamgraha ascribed to Āśvaghoṣa. For the references and translations of the pertinent verses, see SCHMITHAUSEN 2000b: 449, nn. 69–70.

57 Perhaps the ontological status of karunā as proposed in rDzogs-chen literature can be explained in a similar manner.

58 This explanation is inspired by Šāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṁkāra 96–97 (ICHIGŌ 1989: 222–223). The context is made clear in his Madhyamakālaṁkāra-vṛtti (P, fols. 83b8–84a3; D, fols. 834a4–6; S, vol. 62, p. 973.7–14, cited in chapter five, n. 141), where he proposes two possible ways of launching the career of a bodhisattva, namely, one for ‘those who follow the path of reason (or logic)’ (nyāyānusārin) and one for ‘those who follow
ontological condition for the outflow of karunā, nor does it propose that the experience of śūnyatā is a necessary and a direct epistemic cause of the emergence of karunā.

(e) The Union of Emptiness and Compassion: A Tibetan Controversy

There are many points of controversy surrounding śūnyatākarunāgarbha in Tibet, to treat all of which would be beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, as a representative case, I shall present a passage from Klong-chen-pa’s Yid bzhiin mdzod ‘grel, where the union of śūnyatā and karunā is thematised. The discussion occurs in the context of explaining the so-called ‘Three Excellent Ones’ (dam pa gsun), which are said to be implemented in any given bodhisattva practice, namely, excellent cittaṭpāda in the preparatory phase (sbyor ba sems bskyed dam pa), excellent (abiding in the state of) objectlessness or imperceptible (reality) in the main phase (dngos gzhi dmigs med dam pa), and excellent dedicatory transfer (parināmanā) in the concluding phase (mjug bsngo ba dam pa).\(^5\) Klong-chen-pa states:\(^6\)

In this [context], upāya [or] karunā, which is present at the time any wholesome deeds whatsoever are perfomed, and prajñā [or] śūnyatā operate in union [or unite] simultaneously, and hence there is no temporal distinction [between the two]. Some maintain that it is on the occasion of meditating upon reality (dharmaṭā) that karunā of the preparatory phase and [śūnyatā or dharmaṭā of] the main phase [of meditation] unite. This is simply a misunderstanding. Maintaining the union of a past non-entity and a present entity is laughable. [I] maintain that the mental entity (blo rdzas) that has attained cittaṭpāda and not disintegrated is karunā, [while its] essence [or nature], which is nowhere to be attested, is śūnyatā. These two, which are one [in being] mental entities and separate [in being] facets [of the larger union], unite. Because imperceptible [reality], which is śūnyatā, and karunā, which is objectless, are of one taste (ekarasa), they are called a ‘union without separate natures.’ This is a crucial point. It should be added that in general, for Klong-chen-pa (and perhaps for all Tibetan Buddhist scholars), it is śūnyatākarunāgarbha that distinguishes Mahāyāna from non-Mahāyāna.

(f) Three Positions on the Fusion of Śūnyatā/Prajñā and Karunā/Upāya

In sum, there seems to be at least three more or less varying understandings of the fusion of śūnyatā/prajñā and karunā/upāya in common Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhism. The first position is that the prajñā present in the meditative state and the karunā present in the pre-meditative (or post-meditative) state should be merged. This seems to be proposed by Kamalaśīla in his First and Third Bhāvanākrama. This position has been rejected by some

the path of faith’ (śraddhānusārin). In the case of the former, karunā arises only after the correct view of śūnyatā has been gained. However, the decisive word skye (‘arise’) as found in Madhyamakālaṃkāra 96d (i.e. snying rje nyid ni rab tu skye ||) has bskyed (‘generate’) as a varia lectio. In the occurrence of the verse in the Madhyamakālaṃkārayyttī (P, fol. 82b6; D, fol. 82a6; S, vol. 62, p. 971.3), P and N have bskyed. But equally importantly, Santarakaśita’s commentary (ibid., P, fol. 83a1; D, fol. 82a7; S, vol. 62, p. 971.9) has skye, and this, in my view, is also supported by the fact that skye is used in reference to śraddhā (Madhyamakālaṃkāra 97d), which is clearly juxtaposed to karunā.

\(^5\) Yid bzhiin mdzod (fol. 33b1–2). Cf. the Ratnālokālaṃkāra (P, fol. 354a4; D, fol. 304a6; S, vol. 64, p. 838.4–6), where a similar convention is used: sbyor ba snying rje dang ldan pa dang | dngos gzhi pha rol tu phyin pa drag gis zin pa dang | rjes bsngo ba yongs su bsngo ba mi dmigs pa'i rgyas bshad par....

\(^6\) Yid bzhiin mdzod ‘grel (p. 773.1–4): ‘dir thabs snying rje ni dge ba gang byed de'i dus na yod pa de dang | shes rab stong pa nyid nyan mdo du zung du 'jug pas snga phyi med do || kha cig ni chos nyid bsgom dus sbyor ba'i snying rje dang | dngos gzhi'i stong [add. nyid] gzung [='zung] 'jug tu 'dod pa ni | phyogs ma go bar zad de | 'das pa dngos med dang | da lta ba dngos po zung 'jug pa ni bzhad gad kyi gnas so || de yang sems bskyed thob la ma nyams pa'i blo rdzas ni snying rje | ngo bo dang du yang ni dmigs pa ni stong pa | de gnyis blo rdzas ngo bo gcig pa la ldog pa so so ba zung 'jug gam | dmigs med de nyid stong pa yin la | dmigs pa med pa'i snying rfer gyur pa gnyis ro gcig pas ngo bo tha mad med pa'i zung 'jug ces 'dod pa yin no || 'di ni gnad gal po che'o ||.
Tibetan scholars as ridiculous, who argue that a past entity could not possibly fuse with a present entity. In all fairness, this position seems to be merely calling for the combining of the practices associated with the two kinds of accumulations, namely, punyasamabhāra and jñānasamabhāra (corresponding to karunā and prajñā, respectively). Most importantly, no temporal simultaneity is presupposed here. The second position is that a karunā-driven spiritual practice is constantly accompanied by prajñā, which ensures that all factors involved are viewed as śīnya or dream-like so that practitioners do not get carried away by their intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa). The fusion in this case takes place in the post-meditative state, and a strict temporal simultaneity does not seem to be assumed; that is, prajñā and karunā may be actualised alternately or in quick succession but need not simultaneously. Such a position seems to be represented in Śāntideva’s Śīkṣāsamuccaya. According to the third position, the fusion of prajñā and karunā takes place in the meditative state, karunā in this case not being any arbitrary kind of karunā but only the type that has no objective support. Perhaps here a strict temporal simultaneity can be presupposed. This is clearly the position of Abhayākaragupta. Klong-chen-pa’s position in this regard seems to be similar to that of Abhayākaragupta. There may, of course, be many more explanations of the fusion of śīnyatā/prajñā and karunā/upāya.

3. Subclassifying Bodhicitta into Pranidhicitta and Prasthānacitta

One of several ways of classifying bodhicitta is to subdivide it into bodhipranidhicitta and bodhiprasthānacitta. In dealing with this topic, I shall (a) present the locus classicus for the subclassification of bodhicitta into pranidhi and prasthāna, and (b) discuss the possible historical process that may have led to the development of this classification, (c) consider why this classification can be found in some sources and not in others, and (d) analyse the distinction between the two types of bodhicitta and the various interpretations and controversies associated with it.

(a) The Locus Classicus of the Classification

The terms pranidhi and prasthāna employed in the non-Mahāyāna sources are non-technical and thus are of no immediate concern to us here. What primarily concerns us is the use of these terms in the context of the classification of bodhicitta in the sense of bodhipranidhicitta and bodhiprasthānacitta. Thus whenever I speak of pranidhi and prasthāna (or pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta), I mean bodhipranidhicitta and bodhiprasthānacitta, respectively. The locus classicus for this classification is the Bodhicaryāvatāra: This bodhicitta, in short,

Should be known to be of two types:
The resolve to aspire to awakening
And [the resolve to actually] set out towards awakening.

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61 Cf. SEYFORT RUEGG 1981: 82, where pranidhi and prasthāna have been described as the ‘Bodhisattva’s preliminary resolution’ and his ‘realisation’ (of the resolution), respectively, the latter ‘through the perfections on the Bodhisattva’s path proper.’ See also DAYAL 1932: 62.

62 For the terms pranidhi and prasthāna, see PW and MW, s.v. See also BHSD, s.vv. pranidhi and pranidhāna. For the corresponding Pāli terms, see PED, s.vv. panidhāna and panidhi.

63 Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.15:

tad bodhicitattam dvividham vijnātavyyam samāsataḥ |
bodhiprannidhicitav ca bodhiprasthānam eva ca ||.

Chapter Eight: Traditional Classifications of Bodhicitta

An almost identical expression is found in the Śiksāsamuccaya. Bodhicitta is of two kinds: the resolve to aspire to awakening and the resolve to set out towards awakening.

Such a classification of bodhicitta was perhaps inspired by the following statement of the Gandavyūhasūtra, also cited by Sāntideva:

O son of a noble family, sentient beings who aspire to the highest perfect awakening are rare in the world of sentient beings. Even rarer than they are those sentient beings who have set out towards the highest perfect awakening.

Although the subclassification of bodhicitta is not found in the context in which the idea here occurs, nor is the technical term bodhicitta used, the passage seems to presuppose the two stages of aspiration and setting out. This passage has been cited, perhaps following Sāntideva, by a number of later Indian authors. The fact that Sāntideva used this classification does not mean that he did not know other classifications. Faced with the expression ‘in short’ (samāsatab), Prajñākaramati explains that the given one is an abbreviated classification and that other fuller ones are possible as well.

It is quite conceivable that the popularity of Sāntideva’s works, which seemed to have served as sources for many Indian scholars who wrote or commented on bodhicitta, promoted the wider acceptance and standardisation of these terms. I have not yet been able to locate any source that predates Sāntideva and which explicitly subclassifies bodhicitta into pranidhācitta and prasthānacitta. However, although Sāntideva’s influence was great, he was perhaps not the only one who adopted this classification. Jñānagarbha—who with all probability also flourished in the first half of the eighth century and who was a pupil of Śrīgupta and a teacher of Sāntarakṣita—apparently used the same classification in his Yogabhāvanāmarga.

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66 The passage from the Gandavyūhasūtra is often cited as the scriptural source for the subclassification of bodhicitta into pranidhi and prasthāna; for examples, see Sāntideva’s Śiksāsamuccaya, Prajñākaramati’s Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (p. 12.1–2), Kamalaśīla’s First Bhāvanākrama (pp. 192.19–193.1), Atiśa’s Bodhimārgaprādipapanjikā (P, fol. 297a1–2; D, fol. 257b3–4; S, vol. 64, p. 1690.7–10; SHERBURNE 2000: 104–105), and Abhayākaraṇa’s Munimatałamkara (P, folks. 204b8–205a2; D, fol. 162a3–3; S, vol. 63, p. 1278.3–8).

67 Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (p. 11.22–23): “Although other types [of classification] are possible, this one is stated by way of an epitome [of those comprising] two categories” (aparaprakārāsambhave ’pi samksepatah idam dvividham ucyate ||).

68 See, for examples, the First Bhāvanākrama (p. 192.17–19): tac ca bodhicittam dvividham pranidhicittam prasthānacittam ca ||; Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (p. 11.23–24): bodhipramidhicittam ity ekam bodhiprasthānām ity dvitiyam ||; Bodhimārgaprādipapanjikā (P, fol. 297a2–5; D, fol. 257b4–6; S, vol. 64, p. 1690.10–18; SHERBURNE 2000: 104–105).


70 Yogabhāvanāmarga (P, fol. 5a7–8; D, fol. 4b6–7; S, vol. 64, p. 12.6–10): de’i phyir rang gi sms steng pa nyid kyi nga bo nyid yin pa de bzhin du | chos thams cad kyang de lta bu yin na ji litar de sgom du btang ba’i smon pa’i byang chub kyi sms don dam pa’i nga bo nyid la spyd pa’i mshan nyid shes rab dang mtsunks par lendar na ti ’jug pa’i sms zhes bya ste | de kho na nges pa la ’jug pa’i thabs yin pa’i phyir ro ||. The exact meaning of the passage is, however, not quite clear.
(b) The Possible Historical Development of the Subclassification

The subclassification of bodhicitta into pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta is obviously a result of systematisation. In other words, we cannot assume that such a subclassification existed from the very beginning. The question is: How did such a subclassification come into existence? The systematised classification gives the impression that there was originally one general concept, bodhicitta, which was later subdivided into pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta. Historically, however, this does not seem to be the case. One may say that bodhicitta originally covered the semantic range of only pranidhicitta, but later on also assumed and synthesised the stage of prasthānacitta. This historical process may become more comprehensible if we recall the role the idea of pranidhi played in the development of the bodhicitta concept.

On the basis of several Mahāyāna sources, it is clear that the relation between āśaya (or adhyāśaya) and prayoga is similar to the relation between pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta. That is to say, āśaya and pranidhi apply to the stage of mental resolve or aspiration, which is originally nothing other than bodhicitta itself, while prayoga and prasthāna refer to the stage of practical application, such as the practice of the six perfections (pāramitā). In other words, āśaya and pranidhi express the theoretical or mental resolve to become a buddha, and prayoga and prasthāna the actual practices essential for attaining the envisioned soteriological goal. Some exegetes may have felt the need to load a single convenient term, namely, bodhicitta, with the semantic weight of both the theoretical resolve and actual practices. Also, on a practical level, the difficulty of maintaining motivation during the actual practices may have given rise to the need to combine āśaya or pranidhi with prayoga or prasthāna under the unified concept of bodhicitta. This process can be seen as a process of crystallisation that made bodhicitta richer in meaning—and made it assume an ever-increasing role until it became the be-all and end-all of Mahāyāna spirituality. The potential multivalence of the compound bodhicitta would not have stood in the way of such a development. The subclassification of bodhicitta into pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta, moreover, must certainly be more archaic than that into conventional and absolute. And if the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra is the scriptural authority for this classification, as tradition would have it, then it may be considered the oldest source.71

(c) The Pervasiveness of the Classification

One of the questions we might ask is: Does the subclassification of bodhicitta into pranidhicitta and prasthānacitta occur in all Mahāyāna sources that undertake to further particularise bodhicitta, and if not, why not? Just as the classification perhaps originated only in a certain textual milieu, so too is it prevalent only in certain groups of texts. (This statement, of course, is not meant to undermine the fact that attempts were made by later exegetes to gather and systematise the various classifications.) The Bodhisattvapitakasūtra, for example, does not explicitly mention the terms bodhipranidhicitta and bodhiprasthānacitta.72 This particular classification is not found in various other texts either, such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Mahāyānasūtrasūtrālamkāra.

Tendentiously, texts that represent a more archaic or conservative idea of bodhicitta do not contain this particular classification, because bodhicitta in the conservative Mahāyāna texts primarily means the initial resolve to become a buddha and not the actual practice. The


72 However, Ulrich Pagel states that the Bodhisattvapitakasūtra ‘by implication’ recognises the division of bodhicitta into bodhipranidhicitta and bodhiprasthānacitta (Pagel 1995: 130).
details of the practice of a bodhisattva are usually treated in their case outside the framework of the bodhicitta concept. This seems to be the main reason why such a classification is not found in the Bodhisattvavāhūmi, and the same perhaps applies to the Bodhisattvāpātikasūtra. However, an author could have, for practical reasons, chosen to adopt an alternative classification, even though others were known to him. This may be the case with the Mahāyānasūtraśālaṃkāra.

(d) Distinctions, Interpretations, and Contraversies

The distinction between pranidhicitra and prasthānacitra was a topic of much debate among late Indian scholars and their Tibetan successors, Śāntideva, whom many later scholars followed, illustrated the difference with an analogy:74

Just as the difference between
One who desires to travel and one who is travelling is understood,
So should the difference between the two [kinds of bodhicitta]
Be understood by the wise accordingly.75

For Śāntideva, the theoretical resolve to strive for awakening is pranidhi, and the practical course of action is prasthāna. Explanations of the terms pranidhicitra and prasthānacitra are also given by Prajñākaramati.76 In any case, the terms provided much room for conflicting interpretations. The following passage by the eleventh-century Indian scholar Ratnākaraśānti offers a remarkable glimpse into the dissent surrounding the issue of pranidhi and prasthāna current in India during his time:77

[1] Bodhicitta is of two kinds: one pranidhicitra and one prasthānacitra. Why is this so? Because [these are] said to be desire for the result and for the cause, [respectively]. How so? Desiring the sublime result is pranidhicitra, whereas striving for the cause of it is prasthānacitra.

[2] Some claim that prasthānacitra is absolute bodhicitta, directed towards emptiness (śūnyatā), whereas pranidhicitra is conventional bodhicitta, with compassion as [its] priority. [3] Some also claim that prasthānacitra is [bodhicitta] which consolidates wholesome [attitudes and actions], whereas pranidhicitra does not. [4] Some claim that pranidhicitra is pure altruistic inclination (āsaya), since it is an aspirational wish (pranidhi), and that prasthānacitra is

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73 The Bodhisattvavāhūmi does subclassify cittotpāda into two kinds, namely, one leading to the goal (naivyānika) and the other not leading to it (ananaivyānika), but it should be noted that the basis for this classification is only the generation of the initial (prathama) resolve to strive for awakening. See the Bodhisattvavāhūmi 1.2 (§2.1.0).

74 Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.16: gantukāmasya ganuṣ ca yathā bhedah pratiṣṭhe |


76 Bodhicaryāvatārāraṇijā (p. 11.24–25): bodhau pranidhiḥ | tad eva cittam tatra v ca cittam | yac cittam pranidhänād uppannah bhavati dharmāpyavṛttvikalat ca | tat pranidhicitra | tayathā—

superior practical application (*prayogā*), since it is the putting into practice [of theoretical aspiration].

Ratnakaraśānti presents four different positions including his own. Although a tone of scepticism can be felt regarding the three other positions, he does not criticise them but places them on the same level with his own position. Ratnakaraśānti’s own position agrees with that of Atiśa, for whom *pranidhi* is a thought which takes the resultant aspects of the perfect awakening as its supporting object and focuses on them, whereas *prasthāna* is a thought which takes aspects of the path as its supporting object and focuses on them.78

The second position paraphrased by Ratnakaraśānti seems to be Buddhāśrījñāna’s, which is mentioned also by Dharmamitra in his *Prasphuta-pādā.*79

According to Ācārya Buddhāśrījñānapādā, all resolutions [to become a buddha] at the stage of an ordinary being (*prthagajana*) are generated in the form of bodhiprānandihicītta. Beginning with the stage (bhūmi) of ‘Utter Joy’ (*pramuditā*), however, [the resolution], which is [now] characterised by gnosis and is in exact concord with dharmadhātu, is explained as bodhiprānandihicītta.

According to this interpretation, *pranidhi* is mundane and conventional, whereas *prasthāna* is supramundane and absolute.

The third position presented by Ratnakaraśānti is apparently that of Dharmamitra. According to the latter’s *Prasphuta-pādā,* bodhiprānandihicītta is generated through ritual, while bodhiprānandihicītta is generated through meditation.80

The [term] *pranidhi* means mere aspiration that has not been fully accepted [but nevertheless formalised] through the bodhicītāt-pādā ritual procedure after accumulating a mass of [beneficial resources (*punya*)]. The [term] *prasthāna,* on the other hand, means the conduct [leading to] attainment included [within the framework of the bodhisattva stages], beginning with the generation of the resolution [to become a buddha]—which has come about by the full acceptance [of the bodhisattva vow] after pleasing one’s spiritual teacher (*kalyānamitra*)—up to [the stage of] the path that is immediately followed [by the actual result] (*ānantarya-mārga*).81

According to this interpretation, *pranidhi* is a mere aspiration that has not definitively assumed the form of a commitment, and so is not accompanied by practical deeds. By contrast, *prasthāna* is seen as involving practical application from the very first generation of resolve onwards.

The initial resolve to become a buddha, which, according to some other positions, may be *pranidhi,* is here considered to be *prasthāna.* According to Śrījñānakirti,82 the first three of

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78 Bodhimārgapradīpapāṇjikā (P, fol. 297a5–7; D, fol. 257b6–7; S, vol. 64, pp. 1690.18–1691.1): "bras bu rdzogs pa'i byang chub yul du byed cing dmigs pa ni smon pa'i sems yin te | ... lam gyi chos yul du byed cing dmigs pa ni 'jug pa'i sems yin te |. See also SHERBURNE 2000: 106–107.

79 Prasphuta-pādā (P, fol. 44b3–4; D, fol. 39a1–2; S, vol. 52, p. 794.10–14): slob dpon dpal sangs rgyas ye shes [add. zhabs DC] kyi zhal snga nas ni | so so'i skye 'bo i sa t' [hos pa'i P, sa pa'i N] sems can thams cad ni smon pa byang chub kyi sems nyid du bskyed [brjod DC] la | sa rab tu dga' ba nas brsams te [add. ni DC] ye shes kyi khyad par chos kyi byints gi lta ba bzhin la 'jug pa ni [om. DC] byang chub kyi sems so zhes bstan te ||.

80 Prasphuta-pādā (P, fol. 44a8–b1; D, fol. 38b5–7; S, vol. 52, p. 794.2–5): smon pa zhes pa ni smon pa tsam ste [te DC] tshogs bsags pas sems [add. de PN] bskyed pa'i cho gas blang ba yang ma byas pa'o || 'jug pa zhes pa ni dge ba'i bshes gnyen mnyes par byas te yang dag par blangs pa las byung ba'i sems bskyed pa nas brsams te | bar chad med pa'i lam gyi bar du gtags pa'i sgrub pa'i spyod pa'o ||.

81 Namely, the diamond-like concentration (*vaṇtrapamāsāmādhi*).

82 Pāramitāyānābāhāvā (P, fol. 79b4; D, fol. 73b1–2; S, vol. 64, p. 212.7–9):

\[ 'dun pa'i gnas skabs sogs [siosogs DC] dbye bas || smon pa'i sems ni rnam pa gsum || 'jug pa zhes ni bya ba'i sems || rnam pa bcu dgu dag tu 'dod ||. \]
twenty-two kinds of cittotpāda are pranidhiccita, whereas the remaining nineteen are prasthānacitta. Dharmamitra also mentions a position according to which the distinction between pranidhiccita and prasthānacitta is made on the basis of the reversibility or irreversibility of the state a bodhisattva has attained. For Tibetan scholars such as Tsong-kha-pa, most of these proponents have not understood the matter properly, having misread the intent of the Gandavyūhasūtra and of Śāntideva.

4. Subclassifying Bodhicitta into Conventional and Absolute

The idea of conventional and absolute truths in Buddhism, particularly in the Madhyamaka system—where all phenomena are expressed according to these two modes—is well known. What is perhaps less known is the tendency of Buddhist systematists to extend this twofold classification to very particular areas of thought. For example, even in relatively conservative Buddhist literature such as Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosabhāṣya, abhidharma itself is divided into pāramārthika (‘true’ or ‘pertaining to the absolute’) and sāmketika (‘designatory’ or ‘pertaining to convention or transactions’). In the Samskṛtasamskṛtaviniścaya, each of the Three Jewels is also classified according to the pāramārthika-sāmketika divide. It comes as no surprise, then, that cittotpāda (or bodhicitta) has been similarly subclassified in both Indian and Tibetan traditions. The following sets of terms are used to describe the subclassification of bodhicitta into conventional and absolute:

(a) samādānasaṃketika and dharmatāpratilambhika,
(b) sāmketiṣcittotpāda (or samādānasamākṣetika) and pāramārthikacittotpāda,
(c) sāmvytibodhicitta and

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83 See the Prasphutaṇapāḍā (P, fol. 44b4–7; D, fol. 39a2–5; S, vol. 52, pp. 794.14–795.2), particularly the statement: … phyir mi ldog pa’i sar gnas pa dang | de ma thob pa las smon pa dang ’jug par [pa PN] bzhag ste |

84 See the gSer phreng (p. 197.3–4): de ltar na cho gas blangs ma blangs dang | gzhang yang phyir mi ldog thob ma thob dang ’bras bu dang rgyu la dam bcas la ’dod pa yod de de dag gis ni legs par ma rtags te | sdong po bkod pa’i mdo dang de ’di doggs pa’i grél pa’i shānta de ba’i lugs las phyi rol tu gyur pa’i phyir ro |.

85 We find expressions such as pāramārthikapramāṇa (TSD, s.v. don dam pa); pāramārthikajñāna and saṃvytijñāna (TSD, s.vv. don dam pa’i ye shes and kun rdzob shes pa); pāramārthakāya and saṃvytkāya (TSD, s.v. don dam sku); pāramārthāramāṇa (TSD, s.v. don dam pa’i dge sbyong); and pāramārthikāya (TSD, s.v. don dam pa’i rnal ’byor). See also Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.17 (WOGHARA, p. 260.16–17; DUTT, p. 177.19–20): pāramārthikasamākṣetikajñānapārvamgamah pāramārthikasamākṣetikajñānapārvamgamah…

86 Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (p. 2.5): eṣa tāvata pāramārthika ’bhidharmah | sāmketikas tu…. 

87 Daśabalaśrīmitra, Samskṛtasamskṛtaviniścaya (P, fol. 76b8; D, fol. 168a2; S, vol. 63, p. 441.19–20): de la sangs rgyas gnis ni ’di lta ste | don dam pa pa [om. PN] dang | brdar btags [brtags PN] pa’o ||; ibid. (P, fol. 77a7; D, fol. 168a6–7; S, vol. 63, pp. 442.15–16); chos ni gnis yin te [om. PN] ’di lta ste | don dam pa pa dang | brdar btags [brtags PN] pa’o ||; ibid. (P, fol. 77b1–2; D, fol. 168b1–2; S, vol. 63, p. 443.1–2); dge ’dun la gnis ni ’di lta ste | don dam pa pa dang | brdar btags [brtags PN] pa’o ||.

88 The classification, as we shall see, is attested in several Indian sources, and is not a Tibetan invention, as BRASSARD 2000: 58 suggests to suggest.

89 For the terms samādānasamāketika and dharmatāpratilambhika, see TSD, s.vv. yang dag par blangs pa brda las hyung ba, chos ncid kyi rmed pa, and chos ncid kyis ’thob pa. The negation asāmāketika seems to be used in apposition to dharmatāpratilambhika in the Mahāyānasūtraṁkārabhāṣya (p. 9.19): asāmāketikam dharmatāpratilambhikam…. It is clear that dharmatāpratilambhika in general conveys a meaning opposite to what results from causes and conditions. See, for example, the Bodhisattvabhūmiśākyā (P, fol. 26b5; D, fol. 23a1–2; S, vol. 75, p. 660.14–15): rigs ni chos ncid kyis ’thob pa yin gyi [gys PN] | rgyu dang rkyen gvis mmgon par ’dus byas pa ni ma’yi no ||.
pāramārthikabodhicitta\textsuperscript{91} (or paramārthabodhicitta\textsuperscript{92}), and (d) vaivṛtisamvṛtirūpaka (*vaivṛtirūpaka and *samvṛtirūpaka).\textsuperscript{93}

There may also be other terms used within this classification. I shall, for pragmatic reasons, therefore use ‘conventional’ and ‘absolute’ to refer to the first three pairs of terms. The last pair, however, seems to be applied only in the context of psycho-physiological bodhicitta, and the terms samvṛti and vivṛti should perhaps not be understood as conventional and absolute, as suggested by the Tibetan translation (i.e. kun rdzob and don dam), but rather as ‘closure’ (or ‘concealing’) and ‘exposure’ (or ‘revealing’), respectively,\textsuperscript{94} which seem to make better sense in the context of sexual-yogic practices associated with a skilful manipulation of psycho-physiological bodhicitta. The classification of psycho-physiological bodhicitta into *vaivṛtirūpaka and *samvṛtirūpaka will, however, not be discussed here. Instead the following few paragraphs will be devoted to the subclassification of bodhicitta into absolute and conventional modes in general, and to a few related issues.

(a) Two Strands of the Conventional-Absolute Classification

As already shown, an examination of the conventional-absolute categories of classification seems to indicate that there once existed two strands of the bodhicitta concept: Strand A—represented by texts such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi, Mahāyānasūtrañālamkāra, and Abhisamatālārakā—which conspicuously employs terms such as pāramārthikacittotpāda and sāmketikacittotpāda; and Strand B—represented by the Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka literature—which rather employs terms such as pāramārthikabodhicitta and samvṛtibodhicitta to designate the particular subcategories. These two strands, mentioned in the chapter on the two cittotpāda traditions, correspond, though perhaps not exactly, to what I have referred to as the Maitreyo-Asaṅga and Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna traditions. Although they seem to have conceived the mode of classification differently from the very beginning, in some later texts the two strands may have converged, or the distinctions between them at least became less pronounced.

In general, then, Strand A principally, if not exclusively, used the term cittotpāda, while Strand B preferred the term bodhicitta: Strand A tends to expressions such as samādānasāmketika and dharmatāpratilambhika, samādāna/sāmketikacittotpāda and pāramārthikacittotpāda; Strand B favours samvṛtibodhicitta and pāramārthikabodhicitta (or

\textsuperscript{90} The Mahāyānasūtrañālamkāra itself employs none of the compounds used to designate absolute or conventional bodhicitta. The Mahāyānasūtrañālamkārabhāṣya, however, uses pāramārthikacittotpāda and sāmketikacittotpāda.

\textsuperscript{91} The term pāramārthikabodhicitta is attested, for example, in Vanaratna’s Rahasyadipīkā (p. 63.9–10)—in a longer compound—and in the Yogaratnakāla (p. 111.11).

\textsuperscript{92} The terms samvṛtibodhicitta and paramārthabodhicitta occur in the titles of two works, namely, the Samvṛtibodhicittabhāvanā (P 5307, 5432; D 3911, 4519; S 3140, vol. 64) and the Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanā (P 5308, 5431; D 3912, 4518; S 3141, vol. 64) both of which are attributed to Āśvaghoṣa (SEYFORT RUEGG 1981: 120–121) and are extant only in Tibetan translation. The authenticity of these titles is, of course, doubtful. I have not yet been able to trace the compound paramārthabodhicitta. However, the compound samvṛtibodhicitta is found in Gahyasiddhi 2.12cd (p. 21.5): sāmbhogikānā kāyasukhavabhāvam tad bhavyate samvṛtibodhicittam ||. See also TSD, s.v. kun rdzob byang chub kyi sems.

\textsuperscript{93} The compound vaivṛtisamvṛtirūpaka is used in the Hevajra Tantra as an attribute of bodhicitta. See Hevajra Tantra 2.4.29:

\texttt{mandalacakra\textsubscript{\textdagger}} svādhiśṭānakramena ca |
\texttt{bodhicittam utpādaya vaivṛtisamvṛtirūpaka ||}

See also TSD, s.v. kun rdzob don dam gzugs can; Shing rta rnam dag (p. 60.3).

\textsuperscript{94} MW, s.vv. vivṛti and samvṛti.
paramārthabodhicitta). In due course, as the two strands converged, the terminology of Strand B became the more popular one.

(b) Textual Sources of the Conventional-Absolute Classification

In the following few paragraphs, I shall present some textual sources that reflect the above development, whenever possible chronologically. There are no formal criteria for sorting out the material into either of the two strands. Nonetheless, one can more or less form two distinct groups of textual sources on the basis of their ideas and terminologies. One notices, however, a growing tendency of assimilation of terminologies, especially in the context of explaining the various ideas.

I have not been able to trace any Mahāyāna sūtra that explicitly mentions the classification under discussion.95 The Samdhinirmocanasūtra is sometimes, but mistakenly, given as a scriptural source of this classification by both Tibetan and modern scholars.96 The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra is also given by some traditional Tibetan scholars as a source; I have not been, however, able to locate or verify the relevant verse.97 Nonetheless, we do find some Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Dharmasamgitiśūtra,98 which describe bodhicitta clearly on two levels theoretically interpretable as conventional and absolute bodhicitta.

So far, then, the classification has been found only in the sāstra or commentarial literature. The Bodhisattvabhiṣṭa, which is quite likely one of the earliest pieces of literature that represent Strand A, does not mention such a classification. It does, however, subclassify cittotpāda into two types, namely, one leading to the goal (nairâyäka) and the other not (anairâyäka),99 but this classification should be equated neither with the praniñdi-prasthāna subclassification nor with the conventional-absolute one, for it is explicitly stated that the classification is of initial (prathama) cittotpāda. The fact that the Bodhisattvabhiṣṭa does not subdivide cittotpāda into dharmatāpratilambhika and saṃādānasāmketika does not necessarily mean that this classification postdates the Bodhisattvabhiṣṭa.100 It may have been

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95 One could look into the Avatamsaka, but I have not been able to do so, given time constraints.

96 See the Dwags po thar rgyan (p. 138.7–10). The alleged citation from the Samdhinirmocanasūtra is in fact from Kamalasila’s Second Bhāvanākrama. The wrong attribution of the source of this quotation appears to be a result of confusion. The pertinent passage in the Second Bhāvanākrama is Kamalasila’s own statement and not a citation from the Samdhinirmocanasūtra. However, immediately thereafter, he cites the Samdhinirmocanasūtra to show that absolute bodhicitta is the result of the meditation of calmness and higher insight. The occurrence of the title Samdhinirmocanasūtra in the vicinity must have led sGam-po-pa (or some other secondary source upon whom he relied) astray. See also Guenther’s translation of the Dwags po thar rgyan; WILLIAMS 1989: 203; BRASSARD 2000: 15.

97 See, for example, the Grub mtha’ mdzod (p. 192.2): … mya ngan las ‘das la [= pa] las | kun rdzob don dam dbye ba yis | byang chub sms de rnam gnyis te || ‘sen dha pa’ yi sgra bzhin no || zhes so ||. A somewhat similar verse can be found in Manjusriki’s Vajrayānamūlāpaṭittikā (P. fol. 261a5–6; D, fol. 211a4–6; S, vol. 27, p. 787.5–7): de liar yang | «rang bzhin gzhi mthun byang chub sms || sgra gcig gis ni dangs rnam brjod || kun rdzob la sogs dbye ba yis || ‘sent a pa yi’ [sen ta pa’i P] sgra bzhin no ||». For this term, see MW, s.v. saṁthavā.

98 The passage on bodhicitta is cited in both the Śūrasamucceya (pp. 24.19–25.9) and the Madhyamanakāvāśābhyāsa (pp. 6.13–7.6). However, although the passage seems to be identical, the former quotes it under the title Chos yang dag par sbyod pa’i mdo (Dharmasamgitiśūtra), whereas the latter under the title ‘Phags pa chos kun bgru ba’i mdo.

99 See n. 73.

100 Note, however, the expression samketasaṁvriti within a compound found in Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.4 (WOGIHARA, p. 37.8–9; DUTT, p. 25.5–6).
either overlooked or not discovered during the compilation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, but at any rate it was included during the compilation of the *Vinīśayasamgrahani*, or to be more precise, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi-vinīścaya*. The latter lists and explains ten kinds of *cittotpāda* (to which we shall return). The ten are actually five pairs of *cittotpādas*, the first pair being *dharmatāpratīlambhikā* and *samādānāsāmkṣetikā*. Gunaprabha’s *Bodhisattvabhūmi-vṛtti*, be it noted, does not mention such a classification.

The next relatively early source that draws a distinction between absolute and conventional *cittotpāda* is the *Mahāyānasūțrālāṃkāra*. These are referred to there as the ‘one [obtained] through the suggestion of others’ (*parākhyāna*) and the ‘one which is supreme’ (*parama*).

103 The terms *sāṃkṣetikā* and *pāramārthika* are not employed. The *Mahāyānasūțrālāṃkārabhāṣya* ascribed to Vasubandhu (but probably not by Vasu-bandhu the Kusakara) uses the terms *samādānasāṃkṣetikā* and *pāramārthikā*. In addition, a discussion of absolute and conventional *cittotpāda* or *bodhicitta* can be found in several tantric and non-tantric sources, such as Sthiramati’s *(Mahāyāna)sūțrālāṃkārayāvyākhya*, Sāgaramegha’s *Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhya*, *Āsvabhāva’s* (Mahāyāna)sūțrālāṃkāratikā, Kamalaśīla’s Second *Bhāvanākrama*, Vimalamitra’s (fl. end of the eighth century) *Rim gyis ’jug pa’i sgom don*, Aṭīsa’s *Ratnakaranadoghāṭa*, Anāgavajrapāda’s *Prajñopāyaviniścayasiddhi*, Ratnakarasānti’s *Ratnālokālāṃkāra*, and *Gunavati*.

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101 After the explanation of each of the ten *cittotpādas*, the *Vinīśayasamgrahani* (P, vol. zi, fol. 300b8; D, vol. zhi, fol. 285b7; S, vol. 74, p. 691.8–10) states: “Of the ten *cittotpādas*, how many are defiled ones and how many are not defiled ones? Treatises that carry out [this] and similar analyses have not appeared” (sems bskyled [skyled PN] pa bcu po de dag las du ni nyon mongs pa can yin | du ni nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa dang | ‘de la bu la sogs pa’i rnam par gtan la [pa DC] dbab pa’i gzhung ni mi snang ngo ||).

102 See n. 147.

103 *Mahāyānasūțrālāṃkāra* 4.7–8.


105 *Mahāyānasūțrālāṃkārabhāṣya* (p. 15.6–22): pāramārthika*cittotpāda* sapta ślokaḥ | sūpāśatasambuddhe [...] verses 4.8–14. [...] *Prathamaṇa* ślokenopadesapratipattiyadhyamaviśeṣaiḥ pāramārthikataṃ cittotpādasya darśayati |.


107 *Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhya* (P, fol. 23a4–6; D, fol. 19b5–6; S, vol. 75, pp. 652.16–653.1): brda dang ta snyad kyi tshul [tsal P] gnyis zhes bya ba ni ming du btags pa’i tha snyad kyi byang chub sems dpa’ zhes bya ste | brda las byung ba’i sems bskyed pa’o || bra na med pa yang dag par rdogs pa’i byang chub tu don dam pa zag pa med pa’i sems bskyed pa ni sa dang po rab tu rigogs pa’i dus su’o [so DC] | byang chub sems dpa’i nges pa la yang ’jug par’ guyur ro || de bzhin gshegs pa’i riggs su skyes pa yin no || don dam pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ zhes bya’o ||.

108 See n. 121.


110 *Rim gyis ’jug pa’i sgom don* (P, fol. 400a8–b8; D, fol. 343a2–b1; S, vol. 64, pp. 961.15–962.16).

111 See n. 125.

112 Prajñopāyaviniścayasiddhi 2.29 (p. 72.19–20): nityam prabhāsvaran śuddhān bodhicittaṃ jinālayam |
(c) The Relative Chronology of the Conventional-Absolute Classification

In the face of several uncertainties, establishing the relative chronology of the ideas and terminologies under discussion will prove quite difficult if not impossible. Nonetheless, I shall propose one conceivable relative chronology, keeping in mind the two strands of bodhicitta and the internal and external relationships between the pertinent ideas and categories.

In general, the conventional-absolute classification in Strand A seems to be more archaic and conservative than the corresponding one in Strand B. The Bodhisattvabhūmiścaya, representing Strand A, alludes to the classification by means of terms such as *samādānasāmketika and *dhammatāpratilambhika. The corresponding classification in Strand B, as far as I can see, does not predate or even go back as far as the compilation of the Vīścayasamgrahāṇī. Strand A is seen to be relatively down-to-earth, with hardly any touch of the transcendence characteristic of Strand B. Indeed the conventional-absolute classification in Strand A seems to be more archaic and conservative not only than the corresponding classification in Strand B, but also than the praṇidhi-prasthāna dichotomy, which in my view is a characteristic of Strand B.

Furthermore, the actual concepts of conventional and absolute and the terminologies used to convey them in strands A and B do not seem to be of the same antiquity. The notion of bodhicitta that retrospectively came to be designated as conventional bodhicitta in both strands A and B is certainly older than that of absolute bodhicitta. However, the term ‘absolute bodhicitta’ seems to have been used earlier in both strands, and is thus older than its counterpart. This can be easily explained. As in the case of the praṇidhi-prasthāna dichotomy—concerning which I have tried to show that the concept of and terminology for bodhipratsthanacitta was a later extension of the existing concept of bodhicitta, which primarily meant praṇidhi, thereby resulting in a new pair of categories—the concept of and terminology for absolute bodhicitta can be seen as an extension of the existing concept of bodhicitta, which retrospectively came to be called conventional bodhicitta, no doubt for the
sake of symmetry. In other words, after the development of the later idea and term ‘absolute bodhicitta,’ it became necessary to rename the existing older idea ‘conventional bodhicitta.’

The relative chronology of the concepts of conventional and absolute bodhicitta can also be attempted from a different angle. In which strand is the concept of conventional bodhicitta older? I am inclined to believe that the concept of conventional bodhicitta in Strand A is not only older than the corresponding concept in Strand B, but may even be the original concept. (The use of the term conventional may be confusing, and should be understood as merely a label added retrospectively). In both strands the concept of conventional bodhicitta may ultimately be traceable back to the idea of pranidhi (or pranidhāna), as the first step to becoming a buddha, which is perhaps the primordial meaning of bodhicitta. The next question is: In which strand is the concept of absolute bodhicitta older? Here I propose that the concept of absolute bodhicitta in Strand B is older than the corresponding idea in Strand A. My view is, of course, based on the assumption that the doctrine of emptiness (and perhaps also the attendant notion of the two truths), as given contour in texts such as the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, contributed to the development of the notion of absolute bodhicitta.

(d) Two Different Perceptions of Conventional and Absolute Bodhicitta

How conventional and absolute forms of bodhicitta are perceived in the two strands depends on how the terms ‘conventional’ and ‘absolute’ truths are understood by them. There are, however, more than one two-truth models presupposed in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism; and an assessment of conventional and absolute bodhicitta without considering them would result in a mix-up of categories. The separate ideas of ontological and gnoseological bodhicitta, discussed in chapter six, become relevant here. The question they give rise to is whether, in terms of the conventional-absolute classification, ontological and gnoseological bodhicitta (descriptions of which are found also in traditional sources) should be subsumed under conventional or under absolute bodhicitta? In other words, is the idea of ontological and gnoseological bodhicitta related to the idea of conventional and absolute bodhicitta, and if so, how?

Strand A makes a distinction between conventional and absolute bodhicitta primarily on the basis of the attainment or non-attainment of non-conceptual gnosis. Conventional bodhicitta is cultivated by means such as ritual rather than meditation, and is attributed to a bodhisattva who is still a prthagjana. Absolute bodhicitta, on the other hand, is born of meditation and is attributed to a bodhisattva who has attained the first stage (bhūmi) or beyond; it is identical with what has been referred to as gnoseological bodhicitta. For this strand, only gnosis in which true reality appears as it actually is counts as absolute bodhicitta. Apparently, true reality itself is not designated as bodhicitta. This way of understanding absolute bodhicitta appears to be very prevalent in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism. For example, Candrákīrti in his commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, in discussing about when a person can first be called a bodhisattvā, speaks of the following two kinds of bodhicitta:118

In this context, there are two kinds of bodhicitta.119 The first one is the [bodhicitta of] desire (abhilāśa or abhiprāśa).120 The second one is absolute [bodhicitta]. As to the [bodhicitta of]

118 Catuḥśatakāṭikā (P, fol. 103a8–b2; D, fol. 94b3–5; S, vol. 60, pp. 1157.21–1159.5): ‘tir byang chub ’khyi sems’ [sems dpa’ PN] ni rnam pa gnyis te | gcig ni mngon par ’dod pa’o || gnyis pa ni don dam pa’o || de la mngon par ’dod pa [add. pa PN] ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdolegs pa’i byang chub ’dod pa nas bzang ste | so so’i skye bo’i gnas skabs na yang yod do || don dam pa ni rnam pa bcur ’gyur te | sa rab tu dga’ ba sems bskyed pa dang pa nas [add. sa DC] chos kyi sprin sms bskyed pa bcu pa’i bar ro ||.

119 Note that the reading in P and N is bodhisattva not bodhicitta.
desire, it is existent in the state of an ordinary person, from the time [one] desires the highest perfect awakening. As to the absolute [bodhicitta], it is of ten kinds, beginning with the cittotpāda of the first stage (bhūmi) [of a bodhisattva, called] pramuditā, up to the cittotpāda of the tenth stage, [called] dharmameghā.

Kamalāśīla describes conventional and absolute bodhicitta in his Second Bhāvanākrama as follows:¹²¹

Bodhicitta is of two kinds: a conventional one and an absolute one. Of these, the conventional one is the generation of an initial resolve representing the desire for the highest perfect awakening, after making a commitment out of compassion to rescue all sentient beings, to the effect: “May [I] become a buddha in order to benefit sentient beings.” ... Absolute bodhicitta is supramundane, free from all manifoldness, very luminously clear, a domain of the absolute, immaculate, unwavering [and] unflickering, like the flame of an oil lamp in the absence of wind.

Jayānanda in his Madhyamakāvāratāraṭīkā states:¹²²

In this [context], bodhicitta is of two kinds: conventional (sāmketika) and absolute (pāramārthika). Of these, the conventional kind is the one that is characterised by prajñā and prasthāna [and is found at] the level of an ordinary person. The absolute kind is the one that is attained in virtue of [having realised] the primordial reality of phenomena (dharmatāpratilambhikā).

According to Ratnakaraśānti, bodhicitta is sāmketika as long as sūnyatā is not realised directly, and pāramārthika once it is.¹²³

The position of Strand B is not quite clear, but it seems to be that the identifying trait of bodhicitta, regardless of whether it is that of a bodhisattva who is still an ordinary person or of a saint, is sūnyatākarunāgarbhā. If sūnyatā in this compound is understood in the sense of true reality or freedom from manifoldness, the result would be identical with ontological bodhicitta. On the other hand, if what is referred to as sūnyatā is the insight (prajñā) or gnosis (jñāna) which cognises sūnyatā, it would be gnoseological bodhicitta. Karunā is apparently considered to be conventional bodhicitta. I have not been able to trace a detailed explanation of such a distinction in Indian sources.¹²⁴ Nonetheless, according to Atiśa’s Ratnakarāṇḍodghāṭa, absolute bodhicitta is practised during the meditative state, and

¹²¹ TSD, s.v. mgon par ’dod pa.
¹²² Second Bhāvanākrama (P, fol. 48a2–5; D, fol. 44a2–5; S, vol. 64, pp. 124.16–125.7; cf. NAMDOL 1985, pp. 79.11–80.5): byang chub kyi sems de ni rnam pa gyis te | kun rdzob dang | don dam pa’o || de la kun rdzob pa ni snying rjes sems can mtha’ dag mgon par ’don par dam bcas nas ’gro ba la phan gdags [om. PN] pa’i phyir sangs rgyas su gyur cig snyam du blu na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub [add. tu PN] ’dod pa’i [add. mam pas DC] sems dang po bskyed pa’o || ... don dam pa’i byang chub kyi sems de ni ‘jig rtse las ’das pa spros pa mtha’ dag dang bral ba | shin tu gsal ba | don dam pa’i spyod yul | dri ma med pa | mi g.yo ba | rlung med pa’i mar me’i rgyun lta’ mi g.yo ba’o [g.yos pa’o PN] ||. See also Vimalamitra’s Rin gvis ’jug pa’i sgyom don (P, fol. 400a8–b8; D, fol. 343a2–b1; S, vol. 64, pp. 961.15–962.16).
¹²³ Madhyamakāvāratāraṭīkā (P, fol. 81a8–b1; D, fol. 68a4–5; S, vol. 61, pp. 163.16–19): ’dir byang chub kyi sems ni gyis te | brda las byung ba dang | don dam pa’i ’o || de la brda las byung ba ni so so’i skye bo’i sa’i smon pa dang ’jug pa’i rang bzhin can no || | don dam pa ni dang po’i chos nyid kyi [kyi PN] thob pa’o ||.
¹²⁴ Guhyasamājamanḍalalavīhitīkā (P, fol. 360b4–5; D, fol. 69b1; S, vol. 22, p. 175.3–6): byang chub kyi sems ’di yang ji srid stong pa nyid la thag par mos pos par byed kyi mgon msum du mi byed pa de srid kyi bar du ni brdar btags pa nyid yin la | yang gang gi tshe mgon msum du byed pa de’i tshe ni don dam pa yan par shes par bya’o ||. The only explicit reference to such an explanation is by Rong-zom-pa; see the dKon mchog ’grel (A, folis. 95b6–96a1; B, p. 127.18–20): “The generation of absolute and conventional bodhicitta is considered in terms of freedom from manifoldness and benefiting sentient beings, [respectively]” (don dam pa dang kun rdzob kyi byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa zhes bya ba ni | spros pa [om. B] dang bral ba’i don dang ’gro ba’i don gyi dbang du byas pa’o ||). Cf. also ibid. (A, fol. 95a3–b3; B, pp. 126.24–127.11): da ni kun rdzob byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa bstan par ’dod pa las | ... de bas na chos thams cad ye nas sangs rgyas pa’i don yin pas thams cad dhyer med na’ang de ma rongs pa’i dbang gis ’gro ba lnga’i ris bsam gysis mi khyab par smin pa la | thugs rje chen po skyes so zhes sbyar ro ||.
conventional bodhicitta during the post-meditative state, and in this way the two types of bodhicitta, which is then characterised by śūnyatākarunāgarbha, can be stabilised. Following Atiśa, one could say that a bodhisattva (from the first bhūmi onwards) experiences ontological bodhicitta as a spiritual event by means of gnoseological bodhicitta in the meditative state, while the ethico-spiritual bodhicitta becomes manifest in the post-meditative state.

These two different perceptions of bodhicitta (attributed to strands A and B) have not been discussed in any of the Indian and Tibetan sources that I have consulted. The only exception is perhaps Klong-chen-pa, who seems to have come to a similar conclusion, without, of course, making a distinction between two distinct currents. He states:[126]

Furthermore, [the distinction between] conventional and absolute cittotpāda is made on the basis of two [kinds of] cittotpāda pertaining to ordinary persons (prthagjana) and saints (ārya), [respectively]; or on the basis of two [kinds of objects, namely,] appropriating sentient beings as external [objects] and appropriating [the nature] of mind itself as an internal [object].

(e) Can Absolute Bodhicitta Be Generated Ritually? A Tibetan Controversy

As I have already mentioned in chapter five, one of the issues raised by Sa-pan in connection with bodhicittotpāda rites is whether absolute bodhicitta can be generated by means of a ritual. Ever since, three positions have prevailed in Tibetan Buddhism: one position which rejects the possibility of generating absolute bodhicitta through ritual, a second one that accepts it,[127] and a third one that attempts to harmonise the two opposing standpoints. The group that rejects the possibility of generating absolute bodhicitta through ritual is identified by Kong-sprul as including Sa-pan (and naturally his followers) and the followers of mNga'-ris Pañ-chen (meaning most rNy an-nga-pa).[128] One of the persons Kong-sprul names as accepting the generation of absolute bodhicitta through ritual is 'Bri-gung 'Jig-rten-gsum-mgon (1143–1217).[129] Kong-sprul himself belongs to the third group, which seeks to harmonise the two opposing positions.

Let us now briefly examine the first of the three positions, represented by Sa-pan and mNga'-ris Pañ-chen. Sa-pan made his case in his sDom gsum rab dbye and Thub pa dbang gsal,[130] in the sDom gsum rab dbye, Sa-pan categorically rejects the possibility of generating absolute bodhicitta through ritual. He argues that if it were to be generated through ritual, it would be conventional cittotpāda and not the absolute form. The Buddha did not teach any ritual for the generation of absolute cittotpāda, nor has any wise person performed such a rite.

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[126] Shing rta chen po (pp. 532.6–533.1): de ’ang so so ’i skye bo dang ’phags pa ’i sens bskyed pa gnyis sam | phyi rol sens can la dmigs pa dang | nang sens nyid la dmigs pa gnyis kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa ’i sens bskyed ces bya ste |.


[128] Shes bya mdzod (p. 366.23–27): sa skya pan chen gys | don dam sens bskyed sgom pa ’i s tibs las skye ’i cho gas mi skye | gal te skye na brda byung du ’gyur bas mi ’thad | don dam sens bskyed bya’o zhes gsungs pa yod srid kyang dam bca’ tsam yin gya cho ga ma yin par gsungs pas de dang | mnga’ ris pan chen gvi rje ’brang gnams kyang sens bskyed ’di ni cho ga las mi skye bar bzhex pa ste srol gnyis su ’sonams ngo ||.


Even if someone were to perform such a rite, it would not meet the criteria of a ritual. Sa-paṅ thus describes such practices as mere shadows of the Buddha’s doctrine. The most a farmer can do is provide his field with water, manure, seeds, and so forth, but the sprout, stem, bud, and the rest must arise from the field, not from him. Accordingly, one is able to generate conventional bodhicitta by means of ritual, but not absolute bodhicitta, which must arise naturally as a result of meditation. This position of his, he states, can be found in all sūtras and sāstras, together with logical justification. Even if it is possible, one time in a hundred, to find references to statements such as: “The absolute bodhicitta should be generated,” such statements merely represent a pledge (dam bca’) and not a ritual.\footnote{\textit{sDom} gsum rnam nges (p. 37.1): ‘di ni mkses grub du ma’i legs bshad las || sgriin po’i blo yis phyogs gcig dag tu bkod ||.}

mNga’-ris Paṅ-chen’s view on the issue is expressed in his \textit{sDom} gsum rnam nges, although he provided no arguments. Sa-paṅ’s influence on his position is unmistakable. It may prima facie even seem that he followed Sa-paṅ verbatim. In fact, he makes it explicit in his colophon that he availed himself of the writings of several scholars and accomplished masters.\footnote{\textit{Rig ‘dzin} jug ngogs (p. 129.10–14): gal spang skong phyag brgya pa || don dam pa’i byang chub kyi mchog tu sems bskyed par bya’o zhes gsungs pa ltar mdo las bshad pa srid na’ang || de ‘dra dam bca’ tsam nyid du ‘dod pa yin gi mtsphan nyid pa ni sngar bshad pa ltar tshogs sbyor du zhi lhag gi rnal ’byor yang yang bsgoms pa’i stobs las mthong lam du skyen = skyen ba yin no ||. See the pertinent passage in the \textit{dPang} skong phyag brgya pa (P, fol. 5a3–4); ji ltar na dus gsum gyi sangs rgyas dang | byang chub sems dpa’ ’dngos po [yod pa P] thams cad dang bral ba | ’phung po [dngos po P] dang | khams [sems P] dang | skyen mched kyis ma zin pa’i chos bdag med pa dang mnyam pa | thog ma nas ma skyes pa | stong pa yin di kyi rang bzhin gyis byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa ltar bdag ming ’di zhes sgig bas kyang | dus ’di nas nam byang chub kyi snying po la mchis kyi bar du byang chub tu sems bskyed par bgyi’o ||. Note that the title of this work is spelt in several ways. For more information, see MARTIN 2006, s.v.} Let us, however, take a closer look at the pertinent verse: \footnote{\textit{mKhan-po} Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho, commenting on these statements, identifies the sūtra that professes the ability to generate absolute bodhicitta through ritual as the \textit{dPang} skong phyag brgya pa, and tantras or tantric texts that do so as including the Māyājālanātantra, Vairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra, and Paṅcakrama.}

The attainment of absolute \textit{[bodhi]cittotpāda} by acquiring [it] through ritual

[Accords with] the tantric method; although [something similar] may possibly be taught in sūtras,

It would involve a mere pledge, [so that absolute bodhicitta] could arise [only] by the power of meditation.

mNga’-ris Paṅ-chen seems to deviate from Sa-paṅ in one essential point. He does not reject the notion of generating absolute bodhicitta through ritual per se, but makes a distinction between the sūtra and tantra contexts. Absolute bodhicitta cannot be generated by means of ritual prescribed in the sūtra system, and if a sūtra happens to allude to such an idea, it is to be interpreted as a mere oath to set the stage for it to arise one day through meditative practices. It is, however, according to him, possible to generate absolute bodhicitta through a tantric ritual. mKhan-po Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho, commenting on these statements, identifies the sūtra that professes the ability to generate absolute bodhicitta through ritual as the \textit{dPang} skong phyag brgya pa, and tantras or tantric texts that do so as including the Māyājālanātantra, Vairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra, and Paṅcakrama.
Such a distinction is not made by Sa-paṅ, at least not in his discussion of the issue within the non-tantric context. In other words, for Sa-paṅ the calling up of absolute bodhicitta through ritual is simply impossible, whereas for mNga’-ris Paṅ-chen it is possible, but only by tantric methods. Whether Sa-paṅ would allow such a concession in the tantric context is another matter. Therefore, although mNga’-ris Paṅ-chen formally belongs to the first group, his subtle interpretation seems to have laid the foundation for the third approach, namely, that of harmonisation.

For the second position, which holds the generation of absolute bodhicitta through ritual to be possible, let us now turn to the arguments recorded by Kong-sprul:

As for absolute cittotpāda, the Lord of Doctrine ‘Jig-rten-gsum-mgon and others have, based on authoritative tantra and sūtra scriptures, maintained that [it] arises by [relying on] ritual. If it (i.e. absolute bodhicitta), as taught in tantras, arises by [relying on] ritual, then [the absolute bodhicitta] taught in sūtras must also arise [by relying on ritual], just as [in the case of] the ritual of the prātimokṣa vows. The generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] in an absolute [sense] occurs in the tantric system, and the terminological conventions relating to it are also explicated [there], for the ‘generation of moon-diamond resolve’ (*candrabhairvacittotpāda) is known as the generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] in an absolute [sense].

Objection: [No, such practices] do not deserve the terminological convention relating to it (i.e. the generation of the absolute bodhicitta by relying on ritual), since [they] involve a [mere] semblance of the [actual] path (rnam pa lam byed), and therefore only a likeness (rjes mthun) of [absolute bodhicitta], nothing genuine, [has been caused to] arise.

Response: That would also be true in the case of prasthānacittotpāda and so forth. It was with such [arguments] in mind that [the ritual of generating absolute bodhicitta] was practised [by ‘Jig-rten-gsum-mgon and others]. For example, it is maintained that a mere [initial] (i.e. almost implying false) prātimokṣa vow will become a genuine [prātimokṣa] vow once it is later on permeated by [a genuine sense] of renunciation. In the case of the bodhiśattva vows, too, it is maintained that initially a thought characterised by wholesomeness arises, but [it is only] when [a bodhisattva] actually enters the path of accumulation (sambhāramārga) that the entire mind and the mental factors will assume a votive nature and take on authentic forms of pranidhiḥcittā and prasthānācittā. The case here (i.e. regarding absolute bodhicitta) is similar: the mental continuum—which appropriates non-conceptual gnosis (nirvikalpapāñña) as a mental object by means of ritual—later on directly cognises it, as a result of the ripening of wholesome virtues (kuśalamālā).

The rNyāing-ma scholar Lha-btsun Nam-mkha’-’jigs-med (1597–1650), disregarding mNga’-ris Paṅ-chen’s position completely, simply prescribes the ritual taught in the dPang skong phyag rgya pa’i mdo for the generation of absolute bodhicitta, arguing that it had also been among the practices of Nāgārjuna, as one can see in the collection of Indian texts, important

136 Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 129,7–9): ... cho ga’i sgo nas blangs te thob pa’i tshul sgyu ’phrul dra ba dang | rnam snang mgon byang dang | rim pa lnga pa sogs las bshad pa ni gsang snags kyi legs yin te |.

136 Shes bya mdzod (p. 366,13–23): don dam sms bsyked de nyid chos rje ’jig rten gsum mgon la sogs pa rnam ni rgyud dang mdo i lung la brten te cho gas skye bar bshad de | rgyud las bshad pa de cho gas skye na mdo las bshad pa de rig pa byed stey so thar gyi sdom chog bzhin | snags su don dam du sms bsyked pa yod la de’i tha snyad ma bshad pa’ang yin [= min] te | zla ba rao rje’i sms bsyked la don dam du sms bsyked pa yongs su grags pa’i phyir | de dag rnam pa lam byed kyi phyir rjes mthun tson las dngos mi skye bas de’i thas snyad mi ’thob ce na | jig pa sms bsyked la ang de dang mthun phag phags na dang mdo de | dper na | so thar sdom pa rkyang tson phibs nges ’byung gis zin na sdom pa mthun phags par ’guy bar bshad pa dang | byang sdom yang thog niar sms dge ba’i ngo bo tson skyes pa de tshogs lam dngos la zhung pa na sms sms byung rig giys sdom pa’i ngo bo ’gro bas smon ’jug mthun phags par ’guy bar bshad pa dang | ’dor cho ga’i stobs las rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes blo yul du byas pa’i rgyun phibs dge rtsa smin pas mthun sum du rtsogs pa cha mthun phags pa’o ||. The reading yin, which is also found in the xylograph edition, must be an error. A negation in my view is not only necessary here for semantic reasons, but for syntactic ones as well, owing to the preceding particle ‘ang.

137 That is, the prātimokṣa vows is valid regardless of where the prātimokṣa ritual is taught (be it in a tantric or non-tantric scripture).
for the bKa’-gdams-pa tradition, called the Jo bo’i chos chung. This mild critique is probably directed against the view held by scholars such as Sa-paṅ and mNga’-ris Pan-chen. The case for the generation of absolute bodhicitta was also made by other masters, such as 'Brug-pa Padma-dkar-po and gSer-mdog Pan-chen Shākyā-mchog-Idan (1428–1507), both of whom allude to the Bodhicittavivāram. The difficulty is that only some fragments of the Sanskrit text have survived, while the Tibetan translation seems to have undergone numerous revisions, and the very sentence that concerns the generation of absolute bodhicitta contains some dubious corrections. Kong-sprul harmonises the two positions in the following manner:

These [two] are not contradictory, for the intended meaning is that for the first [position] a semblance [of absolute bodhicitta] can be generated through ritual, and for the second [position], a genuine [absolute bodhicitta] cannot be [so] generated. Thus it is not tenable for followers [of later generations] to decide once and for all that [it] cannot be generated through ritual, given that the logical reasoning and the [scriptural] proof shown for the arising of the gnosis of the fourth empowerment merely by means of words and for the generation of absolute bodhicitta through ritual are similar.

Recapitulating, we may speak of three different positions regarding the generation of absolute bodhicitta through ritual: (a) The first position, put forward by Sa-paṅ, categorically rejects the idea of generating absolute bodhicitta through ritual. Whether it is possible or permissible under certain circumstances is not made explicit. The position which is proposed by mNga’-ris Pan-chen and his followers is less categorical. The proponents of this theory concede that the ritual of generating absolute bodhicitta is possible by employing special tantric methods but not by employing the usual sūtra techniques. (b) According to the second position, proposed by 'Bri-gung 'Jig-rten-gsum-mgon and others including some rNying-ma-pas, absolute bodhicitta can be generated even by following ritual procedures prescribed in the sūtra system. (c) Kong-sprul harmonises these two positions by stating that according to the first one the generation of a semblance of absolute bodhicitta is still possible, and according to the second the generation of genuine absolute bodhicitta is not possible.

5. Leading to the Goal and Not Leading to the Goal

Two twofold subclassifications of cittotpāda are found in the Cittotpādapāṭalā of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, namely, leading to the goal (nairynāṇika) and not leading to the goal (anairynāṇika) alongside a stable (adrṛtha) form and an unstable (adrṛtha) form. These classifications are considered synonymous by Sāgaramegha. He may be right, but I shall nevertheless discuss them separately here. The Cittotpādapāṭalā of the Bodhisattvabhūmi first discusses the characteristics of cittotpāda, and only then the subdivisions (prabheda) of it:

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138 sDom gsum bstan snying (p. 87.2–5): gnyis pa don dam pa'i sems bskyed len pa ni spang skong phyag rgya'i mdo las gsungs shing 'phags pa klu sgrub kis phyag len du sgrig pa jo bo'i chos chung brgya rtsa na yang bzhus pa las | thigh mar sālg bshags de nas bsod nams la rjes su yi rang ba dang lus 'bul sngon dī sang nas | ãngos gzhi skyabs 'gro dang sems bsSkyed | rjes bsod nams bsngo ba rnamgs yang dag pa'i so ngas bya ba ste | pnal cher gyis ma rtogs pa'i khyad chos so ||.


140 Shes bya mdzod (p. 366.26–30): de dag kyang 'gal ba ma yin te snga ma'i rjes mthun tsam cho gas kyang bsSkyed nus pa dang | phyi mas mthshan nyid pa bsSkyed mi nus pa la dgongs pa'o | des na rjes 'brang dag mtha' gcig tu cho gas mi skye bar kha tshon gcod pa ni rigs pa ma yin te | dbus bzhis pa'i ye shes tshig tsam gyis skye ba dang | don dam sems bsSkyed cho gas skye bar bshad pa gnyis rig [= rigs] pa dang sgrub byed mshungs pa'i phyir ro ||.

141 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2. (§2.1.0.). This classification is mentioned briefly in DAYAL 1932: 62.
Moreover, this initial generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] of a bodhisattva is, in short, of two types: leading to the goal and not leading to the goal. Of [these two], [the one] leading to the goal [is cittotpāda that], once having come about, maintains [its] course until completion and does not relapse. By contrast, [the type] not leading to the goal is [cittotpāda] that, once having come about, does not maintain [its] course until completion and in the end relapses.

As I have already mentioned, the twofold classifications occurring in the Cittotpāda-paṭala of the Bodhisattvabhairūmi do not correspond to either the pranidhi-prasthāna or conventional-absolute classifications. The basis of classification is explicitly said to be the initial (prathama) cittotpāda. The fact that the expression ‘in short’ (samāsena) is used here may indicate that the Bodhisattvabhairūmi also knew of other (perhaps more elaborate) classifications.

6. A Stable One and an Unstable One

When summarising the causes of and conditions for the arising of the resolve to become a buddha, the Cittotpāda-paṭala of the Bodhisattvabhairūmi indirectly mentions an additional twofold subclassification of cittotpāda, namely, a stable (drdha) and an unstable (adrḍha) form. It states:142

Amongst [them], on the basis of the four conditions [and the four (pre)requisites relating to a bodhisattva collectively [or] separately, if the resolve [to become a buddha] arises by relying on the two strengths, [namely], personal strength (adhyātmabalā) and the strength of the [pre]requisites (hetubala) collectively, then it (i.e. cittotpāda) arises [in a] stable (drdha), solid (sāra), and unwavering (niścala) [form].143 However, if the resolve [to become a buddha] has come forth by relying on the strength of others and the strength of exertion [in the present life], it should be known as having arisen with an unstable [nature] (adrḍha).

This twofold classification is also found in the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra, where it is considered to be a subdivision of what can be called conventional cittotpāda.144 The Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya explains:145

Furthermore, it should be known that the arising [of the] unstable [resolve to become a buddha] is on account of [having relied on] the strength of a [spiritual] friend. The arising [of the resolve to become a buddha] with a stable [nature] is on account of [having relied on] the strength of causes and so forth.

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142 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§3.1.0.).

143 These terms—drdha, sāra, and niścala—have been explained in the following manner by Sāgaramegha in his Bodhisattvabhūmivākyāya (P, fol. 31b1–5; D, fol. 27b2–4; S, vol. 75, p. 671.11–19): “... [it will] be stable ... because [it cannot be] shaken by [the influence of] a bad companion, solid because there is no regress on account of the dwindling of compassion, [and] unwavering because there is no fear and wavering on account of suffering. Another way [of explaining this] is: Because there is no regress on account of the suffering of samsāra, [it is] stable, because there is no regress on account of injury inflicted by sentient beings, [it is] solid, [and] because there is no regress on account of undergoing hardships, [it is] unwavering (brtan [bstan PN] par 'gyur te | ... mi dge ba'i grogs pos mi g.yo ba'i phyir ro | snying por gyur pa mi snying rje dman par gyur pas ldog pa med pa'i phyir ro | mi g.yo bar gyur pa ni sdug bsngal gvis 'jigs shing g.yo ba med pa'i phyir ro | nra gnangs gzhang yang [om. PN] 'khor ba'i sdug bsngal gvis mi ldog pas na brtan pa'o | sems can gnod pa byed pas ldog par mi 'gyur bas na snying por gyur pa'o | dka' ba spyod pa'i sdug bsngal gvis mi ldog pas na mi g.yo ba 'gyur ro |). Cf. the Bodhisattvabhūmivṛtti (P, fols. 185b5ff.; D, fols. 148a2ff.; S, vol. 75, pp. 405.14ff.).

144 See Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra 4.7cd.

145 Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya (p. 15.5–6): sa punar mitrabalād adṛḍhodayo veditavyah | hetvādibalād adṛḍhodayah |.
Sāgaramegha not only equates stable and unstable cīttotpāda with the nairyaṇika and anairyaṇika form, respectively, but also provides two more pairs of synonyms, namely, definite (ātyantiki) and temporary (anātyantiki) forms and irreversible and reversible ones.\(^{146}\)

7. Twofold Classifications of Cīttotpāda in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī

As I have briefly mentioned earlier, the Bodhisattvabhūmiviniścaya of the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī lists ten types of cīttotpāda:\(^{147}\)


It is clear that the ten types of cīttotpāda are grouped into five distinct pairs. For this reason, they will be discussed here as twofold categories.

(a) Samādānasāmketika and Dharmatāpratilambhika

Let us examine how the first pair of cīttotpāda, samādānasāmketika and dharmatāpratilambhika, is explained in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī itself:\(^{148}\)

The samādānasāmketika is [the cīttotpāda] of all those bodhisattvas who have not yet entered [the path of those] bound for perfection (samyaktvaniyata). The dharmatāpratilambhika is [the cīttotpāda] of all those bodhisattvas who have entered [the path of those] bound for perfection and of those śrāvakas who have changed [their course] towards the [supreme] awakening.

Some Buddhist sources mention three categories (rāśi) of (human) beings, namely, those bent on falsity (mithyātvaniyata), those bound for perfection (samyaktvaniyata), and the undetermined (aniyata).\(^{149}\) Although it is not quite clear whether and, if so, how exactly the three types of bodhisattvas described as the bearers of the two types of cīttotpāda are related to the three groups of sentient beings, it looks as though the following three types of bodhisattvas are presupposed by the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī, if I may use the terminology of the Tibetan exegetes: (1) a bodhisattva whose spiritual disposition is fixed (rīgs nges byang chub sems dpa’), but who is an ordinary person (prthagjana), (2) a bodhisattva whose spiritual disposition is fixed, and who has already become a saint (ārya), and (3) a bodhisattva who has a lesser path behind him (dman lam sngon song gi byang chub sems dpa’), that is, a bodhisattva who was formerly a śrāvaka saint. Both the first and second types of bodhisattva can be placed in the samyaktvaniyata category, and the third type in the aniyata category, but

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\(^{146}\) Bodhisattvabhūmivyākhyā (P, vol. 24a3; D, vol. 20b2–3; S, vol. 75, p. 654.16–18): gتان du ba dang | gتان du ba ma yi nyin pa dang | gبitan pa dang | mi bitian pa dang | phyir mi ldog pa dang | phyir ldog pa zhes bya ba ni de’i rnam grangs so ||


\(^{148}\) Viniścayasamgrahaṇī (P, vol. zi, fol. 300a8–b1; D, vol. zhi, fol. 285a7–b1; S, vol. 74, p. 690.6–10): de la yang dag par blang ba brda las byung ba ni byang chub sems dpa’ [dpa’ N] yang dag pa nyan du skyon med pa la yang [om. PN] ma zhung pa thams cad kyi o || de la chos nyid kyi thob pa ni byang chub sems dpa’ yang dag pa nyan du skyon med pa la zhung pa rnam dang | nyan thos byang chub tu yongs su ’gyur ba pa [om. DC] rnam kyi’o [khy DC] ||

\(^{149}\) See BHSD, s.v. rāśi, where these three groups are explained in detail with several references.
no bodhisattva would be said to belong to the mithyātvaniyata category. Moreover, samādānasāṃketikacittotpāda can be coupled with the first kind of bodhisattva, and dharmanipratilambhikacittotpāda with the second and third kinds. We cannot know for certain if the position of the twofold category of samādānasāṃketika and dharmanipratilambhika in the list has any historical or doctrinal significance. However, it is relatively clear that this pair has prevailed over the other four in later exegeses. It should be noted that this pair also occurs in the Mahāyānasūtra-āṅkāra.

(b) The One That Is Uncertain and the One That Is Certain

The Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇi goes on to explain the second pair of cīṭotpādas.150 The one that is uncertain is [the cīṭotpāda] of those who do not possess the spiritual disposition of [a bodhisattva] and of those who are likely to relapse from [their] cīṭotpāda. Cīṭotpāda that is certain should be understood as its opposite (etadviparyayena).151 Two kinds of persons whose cīṭotpāda is uncertain are defined here. First, there is the person who lacks the spiritual disposition of a bodhisattva and yet makes the resolution to become a buddha. Such a person will not be able to adhere to the resolve and become a buddha, for the spiritual disposition he or she possesses is not compatible with that of a bodhisattva. Second, there is the person who does possess the spiritual disposition of a bodhisattva and resolves to become a buddha, but for whatever reason gives up the idea. This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that such a person can renew the resolution after numerous lifetimes, oblivious of all previous attempts and the abandonment of bodhicitta. It is also conceivable that the intended persons here are those with an undetermined spiritual disposition (aniyatagotraka), including those who give up bodhicitta and rush to enter nirvāṇa (in a conservative sense of the word). The question from which point on cīṭotpāda becomes inevitably certain will be discussed briefly in chapter eleven.

(c) The One That Is Impure and the One That Is Pure

The Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇi explains the third pair of cīṭotpādas in the following manner.152

The one that is impure is the generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] on the part of some without having considered [the matter] clearly (nges par ma brtags) [and] without having considered [it] completely (yongs su ma brtags), but rashly (sāhasa),153 [1] either because they follow others, or [2] for fear of kings, for fear of robbers, for fear of demons (grāha),154 or for

150 Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇi (P, vol. zi, fol. 300b1–2; D, vol. zhi, fol. 285b1–2; S, vol. 74, p. 690.10–12): ma nges pa ni de 'i 'rigs can [om. DC] ma yin pa rnams dang | de 'i rigs can sems bskyed [skyed PN] pa las phyir ldog pa'i chos can rnams kyi gang yin pa'o || sems bskyed [skyed PN] pa nges pa ni de las bzlog pa las rig par bya'o ||

151 Skt. etadviparyayena is according to YOKOYAMA & HIROSAWA 1997: 551.


153 The Tibetan translation clearly takes nges par ma brtags, yongs su ma brtags, and gzu lums su adverbially, that is, as the manner in which such a resolution is made and not as motives for making it. The Chinese translation, however, I have been informed, gives these as the second motive for making an impure resolution.
fear of rivers,\textsuperscript{154} or [3] for the sake of livelihood, for the sake of profit and veneration (lābhāsatkāra), or on account of vain mouthings (lapanā) or hypocrisy (kuhanā).\textsuperscript{155} Such and similar generation of resolve [to become a buddha] should be understood to be completely impure. The one that is pure, on the other hand, should be understood as the opposite of it.

The motives for generating impure resolve may all be divided into three groups (as numbered in the translated passage), namely, the influence of others, fear of various kinds, and worldly concerns or wrong ways of making a living. The context seems to suggest that the category of impure cītotpāda, which is actually merely pseudo-cītotpāda, applies only to the cītotpāda of bodhisattvas who are beginners or people who are no bodhisattvas at all.

(d) The One That Is Weak and the One That Is Strong

The fourth of the cītotpāda pairs is explained thus in the Viniścayasamgrahani:\textsuperscript{157}

The one that is weak is as follows: [It concerns, for example,] bodhisattvas who, after generating resolve [to become a buddha], are overpowered by overt outbursts (paryavasthāna)\textsuperscript{158} of desire (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and disorientation (moha), and who, having fallen from correct practices, engage in wrong practices. The one that is strong should be understood as the opposite of this.

Cītotpāda seems to be dichotomised here on the basis of bodhisattvas who are still ordinary beings and those who have become saints, the divining line usually being the path of seeing (darśanamārga). Weak cītotpāda seems to refer to relative beginners or very inexperienced bodhisattvas who, although endowed with compassion, are still under the strong influence of passion and other intellectual-emotional defilements.

(e) The One That Has Yielded the Ultimate Result and the One That Has Not Yet

The Viniścayasamgrahani explains the fifth pair of cītotpādas as follows:\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{154} Hirakawa 1973, s.v. grāha (chu srin 'dzin khrī); MW, s.v. grāha: “a rapacious animal living in fresh or sea water, any large fish or marine animal.”

\textsuperscript{155} For the various kinds of fear or danger (bhaya), see TSD, s.v. 'jigs pa, where five kinds of bhaya (as found in the Bodhisattvatthūmī) are listed. See also Dharmasamgraha, no. 61.

\textsuperscript{156} For an explanation of the five wrong ways of making a living (mithyājīva), see Ratnāvalī 5.13–15:

- kuhana lābhasatkārahetor indriyasamvarāh
- lapanā lābhasatkārahetos cātupuraskṛiyā
- nāmittikatvam tatprāptyai paradravyaprasāmsanam
- naispeṣkatavām lābhoṃ graham samākṣam parapāṃ sanam
- lābhena lipsā lābhānām pūrvalabhadhprāmsanam

śingheḥ prakopitasānyais tat tayad anuṣṭhitam.

See BHSJ, s.v. mithyājīva, where sources are given. See also the eight worldly concerns (lokadharma) given in TSD, s.v. 'jig rten gyi chos, according to the Bodhisattvatthūmi and Mahāyānatsattī; and in the same connection, Dharmasamgraha, no. 61; Suhrlekha, verse no. 29.


\textsuperscript{158} That is, as opposed to latent tendencies (anusaya) to intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa).

\textsuperscript{159} Viniścayasamgrahani (P, vol. zi, fol. 300b6–8; D, vol. zhi, fol. 285b5–7; S, vol. 74, p. 691.3–8): de la ‘bras bu yongs su ma grub pa ni mos pas spyod pa’i sa nas bzung stey | sa bcu pa’i bar gyi o’i | de la ‘bras bu yongs su sgrub pa la [ni PN] de bzhin gshegs pa’i sa la stey | bcom ldan ‘das kyiṣ nga ni dka’ ba spyod pa de las thar cing |
The one that has not [yet] yielded the [ultimate] result is [the hallmark] of [those bodhisattvas on the stages] beginning from the stage of believing confidence (adhimukticaryābhūmi) [all the way] up to the tenth stage. The one that has yielded the [ultimate] result is [the hallmark] of one at the stage of a tathāgata, for the Bhagavan declares: "I am free from the undergoing of hardships. [I] have also [fulfilled] the proper aspirations [and] attained the excellent awakening." Here we gain a clear sense of how the two different types of cittaotpāda range throughout all the stages of a bodhisattva including the final stage of a buddha. Adhimukticaryābhūmi traditionally comprises both the path of accumulation (sambhāramārga) and the path of preparation (prayogamārga). This fifth category, which is apparently a late one, is relevant to the issue whether there is cittaotpāda at the stage of a buddha—an issue that is quite often addressed by Tibetan exegetes.\(^{160}\) The Viniscayasamgrahanī in any case seems to take for granted that a buddha possesses cittaotpāda. It would, of course, all depend on what one means by a buddha's cittaotpāda or bodhicitta.

8. Undistinguished and Distinguished Cittaotpāda

The Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya explains two further types of cittaotpāda, namely, undistinguished (avīśīṣṭa) and distinguished (viśīṣṭa), apparently interpreting them against the background of pranidhicitta and prasthānacitto, without actually employing these terms.\(^{161}\)

There are two ways of generating the resolve [to become a buddha]: one undistinguished and one distinguished. The undistinguished one [involves repeating the aspirational wish] "Oh, may I be perfectly awakened in the state of the highest perfect awakening." The distinguished one [involves repeating the aspirational wish that runs] from "May [I] perfect the perfection of giving (dānapāramitā)" up to [the wish to perfect] the perfection of insight (prajñāpāramitā). It should be known that the distinguished generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] includes the [six or ten] perfections, for [it] is their cause.

This passage, in my view, exemplifies how one form of classification may be interpreted according to another form of classification.

9. The One Characterised by Karuṇā and the One Characterised by Prajñā

In his *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālaṃkārayākyā (Sthiramati subcategorises bodhicitta into two forms, and explains them as follows:\(^{162}\)

Bodhicitta is of two kinds: one characterised by karuṇā and one characterised by prajñā. Of these [two], the one characterised by karuṇā is a state of mind resting in the thought: "May all sentient beings [attain] nirvāṇa!" It has [the tendency to accumulate] beneficial resources (punya) as its nature. The one characterised by prajñā is a state of mind resting in the thought:

\[\text{bdag nyid kyi yang dag pa'i smon lam dang | hyang chub dam pa [par N] yang thob pa yin no zhes ji skad gsungs pa lta bu' o ||}\]

\(^{160}\) See, for example, the Shing ra chen po (pp. 537.4–538.2); Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel (vol. 2, p. 822.2–4); Grub mtha' mdzod (pp. 193.6–194.2). Cf. dBu ma rgyan 'grel (pp. 347.5–348.5); mDo sde rgyan 'grel (p. 61.2–5).

\(^{161}\) Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (p. 110.3–7): dvividho hi cittaotpādah | avīśīṣṭa viśīṣṭa ca | tatāvīśīṣṭo 'ho vatākham antuttāram samyakṣambodhim abhisambudhyeyeti | viśīṣṭa evam dānapāramitām pariśpraveyaṃ yāvat prajñāpāramitāṃ iti | tad anena viśīṣṭena cittaotpādéna pāramitānam samgraha veditavyah, tāsām kāraṇabhāvāt |.

\(^{162}\) *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālaṃkārayākyā (P, vol. mi, fol. 59a7–b1; D, vol. mi, fol. 53b4–6; S, vol. 71, pp. 1029.21–1030.5): hyang chub kyi sms ni rnam pa gnys te | snying rje'i mtshan nyid dang | shes rab kyi mtshan nyid do || de la snying rje'i mtshan nyid ni [om. PN] sms can thams cad mya ngan las 'da o [zlo PN] snyam [snyim P] du sms pa ste | de ni bsod nams kyi rang bzhin no | shes rab kyi mtshan nyid ni chos thams cad stong pa yin pas sms can gang yang mya ngan las 'das pa med do snyam du sms pa ste | de ni ye shes kyi rang bzhin no ||
“Because all phenomena are empty (śūnya), there is no sentient being who [attains] nirvāṇa.” It has [the tendency to accumulate] gnosis (jñāna) as its nature. What is worth noting here is that the bipolar components of bodhicitta, namely, compassion (karuṇā) and discerning insight (prajñā), are employed to classify it into two types and are clearly associated with the two kinds of accumulations (sambhāra). These two kinds of bodhicitta to a certain extent also resemble the subclassification into conventional and absolute bodhicitta.

10. Ongoing and Non-Ongoing Cittotpāda

Another subclassification of cittotpāda is proposed by Sthiramati in the Kāśyapaparivartatikā, namely, ongoing (‘byung ba) and non-ongoing (mi ‘byung ba).¹⁶³ It should be noted that the classification is only of the initial form of cittotpāda and not of cittotpāda in general. Although the terms used (at least on the basis of the Tibetan translation) are not identical with those used in the Bodhisattvabhūmi in its subclassification of bodhicitta into one leading to the goal (nairṛtyānika) and one not leading to the goal (anairṛyānika), the explanation suggests that this classification has been inspired by it. Ongoing cittotpāda is explained as continuing without interruption after once arising, which is reminiscent of the explanation given in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. No explanation of non-ongoing cittotpāda is provided.¹⁶⁴ There may, of course, be several other ways of classifying bodhicitta or cittotpāda according to a twofold scheme of which I am not aware.

11. A Threefold Classification: King-like, Boatman-like, and Herdsman-like

There is also at least one threefold subclassification of bodhisattvas or cittotpāda, namely, king-like (rgyal po lta bu), boatman-like (mnyan pa lta bu), and herdsman-like (rdzi bo lta bu). Although some sources treat these as categories strictly of bodhisattvas, we shall treat them here as ones of cittotpāda as well, since such a classification of bodhisattva is made exclusively according to the difference in magnanimity of a bodhisattva’s resolve. Traditional Tibetan and modern scholars have often alluded to this classification, but most of them provide no Indian sources. Makransky takes up the issue in the context of the postponement of nirvāṇa, where he refers to the fact that in Tibet the bodhisattva Mañjuśrī is given as an example of herdsman-like bodhicitta, and assumes this to be a native Tibetan notion probably drawn from the Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetragunavyāhāsūtra.¹⁶⁵ His suggestion is based on the fact that this sūtra contains a remnant of an earlier ‘postponement’ model. The three types of cittotpāda, however, cannot be traced in this sūtra. Nor have I been able to identify any Indian or Tibetan scholar prior to Klong-chen-pa who mentions and discusses these three types of cittotpāda. Klong-chen-pa named the Ratnakūtasūtra as his source, but I have not been able to it. Nevertheless, what I have been able to do is to find some precursors of this classification in other Indian sources.

¹⁶³ Kāśyapaparivartatikā (P, fol. 255b4–5; D, fol. 208a7; S, vol. 67, p. 556.8–10): cing po byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa de yang mdor [‘dor PN] bsdu na | ‘byung ba dang | mi ‘byung ba dang | ‘byung ba ni gang skyes nas rgyun mi ‘chad per rjes su ‘jug pa yin pa’o ||.

¹⁶⁴ It is not clear whether the author did not comment on it because it is clear from the context, or whether the line containing the explanation of it was lost in the course of textual transmission.

(a) Some Indian Precursors of the Classification

In the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra, bodhicitta is indeed compared to a pālaka (‘protector’), but there is a certain ambiguity whether the comparison is to a king or herdsman (or rather their attitudes), for pālaka (or pāla) can mean both. The point of the comparison expressed in the sūtra seems to suggest that pālaka is meant as a king, but the Tibetan translators rendered pālaka as rdzi (bo), a herdsman. In any case, such comparisons were obviously meant to show the king’s sense of responsibility towards his subject or the herdsman’s towards his herd; and not necessarily the placing of one’s well-being over others’ or vice versa, which is the crux of the threefold subclassification of cittotpāda (or cittotpādika).

Two out of the three types of cittotpāda (or cittotpādika) seem to be discussed by Ratnākaraśānti in his Ratnālokālaṃkāra in the context of establishing the ultimate result of a bodhisattva. Nevertheless, the exact meaning of the passage is not clear to me. He states:

The result can be sorted into two kinds. [First,] one who has generated king-like resolve is said to be distinguished on account of conduct (caryā) and aspirational wish (pranidhāna). As to conduct, [it is of] the two [kinds] mentioned before. The aspirational wish is as follows:

May the objectives of the aspirants
Become manifest in reliance on me—
In whatever manner
[Required] for them to be fulfilled.

[A bodhisattva] acts for the benefit [of sentient beings] by first (?) becoming awakened and so forth as a result of aspirational wish. [In regard to the second,] the herdsman-like [cittotpādika], who forever abides at the Stage of Youth (kumārabhūmi) (i.e. the eighth bhūmi), [the aspirational wish] is as follows:

So long as there is any sentient being
Somewhere not [yet] released,
May [I] abide [in the eighth bhūmi] for its sake,
Despite [the prospect of] attaining the highest state of awakening.

Although the boatman-like bodhisattva is not mentioned here, the passage does clearly refer to the king-like and herdsman-like bodhisattva, and specifies that the latter is a bodhisattva who decides not to go beyond the eighth bhūmi. Interestingly, a commentary on the Lankāvatārasūtra by a certain Jñānavajra entitled Tathāgatahrdayālamkāra also alludes to three kinds of bodhisattvas, the third type of which, called the icchantika, seems to be

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166 See the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra (pp. 494.1–496.11; also cited in TSD, s.v. rdzi lta bu): bodhicittāṃ hi kulaputra ... pālakabhūtam sarvalokāmpulanatāya |.

167 See, for example, MW, s.vv. pāla and pālaka.

168 Ratnālokālaṃkāra (P, fol. 351a–b3; D, fol. 301b–302a1; S, vol. 64, p. 832.4–12): ‘bras bu rnam par dbyer ba ni rnam pa gnyis te | rgyal po lta bur sems bskyed pa ni spyod pa i smon lam gvis khyad par du gyur pa zhes smos te | spyod pa ni sngar bstan pa gnyis so | smon lam gvis khyad par du gyur pa ni | se lta ci ltar gsal bya yi [ yin DC |] don rnam yongs su rdzogs ‘gyur ba | de lta de lta’i snang ba ang | bdag la brient te [de PN] ‘byung gyur cig || ces dang po smon pa i stobs kyi s ‘shang rgya ba la sogs pas don byed pa o’ || phyugs rdzi lta bu ni rtag tu gzhon nu i sa la gnas pa ni | ‘ci srid sems can ‘ga’ zhih kyang | gang du ma grol de srid du | de phyir bla na med pa yi [yis DC |] ‘byung chub thob kyang gnas gyur cig || ces smon pas na kun tu [du D] bsang po i spyod pa i smon lam mo [me D |]; see also ibid. (P, fol. 284a7; D, fol. 242b1; S, vol. 64, p. 682.8–9): ... mos shing spro ba med ces bya ba ni | phyugs rdzi lta bur sems bskyed pa i phyir ro ||.

169 This and the next citation have not been identified.

170 See the Daśabhūmikasūtra (p. 71.11–14; also cited in TSD, s.v. gzhon nu i sa): iyam bho jinapatra bodhisattvasya aṣṭamijñānabhūmī acalīyac evyate ‘samabhāryatvāt ... kumārabhūmīyā ity evyate anavadyatvāt |.

171 Described in the colophon as a rgya’i mkhan po (‘Chinese preceptor (upādhyāya)’).
identical with the herdsman-like bodhisattva. The notion of a bodhisattva giving priority to the Buddhahood of others can be found in the DharmasamgitiSutra cited by Sàntideva.

(b) Assessments by Some Tibetan Scholars

These categories must have been quite important for Klong-chen-pa, for he included them in both the basic verse text of his Sems nyid ngal gso and the autocommentary in prose. The actual context, however, is a discussion about the three kinds of bodhisattvas, and not about cittotpàda. Let us first look at how Klong-chen-pa explains these three types of bodhisattvas with their respective kinds of cittotpàda:

The [first kind] is called a bodhisattva whose cittotpàda is characterised by great desire, that is, one who [wishes to] liberate sentient beings after first becoming a buddha himself. For example, it is like a king who wishes to place his subjects in [a state of] well-being after obtaining the throne. It is said to be a type of cittotpàda like that of the Noble Maitreya in several sûtras. Desiring liberation for oneself and [other] sentient beings together is called cittotpàda characterised by excellent gnosis. It is like boatmen desiring that [their] boat passengers and they themselves reach the shore of the river together. The desire to become free [only] after first liberating [other] sentient beings is called cittotpàda without comparison. The herdsman of goats, sheep, and cows—upon seeing a narrow, dreadful area such as a footpath along a precipice or something [similar]—place them (i.e. the cattle) ahead of themselves and proceed [only] after ensuring that not even one is left behind. [The last two] are like the cittotpàda of Manûshri and that of Śâkyamuni, respectively. Of these [three types of bodhisattvas with three types of cittotpàda], those of dull faculty (i.e. of the first type) will become awakened in the

172 Tathâgatahrdayâlakâra (P, fol. 325b3–4; D, fol. 279a5–6; S, vol. 70, p. 676.9–12): byang chub sems dpa’ rnam pa gsum || zhes pa ni byang chub dman pa sngon du biang nas dus ring mo zhig nas sangs ’rgyas par’ [rgya bar PN] ’gyur ba dang || dbang po rnon po de ’dra ba sngon du ma song bar myur du tshogs rdzogs par byas nas || ’tshang [sangs PN] ’rgya ba dang || ’dod chen pa dang gsum du ’gyur ba’o ||.


174 Sems nyid ngal gso (p. 68.1–3):

rgyal sras de yang rnam pa gsum nyid de ||
rang nyid grol nas ’gro ba sgrol ’dod pa ||
rgyal po lta bu’i byang chub sems dpa’ dang ||
rang dang ’gro ba mnyam du thar ’dod pa ||
gru pa lta bu’i byang chub sems dpa’ dang ||
’gro ba bsgral nas rang nyid zhi ’dod pa ||
rdzi bo lta bu’i byang chub sems dpa’ gsum ||
rin bzhin grangs med cu rtsha gsum dang ||
bdun dang gsum gyis grol ba thob pa ni ||
dbang po’i rim pa langs par mdo las gsungs ||.

See also the Yon tan mczod (p. 54.1–7).

175 Shing rta chen po (p. 637.1–6): de’ang byang chub sems dpa’ ’dod chen pa’i [= po’i] sems bskyed ces bya ste | rang nyid thog mar sangs rgyas nas phyis ’gro ba sgrol ba ni | dper na rgyal pos rgyal srid thob nas rgyal ’bangs bde ba la ’god par ’dod pa ste | ’phags pa byams pa lta bu’i sems bskyed du mdo du ma las bshad do || rang dang ’gro ba mnyam du grol bar ’dod pa ni ye shes dam pa’i sems bskyed ces bya ste | mnyen [mnyan] pa dag gru’i ’grub [= ’grul] po dang rang nyid mnyam du chu bo’i pha rol tu phyin par ’dod pa’o || thog mar ces bsgral nas gdod rang nyid grol bar ’dod pa dpe med pa’i sems bskyed ces bya ste | ra la dang ba lang gi rdzi bo dag gis ’phrang la sogs pa dog cing nyam nga ba’i gnas mthong ngam | gzhan du’ang rang gi mdun du de dag bcug nas | gcig khang phyi la ma lus par byas te ’gro ba ni ’jam dpal dang shäkya thub pa lta bu’i sems bskyed yin no || de dag kyang dbang po rtul po rnam sbyis grangs med cu rtsha gsum dang | ’bring pos bdun dang | rnon pos gsum gyis bla na med pa’i byang chub tu ’tshang ’rgya ba ste |.
highest [state of] awakening in thirty-three countless [aeons], those of mediocre [faculty] (i.e. of the second type) in seven countless [aeons], and those of sharp [faculty] (i.e. of the third type) in three countless [aeons].

In order to authenticate his statement, Klong-chen-pa cites the following passage from the Ratnakūṭasūtra:  

Of these, one who has generated the resolve [to become a buddha] characterised by great desire will be freed from samsāra in thirty-three countless [aeons]. One who has generated the resolve [to become a buddha] characterised by excellent gnosis will accomplish [his goal] in seven countless [aeons]. One who has generated the resolve [to become a buddha] without comparison will become perfectly awakened in three countless [aeons]. Why is it so? [It is] on account of [their] small, medium, and great mental capacity, [respectively]. These, if illustrated with analogies, are [respectively] like a universal ruler (cakravartin), a steerer (śārathi) of a boat, and a herdsman (pālaka).

The actual context in which these three kinds of cittotpāda are treated in the sūtra seems to be the duration of time taken by the three different kinds of bodhisattvas to become a buddha. Of greater interest to us here is the three different degrees of what we may call the ‘magnanimity’ of a bodhisattva. However, the context makes it clear that the kind of cittotpāda is what really makes one a particular kind of bodhisattva. Klong-chen-pa provides one case for each of these kinds of bodhisattvas. According to him, Sākyamuni Buddha was a herdsman-like bodhisattva, Mañjuśrī is a boatman-like bodhisattva, and Maitreya is a king-like bodhisattva. Whether this configuration was Klong-chen-pa’s own or whether it was based on an early Indian or Tibetan source is unclear. In any case, such a concept seems to have other doctrinal implications. It would mean that the outcome does not necessarily correspond to the resolution made by a bodhisattva. In order words, Sākyamuni, who according to Klong-chen-pa wished to become a buddha last, was in reality one of the first to become one.

It is obvious that this concept of cittotpāda merely reflects the forcefulness of attitude and has no bearing on the actual course of events relating to a bodhisattva. The trouble arose once it began to be overinterpreted, as Tsong-kha-pa’s discussion of the issue demonstrates:

The desire to become a buddha oneself [only] after placing all sentient beings in the state of Buddha[hood] is the herdsman-like [type of cittotpāda]. The desire that oneself and all others become buddhas together is the boatman-like [type of cittotpāda]. The desire that others be released [only] after one has become a buddha oneself is the king-like [cittotpāda]. Thus it has

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176 Ratnakūṭasūtra, as cited in the Shing rta chen po (pp. 637.6–638.3): de la 'dod chen po'i sams bskyed pas ni grangs med pa sum cu rtsa gsam gvis 'khor ba las thar ba yin no || ye shes dam pa'i sams bskyed pas ni grangs med bdun gvis ishar [= mthar] phyin pa yin no || dpe med pa'i sams bskyed pas ni grangs med pa gsum gvis mgon par rdzogs par byang chub pa yin no || de ci phyir zhe na || sams stobs chung ngu dang || 'bring dang | chen por gyur pa'i phyir te || 'di dag dper bya na || 'khor los sgur ba'i rgyal po dang || gru'i kha lo pa dang | skyong byed lta bu o.'

177 Such an idea begs the question as to whether spiritual practices such as aspirational wishes (pranidhāna) and those involving the exchange of happiness and sufferings actually affect persons other than the practitioner.

178 gSer phreng (pp. 203.6–204.5): sams can thams cad sangs rgyas la bkid nas rang nyid sangs rgya bar 'dod pa phyugs rde li ta bu dang | bdag gzhon thams cad dus mnyam du sangs rgya bar 'dod pa mnyan pa lta bu dang | rang nyid sangs rgyas nas gzhon grel bar 'dod pa rgyal po lta bu'i sams bskyed dang gsum yod ced 'chad do || don 'di la bcom ldan pa ni || snga ma gnyis ltar na de dag gis mi srid pa dam beas pa dang blo log shes su 'gyur te | sams can thams cad rang gi sngrang dang dus mnyam du sangs rgya ba mi srid pa'i phyir ro || sams can thams cad sangs rgyas na rang nyid sangs rgya la dgos pa med de || sgra brags nas nges grangs rigog pa bzhin no || des na rgyal po lta bu'i sams bskyed 'di nyid gezhung las bshad pas 'di kha na'o zhes gsung yang byang chub sams dpa'i thugs sbyong ba la mi srid pa du ma yod pa dang | 'smon lam 'debs pa yang mi 'grub pa'i 'smon lam du ma snang ba'i phyir dgos pa de dag mi rigs so || des na rgyal po lta bu 'di gezhung lugs rnam sas mang bar gsungs kyang byang sams kyi thugs sbyong tshul bsam gvis mi khyab pas srid do ||


been explained. On this point, bCom-idan-pa states: "In the first two cases, [it would illogically follow that] they (i.e. the bodhisattvas) had vowed [to do] the impossible and that [their]s is [thus] an erroneous perception, since it is not possible for all sentient beings to become buddhas before or together with oneself. If all sentient beings become buddhas [ahead of oneself], there is no point [any more] in oneself becoming a buddha, just as [there is no point in] examining the date once one has cut one’s hair." Therefore, since it is the king-like citotpāda that is taught in the scriptural treatises, it is the only [authentic] citotpāda." Nonetheless, these critiques are unwarranted since many [kinds of] resolve (thugs) on the part of bodhisattvas are impossible on the practical level, and also in regard to the making of aspirations, many unachievable aspirations can be seen. Thus, although [it is true that] the king-like [citotpāda] is what has been mainly taught in the scriptural traditions, [the other two] are [also] possible since the methods the bodhisattvas use to train their minds are inconceivably [manifold].

Tsong-kha-pa does not indicate any Indian source. Nevertheless, he documents an interesting piece of criticism and his own attempt to resolve the doctrinal problems regarding these three kinds of citotpāda. There are also some other interesting reflections made by later Tibetan scholars, which cannot be discussed here in detail.

### 12. A Fourfold Classification

The Mahāyānasūtrałamkāra subclassifies citotpāda into four types.

The citotpāda on the stages [of a bodhisattva]

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179 Tsong-kha-pa probably means bCom-idan Rig-pa’i-ral-gri (b. thirteenth century), a bKa’-gdams-pa master from sNar-thang Monastery.

180 According to Tibetan (and perhaps also Indian or Chinese) astrology, certain days of the week or of the month of the lunar calendar are unfavourable for cutting one’s hair.

181 A somewhat different critique is presented by Bod-sprul mDo-saggs-bstan-pa’i-nyi-ma (1895/1900–1959) in his Ita grub shan ’byed rtsa ’grel (pp. 104.4–105.10), without any author or text being named. The passage containing the critique is introduced with the expression mkhas dbang la la dag. He then goes on to defend all three types of citotpāda as genuine.

182 Note that the term byang sems here is an abbreviation of byang chub sems dpa’ (bodhisattva) and not of byang chub kyi sems (bodhicitta). It seems to be a widely accepted abbreviation in prose, particularly in later Tibetan literature, such as Tsong-kha-pa’s writings. In translated literature, too, the word bodhisattva has been occasionally rendered not as byang chub sems dpa’ but as byang chub sems, obviously metri causa. See, for example, Ratnagunasamcaya 1.11a and 1.24a; Bodhicaryāvatāra 2.25.

183 The explanation of the three kinds of citotpāda given here by Tsong-kha-pa need not necessarily be the ‘official’ position of the dGe-lugs school on the issue. It is said that Tsong-kha-pa’s gSer phreng was composed before he reached his intellectual maturity and that some of the positions presented there were modified over the years.

184 mKhan-po Ngag-dbang-dpal-bzang (or Ngag-dga’) (1879–1941) has stated that the three types of citotpāda differ with regard not to the first aspect of citotpāda, that is, fixing on sentient beings with compassion (snying rje’i sems can la dmigs pa), but to the second, that is, aiming with discriminating insight at perfect awakening (shes rab kyi rdogs byang la dmigs pa). He explains that a bodhisattva drawn towards the herdsman-like citotpāda does not really care whether he himself becomes a buddha or not. In other words, the herdsman-like citotpāda is conceived as a total denial of thought for one’s own benefit (rang don yid byed), such thought being described by him as a demon (’gong po) that must be subdued (btul) by bodhicitta. See the Zhāl lung zin bris (fol. 108a3–b3).

185 Mahāyānasūtrałamkāra 4.2:

\[\text{citotpāda ’dhimokṣo ’sau śuddhādhyāśayo ’parah | vaśāyāko bhūmiṣu mataś tathāvarāṇavarjitaḥ }\]
Is commonly taken to be [of four kinds]: one [characterised by] confidence, [and] another [by] pure altruistic inclination;


The Mahāyānasūtraṃkārabhāṣya comments: 186

The cittotpāda of a bodhisattva is of four kinds: [1] The one characterised by confidence is found at the stage [where the spiritual] practice [is carried out by exerting] confidence. [2] The one characterised by pure altruistic inclination is found at the [first] seven stages. [3] The one characterised by ripening is found at the eighth and later (i.e. the eighth to the tenth) [stages]. The one characterised by lack of obstructions is found at the stage of a buddha.

According to this commentary, the four kinds of bodhicitta explicated in the Mahāyānasūtraṃkāra are distributed among the different stages of a bodhisattva and the stage of a buddha in the manner shown in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cittotpāda</th>
<th>bhūmi</th>
<th>mārga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. anāvaranika</td>
<td>11th buddhabhūmi</td>
<td>5. aśaikṣamārga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. vaipākika</td>
<td>10th bhūmi</td>
<td>3 pure stages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. sūddhādhyāśayika</td>
<td>7th &quot;</td>
<td>4. bhāvanāmārga saikṣamārga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4th &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd &quot;</td>
<td>7 impure stages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st &quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. ādhimokṣika</td>
<td>adhimukticaryābhūmi</td>
<td>3. darśanamārga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. prayogamārga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. sambhāramārga</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sthiramati cites the Gayāśīrasūtra, apparently to authenticate the Mahāyānasūtraṃkāra’s fourfold classification of bodhicitta. However, the four kinds of cittotpāda cited therein are not specified by name, merely by ordinal number (‘the first cittotpāda’ and so forth). 187 The Mahāyānasūtraṃkāra’s fourfold classification of cittotpāda seems to be the only one of its kind, and it has often been alluded to by later Indian scholars, such as Abhayākaragupta. 188

The pertinent verse from the Mahāyānasūtraṃkāra has also been cited in tantric commentaries including Vanaratna’s Rahasyadīpikā, a commentary on Kṣṇācārya’s Vasantatilakā. 189 Another fourfold mode of classification of cittotpāda can be found in the

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186 Mahāyānasūtraṃkārabhāṣya (p. 14.7–9): caturvidho bodhisattvānām cittotpādaḥ | ādhimokṣiko 'dhimukticaryābhāmāḥ | sūddhādhyāśayikāḥ saptasu bhūmīsu | vaipākiko 'stāmyādīśu | anāvaraniko buddhabhūmāḥ.


189 Rahasyadīpikā (p. 3.15–16).
Bodhisatvvabhūmi;\textsuperscript{190} it does not seem, however, to be as popular as the one found in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra.

13. Subclassifying Bodhicitta into Ten Types

The ten bhūmis, as presented in Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra and in its commentaries, are also referred to as ten kinds of cittotpāda.\textsuperscript{191} Another tenfold classification is found in the Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo, which is one of the primary rNying-ma tantrās belonging to the Anuyoga class. The ten types mentioned in it are bodhicitta characterised by: (1) movement (g.yo ba), (2) aspiration (smon pa), (3) soaring (ldang ba), (4) preparation (sbyor ba), (5) setting out (jug pa), (6) efficiency (dge ba), (7) not changing (mi 'gyur ba), (8) cognition (rig pa), (9) abiding (gnas pa), and (10) perfection (rdzogs pa).\textsuperscript{192} I have not been able to trace this tenfold classification in sources outside the rNying-ma tantric literature. Four of these categories, namely, movement (g.yo ba), aspiration (smon pa), soaring (ldang ba), and setting out (jug pa), are also found in other rNying-ma tantric sources (such as the *Guhyaagarbhatantra). Noteworthy, too, is the fact that the more archaic categories of pranidhicittha and prasthānacītta are included in both of these ten- and fourfold classifications. I have not been able to find definitions of these ten categories. The ambiguity of some of the terms seems to be intended, suggesting that they apply to psycho-physiological bodhicitta.

14. Twenty-Two Kinds of Cittotpāda

It is well known that cittotpāda is subdivided in some sources into twenty-two kinds. A comprehensive treatment of this classification is not possible here, simply owing to the mass of material. What will be attempted is to look at the loci classicīs of the scheme that underlies this classification and at some aspects of its conception and development.

(a) Sources of the Twenty-Two Kinds of Cittotpāda

The loci classicīs setting forth the twenty-twofold classification of cittotpāda are Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra 4.15–20 and Abhisamayālaṃkāra 1.19–20. It may, however, be assumed that the key terms of the twenty-two kinds of cittotpāda were compiled from earlier

\textsuperscript{190} Bodhisatvvabhūmi 2.4 (WOGIHARA, p. 326.3–11; DUTT, p. 223.9–13): punar etat suvinīcitan bodhisatvaprāṇidhānam cītottpāda ity ucyate | sa punar eṣa cītottpādo bodhisatvavasya samāsatas caturbhīr ākāraṇa veditavyah | katamaṇ ca cāturbhīr | āditā eva tāvat kidrśānām bodhisatvāvam tac cītām upadāye | kim e`alambo-tapādyate | kidrśām ca kim laksānām kīm'ātmānā upadāye | upanne ca taśminśī citte ko 'nuśaṃsavo bhavati | ity ebiśi cāturbhīr ākāraṇa cācītottpāda veditavyah |.

\textsuperscript{191} Madhyamakāvatārāsūtra (P, fol. 20b5–7; D, fol. 17a7–b1; S, vol. 61, p. 40.17–19): byang chub kyi sems kyi dbye ba rnam pa bcu zhes pa na sa rab tu dga' ba la sogs pa sa bcu 'di dbyes ba byang chub kyi sems [add. pa P] rnam pa bcu bstan par 'dod pas so |.

\textsuperscript{192} Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo (P, fol. 23a6–7; D, fol. 23b6–7):

byang chub sems ni gang zhe na ||
'dyi grangs kyung rnam pa bcu ||
[1] g.yo ba byang chub sems nyid dang ||
[2] de bzhin smon pa byang chub sems ||
[3] ldang ba byang chub chen po'i sems ||
[4] de bzhin sbyor ba byang chub sems ||
Mahāyāna sources. In fact, the Abhisamayālāṃkāra explicitly states that citotpāda is presented in it, both in short and in detail, in accordance with the sūtras. Haribhadra identifies the Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā as the source of this classification. Likewise, Abhayakaragupta states in his Munimatālaṃkāra that the twenty-twowfold classification has been taught in the Śatasāhasrikā and the Pañcavimśatisāhasrikā. I have so far, however, been unable to explore these huge works.

(b) A Historical Sketch

It is conceivable that the twenty-two kinds of citotpāda as we know them today were systematised for the first time in texts that belong to Strand A, such as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Abhisamayālāṃkāra. If the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra is older than the Abhisamayālāṃkāra, it is also conceivable that the classification in the latter was based on the former, and perhaps also on its own source if it had one. It is interesting that the Bodhisattvabhūmi, despite its undeniable similarity of structure and content with the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, does not contain the twenty-two kinds of citotpāda. This would suggest that this classification had not yet been conceived or was not yet known during the final redaction of the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Also, the fact that such a scheme cannot be found in very old Prajñāpāramitā texts, such as the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and Ratnagunasamcaya, indicates that the same applies to them. Although it is possible that the classification was formalised in texts belonging to Strand A, it is likely that the list of twenty-two similes had originally been a collection of picturesque illustrations of bodhicitta found in various texts belonging to Strand B, such as the Gāṇḍavyūhasūtra.

Since its conception, the scheme of twenty-two kinds of citotpāda seems to have undergone at least two phases of development at the hand of commentators or interpreters. During the first phase, the twenty-two were commented upon and interpreted in the light of various factors pertaining to the bodhisattva paths and results. In other words, attempts were made to relate each of the twenty-two kinds of citotpāda with a certain factor. It is doubtful whether such an interpretation was actually intended by the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and Abhisamayālāṃkāra themselves. The similes do not disclose a clear hierarchal sequence, nor have I found any explanation as to why the number of similes, or kinds of citotpāda, was fixed at twenty-two. At any rate, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya seems to be one of the first commentaries to undertake the task of establishing a connection between the twenty-two kinds of citotpāda and the various factors pertaining to the practices of a bodhisattva. Such

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193 Abhisamayālāṃkāra 1.18cd: samāsavyātāḥ sā ca yathāśūtrom sa cocyate ||.
194 Abhisamayālāṃkāraloka (p. 35.5–7).
195 Munimatālaṃkāra (P, fols. 223b8–224a1; D, fols. 173b6; S, vol. 63, p. 1310.13–14): sens bskyed pa de’ang [de yang D] dbye na nyi’ shu rita gnys si’ bcom ldan ’das ma stong phrag ngyi shu lnga pa dang ’bum par yang gsungs so ||. a gloss in PN: ‘dun ldanchos skus dang la pa’i bar; b gloss in PN: slob dponchos kyi bshes ‘gnyes kyi ti ka’ [= gnyen gyi ti kā] ru ||’ dir sensbskyed paka cig ni sensbskyed pahngos gtse ron standingspa stedun pa lasogs pa’o || kha cig ni sensbskyed pa’phel bar byedpaja grogs las der gtags te sblyn pa lasogs pa’o || kha cig na re | sensbskyedpaja’bras bu la der htags te ’gro ba gcig pa’i lam lasogs pa’o || zhes gsungs so ||.
196 Tibetan scholars often allude to the 230 similes employed in the Gāṇḍavyūhasūtra (pp. 494.1–496.14) to describe bodhicitta. See the Dwags po thar rgyan (p. 180. 13–14); Rig ’dzin ‘jug ngogs (p. 137.7–9). See also the Buddhāvatamsaka (T, vol. cha, fols. 240b3–244b2; D, vol. a, fols. 309b1–312a3), where bodhicitta is described in a series of 120 similes.
197 Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya (pp. 16.17–17.8).
an interpretation was influenced by the concept of the inexhaustibles (aksaya) found in the Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra, as stated explicitly by the commentary itself.\footnote{Mahāyānasūtraśāntakabhāṣya (p. 17.8–9): esa ca dvāvimśatayupamaś cittotpāda āryāksayamatīṣāre 'ksaγe[- 'ksaγaṭaṃ]nusāreṇaṃugantavyaḥ |. See also *Asvabhāva’s Mahāyānasūtraśāntakāraṇī (P, fol. 63a3–7; D, fol. 56a1–4; S, vol. 71, p. 140.10–21).}

This cittotpāda characterised by twenty-two similes, it should be known, accord with the [eighty] inexhaustibles that occur in the Āryāksayamatīṣātra.\footnote{Abhisamayālāṃkārabhāṣya (p. 12.23–28): tatrādyām [\(^{5}\)dyāṃ] trayo mṛdumadhyādihimāratavā ādikarmikābhumīsanghrītāḥ | tatas prahlādābhumimāpravesāngasanghrīta ekāḥ | tato dāsa pramādātādīdābhumīsanghrītāḥ darśanābhāvānāmārgagocarāḥ | tato viśeṣāngasanghrītāḥ paśca | tato buddhabhumīsanghrītāḥ trayacittotpādaḥ prayogamaulapṛśāhavareṇyetaḥ ādikarmikābhāṣīm āraḥbhya yāvad buddhabhumīsanghrītāḥ iti cittotpādāpрабheduḥ |. See KAWAMURA 1981 where Mi-pham’s treatment of the eighty ‘inexhaustibles’ of the Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra is discussed. Kawamura goes into Mi-pham’s distribution of the eighty inexhaustibles among the four levels of cittotpāda, but not among the twenty-two types of cittotpāda.}

It is important to note that the commentary does not state that this scheme of twenty-two can be found in the Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra. The Mahāyānasūtraśāntakabhāṣya does not correlate the twenty-two kinds of cittotpāda with the various stages of the bodhisattva path explicitly, although a hierarchical sequence seems to be presupposed. Sthiramati does not propose any similar scheme either, but he does take some clear steps in that direction. For instance, he situates the first type of cittotpāda between the beginner’s stage and the end phase of prayogamārga, that is, within sambhāramārga and prayogamārga (or collectively adhimukticaryābhiṃ).\footnote{Note that according to the Tibetan translation of the Mahāyānasūtraśāntakabhāṣya (P, fol. 150a8; D, fol. 141b6; S, vol. 70, p. 1163.6), the title of the sūtra referred to here should read Āryāksayamatīṣāṣātra (‘Phags pa bo gros mi zad pas sthan pa’i mdo).}

The second phase of development is marked by the actual allocation of the twenty-two kinds of cittotpāda to all stages of a bodhisattva and to the resultant stage, and by a wide variety of positions pertaining to it, as is evident in Haribhadra’s Abhisamayālāṃkārabhāṣya. A comparison of the Mahāyānasūtraśāntakabhāṣya and Abhisamayālāṃkārabhāṣya reveals that they not only differ in the way the factors associated with the twenty-two kinds of cittotpāda are assigned to the stages, but also in the factors themselves. The attempt to combine the so-called eighty inexhaustibles, the subject-matter of the Aksayamatinirdeśasūtra, with the twenty-two kinds of cittotpāda may be seen as the culmination of the classification of bodhicitta—an attempt perhaps first made by Vasubandhu, the author of the Mahāyānasūtraśāntakabhāṣya, and later continued in Tibet.\footnote{*Mahāyāna}sūtraśāntakāryākhyā (P, vol. mi, fol. 64b7–69a6; D, vol. mi, fol. 58a5–61b7; S, vol. 71, pp. 1041.11–1050.13).

15. Concluding Remarks

Hopefully I have been able to demonstrate in this chapter that the idea of bodhicitta, which probably began as the initial resolve to become a buddha, became ever more comprehensive in scope, until the entire doctrine of Mahāyāna contained in the eighty inexhaustibles was expressed in terms of bodhicitta. It is part and parcel of the theory, the practice and path, and finally the goal, of a bodhisattva, and is hence the sine qua non of Mahāyāna, or the bodhisattva doctrine.
Chapter Nine

Causes and Conditions pertaining to Bodhicitta

If, as also taught in the Śūramgama[saṃādhi]sūtra, even bodhicitta that is generated with recourse to deception is a cause of Buddhahood, then how much more [bodhicitta that is generated] by committing a few wholesome deeds!

– Śāntideva, Śikṣāsamuccaya

1. Introductory Remarks

We all know that most Buddhist tenets including those of karma, the four noble truths (āryasatya), and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) are thought of in one way or another as being in accordance with the principle of cause and effect. According to this principle, a given conditioned phenomenon ‘x’ is a result of multiple and complex factors. Mono-causality, or the self-sufficiency of a single cause, is basically not accepted in Buddhism. Bodhicitta, particularly in its ethico-spiritual sense, is, of course, a conditioned entity, and its arising presupposes a host of necessary causes and conditions. The multiplicity and complexity of these factors imply that bodhicitta is not something that can be generated easily and quickly but rather demands much time, patience, and skill. In this chapter, I shall attempt to determine how the causes and conditions pertaining to bodhicitta are conceived in various Mahāyāna sūtras and śāstras.

2. Causes and Conditions pertaining to Bodhicitta in the Sūtra Sources

Mahāyāna sūtras are, generally speaking, not the right place to look for a systematic presentation of the causes and conditions relating to bodhicitta. Nonetheless, I should like to


2 For example, see Bodhicaryāvatāra 9.13: naikasya sarvasāmarthyaṃ pratyayasyāsti kutraco. For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 116.
present a few passages from some Mahāyāna sūtras in which the matter is dealt with. The Daśadharmakāsūtra mentions four possible causes (kāraṇa) of bodhicitta, as follows:¹

O son of a noble family, the bodhisattva who abides in [his] spiritual disposition [and] who has not [yet] generated bodhicitta, having been encouraged, moved, and caused to take [it] upon [himself] by either a tathāgata or a śrāvaka of a tathāgata, generates bodhicitta, [that is, the resolve to strive] for the highest, perfect awakening. This is the first cause of the generation of bodhicitta.² Having heard praise of either perfect awakening or bodhicitta being sung, [he] generates the resolve [to strive] for the highest, perfect awakening. This is the second cause. Having seen sentient beings with no guide, [no protection], and no place of refuge, [and] having placed [himself] in a compassion[ate frame of mind] … (yāvat) he generates the resolve [to strive] for the highest, perfect awakening. This is the third cause of the generation of bodhicitta. Having seen the fulfilment of all types of excellence of a tathāgata, [and] having generated delight, he generates the resolve [to strive] for the highest, perfect awakening. This is the fourth cause.³

The four possible causes of bodhicitta mentioned in the Daśadharmakāsūtra may be thus summarised as follows: (1) an initiative on the part of a tathāgata or a śrāvaka, (2) hearing the advantages of bodhi and bodhicitta, (3) compassion towards needy and defenceless sentient beings, and (4) delight upon seeing the perfection of a tathāgata. The Tathāgatajñānamudrāśamādhiśīṣṭa states that a bodhisattva generates resolve to become a buddha in seven ways. These seven ways are actually seven different causes or occasions, which may be summarised as:⁴ (1) an initiative on the part of a buddha, (2) the thought of protecting the doctrine from disappearing, (3) great compassion (mahākarunā), (4) an initiative on the part of a bodhisattva, (5) an occasion of paying respect and making offering, (6) witnessing bodhicitta being generated, and (7) hearing about the qualities of a buddha.

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¹ Daśadharmakāsūtra, as cited in the Śūkṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 8.8–15; VAIYA, p. 8.13–18): iha kulaputra bodhisattva gotraṣṭheḥ [śvagotra VAIYA] sann anupādītabodh cittā tathāgataṇaḥ vā tathāgataśrāvakaṇaḥ vā samcodyaṁmah samvedyamāṇo 'nuttarāyam samyakṣambodbhau bodhicittam 'upādāyatā | idam [yatiṃ BENDALL] prathamān kāraṇaṃ bodhicittotpādaḥ | sambodher vā bodhisattasvaḥ vā varṇam [ava VAIYA] bṛhāyamāṇaṃ śrūtvā anuttarāyāṃ samyakṣambodhau cittam 'upādāyatā | idam [yatiṃ BENDALL] dvīpaṃ kāraṇam | sa 'sattvaṃ anāthaṃ ātrānandān aśaranān [sattva...naśa BENDALL] advipān ṛśvā kārunyacittam upādhaya yāvad aśrīm samyakṣambodhau cittam 'upādāyatā | idam [yatiṃ BENDALL] trīyam kāraṇam bodhicittotpādaḥ | sa tathāgatasya sarvakāraṣṭrapārīnatāṃ ṛśvā pritān upādāya anuttarāyāṃ samyakṣambodhau cittam 'upādāyatā | idam [yatiṃ BENDALL] caturtham kāraṇam… See the Tibetan translation of the Śūkṣāsamuccaya (P, fol. 8a3–8; D, fol. 7a1–5; S, vol. 64, pp. 1018.15–1019.7). The passage is also cited by Prajñākaramati in his commentary on Bodhicaryāvatāra 3.22–23, but the original Sanskrit text of the commentary containing the passage is lost (Bodhicaryāvatārapaṭijīka, p. 42.29, n. 2). See also Śrīkumāra’s Bodhisattvacaryāvatārasamskāra (P, fol. 6a1–6; D, fol. 4b4–5a1; S, vol. 62, pp. 10.14–11.5).

² Cf. the Tibetan translation (P, fol. 8a5; D, fol. 7a2; S, vol. 64, p. 1018.19–20), which reads ‘di ni byang chub kyi sems la mos pa’i rgyu dang po’o, as if the Sanskrit read *idam prathamān kāraṇaṃ bodhicittādhiṃkṣāya or something similar.

³ Cf. the translation in BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 8–9.

The *Buddhāvatamsakasūtra* for its part mentions ten kinds of conditions or factors pertaining to the generation of bodhicitta.⁷

O son of the Victorious One, these ten are conditions under which bodhisattvas generate bodhicitta. What are the ten? They are: [1] the condition leading to the ripening and taming of the realm of sentient beings is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [2] the condition leading to the removal of the mass of sufferings (*duḥkhasandha*) of all sentient beings is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [3] the condition leading to all sentient beings’ acquiring a provision of happiness is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [4] the condition leading to the elimination of the ignorance of all sentient beings is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [5] the condition leading to all sentient beings’ attaining a buddha’s gnosis is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [6] the condition leading to paying respect and rendering service to all buddhas is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [7] the condition leading to pleasing all *tathāgatas* is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [8] the condition leading to the complete revelation of all buddhas’ physical bodies with [their thirty-two] major marks and [eighty] minor marks is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [9] the condition leading to access to the gnosis of all buddhas is a condition conducive to bodhicitta, [and 10] the condition leading to the complete revelation of all forms of strength (*bala*) and fearlessness of a buddha is a condition conducive to bodhicitta.

Lastly, I refer to a verse from the *Ratnolkādhāraṇī* which is often cited by Tibetan scholars as scriptural authority in the context of the cause of absolute bodhicitta:⁸

Putting clear faith in the Victorious Ones and the doctrines of the Victorious Ones, [He] puts clear faith in the conduct of a buddha’s sons.

Given [his] clear faith in the unsurpassable awakening (bodhi),

The resolve (citta) of the Great Persons arises [in him].

### 3. Causes and Conditions pertaining to Bodhicitta in the Bodhisattvabhumi

The Bodhisattvabhumi associates cittotpāda with four conditions (pratyaya), four (pre)requisites (hetu), and four strengths (bala).⁹ It may be recalled here that cittotpāda in the Bodhisattvabhumi primarily means the generation of the initial resolve (prathamacittotpāda), and hence that the causes and conditions discussed there are to be understood purely as causes and conditions governing the initial resolve, which can be subsumed under what is later called

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⁸ *Ratnolkādhāraṇī*, as cited in the Śīkṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 2.16–17; VAIHYA, p. 4.22–23):

*śraddhayamānu jīnān jinadharmān śraddhayate carī buddhasūtānām | bodhi anuttara śraddhayamāno jāyati citta mahāpuruṣānām ||*.  

⁹ A critical edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of *Bodhisattvabhumi* 1.2 is found in the Appendix. All references to passages from *Bodhisattvabhumi* 1.2 translated in the following discussion refer to the edition found there.
‘conventional’ cittaṭpāda. First, the Bodhisattvabhūmi explains the four occasions or motives in the following manner:¹⁰

What are the four motives? [1] There is a son of a noble family, or a daughter of a noble family, [who] sees or hears from a trustworthy person about the inconceivable and amazing, extraordinary manifestation [and] power of a tathāgata or of a bodhisattva. Having seen or heard [about these things], he falls to thinking thus: “Oh, of great power is this [state of] awakening, [since] such an extraordinary manifestation or such an ability on the part of those abiding and engaging in it is seen and heard!” He, on account of just such seeing or hearing about the power, is strongly inclined towards the great awakening and generates the resolve [to strive] for the great awakening. This is the first motive occasioning the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha]. [2] He neither sees nor hears about the power at all. Rather, [he] listens to the Sublime Doctrine, which tells of the highest, perfect awakening being preached, namely, [in] the Bodhisattvavapīṭaka. And then, after listening [to it, he] conceives faith. After conceiving faith [and] becoming strongly inclined towards the gnosis of the tathāgata from having listened to the Sublime Doctrine, [he] generates the resolve [to become a buddha] in order to attain the gnosis of a tathāgata. This is the second motive occasioning the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha]. [3] He does not hear the [Sublime] Doctrine at all. Rather, [he] sees that the disappearance of the Sublime Doctrine of the bodhisattva is at hand and is imminent. And again, after seeing [the precarious state of the bodhisattvasaddharmam] he falls to thinking thus: “Alas, the endurance of the Sublime Doctrine of the bodhisattva serves to dispel the suffering of an infinite number of sentient beings. Suppose I generate the resolve [to become a buddha] so that the Sublime Doctrine of the bodhisattva [can] endure for a long time, in order to eradicate the suffering of these same sentient beings.” He, on account of the sheer [wish] to uphold the Sublime Doctrine, is strongly inclined towards the gnosis of the tathāgata and generates the resolve [to become a buddha that is needed] for attaining the gnosis of a tathāgata. This is the third motive occasioning the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha]. [4] He does not see the impending disappearance of the Sublime Doctrine at all. Rather, in the final age, during the final time, [he] sees the basis of sentient beings’ [personal existence]—those who are inferior [and] of the last age—as being defiled by the following ten defilements: [they are] [i] full of confusion, [ii] full of shamelessness and lack of embarrassment, [iii] full of jealousy and envy, [iv] full of suffering, [v] full of baseness, [vi] full of defilements, [vii] full of bad conduct, [viii] full of carelessness, [ix] full of laziness, and [x] full of faithlessness. And again, having seen that, he falls to thinking thus: “Alas, this long, grave time of degeneration has dawned. During this time, which is defiled in this way, the generation of the resolve [to strive] even for the lesser awakening of the śrāvakas and the pratyaekabuddhas is in itself not at all easy to come across, and how much less so the highest, perfect awakening! Suppose I myself generate the resolve [to become a buddha]; [then] hopefully others too, following my lead, may generate [bodhicitta].” He, being bent on [attaining] the great awakening in spite of the difficulty in generating the resolve [to become a buddha] in the final time, generates the resolve [to strive] for the great awakening. This is the fourth motive occasioning the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha].

The four pratayas may be summarised as follows: (1) being awestruck by the power of buddhas or bodhisattvas, (2) being inspired by the sublime teachings (of the Mahāyāna), and thus inclined towards the gnosis of the tathāgata, (3) having a sense of responsibility for preserving the Sublime Doctrine, and (4) reflecting upon the rarity of the generation of bodhicitta in the time of degeneration. Hence one may say that while the first two conditions pertain to the power and knowledge of a buddha, the last two mediate concern for the fast disappearance of the Buddhist doctrine (which was meant to make up for the loss of the historical Buddha). The latter are particularly noteworthy because, as I have already tried to show, from a historical point of view it may have been just such a concern that motivated people to introduce the theory of bodhicitta as a measure to guarantee the continued existence

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¹⁰ Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§3.1.1).
of the Three Jewels. The Bodhisattvabхûmi then goes on to explain the four (pre)requisites (hetu):\textsuperscript{11}

What are the four (pre)requisites? [1] Excellence of the spiritual basis is the first (pre)requisite for the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha] within a bodhisattva. [2] Being under the care of buddhas, bodhisattvas, and spiritual friends is the second (pre)requisite for the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha] within a bodhisattva. [3] Compassion towards living beings is the third (pre)requisite for the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha] within a bodhisattva. [4] Being unafraid of even the long-lasting, manifold, intense, [and] unceasing suffering [characteristic] of samsāra, and of the suffering of the practice of hardships, is the fourth (pre)requisite for the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha] within a bodhisattva.

The first (pre)requisite, the excellency of spiritual disposition (gotrasampat), is not earned by hard work but rather said to be inherent.\textsuperscript{12} The text does not comment much on this point, since it has been dealt with in a separate chapter (patala) of the Bodhisattvabхûmi.\textsuperscript{13} The second (pre)requisite, the excellency of the spiritual friend (mitrasampat), is explained by subclassifying it into four types.\textsuperscript{14}

The excellence of the spiritual friend of a bodhisattva should be known to be of four types: [i] The spiritual friend of a bodhisattva proves right from the beginning not to be stupid [or] dull by nature, [but] learned and wise, and [one who has] not fallen into bad views. This is the first excellence of a spiritual friend. [ii] Moreover, [the spiritual friend] neither causes him [to display] carelessness nor provides him an occasion for doing so. This is the second excellence of a spiritual friend. [iii] Further, [the spiritual friend] neither causes him [to engage] in bad conduct nor provides him an occasion for doing so. This is the third excellence of a spiritual friend. [iv] And [lastly, the spiritual friend] does not persuade him to display inferior qualities of faith, devotion, right undertaking, perseverance, [and] efficient strategy by dissuading [him] from [displaying] superior qualities of faith, devotion, right undertaking, perseverance, [and] efficient strategy—for instance, [persuading him to follow] the Śrāvakāyāna or the Pratyekabuddhayāna by dissuading [him] from [following] the Mahāyāna; or [to strive after] contemplation-born [insight] by dissuading [him] from [striving after] meditation-born [insight]; [to strive after] learning-born [insight] by dissuading [him] from [striving after] contemplation-born [insight]; [to engage] in doing [physical] service [in the monastery or temple] by dissuading [him] from [striving after] learning-born [insight]; [to engage] in the [meritorious activity] of generosity by dissuading [him] from [engaging in the merit] accruing from ethical-moral discipline. Thus [he] does not persuade [sentient beings to engage] in one or the other inferior virtuous [activities] by dissuading [them] from [engaging in] one or the other superior virtuous [activities]. This is the fourth excellence of a spiritual friend.

As to the third (pre)requisite, that is, compassion, the text mentions four reasons why a bodhisattva is full of compassion:\textsuperscript{15}

A bodhisattva proves to be full of compassion towards sentient beings for four reasons: [i] There do [indeed] exist world spheres, among the endless unbounded [systems of] world spheres in the ten directions, in which no suffering is perceived. However, this bodhisattva has taken birth in a [world] sphere containing suffering, [that is,] where suffering is perceived, [and] not in [a place where there is] no suffering. [ii] [The bodhisattva] sees that another [sentient being] is affected,

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\textsuperscript{11} Bodhisattvabхûmi 1.2. (§3.1.2).

\textsuperscript{12} Bodhisattvabхûmi 1.2. (§3.1.2): “Amongst [these], it should be known that the excellent spiritual basis of the bodhisattva has been attained by nature” (tatra gotrasampat bodhisattvasa dharmaśrātisambhava vedyavaye).

\textsuperscript{13} See Bodhisattvabхûmi 1.1 (the Gotrapatala).

\textsuperscript{14} Bodhisattvabхûmi 1.2. (§3.1.2).

\textsuperscript{15} Bodhisattvabхûmi 1.2. (§3.1.2).
tormented, [and] overwhelmed by a certain [kind of] suffering. [iii] And [that] he himself becomes affected, tormented, and overwhelmed by a certain [kind] of suffering. [iv] Moreover, [the bodhisattva] sees another or himself or both being affected, tormented, [and] overwhelmed by long-lasting, manifold, intense, and unceasing suffering. Owing to these four [objective] supports [or] bases, compassion—[first] mild, [then] moderate, [and later] intense—originates-and-continues in this bodhisattva on account of his spiritual disposition, [that is,] because he is benevolent by nature, [and this even] without repeated practice [in his lifetime].

Regarding the fourth (pre)requisite, the Bodhisattvabhūmi explains why a bodhisattva is not deterred by the long, intense, and varying difficulties faced by him in samsāra.16

Having set compassion towards the sentient beings as [his] priority, a bodhisattva, on account of the [following] four reasons, neither dreads nor is afraid of even the long-lasting, manifold, intense, and unceasing sufferings [characteristic] of samsāra, much less of lesser ones: [i] He is by nature daring, steadfast, and vigorous. This is the first reason. [ii] He is learned, having a disposition towards proper reflection and possessing a capacity for critical analysis. This is the second reason. [iii] He is endowed with an intense inclination towards the highest, perfect awakening. This is the third reason. [iv] He is endowed with intense compassion towards sentient beings. This is the fourth reason.

The four hetus are thus: (1) having an ideal spiritual disposition, (2) having virtuous spiritual friends, (3) being compassionate, and (4) not being deterred by the suffering endemic to samsāra. Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmi speaks of four strengths (bala) that give rise to cīvotpāda:17

What are the four strengths? [i] Personal strength (adhyātmabala), [ii] the strength of others (parabala), [iii] the strength of the (pre)requisites (hetubala) [attained during past lives], and [iv] the strength of exertion (prayogabala) [in the present life].

The four are explained thus:18 [i] Among these, the passion for the highest, perfect awakening that has arisen in virtue of one’s power is called the personal strength of a bodhisattva [conducive] to the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha]. [ii] On the other hand, the passion for the highest, perfect awakening [that] has been aroused by the power of someone else is, consequentially, called a bodhisattva’s strength of others [conducive] to the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha]. [iii] The previous habitual pursuit of the Mahāyāna-related wholesome factors of a bodhisattva, [having the effect] that the resolve [to become a buddha] arises swiftly in this [present life] as a result of merely seeing buddhas and bodhisattvas or of merely hearing praise [of them]—and how much more so of seeing [their] power or hearing the sublime teachings [taught by them]? [This] is called the strength of (pre)requisites of a bodhisattva [conducive] to the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha]. [iv] The long-term habitual pursuit of wholesome factors in the present life, such as relying on noble persons and listening to [and] reflecting upon sublime teachings, is called the strength of the exertion of a bodhisattva [conducive] to the arising of the resolve [to become a buddha].

The four balas may be summarised as follows: (1) personal strength, (2) the strength of others, (3) the strength of the (pre)requisites, and (4) the strength of exertion. Although Shīramati does not name the Bodhisattvabhūmi as his source, his summary of the four conditions (pratyaya), four prerequisites (hetu), and four strengths (bala) of cīvotpāda in the Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā is evidently based on the pertinent passage of the Bodhisattvabhūmi.19

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16 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2. (§3.1.2).
17 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2. (§3.1.3).
18 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2. (§3.1.3).
19 Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā (P, fols. 255b6–256b1; D, fols. 208b1–209a1; S, vol. 67, pp. 556.13–557.17).
4. Causes and Conditions pertaining to Bodhicitta in the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra

The Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra not only reformulated the four conditions (prataya), four prerequisites (hetu), and four strengths (bala) found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi—turning, for example, the four into five strengths (the fifth, however, is not designated specifically as a ‘strength’)—but also introduced the concept of ‘absolute’ cittotpāda and explored its causes, neither of which topics is found in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Sāgaramegha’s attempt to relate the four pratayyas and the four hetus with the four balas of the Bodhisattvabhūmi may have been influenced by this new scheme in the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra. 20 It must be made clear, however, that the actual context in which these five strengths occur in the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra is the five kinds of conventional cittotpāda given rise to by various extrinsic causes and not the causes and conditions pertaining to cittotpāda as such. The five strengths that conduce to conventional cittotpāda, as specified there, are: 21 (a) the strength of friends (mitrabala), (b) the strength of causes (hetubala), (c) the strength of basic [wholesome virtues] (mila bala), (d) the strength of learning or study (śrutabala), and (e) the strength of repeated practice of wholesome virtues (subhābhyaśa) or repeated learning (śrutābhyaśa). 22

There are some textual problems with the basic text. Nonetheless, the five strengths (bala) listed in it are clarified by the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkārābhāṣya attributed to one Vasubandhu and by Sthiramati’s *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālāṃkāravyākhyā. Sthiramati’s subcommentary naturally provides more details, for it not only comments on the verses but occasionally also on prose portions of the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya. *(Asvabhāva’s Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāraṭīkā, on the other hand, does not contribute anything helpful in the present case. The explanation of the five strengths can be summarised thus: (a) Bodhicitta may be generated on the initiative of one’s spiritual friends (kalyānāmitra), preceptors (upādhyāya), or masters (ācārya). 23 (b) It may be generated by a cause (hetu) that lies within oneself, that is, one’s inherent spiritual disposition (gṛatra). 24 (c) Bodhicitta may arise as a result of the waiving of the spiritual disposition (ṛigs rgyas pa) following the accumulation of basic wholesome virtues (kuṣalamūla) in the past. 25 (d) Bodhicitta may arise in this life as a

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20 Bodhisattvabhūmiśivākyā (P, fol. 24b1–2; D, fols. 20b7–21a1; S, vol. 75, p. 655.15–16): “The first two hetus are two balas, and also the first two pratayyas are two balas” (dang po ’i rgyu gnyis nyid stobs gnyis yin zhiṅ | dang po ’i [po PN] rkyen gnyis kyang stobs gnyis yin no ||)

21 Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra 4.7ab.

22 The alternative reading *(śrutābhyaśa) is according to Sthiramati’s *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālāṃkāravyākhyā (P, vol. mi, fol. 60b4–7; D, vol. mi, fols. 54b6–55a1; S, vol. 71, pp. 1032.15–1033.1), where the expression thos pa goms pa ’i stobs occurs twice.

23 *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya (p. 15.2): sa punar mitrabalād vā bhavati kalyānāmitrānūrodhat | *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālāṃkāravyākhyā (P, vol. mi, fol. 60a5–7; D, vol. mi, fol. 54b1–3; S, vol. 71, pp. 1031.19–1032.3): grogs stobs zhes bya ba’i tshig dang | sems bskyed gzhan gnyis bstan pa zhes bya ba’i tshig gnyis su sbyar te | sems bskyed pa gang mkhan po ’am slob dpon nam | dge ba’i bshes gnyen la la zhiṅ gis ’byung chub tu [du P] sems bskyed na phan pa dang legs pa rgya chen po ’byung bas sems [sams P] bskyed pa’i rigs so’o zhes bya ba’ichos bstan pa las byang chub tu sems bskyed pa ni grogs kyi stobs kyi [kNy PN] sems bskyed pa zhes bya’o ||

24 Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya (p. 15.2): hetubalād vā gotrasāmarṭhyāt | *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālāṃkāravyākhyā (P, vol. mi, fol. 60a8; D, vol. mi, fol. 54b3; S, vol. 71, pp. 1032.3–5): ’byung chub sems dpa’i rigs yod pas rigs kyi mthos shugs kyi bskl nas byang chub tu [du P] sems bskyed pa ni rgyu’i stobs kyi sems [om. PN] bskyed pa zhes bya’o || rgyu dang rigs dag ni don gcig go ||

25 *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya (p. 15.3): kuṣalamūlād vātārapuṣṭitaḥ | ; according to the Tibetan translation (P, fol. 148a6; D, fol. 140a1; S, vol. 70, p. 1158.16), which reads: dge ba’i risa ba’i stobs las te | de’i rigs rgyas pa’i sgo nas…. kuṣalamūlabalād vā ta’gotrapuṣṭitaḥ. See also the *(Mahāyāna)sūtrālāṃkāravyākhyā (P, vol. mi,
result of having studied, contemplated, and meditated on the bodhisattva theories and practices during previous lives.26 (e) It may also arise as a result of habitual study and contemplation during this lifetime.27 Bodhicitta generated on the initiative of one’s friends or teachers is said to be unstable and prone to relapse. (The relapse of bodhicitta, however, will be discussed elsewhere.)

We shall now move on to the causes of absolute cittotpāda presented in the Mahāyānasūtraśālāṃkāra and its commentaries. In this case, too, it must be noted that these causes are brought up only parenthetically within the context of absolute cittotpāda. We have already seen that, according to the Mahāyānasūtraśālāṃkāra and its commentaries, bodhicitta is considered absolute or supreme if it fulfills three criteria. One of the criteria is its gnoseological quality, namely, its being a non-conceptual form of gnosis (nirvikalpaceñāna). The other two criteria are connected with the causes that give rise to such a gnosis: absolute bodhicitta arises as a result of one’s having dully approached (sūpasīta) the Fully Awakened Ones (samuddhā) and of having dully gathered (susāmbhrata) the accumulations of gnosis and beneficial resources (jñānapunyasambhrāra). The causes of absolute bodhicitta mentioned in Mahāyānasūtraśālāṃkāra 4.8 must be compared with the verse cited and discussed above. The two causes mentioned there are explained in the Mahāyānasūtraśālāṃkārabhāṣya as pertaining to instructions (upadeśa) and practice (pratipatti).28 Śhiramati designates the two as ‘supreme instruction’ (lung dam pa) and ‘supreme cause’ (rgyu dam pa), respectively. Non-conceptual gnosis itself is called the ‘supreme nature’ (rang bzhin dam pa). Śhiramati also makes it clear that the causes of absolute bodhicitta discussed here are attended to by a bodhisattva while still on the adhimuktiyābhūmi for one countless aeon. The attainment of the darśanamārga or first bhūmi is thus identical with the attainment of absolute bodhicitta.29

5. Causes and Conditions pertaining to Bodhicitta as Discussed Elsewhere

The Guṇaparyantostotratikā attributed to Dignāga cites a verse which alludes to four causes of bodhicitta. It states:30

fol. 60a8–b2; D, vol. mi, fol. 54b3–4; S, vol. 71, p. 1032.6–9); tshe rabs snga ma la theg pa chen po’i chos [om. PN] don zab cing rgya che ba rtoqs par ’gyar ba dang | byang chub tu sms bsksed par ’gyar ba’i dge ba’i rtsa ba dang | bsod nams kyi tshogs bsags pas riggs brtas [rtas PN] par gyur nas byang chub tu sms bsksed [om. PN] pa ni rtsa ba’i stobs kyi sms [om. PN] bsksed pa zhes bya’o ||.


28 Mahāyānasūtraśālāṃkārabhāṣya (p. 15.21): prathamena ślokenopadeśapratipatyaḥdigamaviveśaḥ pāramārthikatvam cittotpādayasya darśayati ||.

Bodhicitta arises-and-continues

On account of these four causes and conditions:
Spiritual disposition (gotra), a spiritual friend (kalyānasitra),
Compassion (karunā), and not being deterred by suffering.

Ratnakarāsāṁśi, too, discusses the causes of bodhicitta and presents for his part five causes and one condition:31

What are the causes of cittaotpāda? What are the conditions? . . . The causes are of five kinds: [1] Seeing the suffering of sentient beings [by] repeated practice of the four immeasurables (apramāna), [2] knowing the nature [of one’s objective, i.e. the Three Jewels] from having taken refuge (saranagamana) [in them], [3] purifying the mental continuum by gathering the [two] accumulations (sambhāra), [4] the mind becoming serene upon encountering the supports [of the Buddha’s body, speech, and mind, such as statues, scriptures, and stūpas?], and [5] repeatedly practising compassion (karunā). As for the conditions, they are [one]: being under the influence of a good spiritual friend (kalyānasitra).

Furthermore, the Akṣayamatiridēsāṣūra lists forty-five ways in which bodhicitta is said to arise. These, however, cannot be discussed here.33

6. Compassion as the Root Cause of Bodhicitta

The relation between karunā and bodhicitta is somewhat complex. Sometimes one gets the impression that karunā, alongside prajñā, is seen as the basic constituent of bodhicitta. At other times, karunā, prajñā, and bodhicitta are spoken of as co-factors in the emergence of a bodhisattva.34 Some sources also speak of karunā as an outcome of insight into true reality or of awakening itself. Nevertheless, karunā is often seen not only as a cause of bodhicitta but as its root cause, and it is this relation between karunā and bodhicitta that I shall look at here. Although we have seen in the preceding paragraphs that compassion does not always occur as a cause or condition pertaining to bodhicitta, both the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Mahāyānasūtraīālamkāra, which present the most detailed discussions of such causes and conditions, do restate the role of karunā in this regard and explicitly name it as a cause of bodhicitta.

According to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the generation of the resolve to become a buddha is the natural outcome (nisyanda) of compassion:35

Furthermore, a bodhisattva who is compassionate (kārunika) towards afflicted sentient beings [and who harbours] the intention of completely rescuing [them], generates the resolve [to become a buddha]. Therefore, the generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] is the natural outcome of compassion (karunānisyanda).

30. Guṇaparyantostoraiśkā (P, fols. 234b8–235a1; D, fols. 201a2–3; S, vol. 1, p. 590.15–17): byang chub kyi smon lam de’i rgyu [add. yang PN] bzhī stey | origs dang dge bshes snying rje dang | s’du sngag rtams kyi s mi ldog pa | rgyu bzhī rkyen ni ’di dag gis | byang chub sems ni rab tu ’jug ]] ces gsungs pa dag ste |.


32. Cf. the Ratnālokaālamkāra (P, fols. 282b1; D, fols. 240b6; S, vol. 64, p. 678.7–8): “Taking refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha with the desire to obtain them...” (sgags rgyas dang chos dang dge ’dun la de nyid thob par ’dod pas s’kyabs su ’gro...).

33. For details, see the Akṣayamatiridēsāṣūra (T, fols. 19a3–20b6; D, fols. 90a2–91b5).

34. Madhyamakāvatāra 1.1. See also SEYFORT RUEGG 2004: 7.

35. Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§1.2.3).
Gunaprabha, too, makes it clear that citotpāda is the result of compassion.\textsuperscript{36} And again, Sāgaramegha, while accepting both insight (prajñā) and compassion (karunā) as the principal causes of awakening (bodhi), states that it is compassion which causes bodhicitta:\textsuperscript{37}

The two, [namely,] insight and compassion, are the principal causes of awakening. Of these [two], does the resolve [to strive] for awakening arise from insight or does it arise from compassion? [It is] for this reason [that the Bodhisattvabhūmi] says: “[being compassionate] towards tormented sentient beings” (dukkhitēsu ca satvēsu) and so on. If [bodhicitta] were to arise from insight, [this] would be the principal [cause of] attaining awakening. However, [bodhicitta] does not arise on account of it (i.e. insight). Whence [bodhicitta] arises from compassion, and hence it should be known that citotpāda is the natural outcome of compassion. A bodhisattva, having first generated the resolve to protect sentient beings resolutely and unwaveringly, afterwards seeks ways of efficiently protecting sentient beings, and seeing no [means] other than Buddhahood, generates the resolve [to strive] for the highest, perfect awakening. Hence it is compassion that protects tormented sentient beings. Thus should the meaning of this [passage] be understood. The mother whose son has fallen into a well should be taken here as an example [of being compassionate].

The Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra states that the root of all four kinds of citotpāda outlined in it is compassion.\textsuperscript{38} The Mahāyānasūtraśālākāraḥśāya makes this point even more explicitly:\textsuperscript{39}

[Question:] What is the root of the four kinds of citotpāda of the bodhisattvas? ... Answer: Great compassion (mahākarunā) is the root.

Sthiramati more or less states the same thing except that he provides a reason why bodhicitta should be rooted in compassion:\textsuperscript{40}

\textit{[Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra 4.3a has been formulated]} as an answer to the question “What is the root of the four kinds of bodhicitta?” For it is maintained [there] that the root of the four kinds of bodhicitta is compassion, that is, an impulse reflecting the will (cetanā) to eliminate the pain [or suffering] of sentient beings out of compassion. The latter endures in virtue of taking in all sentient beings. If compassion were not at the root [of bodhicitta],\textsuperscript{41} bodhicitta would not be

\textsuperscript{36} Bodhisattvabhūmi (P, fol. 184a4; D, fol. 146b6-7; S, vol. 75, p. 402.15): gang gi 'bras bu yin che na | smras pa | snying rje'i rgyu mthun pa ghes bya'o ||

\textsuperscript{37} Bodhisattvabhūmi (P, fol. 23a8-b5; D, fol. 20a1-5; S, vol. 75, p. 653.8-21): ... shes rab dang snying rje gnyis ni byang chub kyi rgyu'i gtsos bo yin no || de [da P] dag las kyang ci byang chub kyi sams de shes rab las 'byung bar 'gyur ram | 'on te snying rje las 'byung bar 'gyur zhe na | de lta bas na sams can sngag bsngal ba nams las zhes bya la sogs pa la | shes rab las kun tu [du D] 'byung ba yin na ni byang chub thob pa gtsos bor 'gyur zhe | de 'i dbang gis byang [= 'byung] bar mi 'gyur ro || de 'i phyir snying rje las kun tu [du D] byang ba yin pas | de lta bas na sams bsnyed pa de ni snying rje'i rgyu mthun pa yin no zhes bya bar rig par bya'o || byang chub sams 'spa' ni sngar sams can rongs bsSkyab pa'i bsam pa brtan po mi gyo ba bsnyed nas | de'i rjes la rongs bsSkyab pa na thabs kyi lam tshol bar byed pa no || sangs rgyas nyid las gzhan ma mthong nas bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub tu sams skyped [bsnyed PN] par byed do || de lta bas na sngag bsngal ba'i sams can rongs yongs bsSkyab pa ni snying rje [add. Chen po N] yin no zhes 'di'i don rig par bya'o || 'de khor pa'i nang du bu thung ba'i ma dper bya'o ||

\textsuperscript{38} Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra 4.3a: karunāmāla īsto 'sau....

\textsuperscript{39} Mahāyānasūtraśālākāraḥśāya (p. 14.18-20): kimālā eṣa caturvidhā bodhisattvānāṁ citotpādaḥ ... āha | karunāmālāh |

\textsuperscript{40} * (Mahāyānasūtraśālākāraḥśāya (p. fol. 58b1-3; D, vol. mi, fol. 53a1-3; S, vol. 71, p. 1028.5-11): byang chub kyi sams rnam pa bzhis'i rtsa ba gong zhe na zhes dris [dres P] pa dang | de'i lan du byang chub kyi sams rnam pa bzhis'i rtsa ba ni snying rje yin par 'dod pa'i phyir ro zhes snying rje sams can gyi sngag bsngal bsa bar bya'o snyam du sams pa ste || des sams can thams cad bsdus nas gnas so || gal te snying rje rtsa bar gyur pa med na ni sams can rnam kyi don du byang chub kyi sams rnam kyang [khyi PN] mi skyed kyi nyan thos bzhin du nyi ngan las 'das par 'jug par 'gyur te | de bas na rtsa ba ni snying rje'o ||

\textsuperscript{41} Or “If [bodhicitta] were not rooted in compassion.”
generated for the sake of sentient beings, and [the bodhisattvas] would enter into nirvāṇa [in a traditional sense], like śrāvakas. Therefore, the root [of bodhicitta] is compassion.

*Asvabhāva adds that great compassion ‘embraces’ (khyud) all sentient beings, and without it as a root, a bodhisattva would never generate the resolve to strive for the highest awakening but, like the śrāvakas, enter into nirvāṇa without considering the needs of sentient beings.\(^{42}\)

The Samyrtibodhicittabhāvanā attributed to one Aśvaghosa presents what appears to be practical guidance for the generation of bodhicitta. It states that the ‘sprout’ of bodhicitta arises from the ‘seed’ of compassion, and goes on to exhort that one should first of all dwell in a secluded place, where one can detach oneself from meaningless and deceptive worldly concerns.\(^{43}\) Mind, it notes, is itself a place of seclusion since it is primordially unborn. Beginners, however, should first of all abide in a secluded place without, and only afterwards seek the place of seclusion within. This place of seclusion is described as the ‘seed’ (bijā) that is the very ‘seat of awakening’ (bodhimandā), perhaps meaning ‘spiritual disposition’ (gotra) or even the tathāgatagarbha itself.\(^{44}\) (We should perhaps distinguish this ‘seed’ from the ‘seed of compassion’ also mentioned in this context.) Thus, having sought and secured the outer and inner ‘seats of awakening,’ one engages in the contemplative practices of the so-called ‘four immeasurables’ (apramāṇa). The well-prepared field of equanimity (upeksā) is watered or moistened with the water of benevolence (maṇḍri), and a practitioner endowed with a sense of joyousness (muditā) plants the seed of compassion (karunā). Room for insightful view having thus been provided, the sprout of bodhicitta is brought forth by efficient strategies (upāya).\(^{45}\)

Several other authors have referred to compassion as the root of bodhicitta. The Bodhicittavivarana states:\(^{46}\)

\(^{42}\) Mahāyānasūtraīśālamkāraṭīkā (P, fol. 60b6–7; D, fol. 53b5–6; S, vol. 71, p. 135.10–15): snying rje chen po ni sems bskyed pa’i rtsa ba’o zhes bya ba ni | de ni’gro ba’khyud de’dag pa yin no || gal te snying rje chen po rtsa ba’i yin pa ma gyur na | byang chub sems dpa’ rnam nam yang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu sems bskyed par mi’gyur gyi [gyis PN] | sems can la mi lta bas ryan thos dag bzhin du mya ngan las’das pa la gzhol bar’gyur ro ||.

\(^{43}\) Samyrtibodhicittabhāvanā (P, fol. 15b7–8; D, fol. 14a2; S, Vol. 64, p. 39.5–7):
de yang thog mar ‘di lta ste ||
don med rnam par bslu ba yin [= yi?]||
’yig rten chos la ma chags par ||
nags tshal la sogs dben par bsdad ||.

\(^{44}\) Samyrtibodhicittabhāvanā (P, fols. 15b8–16a1; D, fol. 14a2–3; S, Vol. 64, p. 39.7–11):
sems nyyi dgod nas ma skyes pa ||
rang ’byung [byung PN] dgon pa yin mod kyi ||
las dang po pa’i sems can gyis ||
phyi rol dgon pa thog mar bsten [bston D] ||
de [de’i PN] ’og sems nyyi dgon pa bslal ||
byang chub snying po’i sa bon la ||
brten nas don chen ’di ltar sgrub [bsgrub PN]||.

\(^{45}\) Samyrtibodhicittabhāvanā (P, fol. 16a1–2; D, fol. 14a3–4; S, Vol. 64, p. 39.11–14):
de yang thog mar tshad med blo ||
byang snyoms sa gzhi legs bsdal la ||
byams pa’i chu bos rnam bcus la ||
rab tu dga’ ba’i rnal ‘byor pas ||
snying rje’i sa bon legs par gdab ||
ltan ba’i ram mkha’ go phye [phya D] la ||
byang sems myu gu thabs kyiis bskyed ||.

\(^{46}\) Bodhicittavivarana 85:
snying rjes brtan pa’i rtsa ba can ||
The Sons of the Victorious Ones strive for awakening (bodhi),
Which has the benefit of others as [its] single objective,
And which comes forth from the sprout of bodhicitta,
Which [in turn] has steadfast compassion as [its] root.  

Furthermore, Ācārya Śūra is quoted as having stated the following:  
All good qualities depend on bodhicitta;  
Excellent bodhicitta arises from compassion.

Candrakīrti also emphasised the role of compassion, as did later Indian scholars such as Kamalaśīla and Atiśa. The latter states:

It is because the sentiment of compassion (karunācittā) arises out of the sentiment of benevolence (maitricittā), and bodhicitta arises out of the sentiment of compassion that I have stated here: “Having been preceded by the sentiment of benevolence...”

Likewise, his Samādhisambhāra states:

Strength the resolve [to strive] for perfect awakening (sambodhicitā),
Once it has arisen by the power of initial compassion.

According to Ratnākaraśānti, compassion not only causes bodhicitta to arise but also to subsist and attain completion. The importance of great compassion as the root or seed of bodhicitta is also echoed in Vajrayāna Buddhism. For example, in the Vairocanābhisambodhītantra, the bodhisattva Vajrapāni, having extolled the qualities of omniscient gnosis (sarvajñātāna), asks the Buddha what its cause (hetu) is and what its root (mūla) and completion are. Thereupon the Buddha answers:

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byang sms myru las byung ba ||
gzhan don gcig 'bras byang chub ni ||
rgyal ba'i sras rnal sgo par byed ||.

47 Note that my translation of the verse slightly differs from the English translation provided in Lindtner 1997: 61.

48 Ratnālokāśikā (P, fol. 285a7–8; D, fol. 243a7; S, vol. 64, p. 684.14–16): slob dpon dpa' bas | yon tan ma lus byang chub sms la bren || byang chub mchog sms snying rje'i rgyu las 'byung || zhes 'chod do ||.
Ratnākaraśānti is apparently referring to Śūra’s Pāramitāsāmaśa. Cf. Pāramitāsāmaśa 2.57bc:
sambodhicitā ca guṇāḥ samagrhā ||
abhavyate tac ca kṛpāguṇena. ||
For an English translation of the verse, see Meadows 1986: 191.

49 Catuḥśatakātikā (P, fol. 61a2–3; D, fol. 56b4–5; S, vol. 60, p. 1068.9–10): bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi sms snying rje chen po'i rgyu can ||.


51 Bodhimārgaprajñapiṇāmi (P, fol. 287a1–2; D, fol. 249a2–3; S, vol. 64, p. 1669.16–18): byams pa'i sms las snying rje'i sms 'byung la snying rje'i sms las byang chub kyi sms 'byung bas na bdag [dag P] gis 'dir | byams pa'i sms ni sngon 'gro bas || zhes smras so ||. For the text and a translation, see Sherburne 2000: 70–71.


53 Samādhisambhāra 1 (P, fol. 169a2–3; D, fol. 134b6; S, vol. 27, p. 542.4):

  dang po'i [po PN] snying rje'i sobs las byung ||
  rdzogs pa'i byang chub sms britan bya ||

54 Ratnālokāśāntikā (P, fol. 285a8; D, fol. 243a7–b1; S, vol. 64, p. 684.16–17): ... snying rje britan [bstan PN] pas byang chub kyi sms britan par 'gyur te skye ba na [dang PN] gnas pa dang mthar thug pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir ||.
This omniscient gnosis has bodhicitta as [its] cause, compassion as [its] root, and efficient strategy as [its] completion.

Similarly, Rong-zom-pa states: 56

The generation of the resolve [to strive] for omniscient gnosis in order to liberate all sentient beings from the ocean of samsāra is the main part of the commitment (sāṃvara). Without attaining this omniscient gnosis one cannot act for the benefit of sentient beings. Hence, if one attains it, [its] cause will have been bodhicitta. [Its] root is great compassion. [Its] completion is [dependent on] efficient strategies. One cannot do without any of these three.

Although compassion is not directly viewed here as the root of bodhicitta but rather of omniscient gnosis, it can be still argued that compassion is indirectly considered to be the root of bodhicitta, which is the cause of omniscient gnosis. Candrakīrti employed logical reasoning and authoritative scriptures to demonstrate that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas arise from tathāgatas, tathāgataḥ from bodhisattvas, and bodhisattvas from compassion, non-dual insight, and bodhicitta; and that non-dual insight and bodhicitta are rooted in compassion. 57 Finally, it needs to be pointed out that mahākāraṇa is not just conceived of as the root cause of bodhicitta, but occasionally, as in the Dharmasamgrahīśūtra, also described as the single most important dharma to be practised by a bodhisattva. 58

7. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have attempted to present a systematic and exhaustive treatment of the causes and conditions pertaining to ethico-spiritual bodhicitta as found in relatively early sources, such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi and the Mahāyānasūrālāṃkāra, and some later treatises. It may be said that even though the causes and conditions pertaining to bodhicitta are multiple, they can be subsumed under what one may call ‘inner cause’ and ‘external conditions’—the ‘inner cause’ being the spiritual disposition (gṛha) and the ‘external conditions’ being good spiritual friends or teachers (kalyāṇamitra). Furthermore, of all causes and conditions pertaining to bodhicitta, compassion stands out as the seed or the root of bodhicitta, and indirectly even of Buddhahood itself. This is an important point in Mahāyāna Buddhism because, doctrinally, it makes the appearance and activities of a buddha possible.

55 Vairocanābhīsambodhitānta, as cited in the First Bhāvanākrama (p. 196.20–21): tad etad sarvajñānānaṃ karunāmīlaṃ bodhicittathetukam upāyaparyavasāsanam |; cf. the Vairocanābhīsambodhitānta (T, fol. 104b5; D, fol. 153a5): rgyu ni byang chub kyi sems so || rtsa ba ni snying rje chen po’o || mthar thugs pa ni thabs so ||. This passage is also cited in the Pāramitāyānabhāvanā (P, fol. 83b7–8; D, fol. 77a4–5; S, vol. 64, p. 221.10–13) and in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 154a4–b1; B, p. 250.10–15). A further citation is found in Tsong-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo (fol. 185a3–b1); see the corresponding English translation in LAMRIM TRANSLATION COMMITTEE 2002: 17. See also SEYFORT RUEGO 1981: 98; TSUDA 1978: 183; WAYMAN 1991: 55; HODGE 2003: 54–55, 544, n. 11.

56 I.ta 'gre (A, fol. 264a2–5; B, p. 348.14–19): sems can thams cad 'khor ba'i rgya mtho' las bsgrol ba'i phyir | thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes kyi sems bskyed pa ni | sdom pa'i dngos gzi yin la | thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes de ma thobs [= thob] par sems can gyi don byed kyang ni nus pas | de thob par bya na rgyu ni byang chub kyi sems | rtsa ba ni snying rje chen po'o || mthard 'phyin pa ni thabs la mkhas pa ste | 'di gsum ni ni tshang du ni rung ngo ||.

57 Madhyamakāvatārābhāṣya (pp. 1.12–11.12).

58 See the Dharmasamgrahīśūtra, as cited in the Sīkṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, pp. 286.7–287.5; VAIĐYA, p. 151.14–25). For an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 261. See also the Dharmasamgrahīśūtra (T, fol. 314a1–b1; D, fol. 84a5–b3).
Chapter Ten

The Mahāyāna Observances and the Maintenance of Bodhicitta

In sum, apart from striving [to observe] the discipline
Of guarding [one’s] mind on all fronts,
Why strive [to maintain] other disciplines!

– Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po (11th century), mDo rgyas¹

1. Introductory Remarks

In this chapter I should like to present the fundamentals of the tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna ethical-moral codes and offences,² with particular reference to how they are linked with the maintenance of bodhicitta. Given the heterogeneity of the materials and systems, there is no uniform scheme of primary and secondary precepts and offences. Each system, and sometimes even each treatise, seems to have its own scheme. For example, the total number of cardinal (or mortal) transgressions (mūlāpatti) provided by the Samvarasamgraha (probably falsely attributed to Atiśa) is eighty,³ namely, four common cardinal transgressions, twelve according to the Pāramitāyāna, thirteen according to the Kriyā tantric system, fourteen according to Caryā tantric system, fourteen according to the Yoga tantric system, fourteen according to the mahāyoga tantric system, and an additional five and four cardinal transgressions which are not specified. And as for the secondary transgressions, they are too

¹ mDo rgyas (A, fol. 149a6–b1; B, p. 244.19–20):
   mdor na rnam pa thams cad du ||
   sms brungs sdom brson ma gtos pa ||
   sdom pa gzhon brton ci zhih dgos ||.
   This is obviously influenced by Bodhicaryāvatāra 5.18cd: cittarākṣāvratam muktvā bahubhīḥ kim mama vrataḥ ||. One wonders if the Tibetan translation does not yield here a better sense than the English translation in Crosby & Skilton 1995: 35.

² For Tsong-kha-pa’s discourse on tantric ethical-moral discipline (gsangs sngags kyi tshul khrims), see Sparham 2005.

³ Note that the total number of mūlāpatīs specified in the text is seventy (see the following footnote).
numerous to be counted. I shall focus here on the primary precepts and offences, particularly on those that are somehow connected with the maintenance of bodhicitta. I shall begin with what seems to be the most conservative Mahāyāna tradition and conclude with the Atiyoga or rDzogs-chen system. In most cases, I shall avail myself of the writings of Rong-zom-pa, particularly his mDo rgyas, which is, to my knowledge, the most comprehensive and sophisticated treatise that deals exclusively with both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna observances. It is evident that the mDo rgyas in turn was inspired by the Samvarasamgraha.

Perhaps it is worthwhile first to consider some of the relevant terms. Rong-zom-pa employs and explains nine closely related terms which are said to occur in the kriyātantras and yogatantras. These are: (1) vows (samvara: sdom pa), (2) pledges (samaya: dam tshig), (3) ethical-moral discipline (śīla: tshul khrims), (4) austerities (tapas: dka’ thub), (5) austere practices (duścara: dka’ spyod), (6) ascetic precepts (vrata: brtul zhugs), (7) monastic codes (vinaya: ’dul ba), (8) course of conduct (caryā: spyod pa), and (9) mode of dealings or interactions (gocara: spyod yul). In addition, he also frequently employs terms such as precepts (śikṣā: bslab pa) or code of precepts (śikṣāpada: bslab pa’i gzhi), transgressions (āpatti: ltung ba), cardinal transgressions (mūlāpatti: rtsa ba’i ltung ba), and serious offences (pārājika: phas pham pa), the last of these entailing expulsion from the Order.

2. The Model of the Four Cardinal Transgressions (mūlāpatti)

In chapter six I presented an outline of the various bodhisattva-related precepts and transgressions in a purely non-tantric context. What I should like to recall here is the four mūlāpattis found in both bodhicittotpāda traditions, though not in an identical form. The scheme of four mūlāpattis can be found also in Vajrayāna sources such as the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta. Following Rong-zom-pa, it may be assumed that the scheme of four mūlāpattis found in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna systems was modelled on the historically and doctrinally conservative Vinaya scheme of the four pārājika offences, offences entailing expulsion from the Order. Although the term pārājika or pārājavyika is

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4 Samvarasamgraha (P, fol. 255a3–6; D, fol. 45a3–5; S, vol. 41, p. 693.7–14): de la rkang grangs ni thun mong gi rtsa ba’i ltung ba bzhi dang pha rol tu phyin pa’i rtsa ba’i ltung ba bcu gnyis dang kr’ya’i rgyud kyi rtsa ba’i ltung ba bcu gsum dang | spyod pa’i rgyud kyi rtsa ba’i ltung ba bcu bzhi dang | rnal ‘byor gyi rgyud kyi rtsa ba’i ltung ba bcu bzhi dang | rnal ‘byor chen po’i rgyud kyi rtsa ba’i ltung ba bcu bzhi dang | yang lnga dang yang bzhi dang | rtsa ba’i ltung ba bdun cu [bcu PN] tham pa’o || de la yan lag gi dam tshig rnam ni ’di rnam so zhes brgang bar mi nus te | mdo sde dang mngon pa dang ’dul ba dang rgyud sde rnam su bla bar bya’o ||

5 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 150a1–152a5; B, pp. 245.9–248.2). See also the Samvarasamgraha (P, fol. 255a3; D, fol. 45a3; S, vol. 41, p. 693.5–7): de la ming gi rnam grangs ni dam tshig dang sdom pa dang brtul zhugs dang spyod yul dang dka’ spyad dang spyod pa dang shi la la sogs pa’o ||

6 BHSD, s.v. samvara.

7 Cf. BHSD, s.v. vrata-pada.

8 BHSD, s.v. caryā.

9 BHSD, s.v. gocara.

10 CPD, BHSD, s.v. āpatti.

11 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 159a6–b1; B, p. 256.11–13): ’dir ni so sor thar pa las gsungs pa’i phas pham pa bzhi dang | byang chub sems pa’i [= dpa’i] pham pa bzhi tshul bstun nas bshad pa yin te... Cf. the Shes bya mdzod (p. 358.28–29): ... byang sa’i don bsdus sdom pa nyi shu par gsungs pa nyan thos kyi pham pa dang ’dra ba’i rtsa ba’i ltung ba bzhi ste |
used occasionally also in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna contexts, the preferred term seems to be miśāpatti. The term pārājika must have been originally employed in the bodhisattva context only as a point of comparison. For example, according to Ratnagunasamcaya 31.5, a bodhisattva who generated the resolve to become an arhat (i.e. a śrāvaka saint) or a pratyekabuddha would commit an offence far more serious than a pārājika offence. Also the Bodhisattvabhūmi and its commentaries seem to refer to the four cardinal transgressions of the bodhisattva vow as pārājika-like offences and not as pārājikas.

A question we may ask is: Why has the list of four cardinal transgressions been changed in the tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna systems, whereas the scheme itself has been retained? Jinaputra, in his Śilaparivartātikā, asserts that the four cardinal transgressions of both the prātimokṣa and bodhisattva vows can be committed only when one or the other of the three fundamental intellectual-emotional defilements (kleśa)—namely, desire (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), and disorientation (moha)—are present. That is to say, without these intellectual-emotional defilements, the concept of the four cardinal transgressions in both Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna systems would be rendered meaningless. It may be worthwhile here to pause over Jinaputra’s comparison of the four cardinal transgressions of the Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna systems:

[1] Just as a śrāvaka renders himself unfortunate (i.e. commits a pārājika offence) by abusing himself and others through [the gratification of his] sexual desire, so would a bodhisattva commit the pārājika [offence] if [he] were to abuse himself and others through [his] craving for [material] gain and reputation. [2] A śrāvaka would commit a pārājika [offence] if [he] were to steal property of other [people] out of craving. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, would commit a pārājika [offence] if, out of greed for material wealth, [he] were not to give to desperate persons who ask for [material help], even though [he] is in possession of wealth; or if [he] were not to share [his knowledge of] the doctrine (dharma) [with them]. [3] A śrāvaka would commit a pārājika [offence] if [he] were to kill a human being. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, would

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12 Edgerton notes that the four pārājavyikas (= pārājikas) are described in the Bodhisattvabhūmi “but bear no resemblance to the four pārājika[s] of monks, being evidently a recent invention patterned on that ancient category (BHS, s.v. pārājika).

13 See, for example, the Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 66.16; VAIĐYA, p. 41.2): ratnarañjasvaharanād āpat pārājikā matā |; and the Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.10 (DUTT, p. 108.11–12): evan ca śīlasamvaravyavasthitasya bodhisattvasya ca tvāraḥ pārājikāvasthitādhamma bhavantu | (cf. WOGIHARA, p. 158.2–3). For the terms pārājika and pārājavyika, see BHS, s.v. For the occurrence of the term pārājika (phās pham pa) in the Vajraśekharatrantra, see the citation in n. 90. Rong-zom-pa considers the four pārājikas relating to the bodhisattva vow to be uncommon or special (thun mong ma yin pa). See the Theng chen tshul 'jug (A, fol. 76a–b2; B, p. 499.19–23). Cf., however, the dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 159a1; B, p. 218.3), where the four mūlāpattis are described as ‘pārājika-like’ (phās pham pa dang 'dra ba).

14 In the tantric context, Rong-zom-pa tends to use the expression ‘great’ as an attribute of the mūlāpatti, for example, in his Theng chen tshul 'jug (A, fol. 76b–77a1; B, p. 500.7–10). This is perhaps intended to set the tantric mūlāpatti apart from those used in the non-tantric context.

15 Śilaparivartātikā (P, fols. 256b8–257a5; D, fol. 204a4–7; S, vol. 75, p. 558.10–20).

commit a pārājika [offence] if [he] were to generate malicious thought (āghāta) against all sentient beings, inflict injury with his hands, with cloths of soil, or the like, and continue the act of injury relentlessly despite courteous pleas [to consider] the negative consequences of injury and [despite] an acknowledgement of fault. [4] A śrāvakas would commit a pārājika [offence] if [he] were to proclaim the non-existent qualities of [spiritual] attainments. A bodhisattva, on the other hand, would commit a pārājika [offence] if [he] were not to teach [despite his] actual [ability to do so], disparage the Sublime Doctrine (saddharma), and teach [what is] not the Sublime Doctrine.

It is clear that desire (rāga) is involved in the first two cardinal transgressions, hatred (dvesa) in the third, and disorientation (moha) in the fourth.

The motive mentioned in the Vairocanābhisambodhitāntra, as explained by Rongzom-pa, was to induce (gzud) the śrāvakas to enter into the Vajrayāna system by offering a scheme that they already knew.17 Such a justification may sound polemical, and hence one not to be taken seriously. Nonetheless, greater reflection suggests that the reason for not retaining the old list of four pārājika offences (i.e. killing, stealing, lying, and engaging in sexual misconduct) in the tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna ethical-moral context is that these basic offences can, under exceptional circumstances, be committed in the course of applying efficient strategies (upāya) and insight (prajñā), and thus be condoned, thereby creating room for equivocality. In other words, the unequivocalness of the four pārājika offences, taken for granted in the non-Mahāyāna system, no longer holds in Mahāyāna. For example, if a bhikṣu living according to the non-Mahāyāna system commits one of the four pārājika offences, he would automatically lose his bhikṣu status, but if a bodhisattva commits one of these same four deeds under the Mahāyāna system, the consequence is no longer straightforward. The possibility that a bodhisattva could commit one of the four deeds and yet retain his bodhisattva status renders the old scheme inapplicable. We thus understand why the four mūlāpattis of the bodhisattva or the tantric yogin had to be reassigned to include only offences that can never be condoned—such as abandoning the saddharma and bodhicitta or nourishing thoughts of greediness and cruelty.

As we have already seen in chapter six, Candragomin’s Samvaravimśaka is often cited as a scriptural authority on the four cardinal transgressions of the Maitreya-Asanga tradition. The Samvaravimśaka is said to be based in turn on the Bodhisattvatāṭīsīm,18 which is representative of what is perhaps the most conservative Mahāyāna tradition. The four cardinal transgressions outlined in the Samvaravimśaka are:19 (1) praising oneself and disparaging others out of attachment to gain or respect, (2) not administering dharma and wealth to the deprived and defenceless out of greediness, (3) assaulting others out of rage despite their acknowledging their faults, and (4) abandoning the Mahāyāna doctrine and propagating a pseudo-saddharma. When it comes to a scriptural authority on the four cardinal transgressions of a bodhisattva according to the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna tradition, the Śīkṣāsamuccaya is often cited, which is said to be based in turn on the Upāyakauśalyasūtra.20

17 See the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 159b5–160b5; B, pp. 256.23–258.3), where the pertinent passages from the Vairocanābhisambodhitāntra are cited and discussed. See also the Caryāmelāpaṇaprāda (p. 78.16–17): uḍḍāśāyaḥitaṁ jhānāṁ sīkṣā cāpi hi deśitaṁ śrāvakānāṁ mahāvīrā avatarāraṁ tēṣu vai ||, varia lectio: avadhāraya.
For the verse cited in the Tattvasiddhi (ascribed to Śāntarakṣita), see MORIGUCHI 1993: 184.

18 Bodhisattvatāṭīsīm 1.10 (WOGIHARA, pp. 158.2–160.9; DUTT, pp. 108.11–109.20); Shes bya mdo (p. 358.28); SOBISCH 2002: 51, 91.

19 See chapter six, n. 113.

20 For example, see the Shes bya mdo (p. 356.8–12).
Chapter Ten: The Mahāyāna Observances and the Maintenance of Bodhicitta

The four cardinal transgressions given in the Śikṣāsamuccaya are: (1) abandoning bodhicitta, (2) not giving, out of greediness and covetousness, (3) beating others in wrath or out of intolerance, and (4) giving false teachings under the influence of defilements or as a result of following others. Although the abandonment of bodhicitta is not mentioned in the Samvaraviṃśaka as one of the four mūlāpattis, Rong-zom-pa states that abstaining from the mūlāpatti mentioned in it is a means of securing bodhicitta, whereas committing them contributes to the abandonment of bodhicitta. In particular, the four mūlāpattis mentioned in the Samvaraviṃśaka are equated by Rong-zom-pa with those listed in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, namely, with abandoning bodhicitta, being greedy, being cruel, and abandoning the saddharma, respectively. He also links these four respectively with the acts of desire, stealing, killing, and lying, which correlate with the four pārājikas of the Vinaya tradition. 

Rong-zom-pa, without indicating his source, also discusses the four mūlāpattis according to the Vajrayāna: (1) blatantly disparaging one’s tantric teacher (vajrācārya), (2) abandoning bodhicitta for good, (3) refuting doctrines that teach equality (i.e. of samsāra and nirvāṇa), and (4) scorning fellow tantric practitioners. These four mūlāpattis, however, are neither identical with the four taught in the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta nor do they correspond with the four basic pledges (samaya) taught in Jñānākara’s Mantrāvatāra.

3. Pledges and the Maintenance of Bodhicitta in the Kriyātantras

We shall first consider the pledges (samaya) relating to bodhicitta in the so-called kriyātantras. One may argue about which tantras belong to this category, but for practical reasons I shall follow here Rong-zom-pa’s system of tantric classification, which considers,

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21 Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 67.15–18; VAIYDA, p. 41.20–23):
   bodhicittaparityādā yācchāyāpradānatah
   evramāṣṭaryalobhābhāvam krodhād vā sattvātādanāt
   prasādyamāno yāmena sattvesu na tītiṣate
   klesāt parānirvṛttyā vā saddharmābhāsavaranāt

   For an English translation of these verses, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 71.

22 See the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 159a1–6; B, pp. 255.22–256.11).


24 Cf. n. 36.

25 Mantrāvatāra (P, fol. 221a6–7; D, fol. 196b2–3; S, vol. 41, p. 533.8–11):
   de la gzi yi dam thshig ni
   rnam pa bzhi’ ni shes bya ste
   yang dag lta dang ldan pa dang
   dkon mchog gsum po mi spong dang
   byang chub sems dang ldan pa dang
   dbang bskur yang dag mi spong ba’o

   Cf. the verses cited in the Shes bya medzod (pp. 372.33–373.2).

26 For a general discussion of the classifications of Buddhist tantras, see ENGLISH 2002: 2–6.
among other tantras, the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta,\textsuperscript{28} Guhyatānta,\textsuperscript{29} Susiddhikaratantra, and Subhūparipṛcchātānta to be kriyātantras.\textsuperscript{30} He remarks, however, that some earlier teachers (pārvācārya) considered the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta also to be a caryātana or an ubhayatana.\textsuperscript{31}

(a) The Vairocanābhisambodhitānta

Let us, then, first turn to how the pledges relating to and the maintenance of bodhicitta are conceived in the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta. According to Rong-zom-pa, the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta prescribes the following ethical-moral discipline for the lay bodhisattva: the bodhisattva should abide by the precepts pertaining to ten wholesome (kuśala) attitudes or actions characterised by efficient strategies (upāya) and discriminating insight (prajñā), observe the code of precepts (sīkṣāpada) comprising five basic ethical-moral disciplines, gather sentient beings into the dharma by means of four gathering techniques (samgrahavastu), and make sure that the four mūlāpattis are not committed, even at the cost of one’s life.\textsuperscript{32} The five sīkṣāpadas are: (1) avoiding killing, (2) avoiding stealing, (3) avoiding lying, (4) avoiding sexual misconduct, and (5) avoiding intoxication.

\textsuperscript{28} For Rong-zom-pa’s tantric classification, see the dKon mchog ’grel (A, fols. 31a3–32b2, B, pp. 59.6–60.20) and the Theg chen tshul jug (A, fol. 76a1; B, p. 499.7–8). Cf. the ITa ’grel (A, fols. 247a3–255b1; B, pp. 329.4–338.15). See also n. 114.

\textsuperscript{29} mDo rgyas (A, fol. 152b3–4; B, p. 249.16–19): ... thabs dang shes rab zab mo’i tshul nye bar bstan pa | las dang bya ba la rnam par smad pa | byang chub kyi sems gso bo gyur pa | bya ba bye brag gi rgyud du grags pa | rnam par snang mdzad mgon par byang chub pa’i rgyud las | ibid. (A, fol. 227b1–2; B, p. 336.6–10): bya ba’i rgyud du’ang ... rnam par snang mdzad mgon par byang chub pa’i rgyud lta tu ni bya ba bye brag gi rgyud de zab mo’i tshul ston pa’o zhes grags so |. If the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta is a kriyātana, one may describe it as being described by Rong-zom-pa as one that ‘disperses activities and actions’ (las dang bya ba la rnam par smad pa). Addressing this doubt, Rong-zom-pa adds (ibid., A, fol. 227b2–3; B, p. 336.9–10): “Because of this, some early teachers have considered [it] a caryātana or an ubhayatana” (de nyid kyi dbang las sngon gyi slob dpon kha cig gis spyod pa’i rgyud dang gnyi ga’i rgyud du’ang bshad do |).

\textsuperscript{29} The Guhyatānta is cited by Rong-zom-pa as a kriyātana in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 154b5–6; B, p. 251.1–4): spiyir bya ba’i rnam gsam su bsgrub cing nams su bsnyed gnyis bya ba’i rtsa ba’i dam tshig ni bcu gsum du grags te | de yong ’di ltar bcom ldan ’das kyi rigs gsum gyi dkyil ’kor gyi bye brag tu gyur pa | dkyil ’kor sum stong lnga brgya snyed gsungs pa thams cad kyi spyi’i cho ga bstan pa gsal ba’i rgyud las |.

\textsuperscript{30} Rong-zom-pa regarded the Subhūparipṛcchātānta as a kriyātana. See the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 227b1–2; B, p. 336.6–9): bya ba’i rgyud du’ang ’phags pa dpung bzang gis zhus pa lta tu ni spyi’i tshul | ... ston pa’o zhes grags so |; ibid. (A, fol. 156b1; B, p. 252.23–24): de yang rgyud thams cad kyi spyi’i bsgrub pa’i cho ga rgyas par stsan pa dpung bzang gis zhus pa las |; ibid. (A, fol. 185a2–3; B, p. 286.18–19): ’di ltar rgyud thams cad kyi spyi’i sgrub pa’i cho ga rgyas par ston pa dpung bzang gis zhus pa las |. According to the Nyang ral chos ’byung (pp. 308.20–309.5), both the Subhūparipṛcchātānta and the Susiddhikaratantra are counted among the six general tantras (spyi’i rgyud drug) of the Kriyā class. For an English translation of the Susiddhikaratantra from the Chinese translation (Taishō, vol. 18, no. 893) by Subhākarasimha (637–735), see GIEBEL 2001: 109–325.

\textsuperscript{31} See ENGLISH 2002: 3, where the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta is said to be the root text of the caryātantras. It was Buddhaguhya who most prominently took the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta to be an ubhayatana (HODGE 2003: 23, 43). Perhaps for Rong-zom-pa the Vairocanābhisambodhitānta is indeed a kriyātana, but by no means is it an ordinary kriyātana; rather, an exclusive one (bye brag gi rgyud) in emphasising bodhicitta and the profundity (zab mo’i tshul) of the tantric doctrine.

\textsuperscript{32} Vairocanābhisambodhitānta (T, fols. 208b3–209a4; D, fol. 220b2–7). The pertinent passage from this tantra has been paraphrased in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 153b4–6; B, p. 249.18–23) as follows: rnam par snang mdzad mgon par byang chub pa’i rgyud las | ’di ltar gsang sngags kyi sgor zhus pa’i byang chub sems dpas ’khyim pa rnam kyi thabs dang shes rab kyi yongs su rin pa’i dge ba bcu’i las kyi lam yang dag par bsgnis te | bslab pa’i gzhis lnga gzung nas bsdu ba’i dangs po bzhis sems can rnam sdad ci lung ba’i rtsa ba bzhis srog gi phyir yang yongs su mi gtsang ba bar gsungs te .... See also ibid. (A, fols. 159b4–160b5; B, pp. 256.22–258.3).
avoiding illicit sexual conduct, (4) avoiding telling lies, and (5) avoiding false views. What is perhaps remarkable is that these šikṣāpadas are for the most part identical with those laid down for the lay Buddhist followers, except that the last one, ‘avoiding alcoholic drinks,’ has been replaced by ‘avoiding false views.’ This is, however, not the case with all tantras. As we shall see, ‘avoiding alcoholic drinks’ is included in the šikṣāpadas taught in other kriyātantras, such as the Susiddhiyakatarantra and the Subhāhupariprcchātantra, along with some yogatantras, such as the Vajraśīkharaṇaṭra and Durgatipariprśodhanāntar.[35]

The mūlāpattis, which are reminiscent of the four mūlāpattis that we know from the non-tantric Mahāyāna system, are: 1) abandoning the saddharma, (2) abandoning bodhicitta, (3) greediness (mātasya), and (4) cruelty (vyāpāda). My primary interest, however, is not the šikṣāpadas and mūlāpattis as such but rather their relationship to the maintenance or abandonment of bodhicitta, which is explained by Rong-zom-pa as follows:[37]

[Question:] How is bodhicitta adopted-and-maintained by means of these vows (samvara)?
[Answer:] The [first] four šikṣāpadas, namely, avoiding killing and so forth, involve the ethical-moral discipline of [observing] vows (samvaraśīla), [and thus are] the foundation of bodhicitta. A false view (mithyādṛṣṭi) is a hindrance to the arising of bodhicitta, since if one is present, it leaves no room for the arising of bodhicitta. If one has abandoned it and has a correct view (samyādṛṣṭi), bodhicitta has room to arise. Thus given that this code of five [precepts] is the foundation for the arising of bodhicitta, the šikṣāpadas are these five specific ones.

In treating the relation of the four mūlāpattis to the abandonment of bodhicitta, Rong-zom-pa first refers to the passage in the Vairocanaḥhisambodhitantra (which we have already seen), where bodhicitta is identified as the cause of the gnosis of the Omniscient One (or of omniscience), great compassion as its root, and efficient strategy as the cause of its completion, and then states:[38]

33 Vairocanaḥhisambodhitantra (T, fol. 208b6–209a1; D, fol. 220b4–6): de la srog gcud pa dang | ma byin par len pa dang | ’dod pas log par g.yem pa dang | brdzun du smra ba dang | log par lla ba rab tu šangs pa yin te | byang chub sems dpa’ | khyim pas bslab pa’i gzhi de lnga bzung nas | bslab pa’i skad bstan pa’i rams la slob cing dad pas | snog gyi de bzhin gshegs pa’i rams kyis rjes su bslab par bya’o ||. This passage is also cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 160a5–b1; B, p. 237.13–17). See also ibid. (A, fol. 153b6; B, pp. 249.23–250.1): de la bslab pa’i gzhi lnga ni | srog gcud pa spong ba dang | ma byin par len pa spong ba dang | ’dod pas log par g.yem pa spong ba dang | rdzun du smra ba spong ba dang | log par lla ba spong ba’o ||; Rwa ba brygad (A, fol. 275a3–4; B, p. 393.11–16).

34 See NYANATILOKA 1989, s.v. sikkhāpada; BHSD, s.v. šikṣāpada.

35 See the respective šikṣāpadas outlined in the Susiddhiyakatarantra, Subhāhupariprcchātantra, Vajraśīkharaṇaṭra, and Durgatipariprśodhanāntar, and also Rong-zom-pa’s remark in nn. 62 & 63.

36 Vairocanaḥhisambodhitantra (T, fol. 209a3–4; D, fol. 220b6–7): ltung ba’i rtsa ba bzhī ni srog gi phyir [add. yang T] yongs su nyams par mi bya’o || bzhī gang zhe na || ’di lla ste || dom pa’i chos spong ba dang || byang chub kyi sems gongs ba dang || ser sna byed pa dang || sems can la gnod pa [par T] byed pa’o ||. This is cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 160b2–3; B, p. 257.19–22). See also HODGE 2003: 512; WAYMAN 1992: 139.

37 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 154a1–4; B, p. 250.2–9): sdom pa’i dag gis byang chub kyi sems ji ilar ’dzin par ’gyur zhe na || srog gcud pa spong ba la sogs pa bslab pa’i gzhi bzhī ni | sdom pa’i tshul khrims kyi bdag ncid byang chub kyi sems kyi gzhir gyur pa’o || log par lla ba ni byang chub kyi sems skye ba’i gege su gyur pa | gang de yod na byang chub kyi sems skye ba’i go skabs mi ’byed do || de sspangs shing yang dag pa’i lla ba dang ldan na || byang chub kyi sems skye ba’i go skabs ’byed par ’gyur bas || de bas na gzhi de lnga ni byang chub kyi sems skye ba’i gzhir gyur pa’i phyir bslab pa’i gzhi ni ’di lnga kho na yin no ||.

38 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 154b1–3; B, p. 250.15–20): ... ’di byang chub kyi sems spangs pa ni thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes de’i rgyu spangs par ’gyur ro || de bzhin de sser byed pa dang gnod sems kyis ni de’i rtsa ba snying rje chen po spangs par ’gyur ro || dam pa’i chos spong bas ni || de’i mthar thug pa thabs la mkhas pa spangs par ’gyur te || de lla na thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes de thams cad du spangs par ’gyur ba’i phyir || ’di rnam la ltung ba’i rtsa ba chen por gsungs pa yin no ||.
The abandonment of *bodhicitta* (i.e., the second *mūlāpatti*) would cause the abandonment of the cause of the gnosis of omniscience (or of the Omniscient One). Similarly, greediness (*mātsarya*) and thoughts of cruelty (*vyāpāda*) (i.e., the third and fourth *mūlāpattis*, respectively) will cause the abandonment of great compassion, which is its root (i.e., the root of the gnosis of omniscience, and the abandonment of the Sublime Doctrine (i.e., the first *mūlāpatti*) would cause the abandonment of [the means of] bringing it to completion—[namely,] the efficient strategy. In such cases, the gnosis of omniscience will be wholly abandoned, and hence these are taught as being the great *mūlāpatti*.

(b) The Guhyatantra

The *Samvarasamgraha* states that there are thirteen cardinal transgressions (*mūlāpatti*) according to the *kriyātantras*.39 It is probably referring to the *Guhyatantra*, which proposes thirteen basic pledges (*rtsa ba'i dam tshig*), as follows:40 (1) placing firm confidence (*śraddhā*) in the Three Jewels, *bodhisattvas*, tantric knowledge (*vidyā*), and tantric formulas (*mantra*), (2) putting constant trust in the 'great seal' (*mahāmudrā*), (3) showing confidence in those who have taken pledges, in friends, and in teachers, (4) harbouring no aversion towards any deity, (5) making occasional offerings to the deities, (6) not showing reverence to

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39 *Samvarasamgraha* (P, fol. 255a4; D, fol. 45a4; S, vol. 41, p. 693.8–9): ... *kr ya'i rgyud kyi rtsa ba'i ltung ba bcu gsum...*

40 *Guhyatantra* (T, fols. 311b4–312a2; D, fols. 163b7–164a4):

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de nas bla mas [ma T] slob ma rnams ||
ma yengs legs par bkod nas su ||
shes rab pha rol phyin bklags te ||
dam tshig 'di la bsgo bar bya ||
[1] de ring phyin chad khyed rnams kyi ||
sangs rgyas chos dang dge 'dun aang ||
hyang chub sems dpa' rnams dang ni ||
rig sngags gsang sngags tshogs rnams la ||
dad pas [pa T] rab tu brten [brtan T] par bya ||
[2] rtag par phyag rgya chen po la ||
kyad par du ni mos par bya ||
[3] dam tshig can dang mda' bo dang ||
bta ma la yang gus par bya ||
[4] lha rnams kun la sdang mi bya ||
[6] sion pa gzan gvi gzhang mi mchod ||
[8] srog chags rnams la byams pa'i sems ||
rab tu brtan pa nye bar gzha ||
[9] rtag pa la ni dga' rnams kyi [kyi D] ||
bsod nams dag la nan tan bskyed ||
[10] bzlas brjod byed la 'bad pa yis [kyi T] ||
gsang sngags spyod la brtsan par bya ||
dam tshig rnams kyang bshung bar bya ||
[12] dam tshig med pa rnams la ni ||
sngags dang phyag rgya mi sbyin no ||
de yang bdag gis rtags par bya ||
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See the *mdo* rgyas (A, fols. 154b6–155a6; B, p. 251.5–17), where these verses are cited. See *ibid.* (A, fol. 154b5–6; B, p. 251.1–5), where, as an introduction to the citation, *rong-om-pa* states: *spyir bya ba'i rgyud rnams su bsgrub cing nyans su blang bar bya ba'i rtsa ba'i dam tshig ni bcu gsum du grags te | de yang 'di ltar bcom ldan 'das kyi rigs gsum gvi dkyil 'khor gyi bye brag tu gyi pa | dkyil 'khor sum stong lnga brgya snyed gsungs pa thams cad kyi spyi i cho ga bstan pa gsang ba'i rgyud las spyi'i rtsa ba'i dam tshig gsungs te |*. Cf. *Buddhaguhya's Taṅtārīṭhāvalāra* (P, fol. 12a3–7; D, fol. 10a4–b1; S, vol. 27, p. 1005.2–14).
treatises of non-Buddhist teachers, (7) showing hospitality to unexpected guests, (8) cultivating unflagging benevolence towards sentient beings, (9) making an earnest effort to generate beneficial resources (punya)—effort, that is, on the part of those who take delight in the vehicle (perhaps Mahāyāna), (10) being industrious in tantric conduct by diligently reciting mantras, (11) keeping all the pledges taught in the tantras, (12) not bestowing mantras and mudrās on those who have taken no pledges, and (13) protecting tantras and being oneself proficient in them. Rong-zom-pa then demonstrates how each of these thirteen basic pledges, in one way or another, concerns the maintenance of bodhicitta. He does not, however, strictly follow the sequence of thirteen pledges as they occur in the verses, but rather deals with related pledges together.41

These thirteen basic pledges include [those relating to] the four mūlāpattis explained above, and [also] encompass bodhicitta [in one way or another]. How so? The placing of firm confidence in the Three Jewels is the cause of [generating] bodhicitta.42 Constantly putting trust (adhimukti) in the mahāmudrā maintains the defining characteristics of bodhicitta. Placing firm confidence in deities of vidyā and mantra forms a foundation for the characteristics of bodhicitta. Showing respect to tantric masters [concerns the maintenance of bodhicitta, for they are] the providers of bodhicitta. Showing respect to those bound by pledges and to the friends of those bound by pledges [is justified, for they] are friends who are conducive to bodhicitta. Being industrious in tantric conduct by diligently reciting mantras can accelerate the attainment of bodhicitta. Not bestowing mantras and mudrās upon those not bound by pledges can prevent the destruction of bodhicitta. Not showing reverence to treatises of non-Buddhist teachers is to avoid what is not the cause of [generating] bodhicitta. Harbouring no aversion to any deity is to eliminate factors that hinder bodhicitta. Making an earnest effort to generate beneficial resources (punya) is an accessory factor conducive to bodhicitta. Cultivating unflagging benevolence towards sentient beings is to abandon thoughts of cruelty (vyāpāda), and making occasional offerings (pūja) to one's deity, tutelary deity,43 and guru, and offerings and donations (dāna) to non-Buddhists (bāhyaka) and visitors who are non-partisan (udāśina), will eliminate greediness (mātsarya). These will also remove factors opposed to bodhicitta and stabilise the root of great compassion (mahākarunā). Protecting tantric scriptures and being oneself proficient in them is to uphold the

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41 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 155a6–156a5; B, pp. 251.17–252.18): rtsa ba'i dam tshig bcu gsum po 'di dag gis kyang gong du bstan pa'i ltung ba'i rtsa ba bzhi yang bsad pa yin la | byang chub kyi sems yongs su bzung bar yang gyur ba [= pa] nyid yin no || ji la zhe na | dkon mchog gsum la dad pa brtan par bya ba ni | byang chub kyi sems kyi rgyu mshkan no || rtags tu phyag rgya chen po la lhaq par mos par bya ba ni | byang chub kyi sems kyi mshkan nyid bzung ba yin no || rig sngags dang gsang sngags kyi lha la dad pa brtan par bya ba ni | de bzhin du byang chub kyi sems kyi mshkan gzhi'o || rtags la gsal gyur bya ba ni | byang chub kyi sems sbyin par byed pa'o || dam tshig can dang dam tshig can gyi 'dzas [= mda'] bo rnam la gus par bya ba ni | byang chub kyi sems kyi mshkan mthun pa'i grogs so || bzas brjod la 'bad pas gsang sngags kyi spyod pa la brtson par bya ba ni | byang chub kyi sems myur du sgrub pa'o || dam tshig med pa la rnam la sngags dang phyag rgya mi sbyin na pa ni | byang chub kyi sems chud mi gsal pa'o || ston pa gzhon gyi gzhung mi mchod pa ni | byang chub kyi sems kyi rgyu mshkan ma yin pa spang ba'o || lha thams cad la sdang bar mi bya ba ni | byang chub kyi sems kyi gugs bsal ba'o || bsa'i rnam kyi tshogs la nan tan bskyed pa ni | byang chub kyi sems dang mthun pa'i yan lag go || srog chags rnyams la byams pa'i sems nye bar bzhag pa ni | gnod sems spong ba dang | rang gi lha dang | lhaq pa'i lha dang | bzas la dus mshkams kyi mchod pa bya ba dang | phyi rol par lha dang ma'i pa'i glo bur 'ba dag' [bdag B] la mchod pa dang | sbyin pa byed pas ni | ser sna byed pa spong bar 'gyur te | 'di dag kyang byang chub kyi sems kyi mthun pa bsal nas rtsa ba snying rje chen po brtan par byed pa'o || gsang sngags kyi rgyud rnyams kyi glegs ham bsrung zhing | de yang bdag gia rtags pa bya ba ni dam pa'i eks yongs su gzung ba ste | byang chub kyi sems kyi thabs ma mkhas pa yongs su 'dzin par byed pa ste | de baus na rtsa ba'i dam tshig bcu gsum po 'dis kyang dam tshig thams cads bsadus par shes par bya ba ste | gang dag 'dir ma gsungs pa rnyams kyung | gsang sngags rgyud las bstan pa yi || dam tshig rnyams kyung bsrung bar bya || zhes gsungs pa 'dir 'dus te | de bas na 'di dag ni thams cads kyi thun mong du bsrung bar bya ba yin la | gzhon las gsungs pa'i dam tshig rgyas pa rnyams kyung bsrung bar gsungs pa yin no ||

42 See also the dKon mchog 'grel (A, fol. 6b1; B, p. 33.1): dkon cog gsum gyi rang bzhi byang chub sens ||.

43 It is not clear what the difference between 'one's deity' (rang gi lha) and 'special deity' (lhaq pa'i lha) is.
Sublime Doctrine and to uphold efficient strategy regarding bodhicitta. Thus one should know that all pledges are included in these thirteen basic pledges, and ones not taught here are included in them as well, as stated:

One should also keep

The pledges taught in the [other] tantras of the Mantra[yāna].

Therefore these [thirteen pledges] are to be observed in common by all, and the detailed pledges taught elsewhere as well. So it is said.

In sum, what Rong-zom-pa is attempting to do here is to demonstrate how the thirteen basic pledges taught in the Guhyatrantra, a kriyātantra according to him, are bound up with the maintenance of bodhicitta. He is, however, aware that there are also other sets of basic pledges and śīkṣāpadas taught elsewhere, but he asserts that in essence they can all be subsumed under the basic pledges presented here.44

(c) The Susiddhikaratantra

The Susiddhikaratantra presents the abandonment of various kinds of ‘baseness’ (dausṭhulya) of body, speech, and mind,45 together with the four mūlāpattis in great detail. We shall here concentrate on its understanding of the mūlāpattis and on how they figure in in other Buddhist spiritual practices, particularly that of bodhicitta. The following precepts are mentioned in the Susiddhikaratantra:46 (1) take refuge three times daily, (2) confess negative deeds three times

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44 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 156a5–b1; B, p. 252.21–23): rgyud gzhon du cho ga zhib mo bstan pa dag las | bslab pa'i gzhis mang du gsungs pa 'yang | dam tshig gi sdom pa mang du rgyas par bshod pa rnams kyang rtsi ba 'di dag tsam du shes par bya'o ||.


46 Susiddhikaratantra (T, fol. 328a6–b4; D, fol. 174a7–b4):
[1] sgrub pa po ni blo can gyis ||
[2] dus gsum du yang skyabs su 'gro ||
[4] dus gsum byang chub sms kyangs bskyed ||
[5] rgyud mthong cho ga shes pa yis ||
[6] dus gsum du yang smon lam gdab ||
[7] !? cho gar spyad pa de dang de ||
[8] ji ltar 'dod par ci nus bya ||
[9] rtag tu giong la brtson pa dang ||
[10] jungs bral ['bral T] [7] snying rje ldan pa dang ||
[12] rtag tu brtson 'grus ldan par bya ||
[13] rjes su dran pu drug rnams kyang ||
[14] bsam pa des [nges D] pas rtag tu bsgom ||
[15] rnam pa sna tshogs chos mnyan nas ||
[16] mos po rnam par spyad par bya ||
[17] gsang sngags cho ga zhib bkgal cing ||
[18] sngags dang phyag rgya rnams kyang mchod ||
[19] cho ga las ni 'byung ba bzhi ||
[20] blo dang ldan pas dkyil 'khor bri ||
[21] yang dag lta ba nges gyur cing ||
[22] byang chub sms ni bstan byas la ||
[23] dge slong la sogs 'khor bzhi rnams ||
[24] mkhas pas rtag tu gzung bar bya ||
[25] dam tshig phyag rgya bcings nas su ||
[26] rang gi gsang sngags rgyud rnams bstan ||
[27] mkhas pas gsang sngags lung gi rnams ||
[28] thams cad yang dag rgyas par bya ||.
daily, (3) generate bodhicitta three times daily, (4) make aspirational wish (pranidhāna) three times daily on the strength of having studied the tantras and being knowledgeable about ritual procedures, (5) constantly make an earnest effort to practise giving (dāna), (6) be free from greediness (mātsarya), (7) be constantly endowed with compassion (karunā), (8) be constantly endowed with patience or receptivity (ksānti), (9) be constantly endowed with benevolence (maitrī), (10) be constantly endowed with diligence (vīrya), (11) constantly practise the six kinds of recollection (anusmṛti) with great suppleness (des pa) of mind, (12) listen to the various teachings (dharma), (13) analyse them with devotion (adhimukti), (14) recite detailed tantric ritual procedures (vīdhā), (15) make offerings of tantric formulas (mantra) and tantric gestures (mudrā), (16) draw mandalas in accordance with the stipulated procedures, (17) initiate the ‘four retinues’ who have a correct view (samyagdṛṣṭi) and firm bodhicitta, (18) expound tantras to those who abide by their pledges, and (19) propagate tantric scriptural transmissions.

The total number of precepts is not specified in the Susiddhikaratana verses cited by Rong-zom-pa. The figure nineteen is according to Rong-zom-pa, who arranged the precepts into six groups with varying numbers of precepts (4 + 3 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 8). A group which contains more than one precept is considered by him to contain ‘limbs’ or ‘ancillaries’ (yan lags). The enumeration of these precepts is, however, not certain. For example, Rong-zom-pa seems to ignore the precept between numbers 4 and 5. Let us take a closer look at how Rong-zom-pa attempts to interpret these precepts as they pertain to the maintenance of bodhicitta:

The mūlāpati that involves the abandonment of bodhicitta cannot possibly occur to one who maintains bodhicitta by means of the four limbs, namely, taking refuge three times daily, confessing negative deeds, generating bodhicitta, and making aspirational wish. The mūlāpati that involves [succumbing to] greediness cannot possibly occur to one who is endowed with the three limbs, namely, constantly making an earnest effort to give, being free from greediness, and being endowed with compassion. The mūlāpati that involves [harbouring] thoughts of cruelty (vyāpāda) cannot possibly occur to one who is endowed with two ‘limbs’, namely, constant possession of patience or receptivity (ksānti) and of benevolence (maitrī).

For an English translation of the Chinese translation, see GIEBEL 2001: 150. Cf. the citation in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 157a3–b2; B, pp. 253.18–254.5); ibid. (A, fol. 178a3–b2; B, pp. 278.23–279.9). Cf. the Kṛṣṇa-vemāritantrapāñjikā (P, fol. 199a6–b6; D, fol. 166a5–b4; S, vol. 23, p. 1139.4–21).

The Tibetan word employed for mātsarya is ‘jungs pa, which is recorded in the Tshig mdzod chen mo (s.v.) as an archaic word with the meaning of ser sna.

In the quoted text of the Susiddhikaratana (see n. 46), nos. 14 and 15 are counted as one, for good syntactic reasons, but Rong-zom-pa (see n. 54) counts them separately.

For Rong-zom-pa’s interpretation of this precept, see precept no. 7 in n. 54.

That is, (1) bhikṣus, (2) bhikṣunīs, (3) upāsakas, and (4) upāsikās (Tshig mdzod chen mo, s.v. ‘khor rnam bzhi).

According to some, however, the Susiddhikaratana teaches thirty pledges. See the Shes bya mdzod (p. 373.6–14).

See the precept marked with [? ] in n. 46. The verse seems to mean: “Whatever ritual procedure [a practitioner engages in] should be carried out as practicability dictates and to the best of [his or her] ability.”

mDo rgyas (A, fol. 157b2–5; B, p. 254.5–12): de la dus gsum du skyabs su ’gro ba dang [deng A] | sdi g pa bshags pa dang | byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa dang | sron lam gdab pa ste | ’di liar yan lag bzhi i sgo nas byang chub kyi sems ’dzin pa la ni | ltung ba’i rtsa ba byang chub kyi sems spong ba ’byung ba’i gnas med do | riag tu gton ba la brson pa dang | ’jungs pa dang bral ba dang | snying rje rdon pa ste | yan lag gsum dang ldn pa la ni ltung ba’i rtsa ba ser sna ’byung ba’i gnas med do || riag tu bzod pa dang byams par ldon pa ste yan lag gnyis dang ldn pa la ni | ltung ba’i rtsa ba gnod sems ’byung ba’i gnas med do ||.
So much for these three mūlāpattis. Concerning the mūlāpatti that involves the abandonment of the saddharma, the following explanation is given:54

The mūlāpatti that involves the abandonment of the saddharma cannot possibly occur to one who upholds (or maintains) the saddharma by virtue of possessing the eight limbs, as follows: [1] listening to the various teachings (dharma), [2] analysing [them] with devotion (adhimukti), [3] reading detailed tantric ritual procedures (vidhi), [4] making offerings (pūja), that is, making two offerings, [one] external and [one] internal, consisting [each of] tantric formulas (mantra) and tantric gestures (mudrā), [5] bestowing empowerments (abhiseka) and pledges upon disciples in a maṇḍala in accordance with (lit. without contravening) the ritual procedures (vidhi), [6] initiating the four kinds of followers—bhikṣus and so forth—who are firm in [their] bodhicitta,55 [7] expounding tantras of the Mantrā[ṇā] to those disciples, all the while abiding by the ‘seal’ (mudrā) of [one’s] pledges,56 and [8] propagating tantric scriptural transmissions.

To summarise, four of these precepts (nos. 1–4) are supposed to prevent one from committing the mūlāpatti of abandoning bodhicitta; three precepts (nos. 5–7), from committing the mūlāpatti of succumbing to greediness; two precepts (nos. 8–9), from committing the mūlāpatti of harbouring thoughts of cruelty (vyāpāda); and eight precepts (nos. 12–19), from committing the mūlāpatti of abandoning the Sublime Doctrine (saddharma). In addition, precept no. 10, the constant possession of diligence, is said to be compatible with all other precepts,57 and precept no. 11, consisting of the practice of the six kinds of mindfulness (anusmṛti), to be an antidote for all four mūlāpattis.58 The Susiddhikaratantra passage quoted by Rong-zom-pa mentions, to be sure, six anusmṛtis but does not list them. The six anusmṛtis as recorded, for example, in the Mahāvyutpattī,59 are buddhānusmṛti, dharmānusmṛti, samghānusmṛti, śīlānusmṛti, tyāgānusmṛti, and devatānusmṛti. Instead of śīlānusmṛti, Rong-zom-pa has anāpānānusmṛti (‘mindfulness of breathing’).60 He states:61

Also, amongst the six kinds of anusmṛtis, the anusmṛtis pertaining to the Three Jewels (i.e. buddhānusmṛti, dharmānusmṛti, and samghānusmṛti) are what causes bodhicitta to arise and the efficacy of strategies (upāyakauśalya) to be maintained. Two, namely, tyāgānusmṛti


55 Note that the pertinent verse in the Susiddhikaratantra has also the ascertainment of the correct view (samyagdṛṣṭi), which is omitted by Rong-zom-pa.

56 Or, perhaps: “expounding tantras of the Mantrā[ṇā] to those disciples who abide by the ‘seal’ (mudrā) of pledges.”

57 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 157b5; B, p. 254.12): brtsong 'grus ni kun gyi grogs so ||.

58 See n. 61.

59 Mahāvyutpattī, nos. 1148–1154; BHSD, s.v. anusmṛti.

60 See BHSD, s.vv. anusmṛti and anāpāṇāna.

61 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 157b5–158a2; B, p. 254.12–18): rjes su dran pa drug kyang dkon mchod gsum rjes su dran pa gsum ni | byang chub kyi sems 'byang ba'i rgyu dang thabs la mkhas pa 'dzin pa'i rgyu'o || gtong ba rjes su dran pa dang | lha rjes su dran pa gnis ni | rgyu dang 'bras bu gnis kyi sgo nas ser sna dang gnod sems kyi gnyen po'o || dbug [dbug B] phyi nang du rgyu ba rjes su dran pa ni rnams par ma zhi ba'i gnyen po ste | de dag kyang bsam pa des pas bsogam pas ni khengs pa dang dregs rgyags kyi gnyen po 'gyur te | de bas na rjes su dran pa drug po 'di nyid kyis kyang lung ba'i rtsa ba bchi'i gnyen po 'gyur ro ||.
(‘mindfulness of giving’) and devatānusmṛti (‘mindfulness of deities’), are, in terms of cause and result, antidotes for greediness (mātsarya) and cruelty (vyāpāda), [respectively]. The ṣnāpānānusmṛti is an antidote for restlessness (or unrestlessness). The practice of these with a gentle attitude (sauratya) will be an antidote for haughtiness (unmati) and arrogance (mada).

Therefore, the six amusmṛtis, too, can [serve as] antidotes for the four mulāpattis.

Rong-zom-pa concludes his discussion of the precepts presented in the Susiddhikaratantra with the following remarks:62

In some treatises there is also the statement that there are five [sikṣāpadas], namely, the four sikṣāpadas pertaining to [the abandonment of] the four mulāpattis, and the abandonment of meat and alcohol as the fifth. Of the latter, the abandonment of meat is [associated with] the maintenance of great compassion. Cruelty (vyāpāda) and greediness (mātsarya) will recede from one who possesses it (i.e. great compassion). Therefore, all the vows (saṃvara) taught in Mahāyāna are supplementary elements in the maintenance of bodhicitta.

(d) The Subāhuparipṛcchātantra

Finally, let us look at how the sikṣāpadas, the pledges, and the maintenance of bodhicitta are dealt with in another kṛiyātantra, namely, the Subāhuparipṛcchātantra. The Subāhuparipṛcchātantra devises an ethical-spiritual code of nine precepts:63 (1) avoiding greediness (mātsarya), (2) avoiding conceit (*darpa), (3) avoiding arrogance (*mada), (4) avoiding causing harm (*apakāra), (5) avoiding alcoholic consumption,65 (6) avoiding harsh words (pārusya), (7) avoiding vain words (pralāpa), (8) avoiding slanderous words (paśunyā), and (9) avoiding false views (mithyādṛṣṭi). The first four sikṣāpadas involve not committing the four mulāpattis, which are, however, not identical with what we have seen thus far.66 Obviously, the sikṣāpadas associated with the mind or with attitude are here considered to be more important. The correct view (saṃyagdṛṣṭi) is given a prominent status, the abandonment of false views (mithyādṛṣṭi) being considered the root of the sikṣāpadas. The tantra compares a mind overcome by false views to a burnt seed, which is incapable of giving rise to any wholesome virtue.67

62 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 158a4–6; B, p. 255.1–5): gzhung la las ni bslab pa ’i gzhi rtsa ba bzhi dang sha chang spang ba ste lngr gungs pa yang yod na | de la sha spang ba ni snying rje chen po ’dzin pa yin la | gang de yod na gnod sms dang ser sna yang ldog par ’gyur te | de bas na theg pa chen por gungs pa ’i sdom pa thams cad kyung byang chub kyi sms gzung ba ’i yan lag yin no ||.

63 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 156b1–2; B, pp. 252.23–253.2): de yang rgyud thams cad kyi spyi’i bsgrub pa ’i cho ga rgyas par bstn pa dpung bzang gis zhus pa las ni bslab pa ’i gzhi dgu gungs te | ’di litar | rtsa ba bzhi | chang dad [dang B] byed pa dang | tshig rtsb mo dang | kyal pa dang | phra ma smra ba dang | log par lla ba spang ba dang gdu gungs so ||; ibid. (A, fol. 158a6–b1; B, p. 255.5–7): phags pa dpung bzang gis zhus pa las ni | gong du bstan pa bzhi dun | ser sna dang dregs rgyags dang gnod sms spang pa’ang gungs la.... See also the citation in ibid. (A, fol. 185a4–6; B, pp. 286.22–287.2). Cf. the Subāhuparipṛcchātantra (T, fol. 390a6–b1; D, fol. 118b2–4).

64 TSD, s.v. rgyags pa.

65 Note that the xylographic edition of the text (A) reads chang dang byed pa, which must mean something like ‘craving for alcohol’ (see Jäschke, s.v. dad pa: secondary form of ‘dod pa’), whereas the modern edition (B) reads chang dang byed pa, which makes no sense.

66 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 156b5; B, p. 253.9–10): litung ba’i rtsa ba’ang | ser sna dang | dregs pa ’ang | rgyags pa dang | gnod par byed pa spang bar gungs te |.

67 Subāhuparipṛcchātantra (T, fol. 390b1–3; D, fol. 118b4–5):

  dper na sa dang chu dang dus ldan yang ||
  sa bon tshig pa myu gu mi skye litar ||
  de bzhin mi shes log las bcom pa yi ||
The Subāhupariprcchātantra also deals with the characteristic Mahāyāna ethical-moral discipline including the generation of bodhicitta cut off faith (sādābhā). According to it, just as a king endowed with the ‘seven limbs’ can conquer the world without difficulty, so too can a tantric practitioner (māṇtriṇ) endowed with the seven limbs specified below conquer evil deeds (pāpa). The seven limbs pertaining to the maintenance of bodhicitta are, according to the Subāhupariprcchātantra, the following: (1) ethical-moral discipline (sīla), (2) diligence (vīrya), (3) endurance or receptivity (ksānti), (4) faith (sādābhā), (5) bodhicitta, (6) mantra, and (7) absence of lazziness (kausīḍya). Rong-zom-pa briefly explains the seven as follows:  

[1] The ethical-moral discipline consisting in vows (samvarāśila) is the basis and the root of bodhicitta. [2] Diligence (vīrya) is the impetus [behind it]. [3] Endurance (ksānti) is the acceptance [of bodhicitta]. [4] Faith (sādābhā) is [its] cause. [5] Mantras are a quick [means of] attaining [it]. [6] Learning [is characterised by] the absence of lazziness (kausīḍya). [These six and bodhicitta (i.e. no. 5)] embody the nature of the seven limbs of awakening (bodhyanga). [7] The nature of bodhicitta itself is here [seen to be] the power (bala) of prāṇidhīcchita. If one possesses it, one is able to keep all vows (samvarac, and there are no broken and [seemingly] irreparable prātimokṣa vows that cannot be restored if renewed by the power of this bodhicitta. 

Rong-zom-pa also states that in both Kriyā and Yoga tantric systems the application of one’s body, speech, and mind to the yogic practices pertaining to deities in reliance upon bodhicitta constitutes the principal part of all pledges (samaya).  

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`sams la [las T] dge ba’i chos rnams mi skye ’o ||
de phyir log pa lta ba rnam sngags la ||
yang dam lta be la ni rten [bsten T] par gyis ||
See also the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 156b3–4, 185b1–2; B, pp. 253.5–8, 287.4–7).  

68 Subāhupariprcchātantra (T, fol. 390a5–6; D, fol. 118b2–3):
de yis bde bar gshugs la dad bslyed nas ||
de bzhin du ni byang chub sems kyang bskyed ||
ser sna drags dang rgyas pa pnams [rnams T] spangs te ||
dkon mchog gsum la dad ‘pas bsnyen bkur [pa bsten par T] bya ||
See also the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 185a4–5; B, p. 286.21–23); ibid. (A, fol. 156b1–6; B, pp. 252.23–253.11): ... dpung ‘dzang gis zhus pa las ni ... gzhon yang dad pas byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa dang | dkon mchog gsum la dad pas brten par bya ba ia sogs pa yang gsungs so ||

69 Cf. the term saptagana ‘consisting of 7 [units of] troops’ (MW, s.v. sapa), and also the term cauranga (Mahāvyutpatti, nos. 3638–3641).  

70 Subāhupariprcchātantra (T, fol. 417b1–2; D, fol. 138b4–5):
sngags kyi rtsa ba dang po tshul khrims te ||
de nas brtson ’grus dang ni bzod pa dang ||
rgyal ba la ni dad [bzod T] dang byang chub sems ||
gsang sngags dang ni le lo med pa o ||
ji [de T] ltar mi dbang yan lag bsdun ldan pa ||
skyo ba med par skye dugi ’dlu bar byed ||
See the citation in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 158a6–b7; B, p. 255.5–12), where the text corresponds with the reading in D. The verses are also cited in ibid. (A, fol. 197a3–4; B, p. 300.15–19).  

71 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 158b3–5; B, p. 255.12–18); de la sdom pa’i tshul khrims ni byang chub kyi sems kyi gzhi dang rtsa ba’o || brtson ’grus ni bskul ba’o || bzod pa ni ’dzin pa’o || ’dad pa ni rgyu’o || gsang sngags ni myur du bsgrub pa’o || thos pa ni le lo med pa stey byang chub yan lag bsdun gyi rang bzhin no || byang chub kyi sems kyi rang gi ngo bo ni || dir smon pa’i sems stobs te || ’di yod na sdom pa kun kyang ’dzin par nas shing || so so thar pa’i sdom pa zhig cing gser mi rung bar gyur pa pnams kyang ’di’i stobs la brien nas blangs na mi ’thob pa med do zhes so ||

72 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 201a5–6; B, p. 305.13–17); mdor na byang chub kyi sems la brien nas rang gi lus ngag yid gsum lha’i rnal ’byor du bya ba ’di ni dam tshig thams cad kyi dngos gzhir gyur pa bya’i rgyud dang rnal ’byor
4. Pledges and the Maintenance of Bodhicitta in the Yogatantras

We shall now examine the pledges and the maintenance of bodhicitta as presented in the yogatantras (rnal ’byor gyi rgyud). As noted by Kong-sprul, there are too many pledges and transgressions (āpatti) in the yogatantras to be summarised along consistent lines.73 I use the term yogatantra here in a narrow sense of the word to refer to only what is occasionally called ‘outer yoga’ (rnal ’byor phyi pa),74 which excludes all ‘inner tantras’ (nang rgyud) or mahāyogatantras (rnal ’byor chen po’i rgyud), which in turn should be differentiated from tantras belonging to the Mahāyoga class, to which we shall return later. For Rong-zom-pa, tantras such as the Durgatiparīśodhanatantra, Vajraśikharatantra,75 Śrīparamādyatantra,76 and Tattvasaṃgrahasūtra77 are yogatantras.

(a) The Durgatiparīśodhanatantra

Again we may begin by considering the various schemes of sīkṣāpadas and pledges. The Durgatiparīśodhanatantra mentions the following seven sīkṣāpadas:78 (1) not killing, (2) not stealing, (3) not telling lies, (4) not committing sexual misconduct, (5) not consuming alcohol, (6) not eating meat or the like,79 and (7) never injuring sentient beings.80 As for the basic


73 Shes bya mdo (p. 377.20–21): spyi rnal ’byor rgyud las dam tshig dang ltung ba’i rnam grangs bsad pa ni shin tu mang bas mtha’ gcig tu bsdu mi nus so ||.

74 For references, see n. 27.

75 The Vajraśikharatantra (or Vajraśikharatantra) is designated by Rong-zom-pa as a yogatantra (rnal ’byor gyi rgyud) and as an ‘outer tantra’ (phyi’i rgyud). See the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 152b6–153a1; B, p. 248.18–21): tshul ’di ni bya ba’i rgyud ’ba’ zhig tu ma zad [thad B] kyi | rnal ’byor gyi rgyud du yang de bzhin du gsungs te | rnal ’byor gyi rgyud thams cad kyi dgongs pa dang cho ga ston pa phyi’i rgyud rdo rje rtse mo las...); ibid. (A, fol. 227b3: B, p. 336.10–11): rnal ’byor gyi rgyud du’ang rdo rje rtse mo lla bu ni spyi’i tshul bstan pa’i. See also the Nyang ral chos ’byung (p. 309.19), where it is treated as one of the four outer yogatantras. Cf. the title Vajraśekhara in HUDGE 2003: 11, 12. For an English translation of the Vajraśekhara Tantra from the Chinese translation (Taishō, vol. 18, no. 865) by Amoghavajra (705–774), see GIEBEL 2001: 1–107.

76 The Śrīparamādyatantra is also considered to be a yogatantra in the Nyang ral chos ’byung (p. 309.19). For some details on the Tibetan translation of this tantra, see DE JONG 1979: 635.

77 Note that while the Tattvasaṃgrahasūtra is, according to some, a yogatantra, according to others it is a mahāyogatantra. See the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 227b3: B, p. 336.10–12): rnal ’byor gyi rgyud du’ang ... ta twa sang gra ha lta bu ni zab mo’i tshul bstan pa’o zhes grags so || de nyid kyi [= kyi] dbang gis ta twa sang gra ka ni rnal ’byor chen po’i rgyud yin no zhes kyang zer ro ||. It is also classified as a yogatantra in the Nyang ral chos ’byung (p. 309.18).

78 The Durgatiparīśodhanatantra, as cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 209a4–5; B, p. 314.19–22):

khyod kyi srog chags bsad mi bya ||
ma byin par yang blang mi bya ||
rzsun dang ’dod pa spyod pa rnam ||
dngos grub ’dod pas bya ba min ||
chong ni btung bar mi bya zhing ||
sha la sogs pa bza’ mi bya ||
sems can gnod par sbyor ba ni ||
nam [nams B] yang bya ba ma yin no ||.

Cf. the Durgatiparīśodhanatantra (Tib, A, p. 316.27–31).

79 The phrase ‘or the like’ here is probably intended to include fish.
pledges (*rtsa ba'i dam tshig*). Rong-zom-pa states that, in most cases (*phal cher*), there are seven basic pledges according to the *Durgatiparipāṣodhanatantra*. If I understand him correctly, these seven are:

80 (1) not abandoning the Three Jewels, (2) not abandoning *bodhicitta*, (3) not abandoning *hrdayas, mantras*, and *mudrās*, (4) not abandoning *devatās*, (5) not abandoning one’s *guru* (or *vajrācārye*), (6) not insulting one’s Vajra brothers (*vajrabhrātrī*), Vajra sisters (*vajrabhaginī*), or Vajra consorts (*vajrā*), and (7) not revealing tantric secrets. It is to be noted, however, that these seven are, in Rong-zom-pa’s own words, not found ‘in one cluster’ (*tshoms gcig tu*) in the *Durgatiparipāṣodhanatantra* and are, in fact, not specified as seven. The first five are found together in one passage, the fifth is mentioned again together with the sixth in another passage, and the seventh is mentioned separately in yet another passage. Theoretically, one could enumerate the non-abandonment of the Three Jewels as three, the non-abandonment of *hrdayas, mantras*, and *mudrās* as three, and so forth. But, as far as I can see, Rong-zom-pa counted the basic pledges as I have indicated above. That the non-abandonment of *mantras* and *mudrās* could be treated as one was, in any case, known to Rong-zom-pa from the *Guhyagarbhatantra*, where the non-abandonment of the two is listed as one of five basic pledges.

He also justifies why these seven pledges, although scattered in different places in the *Durgatiparipāṣodhanatantra*, can still be considered basic pledges. That only five (and not all seven) basic pledges are taught in one cluster can, according to him, be explained by the fact that the *yogatantras* do not emphasise group practice in a *mandala* (*tshogs kyi dkyil 'khor gyi sgrub pa*), there being hence no need to stress the sixth and seventh basic pledges, which are connected with fellow tantric practitioners and with the disclosure of secret tantric activities.83

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80 *Durgatiparipāṣodhanatantra* (p. 216.22–23):

prāṇinās ca na samhātyā adatam naiva cāhāre ||

mrṣā naiva ca bhāṣeta nācaret ātparaśtriya ||

See also *ibid.* (Tib. A, p. 351.24–25) and the citation in the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 209b2–3; B, p. 315.5–6):

sroṅ chags rnam ni bsdad gyi bya ||

ma byin par yang mi blang zhing ||

rdzun du smra ba bya ba min ||

pho rol bud med spyad mi bya ||.


82 The term *rdo rje* ma seems to refer here to female consorts rather than to female tantric deities (cf. *TSD*, s.v. *rdo rje ma*).

83 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 210a2–6; B, pp. 315.19–316.3): *gang dag 'di skad du 'di dag tshoms gcig tu gril nas ma gsungs pas risa bar 'gyur bar nges pa med do zhes bsam par mi bya ste || 'di ltae tshe dpag med kyi dkyil 'khor du dbang bsdkar ba rgyas par gsungs pa || rtsa ba'i dkyil 'khor la sos pa gzhon du sbyar du mi rung ba med pa bzhin no || 'di dag tshoms gcig tu ma gsungs pa'i dgon pa 'di yin par dgon pa* ||[8] *raal 'byor gyi rgyud 'di dag tu tshogs kyi dkyil 'khor gyi sgrub pa gtsor ma bstan pas || de i phyir rdo rje mehed kyi dam tshig dang*
Thus only the first five out of the seven are regarded as principal basic pledges. These recur in
the Durgatipariśodhanatrantra in slightly different wording. Rong-zom-pa has made it clear
that the Yoga tantric system follows the scheme of fourteen mūlāpattis. Nevertheless, it
seems that these fourteen mūlāpattis are not found in the Durgatipariśodhanatrantra.

(b) The Vajraśikharaṇatrantra

We shall now examine what the next yogatantra, namely, the Vajraśikharaṇatrantra, has to say
about the sīksāpadas, basic pledges, and mūlāpattis. The sīksāpadas taught in the
Vajraśikharaṇatrantra, according to Rong-zom-pa, involve adopting ten courses of wholesome

gsang ba'i spyod pa mi bstan cing mi smra ba'i dam tshig la yang | yang dang yang nan tan bskyed mi dgos te
gsor nan tan bskyed pa ni rnam pa lnga yin par dgongs te | de'i phyir rtsa ba'i dkyil 'khor du'ang tshoms gcig
tu lnga po gtsor bstan la |.

84 Durgatipariśodhanatrantra, as cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 210a6–b2; B, p. 316.4–8):
dkon mchog gsum dang byang chub sems ||
bla ma dam pa rnam mi spang ||
bla ma smad pa mi bya ste ||
de yi grii ma 'gom mi bya ||
slob dpon ma yin mi gzung la ||
rdo rje slob dpon mtshan mi brjod ||
sngags dang phyag rgya mi smad de ||
tha rnam la lta smos ci dgos ||
ci ste glen pas smad na ni ||
nad kyi nges par 'chi bar 'gyur ||.


85 See n. 94.

86 Vajraśikharaṇatrantra, as cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 209a5–b1; B, pp. 314.22–315.2):
khyod kyi srog chags bsad mi bya ||
ma bya par yang blang mi bya ||
rdzun pa'i tshig nyid smra mi bya ||
nyes pa kun gyi rtsa ba yin [= yi] ||
myos byed bsung ba rnam [rnam B] par spang ||
bya ba ma yin spang ba nyid ||
rrnal 'byor pa la bsnyen bkur bya ||
lus kyi las ni rnam gsum dang ||
gdag gi yang ni rnam pa bzhi ||
yid kyi rnam pa gsum dag ni ||
rtag tu spang zhih bsrang bar bya ||.

Cf. Vajraśikharaṇatrantra (D, fol. 156b4–6):
khyod kyi srog chags gsad mi bya ||
ma byin pa yang blang mi bya ||
'dod pas log par g yem mi bya ||
brdzun du yang ni smra mi bya ||
nyes pa kun gyi rtsa ba yi ||
chang dag 'thung ba spang bar bya ||
bya ba ma yin thams cad dor ||
mchog tu sems can gdul bar bya ||
dam pa rnam la rim gro dang ||
rrnal 'byor pa rnam bsnyen bkur bya ||
rrnal 'byor rig pa bsgrub pa'i phyir ||
mkhas pa rnam la bsten par bya ||
lus kyi las ni rnam gsum dang ||
gdag gi yang ni rnam pa bzhi ||
yid kyi rnam pa gsum dag kyang ||
cci nus par ni bsrang bar bya ||.
attitude or action *(daśa[kṣa]lakarmapatha[sa]masadāna)* in general,\(^{87}\) and of avoiding the four mūlāpattis (such as homicide) and lesser failings (such as consumption of intoxicating drinks) in particular.\(^{88}\) The details of the śikṣāpadas taught in the two *yogatantras*, the *Vajraśikharatantra* and the *Durtapiṣṭodhanatantra*, however, differ slightly. For example, while the consumption of alcoholic drinks is mentioned in both, the consumption of meat is mentioned only in the *Durtapiṣṭodhanatantra*. We have seen above that Rong-zom-pa put together seven basic pledges of the *Durtapiṣṭodhanatantra*, of which five are principal ones. These five main pledges are also mentioned in the *Vajraśikharatantra*, as follows:\(^{89}\) (1) adopting the Three Jewels, (2) adopting a 'chief' (*gtso bo*), (3) not abandoning *bodhicitta*, (4) not abandoning devatās, and (5) not abandoning *mantras* and *mudrās*. Minor differences are noticeable in the sequence and the terminology employed. It is, however, possible that the sequence varies due to the Tibetan translation. Presumably, the term 'chief' should be understood to be referring to the tantric master or *guru*.

The *Vajraśikharatantra*, unlike the *Durtapiṣṭodhanatantra*, proposes a scheme of fourteen mūlāpattis, or, when positively formulated, fourteen basic precepts.\(^{90}\) Rong-zom-pa

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\(^{87}\) For the term *daśa[kṣa]lakarmapatha[sa]masadāna*, see BHSD, s.v. *karmapatha*.

\(^{88}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 209a1–2; B, p. 314.14–16): *diṅ yang bshlab pa’i gzhis ni dge ba bcu’i las cā yi lam yang dag par blang ba dang | khyad par du’ang srog go드 pa la sogs pa rtsa ba bzhis yan lag dang bcos pa spang bar gungs te |

\(^{89}\) *Vajraśikharatantra* (T, fol. 96a1–3; D, fol. 211b3–5):

sangs rgyas chos dang dge ’dun dang ||
gtso bo da [= de] dag lhur blang bya ||
’tsho ba’i srog gi phyir yang ni ||
byang sams nges par dor mi bya ||
la rnam la ni smad mi bya ||
snags dang phyag rgya nom yang min ||.

See the citation in the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 210b2–3, 222a3–4; B, pp. 316. 8–10, 329.17–19).

\(^{90}\) *Vajraśikharatantra*, as cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 211a1–5; B, pp. 316.20–317.9):

sangs rgyas rnal ’byor sdom pa la ||
sdom pa yi ni tshul khrims dang ||
dge ba’i chos ni bsdu ba dang ||
sems can don bya tshul khrims gsum ||
de dag brtan por gzung bar bya ||
sangs rgyas chos dang dge ’dun te ||
bla na med pa’i dkon mchog gsum ||
deng nas brtams te gzung bar bya ||
rdzogs rje rigs mchog chen po yi ||
rdo rje dril bu phyag rgya yang ||
blo gros chen po khyod kyi gzung ||
byang chub sams gang de rdo rje ||
shes rab dril bu zhes su bzhod ||
slob dpun yang ni bzungs bya ste ||
bla ma sangs rgyas kun dang mnyam ||
rin chen rigs mchog chen po yi ||
dam tshig yid du ’ong ba la ||
nyin re bzhin du lan drug tu ||
zang zin byams dang mi ’jigs chos ||
sbyin pa rnam bzhis riug tu sbyin ||
pad ma’i rigs mchog dang pa la ||
phyi rang [= dang] rgsang ba’i theg pa gsum ||
dam pa’i chos ni rab tu gzung ||
conveniently enumerates the fourteen basic precepts by sorting them out according to the so-called ‘five families’ (pañcakula),\(^1\) (1) four limbs for the Tathāgata family, namely, holding fast to three kinds of śīla, which are counted as three, and holding fast to the Three Jewels, counted as one, (2) two limbs for the Vajra family, namely, holding fast to bodhicitta and adhering to a vajrācārya, (3) four limbs for the Ratna family, namely, making gifts of material things (āmiśa), benevolence (maitrī), security or protection (abhaya), and doctrine (dharma),\(^2\) (4) two limbs for the Padma family, namely, holding fast to the saddharma of three outer and three inner vehicles,\(^3\) and (5) two limbs for the Karma family, namely, paying homage to noble beings (e.g. a bodhisattva of the first bhāmi and higher) and acting for the benefit of sentient beings.

Rong-zom-pa notes that the generation of bodhicitta is common to all fourteen limbs. According to him, the Kriyā tantric system mainly follows the pattern of four basic mūlapattis, whereas the Yoga tantric system follows the model of fourteen mūlapattis. He adds that the four mūlapattis found in the non-tantric and conservative Mahāyāna and in the Kriyā system of the Vajrayāna can be accommodated within the fourteen mūlapattis of the Yoga system.\(^4\) This is done by employing the positive term ‘pledge’ (samaya) and not the

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\(\text{las kyi rigs mchog chen po yi ||}
\text{sdom pa thams cad ldan par ni ||}
\text{sems can kun don bya ba dang ||}
\text{mchod pa‘i las rnam ci nus bya ||}
\text{phas pham zhes bya de dag ni ||}
\text{bcu bzhi dag tu ‘dod pa gzhan ||}
\text{dor ba mi bya smad mi bya ||}
\text{rtsa ba‘i ltung ba zhes byar bshad ||}
\text{nyin dang mtshan [tsan B] mo lan gsum du ||}
\text{nyin re bzhi ni blas par bya ||}
\text{gal te rnal ‘byor nyams gyur na ||}
\text{rtsa ba‘i ltung ba gyur pa yin ||}

See also the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 210b6; B, p. 316.18–19): de yang ‘di ltar dpal rdo rje rtse mo‘i rgyud las | lha khyad par gyi sdom pa‘i dhang du byas nas rtsa ba‘i ltung ba bcu bzhi gsums te |. Cf., however, the set of pledges in the Vajraśikharaṭantra (T, fol.s 58a2–59a7; D, fol.s 183a7–184a7). The translation of the Vajraśikharatrantra used by Rong-zom-pa seems to have differed considerably from the one found in the bKa’-‘gyur.\(^5\) The Sanskrit text of this rather popular verse is extant (see, for example, TSD, s.v. gsang ba) and the translation is certainly a mistake. The orthographic similarity between dang and nang, and the perfect sense phyi nang gsang ba‘i theg pa makes to a Tibetan scholar (phyi nang gsang gsum being a quite common expression), can explain this rather inevitable mistake. That Rong-zom-pa himself read dang can be deduced from the fact that, based on this verse, he counted one outer vehicle and three secret vehicles. See the passage dealing with four vehicles in chapter five.

\(^1\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 211b2–5; B, p. 317.13–20): ‘dir yan lag bcu bzhi hgrang ba ni byang chub kyi sems bskyed pa spiyi btang ste | de bzhi gshigs pa‘i rigs la tshul khrims rnam pa gsum gzung ba dang | dikon mchog gsum bzung ba ste yan lag bzhi rdo rje‘i rigs la byang chub kyi sems gzung ba dang rdo rje slob dpon gzung ba ste yan lag gnyis | rin po che‘i rigs la sbyin pa rnam [rnam B] pa bzhi gzung ba ste yan lag bzhi | pad ma‘i rigs la phyi‘i theg pa gsum gzung ba dang | gsang ba‘i theg pa gsum gzung ba ste yan lag gnyis | las kyi rigs la ‘phags pa mchod pa dang sems can gyi don bya ba ste yan lag gnyis te | de ltar bcu bzhi ni phas pham pa zhes bya ste rtsa ba‘i ltung ba bcu bzhi zhes grags so ||.

\(^2\) Three kinds of dāna are commonly known (DAYAL 1932: 173; TSD, s.v. zang zing gi sbyin pa), namely, making gifts of material things (āmiśa), security or protection (abhaya), and doctrine (dharma). The conferring of benevolence (maitrī) is, hence, somewhat unusual.

\(^3\) For the three outer vehicles (phyi‘i theg pa gsum) and three secret vehicles (gsang ba‘i theg pa gsum), see Rong-zom-pa’s explanation of the four-vehicle model in chapter five.

\(^4\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 210b5–6; B, p. 316.15–18): gzhan yang bya ba‘i rgyud las ni rtsa ba‘i ltung ba bzhi gtson gzha la | rnal ‘byor gyi rgyud du ni rtsa ba‘i ltung ba bcu bzhi zhes bstan te | des ni snga ma‘i rtsa ba‘i ltung ba bzhi‘ang ‘dus la de bas lhag pa‘ang rtsa ba‘i ltung bar bstan to ||.
negative term ‘transgression’ (āpatti). That is to say, the non-abandonment of the Sublime Doctrine (saddhārma) is included in the pledge pertaining to the Padma family, the non-abandonment of bodhicitta is included in the pledge pertaining to the Vajra family, not nourishing greediness (mātārīya) is included in the pledge pertaining to the Ratna family, not inflicting injury to sentient beings is included in the pledge pertaining to the Truthgata family, and all activities associated with the precepts (samvara) are included in the pledge pertaining to the Karma family.

Let us now consider the relevance of the maintenance of bodhicitta within the framework of these fourteen basic precepts. Rong-zom-pa states:

As for how bodhicitta can be maintained on the basis of these explanations of the śikṣāpadas, basic [precepts], and mūlāpattis, this should be known as explained above in the context of the Kriyā tantric [system]. Here, too, in the context of the [fourteen] basic precepts, [it is] therefore [explained as follows:] Holding fast to the three śīlas is the foundation of bodhicitta. Likewise, holding fast to the Three Jewels is the cause of bodhicitta. Holding fast to bodhicitta is its actual essence. The vajrācārya is the conferrer of bodhicitta. The four kinds of giving (dāna) are the antidotes for the factors opposing it (i.e. bodhicitta). Upholding the saddhārma is to hold fast to the efficient strategies [necessary for salvific activities]. Paying homage to the noble ones and acting for the benefit of sentient beings is to accomplish the activities natural to it. In this way, [relying on the commits] all these fourteen mūlāpattis (i.e. keeping the fourteen basic precepts) is seen to be ancillary to the maintenance of bodhicitta.

(c) The Śrīparamādyatantra

The Śrīparamādyatantra, also belonging to the Yoga class, mentions seven pledges, all of which, according to Rong-zom-pa, serve to maintain bodhicitta. Interestingly, forty-two original Sanskrit verses of the Śrīparamādyatantra containing the seven pledges have been a subject of several publications among specialists in Old Javanese literature, beginning from as early as 1910. These Sanskrit verses became known to the specialists when the Old Javanese was translated and commented. Several scholars—primarily J. Kats, J. S. Speyer, K. Wulff, H. von Glasenapp, Unrai Wogihara, Sakai Shiro, and J. W. de Jong—have contributed in different ways to the study of these verses. Rong-zom-pa cites nine and a half verses (roughly corresponding to the verses numbered 28–36 in de Jong’s edition). According to

95 *mDo rgyas* (A, fol. 211a6–b2; B, p. 317.9–13): de ltar na gong gi rtsa ba'i lhun ba bzhis'ang | 'dus te | dam pa'i chos mi spang ba ni pad ma'i rigs | byang chub kyi sms pa'i gtsang ba ni rdo rje'i rigs | ser sna mi bya ba ni rin po che'i rigs | sms can la gnod pa mi bya ba ni de bzhin gskhegs pa'i rigs | sdom pa thams cad kyi las ni las kyi rigs so |.

96 *mDo rgyas* (A, fols. 211b5–212a3; B, pp. 317.20–318.6): de ltar bslab pa'i gzi dang rtsa ba dang rtsa ba'i lhun ba bshad pa de dag gis kyang byang chub kyi sms yongs su'dzin pa ji ltar 'gyur ba ni | gong du bya ba'i rgyud kyi skabs su ji ltar bstan pa bzhin du 'dir yang shes par bya'o || de bas na rtsa ba'i skabs 'dir ['dar A] yang | tshul khrims gsum gzung ba ni byang chub kyi sms kyi gzi'o || de bzhin du dkon mchog gsum gzung ba ni de'i rgyu ntsan no || byang chub kyi [kys B] sms gzung ba ni rtag gi ngo bo'o || rdo rje slob dpon ni de sbzins par byed pa'o || sbzin pa rnam pa bzhis ni | de'i mi mhung pa'i phug phug kyi bynyen po'o || dam pa'i chos yongs su byung ba ni de'i thabs la mkhas pa'dzin par byed pa'o || 'phags pa mchod pa dang sms can gyi don bya ba ni | de'i 'phrin las yongs su sgrub pa ste | de ltar na rtsa ba'i lhun ba bcu bzhis po 'di dag gis kyang byang chub kyi sms yongs su gzung ba'i yan lag tu gyer pa'o ||.

97 *mDo rgyas* (A, fol. 212a3–4; B, p. 318.6–8): gshen yang dpal mchog dang po las | lha thun mong gi sdom pa'i dbang du gsums pa | rtsa ba'i lhun bar gyur pa | byang chub kyi sms yongs su gzung ba'i yan lag tu gyur pa | dam ishig dbun gsums te |.

98 For an account of these scholars’ study of the Sanskrit verses of the Śrīparamādyatantra, see DE JONG 1979: 619–622.
him, the Śrīparamādyantarā in general teaches how to abide by the directives (ājñā) of the buddhas. In particular, it has laid down seven pledges, which can be grouped into ‘six kinds of things that should not be done’ (bya ba ma yin pa rnam pa drug), and ‘three which should always be done’ (rtag tu bya ba gsum), the latter being counted as one.\footnote{For the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of the Śrīparamādyantarā dealing with the seven pledges, see DE JONG 1979: 627–629 (verse nos. 28–36). The verses found there, however, do not correspond exactly with those cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 212a4–b5; B, p. 318.9–24). For instance, verse 32ab in DE JONG 1979: 628 has no parallel in the mDo rgyas.} (1) not abandoning bodhicitta,\footnote{mDo rgyas (A, fol. 212b5–213a3; B, pp. 318.24–319.8): de yang ‘di litar bde bar gshogs pa’i bka’ bzhin bsring ba dang | rtag tu dam ishig bsring bar gsums pa ni snyir bstan pa ste | bye brag tu gsums pa ni | [1] byang chub kyi sams mi giang ba dang | [2] de’i phyag rgya mi spang ba dang | [3] de‘i thabs la mkhas pa ‘dzin pa dam pa’i chos mi spang ba dang | [4] de gzhon gyi rgyud la chud mi gsan pa’i mshon nyid mi shes pa dang | rnongs pas thul chen mi bstan pa dang | [5] de bdag gi rgyud la chud mi gsan pa’i mshon nyid | phyag chub kyi sams kyi rphan bzhin | rang gi lha’i bdag ni gnas par bye bo spangs te | de’i thub kyi gsum bar mi bya ba dang | [6] de sbyin par byed pa rdo rje slob dpon la brnyas par mi bya ba ste | de litar bya ma yin pa rnam pa drug spang ba dang | [7] rtag tu bya bo gsum bstan pa ste de litar rnam pa baun du grags so |.} (2) not abandoning the mudrā of bodhicitta,\footnote{Śrīparamādyantarā (according to the edition in DE JONG 1979: 627–628, verse no. 29): bodhicittam tavāyāvāyaḥ yad vajram iti mudrāyā | yasyopādikāyaṃ endaḥ buddha eva na samātāyāḥ |.} (3) not abandoning the saddharmā,\footnote{The Tibetan translation: gang zhig skyped pa tsam gvis ni || san gso rgyas nyid du dogs med pa’i || byang chub sams ni giang mi bya || phyag rgya rdo rje gang yin pa’. || The Tibetan text cited by Rong-zom-pa (mDo rgyas, A, fol. 212a5–6; B, p. 318.10–11) varies slightly: byang chub sams ni giang mi bya || phyag rgya rdo rje gong yin po’ || gang ni bskyed pa tsam gvis su || san gso rgyas nyid du dogs med pa’. ||} which is the efficient strategy necessary for salvific activities motivated by bodhicitta, (4) not revealing ‘great methods’ out of ignorance or confusion, so that bodhicitta is not destroyed in the mental continuum of others,\footnote{According to de Jong, Wulff changes tavā to tava without indicating the MS reading, but his emendation is unnecessary.} (5) not tormenting oneself (embodifying as one does bodhicitta and a future buddha) with austerities (tapas),\footnote{De Jong notes that the Tibetan does not translate eka and that one perhaps should read yasyotpādikāyaṃ taraṇa.} so that bodhicitta is not destroyed in one’s mental continuum, (6) not disparaging the acārya,\footnote{Probably by mudrā Rong-zom-pa means the sceptre (vajra) and bell (ghanta). See the Śrīparamādyantarā (DE JONG 1979: 628, verse no. 32ab): vajram ghanṭāṇ ca madrāṇ ca na samīyasya kadačana |.} (7) not disparaging the acārya, the giver of
bodhicitta, and (7) doing the ‘three things which should always be done.’ The ‘three things which should always be done’ are: ⁹⁰ (1) always keeping the pledges, (2) always paying homage to the tathāgatas, and (3) always making offering to one’s guru. It is also stated that meditating on Vajrasattva, who is characterised by bodhicitta, is supposed to automatically entail the observance of all pledges. ¹⁰⁸

(d) The Tattvasamgrahasūtra

The Tattvasamgrahasūtra, yet another yogatantra, is said to emphasise the practice of bodhicitta and, in addition, to propose a set of five pledges. ¹⁰⁹ The five pledges, corresponding to the five kinds of deities (lha rnam pa lnga) associated with the four families (rigs bzhis), are: (1) the pledge pertaining to the tathāgatas, (2) the pledge pertaining to the Tathāgata family, (3) the pledge pertaining to the Vajra family, (4) the pledge pertaining to the Padma family, and (5) the pledge pertaining to the Ratna family.¹¹⁰ The essence of the five pledges may be summarised as follows: (1) uniting with desire (rōga), explained as uniting with the practice of bodhicitta, is the pledge pertaining to the tathāgatas; (2) not becoming tired of desire, explained as the consolidation of bodhicitta, is the pledge pertaining to the Tathāgata family; (3) threatening malevolent people and those engaged in harming others and being benevolent to sentient beings constitute the pledge pertaining to the Vajra family; (4) not being attached to any activity, in virtue of knowing

¹⁰⁷ Śrīparamādayatana (DE JONG 1979: 629, verse no. 35):

nityam svasamayāḥ sādhya nityam pūjyas tathāgataḥ
nityān ca guruvedeyam sarvabuddhasamo ky asau ||.

Tibetan translation:

rtag tu rang gi dam tshig bsgrung ||
rtag tu dge bzhin gshegs pa mchod ||
rtag tu bla ma la yang dbul [‘bul P] ||
‘di ni sangs rgyas kun dang ‘dra ||.

Cf. the verses cited in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 212b3–4; B, p. 318.20–22):

rtag tu bdag gis dam tshig bsgrung ||
rtag tu de bzhin gshegs pa mchod ||
rtag tu bla ma la yang dbul ||
‘di ni sangs rgyas kun dang ‘dra ||.

¹⁰⁸ De Jong notes the reading in Speyer (pūjyāḥ tathāgataḥ) and adds that the Tibetan translation has no plural particle but that this is often omitted. ¹⁰⁹ De Jong notes the reading in Speyer (guruvedheyam) and adds that the Tibetan has guru deyam, which is undoubtedly the correct reading.

¹¹⁰ mDo rgyas (A, fol. 213a3–4; B, p. 319.9–13): gzhon yung mdor bsdus na byang chub sems kyi rang bzhin bcom ldan ‘das rdo rje sens dpa’ ‘ba’ zhig bsigoms pas kyang dam tshig thams cad ‘das par gsungs ste rgyud de nyid (i.e. Śrīparamādayatana) las ‘di litar ‘bscom ldan ‘das dpal rdo rje sens dpa’ sriā pa rnam par dag pa’ thabs kyi mchog rtog pa thams cad kyi gsang ba chen po dam tshig tu bsigom par bya’o [¼ zhes gsungs so ||].

¹¹¹ De Jong notes the reading in Speyer (bvyas tathāgataḥ) and adds that the Tibetan family is not mentioned separately in the Tattvasamgrahasūtra (mDo rgyas, A, fol. 213a6–b1; B, p. 319.18–20): “It is well known that in that tantra, in consideration of the trainees, the Karma family is not taught separately, since agent and action are not thought of as being different” (rgyud der ni ‘dul ba’i dbang gis las kyi rigs gud du ma bstan te ‘byed pa po dang las thia mi dad par dgon gos pa’i phyir ro zhes gsungs so ||). His expression ‘it is known’ evidently means ‘as known in the Tantrārthavatāra’ (P, fol. 13b5–7; D, fol. 11a6–7; S, vol. 27, pp. 1007.14–19).
the pure nature of all phenomena, and being attached to the activities that benefit sentient beings constitute the pledge pertaining to the Padma family; and (5) practising generosity is the pledge pertaining to the Ratna family. Rong-zom-pa explicitly refers to Buddhaguhya’s *Tantrārthāvatāra* only while explaining the first of these five pledges, but it is evident that the remaining explanations are also virtually verbatim extracts from that work.\(^{111}\)

5. Pledges and the Maintenance of Bodhicitta in the Mahāyoga System

Rong-zom-pa considered, either explicitly or implicitly, *tantras* such as the *Guhyendutilakatantra*, \(^{112}\) *Guhyasamājatantra*, *Buddhasamāyogatantra*, and *Vairocanamāyājāla* as belonging to the mahāyoga class.\(^{113}\) Much confusion can be avoided if the terms ‘mahāyoga’ and ‘Mahāyoga’ are distinguished from the very outset, particularly when dealing with both ‘old’ and ‘new’ *tantras*. The word ‘mahāyoga’ is used as a generic term to designate all that is known as the inner or higher yogas (*niruttarayoga*). In the rNying-ma tradition, however, there are also the so-called ‘three classes of inner *tantras*’ (*nang rgyud sde gsum*), namely, Mahāyoga, Anuyoga, and Atiyoga, all of which are considered mahāyogas. For Rong-zom-pa, Mahāyoga, Anuyoga, and Atiyoga are distinguished on the basis of the mental capacity of the yogins (*rnal byor pa rnams kyi blo rtsal* to assume *bodhicittavajra*, which is the *bodhicitta par excellence* (samantabhadram bodhicittam).\(^{114}\)

On account of the difference in the mental capacity of yogins to realise the equality of phenomena in order to acquire *bodhicittavajra*, [which is the *bodhicitta par excellence*, the [greater] *yoga* ([mahā]yoga)] is divided into three, namely, Mahāyoga, Anuyoga, and Atiyoga. These are also known as the yogas of Generation (*bskyed pa*), Perfection (*rdzogs pa*), and Great Perfection (*rdzogs pa chen po*); all, it should be known, are merely particularisations of the greater yoga (*mahāyoga*).

In later rNying-ma sources, we can find subclassifications of the three classes into nine classes, beginning with the Mahāyoga of the Mahāyoga (*ma hā’i ma hā*), the Mahāyoga of the Anuyoga (*ma hā’i a nu*), and the like, and ending with the Atiyoga of the Atiyoga (*a ti’i a ti*).\(^{115}\) When this classification was introduced for the first time is yet to be determined. In any

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111 Cf. the *mdo rgyas* (A, fols. 213b4–215a2; B, pp. 320.2–321.17) and the *Tantrārthāvatāra* (P, fols. 14a2–16a3; D, fols. 12b4–14a4; S, vol. 27, pp. 1010.14–1014.2).

112 In the introductory passage on mahāyoga pledges, the *mdo rgyas* (A, fols. 222b1–2; B, p. 330.3–5) states: *la la las ni sku gsung thugs kyi phyag rgya bsgom pa la sogs pa sgrub pa’i dam tshig gi phyogs nas bstan to|. An annotation correctly identifies ‘some [tantras]’ (*la la*) as the Guhyendutilakatantra. Later on the Guhyendutilakatantra is explicitly mentioned by name. See ibid. (A, fols. 236b5–6; B, p. 347.6–7): sgrub pa’i dam tshig ni | dpal zla gsang thig le las | byang chub snying por bgrod pa’i yan lag drug gsungs te |

113 *mdo rgyas* (A, fols. 227b4–6; B, p. 336.13–17): *de bzhin du rnal byor chen po’i tshul du dang dpal rnam par snang mdzad sgyu ‘phrul drwa ba dang | dpal sangs rgyas mnyam sbyor lla bu ni thabs dang shes rab spyi’i tshul bstan pa | dpal gsang ba ‘dus pa lta bu ni thabs dang shes rab zab mo’i tshul bstan pa o zhes grags so | de nyid kyi dbang gis sgyu ‘phrul drwa ba dang sangs rgyas mnyam sbyor ni rnal ‘byor chen po’i rgyud ma yin no zhes kyang zer ro | |

114 *mdo rgyas* (A, fols. 252a5–b1; B, p. 365.3–8): *kun tu bzang po rdo rje byang chub kyi sens ‘dzin par byed pa la | chos mnyam pa nyid tu rongs pa’i rnal ‘byor pa rnams kyi blo rtsal gyi khyad par lat | rnal ‘byor rnam pa gsum du phye st | rnal ‘byor chen po dang | rjes su mthun pa’i rnal ‘byor dang | shin tu rnal ‘byor ro | de nyid la bskyed pa dang | rdzogs pa dang | rdzogs pa chen po’i rnal ‘byor zhes kyang grangs te | de dag thams cad kyang rnal ‘byor chen po nyid kyi bye brag tsam du shes par bya’o | | |

115 Interestingly, the three bodies (kāya) of the Buddha have been subclassified in a similar way, that is, into the Dharmakāya of Dharmakāya (*chos sku’ichos sku*) and so forth. Perhaps such a subclassification was inspired by
case, what should be made clear is that the tantric system we are concerned with here is the general mahāyoga class and not the more specific Mahāyoga.

Before Rong-zom-pa goes on to discuss the actual pledges within these tantras, he makes some general introductory remarks about the different types of pledges taught in them. These introductory remarks are clearly meant to serve as a kind of outline for his presentation of the pledges according to the mahāyoga class, which clearly fall into the following five categories: (1) pledges pertaining to refrainment (srung ba'i / bsrung bar bya'i dam tshig),\(^{116}\) (2) pledges pertaining to practices (sgrub pa'i / bsgrub par bya ba'i dam tshig),\(^{117}\) (3) pledges pertaining to indulgence (spyod pa'i / spyad par bya ba'i dam tshig), (4) primary and ancillary pledges (rtsa ba dang yan lag gi dam tshig),\(^{118}\) and (5) general, specific, and additional pledges (spyi dang khyad par lhag pa'i dam tshig).\(^{119}\) The contents and the scriptural or personal authority of the five categories of pledges may be presented as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.</th>
<th>Pledges Pertaining to Refrainment (srung ba'i dam tshig)</th>
<th>Scriptural or Personal Authority</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>precepts (siksāpada)</td>
<td>Buddhhasamāyogatantra, Māyājālatantra, etc.(^{120})</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>cardinal transgressions (mulaāpatti) &amp; gross (but venial) transgressions (sthulāpatti)</td>
<td>Kṛṣṇaṃārītantra, Guhyasamājābhīṣekavidhi, etc.(^{121})</td>
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the common practice of subdividing mild (mrdu), middling (madhya), and excessive (adhimātra) into the mild of mild (mrdu mrdu), etc.

\(^{116}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 222a6–b1; B, p. 330.1–3): de yang rgyud la la las ni srog mi bcad pa dang | sens can la gnod pa mi bya ba la sogs pa bslab pa'i gzhi dang | lhung ba'i rtsa ba lta bu bsrung bar bya ba'i phyogs nas bstan to ||. That the bsrung bar bya'i dam tshig are understood in the sense of 'pledges pertaining to refrainment' is evident from a passage in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 228a2; B, p. 336.22–23): ... rtsa ba'i lhung ba lta bu bya ba ma yin pa las ldog pa'i mtshan nyid bsrung bar bya ba'i dam tshig gi phyogs nas bstan pa'ang |. Such 'pledes pertaining to refrainment' can be found, for example, in the Buddhhasamāyogatantra.

\(^{117}\) See above, n. 112.

\(^{118}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 222b3–4; B, p. 330.7–10): la la las ni | rtsa ba dang yan lag tu phye nas sgrub cing bsrung bar'i dam tshig dang | mi spang ba dang | dang du blang ba dang | spyad par bya ba dang | shes par bya ba dang | grub par bya ba rnams kyi phyogs nas bstan to ||. The annotation mentions here the *Guhyagarbhatantra.

\(^{119}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 222b4; B, p. 330.10–11): la la las ni spyi dang khyad par dang lhag pa'i dam tshig gi sgo nas rgya che bar bstan te ||. The locus classicus for the expression seems to be the Kun ' dus rig pa'i mdo (P, fol. 62a8; D, fol. 63b3) belonging to the Anuyoga class. The pertinent lines are cited also in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 247b6–248a4; B, p. 360.4–11).

\(^{120}\) It should be noted that the siksāpadas found in the Māyājālatantra have been designated as 'pledges pertaining to the adamantine body' (sku rdo rje'i dam tshig), 'pledes pertaining to adamantine speech' (ngog rdo rje'i dam tshig) and 'pledges pertaining to adamantine mind' (sens rdo rje'i dam tshig). See the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 228b5–229a6; B, pp. 337.21–338.12).

\(^{121}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 229a6–236b5; B, pp. 338.12–347.6).
### Chapter Ten: The Mahāyāna Observances and the Maintenance of Bodhicitta

#### 2. Pledges Pertaining to Practices (sgrub pa’i dam tshig) Scriptural or Personal Authority

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
<td>practices endowed with six limbs (yan lag drug dang idan pa)</td>
<td>Guhyendutilakatantra&lt;sup&gt;122&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii)</td>
<td>practices of the seals of body, speech, and mind (sku gsung thugs kyi phyag rgya)</td>
<td>Guhyendutilakatantra &amp; <em>Mahāyānābhisamaya</em>&lt;sup&gt;123&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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#### 3. Pledges Pertaining to Indulgence (spyod pa’i dam tshig) Scriptural or Personal Authority

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<td>killing, stealing, etc.</td>
<td>Guhyasamājatantra, etc.&lt;sup&gt;124&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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#### 4. Primary and Ancillary Pledges (rtsa ba dang yan lag gi dam tshig) Scriptural or Personal Authority

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<tr>
<td>(i)</td>
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<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>5 primary pledges (tsa ba’i dam tshig)</td>
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<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>10 ancillary pledges (yan lag gi dam tshig): five pledges pertaining to non-abandonment (mi spang ba’i dam tshig) + 5 pledges pertaining to adoption (dang du blang ba’i dam tshig)</td>
<td><em>Guhyyagarbhatrantra</em> (or Vajrasattvatvāvājāla)&lt;sup&gt;125&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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| (ii) |   |   |
| a. | 3 primary pledges (rtsa ba’i dam tshig): pledges pertaining to body (sku’i dam tshig) + pledges pertaining to speech (gsung gi dam tshig) + pledges pertaining to mind (thugs kyi dam tshig) | Ācārya Padmasambhava<sup>126</sup> |
| b. | 25 ancillary pledges (yan lag gi dam tshig): 5 pledges pertaining to non-abandonment (mi spang ba’i dam tshig) + 5 pledges pertaining to adoption (dang du blang ba’i dam tshig) + 5 pledges pertaining to indulgence (spyod pa’i dam tshig) + 5 pledges pertaining to what should be cognised (shes par bya ba’i dam tshig) + 5 pledges pertaining to practices (sgrub pa’i dam tshig) |   |
| (iii) | pledges pertaining to refrainment (bzsung ba’i dam tshig) common to all; i.e., not letting the four mūlāpattis occur | Rong-zom-pa<sup>127</sup> |

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<sup>122</sup> mDo rgyas (A, fols. 236b5–237a6; B, p. 347.6–22).

<sup>123</sup> Both the Guhyendutilakatantra and the *Mahāyānābhisamaya* are said to teach, in a similar way, the attainment of the ‘seals of body, speech and mind’ discussed in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 237a6–b5; B, pp. 347.22–348.8). The *Mahāyānābhisamaya* mentioned by Rong-zom-pa seems to be identical with the Tattvasamgrahasūtra, but I have not been able to locate the verses cited by him.

<sup>124</sup> mDo rgyas (A, fols. 237b5–238b2; B, pp. 348.9–349.6).

<sup>125</sup> For the fifteen pledges according to the *Guhyyagarbhatrantra*, see the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 238b2–240a4; B, pp. 349.6–351.3). Note that the *Guhyyagarbhatrantra* is often cited under the title Vajrasattvatvāvājāla.

<sup>126</sup> For the twenty-eight pledges, see the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 240a4–247b5; B, pp. 351.2–360.1). Rong-zom-pa, however, does not specify any text but merely states (ibid., A, fol. 240a4–5; B, p. 351.3–5): slob dpon padma ’byung gnas kyi zhal snga nas dam tshig nyi shu rtsa brgyad kyi dbye ba mzdad pa dag dang mthun par tshoms gcig tu drel te bstan par bya’o ||.

<sup>127</sup> This seems to be Rong-zom-pa’s own attempt to condense the preceding twenty-five or twenty-eight pledges into four main pledges (mDo rgyas, A, fol. 247b5–6; B, p. 360.1–4). For details, see n. 23.
5. General, Specific, and Additional Pledges (spyi dang khyad par lhag pa’i dam tshig)\(^{128}\)  

(i) general pledges (spyi’i dam tshig):  
23 pledges pertaining to austerities (brtur zhugs kyi dam tshig)\(^{129}\) + 28 pledges pertaining to indulgence (spyad pa’i dam tshig) + pledges binding at all times (rgyun gyi dam tshig)  

(ii) additional pledges (lhag pa’i dam tshig)  

(iii) 25 specific pledges (khyad par gyi dam tshig)\(^{131}\) or 10 pledges [corresponding to] the aptitudinal niveau (rtsal ’phang gi dam tshig)\(^{132}\)  

Scriptural or Personal Authority  

\*Vajravyūhatantra\(^{130}\)

In particular, each tantric system, whether Yoga, Mahāyoga, Anuyoga or Atiyoga, is said to have its own ten specific pledges (khyad par gyi dam tshig) or pledges [corresponding to] the aptitudinal niveau (rtsal ’phang gi dam tshig). They may be presented as follows:\(^{133}\)

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\(^{128}\) The general, specific, and additional pledges (spyi dang khyad par lhag pa’i dam tshig) are explained in great detail in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 247b6–257b4; B, pp. 361.17–371.11).

\(^{129}\) Cf. the Theg pa’i bye brag (A, fol. 174b4–5; B, pp. 43.1–4; without the gloss): nyams nga ba med pas brtur zhugs kyi dam tshig nyi shu rtsa gsum yang rdzogs pa yin no ||.

\(^{130}\) The rDo rje bkod pa’i rgyud (*Vajravyūhatantra) referred to here by Rong-zom-pa is clearly the dGongs pa ’dus pa’i mdo of the Anuyoga class.

\(^{131}\) The total number twenty-five is according to the Theg pa’i bye brag, which states (A, fol. 174b4; B, pp. 42.24–43.1): gnvis su mi ’byed pas khyad par gyi dam tshig nyi shu rtsa lnga yang rdzogs pa yin no ||. We do not know whether Rong-zom-pa explicitly equated the so-called ‘pledges [corresponding to] aptitudinal level’ (rtsal ’phang gi dam tshig) with the ‘specific pledges’ (khyad par gyi dam tshig), given that the introductory text dealing with these pledges is missing in the mDo rgyas (see n. 138), but we do know from the given context that he at least virtually equated them. This means that the pledges taught in these three tantric classes bear distinctive or specific features that reflect differences in the mental calibre of the yogins (rnal ’byor rnam sbyi blo rtsal gnyi khyad par). See, for example, the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 252a3–4; B, pp. 364.24–365.1). Cf. the use of the term rtsal ’phang in the dGongs pa’ ’dus pa’i mdo (P, fol. 233b1–2; D, fol. 245b3): rtsal [btsal P] ’phang mtho dman rnal ’byor pas || mtho dman go ’phang sa bgrud bya ||.

\(^{132}\) Cf. the Theg pa’i bye brag (A, fol. 174b6–175a1; B, p. 43.5–7): lam thams cad dbang du ’dus pas rtsal ’phags kyi dam tshig bcu yang rdzogs pa yin no ||.

\(^{133}\) Pledges explicitly associated with bodhicitta are marked with ‘x.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ten Specific Pledges (khyad par gyi dam tshig bcu)</th>
<th>Kriyā</th>
<th>Yoga</th>
<th>Mahā-&lt;br/&gt;yoga</th>
<th>Anuyoga</th>
<th>Ati-&lt;br/&gt;yoga</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to refrainment (bsrung ba'i dam tshig)</td>
<td>(x^{134})</td>
<td>(x^{135})</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to indulgence (spyod pa'i dam tshig)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(x^{136})</td>
<td>(x^{137})</td>
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<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to view (lta ba'i dam tshig)</td>
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<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to gnosis (ye shes kyi dam tshig)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(x^{138})</td>
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<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to accumulations (tshogs kyi dam tshig)</td>
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<td>(x^{139})</td>
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<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to a buddha’s stage (sangs rgyas sa'i dam tshig)</td>
<td>(x^{140})</td>
<td>(x^{141})</td>
<td>(x^{142})</td>
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<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to activities (phrin las kyi dam tshig)</td>
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<tr>
<td>obscuration of pledges (dam tshig gi sgrub pa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>pledges pertaining to a vidyādhara’s stage (rig 'dzin sa'i dam tshig)</td>
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<tr>
<td>the point at which a pledge is broken (dam tshig gi chad pa'i gnas)</td>
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\(^{134}\) The maintenance of bodhicitta in connection with the pledges pertaining to refrainment in the context of the Yoga system is mentioned in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 250b6; B, p. 363.14).

\(^{135}\) The connection between the pledges pertaining to refrainment and bodhicitta in the context of Anuyoga is made in the mDo rgyas as follows (A, fol. 254b4; B, p. 368.1–2): gnyis su med pa'i rig pa byang chub kyi sems nyid bsrung ba'i dam tshig tu 'dod do ||.

\(^{136}\) The term kun tu bzang po byang chub kyi sems is mentioned in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 253a2; B, p. 366.2–3) in connection with the pledges pertaining to the view in the Mahāyoga system.

\(^{137}\) The connection between the pledges pertaining to view and bodhicitta in the context of Anuyoga is made in the mDo rgyas as follows (A, fol. 255a1; B, p. 368.7–8): snod bcdud 'du byed dang bcas pa yab yum gnyis su med pa'i byang chub kyi sems su bta' o ||.

\(^{138}\) Regrettably, the passage dealing with the first five pledges of the Kriyā class, i.e., from bsrung ba'i dam tshig to ye shes kyi dam tshig (probably one folio), is missing in the mDo rgyas. The last few lines of the passage dealing with ye shes kyi dam tshig have, however, survived. See ibid. (A, fol. 250a3–5; B, p. 362.19–21). Several folios seem to be missing also at the end of the mDo rgyas (just before the concluding verses), for an anonymous annotation states (ibid., B, p. 387.23): “[I] am convinced that much is missing from here onwards. [The missing text] should be inserted if a better copy arrives” (’di nas mang po zhig chad song nges bsam dpe khungs dag lon na’dzud dgos ||). This annotation is not found in the xylograph edition (cf. A, fol. 271b5–6).

\(^{139}\) The connection between bodhicitta and the pledges pertaining to accumulations in the context of Atiyoga is made in the mDo rgyas as follows (A, fol. 257a1; B, p. 370.15–16): byang chub kyi sems yid bzhin gyi nor bu rin po che yin pas || [add. | B] tshogs rang bzhin gyi rdzogs so ||.

\(^{140}\) The connection with bodhicitta and the pledges pertaining to the stage of a buddha are made by Rong-zom-pa in his mDo rgyas as follows (A, fol. 250b1; B, p. 363.2–3): ‘dir byang chub kyi sems rnam par dag pa langs rgyas kyi sar lta ste | grub pa'i sang rgyas kyi sa ni ma yin no || og ma rnam la yang de bzhin du sbyar ro ||.

\(^{141}\) The connection between bodhicitta and the pledges pertaining to the stage of a buddha in the context of the Yoga system is made by Rong-zom-pa in his mDo rgyas as follows (A, fol. 251b3–4; B, p. 364.9–11): rang bzhin rnam par dag pa dang | kun tu bzang po byang chub sems kyi byin gyi brlabs [bbrlabs B] kyiis | g.yo ba dang mi g.yo ba'i dangos po thams cad la khyab ste | chos thams cad rang bzhin gyi dkyil 'khor ro zhes grags so ||.

\(^{142}\) The connection between bodhicitta and the pledges pertaining to the stage of a buddha in the context of the Mahāyoga is found in the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 253b1–6; B, pp. 366.13–367.2).
Rong-zom-pa is well aware of the dangerous implications of the 'pledges of indulgence.' He states that the common yogins (rnam 'byor pa spyi) should observe all pledges appropriately ('tsham par) by imbuing them with efficient strategies. If I understand him correctly, he argues that if a person who engages in ordinary conduct (thu ma la'i sudyod pa) and who has not obtained the strength of great prañā, sāmādhi, and karuṇā is not blemished as a result of reckless attitudes and actions such as passion (rāga) and killing, this would imply that even wicked (ma rabs) sentient beings have already been released from samsāra, and hence there would be no need for the buddhas to show the path of salvation. But this is obviously not the case. On the other hand, he argues, if such daring practices or conduct (spbyod pa rlab s po che) encompassed by the pledges pertaining to indulgence were meant only for those who possess the strength of great prañā, sāmādhi, and karuṇā, or if they were to be interpreted as being of provisional meaning (neyārtha), it makes no sense for the tantras to address the risks of false tantric practices (gsang snyags log par spbyod pa) and their consequences, and the risks of the so-called 'nine doors of transgression' (lhung ba'i sgo dgu). According to him, even a person who has not obtained the strength of great prañā, sāmādhi, and karuṇā can in principle engage in daring tantric practices out of mere faith (mos pa tsam), by relying on the great instructions of the Three Jewels, and without being tarnished with karmic obscurations (las kyi sgrigs pa). Thus, for Rong-zom-pa, daring tantric practices are meant to be neither practised recklessly by anybody nor indiscriminately prohibited. This point, in my view, is representative of the rNyung-ma stance on the issue of tantric practices of the so-called 'union' (sbyor ba) and 'liberation' (sgrol ba) in general. Rong-zom-pa also goes into the extremely problematic question of pledges involving such things as killing and stealing, as dealt with, for example, in the Guhyasamājatantra. Why is it that tantric practices such as killing are proclaimed as pledges in the Guhyasamājatantra and other tantras in the first place? Rong-zom-pa's detailed answer to this question contains some of the most stimulating reflections upon what we might call 'tantric ethical philosophy,' which he places within a wider Buddhist context.

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143 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 222b5–223a5; B, pp. 330.12–331.4): spbyir rnal 'byor pa [ba B] rnam gi bs rung zhi ng s m s b la ng ba bya ba na | gcig la gcig 'du ggos par s na ng s te | gang gi phyi bs rung ba'i dam thig la gnas pa rnam gi kyang sgrub pa'i dam thig kyang bs rung dgos la | spbyod pa ang bkag pa ma yin no || spbyod pa brlabs po che bstan pa rnam gi kyang bs rung da'i dam thig dang Idan pa bya dgos te gung gi phyi shes rab dang ting nge 'dzin dang snying rje chen po'i stobs ma rnyed bzhin du 'dod chags la sogs pa'i dbang gi [= gis] tha mal pa'i spbyod pur gnas bzhin du | srog bcad pa la sogs pa yang nyes par mi 'gyur ba zhi ng na | de la na ni 'gro ba ma rab [= rabs] rnam gi la thar pa'i lam rang chas s an pas sngon nyi du grol zin te | rgyal ba rnam gi kyang ba'i lam sbyan [= bstan] mi ggos par 'gyur ba zhi ng na | de la ya yin na | ga te gshang sngags kyi tshul zab mo'i sgor zhugs te | dkon mchog bka' che ba la brten nas m s pa sman gyis spbyod pa brlab po che spyad na | shes rab dang ting nge 'dzin dang snying rje chen po'i stobs dang mi'dan yang las kyi sgrigs pas gos par mi 'gyur ba zhi ng na | rgyud rnam gi las sngon gshang sngags log par spyad pa las ltung ba chen po byung ste | mthar yang ra tra [= dra] chen po gyur pa dang | gzhan yang rnal 'byor chen po'i rgyud las | spyad nyes pa'i mishan nyid ltung ba'i sgo dgu gshangs pa la bu 'ang mi 'byung ba zhi ng na | de la ya yang ma yin pas de bas na rnal 'byor pa spyi rnam gi thabs kyis zin par bya ste thams cad 'tsham par bs rung dgos so ||.

144 Note, however, that while the Guhyasamājatantra itself mentions the pledges of killing, stealing, and the like, the Guhyasamājatantra ritual texts of empowerment, such as the one composed by Ācārya Nas-gling-pa, do not mention such daring practices or conduct (spbyod pa rlab s po che), only fourteen mūlāpattis and eight gross (but venial) transgressions (shūlāpattis). The explanatory tantra (bskad pa'i rgyud) of the Guhyasamājatantra considers pledges relating to killing and stealing as words (denoting) intention (dgongs pa'i thig), that is, as containing a provisional sense (neyārtha), which is not to be taken literally. In Rong-zom-pa's opinion, such pledges are not mentioned in the explanatory tantra and in the empowerment rites of the Guhyasamājatantra out of consideration for general yogins and ordinary individuals. Similarly, he refers to a certain gSang ba'i dmigs pa bstan pa, which teaches that profound views (lua ba zab mo) and daring conduct are to be kept secret, and hence are not meant for common practice. See the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 223a5–b5; B, p. 331.4–17).

145 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 223b5–223a1; B, pp. 331.17–336.21).
(a) The *Buddhasamāyogatana*

We shall now discuss the actual pledges of the *mahāyoga* tantric system. The śiksāpadas and miślāpattis found in the *Buddhasamāyogatana* are presented in the form of ethical-moral don’ts. The four don’ts mentioned there are:

1. **(1) do not kill**, (2) do not abandon the Three Jewels, (3) do not abandon bodhicitta, and (4) do not abandon the [tantric] teacher (ācārya) of one’s fortune. Of the four, Rong-zom-pa considers the first to be a śiksāpada, and the remaining three to be the major root pledges (*rtsa ba’i dam tshig*). In his commentary to the *Buddhasamāyogatana*, these four are explained in the following manner.

These four vows consisting in pledges are the gist of the general and specific basic vows of the Secret Vehicle. Furthermore, those who abide in the Secret Vehicle should observe the prātimokṣa vows and the bodhisattva vows in general, and their own [tantric] vows should be observed specifically. And in the context of the prātimokṣa vows, the mūlāpattis are the four pārājikas. Amongst them, killing is an extremely severe [offence]. Therefore, it is the quintessence of the śiksāpadas common to [all Buddhist] vehicles. This being the case, it (i.e. abandonment of killing) is taught [here in the *Buddhasamāyogatana*]. Two [precepts, namely], non-abandonment of the Three Jewels and non-desertion of bodhicitta, are the quintessence of what has been taught as the mūlāpatti common to all Mahāyāna systems. For this reason, they are taught [here in the *Buddhasamāyogatana*]. Among what has been taught as the mūlāpattis of specific pledges of the Mantra[yāna or tantric systems], the non-abandonment of the [tantric] teacher (ācārya) of one’s fortune is the quintessence. Therefore, [the four precepts] are taught as the quintessence of the roots of the general and the specific pledges.

To recapitulate, Rong-zom-pa sees the abandonment of killing as the quintessence of Buddhist ethical-spiritual morality, the non-abandonment of the Three Jewels and of bodhicitta as the quintessence of Mahāyāna ethical-spiritual morality, and the non-abandonment of one’s tantric master as the quintessence of tantric ethical-spiritual morality.

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160 *Buddhasamāyogatana*-1 (T, fol. 258a6–7; D, fol. 164b3):

srgs chags gsad par mi bya zding ||

dkon mchog gsum ni yong [= yongs] mi spang ||

byang chub sems ni mi gtang stey ||

slob dpon skal bzang yong [= yongs] mi gtang ||

See the citation in the *mdo rgyas* (A, fol. 228a2–3; B, pp. 336.24–337.1). See also the *mNyam sbyor’grel pa* (A, fol. 87a5–6; B, p. 555.9–10) and the *Buddhasamāyogatikā* (P, fol. 385a1–7; D, folos. 340b6–341a3; S, vol. 13, pp. 1726.9–1727.3).

167 *mdo rgyas* (A, fol. 228a3–4; B, p. 337.1–3): de yang ’di litar srog mi gcud pa ni bslab pa’i gzhi | lhag ma gsum ni rtsa ba’i dam tshig gi gtsor [= gtso] bo mdor bsdus pa stey |

168 *mNyam sbyor’grel pa* (A, fol. 87a6–b5; B, p. 555.10–21): dam tshig gi sdom pa ’di bzhi ni gsang ba’i theg [thig A] pa spyi dang khyad par gyi rtsa ba’i sdom pa mdor bsdus pa stey | de yang gsang ba’i theg pa la gnas pa rnams kyi so sor thar pa’i sdom pa dang byang chub sems dpa’i sdom pa spyir byas nas rang gi sdom pa khyad par du bshung bar bya ba yin pa las so sor thar pa’i sdom pa’i skabs rtsa ba’i ltung ba phas pham ba bzhi yin pa las | de las shis tu le tsi ba ni srog gcud pa yin te | de bas na ’di theg pa thun mong gi bslabs pa’i gzhig rnams kyi snying po yin pas de bstan to || dkon mchog gsum mi spang ba dang byang chub kyi sems mi btags ba gnyis ni theg pa chen po thams cad kyi thun mong du rtsa ba’i ltung bar gsungs pa thams cad kyi snying po yin pas de bstan to || slob dpon skal bzang mi btags ba ni gsang snogs kyi khyad par gyi dam tshig tu rtsa ba’i ltung ba gsungs pa rnams kyi nang na’ang snying po yin te | de bas na spyi dang khyad par gyi dam tshig rnams kyi rtsa ba rnams kyi snying po gsungs pa’o ||.
(b) The *Krṣṇayamāritantra* and *Guhyasamājābhiṣekavidhi*

There seem to be several sources for the fourteen mūlāpatīs (or, if expressed positively, fourteen basic precepts), among which are the *Krṣṇayamāritantra*, the *Guhyasamājāmandalavidhi*, the *Guhyasamājābhiṣekavidhi* by Acārya Nas-gling-pa (*Yavadvipa*?), the *Vajrayānamūlāpatī* and *Vajrayānamūlāpatīsāṃgraha* (both ascribed to one Aśvaghoṣa), and the *Kriyāsāṃgraha*. The fourteen mūlāpatīs are: (1) disparaging one’s tantric master (ācārya), (2) violating the directives (ājñā) of the Well-gone Ones (ṣugata), (3) venting anger on ‘Vajra brothers’ (vajrabhrāṭ), (4) abandoning great benevolence (mahaṁmaitrī), (5) abandoning bodhicitta, (6) disparaging the Dharma (of the three vehicles), (7) disclosing secret teachings to immature individuals, (8) dispersing the five skandhas, which are of the nature of a tathāgata, (9) having doubt about the purity of phenomena, (10) being affectiorate to the hostile or wicked (duṣṭa), (11) holding phenomena to fall under the two extremes, (12) offending the faithful, (13) not consuming pledge-related substances when one obtains them, and (14) disparaging women, who are the embodiment of discriminating insight (prajñā). Rong-zom-pa compares these fourteen mūlāpatīs with the fourteen occurring in the *Kālacakratantra*. He notes that the *Kālacakratantra* has as the second mūlāpatī ‘ignoring the instructions of the guru’ instead of ‘ignoring the instructions of the sugata.’ Moreover, the sixth mūlāpatī in the *Kālacakratantra* is ‘not disparaging extraordinary individuals’ instead of ‘not disparaging the three vehicles.’ Rong-zom-pa also remarks that he observed slight differences in the fourteen mūlāpatīs as found in various other sources, but does not regard these differences as contradictions, for these mūlāpatīs are,

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150 Guhyasamājāmonḍalavidhi (P, fols. 34a4–b1; D, fols. 30b5–31a2; S, vol. 18, p. 80.1–14).

151 dMo rgyas (A, fol. 223a6–b2; B, p. 331.7–11): rgyud de nyid kyi dbang bskur ba i cho ga slob dpon nas gling pa la sogs pa i zhal snga nas mdaz pa dag las ... rtsa ba i ltung ba bcu bzhis dang sbom [spom B] po i ltung ba bryan la bu la bren nas rdo rje slob dpon du dbang bskur ba rdo rje ’chang chen po i go ’phang gi mthshan nyid sbyin pa gsungs te j. See also ibid. (A, fol. 229a6–b6; B, pp. 338.12–339.3).

152 Vajrayānamūlāpatī (P, fol. 221b8–222b3; S, vol. 27, pp. 694.1–695.14); Vajrayānamūlāpatīsāṃgraha (P, fols. 219b7–220b3; D, fol. 179a6–b5; S, vol. 27, pp. 682.1–683.16). The Sanskrit text of the latter (with the title *Mūlāpatīsāṃgraha*) with a few lacunae can be found in LÉVI 1929: 266. See also LESSING & WAYMAN 1968: 328–329, n. 14; DAVIDSON 2002: 322–325.


mūlāpatīḥ prathamotkāt sadguror apanānanaḥ |
dvīyā kāthāpatīḥ sagatājñāvilānghanāḥ ||
triyā vajrabhrāṭaṁ kopaḥ doṣapraκāśane |
mārityāgac ca sattvāsya caturthiḥ garitā jināḥ ||
bodhicīttaṁ dharmanām tasya tyāgac ca paścmaṁ |
śaśtiḥ sva paraśkevaśa siddhāntaḥ dharmanindanaṁ ||
aparāppācitasattvāsya guhyākhāyaṁ ca saptapāṁ |
 paścabadhātmakāḥ skandhas teṣaṁ avajñayāṣaṁ ||
vakhavaśuddhārmanāvām vayam vicikitsayaḥ |
duṣṭamaitri sadā tyājya daśamiḥ tuktrau matā ||
āyantarāke dharma ekādaśi ātakanāḥ ||
dvādaśi śrīdharasattvāḥ prakāti cittaiddrājanam ||
sayamāṁ yathālābham aśevasaḥ trayoṣaśa ||
strīnāṁ prajñāvibhāvanāṁ jugupsaya caturdaśi ||
itī mūlāpatīḥ ||.
according to him, not taught as ‘specific’ or ‘additional’ pledges, but rather as ‘general’ pledges.154

Rong-zom-pa explains that these fourteen mūlāpatīs are also applicable to the Kriyā and Yoga systems and, to a great extent, even to the general Mahāyāna. Thus the fourteen mūlāpatīs are discussed in the mDo rgyas on two occasions: once when they are treated as ‘those that may be common [to other systems]’ (thun mong du ‘gyur du rung ba), and once, in the mahāyoga context, as uncommon (thun mong ma yin pa), that is, not applicable to other systems. In discussing the fourteen common mūlāpatīs, Rong-zom-pa alludes to the various types of bodhicitta, and explains some of them with the aid of citations from the sūtras and tantras. What is of particular interest, though, is his treatment of the fourteen uncommon mūlāpatīs, for it is in this connection that the maintenance of bodhicittavajra is discussed in detail.155

Let us first of all look at how Rong-zom-pa describes the link between the maintenance of bodhicittavajra and the first of the fourteen mūlāpatīs, namely, disparaging one’s tantric master (ačārya).156

In this context of presenting [the fourteen mūlāpatīs] in the form of special vows, all of them should be treated as ancillary to the maintenance of bodhicittavajra.157 As for not disparaging one’s vajrācārya, this [should be viewed] the way it is taught in [scriptures] such as the Śrīgūhyasamāja[ tantra] and the Māyājāla[tantra].158 The way it is taught [first in the

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154 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 230b1–4; B, pp. 339.17–340.1); dpal dus kyi ’khor lo las ni «dpal ldan ri bong ‘dzin pa yi || bla ma’i thugs ni ‘khrug pa dang || de yi bka’ da ‘de las gzhan ||} zhes gsungs te || gnyis pa bde bar gshegs pa ‘i bka’ las ‘da bar ma’i bshad de || bla ma’i thugs dkrugs pa ni dang po || bla ma’i bka’ las ‘da pa ni gnyis par bshad do || gezhan yang || «drug pa grub pa dang la smod ||} [B]b ces pas gang zag khyod par can la mi smad par gsungs te || dam pa’i chos la smad par ma’i gsungs so || de bzhin du ngo bo cung zad mi ‘dra ba bshad pa dag snang ste || ‘on kyang spry bsrgun ba’i dam tshig tu gsungs ki khyod par gyi dam tshig dang lha’i pa’i dam tshig lta bur gsungs pa ni ma yin pas || gang la yang nyes skyon ma mthong ngo ||. ’The Sanskrit text and the canonical version of the Tibetan translation read: ’saṣṭhi siṣṭhāntanīda ’ drug pa grub pa’i mitha’ la smod pa. Rong-zom-pa’s understanding of the sixth mūlāpatī of the Kālacakra tantra was obviously based on a different reading, probably something like ’saṣṭhi siṣṭhāṇīndā. For the explanations of the fourteen mūlāpatīs according to the system of the Kālacakra tantra, see the Vimalaprabhā ad 2.102–103 (vol. 2, pp. 97.1–98.10).

155 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 230b4–233b1; B, pp. 340.1–343.9).

156 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 233b1–234a3; B, pp. 343.9–344.2); ‘on kyang thun mong ma yin pa’i sdom par ‘ksten pa’i skabs ’dir ni thams cad kyang rdo rje byang chub kyi sms ’ ’dzin pa’i yan lag tu sbyar te || ’di ltar rao rje slob dbon brnyas par mi bya ta yang || ji ltar dpal gsang ba ’du pa dang sgyu ’phrul drwa ba lta bu las || ’ksu gsungs thugs rdo rje gsang gsas bs dus pa mgon par dbang bs kur ba’i slob dbon la de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyang rdo rje byang chub kyi sms bzhin du bta bar bya’o || de cii phyir zhe na || slob dbon de ni byang chub kyi sms dang mi gnyis shing rnam pa gnyis su bhyer med doz zhes gsungs pa dang || yang de nyid las || sphyogs bcu’i sansgs rgyas thams cad kyi rdo rje bsod nams kyi phung po bas kyang slob dbon gyi ba spu’i bu ga’phags so || ci’i phyir zhe na || rigs kyi bu byang chub kyi sms ni || sangs rgyas kyi ye shes kyi snying por gyur pa’o || skye ba’i gnas su gyur pa nas thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes kyi ’byang gnas yin pa’i bar du’o ||’ zhes gsungs pa lta bu ste || rdo rje byang chub kyi sms sbyin par byed cing byin gyis rlob par byed pa ni || rdo rje byang chub kyi sms nyid du bta ba yin la || de la ni mgon par rdzogs par sansgs rgyas pa rnam kyi || kyi[ky’s] dus gsum du hyon nas mchod par byed par gsungs na brnyas par bya ba’i gnas lta ga la yin te || de la brnyas par gyur na rdo rje byang chub kyi sms nyid gstan svangs par ’gyur ro || de bas na’i ni rdo rje byang chub kyi sms ’ ’dzin pa’i mtshan nyid du thun mong ma yin par bshad pa ste ’og ma kyi la yang de bzhin du sbyar ro ||.

157 Note that Rong-zom-pa fluctuates between positive and negative formulations—i.e., between the mūlāpatī and their respective vows—for example, between ‘disparaging one’s vajrācārya,’ which is a cardinal transgression (mūlāpatī), and not disparaging one’s vajrācārya, which is the corresponding basic vow (rtsa ba’i sdom pa) or basic pledge (rtsa ba’i dam tshig).
Guhyasamājatantra: “The acārya who has been empowered for or initiated into the [deity] Guhyasamāja, comprising the adamanite body, speech and mind, should be regarded by all tathāgatas and all bodhisattvas in the same way [they perceive] bodhicittavajra. Why is this so? [It is because] the acārya and bodhicitta are not dual and not separable into two.” And as stated [in the Māyājālatantra]: “A pore of the acārya’s body hair surpasses the adamanite mass of beneficial resources of all buddhas of the ten directions. Why is this so? O son of a noble family, [it is because] bodhicitta is the quintessence of a buddha’s gnosis, [its] place of origin, and so forth, up to being the source of a buddha’s gnosis of omniscience.”

One who bestows and empowers bodhicittavajra should thus be considered bodhicittavajra itself. And if [the vajrācārya] is said to be visited and honoured by the perfectly awakened ones in the three times, how can [he] be an object of disparagement (or ridicule)! And indeed, disparaging him would cause one to lose one’s bodhicittavajra once and for all. Therefore, this [first mūlāpati] is explained in the form of a special [vow] whose characteristic feature is the maintenance of bodhicittavajra. This should similarly be applied to all [the rest of the mūlāpatis] that follow.

The argument given in the passage cited by Rong-zom-pa as to why one should not disparage one’s vajrācārya is not exactly identical with his own argument. The citations virtually represent the vajrācārya as the embodiment of bodhicittavajra; to disparage him would be to disparage bodhicittavajra, and so amount to abandoning it. Rong-zom-pa simply asserts that the vajrācārya is the bestower of bodhicittavajra, though the consequences of disparaging him are, to be sure, the same.

In regard to the second of the fourteen mūlāpatis, namely, violating the directives (ājñā) of the sugatas, and its relation to the maintenance of bodhicittavajra, Rong-zom-pa states:

The second [of the fourteen mūlāpatis, namely,) violating the directives (ājñā) [of the sugatas]:

The directives may be those of the sugatas or those explained by [one’s] guru. If the directives of a great teacher—a vajradhāra, [who is] the lord of pledges—are violated, bodhicittavajra would be undermined since it would have been empowered [in the form of directives].

Similarly, while commenting on the third mūlāpati, namely, nourishing ill will against Vajra brothers, he states that one would undermine bodhicittavajra as a result of this bias and malevolence shown to them.

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158 The passages of the Guhyasamājatantra and the Māyājālatantra quoted by Rong-zom-pa deviate from those transmitted in the bKa’-gyur. Compare the citations in n. 156 with those in nn. 159 & 160. Perhaps Rong-zom-pa used the not yet revised translations of the Guhyasamājatantra and Māyājālatantra.

159 Cf. the Guhyasamājatantra (p. 104.15–19): attha khalu maitreya bodhisatvo mahāsattvāḥ sarvatahāgatān pranipatyaivam āha | sarvatahāgatakāyavākśaítavajra-guhya-samājāh-bhāga-vān vajrācāryah sarvatahāgatāh sarvabodhisattvāh ca katham drāṣṭavāh | sarvatahāgatah prāhuh | bodhicitto vajra iva kulaputra sarvatahāgatāh sarvabodhisattvāh ca drāṣṭavāh | tai kasmād dhetoḥ | bodhicitto cācāryāḥ cādyam etad advaṭhikāram |

160 Cf. the Māyājālatantra (T, fol. 70a3–5; D, fol. 133a5–6): ... phyogs bcon na bzhugs pa’i bar de dag gis sngags rgyas bcom ldan ’das rnam kyi rdo rje ’i sdu dang gsung dang thugs kyi bsod nams kyi phug po ba ni rdo rje slob dpon de ’i spu ’i khung bu gcig gi bsod nams kyi phung po ches khyad par du ’phags so || de ci’i phyir zhe na rings kyi bu byang chub kyi sms ni sngags rgyas thams cad kyi ye shes kyi snying por gyur pa’i bar nas thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes kyi byung gnas yin no ||

161 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 234a3–4; B, p. 344.2–5): gnyis pa bka’ las mi ’da’ ba ni bde bar sgshes pa’i bka’ yang rung | bla ma’i bkar bshad kyang rung stie | sion pa rdo rje ’chang chen po dam thig gi bdag po de’i bka’ ni ’das par gyur na rdo rje byang chub kyi sms nyid bshig par gyur pa stie | gang gi phyir de nyid du byin gyis brlbs par yin pa de’i phyir ro ||

162 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 2344–6; B, p. 344.5–10): gsum pa rdo rje spun la ngan sms mi bya ba ni | gang gi phyir rnam pa gsum gyis mi phyed pas rdo rje spun te | yul chos nyid du mthun pa dang | sdom pa rdo rje byang chub kyi sms su gcig pa dang | smon lam mthun pas lha dang slob dpon dang lha spyod gcig par bsdu pas stie ’di la gang zhig ris su phyre nas ngan sms byed pa ni | rdo rje byang chub kyi sms nyid bshig pa yin no ||
The third [basic pledge pertaining to the third mūlāpatti, namely,] not nourishing ill will against Vajra brothers: [Persons 'x' and 'y'] are Vajra brothers because [they] cannot be differentiated, [and this] in a three-fold sense: [They] are bound by one and the same object, namely, reality (dharmatā); by one and the same vow (sāmvara), namely, the [maintenance of] bodhicittavajra; and because [they have] the same aspirational wish (pranidhāna)—and thus [are bound by] one and the same deity, ācārya, view, and conduct. One who is biased and malevolent to this [Vajra brother] undermines bodhicittavajra.\(^\text{165}\)

Elsewhere, nourishing ill will towards Vajra brothers is described by Rong-zom-pa as not speaking of their good qualities but rather of their faults, out of ill will.\(^\text{164}\)

Likewise, Rong-zom-pa explains how abandoning great benevolence (mahāmaitri) would cause the abandonment of bodhicittavajra, as follows: \(^\text{165}\)

The fourth [mūlāpatti], the abandoning of great benevolence: It is true that benevolence that has sentient beings as its object, and likewise benevolence that has phenomena as its object and [benevolence that has] no object, are all common [types of] benevolence. But the special benevolence here [in this system] is as taught: “Enjoy the comfort of being one in nature, since you yourself and others [desire or are characterised by] the same awakening (bodhi).” Just as those who [possess] the view of self do not have to make an effort to benefit themselves, so too those who uphold bodhicittavajra do not have to make an effort to benefit [other] sentient beings. If one were to have no concern (dayā) for others, one would have abandoned bodhicittavajra.

The abandonment of bodhicitta itself occurs here as the fifth mūlāpatti, concerning which Rong-zom-pa states: \(^\text{166}\)

As for the fifth [mūlāpatti, namely,] the abandonment of bodhicitta, [it is] as follows: The non-abandonment of vigour (bala) in generating the resolve [to strive] for the highest awakening in order to attain salvation (mokṣa) [for] oneself and to cause [other] sentient beings [to attain] salvation is common [to all Mahāyāna vows]. However, it (i.e. bodhicitta in the common system) is considered to be of a different nature at three [different stages], namely, the [bodhičitta during the unexplored phase] of spiritual disposition (gotra), the [bodhičitta during the phase of causal process], and the [bodhicitta in its] resultant form are respectively comparable to seed, seedling, and fruit. However, bodhicitta par excellence (samantabhadram bodhicittam) is not considered to be of a different nature at the three [stages]—the phases of

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\(^{163}\) Synaptically, the passage seems to admit of more than one way of being translated.

\(^{164}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 232a3; B, p. 341.17–18): spun la ngan sms kyi yon tan mi brjod cing skyon brjod pa dang .

\(^{165}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 234a6–b3; B, p. 344.10–16): bzhī pa byams pa chen po spong ba ni 'di ltar sms con la dmigs pa'i byams pa dang | de bzhin du chos la dmigs pa dang | mi dmigs pa dag kyang thun mong gi byams pa yin mod kyi | 'dir thun mong ma yin pa ni baig dang gzhan byang chub mshungs pa'i phyir rang bzhin gcig pa'i sgo nas nyam bsg tu ro zhes gsungs pa ita bu ste | ji ltar bdag tu ita ba rams rang la phan pa'i bsam po rtsal mi dgos pa bzhin | rdo rje byang chub kyi sms 'dzin pa rams sms con la phan 'dogs pa rtsal mi dgos so || gal te gzhan la brtshe be med na rdo rje byang chub kyi sms spangs par 'gyur ro |.

\(^{166}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 234b3–235a3; B, pp. 344.16–345.6): lnga pa byang chub kyi sms spong ba ni | 'di ltar bdag nyid thar pa [ba b] sgrub pa'i sms dang | sms can thar bar bya ba'i phyir bsha na med pa'i byang chub kyi sms bskyed pa'i stobs mi gtag ba'ang thun mong du gyur pa yin te | 'on kyang de ni rigs kyi sms dang | rgyu'i gnas skabs kyi sms dang | 'bras bu'i ngo bo gsum rang bzhin tha dad par 'dod de | ji ltar sa con dang | myu g dang | 'bras bu lta bu'o || kun tu bzang po'i byang chub kyi sms ni | rigs dang | rgyu'i gnas skabs dang | 'bras bu gsum rang bzhin tha mi dad par 'dod de | ji ltar sa khng na yod pa'i gser kham kyi rang bzhin du grags pa dang | mes reg na cung zad ser bar snang bar gyur pa dang | dri ma thams cad dang yongs su bral ba'i gser rams rang bzhin bye brag med pa lta bu'o || de i sbe dri ma dang bral ma bral ni bye brag tu 'dod do || rdo rje byang chub kyi sms ni | chol bzang las gzhong par [ba b] byas te de las sku gzhugs su byas na | 'di la ni dri ma dag pa dang ma dag pa'i bye brag kyang med de | 'on kyang dhyibs nam [dang B] yon tan dmigs pa ni khyad par du snang ngo zhes pa lta bu'o || de bas na 'dir rdo rje byang chub kyi sms 'dzin pas byang chub kyi sms thams cd gtag bar mi bya'o ||.
spiritual disposition, causal [process], and result—just as, for instance, there is no distinction in the nature of gold as known in the elementary form [of it] which exists in ore, [the one in which it has] turned somewhat golden upon coming into contact with fire, and [the one in which it has become] completely free from all stains. However, a distinction is still made as to whether it is free from stains or not. As for bodhicittavajra, [it is] comparable to the following: If a container for spit or urine (chol zangs)\(^{167}\) is made into a bowl or basin (gzong pa) [used for less filthy purposes], and then turned into a [sacred] statue (e.g. of a buddha), there is no distinction between being free and not being free from stains. Yet one would say that as far as the perception of the shape and quality is concerned, these appear to be different. Therefore, here [in this system] one who upholds bodhicittavajra should not abandon any kind of bodhicitta.

The abandonment of bodhicittavajra is not mentioned explicitly in his explanation of the sixth mūlāpatti, namely, the disparagement of the three vehicles. He merely states:\(^{168}\)

The non-disparagement of the three vehicles: One who abides in [the view of] the dharma of equality is said not to deride even the dharma of the sentient beings in hell, let alone refute or abandon the dharma of the śrāvakas. One should view all [dharmas] as equal in that they all alike have been taught by the Buddha as benefitting sentient beings according to the [different] calibre of recipients.

Concerning the seventh mūlāpatti, the disclosure of secret teachings to immature individuals, he states:\(^{169}\)

As for not disclosing secret teachings to unworthy [individuals], it is as taught in the following: [Only] if one carries out activities for the benefit of sentient beings by means of the lower vehicles, until a mind that cognises such [a tantric view] arises [in them], will the sentient beings to be tamed not be ruined. Thus Vajrayāna is to be kept extremely secret, and hence it is taught as being a Secret Vehicle.

What is noteworthy is that the issue of secrecy does not really concern the misuse of tantric teachings per se, but rather the harm that sentient beings might incur as a result of misunderstanding and misusing these teachings. The abandonment of bodhicitta is not spoken of here, but Rong-zom-pa had explained elsewhere that not disclosing secret mantras and mudrās to those without pledges is meant to prevent the misuse of bodhicitta.\(^{170}\) Similarly, one can understand why not disclosing secret teachings to unworthy individuals would also prevent misuse.

The non-abandonment of bodhicitta is again not explicitly mentioned in connection with the eighth mūlāpatti, disparaging the five skandhas, which are of the nature of the tathāgata. Rong-zom-pa states:\(^{171}\)

[The eighth basic pledge], not abusing [one's] personal constituents (skandhas), which are of the nature of the Victorious Ones (jina): The skandhas are primordially awakened. Having been

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\(^{167}\) The Tshig mdzod chen mo (s.v.) records chol zangs as an archaic word and provides three meanings: (1) container for spit (mchil snod), (2) container for urine (gcin snod), and (3) basin for washing hands and feet (rkang iag 'khro snod). See also ibid. (s.v. bzed zhal).

\(^{168}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 235a3–4; B, p. 345.6–10): tshag pa gsum la mi smad pa ni | mnyam pa nyid kyi chos la gnas pas sna cem dmyal ba'i chos kyi kyang ni bkol bar gsungs na | nyan thos kyi chos la sun dbyung zhing spang ba lta ci smos te | langs rgyas kyi snod kyi rim pa dang sbyar nas sna cem can gyi don du 'gyur bar gsungs par 'dra bas thams cad mnyam par bla'o || zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o ||.

\(^{169}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 235a4–6; B, p. 345.10–13): skal pa med pa la gsang ba mi bstan pa ni | yang 'di lta bur rtogs pa'i blo ma skyes kyi bar du tshag pa 'og ma nas 'gro ba'i don byas na gdul bya chud mi za bas rab tu gsang ba'i phyir gsang ba'i tshag pa zhes bka' stsal to zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o ||.

\(^{170}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 155b3–4; B, p. 252.2–3).

\(^{171}\) mDo rgyas (A, fol. 235a6–b1; B, p. 345.13–15): rgyal ba'i bdag nyid phung po mi smad pa ni | phung po ye nas sangs rgyas pa yin pa la yin pa nyid du rtogs shing bs gom [bsgom B] nas rang las mi gzhan pa'i longs spyod kyi [khi B] rtig tu mnyes par bya ba yin na | lus sun dbyung zhing smad par bya ba lta ci smos ||.
cognised [and accordingly] meditated upon as such, they are always to be cherished as objects of enjoyment, which are not separate from oneself, and thus [one's] body is under no circumstances to be abused and maltreated.

This idea, Rong-zom-pa states, is found in sūtras of definitive meaning (niṭārtha), such as the Gandavyūhasūtra, as well as in tantras.172

Doubting the purity of phenomena—the ninth mūlāpatti—is expressly said to cause the abandonment of bodhicittavajra:173

[The ninth basic pledge], not having doubts about the purity of phenomena: If having doubts about karma and karmic consequences hinders [the attainment of] higher destinations [in samsāra] and freedom [from samsāra] (moksha), then it is, of course, clear that having doubts about the pure nature of phenomena will cause the abandonment of bodhicittavajra.

The tenth mūlāpatti, being affectionate to hostile persons (duṣṭa), is one of the fourteen mūlāpattis where bodhicittavajra is not referred to explicitly. But Rong-zom-pa's statement that not paying homage to non-Buddhist teachers is one means of avoiding all those things that are not causes of bodhicitta,174 may be applicable here, as he states:175

[The tenth mūlāpatti], expressed as 'being benevolent to hostile persons and being free from desire': 'Being benevolent to hostile persons' [means being affectionate to] enemies of the [Buddhist] doctrine (dharma), such as non-Buddhists who are opposed to the pledges. By being benevolent to them, one becomes a mārā (i.e. an opponent of the saddharma) oneself. And 'being free from desire' [means] arriving at the state of nirvāṇa, and thus being tired of [one's] skandhas and not being interested in constantly working for the benefit of sentient beings.

[Attitudes or actions] such as these, which are not compatible with the great objective [of a bodhisattva], are not permissible even [according to the ethical principles of] general Mahāyāna. [They] are very reproachable in the system of the mahāyoga in particular, and [they] undermine the activities of a buddha.176

What is involved here are emotions of hostility and attachment, and the difficulties ensuing from a total denial of such emotions, from the perspective of mahāyoga ethical-spiritual principles. The benevolence directed to those opposed to the Buddhist doctrine is also called 'illusory (or deceptive) benevolence' (sgyu ma'i byams pa).177

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172 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 232a6–b2; B, p. 342.1–7).

173 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 235b1–2; B, p. 345.15–18): dag pa'i chos la the tshom mi bya ba ni | gang las dang las kyi 'bras bu la sogs pa la the tshom za ba'ang [ba dang B] bde 'gro dang thar pa'i bar du gcod pa yin 'no || [= na || ngo bo nyid kyis dag pa'i chos la the tshom du gyur na | rdo rje byang chub kyi sms spong ba lta ci ci smos ].

Cf. the syntax of the sentence in n. 171.

174 See n. 41 for Rong-zom-pa's explanation (mDo rgyas, A, fol. 155b4–5; B, p. 252.3–4) of the ninth basic pledge according to the Guhyatāntara.

175 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 235b2–5; B, pp. 345.18–346.1): «sdang la byams dang chags bral dang» zhes bya ba la | sdang la byams pa ni dam tshig la sdang ba'i phy | [phyi B] rol pa la sogs chos dgrar gyur pa ste | de la byams par byed pa ni bdag nyid bdud du gyur pa yin la | chags pa dang bral ba ni mya ngas las 'das pa la gzhol bas | phung po la skyo bar byed cing rtog tu sms can gyi don bya ba la spro bar ma gyur pa ste | 'di lta bu dag gis don chen po dang mi mthun pa ni tsho pa chen po spyi' yang ma gnang ba yin na | khyad par du rnal 'byor chen po'i gzhung las shin tu smad pa ste sangs rgyas kyi mdzad pa las nyams par byed pa'o ||.

176 The idea that such deeds undermine the activities of a buddha may be based on the notion that a Vajrayāna practitioner does not act like a bodhisattva but rather like a buddha.

177 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 232a5; B, p. 341.22): kha cig nas sgyu ma'i byams per bshad....
Holding phenomena to be defined by (either of) the two extremes (i.e. of eternalism and annihilationism), which is the eleventh mûlûpati, is again regarded by Rong-zom-pa as being incompatible with the maintenance of bodhicittavajra, for he states: 178

[The eleventh basic pledge, namely,] not viewing phenomena in terms of the two extremes: [This pledge] is common to all Buddhist vehicles. Nonetheless, [in this system, viewing phenomena in terms of the two extremes] would in particular contradict the pledge pertaining to great equality and would consequently cause the abandonment of bodhicittavajra.

Concerning the twelfth mûlûpati, offending the faithful, Rong-zom-pa first defines as faithful those who have consolidated their bodhicitta, and then argues that offending them would lead to the abandonment of bodhicittavajra: 179

[The twelfth mûlûpati, namely,] offending the faithful: The faithful are those whose thought of bodhicitta is firm. By offending them, one would show hostility towards bodhicitta and jealous bias [against it]. Thus [such attitudes and actions] would be incompatible with bodhicittavajra.

According to Rong-zom-pa, this mûlûpati is shared by general Mahâyâna as well as by the Kriyâ and the Yoga systems. 180

The thirteenth basic pledge, namely, consuming pledge-related substances when obtained, is considered by him as a means of consolidating bodhicittavajra: 181

[The thirteenth mûlûpati, namely,] not accepting pledge-related substances when one obtains [them]: As stated above, substances pertaining to attainments (siddhi), substances pertaining to offerings (pûja), and substances pertaining to ascetic practices (vrata) [involving tantric] deities and to empowerments (abhiññaka) are [substances] common to the general tantric systems. What is special here [in this system] is the reliance on substances pertaining to practices carried out [while maintaining a view] of the equality [of phenomena], with a mind that is free from concepts [of revulsion and the like]. This will consolidate bodhicittavajra.

It is known that the consumption of substances that are normally held in revulsion is mentioned in the mahâyâganatrantras. What is perhaps less known is, as Rong-zom-pa has showed, that this practice can also be found in the relatively conservative kriyâtantras. 182

In the same context, he identifies the four kinds of so-called pledge-related substances (dam tshig gi rdzas) as: (1) substances pertaining to attainments (dngos sgrub kyi rdzas), (2) substances used for empowerments (dbang bskur ba’i rdzas), (3) substances used for offering (mchod pa’i rdzas), and (4) substances for consumption (bza’ ba’i rdzas). Some of the substances named by him are meat (sha), blood (khrag), alcohol (chang), and extremely repulsive substances such as human corpses (mi’i ro), said to be used for the ‘zombie attainment’ (ro langs kyi sgrub pa). The rationale behind such practices seems to be that they allow one to test one’s view concerning the equality of samsâra and nirvâna.

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179 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 235b6–236a1; B, p. 346.3–6): dad sems can la ngan du brjod pa ni | byang chub kyi sems kyi bsam pa brtan pa ni dad pa can te | de dag la ngan sems skyes pa ni | byang chub kyi sems nyid la sding bar gyur pa’i phvir dang | phrag dog gis ris su phye ba’i [bas B] phyir | rdo rje byang chub kyi sems dang ‘gal bar ‘gyur ro’ ||.

180 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 232a5–6; B, pp. 341.24–342.1).

181 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 236a1–3; B, p. 346.6–11): dam rdzas rnyed pa mi len pa ni | gong du bstan pa bzhin dngos sgrub kyi rdzas dang mchod pa’i rdzas dang la’i brtal zhugs dang dbang bskur ba’i rdzas lta bu ni gsang sngags spyi’i yang thun mong du gyur pa yin na | ’dir thun mong ma yin pa ni chos mnyam pa nyid kyi brtal zhugs su sphyad pa’i dam rdzas rnams rtag pa dang bral ba’i sems kyi bsten pa ste ‘dis rdo rje byang chub kyi sems brtan [brten B] par byed par ‘gyur ro’ ||.

182 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 232b1–233a3; B, p. 342.7–22).
Regarding the fourteenth and last mūlāpatti, namely, disparagement of women, Rong-zom-pa states that not disparaging women is a means of consolidating bodhicittavajra. In the context of explaining the uncomprehending fourteen mūlāpattis, he states:

[The fourteenth basic pledge, namely,] not disparaging women, who are the embodiment of discriminating insight: It is true, as [already] explained above, that not disparaging [female] deities of knowledge (vidyā), symbolic representations (mudrā) [of those deities], semblances [of those deities] as represented in [physical] forms, or [any animate or inanimate objects] generically similar [to deities] is common to all tantric [systems]. However, the special explanation given here is as follows: In order to confer the status of a teacher, a great vajradhāra, [on someone.] one must rely upon his domain of activity, that is, the mahāmudrā, which is characterised by the prajñāpāramitā. Thus relying on a ‘female of insight’ (shes rab ma) by empowering her as [one’s] karmamudrā (i.e. as one’s female partner in the tantric praxis of union) is extraordinary [tantric] conduct. Hence it can be maintained that [all women] are generically females of insight, and [they] should therefore not be disparaged. This [is a way] to consolidate bodhicittavajra.

It must be admitted that Rong-zom-pa’s explanations as to why women should not be disparaged, given here well as in the context of the common fourteen mūlāpattis, are not easy to understand. The gist of his argument, however, seems to be that, according to the tantras, deities abide in the form of tantric formulas (mantra) and knowledge (vidyā), and one is not supposed to disparage either deities or the ‘forms’ (rnam pa) of deities. Women should not be disparaged because they generically resemble such deities and their forms. Rong-zom-pa understands ‘forms’ in the sense of ‘semblances’ (‘dra ba) and seems to subclassify the ‘forms’ of deities (lha'i rnam pa) as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>pictorial representations</th>
<th>generic semblances (rigs 'dra ba):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(gugs su byas pa)</td>
<td>animate or inanimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ones empowered through meditative visualisation (dmigs pas byin gyis brlabs pa)</td>
<td>ones represented in the form of symbols (phyag rgya'i dbyibs su byas pa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ones generally similar to the [actual] deity (lha dang rigs 'dra ba)</td>
<td>ones generally similar to a symbolic representation of the deity (lha'i phyag rgya dang rigs 'dra ba)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Rong-zom-pa, (a) a symbolic representation of a woman that has been empowered through meditative visualisation (dmigs pas byin gyis brlabs pa'i phyag rgya), that is, an ‘imaginary woman,’ (b) the pictorial representation of a woman (de'i gugs su byas pa), and (c) a real woman (bud med dngos) are all generic semblances (rigs 'dra ba) of the female tantric deities of knowledge (rig sngags kyi lha). Hence from the generic point of view (rigs kyi sgo nas), no woman should be disparaged. Rong-zom-pa adds that not disparaging

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183 According to some sources, ‘disparagement of women’ seems to include all forms of physical, verbal, and mental abuse. See, for example, the Abhisamayalamārti (p. 39.5–6): yosito na tāditayāḥ, na krodhāyāḥ, na cāvamantavyāḥ. For the Tibetan translation, see ibid. (p. 93.31–32).

184 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 236a3–b1; B, p. 346.11–19): shes rab rang bzhin bud med mi smad pa ni | 'di la gong du bstan pa bzhin du phyag rgya dang | rig sngags kyi lha dang | de'i rnam par gyur pa gugs su byas pa dang | rigs 'dra ba dag mi smad pa ni gsang sngags spyi'i thun mong yin mod kyi 'dir thun mong ma yin par bstan pa ni | ston pa rdo rje 'chang chen po'i go 'phang du byin gyis brlabs pa la | de'i spyod yul shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i bdag nyid phyag rgya cher por bstan [= bsten] pa'i phyir | las kyi phyag rgya shes rab mar byin gyis brlabs te bsten par bya ba | 'di ni thun mong ma yin pa'i spyod pa ste | de bas na rigs kyi sgo nas shes rab mar 'dod pas smad par mi bya ste rdo rje byang chub kyi sms brian par byed pa'o ||.

185 See the following note.

186 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 233a3–b1; B, pp. 342.22–343.8): bud med mi smad pa yang gsang sngags kyi rgyud las lha rnams ni gsang sngags dang gsang sngags kyi gugs su bzhugs par bshad la | lha dang lha'i rnam pa'ang mi smad par gsungs so || de la rnam pa zhes bya ba ni 'dra ba'i don te 'di litar gugs su byas pa dang | gezan yang
women, however, does not mean that one should regard them as objects of desire.\textsuperscript{187} It should be noted here that, besides the fourteen \textit{mīlāpatti}s, the texts also speak of eight gross (but venial) transgressions (\textit{sthūlāpatti}), which are of lesser gravity. These, though, will not be discussed here.\textsuperscript{188}

(c) The \textit{Guhyendutilakatantra}

The pledges in the \textit{Guhyendutilakatantra} are said to be taught as ‘pledges pertaining to practice’ (\textit{sgrub pa'i dam tshig}), which are described as ‘six limbs for journeying to the seat of awakening’ (\textit{byang chub kyi snying por byrog pa'i yan lag drug}).\textsuperscript{189} It is, however, not easy to understand the verses of the \textit{tantra}, and hence, I resort to Rong-zom-pa’s commentary. According to him, the six limbs are:\textsuperscript{190} (1) realising vast and profound doctrines which have not arisen in the past, (2) releasing through various means sentient beings that are tormented by pain and passion, (3) indulging in objects of supreme desire (e.g. \textit{bodhicitta}) in accordance with one’s devotion, (4) enjoying bliss without being attached to objects of desire to the extreme, (5) observing the pledges, and (6) being endowed with resolve. He contends that the first two are meant to free one’s views from the two extremes, the third to prevent sentient beings being undone or ruined, the fourth to free one’s conduct from the two extremes, and the fifth to prevent the abandonment of the precepts. The sixth is said to be the power that generates \textit{bodhicitta}.

\textit{Guhuyendutilakatantra}, as cited in the \textit{mdo rgyas} (A, fols. 236b1–2; B, p. 347.8–13):

\texttt{rigs 'dra ba dag go || de la gzugs su byas pa ni dmigs pas byin gvis brlabs pa yin pa || zas dang gos dang gnas dag la mdes par bya ba'i phyir phyag rgya'i dbyibs [= dbyibs su] byas pa dag go || rigs 'dra ba ni | srog chags sam gzhan yang rung ste lha'am lha'i phyag rgya dang rigs 'dra ba dag go || de bas na bud med mi smad pa'ang dmigs pas byin gvis brlabs pa'i phyag rgya dang | de'i gzugs su byas pa dang | bud med dngos rnam snyang rig [= rigs A] sngags kyi lha rnam kyi rigs 'dra ba yin te | de'i phyir rigs kyi sgo nas smad du mi rung ngo ||}.

\textsuperscript{187} \textit{mdo rgyas} (A, fol. 233b1; B, p. 343.8): \textit{chags pa'i gzhi spang ba ni ma gtogs so ||}.

\textsuperscript{188} For Nas-gling-pa’s verse text on the eight \textit{sthūlāpatti}s, see the \textit{mdo rgyas} (A, fols. 229b6–230a4; B, p. 339.4–10). For Rong-zom-pa’s own presentation of them, see \textit{ibid.} (A, fol. 236b1–5; B, pp. 346.20–347.6).

\textsuperscript{189} \textit{mdo rgyas} (A, fols. 236b6–237a2; B, p. 347.8–13):

\texttt{'das pa'i dus na ma byung ba || mtha' yas chos ni yangs par bstan || 'dod chags rnam kyi dkris pa yi || sdog bssngal gzir ba mtha' nas dgrol || 'dod pa mchog gi longs spyod rnam || mos pas rjes su zhugs shing spyad || kun tu chags par mi 'gyur zhing || bde bas longs pa'i yid dang ldan || byang chub snying por byrog pa ni || dam becs rnam sngangs kyi so ||}.

\textsuperscript{190} \textit{mdo rgyas} (A, fol. 237a2–6; B, p. 347.12–22): ‘\textit{di ltar} [1] sngon chad 'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos lugs las ma byung ba'i zab cing rgya che ba'i chos lugs rogs pa dang [2] sems can 'dod eks gcis kun nas dkris pa'i sdog bssngal gvis gzir ba rnam la thabs sa tshogs kyi dgrul ba dang | 'di gnis ni lha ba mtha' gnyis las grol ba'o || [3] 'dod pa mchog gi longs spyod rnam las mos pa'i rjes su spyad pa ni | 'di ltar gzung dang | sgra la sogs pa'i 'dod pa rnam byang chub rna rnam kyi longs spyod du spyad pa ste | 'di gnis ni sams can chud mi gsan par gsungs so | [4] kun tu chags par mi 'gyur zhing bde ba la longs spyod pa ni | spyod pa mtha' 'gnis las grol ba'o || [5] dam becs rnam ni | sdam pa ji ltar nos pa mi gtsang ba'o [ba'a A] || [6] sams kyi sngags kyi sams bskyed pa'i sams stobs te | 'di ltar yan lag drug dang ldan pas byang chub kyi snying po sgrub pa'o zhes bya ba yin no ||}.
(d) The *Guhyagarbhatantra

As noted by Rong-zom-pa, the *Guhyagarbhatantra proposes five primary and ten secondary pledges. The five primary pledges are: (1) not abandoning the unsurpassable, (2) respecting one’s tantric master, (3) not interrupting mantras and mudrās, (4) being kind to those who have entered the correct path, and (5) not disclosing ‘secrets.’ The ten secondary pledges are the non-abandonment of five kleshas and the intake of five ‘nectars.’ The non-abandonment of bodhicitta is not explicitly mentioned in the *Guhyagarbhatantra itself, but the expression ‘unsurpassable’ is interpreted in Vīryavāra’s Dam tshig gsal bkra as referring to the two kinds of bodhicitta, namely, conventional and absolute. Rong-zom-pa, however, seems to understand ‘unsurpassable’ as qualifying the Three Jewels, whose nature, to be sure, is held to be bodhicitta. Each of the five primary pledges are multiplied by thirty-two, resulting in one hundred sixty, and each of the ten secondary pledges are multiplied by twenty, resulting in two hundred, which yields a total of three-hundred sixty pledges. There are, however, numerous other categories of pledges, which cannot be discussed here.

(e) Padmasambhava’s Categories of Pledges

Rong-zom-pa states that Ācārya Padmasambhava devised twenty-eight pledges, namely, three basic and twenty-five secondary pledges, a scheme also found in some mahāyogatantras. The three basic pledges are: (1) the pledge pertaining to body (sku’i dam tshig), (2) the pledge pertaining to speech (gsung gi dam tshig), (3) and the pledge pertaining to mind (thugs kyi dam tshig).

The twenty-five secondary pledges are: (1) five pledges pertaining to non-abandonment, (2) five pledges pertaining to adoption, (3) five pledges pertaining to engagement, (4) five pledges pertaining to cognition, and (5) five pledges pertaining to practice. The five pledges pertaining to non-abandonment involve the non-abandonment of the five kleshas. The five pledges pertaining to adoption involve ingesting the five nectars. The

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191 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 238b2–239b6; B, pp. 349.6–350.19); dKon mchog ’grel (A, fols. 37a3–4, 186b4–186a6; B, pp. 65.20–21, 223.9–233.8).

192 *Guhyagarbhatantra (P, fol. 128a3; D, fol. 130a1–2):
bla med [ma P] mi spong [spang P] bla ma bkur ||
sgags dang pīyag rgya rgyun mi gcad ||
yang dag lam du zhugs la byams ||
gsang ba’i don nyid [phyir P] smra mi bya ||
’di ni rtsa ba Inga rnams te ||.

193 For a detailed explanation of the ten ancillary pledges of the *Guhyagarbhatantra tradition, see the dKon mchog ’grel (A, fols. 192a4–196a4; B, pp. 228.23–233.4).

194 Dom tshig gsal bkra (P, fol. 574b2; S, vol. 43, p. 1191.5): byang sems rnam gnyis slob dpon drug ||. The expressions byang sems rnam gnyis and slob dpon drug are circumlocutions, respectively, for the words bla med and bla ma in the verse of the *Guhyagarbhatantra dealing with the primary pledges.

195 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 238b2–239a3; B, pp. 349.6–21); dKon mchog ’grel (A, fols. 186b4–187b4; B, pp. 223.9–224.12); cf. the Phyogs bcu’i mun sel (pp. 604.2–605.5).

196 dKon mchog ’grel (A, fols. 198a1–199a2; B, pp. 234.20–235.23).

197 mDo rgyas (A, fols. 240a4–247b5; B, pp. 351.2–360.1). Cf. the Nyong ral chos ’byung (p. 337.7): dam tshig nyi shu rtsa brgyad….

198 Cf. the Theg pa’i bye brag (A, fol. 174a3–b1; B, p. 42.9–17).
five pledges pertaining to engagement involve the practices of ‘union’ (shyor ba), ‘liberation’ (sgrol ba), stealing, lying, and rude speech. The five pledges pertaining to cognition entail cognising the five skandhas as having the nature of the five tathāgatas. And the five pledges pertaining to practice involve putting the preceding five pledges pertaining to cognition into practice and perfecting them.  

6. All Mahāyāna Precepts Relating to the Maintenance of Bodhicitta

The tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna vows or pledges are seemingly limitless in number. Some rNying-ma sources speak of one hundred milliard (sa ya ’bum) pledges. Nonetheless, according to Rong-zom-pa, all pledges, which embrace also non-tantric and non-Mahāyāna precepts, are said to be included in the maintenance of bodhicitta. He states:

The vows (samvara)—pledges (samaya) involving engaging in and avoiding things that are [respectively] wholesome and unwholesome, [and thus respectively] permissible and impermissible, and that arise in connection with the [Three] Jewels, individuals, the range of conduct, and the attributes of these, [such pledges being] taught in the kriyā and yogatantras by the Victorious Ones with the aid of various terms—are as follows: pledges (samaya), vows (samvara), ethical-moral discipline (śīla), austerities (tapas), ascetic discipline (vrata), monastic rules (vinaya), [codes of] conduct (caryā), range of conduct (gocara), and so forth. All [of these vows] which are taught with the aid of various terms, should be known in short as being subsumed under [the categories of] general, specific, and additional pledges, depending on the treatises, deities, and individuals. To be even shorter, they involve maintaining bodhicitta. [This] is summarised here as follows:

Whatever existing vows—pledges

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199 Note that Rong-zom-pa discusses these twenty-eight pledges also in his gNang bkag yi ge (pp. 409.1–412.13). For the expression dam tshig nbi shu rtsa inga, see n. 131.

200 See, for example, the sDom gsum rnam nges (p. 31.5–6):

_mdro na rang lus rdo rje gsum shes na ||
snags kyi dam tshig sa ya ’bum sde ’dus ||.

See also the Rig ’dzin ’jug ngogs (p. 205.6–11); Nyang ralchos ’byung (p. 337.8). Cf. the Dam tshig gsal bkra (P, fol. 574a8–b1; S, vol. 43, p. 119.1–2), also cited in the Phyogs bcu’i mun sel (p. 619.5–6).

201 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 150a1–b1; B, p. 245.9–24): rgyal ba rnam kyis bya ba dang rnal ’byor gyi rgyud rnam su ’i _dkon mchog dang gang zag rnam dang spyod yul dang de dag gi chos la brtse pa las byung ba’i_ dge ba dang mi dge ba dang bya ma yin pa la ’jug pa dang ldog pa’i mtshan nyid dam tshig gi sdom pa rnam brda sna tshogs kyi sgo nas gshungs pa ni ’di _’dam tshig dang sdom pa dang tshul krim dang_ dka’ thub dang _brul zhugs dang_ dka’ spyod dang ’dul ba dang_ spyod pa dang _spyod yul la sogs pa’i brda sna tshogs kyis gshungs pa thams cad kyang mdo bsdu na_ gzhung dang lha dang gang zag rnam kyi dbang las _spyi dang_ khyad par dang ’lhag pa’i dam tshig rnam _rnam B su ’dus par shes par bya ste de las_ kyad kun nas bsdu na ni _byang chub kyi sems yongs su gzung ba’i mtshan nyid do ’dir sdom tshig ni _dkon mchog dang ni gang zag dang_ spyod yul dang ni de chos la ||_

amigs shing brtse pa las byung ba’i ||
dge dang mi dge gang yin pa ||
bya dang bya min shes nas ni ||
’jug dang ldog par bya ba la ||
tshul chen gshung ba’i theg pa las ||
dam tshig sdom pa _ji snyed cig ||
sna tshogs brda yis gshungs pa yang ||
gzhung dang lha dang gang zag rnam ||
spyi dang khyad par lhag pa yi ||
dam tshig rnam su ’dus par ’dod ||
kun nas bsdu na byang chub sems ||
yongs su gzung ba’i mtshan nyid do [de A] ||.
Taught in the great system of the Mantrayāna
With the aid of various terms—
Are, [depending on] the treatises, deities, and individuals,
Considered as general, specific,
And additional pledges
With respect to engaging in and avoiding [things]
After learning what is permissible and impermissible, [namely,]
The wholesome and unwholesome [things]
That arise in view of and in connection with
The Three Jewels, individuals,
The range of conduct, and the attributes of these.
[They], if summarised further,
Involve maintaining bodhicitta.

7. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has dealt with the maintenance of bodhicitta both in the wider context of the Mahāyāna and in the more restricted one of Vajrayāna ethical-moral codes. As we have seen, the maintenance of bodhicitta is considered to be the quintessence of all vows, both non-tantric and tantric—which are compared to the life force (srog gi dbang po), the breakdown of which would cause the failure of all other forces\(^{202}\)—and as such is of profound existential significance.

\(^{202}\) *dKon mchog ’grel* (A, fol. 178b1–3; B, p. 215.1–5): bs lab pa thams cad kyi gzhi ni dam tshig yin te | dper na skyes bu ’i srog gi dbang po ’gags na dbang po thams cad ’gag par ’gyur ba bzhin | rnal ’byor dam pa rnams kyi [= kyi] dam tshig gi bs lab pa med par ’gyur na dbang po la sogs pa ’i bs lab pa thams cad kyang don med par ’gyur bas | de ’i phyir de skad bya’o ||; *ibid.* (A, fol. 192a3–4; B, p. 228.21–23): spyir rtsa ba ’i dam tshig ’di dag ni | dbang po thams cad kyi rtsa ba srog gi dbang po yin pa bzhin | dam tshig ’di dag ma nyams na yan lag nyams pa rnams rim gyis sor chud par ’gyur ro ||; *ibid.* (A, fol. 37a4–5; B, p. 65.22–24): ’di ni yid bzhin gyi nor bu rin po che lta dgos pa thams cad kyi ’byung gnas su gyur pa | bs lab pa thams cad kyi gzhi ’dzin pa ’i sa gzhi lta bu | dge ba ’i dbang po thams cad kyi srog lta bur bshad do ||. Cf. the rGyud spyi ’i dngos po (A, fol. 224a6; B, p. 88.22–23): ’di ni legs pa thams cad ’dzin pa ’i las can te | yid bzhin gyi nor bu rin po che lta bu ’o ||.
Chapter Eleven

The Relapse and Restoration of Bodhicitta

May the excellent precious bodhicitta arise
[In whom] it has not [yet] arisen!
May [it] grow evermore, without dwindling,
[In whom] it has [already] arisen!

— Anonymous

1 Cited by dPal-sprul in his Kun bzang bla ma’i zhal lung (fol. 171a3–4):
   byang chub sms mchog rin po che ||
   ma skyes pa rnams skye gyur cig ||
   skyes pa nyams pa med par yang ||
   gong nas gong du ’phel bar shog ||.

I have not been able to determine the authorship of this verse. mKhan-po Kun-dpal (sPyod ’jug tshig ‘grel, p. 172.6) writes that the verse is ‘composed as a synopsis in the Indian treatise’ (rgya gzhung du sdom du bkod pa), or perhaps ‘a synopsis of the Indian treatise [Bodhicaryāvatāra]’ (in which case one should read rgya gzhung du sdom du bkod pa). mKhan-po Ngag-dga’ in his Zhel lung zin bris (fol. 94b1–2) attributes this verse to Śāntideva. This is, however, obviously an error, if an understandable one. The Tibetan commentators of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra have often used this verse as an outline for commenting it. See, for example, Thub-bstan Chos-kyi-grags-pa’s sPyod ‘grel bum bzang (p. 20.15–16).

2 Bodhicaryāvatāra 4.7c; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 25; Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL, p. 67.15; VAIIDYA, p. 41.20).

3 For references, see nn. 66 and 67.
one can, if one wants, always make amends if this occurs. Given the crucial role bodhicitta plays in tantric and non-tantric vows, we can well understand why there is no real substitute for the generation of bodhicitta in the process of restoring broken vows.

A few points that are not always made clear in primary sources require some comments here. Firstly, the abandonment or non-abandonment of bodhicitta is expressed in numerous ways: not forgetting bodhicitta (bodhicitattasampramoṣa), not becoming separated from bodhicitta (bodhicitāvirahita), not destroying or losing bodhicitta (bodhicitāvipranāṣa), and so forth. We shall see that in the Samayasamgraha and the mDo rgyas, the term ‘impairment’ (vipranāṣa: nyams pa) has been used in a broad sense for both reparable and irreparable damage. Secondly, although it is not always clear whether it is bodhicitta itself or the bodhisattva vow that is spoken of as being impaired or nullified, we can perhaps take for granted that it is both of them together. Thirdly, we may ask what kind of bodhicitta is prone to damage or loss. Primarily, it is the bodhicitta of a bodhisattva who has not yet attained the path of seeing (darṣanamārga). Fourthly, it is said that even in the case of complete loss, one can always regenerate bodhicitta or renew the bodhisattva vow. In the case of damage, one can always restore it.

2. Impairment to or Loss of Bodhicitta

The acquisition of bodhicitta bears no soteriological fruits unless it is maintained and nourished continually. It is described as never to be let go of or slackened (vimocyaṃ) and is to be held firmly. The abandonment of bodhicitta is indeed condemned, whereas the stabilisation or maintenance of bodhicitta is highly praised as one of the rarest of things. Some of the earliest Mahāyāna scriptures already talk about the maintenance of bodhicitta in various contexts. The Bhadrapālasūtra states:

In order to benefit the world, [a bodhisattva], having generated compassion (karunā),

Teaches the precious [dharma], the best [of all dharmas].

Although [he] abandons all conditioned [phenomena] (saṃskṛta),

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4 Mahāvyutpatti, no. 2351. Cf. n. 39.
5 Bodhicaryāvaśrā 10.32a; CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 141.
6 Bodhicaryāvatāra 4.1:
evam grhitvā sudrādam bodhicittam jinīmatō
śīkṣānātikrame yatnām kuryān nityām ata indratah ||
For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 25.
7 Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.8:
bhavadhikhaśatāni tārtukāmair api sattvavyasanāni harkukāmaṁ
brahusaukhyaśatāni bhoktukāmair na vimocyaṁ hi sadaiva bodhicittam ||
For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 5.
8 Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.10d: sudrādam grhnata bodhicittasamjñāt
; ibid. 1.11d: sudrādam grhnata bodhicittaratnam
9 Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra, as cited in the Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇijīka (p. 5.13–14):
bodhau cittaṁ drṣṭāram sarvasatvāṁ ānukampayā
sarvadukhaśprāṇaṁyartham durlabhāṅgam paramparā ||
10 Bhadrapālasūtra (p. 164.5–8):
snying rje bskyed nas 'jig rten kun phan phyir ||
chos kyi gtso bo rin chen ston par byed ||
'tus byas ma lus thams cad spong byed kyang ||
byang chub sems ni yongs su gtong mi byed ||.
Chapter Eleven: The Relapse and Restoration of Bodhicitta

[He] never gives up [his] bodhicitta.\(^{11}\)

The Drumakinnarājaparipṛcchāsūtra mentions four qualities which can prevent a bodhisattva from becoming tired of samsāra. One of them is not giving up bodhicitta even during extremely trying situations:\(^{12}\)

O Drumakinnarājā, it should furthermore be known that a bodhisattva does not grow weary of [samsāra] if [he is] endowed with four attributes. What are the four? They are: [1] Not giving up bodhicitta even in extremely trying cases, [2] not desiring [to attain] the [spiritual] level of a śrāvaka or a prayekabuddha, [3] protecting the Sublime Doctrine (śaddharma) even [if it means] giving up life and limb, and [4] travelling a thousand yojanas in order to induce others to properly assume [the bodhisattva’s career of] awakening (bodhi). O Drumakinnarājā, it should be known that a bodhisattva does not grow weary of [samsāra] if [he is] endowed with these four attributes.

Again in the Drumakinnarājaparipṛcchāsūtra, the musical instruments which the Buddha manifested through his magical power sound with the following questions:\(^ {13}\)

How does one generate
The resolve [to strive] for the highest awakening, and
[How would] one not forget the resolve for as long as
One is not on the seat of awakening (bodhimanda) (i.e. the spot under the Bodhi tree)?

Thereupon the bodhisattvas (who are allegorically called Rūpa) answer:\(^ {14}\)

[Bodhicitta is generated] by ‘all that constitutes altruistic inclination’ (*adhyaśayasampad)\(^ {15}\)
For the sake of all sentient beings.
One who is endowed with great compassion
Will not forget bodhicitta.

Not forgetting bodhicitta is a topic also addressed in the Bodhisattvapitakasūtra, where it is counted as one of the four powers that increase the accumulation of gnosis

\(^{11}\) Cf. HARRISON 1990: 151. ‘Conditioned’ (samskṛta) and ‘non-conditioned’ (asaṃskṛta) have often been equated with samsāra and nirvāṇa, respectively. See, for example, Ratnākaraśānti’s Ratnālokālāmākāra (P, fol. 377b7; D, fol. 324b4; S, vol. 64, pp. 888.5–6): ‘dus byas ni kun rdo sbon ste [te P] ’khor ba’o ||’ dus ma byas pa ni don dam pa ste mya ngan las ’dus pa’o ||. From an Abhidharma point of view, however, there are certain conditioned phenomena which are associated with nirvāṇa. What the last two pādas of the verse seek to convey is that although bodhisattvas have given up the factors responsible for ordinary existence in samsāra, and hence have already secured their own salvation, for the sake of others they do not give up bodhicitta. Bodhicitta thus strikes a balance between samsāra and nirvāṇa, making the so-called ‘non-stalemated nirvāṇa’ (apratīṣṭhānairvāṇa) possible.

\(^{12}\) Drumakinnarājaparipṛcchāsūtra (pp. 259.8–261.2): mi ’am ci ’i bdag po gzhan yang byang chub sms dpa’ chos bzhi dang ldan na | yongs su mi skyo bar rig par bya’o || bzhi gang zhe na | ’di ita ste | rab tu nyen kyang byang chub kyi sms mi gtong ba dang | nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas kyi sa mi ’dod pa dang | lus dang srog kyang ’dor zhin dam pa’i chos srong ba dang | dpag tshad stong du ’gro zhin gzhan dag byang chub yang dag par ’dzin du ’jug pa ste | mi ’am ci ’i bdag po byang chub sms dpa’ chos bzhi po ’di dag dang ldan na | yongs su mi skyo bar rig par bya’o ||. See also ibid. (pp. 4.7, 45.7, 77.11, 126.2, 134.11, 152.7–10, 153.2–5, 161.15–16, 284.4).

\(^{13}\) Drumakinnarājaparipṛcchāsūtra (p. 152.7–10):

bla na med pa’i byang chub sms ||
ji lla bu ni bsbyed pa dang ||
byang chub snying po ’dug bar du ||
sms ni brjed pa med par ’gyur ||.

\(^{14}\) Drumakinnarājaparipṛcchāsūtra (p. 153.2–6):

sms can kun gyi ched kyi phyir ||
lhag pa’i bsam pa phun sum tshogs ||
snying rje che dang ldan pa ni ||
byang chub sms brjed mi ’gyur ro ||.

\(^{15}\) See WEZLER 2000: 449–450 for a more precise understanding of sampad or *sampad. Sampad here might have well stood in fine composite, that is, as *adhyaśayasampad.
(jñānasambhāra). One who studies and expounds the Bodhisattvapītakasūtra is said to be never separated from bodhicitta. According to the Ugrapariprcchāsūtra, a bodhisattva who is a householder can be said to have taken refuge in the Buddha if he is endowed with four qualities, one of which is the non-abandonment of bodhicitta. Besides, O householder, a bodhisattva who is a householder has taken refuge in the Buddha if he is endowed with four qualities. What are the four? [They are:] not abandoning bodhicitta, not breaking [one's] commitment, not giving up great compassion (mahākaruṇā), and not aspiring to other ways (or vehicles). O householder, a bodhisattva who is a householder has taken refuge in the Buddha if he is endowed with these four qualities.

Bodhibhadra, in his Samādhīsamābhāra, cites the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra according to which even endeavours that are rooted in basic wholesome virtues (kuśalamūla) but still cause the loss of bodhicitta are the work of Māra. The Sāgaranāgarāpariprcchāsūtra as quoted in the Śūrasamuccaya states that a bodhisattva is endowed with faith (śraddhā) if he has the power not to renounce bodhicitta. The safeguarding of bodhicitta is also a theme in the Samdhinirmocanasūtra, where it is counted as one of the six sākyapadas of a bodhisattva. In the Rāṣtrapālapariprcchāsūtra, the state of being separated from bodhicitta is listed as one of the several disadvantages of being in the company of a bad friend (pāpamitra). The act of stabilising bodhicitta is also said to be mentioned in the Śrīmālādevīsūtra. As I have already mentioned, the term bodhicitta seldom occurs in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, and hence we cannot expect the latter to explicitly allude to the maintenance of bodhicitta or stabilisation of bodhicitta and so forth in an exhortative sense. Nevertheless, in mentioning four advantages

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18 Ugrapariprcchāsūtra (T, fol. 6b1–3; D, fol. 259b5–6): khyim bdag gzhan yang byang chub sms dpas khyim pa chos bzhi dang ldan na sags rgyas la skyabs su song ba yin te i bzhi gang zhe na i byang chub kyi sms ms 'dor ba dang i dam bcas pa mi 'jig pa dang i snying rje chen po yongs su mi gton ba dang i theg pa gzhan la mi dmigs pa ste i khyim bdag byang chub sms dpas khyim pa chos bzhi po de dang ldan na sags rgyas la skyabs su song ba yin no ||.

19 Samādhīsamābhāra 2 (P, fol. 97b5–6; D, fol. 89a2–3; S, vol. 64, p. 256.11–12): ji skad du 'phags pa sdong po bkod pa las i byang chub kyi sms nyams par byed pa'i dge ba'i risa ba risom pa thams cad ni bdud kyi las so zhes gsungs la ||.

20 Śūrasamuccaya (p. 14.3–10): klu'i rgyal po rgya mtshos zhus pa las kyang | klu'i bdag po byang chub sms dpas 'chos lnga dang ldan pa dag ni dad pa can yin te | lnga gang zhe na | mos pa'i stobs dang | las kyi nram par smin pa la 'jug pa'i stobs dang | byang chub kyi sms ms 'dor ba'i stobs dang | yi dam la brtan pa'i stobs dang | mi dge ba'i chos thams cad spangs te | nyes par byas pa thams cad bzod pa'i stobs dang ldan pa'oi zhes gsungs so ||.

21 Samdhinirmocanasūtra (pp. 131.29–132.6): bcom ldan 'das bslab pa'i gzi drug po de dag la byang chub sms dpas 'ji litar bslab par bygi lags | sphyar ras gzigs dbang phyug nram pa lngaste te | pha rol tu phyin po dang ldan pa'i dam pa'i chos bstan pa | byang chub sms dpas 'i sde snod la thog ma kho nar shin tu mos pa dang | de'i 'og tu chos spyad po bcu po dag gis thos pa dang | bsams pa dang | bsogs pa las byung ba'i shes rab bsgrub pa dang | byang chub kyi sms rjes su bsrong ba dang | dge ba'i bshes gnyen la bsten pa dang | rgyun mi 'chad par dge ba'i phyogs la sbyor bas bslab par bya'o ||.

22 Rāṣtrapālapariprcchāsūtra (p. 58.10).

23 See the dKon mchog 'gre (A, fol. 190a5–6; B, p. 227.2–4): dpal gyi phreng [\'phreng A] ba'i mdo las | byang chub sms brtan theg chen zhugs la byams ||; Phyogs bcu'i mun sel (p. 609.2). Whether the line can indeed be found in the Śrīmālādevīsūtra needs to be confirmed. I have not been able to trace it in the translation of the stūra in WAYMAN & WAYMAN 1974.
of being dedicated to the cultivation of the four immeasurables (apramāṇa), it does allude to the firmness of the solemn wish (āśaya) to strive for the highest awakening.24

3. Causes of the Partial or Total Breach of Vows

In general, four causes of (or ‘gates’ to) the overstepping or breaching of vows are mentioned in the Vinaya context:25 (a) lack of knowledge (mi shes pa), (b) carelessness (pramāda), (c) abundance of intellectual-emotional defilements (nyon mongs mang ba), and (d) faithlessness (aśraddhyā). These can be applied in particular to the bodhisattva and mantra vows. The Viṇīcayaśaṃskāraṇī refers to four causes of the breach of the bodhisattva vows, which may be summarised as:26 (a) generating a resolve contrary to the one initially assumed (?), (b) formally giving up the vow in the presence of a person who is capable of understanding, (c) committing one or more of the four pārājika-like offences, and (d) committing one or more of the four pārājika-like offences coupled with excessive (adhimātra) fetters (paryavasthāno).

The Dākiniśamvaratantra increases the above four causes to make six causes relating to the breach of tantric vows:27 (a) lack of knowledge, (b) carelessness, (c) possessing (many) intellectual-emotional defilements, (d) faithlessness, (e) forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛti), and (f) lacking mindfulness (or clarity of mind). The Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo mentions ‘nine doors of transgression (or fall)’ (ltung ba'i sgo dgu), an expression also employed by Rong-zom-pa, but one that does not seem to mean what it appears to, referring rather to nine transgressions that cause one to suffer nine undesirable destinations.28 The Dam tshig gsal bkra lists twenty causes of samaya impairment,29 but the reading is very uncertain, and prone to more than one interpretation.

24 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.16 (WOGIHARA, p. 249.4–6; DUTT, p. 170.13–14): anuttarāyam samyaksambodhān āśayadṛḍhavāyā bhavati |; see also MAITHRIMUKTHI 1999: 316, 327.

25 Vastusamgrahani(P, fols. 2b8–3a1; D, fol. 2b3; S, vol. 75, p. 5.2–3): de yi rgyu yang rnam bzhi ste ||
mi shes pa dang bag med dang ||
nyon mongs mang dang ma gus pa'o ||.
For an explanation of each of the four causes, see ibid. (P, fol. 9a5–b6; D, fols. 7b5–8a4; S, vol. 75, pp. 17.16–18.16). See also the MTho ṭik (p. 230.9–11).


27 Dākiniśamvaratantra (T, fol. 35a4–5; D, fol. 243b4):

| dang por nams pa'i rgyu nyid kyang || |
| mi shes pa dang bag med dang || |
| nyon mongs ldan dang ma gus dang || |
| brjed ngas dran pa migsal ba || |
| 'di drug dam tshig nams pa'i rgyu || |


29 See the Dam tshig gsal bkra (P, fol. 578a1–3; S, vol. 43, pp. 1197.20–1198.6):
4. Causes of Impairment to or Loss of Bodhicitta

There may be many other lists of the causes of bodhicitta being impaired or lost. In the following paragraphs I shall present those of which I am aware. In the Punyasamuccayasamādhisūtra, the Buddha tells the bodhisattva Nārāyaṇa that there are four sets of four qualities that can cause one to forget bodhicitta. The first set of four is stated to be as follows:30

O Nārāyaṇa, a bodhisattva will forget [his] bodhicitta if [he is] possessed of four qualities. What are the four? They are: [1] great haughtiness (atimāna), [2] lack of respect for the Doctrine (dharma), [3] disrespectfulness or contemptuousness (adhiṣekap) for [one’s] spiritual companion (kalyāṇamitra), and [4] mendacity (mithyāvāc). O Nārāyaṇa, if a bodhisattva is possessed of these four qualities, [he] will forget [his] bodhicitta.

The sūtra does not explain why or how these qualities would cause one to forget one’s bodhicitta. The second set of qualities are then listed:32

O Nārāyaṇa, a bodhisattva will forget [his] bodhicitta if [he is] possessed of four qualities. What are the four? They are: [1] acquainting himself with practitioners (yogācārin) who are the followers of the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna, [2] [acquainting himself with] those who are [intellectually and emotionally] disposed (adhimukta) to Hinayāna, [3] being hostile to bodhisattvas and disparaging [them], and [4] being a teacher who is unforthcoming with the Doctrine.34 O Nārāyaṇa, if a bodhisattva is possessed of these four qualities, [he] will forget [his] bodhicitta.

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31 Note that T adds here ‘not paying homage [to them]’ (gsol ba mi ’debs pa).


33 The compound sāvakapratyekabuddhayānika is attested. See, for example, KEIRA & UEDA 1998, s.v.

34 According to the Tshig mdzod chen mo (s.v.), mkhyud pa means to ‘keep secret’ (gsang ba) or ‘conceal’ (sbed pa) so that dpe mkhyud means ‘keeping an instruction secret and not teaching it, out of a sense of parsimony’ (man ngag shes kyang ser snas gsang ste mi ston pa), and in particular, sob dpon gyi dpe mkhyud.
In this set of four, it is evident why the first three qualities can cause degradation of bodhicitta. As for the third set of four, the sūtra states:\textsuperscript{35}  
O Nārāyaṇa, a bodhisattva would further forget [his] bodhicitta if [he is] possessed of four qualities. What are the four? They are: [1] being deceitful, [2] associating with (lit. ‘relying upon’) sentient beings for perfidious purposes, [3] being double-tongued to [one’s] spiritual companions, and [4] being greatly attached to material gain and a good reputation. O Nārāyaṇa, if a bodhisattva is possessed of these four qualities, [he] will forget [his] bodhicitta.  

The fourth set of four qualities is as follows:\textsuperscript{36}  
O Nārāyaṇa, a bodhisattva will forget [his] bodhicitta if [he is] possessed of four qualities. What are the four? They are: [1] not recognising the deeds of Māra, [2] being obscured by karmic obscurations, [3] having weak altruistic inclinations (adhyāśaya), and [4] lack of discriminating insight (prajñā) and [efficiency in applying] strategic means (upāya). O Nārāyaṇa, if a bodhisattva is possessed of these four qualities, [he] will forget [his] bodhicitta.  

The Punyasamuccayasamādhisūtra then goes on to narrate the story of how Sudhana, out of pride, neglected bodhicitta during the time of the Buddha Krakucchanda, and was thus dispossessed of five things, namely, seeing buddhas, hearing the Doctrine, discussing with great bodhisattvas matters of the Doctrine, dedicatory transfer (parināmanā) of wholesome virtues (kuśalāmūla), and the stabilisation of bodhicitta. And yet, in virtue of his previous bodhicitta, he was not reborn in hell.\textsuperscript{37}  

In the chapter on the two bodhicittotpāda traditions, we have seen that manifesting the so-called ‘four black practices’ (nag po’i chos bzhi) or not manifesting the ‘four white practices’ (dkar po’i chos bzhi) has been considered to be the four cardinal transgressions (mulāpatti) according to the Maitreya-Asanga tradition. According to the Ratnakūṭasūtra, as cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, these four negative practices cause one to forget one’s bodhicitta.\textsuperscript{38}  

Forgetting bodhicitta is also detrimental, and its causes have been taught in the Ratnakūṭa Sūtra: “O Kāśyapa, the bodhicitta of a bodhisattva will go astray (or be forgotten)\textsuperscript{39} if he is] possessed of four qualities. Which four? The following: \textsuperscript{40} [1] betraying of [one’s] preceptor, master, and [others] worthy of respect (or offerings), [2] causing regrets (or misgivings) in others who are without regrets (or misgivings), [3] uttering depreciation, slurs, disapproval, or malicious verse against sentient beings who are properly established in the


\textsuperscript{37} Punyasamuccayasamādhisūtra (T, fols. 130b1–131b1; D, fols. 101b4–102a6).  


\textsuperscript{39} According to the Tibetan translation (tshigs su beck pa ma yin pa ‘byin pa), this should read ašoka”, which I have followed in my translation.  

\textsuperscript{40} The Tibetan translation has ‘di lla ste (tadyathā), which is not reflected in either Sanskrit edition.
Mahāyāna, and [4] approaching others with deceitfulness and dishonesty rather than with altruistic inclinations.\(^{41}\)

Ratnākaraśānti, in his *Ratnālokālamkāra*, has summarised these four causes of forgetting bodhicitta as follows:\(^{42}\) (1) deceiving one’s teachers and those worthy of offerings, (2) inappropriately causing regrets in others,\(^{43}\) (3) speaking ill of other bodhisattvas out of malevolence, and (4) treating sentient beings with deception and dishonesty. The four positive practices meant to keep bodhicitta thriving are given as follows:\(^{44}\)

The avoiding of this [set of four negative practices] is [also] taught there (i.e. in the *Ratnākītāsūtra*): “O Kāśyapa, the bodhicitta of a bodhisattva who is possessed of four qualities will exhibit itself immediately after [his] birth in all lifetimes, and will not go astray (or be forgotten) in between up to the act of sitting down on the seat of awakening. Which are the four [qualities]? [They are] as follows: [1] [He] does not deliberately utter false speech, not even for the sake of [his] life or with an eye to amusement.\(^{45}\) [2] [He] remains close to all sentient beings thanks to his altruistic inclinations, being free of hypocrisy and dishonesty. [3] [He] generates a notion of the Teachers (i.e. the buddhas) within all bodhisattvas and proclaims their praise in the four directions. And [4] [he] causes all those sentient beings whom he brings to maturation to generate [the resolve to strive for] the highest perfect awakening without the desire [to place them in the ‘Vehicle of Limited Scope’] (i.e. Hinayāna). These, O Kāśyapa, are the four.\(^{46}\)

These four antidotes are summarised by Ratnākaraśānti as follows:\(^{47}\) (1) not telling lies deliberately, not even in jest, (2) establishing others in the state of perfect awakening, (3) regarding other bodhisattvas as if they were the Buddha himself, and (4) harbouring pure altruistic inclinations towards others.

In the *Pārṇaparipṛcchāsūtra*, Pūrṇa asks the Buddha what kind of unwholesome deeds he must have committed that caused the deterioration of his bodhicitta for one aeon. The Buddha tells him that he had in the past relied upon bad companions and that he did not

\(^{41}\) For the Tibetan translation of this passage, see the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (P, fol. 42b2–5; D, fol. 34b6–35a1; S, vol. 64, pp. 1085.14–1086.1). Cf. the English translation in BENDALL & ROUSE 1971: 53. See also the *Rig 'dzin jug ngogs* (p. 138.1–6), where the pertinent passage is cited. Cf. SOBISCH 2002: 54, nn. 168–169.

\(^{42}\) *Ratnālokālamkāra* (P, fol. 277b3–5; D, fol. 236b5–6; S, vol. 64, pp. 667.20–668.3): *de la byang chub kyi sems brjed pa ni rgyu rnam pa bzhis ste* | *bla ma dang sbyin gnas la* [om. PN] *log par slu [bslu PN] ba dang* | *gzhana gnas ma yin pa la ’gyod pa bskyed pa dang* | *byang chub sems dpa’ la zhe sdang bas ngan du brjod pa dang* | *sems can la g.yo dang [om. N] sgyus spyod pa’o* || *rgyu de bzhis bstan pa ni* | *rdo rje rin po che chag pa lta bu’o* ||

\(^{43}\) The fact that the corresponding antidote is given as ‘placing others in the [state] of perfect awakening’ (gzhana dag rdoogs pa’i byang chub la ’god pa) suggests that ‘inappropriately causing regrets in others’ should be understood particularly as causing misgivings in others about Mahāyāna, and thus causing them to abandon bodhisattva practices.


\(^{45}\) Cf. BHSD, s.v. preksikā, where sukhapreksikāya is translated as ‘with regard to pleasure’.

\(^{46}\) For the Tibetan translation of this passage, see the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (P, fol. 42b5–43a1; D, fol. 35a2–4; S, vol. 64, p. 1086.1–13). Cf. the English translation in BENDALL & ROUSE 1971: 53.

\(^{47}\) *Ratnālokālamkāra* (P, fol. 277b5–6; D, fol. 236b6–7; S, vol. 64, pp. 668.3–6): *de i gnyen po ni rnam pa bzhis ste| shes bzhin bzhad gad kyi phyir yang brdzun ni brjod pa dang | gzhana dag rdoogs pa’i byang chub la ’god pa dang | byang chub sems dpa’ la ston pa liar sems pa [dpa’ N] dang | gzhana lha bsum pa rnam par dang pa’o*.
widely propagate the Sublime Doctrine (saddharma).\(^{48}\) The Buddha then goes on to explain four qualities that cause a bodhisattva’s bodhicitta to deteriorate, relegating him to the status of a śrāvaka.\(^{49}\) The first such factor is explained thus: \(^{50}\)

Because a bodhisattva has relied upon a bad, unwholesome companion, he utterly abandons all the basic wholesome virtues, and afterwards [his companion] proclaims thus: “Why do you have to generate the resolve [to strive] for unsurpassable awakening? The extent of samsāra is extremely great. You would experience infinite pain (or suffering) while going through the five destinations [of samsāra]. In other words, encountering a suitable opportunity is extremely rare. Encountering the appearance of a buddha is also extremely rare. Obtaining an intense pristine faith is also extremely rare. Even if you happen to encounter a buddha who has appeared [in the world], going forth from a home to homelessness is exceedingly difficult. Do not waste the opportunity you have now. You have not obtained a prophecy from the tathāgatas that you will become awakened unto the unsurpassable, correct perfect awakening, nor will you attain nirvāṇa, since [your] basic wholesome virtues have not taken firm shape. And you would wander depressed and turn back from the path of awakening, and in his torpor lose confidence [in it]. O Pūrṇa, if a bodhisattva is endowed with this first quality, he will revert from the unsurpassable awakening (i.e. from Mahāyāna) and resort to Śrāvakayāna.

The second quality causing a bodhisattva’s bodhicitta to deteriorate is explained thus: \(^{51}\)

\(^{48}\) Pūrṇaparīśeṣāsūra (T, fol. 345a1–4; D, fol. 185a5–6): bcom ldan ‘das la tse dang ldan pa gang pos gsal pa | bcom ldan ’das dbag gis sngon mi dge ba’i las ci zhig bygis na bskal pa gcig gi bar du bla na med pa yang dag par rdzo gs pa’i byang chub tu sams bskyed pa las slar ldog [log D] cing nyams par guyr lags | bcom ldan ‘das kyis bka’ stsal pa | gang po khyod kyis mi dge ba’i grogs po la brten [bsten D] pa’i phiyir dang | gzhan yang khyod kyis dam pa’i chos rgya cher ma spel ba’i phiyir khyod bla na med pa yang dag par rdzo gs pa’i byang chub las slar ldog cing nyams par guyr pa yin no ||.

\(^{49}\) Pūrṇaparīśeṣāsūra (T, fol. 345a4; D, fol. 185a6–7): gang po chos bzhin dang ldan na bia na med pa yang dag par rdzo gs pa’i byang chub las ldog cing nyams nas nyan thos kyi theg par ‘gyur ro || bzhin zhe na ||.

\(^{50}\) Pūrṇaparīśeṣāsūra (T, fol. 345a5–4b; D, fol. 185a7–4b): byang chub sams dpa’ salg pa mi dge ba’i grogs [add. po T] la brten [bsten D] pa’i phiyir dge ba’i rtsa ba yongs su spangs nas ‘di skad du ‘di ltar bla na med [add. yang dag par rdzo gs T] pa’i byang chub tu sams bskyed ci digos | ‘khor ba’i rtha’i ni shin tu thag ring ste ‘gro ba lnga po rnam su kha bbyud cing sdug bsgsal thad med pa [om. D] myong bas khom po dang phrad ‘pa yang6 shin tu dkon | sangs rgyas ‘byung ba dang phrad ‘pa yang6 shin tu dkon | shin tu dang ba’i dad pa thob ‘pa yang6 shin tu dkon | sangs rgyas ‘byung ba dang phrad par gyur ‘na yang’ [na’ang T] khyim nas khyim med par rab tu ‘byung ba ches shin tu dka’ bas denk khyod [khyed D] khom pa dang dag dan pa chud ma gzan cig | khyod de bzhin gshegs pa rnam las bla na med pa yang dag par rdzo gs pa’i byang chub mgon par rdzo gs par ‘shang rgya bar ‘gyur bar lung bstan pa thob ‘pa yang5 ma yin la | dge ba’i rtsa ba nges par gyur ‘pa yang6 ma yin pas yongs su mya ngan las ‘da’ ‘ba yang6 [ba’ang T] mi thob cing ‘gro ba lnga po rnam su ‘khor bar ‘gyur ro zhes smras pa gang zag de skad smras pa thos pa’i dbang gis sams bying nas byang chub kyi lam las ldog cing le los mos par [unclear D] mi ‘gyur te | gang po byang chub sams dpa’ gang chos dang po ‘di dang ldan par gyur na bla na med pa’i byang chub las slar ldog [log D] nas nyan thos kyi theg pa bar [par T] ‘gyur ro ||, pa’ang T.

\(^{51}\) Pūrṇaparīśeṣāsūra (T, fols. 345b4–346a6; D, fols. 185b4–186a2): gzhan yang gang po byang chub sams dpa’ gang byang chub sams dpa’i rjes su mthun6 pa’i mdo sde ‘di lta ste | byang chub sams dpa’i sde snod kyi mdo dang | byang chub tu sams bskyed pa’i mdo dang | byang chub sams dpa’i bya ba yang dag par sdad pa’i mdo dang | pha rol tu phyin pa drug dang rjes su mthun6 pa’i mdo thos pa ma guyr na | ‘di ltar thos par ma guyr pa’i phiyir ji skad bstan pa bzhin du spyod par mi ‘gyur | ji skad bstan pa bzhin du yang dag po slob par mi ‘gyur bas de byang chub sams dpa’i chos gang ni bsten par bya | chos gang ni yongs su spang bar bya | chos gang ni yang dag par bhang bar bya ba’i rigs | chos gang ni yang dag par bhang bar bya ba’i rigs | chos gang ni byang chub sams dpa’i chos yin | chos gang ni yongs kyi byang chub sams dpa’i chos yin | chos gan ni yongs kyi byang chub sams dpa’i chos yin | chos gan ni yongs kyi byang chub sams dpa’i chos yin | ‘di ltar mi shes shing rab tu ‘byed par mi nus pa’i phiyir bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten [bsten D] par mi byed la | bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos la ni rab tu bsten [sten T] par ‘gyur ro || des bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten par mi byed la | bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos la ni rab tu bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten par mi byed la | bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos la ni rab tu bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten par mi byed la | bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos la ni rab tu bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten par mi byed la | bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos la ni rab tu bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten par mi byed la | bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos la ni rab tu bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten par mi byed la | bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos la ni rab tu bsten par bya ba’i rigs pa’i chos ni sten par mi byed | le lo can du
Moreover, O Pûrṇa, if a bodhisattva does not happen to hear those sūtras that are consistent with [the conduct of] a bodhisattva, namely, the Bodhisattvasūtraṇi, Bodhicittotpādasūtra, Bodhisattvakriyāsámgrahasūtra, and *Ṣatpāramitāvarttisūtra, [he] will not conduct himself as instructed, because [he] will not have heard them. Because [he] does not properly train himself as instructed, he will not know clearly what kind of dharma a bodhisattva should rely upon; what kind of dharma should be abandoned; what kind of dharma is worth adopting; what kind of dharma is not worth adopting; what kind of dharma the bodhisattva's dharma is; [and] what kind of dharma the śrāvakā's dharma is. Failing to understand and differentiate in this way, [he] will not rely upon [those] dharmas that are worth relying upon and will rely upon [those] dharmas that are not worth relying upon. Because he does not rely upon [those] dharmas that are worth relying upon and relies upon [those] dharmas that are not worth relying upon, [he will suffer] a complete setback and relapse from the bodhicitta of the buddhas, and will become disheartened and apathetic, and thus completely renge on the aspirations [he had] before. O Pûrṇa, a bodhisattva who is endowed with this second quality will relapse from [the path] of the highest awakening and become a śrāvakāyānīka.

The third quality causing a bodhisattva to allow his bodhicitta to deteriorate and fall back to the status of a śrāvaka is explained thus:52

Furthermore, O Pûrṇa, suppose that a bodhisattva holds to all phenomena to be existent and firmly clings to a self (ātman), practises false views, and [even] descends into extreme views. [And] suppose that [having become incorrigible as a result of being submerged in false [views and] misdeeds, he opposes profound sūtras [whose content is] in harmony with absolute reality—without the slightest sign of trust despite listening to [them]—and having failed to realise [their purport] clearly, commits blameworthy [deeds] that cause the destruction of the right dharma. Given such causes and conditions, he would be born in an unfavourable place, and thus would not encounter the buddhas [and] would not hear the Sublime Doctrine (saddharma); would not encounter the instructions of the buddhas; and would not find [spiritually] favourable companions (i.e. good teachers and friends). Not [being able to] encounter buddhas, he would not hear the right dharma. Not hearing the right dharma, [he] would not encounter instructions taught by the buddhas. Not encountering instructions taught by the buddhas, [he] would not find [spiritually] favourable companions. Not finding [spiritually] favourable companions, [he] would be cut off from favourable places and be born in an unfavourable place. Being born in an unfavourable place, [he] would be separated from [spiritually] favourable companions and encounter [spiritually] unfavourable companions. Following [spiritually] unfavourable companions, [he] would forget and lose the resolve [he had] before. Forgetting and losing the

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52 Pûrṇaparipṛcchāsūtra (T, fol. 346a6–347a3; D, fol. 186a2–b2): [3] gzhon yang gang po byang chub sems dpa’ gang chos nnams yod pa nyid du ’dzin cing bdag tu mngon par zhen pa dang | log par lta ba nnams spyd cing mtha’ ’dzin pa’i lla bar ltung ba dang | log pa’i sdiq pa nnams su bying ste drang dka’ bar gnyur nas mdo sde zab mo don dam pa’i rjes su mthun [’thun D] pa dang thos par gnyur ’na’ang | mngon par yid ches pa’i rtags cung zads tham yang med cing ’gal bar byed pa dang | mngon par ma rtags nas yang dang pa’i chos ’jig pa’i kha na ma tho ba dag slong bar byed na rgyu dang rkyen dsi mi khom pa’i gnas su skyes nas sngas rgyas nnams dang yang phrad par mi ’gnyur | dam pa’i chos kyang thos par mi ’gnyur | sngas rgyas nnams kyi rjes su bstan pa dag dang yang phrad par mi ’gnyur | deg ba’i bshes gnyen yang rnyed par mi ’gnyur ro | des sngas rgyas nnams mi mthong ba’i phyir yang dag pa’i chos kyang thos par mi ’gnyur ro | yang dag pa’i chos ma thos pa’i phyir sngas rgyas nnams kyi rjes su bstan pa dag dang yang phrad par mi ’gnyur | sngas rgyas nnams kyi rjes su bstan pa’i chos dang phrad par ma gnyur pa’i phyir dge ba’i bshes gnyen rnyed par mi ’gnyur ro | deg ba’i bshes gnyen ma rnyed pa’i gnas de gnyen dang bral nas mi khom pa’i gnas su skyer ’gnyur ro | mi khom pa’i gnas su skyes pa’i phyir dge ba’i bshes gnyen dang bral nas mi dge ba’i grogs po dang phrad par ’gnyur ro | mi dge ba’i grogs po’i rjes su’i bhangs pa’i phyir sngon gyi yi dam brjed cing stor ’gnyur ro | des sngon gyi yi dam brjed cing stor gyur pa’i phyir byang chub kyi sams kyang spong bar byed | byang chub sems dpa’i theg ’pa yanga spong bar byed pas slar idog par ’gnyur zhing byang chub kyi bsam ’pa yanga ston dus ’khor ba’i chos ’ba’ shig spyod cing theg pa chen po’i spyod pa’i chos mngon par bsgrub [sgrub D] par mi ’gnyur te | gang po byang chub sems dpa’ gang chos gsum po [pa T] ’di dang ldan par gnyur na bla na med pa’i byang chub las slar log nas nyan thos kyi theg pa bar [par T] ’gnyur ro |. a pa’ang T.
resolve [he had] before, he would also abandon bodhicitta; would also abandon the Bodhisattvayāna; would consequently relapse [from it]; would lose for good the resolve [to strive for] awakening; would become engaged exclusively in the deeds of samśāra; and would not be engaged in practising Mahāyāna. O Pūrṇa, a bodhisattva who happens to be endowed with this third quality would relapse from [the path] of the highest awakening and would become a śrāvakayānikā.

The fourth quality causing a bodhisattva’s bodhicitta to deteriorate is explained thus: 53

Furthermore, O Pūrṇa, suppose that a bodhisattva who has heard such sūtras does not properly teach others out of an altruistic inclination (adhyāśaya); in his torpor takes delight in visiting [and teaching] only one [kind of person]; has no will to teach others, being unforthcoming with the Doctrine; and does not gather masses of other [people] by [teaching] the Doctrine. Given these unworthy causes and conditions, [he] would seriously damage [his] discriminating insight (prajñā) and awareness (smṛti). A person who, having damaged [his] discriminating insight and awareness, does not read and recite sūtra scriptures together with other [persons] and does not conduct himself in harmony with others on the basis of the Doctrine would lose his bodhicitta immediately after the exchange of [his present] body (i.e. after his death), and would also forget the bodhisattva’s altruistic inclination (āśaya). O Pūrṇa, a bodhisattva who happens to be endowed with these four qualities will relapse from the resolve to strive for the highest awakening and will become a śrāvakayānikā.

The four qualities that cause the relapse of bodhicitta have been summarised once again in verse. 54 The sūtra also explains four qualities that can prevent the deterioration of bodhicitta: 55


54 Pūrṇaparipṛcchāsūtra (T, fol. 347b1–348a1; D, fols. 186b6–187a3):

mi dge ’i grogs po sten byed cing ‖
byang chub la ni mi brtsan na ‖
gryu dang rkyen ni de yi phyir ‖
bla med byang chub sems stor ’gyur ‖
sdi pa’i bdag lta rab bskyed nas ‖
mta’ dang log ltar gang lhung ba ‖
chos ’jig sdi ni bslang [blang T] bas na ‖
mi khom gnas su skye bar ’gyur ‖
mi khom gnas su skyes nas kyang ‖
byang chub sems ni gcod byed cing ‖
sngon gyi yi dam stor ’gyur bas ‖
de phyir byang chub sems kyang nyams ‖
de yis byang chub sems skye ba’i ‖
chos ni thos par yang [yon T] mi ’gyur ‖
de yi sems ni ’phel gyur na ‖
byang chub sems ni sgrub [bsgrubs T] par ’gyur ‖
dam chos rgya chen thos gyur kyang ‖
ser snas gzhan la ston mi mos ‖
gryu dang rkyen ni de yi phyir ‖
byang chub lam ni ldog par ’gyur ‖
byang chub sems dpa’ theg chen gnyer ‖
chos ’di bzhi ni shes par bya ‖
chos ’di bzhi ni shes gyur na ‖
O Pūrṇa, a bodhisattva who is endowed with four qualities will not revert from [his] bodhicitta, in keeping with his dedication aspiration (parināmanaḥ), nor will his basic wholesome virtues (kusālamūla) deteriorate, [again] in keeping with his dedication aspiration. What are the four? [They are:] if bodhisattvas adhere to the immaculate ethical-moral discipline (śīla) and bring [their] altruistic zeal (āsaya) to fruition; [if they are] endowed with awareness (smṛti) and properly abide in discriminating insight (prajñā); [if they] make efforts in a diligent [state of] mind and are free from laziness; [and if they possess] the excellence of vast learning and enhanced discriminating insight. O Pūrṇa, if a bodhisattva is endowed with these four qualities, [he] will not revert from [his] bodhicitta, in keeping with his dedication aspiration (parināmanaḥ), nor will his basic wholesome virtues (kusālamūla) deteriorate either, [again] in keeping with his dedicationary aspiration.

The Brahnaviśeṣacintipariścāraśūra mentions four qualities that prevent a bodhisattva laying waste to his bodhicitta:56

O Brahma, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas will not lay waste to [their] bodhicitta if [they] are endowed with four qualities. What are the four? [They are:] [1] ‘[focusing their] attention on recollecting the Buddha’ (buddhānusmṛti), [2] [making sure that the practices of] all the basic wholesome virtues (kusālamūla) are headed by [the practice of] bodhicitta, [3] relying upon [spiritually] favourable companions (kalyāṇamitra), and [4] properly praising (or appreciating) Mahāyāna. These are the four.

The Bodhisattvabhūmi mentions four causes (kāraṇa) of the relapse (vyāvṛtti) of cittotpāda:57

There are four causes of the relapse of the resolve [to strive for awakening] within a bodhisattva. What are the four? [1] Not being endowed with the spiritual disposition (gotrasampāna) [of a bodhisattva], [2] being in the grip (or influence) of a bad companion (pāramitraparighita), [3] being apathetic (mandakaruna) towards sentient beings, and [4] being afraid (bhīra) of the long-term, manifold, excruciating, and unceasing suffering of samsāra—extremely frightened [of it], terrified and stricken with terror. These four causes of the relapse of the resolve [to strive for awakening] should be known in detail as being in opposition to the four [pre]requisites for the arising of the resolve [to strive for awakening, which should be understood] analogously to what [was explained] before.

55 Pūrṇaparipariṣćāra (T, fol. 348a2–6; D, fol. 187a3–6): gang po byang chub sens dpa’ chos bzhis dang ldan na ji ltar yongs su bsngos pa bzhin du byang chub kyi sens las [add. slar T] ldog par mi ‘gyur zhung | ji ltar yongs su bsngos pa bzhin du dge ba’i rtsa ba rnam sogs yongs su nyams par mi ‘gyur ro | bzhis gang zhe na | byang chub sens dpa’ rnam tshul khrims rnam par dag pa yongs su bsrgungs nas bsam pa rnam mgon par grub par byed pa dang | dran pa dang ldan zhung shes rab la yang dag par gnas pa dang | rab tu brtsan pa’i sens kyi brtsan zhiṅg le lo med pa dang | mang du thos pa phun sum tshogs shing shes rab ‘phel bar gyur pa dag yin te | gang po byang chub sens dpa’ gang chos bzhis po ’di dag dang ldan par gyur na ji ltar yongs su bsngos pa bzhin du byang chub kyi sens las yongs su ldog par mi ‘gyur zhung | ji ltar yongs su bsngos pa bzhin du dge ba’i rtsa ba rnam sogs su nyams par mi ‘gyur ro |.

56 Brahnaviśeṣacintiparipariṣćāra (T, fol. 165b2–4; D, fol. 39a5–6): tshangs pachos bzhis dang ldan na byang chub sens dpa’ sens dpa’ chen po rnam byang chub kyi sens chud mi gzon te bzhis gang zhe na | sangs rgyas rjes su dran pa yid la byed pa dang | dge ba’i rtsa ba thams cad la byang chub kyi sens sngon du ’gro ba dang | dge ba’i bshes gnyen la bsten [sten T] pa dang | theg pa chen po la yang dag par bsngags pa stie | bzhis po ’di dag go |.

57 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§3.2.0).
The Bodhisattvabhūmi in general presupposes the existence of some sentient beings without any kind of spiritual disposition (gotra). Here, however, it is the lack of the spiritual disposition of a bodhisattva that is referred to, if not explicitly, as being one of the causes of the relapse of cītotpāda—and not the lack of gotra as such. The fact that the gotra of a bodhisattva is in question here has been made explicit elsewhere in the Bodhisattvabhūmi. A relapse of cītotpāda caused by the absence of a spiritual disposition is viewed by Sāgaramahā in a fatalistic fashion. He states that relapses brought on by three other causes are not permanent relapses, whereas the lack of an excellent spiritual disposition would cause permanent relapse. It should be, however, stated here that the agotra theory appears fatalistic only from a soteriological point of view, not from a worldly perspective. The Bodhisattvabhūmi makes it clear that the welfare of an agotra is included among the ‘ripening’ agenda of a bodhisattva. That is to say, even a person without the requisite spiritual disposition can be ripened in order to attain a good existence. Sāgaramahā explains the expression ‘a bad companion’ as follows:

A bad companion is [one] who causes [a bodhisattva or a potential bodhisattva] to give up [his] inclination towards the Greater Vehicle and makes [him] aspire to other vehicles; or else [he] is [one who] instigates [an aspirant] to give up [his] practice on the path of liberation [from samsāra], provoking [him] to give up the endeavour. Under such [circumstances] (i.e. under the influence of a bad companion), his resolve [to become a buddha] will relapse.

As to the third cause of the relapse of cītotpāda, Sāgaramahā explains that the very existence of Bodhisattvahood is dependent on compassion towards sentient beings, and thus by losing this compassion, a bodhisattva automatically forfeits his status as a bodhisattva.

Because of his apathy, [a bodhisattva] is no longer regardful of sentient beings. In such a case, given that [he] is no longer regardful of sentient beings, [his bodhi]citta, [which in the first place

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58 Bodhisattvabhūmi 2.4 (WOGIHARA, p. 319.1–3; DUTT, p. 218.15–17): “And that procedure for abiding in the spiritual disposition which has been explained in the chapter on spiritual disposition (i.e. Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.1) should be known in detail [accordingly], to be that of the bodhisattva’s abiding in [his] spiritual disposition. This is called the bodhisattva’s abiding in [his] spiritual disposition” (vas ca vidhir gotrasastrya gotrapaṭalāte nirūṣṭhā | sa gotravahinīna bodhisattvasya vistaraṇa veditayavah | ity ayam ucce bodhisattvasya gotravahśah ).

59 Bodhisattvabhūmiśāvyākhya (P, fol. 31b7–8; D, fols. 27b7–28a1; S, vol. 75, p. 672.12–13): rgyu gsum po ’di dag gis ldog pa ni gstan ldog pa ma yin no || rigs phun sum tshogs pa ma yin pa ni gstan ldog par ’gyur ro ||.

60 See, for example, Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.6 (WOGIHARA, p. 78.23–25; DUTT, p. 55.16): “Even a person with no spiritual disposition has to be ripened in order that [he] may go to a good existence” (agotrasaḥ ‘pī pudgalāḥ sugatigamanāyā paripācayatayo bhavati ). See also ibid. 1.6. (WOGIHARA, p. 85.4–6; DUTT, p. 60.5–6): “The ripening towards a good existence on the part of persons with no spiritual disposition is liable to relapse again and again, and has to be done repeatedly” (tatāgottorasthānām pudgalānām sugatigamanāya paripākāḥ ‘punah punah” pratyāvartyo bhavati ‘punah punah” karāṇīyaḥ ).[Naṃpu] WOGIHARA).

61 Bodhisattvabhūmiśāvyākhya (P, fol. 31b5–6; D, fol. 27b5–6; S, vol. 75, p. 672.2–6): de la mi dge ba ’i bshes gnyen ni thug pa chen po la mos pa ’dor du ’jug cing | thug pa ghan la smon pa byed du ’dzwad pa ’am | thar pa ’i lam la sbyor bar byed pa ’dor bar byed cing brtson pa ’dor bar sbyor ba ste | de ltar na de ’i sems ldog par ’gyur ro ||.

62 The Ugradatta-prapccaśāstra, as quoted in the Śāksaśāmuccaśāstra (BENDALL, pp. 198.1ff.; VAIDIyA, pp. 109.31ff.), states that a bodhisattva who abides in a solitary place should ponder upon reasons (i.e. the reasons for the one). He states that a bodhisattva who abides in a solitary place should ponder upon reasons (i.e. the reasons for the one). He states that a bodhisattva who abides in a solitary place should ponder upon reasons (i.e. the reasons for the one). He states that a bodhisattva who abides in a solitary place should ponder upon reasons (i.e. the reasons for the one).

63 Bodhisattvabhūmiśāvyākhya (P, fol. 31b6–7; D, fol. 27b6–7; S, vol. 75, p. 672.6–8): snying rje chung bas sms can ’la ltos’ [bltos P] pa med par ’gyur ro || de ltar na sms can gyi don gtsobs brgyas nas byang chub la dmigs pa yin na | sms can rnam ’la ltos’ [bltos P] pa med pas byang chub la sms ldog par ’gyur ro ||.
is an aspiration] aimed at awakening, with the benefit of the sentient beings as [its] priority, will relapse.

On this third cause Sāgāramegha comments:\(^64\)

When he sees the threat posed by the four kinds of suffering (duhkha) associated with conditioned [phenomena], a sense of extreme agony will arise. Thus [he] will desire to quickly pass into parinirvāṇa, and [his] citotpāda will relapse.

In addition, Sāgāramegha rightly points out that the opposites of the four causes of the arising of citotpāda are the causes of the relapse of citotpāda:\(^65\)

The opposites of the causes of the arising of the resolve [to strive for awakening] should be known to be the causes of the relapses [of the resolve to strive for awakening]. And [this] should also be known on the basis of the positive (lit. ‘white’) components and the negative (lit. ‘black’) components, and on the basis of the complete presence or incomplete presence [of the necessary causes]. The positive components and the complete presence of [causes] are the causes of the arising-and-continuing [of citotpāda], [whereas] the negative and incomplete presence [of causes] are the causes of [its] relapse.

5. The Abandonment of Bodhicitta as the Severest Transgression

The abandonment or loss of bodhicitta is considered to be the worst of all transgressions. For example, the Ratnagunasamcaya states that a bodhisattva would impair his ethical-moral discipline (śīla) should he resolve to become a pratyekabuddha or an arhat (i.e. a śrāvakā saṁtyāga:) and would thereby commit an offence more serious than one of the pārājikas.\(^66\)

Sāntideva, too, considers the abandonment of bodhicitta to be the most serious offence that a bodhisattva can commit.\(^67\) Vībhūticandra’s commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra states that the abandonment of bodhicitta is an (outwardly) small but nevertheless serious offence.\(^68\)

Why the abandonment or impairment of bodhicitta should be considered such a serious transgression will become comprehensible if we look at the ‘extent of impairment’ (nyams pa'i tshad) discussed in the tantric context. The following five types of impairment to a tantric pledge are mentioned in the Samayasaṃgraha and the mDo rgyas, both of which were perhaps based on the Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo: (1) massive impairment (kun tu nyams pa

\(^{64}\) Bodhisattvabhūmīivākhyā (P, fols. 31b8–32a1; D, fol. 27b7; S, vol. 75, p. 672.9–11): 'du byed kyi sdeug bsngal gyi rigs bzhi'i 'jigs pa mthong nas drag cing gdung ba'i yid la byed pa skye bar 'gyur ro || des na myur du yongs su mya ngan las 'da bar 'gyur bar 'dod cing | sems bskyed pa de ldog par 'gyur ro ||.

\(^{65}\) Bodhisattvabhūmīivākhyā (P, fol. 32a1–3; D, fol. 28a1–2; S, vol. 75, p. 672.13–17): sems skye ba'i rgyu las bzloog pa ldog pa'i rgyur rig par bya ste | dkar po'i phyogs dang | nag po'i phyogs kyi dbys ba dang | tshang [tsha P] ba dang | ma tshang ba'i dbye bas kyang rig par bya'o || dkar po'i phyogs dang tshang ba ni 'jug pa'i rgyu yin no || nag po'i phyogs dang | ma [om. P] tshang ba ni ldog pa'i [om. PN] rgyu yin no ||.


-yadi kalpakoti dasahi kuusalai pathebbih caramanu pratayarahāna sprāhānjaneti||
tada khandṣilī bhavate api chidrasilī pāraṃjīkād gurutara ayu citta upādo ||.

\(^{67}\) Bodhicaryāvatāra 4.8:

bodhisattvasya tenaivaṃ sarvāpattir garjayati||
yasmād āpadyamāno sangarṣatvārthahānikt ||.

For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 25. See also DAYAL 1932: 64.

\(^{68}\) Vīṣeṣādyotanī (P, fol. 256b2–3; D, fol. 215a6; S, vol. 62, p. 563.16–18): des 'di la ltung ba chung [add. ba PN] yang shin tu lci bar 'gyur te || gang gi phyr 'di gcig pu la ltung ba byung na sens can thams cad kyi don mi 'grub pa'o ||.

\(^{69}\) Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo (P, fols. 56b8–57a1; D, fol. 58a3):

kun du nyams pa chen po dang ||
ṛṣa ba nyams dang yan lag nyams ||
de bzhin zlas nyams zhar nyams lnga ||.
chen po), (2) fundamental impairment (rtsa ba nyams pa), (3) secondary impairment (yan lag nyams pa), (4) impairment owing to a companion (zlas nyams pa), and (5) incidental impairment (zhar la nyams pa). Both the Samayasamgraha and the mDo rgyas demonstrate in general that the type of damage done to the pledge is determined not only by the type as such but also by the severity of the transgression or offence committed. The Samayasamgraha explains the five types of impairment pertaining to the abandonment of bodhicitta in greater detail: 70

[1] The occurrence of multiple fundamental [transgressions] after abandoning bodhicitta is called ‘massive impairment’ (kun tu nyams pa chen po). [2] The occurrence of one or more fundamental lapses, even though it (i.e. bodhicitta) has not been lost, is called ‘fundamental impairment’ (rtsa ba nyams pa). [3] The occurrence of other lapses without the fundamental pledge having been breached is called ‘secondary impairment’ (yan lag nyams pa). [4] If lapses have occurred on account of [one’s] bad masters (guru) or bad friends, [they are] called ‘impairment owing to a companion’ (zlas nyams pa). [5] The occurrence of offences as a result of ignorance, lack of respect, carelessness, or the magnitude of intellectual-emotional defilements (klesa) is called ‘incidental impairment’ (zhar la nyams pa).

In a similar tone, the mDo rgyas explains: 71

[1] If a breach of most basic [pledges] has occurred (nyes par shor) from having abandoned bodhicitta once and for all, [this is] called ‘massive impairment’ (kun tu nyams pa chen po). [2] If bodhicitta has not been lost, but nevertheless a single or multiple fundamental [pledges] that have been explained [to one] are breached, [this is] called ‘fundamental impairment’ (rtsa ba nyams pa). [3] The occurrence of lapses gradually without the fundamental pledge being breached is called ‘secondary impairment’ (yan lag nyams pa). [4] Although one is unwaveringly intent on abiding by [one’s pledge], one associates with bad teachers (acarya) and bad friends, and so automatically loses [one’s] attentiveness and naturally becomes engaged in bad conduct, [to the point where] one is not [able to] see even serious offences as serious offences. Impairment that has occurred [in this way] is called ‘impairment owing to a companion’ (zlas nyams pa). [5] Moreover, those lapses that occur during an insufficiently attentive preoccupation with wholesome or neutral activities, despite the unwavering intention to abide by [one’s pledge], are called ‘incidental impairment’ (zhar gyis nyams pa).

In sum, the abandonment of bodhicitta is said to cause not only total or massive impairment to one’s mantra vow but also—as made explicit, for example, in the Mantravataraavrtti—undermine the foundation of all Mahayana pledges. 72

See also the Samayasamgraha (P, fols. 255b8–256a1; D, fol. 45b6–7; S, vol. 41, p. 695.2–3): de la nyams pa [om. PN] che chung gi tshad ni kun du nyams pa chen po dang rtsa ba nyams pa dang | yan lag nyams pa dang zlas [zlos pa P; zlas pa N] nyams pa dang zhar la nyams pa’o || mDo rgyas (A, fol. 268b4; B, p. 384.7–9): kun tu nyams pa chen po dang | rtsa ba nyams pa dang | yan lag nyams pa dang | zlas nyams pa dang | zhar gyis nyams pa dang lnga’o ||.


The fact that the abandonment or loss of bodhicitta is perceived as a serious breach of the bodhisattva’s ethical-moral discipline does not mean that someone who has not cultivated bodhicitta at all automatically has to bear the consequences of not doing so. One could say that a person who has not made any promise has no promise to keep or break. Thus, for example, a śrāvaka who has not taken the bodhisattva vow has neither any incentive to maintain bodhicitta nor disincentives to acquiring it. The main argument for considering the abandonment of bodhicitta as a serious offence of the bodhisattva’s ethical-moral discipline is that, by abandoning or impairing his bodhicitta, he turns his back on all sentient beings, and so revokes the commitment that he had made. The idea that his personal integrity is at stake is often played up to encourage a bodhisattva to keep his bodhicitta alive, for even by worldly standards a person who cannot keep a commitment is considered unreliable.  

6. The Types of Setbacks

The fact that bodhicitta is prone to relapse does not mean that all bodhisattvas at some point invariably suffer setbacks. The ones they do suffer may be of different kinds. The bodhicitta of some bodhisattvas is said to never suffer any relapse from the beginning to the end of their career, whereas in other cases the relapse may be irreversible. According to the Bodhisattvabhūmi, there are two types of relapse (vyāvṛtti) of citrātāpāda:  

Moreover, relapse (vyāvṛtti) of the generation of the resolve [to become a buddha] is also of two types: a definitive one (ātyantikā) and a temporary one (anātyantikā). Of these two, the definitive one [implies] that the resolve [to become a buddha], having relapsed once, does not arise towards awakening again. The temporary one [implies] that the resolve [to become a buddha], having relapsed, arises towards awakening again and again.  

In a similar tone, Śthiramati states in the Kāśyapaparivartattā:  

Its relapse is of two kinds: irreversible and reversible. Of the [two], the irreversible one is one [in which bodhicitta] does not arise any more once [it] has relapsed. The reversible one is one [in which it] arises again even after relapsing.  

The intellectual-emotional receptivity to the fact that phenomena have no origination (anupattikadharmakṣaṇī) shown by bodhisattvas seems to be relevant to the nature of the

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72 Mantrāvātāravṛtti (P, fol. 231a7; D, fol. 206a4–5; S, vol. 41, p. 559.17–19): gang gi tshe des byang chub kyi sams bthang na | de’i tshe theg pa po’i dam tshig thams cad rtsa ba nas nyams par byed pa bya’o |.

73 For example, see the Trisamnyavaprabhāmālā (P, fol. 268a1–2; D, fol. 56b1; S, vol. 41, p. 725.9–10):  
   byang sams nyams na ’gro ba kun ||  
   bslus pas gnod pa shin tu mang ||  
   rgyal dang de sras thams cad dang ||  
   ’gro ba kun gyis shin tu khrel ||.

See also Bodhicaryāvatāra 4.4–6. For an English translation, see CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 25.

74 For the four reasons for the relapse of citrātāpāda, see the Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§3.2.0). See also Śāgaramegha’s Bodhisattvabhūmi viśvākyā (P, fol. 244a–5; D, fol. 20b3–4; S, vol. 75, pp. 654.19–655.2).

75 Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2 (§2.2.0). This is noted also in DAVAL 1932: 62.

76 Cf. the Tibetan translation which has ‘although having relapsed.’

77 Kāśyapaparivartaṭā (P, fol. 255b5–6; D, fol. 208a7–b1; S, vol. 67, p. 556.10–12): de’i ldog pa yang rnam pa gnyis te | rgyun chad pa pa [om. PN] dang rgyun mi ’chad pa’o || de la rgyun chad pa ni ggan lan cig log nas yang mi skye ba’o || rgyun mi ’chad pa ni ggan log kyang yang skye’o ||.

78 For this difficult expression, see the BESD (s.vv. ksānti and anupattikadharmakṣaṇī), where Edgerton has translated it as ‘intellectual receptivity to truth that states of existence have no origination’ and ‘receptivity to the fact that states-of-being have no origination.’ My impression is that the term ksānti has connotations not only of
relapse of bodhicitta. There are said to be three kinds of anupattikadharmaksanti, as Mipham explains.  

In general, the attainment of three kinds of ksanti, namely, mild (mṛdu), middling (madhya), and great (adhimātra), occurs when one is intellectually and emotionally receptive to the fact that phenomena have no origination (anupattikadharma): [1] mild ksanti is the ksanti attained on the path of preparation (prayogamarga) when one is receptive to unborn reality by virtue of [an inference based on] the ‘universal object,’ 80 [2] the middling kind of ksanti is the one [attained] on the path of seeing (darśanamarga), [or] the first bhumi, [and] is accompanied by a direct realisation of the non-origination [of phenomena], and [3] great anupattikadharmaksanti is attained by [the bodhisattva] on the eighth bhumi by bringing non-conceptual gnosis to complete maturation and by not deviating in any way from the true reality of the primordial non-origination of all phenomena, in either a meditative or post-meditative state. [Those] bodhisattvas who have irreversibly attained ksanti are prophetically destined [to become] buddhas. 81 The eighth bhumi is designated in particular as the ‘stage of prophecy.’ But there are also cases where, for certain purposes, it has been prophesied that one who abides in the spiritual disposition (gotra) [of a bodhisattva but has not yet generated the resolve to become a buddha] or has just generated his resolve [will become] a buddha. The term anupattikadharmaksanti is explained primarily as intellectually-emotional receptivity to the fact that all phenomena are primordially without origination, for there is no phenomenon separate from the sphere of reality (ādharmadatu).

70 mDo sde rgyan ’grel (pp. 274.3–275.1): spyi’i skye ba med pa’i chos la bzhod tshul gyis bzhod pa thob pa’i rnam grangs chung ‘bring chen po gsum byung ste | sbyor lam bzhod pa thob pa’i tshel skye med kyi don la don spyi’i tshul gyis bzhod pa’i bzhod pa chung ngu dang | mthong lam sa dang por skye med mgon sum rdogs pa’i bzhod pa’i ’bring gi gnas skabs dang | sa brgyad par rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes yongs smin pas chos thams cad gzhod nas skye ba med pa’i don las mnyam rjes kun du mi go ba’i mi skye bai’i chos la bzhod pa thob pho pa’o ||| bzhod pa thob pa phyur mi ldog [= ldog] pa’i byang sems rnam la sangs rgyas su lung ston cing | khyad par sa brgyad pa la lung bstan pa’i sa zhes kyang sgungs | ’on kyang dgos pa’i dbang ris gsigs la gnas pa dang | sems bskyed ma thag pa la yang sangs rgyas su lung ston pa yang yod do ||| mi skye bai’i chos la bzhod pa zhes pa chos kyi dbyings la gzhon du gyur pa’i chos med pas chos thams cad gzhod nas skye bai’i don la bzhod pa la gtsos bor bshad do ||). 

80 Each kind of ksanti seems to harbour a certain type of irreversibility. Even in the non-Mahayana context—for example, in the Abhidharmakosâ—it is said that a person who has attained the ksanti of the prayogamarga will not assume any bad forms of existence in the future, at least not on account of karma or klesas. See Abhidharmakosa 6.23b: ksântilabhâ anapâyagah ||. On the reason for this, see the Abhidharmakosabhâsya (p. 348.5): vihânâyâm api ksântau na punar âpâyân yâti tadbhûmika [= tadgatika] karmâklesâdûrikaranât |.

81 See also, for example, Abhisamayâlamkâra 4.38, 4.45–46.
The three kinds of *anuttakkadharmakṣānti* can be positioned among the stages of a *bodhisattva* as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>mārga</th>
<th>bhūmi</th>
<th>anuttakkadharmakṣānti</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. saṃbhāramārga</td>
<td>1.1. <em>ṛdu</em></td>
<td>adhimukti-caryābhūmi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2. <em>madhya</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3. adhimātra</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.1. <em>uṣman</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2. <em>mūrdhan</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. prayogamārga</td>
<td>2.3. <em>kṣānti</em></td>
<td>1. mild (<em>ṛdu</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.4. laukikāgradharma</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. darśanamārga</td>
<td>1st. pramādītā</td>
<td>seven impure bhūnis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd. vimalā</td>
<td>2. middling (<em>madhya</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd. prabhākāri</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4th. arcīṣmatī</td>
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<td>5th. sudurjayā</td>
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<td>6th. abhimukhī</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7th. dūrangaṃā</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. bhāvanāmārga</td>
<td>8th. acalā</td>
<td>three pure bhūnis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9th. sādhumati</td>
<td>3. great (<em>adhimātra</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10th. dharmamegha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. aśaikṣamārga</td>
<td>11th. samantaprabhā</td>
<td>buddhabhūmi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mi-pham has stated that the textual source for these three kinds of *anuttakkadharmakṣānti* is the *Samādhīrājasūtra*.

The question is: if even a *bodhisattva* of the first bhūmi is said to be ‘irreversible,’ how is it that in some Prajñāpāramitā *sūtras* even a *bodhisattva* on the eighth bhūmi is said to still run the risk of passing into nirvāṇa prematurely? Does this mean that bodhisattva can relapse even at that stage? For scholars such as Mi-pham, who were well aware of the three kinds of *anuttakkadharmakṣānti* and the corresponding grades of irreversibility, the statement that a *bodhisattva* of the eighth bhūmi runs the risk of passing into nirvāṇa prematurely would appear irreconcilable with most Mahāyāna scriptures. Mi-pham himself thus held that the risk of highly advanced bodhisattvas such as those on the eighth bhūmi to relapse into the so-called ‘one-sided cessation’ (*zhing phyogs gce pa*) was purely hypothetical. Mi-pham’s attempt to resolve this contradiction, however, is a doctrinal rather than a historiographical one.

The contradiction, which Mi-pham has attempted to resolve, seems to be a result of mixing two strands of doctrine, each with different historical backgrounds (specifically in regard to the notion of nirvāṇa) and can be explained accordingly. (1) The Mahāyāna *sūtra* which expresses the potential ‘reversibility’ of the *bodhisattva* of the eighth bhūmi presupposes a very old concept of nirvāṇa, in which no distinction is made between the nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa (*nirvāṇa without residue*) of a śrāvaka saint, a pratyekekabuddha, and a buddha. According to this presupposition, passing into nirvāṇa would not be seen as a kind of regression into a lower status, for it involves the same kind of nirvāṇa into which the Buddha himself passed. The only disadvantage of a *bodhisattva* prematurely entering into such a nirupadhiśesanirvāṇa is that he, like the Buddha, can no longer be active and effective thereafter. In short, this tradition presupposes an identical nirvāṇa for a śrāvaka saint, a pratyekekabuddha, and a buddha (with the saint becoming ineffective after his death), and

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82 *dbu ma rgyan* 'grel (p. 77.2–3); *gzhang* 'di 'dra ba thos sbing thos don bsams la | bsam zhin gsam pas nges pa rnyed pa'i 'don la goms par byas na zab mo'i lam la bzod pa rim gyes skye bar 'gyur te | zla ba sgron me'i mdo las bzod pa gsum gyi skabs su ji skad bshad pa la sogs pa bzhin no ||.

83 For Mi-pham’s detailed discussion of this matter, see his *mdo sdbu 'grel pa* (pp. 139.3–142.5).
presumably either does not know of or recognise the three kinds of anutattikadharmaksānti. (2) For the tradition that professes the ‘irreversibility’ of the bodhisattva of the eighth bhūmi, Buddhahood is strongly contrasted with the ‘sterile’ nirvāṇa of a śrāvaka saint or of a pratyekabuddha. Given such a presupposition, it is understandable why falling into the ‘sterile’ nirvāṇa would be a regression from the bodhisattva path, but in reality this is not possible, because a bodhisattva of the eighth bhūmi is destined to become a buddha and remain active and effective by abiding in what one might call the ‘fertile’ nirvāṇa of a buddha or a bodhisattva. Thus the question as to whether a bodhisattva of the eighth bhūmi indeed runs a real risk of passing into nirvāṇa, and thereby relapsing from his bodhicitta, is answered differently by these two strands of thought. According to the former strand, although the risk of passing into nirvāṇa is real for such a bodhisattva, his passing into nirvāṇa prematurely would not be considered a regression or relapse from his bodhicitta, any more than the Buddha’s passing into nirvāṇa can be considered a regression or relapse. According to the latter strand, the answer would depend on how nirvāṇa in this context is understood. If it is understood as the ‘sterile’ nirvāṇa, the risk of passing into such a nirvāṇa is not real, as has been argued by Mi-pham. If nirvāṇa in this context is the ‘fertile’ nirvāṇa, it is by definition not a risk.

7. The Restorability of Bodhicitta

The idea and actual practice of confessing misdeeds (pāpadeśanā) in Buddhism, particularly in view of the Buddhist theory of karma, certainly deserve further investigation. Har Dayal’s claims that the practice of confession described by Sāntideva ‘bears witness to the influence of the completely developed Hindu doctrine of bhakti (devotion) on Buddhist thought’ and that the ‘ideas of self-reliance and personal retribution are discarded, and the bodhisattvas are invoked to save a sinner from evil consequences of his deeds’ seem to provide an inaccurate picture of the bodhisattva doctrine and should be reconsidered. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to discuss these issues.

In Tibet it is said that the good quality of misdeeds is that they can be purified through confession. The stories of Nanda, Aṅgulimāla, Ajātāśatru, and Udayana have often been used for didactic purposes to illustrate that even those who have negligently committed the most heinous deeds are capable of reacquiring their circumspection. Breaking one’s vows is no doubt considered negative, with potential negative consequences. Unlike the prātimokṣa vow, however, which is said to be irreparable if damaged, and hence has often been compared to a palm tree or an earthenware vessel (rdza be’u), the bodhisattva and mantra vows are

84 Dayal 1932: 56–57.
85 See, for example, dpal-sprul’s Kun bzang bla ma’i zhal lung (fol. 205b4): sngon gyi dam pa dag gi zhal nas spiyi sdig pa la yon tan med kyang | bshags pas ’dag pa sdig pa’i yon tan yin gsungs |.
86 Suhrllekha 14:

gang zhiṅ sgang chad bag med gyur pa lags ||

phyi nas bag dang ldan par gyur de yang ||
zla ba sprin bral lta bur rnam mdzes te ||

dga’ bo sor phreng mthong ldan bde byed bzhi n ||

Cf. TSD, s.v. sor phreng. Brief accounts of the past misdeeds of Nanda, Aṅgulimāla, Ajātāśatru, and Udayana are given in the Suhrllekhaṅkā (P, fols. 334a6–335a2; D, fols. 80b6–81a7). For an English translation of the verse and comments, see JAMSPAL 1978: 9. Compare the translation of the verse with Mi-pham’s annotation (mchau) in KAWAMURA 1975: 18, n. 32, where Nanda is erroneously called Ananda. Mi-pham’s commentary itself (bshes spring mchau ‘grel, p. 166.2–5) reads gcung dga’ bo and not kun dga’ bo. See also the Dwas po thar rgyan (pp. 154.12–159.14); Kun bzang bla ma’i zhal lung (fols. 205b4–206a3).
said to be, in principle, restorable. To be sure, bodhicitta has an exclusive role to play. If other parts of the tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna vows are broken, they can be repaired with the help of bodhicitta. But if bodhicitta itself is lost or damaged, nothing else is able to restore it. In other words, there is no substitute for bodhicitta. Likewise, there are several measures prescribed for the confession and purification of all kinds of misdeeds. Finding an antidote for bad deeds more powerful than bodhicitta is said to be impossible.\(^9\) The fact that broken vows can be restored is, of course, no excuse to break them again and again, for according to Sāntideva doing so would decelerate the attainment of the stages (bhūmi).\(^10\)

8. Retaking and Restoring Bodhicitta

We have already considered the process of restoring the bodhisattva vow according to the Mañjuśrī-Nāgārjuna and Maitreya-Asaṅga traditions. We shall not go into the method of retaking or restoring bodhisattva and mantra vows\(^91\) in general but focus only on how bodhicitta is restored by means of bodhicitta. Whether one retakes or merely restores a bodhicitta vow would, of course, depend on whether it has been completely or only partially breached. The loss of bodhicitta cannot be compensated by anything other than the re-assumption of bodhicitta itself; the same is true with regard to restoring impaired bodhicitta. Here, we shall look at the reviving or restoring of bodhicitta as discussed in the context of the mantra vow. Just as the term ‘impair’ (nyams pa), as has already been mentioned, is used as a generic term for both ‘impairment’ and ‘loss,’ so the term ‘restoration’ (bskang ba) is employed as a generic term for the following four procedures:\(^92\) (1) confessing (bshags pa) offences committed through carelessness, (2) restoring or reconstituting (bskang zhing gso ba) breached pledges, (3) purifying (sbyang ba) misdeeds (sdig pa), and (4) retaking (slar blang ba) the vows.

It is stated that according to the kriyātantras and yogatantras those who have abandoned bodhicitta and thereby nullified their vow should basically retake the vow.\(^93\)

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87. See, for example, the Vinayavastu (T, vol. ka, fol. 89b6–7; D, vol. ka, fol. 59b6–7): ‘di ita ste dper na shing ta la’i mgo bcad na sgon por ‘gyur du mi rung la ‘phel zhing rgyas pa dang ‘yangs par ‘gyur du mi rung ba bzhin no ||. See also the mChin chen (p. 378.8–9). Cf. the Sāgaramatipariprachiśāra (T, fol. 32b7; D, fol. 23a6): shing ta la’i mgo bcad [gcead D] pa bzhin du rtsa ba nas chad nas ma ‘ongs pa na mi skye ba’i chos can du ‘gyur ro ||.

88. Kun bzang bla’ ma’i zhal lung (fols. 217b5–218a2): nyan thos kyi luggs la rtsa ltung skor gcig byung na rdza be’u chag pa dang ‘dra te slar gso ba’i thabs med par gsungs | byang sdom rin po che’i nyer spyad chag pa dang ‘dra ste | dper na rin po che’i nyer spyad chag na mgar ba mktas pa la brient nas bcos su yod pa lta | gzhan rkyen dge ba’i bshes gnyen la brient nas gso rung bar gsungs | gsang sngags kyi sdom pa ni rin po che’i nyer spyad cung zad zhom pa dang ‘dra ste | rang nyid kyis kyang lha sngags ting ‘dzin la brient nas bshags pa byas kyang lhag ma med par dag par gsungs pa yin |.

89. Bodhicaryāvatārapaṇjikā (p. 6.14): na ca sambodhicittāt pratipakṣo maḥyānāparah saṃbhavati |.

90. Bodhicaryāvatāra 4.11:

\[\text{evan āpattibalato bodhicittabāena ca |}
\text{dolāyamānāḥ samsāre bhūmiprātipāsāt ātyate ||.}\]


91. Perhaps I should point out LOPEZ 1995, where a rite for restoring bodhisattva and mantra vows according to Tsong-kha-pa’s tradition is discussed. The article also includes (pp. 507–512) a plain translation of the sDom pa gong ma gnyis kyi phyir bcos byed ishul rje i phyag len bzhin bkod pa (TsSB, vol. kha, pp. 917–928).

92. mDo rgyas (A, fol. 265a1–2; B, p. 379.23–24): da ni nyams pa rnam bsang ba’i cho ga bshad de de yang mdor bsdu na rnam pa bzhir ‘dus te bshags pa dang | gso ba dang | sbyang ba dang | sdom pa slar blang ba’o |.
According to the mahāyoga system, the restoration or revival of a mantra vow on the strength (rtsal) of one’s own compassion (karunā) and discriminating insight (prajñā) is particularly noteworthy. In this regard, Rong-zom-pa states:

[Question:] It has been taught that the tantric pledges can be restored by one’s own power. If that is the case, [why is this not discussed here?] Is there not such a method here [in this system]? [Response]: This method has been taught [with the understanding] that [the mantra vow] can be restored if [one is] aware of (lit. ‘imbued with’) the fact that there is [in reality] nothing to restore.

[Question:] What is that [power]? [Response]: It is the power of [one’s] compassion and the power of [one’s] discriminating insight. Of these, the power of [one’s] compassion is as follows: All sentient beings are endowed with the Essence of Awakening (i.e., clearly, the tathāgatagarbha) and are under the protection of those who have generated bodhicitta. Likewise, it is taught that even those who have not accumulated the basic wholesome virtues (kuśalamūla) and those whose [mental] continuum has not matured can attain (lit. ‘become causes of’) release (mokṣa) [from samsāra] or good destinations (sugati) [in samsāra]. This being the case, I myself have not broken [my] pledge and will protect all sentient beings. In this way, if the great strength of bodhicittotpāda is practised for a long time, [an impaired vow] will be restored. The strength of discriminating insight is as follows: All phenomena are by nature pure. If even those that appear in the form of mere illusion are pure and equal within the configuration (māndala) of an [awakened] body, speech, and mind, what impure sentient being [can] exist? If [this view] is realised and practised for a long time, it is taught that [the impaired vow] will be restored.

This passage makes it clear that the power of one’s compassion and insight, which are two indispensable components of bodhicitta, can reinvigorate broken mantra vows. We shall now consider two points, namely, the four means of confession (bshags pa) and the five methods of restoration (bskang ba) according to the Kun ‘ dus rig pa’i mdo, cited by Rong-zom-pa under its alternative title rDo rje bkod pa (*Vajravyūha*). In these cases, too, emphasis will be laid on bodhicitta. The four means of confession may be summarised as follows: (1) confessing by means of the continuum of great insight (she rab chen po’i rgyud) so that the latent tendencies (vāsanā) are cognised as possessing no self-nature, (2) confessing by means of the fire of the great meditative absorption (ting nge ‘dzin chen po’i me) so that the latent tendencies are burnt and reduced to nothing, (3) confessing by means of the light rays of bodhicitta (byang chub sms pans kyi ‘od zer) so that all the darkness of the latent tendencies is

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94 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 266a2–3; B, p. 381.6–9): byang chub kyi sms btag zhin sdom pa zhiig par gyur pa rnams la ni dkyil ’khor du ’jug cing sdom pa slar blang ba gisor gyur pa yin no || ‘di ni bya ba’i rgyud las gsungs pa’i sdom pa nyams pa bskang ba’i cho ga ste || rnal ’byor gyi rgyud du’ang tshul ’di nyid kyis sbyar bar bya ‘o ||.

94 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 267a2–b2; B, p. 382.9–22): ‘o na gsang snags kyi dam tshig rnams kyang rang gi rtsal gyis skongs so zhes gsungs na || ’di la thabs med dam zhe [zhi A] na ’di ni skong [skang B] du med pa’i don gyis zin na bskongs [skongs B] par gsungs te || de gang zhe na || snying rje’i rtsal dang || shes rab kyi rtsal lo || de la snying rje’i rtsal ni || sms can thams cad ni byang chub kyi snying po can yin la || byang chub kyi sms bskyed pa rnams kyis kyang thams cad bskyabs [skyps B] par bya ba yin te || ’di lar dge ba’i rtsa ba ma bsgas pa dang rgyud ma smin pas kyang || thar pa dang bde ’gro’i rgyur ’gyur bar gsungs pas || bdag gis kyam dang tshig nyams pa med de || sms can thams cad bskyabs [skyps B] par bya ‘o || zhes byang chub tu sms bskyed pa’i stobs chen po yun ring du bsgoms na bskongs [skongs B] so || shes rab kyi stobs ni || chos thams cad ni rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa ste || sgyu ma tsa m snang ba rnams kyang || sku gsung thugs kyi dkyil ’khor du dag cing mnynam par yin na || ma dag pa’i sms can gang zhiig yod ces de lar rto gs shing yun ring du bsgoms na bskongs [skongs] so zhes ’byung ngo ||.

95 Kun ‘ dus rig pa’i mdo (P, fol. 61b2–3; D, fol. 62b5–6): thabs ni rnam pa bzhi yod de || gang zhe na || shes rab chen po’i rgyud kyis bag chags thams cad rang bzhin med par shes pa dang || ting nge ’dzin chen po’i mes bag chags thams cd bregs te med par bya ba dang || byang chub sms kyi ‘od zer gyis bag chags kyi mun nag thams cad bsal [gsal P] te de dag dag par bya ba dang || spyod pa rhaps po che’i chus bbru ba’o ||. See also the mDo rgyas (A, fols. 267b2–268a2; B, pp. 382.22–383.14), where this passage is cited.
dispelled and purified, and (4) confessing by means of the water of daring conduct (spyod pa rlab po che) so that all the latent tendencies are washed clean.

It should be added that the purification of misdeeds by generating bodhicitta is included as one form of daring conduct. The five methods of restoration (bskang ba) are, (1) restoring through the performance of (wholesome) activities (spyad pa'i las kyi bskang ba), for example, recitation of mantras and minor sūtras, building stūpas, rescuing lives (srog gdon pa), and making prostrations, (2) restoring by means of material resources (rdzas kyi bskang ba), for example, by making material offerings to the deities and teachers, (3) restoring on the strength of (having seen) true reality (don gyis bskang ba), for example, realising the freedom from manifoldness of all phenomena; studying, contemplating, and meditating on the profound dharma; sponsoring teaching activities; and copying scriptures and donating them, (4) restoring through meditative concentration (ting nge 'dzin gyis bskang ba)—three kinds of meditative concentration being discussed, namely, the meditative concentration that burns up the latent tendencies (bag chags bsreg pa'i ting nge 'dzin), the meditative concentration that scatters the latent tendencies (bag chags gtor ba'i ting nge 'dzin), and the meditative concentration that washes the latent tendencies clean (bag chags bkru ba'i ting nge 'dzin), and (5) restoring by the method of secret instructions (man ngag gsang ba thabs kyi bskang ba), for example, special meditative practices.

The mDo rgyas goes on to explain the relation between the three vows and the reason why impaired bodhicittavajra cannot be restored by anything else:

It is taught that there are methods of restoration if the three, namely, the vase empowerment (kālasābhiṣeka) pertaining to body, the secret empowerment (guhyābhiṣeka) pertaining to speech, or the empowerment of the knowledge of insight (prajñāpārameśvara) pertaining to mind, have been impaired once obtained, but there is no method of purification if the fourth empowerment (caturthābhiṣeka) has been impaired. This is because it has been taught that [of] the [three] vows, the lower ones rely [for their continuance] on the upper ones successively, while the upper ones secure (lit. 'hold') and invigorate (lit. 'purify') [the lower ones] with [their] might. In this way, if the bodhisattva vow is taken on the basis of the prātimokṣa vow, invalidated prātimokṣa vows can be retaken on the basis of the bodhisattva vow. Similarly, up until the mantra vow, upper [vows] are taken successively on the basis of the lower ones, and the latter are allowed to be restored on the strength of the former. However, if the upper ones themselves are broken, they cannot be restored by lower methods. Therefore, if the fourth empowerment, which involves the maintenance of bodhicittavajra, should become impaired, no

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96 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 268a2–3; B, p. 383.14–15): de la spyod pa rlab po ches bkru ba'ang byang chub kyi sens bsnyed cing sdig pa sbyong ba dang | .

97 Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo (P, fol. 57a1; D, fol. 58a3–4):
bskang ba'i thabs kyang lnga yod de ||
spyad pa'i las [thabs P] kyi bskang ba dang ||
rdzas dang don dang ting 'dzin dang ||
man ngag gsang ba'i thabs chen no ||.
See also the mDo rgyas (A, fol. 268b4–270b4; B, pp. 384.9–386.17).

98 mDo rgyas (A, fol. 270b5–271a4; B, pp. 386.19–387.6): rum pa sku'i dbang dang | gsang ba bsng gi dbang dang | shes rab ye shes thugs kyi dbong gsun thob pa las | nyams par gyur na ni bskang ba'i thabs yod kyi | dbang bzhis pa las nyams na ni dag pa'i thabs med do | zhes gsungs te | gang gi phiyir sdom pa rnam pa | nas yar [la A] rim gyis brten cing | gong ma'i mthu 'dzin cing dag par byed par gsungs te | 'di litar so sor thar pa'i sdom pa la brten nas | byang chub sems dpal'i sdom pa blangs pa na | so sor thar pa'i sdom pa zhig pa rnam | byang chub sems dpal'i sdom pa la brten nas ilbar blang du rung ngo | de bzhin du gsang snags kyi sdom pa'i bar du yang rim gyis | 'og ma blangs pa yin la | gong ma'i mthu la brten cing 'og ma sor [= gsor] gzhug sde | gong ma nyid nyams na de la thabs 'og mas me bsngks [skongs B] so || de bas na dbang bzhis pa ni rdo rje byang chub kyi sens 'dzin pa yin la | gal te de nyid nyams par gyur na | de lgho ba'i thabs su gyur pa | gzhon gyis ni nus te | rdo rje rin po che chag pa rtsi gzhon gyis mi 'byor ba bzhin no ||.
other means of restoring it can do so, just as, for example, no other adhesive can fasten together broken [pieces of] precious diamond. Although the relationship between the three vows is not his actual theme, this passage shows Rong-zom-pa’s stance on the issue of the assumption, subsistence, and restoration of the three vows (in the mental continuum of an individual). First, his position on the assumption of the three vows is that the higher vows are taken on the basis of the lower ones, that is, the mantra vow on the basis of the bodhisattva vow, and it in turn on the basis of the prātimokṣa vows. Second, his position on the continuing validity of the three vows is that the lower vows rely on the upper ones for their security, so to speak; that is, the upper ones provide the lower ones with stability and qualitative enhancement. Third, his position on the restoration of the three vows is that the impaired lower vows can be retaken or otherwise restored on the strength of the upper ones, but not vice versa. And since Rong-zom-pa does not really tell us how impaired bodhicittavajra should be restored, I assume that the vow relating to the fourth empowerment, involving bodhicittavajra, can only be retaken.

9. The Four Strengths

We have already run across the expression ‘four strengths’ (stobs bzhi) in the chapter on the two bodhicittotpāda traditions. The exercise of the four strengths seems to be the most popular method of cleansing oneself of one’s past misdeeds. Its popularity is perhaps due to its supposed effectiveness, for it is maintained that there is no misdeed that cannot be purified through the four strengths. The locus classicus is perhaps the following passage from the Caturdharmakāsūra, which is cited in the Śikṣāsamuccaya: 99

Furthermore, the washing away of misdeeds has been taught in the Caturdharmakāsūra, [as follows]: “O Maitrey, a bodhisattva-mahāsattva endowed with four qualities overcomes misdeeds that have been committed and [allowed to] collect. Which four? [The following four]: [1] the proper approach to reproaching [oneself for one’s misdeeds], [2] the proper approach to antidotes, [3] the strength to resist committing transgressions, and [4] the strength [to seek] support. [1] As to these [four], the proper approach to reproaching [oneself for one’s misdeeds] is to feel great repentance for unwseomone deeds whenever they have been perpetrated; [2] the proper approach to antidotes is to make energetic efforts to commit wholesome deeds once unwseomone deeds have been committed; [3] the strength to resist committing transgressions comes from [re]taking a vow of non-action (akaranasaṃvara)100; [4] the strength [to seek] support comes from taking refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha and from the non-abandonment of bodhicittta. Given the support of the Powerful One, [one] cannot be overpowered by misdeeds. O Maitrey, a bodhisattva-mahāsattva endowed with these four qualities overpowers misdeeds that have been committed and [allowed to] collect.”101

Although in the Tibetan sources, each of these four qualities is referred to as a ‘strength’ (stobs: bala), we notice here that only the last two are referred to as pratyāpattibala and


100 It is not clear to me what akaranasaṃvara means.

101 For the Tibetan translation, see the Śikṣāsamuccaya (P, fols. 105b5–106a1; D, fols. 89b7–90a4; S, vol. 64, pp. 1218.18–1219.10). Cf. the English translation in BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 158–159.
āśrayabāla, the first two being called vidūṣaṇāsamudācāra and pratipaśasamudācāra. In the Tarkajvālā, the above passage from the Caturdharmakasūtra has been cited to make the Mahāyāna case that even the most serious misdeeds can be neutralised. The passage is often quoted in the Tibetan sources. sGam-po-pa, for instance, illustrates each of the four strengths with an example and refers to the stories of Nanda, Aṅgulimāla, Ajātaśatru, and Udayana as, so to speak, historical cases, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four Strengths</th>
<th>Four Analogies</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. vidūṣaṇāsamudācāra</td>
<td>Making a plea to a powerful person to be exempted from unpayable debts</td>
<td>Aṅgulimāla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. pratipaśasamudācāra</td>
<td>Washing and perfuming a person after rescuing him from a pit of filth</td>
<td>Udayana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. praṇāpattibala</td>
<td>Changing the course of a devastating flood</td>
<td>Nanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. āśrayabāla</td>
<td>A culprit clasping (i.e. seeking pardon from) a powerful king or the detoxification or neutralisation of poison through mantras</td>
<td>Ajātaśatru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, one of the qualities of bodhicitta that has often been eulogised is its ability to cleanse all misdeeds.

10. Concluding Remarks

Let me recapitulate what has been said in this chapter. Firstly, bodhicitta is seen as something that can be impaired and easily lost. Secondly, impairing or abandoning bodhicitta is considered a serious offence in the context of both the bodhisattva and mantra vows. Thirdly, Mahāyāna Buddhism seems to profess that not only is the impaired or lost bodhicitta restorable, but in fact all offences or misdeeds, regardless of how grave they may be, can be atoned for by timely and proper measures. Fourthly, bodhicitta is said to be capable of mending other broken vows or pledges and purifying other misdeeds, but if bodhicitta itself is lost, there is nothing that can serve as a substitute for it. Thus the one and only way to atone for the loss of bodhicitta is to regain it.

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102 Tarkajvālā (P, fol. 201a4–b2; D, fols. 184b4–185a2; S, vol. 58, pp. 448.15–449.9).

103 Dwags po thar rgyan (pp. 149.10–159.14).

104 See the Maitreyavimoksāsūtra, as cited in the Śikṣāsamuuccaya (BENDALL, pp. 177.14–178.8; VAI DY, pp. 98.27–99.6), where bodhicitta is praised for its role in cleansing one’s misdeeds. For an English translation, see BENDALL & ROUSE 1922: 173. See also Bodhicaryāvatāra 1.6 and the English translation in CROSBY & SKILTON 1995: 5.
Appendix A

A Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text of Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2

1. Introduction

For the critical edition of the Sanskrit text, I have used two previous editions made by Wogihara (W) and Dutt (D) together with photocopies of a Nepal MS (N) microfilmed by the NGMPP and photographs of the Patna MS (P).1 Below I shall first describe the extant manuscripts and editions briefly. This will be followed by a short discussion of the stemmatic relationship of the manuscripts to one another. Finally I shall explain the method employed in the critical edition.

(a) Extant Manuscripts, Critical Editions, and Other Related Studies on the Bodhisattvabhūmi

In the course of the nineteenth century, numerous Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts from Nepal found their way to libraries of Asian societies in London and Paris. The collection of such manuscripts from Nepal was initiated and stimulated by Brian Houghton Hodgson (1800–1894), who arrived in Kathmandu as an English resident at the Court of Nepal in the year 1821.2 This activity of collecting manuscripts was continued by Dr. Daniel Wright, a brother of the Arabist William Wright of Cambridge and a long-time English surgeon to the British Residency at Kathmandu. His collection of manuscripts numbered over four hundred, some of them very old. These manuscripts, which ended up in the Cambridge University Library, were catalogued by Cecil Bendall in 1883.3 This catalogue brought the manuscripts of the Cambridge collection to the attention of interested scholars, thus lending impetus to the study of various Buddhist Sanskrit texts,4 the Bodhisattvabhūmi being among them.

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1 I should like to thank Prof. Schmithausen for kindly procuring for me the microfilm of the Nepal manuscript from the Berlin State Library and for lending me his photographs of the Patna manuscript.

2 For bibliographical references to the Hodgson collection of Sanskrit manuscripts, see the appendix in Yuyama 1992: 16–17.

3 Bendall 1883.

4 Ernst Windisch (1844–1918) discussed the discovery of the Sanskrit manuscripts from Nepal and the boost it gave to the study of what was then known as ‘northern Buddhism.’ See Windisch 1917: 130–131.
Having attracted interest since almost the beginning of Western Indology and modern Buddhist studies, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* has been the subject of a number of monographs. Unrai Wogihara (1869–1937), a Japanese Sanskritist then in Strassburg, noticed the title *Bodhisattvabhūmi* while reading Bendall’s catalogue (MS Add. 1702) in 1904, and in the same year, presuming it to be the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* from the Yogācārabhūmi collection, went to Cambridge, where he made two transcripts of the palm-leaf manuscript.\(^5\) A short article by him on the ‘northern’ Buddhist terminology in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* appeared in 1904.\(^7\) In 1908 he submitted his dissertation (at the University of Strassburg), in which he discussed the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in general and some of its lexical terms in particular.\(^8\)

When he was compiling the catalogue, Bendall assumed that no other manuscripts or versions of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* existed.\(^9\) However, in 1914, to Wogihara’s surprise, the Japanese scholar Ryōzaburō Sakaki ‘brought home from India’ a paper manuscript of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and deposited it in the Kyoto University (then called the Kyoto Imperial University) Library.\(^10\) Wogihara started editing the

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\(^5\) **BENDALL 1883:** 191–196.

\(^6\) See WOGIHARA 1904: 34; WOGIHARA 1908: 2 (preface to his dissertation); WOGIHARA 1930–36: i–iv. Unrai Wogihara, who may be called a pioneer in the study of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, made it possible for other pioneering scholars such as La Vallée Poussin to do work on the same topic. His edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, general introduction to it, division of the text, and discussion of its authorship, lexical terms, and the like can still be read with much profit.

\(^7\) **WOGIHARA 1904.**

\(^8\) The title of Wogihara’s dissertation, as mentioned in **LEUMANN 1931:** 21, is “Asaṅga’s Bodhisattva-bhūmi ein dogmatischer Text der Nordbuddhisten nach dem Unikum von Cambridge im allgemeinen und lexikalisch untersucht (1908).” This dissertation, which he calls ‘my little German dissertation’ (WOGIHARA 1930–36: i), is appended to his edition with an independent pagination running from page 1 to 43. This dissertation consists of two parts: part one (pp. 4–14) is a general discussion of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and part two (pp. 15–43) is about its lexical terms. The original title of the dissertation does not seem to have been mentioned.

\(^9\) **BENDALL 1883:** 191: “No other MS or version of the work seems to exist.” Cf. **WOGIHARA 1904:** 452: “Weil indessen besagte Handschrift in Europa als Unikum gilt....” See also WOGIHARA 1930–36: ii: “All the events as stated above took place in the thirty-third year of Meiji (1904 P. Chr.), when the MS. was still a unique one in the world.” See also the title of Wogihara’s dissertation.

\(^10\) See WOGIHARA 1930–36: ii. The paper manuscript of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (MS K) is identified as having the serial number E 263 in **GOSIMA & NOGUCHI 1983:** 20–21. The collection to which it belongs is called the Sakaki Ryōzaburō Collection; see **YUYAMA 1992:** 13 (no. 24), 14 (no. 28). Confusion reigned in regard to the origin of MS K. For instance, Dutt in the introduction to his edition of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* stated that it was ‘procured probably from Nepal’; see **DUTT 1966:** 3. Ernst Leumann (1859–1933) thought that MS K was brought by Eak Kawaguchi from Tibet! He gave the following account of the manuscript: “Zurück in Japan hat Wogihara später unter den im Verlauf von Kawaguchi in Tibet erworbenen Handschriften noch ein zweites Exemplar der Bodhisattva-bhūmi gefunden, das freilich auch wieder bedauerlich Lücken aufwies. Aber Wogihara konnte doch den Plan fassen, nunmehr das Werk herauszugeben, um so mehr als er im Tibetischen sich sowohl vervollkommnete, daß er die tibetische Übersetzung der Bodhisattva-bhūmi, die lückenlos erhalten ist, zur Kontrolle und zur Ergänzung der beiden Sanskrithandschriften (C = Cambridge und K = Kawaguchi) heranziehen konnte”; see **LEUMANN 1931:** 21–22. Probably the siglum K used by Wogihara to designate the manuscript of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* deposited in the Kyoto University Library was falsely associated with the name Kawaguchi. Although there is a Kawaguchi Eak Collection of manuscripts kept in the Toyo Bunko Oriental Library in Tokyo (KANeko & MATSUNAMI 1979: 151–191), no Sanskrit manuscript of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* brought by Kawaguchi is known of (to me at least). Note that Ernst Leumann’s article, where the description of MSS C and K occurs, was published after his death, and the mistake may be that of the editor(s) rather than the author himself.
Appendix A: A Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text of *Bodhisattvabhūmi* 1.2

*Bodhisattvabhūmi* using the Cambridge and Kyoto manuscripts, comparing them with the sDe-dge edition of the Tibetan translation and with the Chinese translations by Hsüan-tsang and Dharmākṣema.11 His edition appeared in two parts: part one in 1930 and part two in 1936.12 Johannes Rahder used one of the two transcripts made by Wogihara in Cambridge for his edition of the *Vihārapatola* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi* 2.4) and the *Bhūmipaṭala* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi* 3.3).13 After the first volume of Wogihara’s edition was published, a major portion of the *Balagotrapatāla* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi* 1.8) was published again as a specimen by his professor Ernst Leumann.14

The Indian pāṇḍita Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1893–1963)15 travelled to Tibet in the years 1929/30, 1934, 1936, and 1938. Although he heard about the existence of palm-leaf manuscripts of Sanskrit texts in Tibetan monasteries, he did not find any during his first journey.16 The following trips, however, yielded many palm-leaf Sanskrit manuscripts, most of them in three Tibetan monasteries situated in gTsang: Sa-skya, Ngor, and Zha-lu. The manuscripts found in Ngor and Zha-lu, though, were originally housed in Sa-skya.17 Some of his finds he copied down,18 but most he had photographed.19 In 1938, during the last of his four visits to Tibet, the manuscripts of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Śrāvakabhūmi*,20 among many others, were discovered at Zha-lu Monastery.21 On his return to India, Sāṅkṛtyāyana wrote a report and made a catalogue of his finds.22 The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* manuscript appears in the latter as

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11 According to Prof. Schmithausen (personal communication), the Chinese name of the translator should rather be reconstructed into Sanskrit as *Dharmākṣema* (cf. Hābogirin, s.v. dommusen) and not as *Dharmarakṣa*, as given by Wogihara. See also DE JONG 1987b: 166, where the name of the translator is given as *Dharmākṣema*.

12 Since the two parts have been now published as one book, it is not clear where the original partition lay. It should be noted that this publication contains several related studies, such as the ‘Synopsis of the Contents of the Bodhisattvabhūmi’ with separate pagination (from 1 to 23) and Wogihara’s dissertation in German, also with separate pagination (from 1 to 43).

13 RAHDER 1926.

14 See LEUMANN 1931. The portion of the text published is basically the same as in Wogihara’s edition (pp. 95–110). There is a difference in the lay-out of the text. A numbered outline has been introduced into it in order to make the structure of the text ‘clearer’ (übersichtlicher). The critical apparatus found in the footnotes in Wogihara’s edition was left out.

15 For the biography of Sāṅkṛtyāyana, see BANDURSKI 1994: 27, n. 76.

16 SĀṅKṛTYĀYANA 1935: 21 (part 1).


18 MUCH 1958: 12.


20 For a recent discussion on the origin and date of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* manuscript, see DELEANU 2006: 51–72.

21 SĀṅKṛTYĀYANA 1938: 21 (part 4).

22 SĀṅKṛTYĀYANA 1938. dGe-'dun-chos-'phel (1903–1951), who accompanied Sāṅkṛtyāyana, also describes the same *Śrāvakabhūmi* and *Bodhisattvabhūmi* manuscripts as having been seen by them in Zha-lu Monastery. According to him, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* manuscript contained 266 short format (*dpe
number forty-one of the Zha-lu corpus (section IX).\(^{23}\) The negatives of the photographs of the manuscript were deposited in the Bihar Research Society in Patna.\(^{24}\)

The famous Tibetologist Giuseppe Tucci (1894–1984) made many scientific expeditions to India, Nepal, and Tibet in the 1930s and 1940s. During his expedition to Tibet in 1939 he was able to photograph more than 1,500 pages of Indian palm-leaf manuscripts that he discovered in various monasteries in Tibet.\(^{25}\) He also photographed some of the manuscripts that had already been photographed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana.\(^{26}\) One manuscript photographed twice was the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.\(^{27}\)

From 1968 to 1971, the Department of Indology and Buddhist Studies of the University of Göttingen was able to make copies from the negative films that were put at the disposal of Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute in Patna by the Bihar Research Society. This Göttingen collection of Buddhist Sanskrit texts discovered in Tibet by Sāṅkṛtyāyana was the theme of Frank Bandurski’s M.A. thesis, in which he catalogued and described each manuscript included in the collection.\(^{28}\) In his catalogue of the Göttingen collection, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* bears the catalogue number 28 (Xc 14/29).\(^{29}\) The original manuscript of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* from Zha-lu Monastery, was held for a time in the Central Institute of Nationalities (Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan) in Beijing,\(^{30}\) and then brought back to Lhasa in 1993.\(^{31}\)

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\(^{23}\) See SĀṅKṛTYĀYNA 1938: 145 (part 4); cf. ROTH 1975/76: 166; see also BANDURSKI 1994: 65.

\(^{24}\) The negatives are kept in the Archives of the Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Museum Buildings, Patna-1. See ROTH 1975/76: 166, 174. Whether the negatives are of glass or films is discussed by BANDURSKI 1994: 13, n. 15. See also MUCH 1988.

\(^{25}\) For an informative report on the Sanskrit manuscripts and photos of them in Giuseppe Tucci’s collection, see SFERRA 2000.

\(^{26}\) SFerra states that while working on his critical edition of the *Hevajratantrapiṇḍārthaḥ* (forthcoming in the Serie Orientale Roma), a clear reading of the manuscript was made possible by comparing the photographic reproductions prepared by Tucci and Sāṅkṛtyāyana. In certain cases, such as Ratnakarasántti’s *Sāratamā*, which is a commentary on the *Aśṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, Tucci’s photographs contained more leaves than Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s (SFERRA 2000: 401).

\(^{27}\) The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* occurs thrice in the list of items in Giuseppe Tucci’s collection compiled by Francesco SFerra and Claudio Ciuacza (SFERRA 2000: 409–413). The number of negatives specified are 8, 3, and 10 (totaling 21). The list is a provisional one, and the details offered are minimal. A more detailed and accurate list will be published in a forthcoming catalogue and accompanying CD-ROMS; see SFERRA 2000: 410. SFerra does not mention the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* as a work photographed by both Sāṅkṛtyāyana and Tucci. However, Zha-lu is given as the location where both Tucci and Sāṅkṛtyāyana photographed a manuscript of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which is perhaps enough to conclude that the object was one and the same manuscript. I should like to take this opportunity to thank Prof. Francesco SFerra of the University of Rome for kindly sending me a CD-ROM containing a tentative copy of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* manuscript photographed by Tucci. However, as already noted by him (SFERRA 2000: 399, 401), the quality of the photographs is often very poor, and I have not been able to make use of them.

\(^{28}\) BANDURSKI 1994.

\(^{29}\) BANDURSKI 1994: 64.

\(^{30}\) This fact is documented in unpublished lists of Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscripts kept in Beijing (Mis-tsu t’i-shu-kuan-t’ang fan-wen-pei-yeh-ching mu-lu (Verzeichnis der in der Nationalitäten Bibliothek aufbewahrten Sanskrit Palmblatt-Sūtras), List No. 19. See BANDURSKI 1994: 27 (n. 76), 66, 119.
In 1966 Nalinaksha Dutt (1893–1973) published a new edition of the *Bodhisattvbhūmi*\(^{32}\) using the photos taken by Sāṅkṛtyāyana at Zha-lu\(^{33}\) (with the help of a copy of the manuscript made by Paṇḍita Baldeo Mishra of the Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute) and Wogihara’s edition.\(^{34}\) Gustav Roth published a new edition and an annotated English translation of the beginning of the text in 1975/76, noting a number of wrong readings in Dutt’s edition.\(^{35}\) Recently, yet another palm-leaf manuscript of the *Bodhisattvbhūmi* was microfilmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project,\(^{36}\) and thus one more manuscript has been put at our disposal. But again this manuscript is unfortunately incomplete.

The most recent work concerning the *Bodhisattvbhūmi* is that of Madagamuwe Maithirimurthi. The portion of the *Pūjasevāpramānapaṭala (Bodhisattvbhūmi* 1.16) dealing with the four immeasurables (*aprāmāṇa*) has been critically edited, analysed and translated by him. This forms a part of his doctoral dissertation on the study of the history of ideas as it relates to the four immeasurables in Buddhist ethics and spirituality, beginning from earliest Buddhism to early Yōgācāra.\(^{37}\) For his edition, Maithirimurthi has used photographic copies of the palm-leaf manuscripts from Patna (P) and Nepal (N) and the two editions of Wogihara (W) and Dutt (D). In addition, he has consulted the Tibetan translation of the *Bodhisattvbhūmi* (Peking and sDe-dge) along with Sāgaramegha’s *Bodhisattvbhūmivyākhyā*, which is extant only in Tibetan. He did not, however, edit the Tibetan text. He also consulted Hsüan-tsang’s Chinese translation.

It should be mentioned here that Edgerton’s dictionary is one of a number of important contributions to the lexicography of the *Bodhisattvbhūmi*.\(^{38}\) Another is a Sanskrit-Chinese index of the *Bodhisattvbhūmi* published by Hakuju Uj (1882–1966). Further, in 1996 Koitsu Yokoyama and Takayuki Hiroswa brought out an index (Chinese-Sanskrit-Tibetan) to the *Yogācārabhūmi* including the *Bodhisattvbhūmi*.\(^{39}\) Lastly, there are several other *Bodhisattvbhūmi*-related publications, particularly by Japanese scholars, which cannot be mentioned here.

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\(^{31}\) According to YONEZAWA 1998: 11, n. 1, these original Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscripts were brought back to Lhasa and are now preserved in the Nor-bu-gling-ka (the Summer Palace of the Dalai Lamas). The Cultural Palace of Nationalities in Beijing possesses microfilms of the original Sanskrit manuscripts. A recent report on the past and future of Sanskrit manuscripts in Tibet appears in STEINKELLNER 2004.

\(^{32}\) DUTT 1966.


\(^{34}\) See my discussion of Dutt’s edition in the introduction to the critical edition of the Sanskrit text.

\(^{35}\) See ROTH 1975/76. De Jong made the following comment regarding Dutt’s edition: “...Gustav Roth has shown convincingly that Dutt’s edition is not to be relied upon” (DE JONG 1987a: 73).

\(^{36}\) See n. 42.

\(^{37}\) MAITHIRIMURTHI 1999.

\(^{38}\) It is, however, difficult to know if Edgerton had read the entire text or had mainly used Wogihara’s index to his edition (DE JONG 1987b: 164).

\(^{39}\) See YOKOYAMA & HIROSADA 1996. For a review of this index, see SILK 2001.
(b) A Brief Description of the Extant Manuscripts and Editions

The following general description of MSS P, C, and K are to a great extent based on details provided in previous studies, reference to which will be made in the respective footnotes. Note that any further specific observations made on all manuscripts and editions are based only on the Cittotpādaṭāla. Still, I hope that at least some of the observations I make in the following paragraphs are representative of the manuscripts and editions of the Bodhisattvabhūmi as a whole.

(i) The Patna MS

The Patna MS (P) contains 266 leaves measuring 12 x 2 inches, and represents a complete text. The text is written in Kuṭīla script with seven lines on each side. There are 30 photo plates reproducing the whole, labelled 1A, 1B up to 15A, 15B. The folio numbers occur on the reverse. Sometimes MS P uses a danḍa-like stroke at the end of lines, seemingly with a hyphen-like function. It also occasionally manifests some scribal peculiarities—for instance, not combining the consonant of the previous word with the vowel of the following word (e.g. "m u" instead of the common "mu"). It generally (but not always) omits avagraha signs, and it does not use the virâma sign at all. It also contains a few corrections made by the scribe. Compared to MS N, it is in much better shape and contains no lacunae, as far as I could judge from the Cittotpādaṭāla portion.

(ii) The Nepal MS

The Nepal palm-leaf manuscript (N) is written in ornamental Nevārī script and contains 108 folios with five lines each. Numerous folios are missing, among them the first folio and possibly the last series of folios; the text concludes at the end of the third Yogasthāna. The last folio filmed is numbered 174 which means that at least 66 folios are missing. The folios, measuring 56 x 6 centimetres, are riddled with holes, and the margins of several folios have broken off, resulting in damage to numerals. This must have created a good deal of confusion when the manuscript was photographed. The Cittotpādaṭāla, for instance, begins on folio 6 recto and ends on 10 recto. Folio 8 is missing, another folio belonging to another section (its folio number is missing) being found in its place, that is, between folios 7 and 9, and a further two folios, again belonging to another section (their folio numbers are missing as well), have been inserted between folios 9 and 10. MS N generally (but not always) omits avagraha

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40 By a printing mistake, the number of folios is given in Sānkṛtyāna 1938: 145 as 226 instead of 266. This was pointed out by Roth 1975/76: 166, 174. The number 266 is confirmed by the report of the discovery of the manuscript written by dGe-'dun-chos-'phel (gSer gyi thang ma, p. 26.2–3). In the unpublished lists of Sanskrit palm-leaf manuscripts kept in Beijing, the number of manuscript leaves is also registered as 266; see Bandurski 1994: 66.

41 For details, see Sānkṛtyāna 1938: 145 (part 4); Bandurski 1994: 65.

42 The MS no. 3–681 (buddhādarśana 63), National Archives, Kathmandu, NGMPP-Reel No. A 38/3. The date of filming is given as 22.9.70. This manuscript has a book-cover illustrated with nine Buddha-figures displaying various hand gestures (mudrā).
signs, and often too the anusvāra is either missing or indiscernible. Owing to the numerous lacunae, MS N has not been of much value for the critical edition.

(iii) The Cambridge MS

The Cambridge palm-leaf manuscript (C) consists of 144 leaves, the number of lines on them ranging from 6 to 8. The size of the leaves is given by Bendall as 12 x 2 inches. The physical condition of the manuscript is described by him as "imperfect and very shattered at the edges, in particular many of the leaf-numbers being broken off." In addition, Wogihara noted the occasional illegibility of letters marred by stains. Bendall also remarked that the manuscript, which is written in Nevārī script, is scribed in two different hands and that one hand is more archaic than that of the palm-leaf manuscript of the Paramēśvaratantra (MS Add. 1049) which dates from 875 C.E. He placed this manuscript of the Bodhisattvabhūmi in the ninth century C.E. According to Wogihara, C was written in the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century.

(iv) The Kyoto MS

I have been able to obtain a copy of the microfilm of the Kyoto manuscript of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (K) through the library of the Department of the Culture and History of India and Tibet (University of Hamburg). Unlike the other manuscripts, K is written on paper. There are 206 folios, the number of lines being regularly 7. The folios are numbered on the right margin of the verso in Devanāgarī numerals, while on the left margin of the same side appears the syllable bo, obviously an abbreviation of Bodhisattvabhūmi. It seems that the manuscript was provided with a corresponding pagination on the recto in Arabic numerals before filming. The colophon of K states that its original was an undated palm-leaf manuscript. Such facts as the absence of the

43 Originally, the number of leaves of MS C must have been 151, and thus it now lacks seven leaves; see WOGIHARA 1930–36: ii (preface).

44 BENDALL 1883: 191.

45 See WOGIHARA 1930–36: ii (preface). For a description of MS C, see WOGIHARA 1904: 34.

46 For a discussion of palaeographical features of MS C, see the ‘Palaeographical Introduction’ in BENDALL 1883: xvii–xxxviii.

47 The end of the first hand and the beginning of the second hand of MS C (Add. 1702, leaf no. 19) is reproduced in Plate 1.1; see BENDALL 1883: 191–196.

48 BENDALL 1883: xxxix–lv.

49 Har Dayal, who used the Cambridge palm-leaf manuscript of the Bodhisattvabhūmi manuscript for his dissertation, also dated it to the ninth century. He gives no explanation for his dating, but he probably relied on Bendall; see DAYAL 1932: 348 (appendix).

50 See WOGIHARA 1908: 6; DE JONG 1987b: 165.

51 I should like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Felix Erb who, in spite of severe financial constraints faced by the library of the Department, agreed to order the microfilm of the Kyoto manuscript of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (K) from Kyoto, Japan, and Achim Beyer for clearing the order in Japan.
beginning portion of the Gotrapātāla and the fourth and last Anukramapātāla, and the marking of missing lines and letters with dashes, indicate that the palm-leaf manuscript upon which K was based was in a poor condition. Wogihara held the original of K to be older than the original of C. However, he did not venture to estimate the date of MS K. In de Jong’s judgement, MS K is probably a recent copy made in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{52} Not being a palaeographer, I am unable to offer any suggestions as to the age of P and N. MS K seems to be in any case quite recent.

\textbf{(v) Wogihara’s Edition}

Wogihara remarked that the manuscripts that he used (C and K) are both incomplete and abound in clerical errors, which he corrected (wherever possible) on the basis of the Tibetan translation. Irregular *samdhī, though, he left as it stands in the original, except at the end of a sentence.\textsuperscript{53} He took into consideration the Tibetan translation of the sDe-dge recension and the Chinese translations of Hsüan-tsang and *Dharmakṣema. In cases of lacunae in his manuscripts, he reconstructed the Sanskrit text based on the Tibetan and Chinese translations, often successfully. In general, given the quality of the manuscripts and the amount of work involved, his edition, done with much more care than Dutt’s, is quite reliable.

\textbf{(vi) Dutt’s Edition}

As already stated, Dutt used photographs of MS P for his edition. In addition, he used a copy of the same manuscript made by Paṇḍit Baldeo Mishra of the Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute. In this regard the following statement is made by Dutt:\textsuperscript{54} I should also thank Paṇḍit Baldeo Mishra of the Institute for preparing a copy from the photographs, all of which are not legible. As the photographs are not kept in order, the Paṇḍit’s copy also suffered from the same defect. The copy however reduced my labour of decipherment to a large extent though I had to prepare a fresh copy for the Press.

As is evident from his critical apparatus, Dutt used another version (assigned by him the siglum J), without, however, identifying it. As most of the variant readings in J recorded by Dutt in his critical apparatus bear a great deal of similarity with Wogihara’s edition, with the numbers following the siglum J obviously referring to the page numbers in the latter, J (probably standing for ‘Japanese’) must be referring to Wogihara’s edition, concerning which Dutt states:\textsuperscript{55}

On the basis of the Cambridge and Kyoto mss., Prof. U. Wogihara published an edition in Romanised script. A copy of this work came into my hands when I had nearly completed the edition of the present ms. I found that the readings of the Cambridge ms. agreed with those in our ms. The present ms. being almost complete, it filled up the lacuna in Wogihara’s edition.

A careful examination reveals, however, that J is not completely identical with W, which can perhaps only be explained by assuming inaccurate recording on the part of

\textsuperscript{52} The colophon of MS K (fol. \textit{verso} 206.5–6) reads: ‘[The text] was written after being seen in an old undated book written on palm leaves in Lāñjana/Rañjana-aṅśaras’ (tālapatresu lāñjanāṅśarasai iṅkhitā samvatsararaḥite purātanapustakā drṣṭānāṃ ikhitam ||). See also WOGIHARA 1930–1936: ii.


\textsuperscript{54} See WOGIHARA 1930–36 (no page number), ‘General Remarks’ in his edition of the \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi}.

\textsuperscript{55} DUTT 1966: 2 (Preface).

\textsuperscript{56} DUTT 1966: 3 (Introduction).
Dutt. Unlike Wogihara, Dutt seems to have consulted neither the Tibetan\textsuperscript{57} nor any Chinese translation.

The observations made by me in regard to Dutt's edition on the basis of my critical edition of the Cittotpādapaṭāla portion make clear that Dutt's edition abounds in mistakes and is often imprecise. Several cases demonstrate that he has sometimes misread his manuscript, creating variants that cannot be confirmed. There are many instances where D reads the same as W (only occasionally does Dtt indicate, by using square brackets, that his reading is an emendation) without the variant of P or D\textsuperscript{1} being given, although P reads differently. These cases clearly demonstrate that Dutt often did not faithfully record the readings of his manuscript. In various other cases Dutt, while not following any of the readings attested, emended the text without marking the emendation as such. Furthermore, the notes given in his critical apparatus are sometimes ambiguous and thus prone to conflicting interpretations.\textsuperscript{58} Since Dutt employs a negative apparatus, one can only assume that in the instances where D reads the same as W, with variants recorded for P but not for D\textsuperscript{1}, and vice versa, he is following respectively D\textsuperscript{1} against P and the reverse. There is at least one instance where D reads the same as W while recording a variant reading in D\textsuperscript{1} as well as in P. In three further cases, D reads the same as W\textsuperscript{K} (in one of them he supplies no variant either in P or in D\textsuperscript{1}; and in the remaining two he notes a variant in D\textsuperscript{1} but not in P, but nevertheless reads against both P and D\textsuperscript{1}, which reads the same as W). These cases confirm that Dutt has actually used W without explicitly stating so. It was also de Jong's impression that Dutt adopted some readings from Wogihara's edition even when his own manuscript offered a better reading, and that on the whole Dutt's edition was produced with much less care than Wogihara's.\textsuperscript{59}

(c) Some Observations on the Stemmatic Relationship of the Manuscripts

Given the limited number of manuscripts available and the focus on only a small portion of the text, there is no firm basis for adequately determining the stemmatic relationship of the manuscripts to one another. Nevertheless, I should like to present here some observations based on a statistical evaluation of the different readings of the manuscripts of this particular portion of the text. In general, the readings in P differ from the readings in W (which reflects both C and K). But when C and K differ, P is clearly closer to K. The number of cases in which N shows some similarity to P as opposed to W is approximately equal to the number of cases in which N and W have similar readings as opposed to P (note, however, that we have a number of cases in which P differs from W but where N is lost). Again, when C and K differ, N shows a greater affinity with K. Hence one may generalise that while C and K show a certain similarity as opposed to P, both P and N more closely resemble K than C. One may recall here that the three manuscripts P, N, and K lack the Anukramapaṭāla, which is found only in C. There are, further, no clear indications as to whether the manuscript(s) used by the Tibetan translators is or are in anyway related to any of the present manuscripts, for the Tibetan translation does not predominately support the readings of any of them. Note, however, that the Tibetan translation includes the Anukramapaṭāla, found also in MS C.

\textsuperscript{57} The few instances where he gives 'Tib.' in his critical apparatus may have simply involved copying from Wogihara's edition.

\textsuperscript{58} See also my presentation of the methods employed in my critical edition of the Sanskrit text.

\textsuperscript{59} DE JONG 1987b: 164.
(d) The Methodology and Abbreviations Employed in the Critical Edition of the Sanskrit Text

A positive apparatus has been followed for the critical edition. I have made an attempt to record all variants: Those variants that I regard as significant for textual criticism and for the textual transmission are reproduced in the footnotes (in Roman letters, beginning anew on each page) and the less significant ones in the endnotes (in Arabic numerals that run on). The variants regarded by me as less significant are ones largely palaeographical and stylistic in nature, namely, variants regarding the *avagraha* sign (often omitted by both P and N), any variation involving the application of *anusvāra* versus one of the nasal letters (including cases where the *anusvāra* is missing or indiscernible, as is often the case in MS N), and variants in punctuation (i.e. the use of *dandas*\(^\text{60}\)), along with obvious scribal or printing errors.

The numbering of the text in Arabic numerals (e.g. 3.2.0.) is mine and employed to mark the main points. When necessary, passages are partitioned further and numbered in Roman letters within round brackets (e.g. (a)). The page or folio numbers of the manuscripts and editions are given in raised and large angled brackets (e.g. "\(^{p12r}\)") where a new page or folio commences. In cases where I thought it unclear which portion of text a particular footnote or endnote refers to, I have used small raised angled brackets (e.g. 'aṇyāṃ prathamah') to mark the text in question. In addition to the variant readings in the editions made by Wogihara and Dutt, I have also included all variant readings marked by them in the notes to their editions. These readings are indicated by the sigil of the edition followed by a raised sigil for the manuscript (e.g. W\(^C\) for Wogihara’s reading of MS C). I also refer to any remark or observation made by Wogihara regarding the Tibetan or Chinese translations. The variants given by Dutt in his critical apparatus are sometimes ambiguous and subject to interpretation. In such cases, I interpreted Dutt’s variants (at times with the help of MS P used by him) and recorded them in my critical apparatus as he had apparently intended, as opposed to how he himself recorded them. When I found it necessary to do so, I provided Dutt’s exact formulation, described its ambiguity, and explained my interpretation. In general, *samādi* rules have been adopted if attested in at least one of the manuscripts or editions. Only in a few cases have I emended the text by applying *samādi* rules. The lacunae in MS N have been marked with *lost in N*. When illegible, in part or in whole, I have used *defaced in N*. In a few cases, I have also recorded the scribal corrections found in MS P using P\(^\text{ac}\) to designate the reading before correction, and P\(^\text{ac}\) the reading after correction. In cases of uncertainty, I refer to the Tibetan translation in the Sanskrit edition and vice versa.

As stated above, I have made an attempt to record all variants. Some minor variants, though, which seem to be mere stylistic peculiarities have not been noted. These include the omission of the *vīrāma* sign and the use of the *danda*-like short stroke at the end of a line, both in MS P. Some other scribal peculiarities observed in MS P are no longer visible when transliterated into Roman script. For instance, both *ci ttam u tpā da ya ti* (as in MS P) and the common *ci tta mu tpā da ya ti* are transcribed as *cittam utpādayati*.

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\(^{60}\) Note that Wogihara used a full stop for *dandas* throughout. Hence the variants in W regarding *dandas* can be indicated only in cases when these are either omitted or added. Differences in the number of *dandas* cannot be determined.
The following abbreviations are used in the critical edition of the Sanskrit text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ac</td>
<td>ante correctum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>add</td>
<td>addendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Cambridge MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin</td>
<td>Chinese translation by Hsün-tsang (in the critical apparatus of W)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conj</td>
<td>conjecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Dutt’s edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'</td>
<td>Dutt’s reading of Wogihara’s edition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D''</td>
<td>Dutt’s reading of the Patna MS indicated in his footnotes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>em</td>
<td>emendation</td>
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<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Kyoto MS</td>
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<td>N</td>
<td>Nepal MS</td>
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<td>om</td>
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<td>P</td>
<td>Patna MS</td>
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<td>post correctum</td>
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<td>recto</td>
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<td>Tib</td>
<td>Tibetan translation</td>
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<td>v</td>
<td>verso</td>
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<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Wogihara’s edition</td>
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<tr>
<td>W'C</td>
<td>Wogihara’s reading of the Cambridge MS indicated in his footnotes</td>
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<tr>
<td>W'K</td>
<td>Wogihara’s reading of the Kyoto MS indicated in his footnotes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. The Text

1.1.1. iha bodhisattvasya prathamaś cittotpādaḥ sarvabodhisattvasamyakprajñādhānānām ādyam samyakprajñādhānam a tadanyasaṃyakprajñādhānasamgrāhakaṃ | tasmā | t sa ādītaḥ samyakprajñānaḥsvabhāvaḥ |

1.1.2. sa khalu bodhisattvo bodhāya cittaṃ prāṇidhadh evam ca abhisamñkaroti vācāṃ ca bhāṣate aho batāham anuttarāṃ samyaksambodhiḥ abhisamñbudhiyam sarvasattvānāṃ cārthakaraḥ sāyam atyanānīśhe nirvāne pratiṣṭhāpayeyo tathāgatajñātāne ca sa 'evam ātmanaś ca bodhiḥ sattvārthaṃ ca prārthhayamāṇā cittaṃ upādaya ca tasmāt sa cittotpādaḥ prārthanaṃkāraḥ |

1.1.3. tāṃ khalu bodhiḥ sattvārthaṃ cālambya sa cittotpādaḥ prārthayate nānālambya tasmat s cittotpādo bodhyālambanaḥ sattvārthālambanaṃ ca |

1.1.4. sa ca cittotpādaḥ sarvabodhiḥpakṣa kuśalamūlasamgrāhaya pūrvaṃgamavā kuśalāḥ 'paramakṣaṃyayunayuktah bhadrāḥ paramabhadrah kalyāṇāḥ 'paramakalyāṇāḥ sarvasattvādiṣṭhānahkāryavāmanoṣṭhārtrā vairodhikāḥ |

1.1.5. yānī ca 'kānidīk anyānī laukikakoktāresv artheṣu kuśalāni samyakprajñādhāni 16 tēṣām sarvesāṃ agrāṃ etat samyakprajñādhānam niruttaram yad uta bodhisattvasya prathamaś cittotpādaḥ |

1.1.Ø. evam ayaṃ prathamaś cittotpādaḥ svabhāvato 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pi 'pir
1.2.2. utpādyā ca bodhisattvas tac cittaṁ kraṇenaṇuttarāṁ samyaksambodhimābhisambudhyateb nānuttadāyaṃ k ā tasmād anuttarāyāḥ samyaksambodheḥ sa cittotpādo mūlam e

1.2.3. duḥkhiṣeṣu ca sattvesu saṃ kāruṇiko bodhisattvaḥ paritṛṣṇābhīpṛayasyaṃ tayam utpādayati | tasmāt sa cittotpādaḥ karunāniṣyandah 1.2.4. tamā ca cittotpādaṃ niśritya pratiṣṭhāya bodhisattvaḥ bodhipākṣeṣu dharmesu sattvārthakriyāyāṃ ca bodhisattvaśīkṣāyāṃ prayujyate | tasmāt sa cittotpādo bodhisattvaśīkṣāyāḥ samāniśrayah 1.2.Ø. evam asau prathamaś cittotpādaḥ saṃgrahato 'piṃ mūlato 'piṇ niśyandato 'piśaṃ niśīrayato28 'piṃ veditavyah 1.2.1.0. sa ca bodhisattvasya prathamaś cittotpādaḥ34 samāsena dvividhaḥ | nairṛyānikā ca anairṛyānīkā35 ca | 'tatra nairṛyāniko3 śayam uppanno 'tyantam 'anuvartate na puṃ pravartanāyāṃ vyāvartate | pravartanaḥ puṇar yad uppanno nātyantam anuvartate36 puṇar eva vyāvartate |

2.2.0. tasya ca cittotpādasya vyāṛṛtir api 'dvividhā | ātyantikā374 cānātyantikī ca | tatrātyantikī yat sakṛd vyāṛṛtāṃ38 cittaṁ na punar utpādayate bodhāya | anātyantikī puṇah39 yad vyāṛṛtām 'cittām puṇah3 punar utpādayate bodhāya |

3.1.0. saḥ khalo cittasyotpādaḥ40 caturbhīḥ pratyaśayaiḥ caturbhīḥ hetubhiḥ41 caturbhī balair42 veditavyah |

3.1.1. cavaraḥ pratyaśayaḥ43 katame44 (a) iha kulaputro vā kuladuhitā vā tathāgaṭasya vā bodhisattvasya 'vā acintyam44 adbhutaṃ prāthihāyaṃ prabhāvaṃ paśyati 46 sampratayitasya vā 'ṭīṇcā chṛṣṭi vā 'ṛṣṭvā vaiṣṇavā bhavati | mahānubhāva bateyāṃ 414 vā bodhir yasyāṃ sthitasya vā pratipannasya vā 47 yam

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* "rāṃ samyaksambodiḥ" [PWD, lost in N (aṅkara rāṃ partly visible)]
* abhisambudhyate [W (also Tib.), amisambudhyate D (obviously a scribal or printing error), adhigacchati NDW, gacchati P]
* dya || NWD, dya P
* tasmād] NWD, tasmād P (Probably the danda that should precede tasmād had erroneously been scribbled as a stroke of vowel e).
* cālam || D, cālam || NW, cālaḥ || P
* sa] NWD, om. PW4 D
* bodhisattvo] WD (also Tib.), om. PND
* pakṣeṣu] NW, pakṣeṣu PD
* cāvatātāh kriyāyāṃ ca] W, cāvatātāh kriyāyāṃ ca PD, lost in N (aṅkara ca partly visible).
* tayāḥ] PND, tayāḥ W
* maś cittot] NW, maś cittot P D, maś cittot P
* tra nairṛyāniko] PWD, lost in N
* yad] PN, ya WD
* itrate] WD, itrate] na P, lost in N
* puṇar] PWD, illegible in N
* yad] PN, ya WD
* nātāk] P4 NWD, nātāk P
* cittaṃ puṇa] PWD, lost in N (lowermost part visible)
* sa] WD4, tasya PND
* duhitā] PND, duhitā D (probably a printing error)
* adbhutam] W (also Tib.), atyadbhutam PND, adbhutam D4
* strūtvā vaiṣṇava] NW, strūtvā vaiṣṇava W, strūtvā vaiṣṇava W, strūtvā evam PND
evamṛüpaḥ prabhāvaḥ\(^47\) idam evamṛuşpaḥ pratiḥāryaṃ drṣṭya ca śṛṣṭye ca \(^48\) sa\(^a\) tad eva prabhāva’daśānaṃ śrāvaṇaṃ vādhipatiṃ kṛtvā mahābhodyadhimukto mahābodhau cīttaṃ utpādayati \(^49\) ‘ayaṃ prathamaḥ\(^c\) pratyayaś\(^50\) cīttaṣyoṭpattaye | (b) sa na haiva prabhāvam paśayati vā śṛṇoti vā\(^d\) api tv anuttaraṃ samyaksambodhiṃ\(^e\) arabhya saḍdhaṃmarṣṇi bo\(^f\) dhisattvaṃpiṣṭitaṃ \(^g\) desṭyaṃnaṃ | śrūtvā ca punaḥ abhiprasadita\(^i\) abhiprasasenaḥ ca saḥsaddharmaśravaṇam adhipatiṃ kṛtvā tathāgatajñānādhitumkaṭaḥ\(^j\) tathāgatajñānāpratilambhayaḥ\(^k\) cīttaṃ utpādayati | ayaṃ dvitiyaḥ pratyayaś\(^54\) cīttaṣyoṭpattaye \(^h\) | (c) sa na haiva dharmaṃ śṛṇoty\(^j\) api tu bodhiḥsattvasadhaṃstrīdhaṃnīṃ \(^l\) āmukhyam upagataṃ paśayati | dṛṣṭvā ca punaḥ asyaivaṃ bhavati \(^55\) aprameyaṇāṇaṃ k\(^k\) bata sattvāṇāṃ duḥkha-papagamāya bodhiḥsattvasadhaṃstrīdhaṃ samvartate | yan naḥ uṣṭoḥ bodhiḥsattvasadhaṃcīrasthitaye cīttaṃ utpādayeyyaṃ\(^56\) yad uta eṣaṃ eva sattvāṇāṃ duḥkha-pakaraṇaṃ\(^m\) | \(^n\) sa’n samyakkhaṃdhāraṇaṃ evādhipatiṃ\(^o\) kṛtvā tathāgatajñānādhitumkaṭaṃ tathāgatajñānāpratilambhayaṃ\(^58\) cīttaṃ utpādayati | ayaṃ\(^59\) \(^\langle\text{D10}\rangle\) tṛṭiyaḥ\(^60\) pratyayaś cīttaṣyoṭpattaye | (d) sa na haiva saḍdharmaṁ strīdhaṃnīṃ pratyupasthitāṃ paśayati \(^61\) api tv antaye ye ’ntakāle ’pratyavaraṇ antayuṣikāṇiṃ \(^q\) sattvaṃśrayanāṃ paśayati\(^62\) ’yad uta daśābhīr upaklesāṣaṃ upakliṣṭān\(^63\) | tadyathā ‘mohahulyaḥ āhṛkṣyamānapratiprāyabahulaḥ\(^t\) śṛṣṭyāmaṃśaryabahulaḥ\(^64\) duḥkha-bahulaḥ\(^65\) daśṭhulyaḥ bahulaḥ\(^66\) klesa-bahulaḥ\(^67\) \(^\langle\text{P10}\rangle\) duṣṭcaraṃ-\(^W\) pramādabahulaḥ\(^68\) kausīdyabahulaṃ ca \(^70\) drṣṭvā ca punaḥ asyaivaṃ bhavati | maḥan\(^72\) batayaṃ kṣaṇa-kathālaṃ\(^7\) pratyupasthitāḥ | asminn evam upakliṣṭe kāle na sulasabhaḥ niḥsaṃśravaḥ\(^\langle\text{N7}\rangle\) pratyekabodhāv api tāvac cītto-pādāḥ \(^73\) prāg evaṃnuttarayaṃ samyakṣaṃbodhau | yan naḥ aham api tāvac cīttaṃ utpādayeyyaṃ\(^75\) api eva naṃ naṃ mamāniṣṭaṃśaṃānaḥ anye ’py\(^76\) utpādayeyur iti | so ’ntakāle ’cītto-pādādurlabhatāṃ

\(^a\) sa [PNWD, tādā W\(^C\)
\(^b\) ’eva PND\(^W\)\(^C\), oṣva W\(\mathsf{D}\)
\(^c\) ’ayaṃ prathama’ PWD, lost in N (lowermost part visible)
\(^d\) vā’ WD, vā | N, vāti P
\(^e\) samyaksambodhiṃ W (also Tib.), bodhim PND
\(^f\) ’Note Tib. byang chub kyi sde snod.
\(^g\) desṭyaṃnaṃ PWD, vā, desṭyaṃnaṃ N
\(^h\) cīttaṣyo’ PWD, lower part lost in N
\(^i\) śṛṇoty PND (“ty in N partly damaged”), śṛṇoti W
\(^j\) ottvasaddharha’ W, “svaḥ sadder” PD, “svaḥ” sadder N
\(^k\) “meṣyaṇāṃ” PND (“Note that the variant in K recorded by Woghara reads a-prameyaṇ” which can also be interpreted as aprameyaṇāṇāṃ.), “meṣyaṇāṃ N, ”māṇāṇāṃ W
\(^l\) onāṃ PWD, stroke of long vowel a lost in N
\(^m\) ”kaśraṇāya” FD, only “gāya visible in N (probably N = PD), “karṣya W\(^D\)
\(^n\) ”sa” W, ”sa” D, om. PND
\(^o\) “dhāraṇaṃ eva’ PD, “m eva” lost in N (unclear whether na or nā), “dhāraṇāṃ eva’ W
\(^p\) ”n” W, ”n” N, ”n” P
\(^q\) ”rān antaye” PND, ”rāntayugi” D
\(^r\) sattvāṣrayanāṃ PWD, sattvāṣrayāṃ W, sattvān N
\(^s\) ap uta daśābhīr upa’ PWD, lost in N
\(^t\) onāṃ āhṛt\(^r\) WD, ”lānāṃ hṛt\(^r\) P (amusvāra probably added by mistake), ”lāhṛt\(^r\) or ”lānhṛt\(^r\) N
\(^u\) ”mā” P\(^N\) W, ”ma P\(^\mathsf{C}\)
\(^v\) καṣāyaκālaḥ W, καṣāyaκālaḥ | P, lost in N
\(^w\) ”kṣyam” PWD, partly damaged in N
\(^x\) upasthitāḥ PND, ”avasthitāḥ W\(^C\)
\(^y\) ”nasāvaka’” NW, “nāh śrāvaka” PD
\(^z\) ”nāma”, NW, ”nāma” D, om. P
adhipatiṃ | kṛtvā mahābodhīadh adhimukto mahābodhau cittam upādayati | ayam | caturthaḥ pratayyas | citasottpattaye

3.1.2. catvāro hetavā katame | (a) gotrasampad bodhisattvasya prathamo hetuḥ | citalotpattaye | (b) buddhābodhisattvakāyānāmitraparigahau | dvitiyo hetuḥ | citalotpattaye | (c) sattvesu kāryan | bodhisattvasya trītyo | hetuḥ | citalotpattaye | (d) samśrādukhacaracyādūkhād | api dirghakālikād vicīrīt tvīrvīr niranantarād abhirūtā caturtho hetuḥ | citalotpattaye | (a) tatra gotrasampad bodhisattvasya dharmātpratīlabdhava veditavyā | <D1> | (b) caturthi ākāra-i | bodhisattvasya mitrasampad | veditavyā | (i) iha bodhisattva mitraṃ ādīta evājādaṃ bhavaty adhāndhājaṇiṃ panḍitaṃ | vicakṣanāṃ na ca kudrṣtipatiṃ | iyaṃ | pratamaṃ mitrasampad | <D1> | (ii) na caināṃ pramāde viniyojayaṃ na pramādāsthānam asyopasāṃharati | iyaṃ dvitiya mitrasampad | (iii) na caināṃ duścarte viniyojayaṃ na duścaratvāsthānam asyopasāṃharati | <D1> | (iv) na caināṃ utkṛṣṭarterabhyaḥ sṛddhācchandasamādānaṃvāpyopanembhyaḥ vicchandiyitvā nihinataṃ ṣrādcchandasamādānaṃvāpyopanembhyaḥ samādpayati | tadyathā mahāyānād vicchandiyitvā śrāvākayāne va bhāvanāmāyād vicchandiyitvā cintāmye | cintāmyād vicchandiyitvā śrutamayē | śrutamayād vicchandiyitvā vaiyāpyṛtya kartmā | śrutamayād vicchandiyitvā dānamayē | evambhāgyāṃ bhūte nihinataṃ ṣrādchandasamādānaṃvāpyopanembhyaḥ samādpayati | iyaṃ | caturthi mitrasampad | (c) <D1> caturthi kāraṇaṃ bodhisattvah kaurunābahu bhavati satteṣu | (i) santi te <D1> dhātavaḥ, | yeuḥ duḥkhaṃ nopalabhyaSAVE | daśasau diśy evantaṃpyantyuṣa lokadhatuṣa | sa ca bodhisattvaḥ saduḥkhe lokadhatau pratījāto bhavati, | yatra duḥkhaṃ upalabhya, | nāduḥkhe | (ii) paramSAVE cāṇyaṭamaṇa duḥkhena śṛṣṭaṃ upadrataṃ abhimūtaṃ paśyati | (iii) ātmanā cāṇyaṭamaṇa duḥkhena śṛṣṭo bhavaty upadruto bhībhūtaḥ |
The Resolve to Become a Buddha


3.2.0. catvāri bodhisattvāya cittavyāvṛttikāraṇāni | katamāni catvāri | (a) na gotrasampanno[1] bhavati | (b) pāpamitraruparighito bhavati | (c) sattvesu mandakarūṇa bhavati | (d) samśāradūḥkhāḥ ca dhīrakālikād vicītṛādī tīvṛa nirantarād bhūr bhavati[139] atyarthāṃ bībhety uttrasati[140] santrāsam āpadyate | catuṇḍa[141] cittiottipattheṣuṃ niparyayena catvāry etāni cittavyāvṛttikāraṇāni vistāreṇa pūrvaṃ vadvad veditavyaṃ |

4.1.0. dvāv imau drṣṭadhramacittotpādikasya bodhisattvāya lokāsādhāraṇaś āścaryādhibhutau dharmau | katamau dvau | (a) sarvasaṃsvaṃ[142] ca kadātvarahāvēna parighñāti[143] (b) na ca punaḥ kadāttraparighaadisoṇa lipyate | tatrāyaṃ |

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[18] tīvrena] WD, om. P
[5] ottaye] PWD (W remarks that his reading is based on C but suggests a different reading based on Tib.: sems skye bar 'gyur na =? cittasottpatl).
4.2.0. dvāv imau dhṛdprathamacittotpādikasya bodhisattvasya 'sattvesu kalyānādhyaśayaṁ pravartete\(^{14}\) (a) 'hitādhyaśaṁ yaś ca\(^{15}\) (b) sukhādhyaśayaṁ ca tatra 'hitādhyaśayaṁ ya akusālaṁ\(^{16}\) sthānād yuyuthāpya kuśale sthāne pratiṣṭhāpanakāmatā | sukhādhyaśayo ya vighātināṁ anāthaṁ apratisaraṇāṁ sattvānāṁ kliṣṭavarjītanāgāhakavastupasamaṁkaranaṁ kāmatā
dvāv imau dhṛdprathamacittotpādikasya bodhisattvasya pravogau | (a) adhāyāsāyaprayogāḥ (b) pratipattiprayogad ākṣaraṁ | tatāryāsāyaprayogau yā tasyaihitāsukhādhyaśayaṁ pratidivasam anubṛhmaṇā | pratipattiprayogāḥ pratidivasam ātmanaḥ ca buddhadharmaparipākaprayogāḥ\(^{145}\) sattvānāṁ ca yathāsaktiṁ yathābalam\(^{147}\) adhāyasyaprayogam eva niṣṛtya hitasukhoṇāsāmāhrayaprayogāḥ\(^{149}\) |

dve ime dhṛdprathamacittotpādikasā bodhisattvasya mahati kuśaladharmaśadvē ākṣaraṁ | (a) svārthaprayogāḥ cānuttarāyāḥ samyakṣambodheṇa samudāgamya | (b) parārthaprayogau sā sarvasattvānāṁ sarvadukkhanirmokṣaya | yathā dve āyadvē āvann dvau mahāntau kuśaladharmanāṁcayau dvāv 'āprameyau kuśaladharmaśadvē bhāya[151] peyālam\(^{152}\)

4.5.0. dve ime pra\(^{<\text{P15v}>}\) thamacittotpādikasya bodhisattvasya prathamān cittotpādām upādāya bodhaḥ kuśalaprāgrahavisṛṣyey tadanyāṁ kuśalāparigraham upanidhāya\(^{153}\) (b) hetuvaśeṣayām\(^{156}\) (b) phalavāśeṣayām\(^{157}\) ca | sa

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\(^{a}\) ākṣaraṁ ka [PWD, upper part of ākṣaras slightly damaged N]
\(^{b}\) 'yānugrahapathābhāyāṃ kliṣṭā' [PWD, lost in N]
\(^{c}\) 'dika' [PWD, lost in N (vowel sign i in di visible)
\(^{d}\) 'su kalayānādhyaṁ' [PWD, lost in N (lower half of ākṣaras su and ka still visible)
\(^{e}\) Note that, as already mentioned by Wogihara, Tib. add. gnyis gang zhe na (*katanau dvau).
\(^{f}\) 'yas ca' [PNWD, 'punyā D' (Dutt's actual record of the variant which is placed after hitādhyaśayaṁ ca is punyaskhāṁ thereby giving the impression that P reads punyaskhāṁ instead of hitādhyaśayaṁ ca which is not the case.)
\(^{g}\) 'sayo ya a' W, 'sayo ya a' PD, lost in N (extreme left part of ākṣara sa visible)
\(^{h}\) 'sukhādhyaśayo ya vighātināṁ' [PWD, lost in N
\(^{i}\) 'tisar' [PNWD, 'tisar' W
\(^{j}\) 'haranakā' [PWD, slightly defaced in N
\(^{k}\) 'tti prayogā ca' [PWD, lost in N (remains of ākṣaras tti and ca visible)
\(^{l}\) 'divasam anubṛhmaṇā' [PWD, 'divasasvarbaṛhmaṇā D' (Dutt's actual record of his reading of MS P here is divasasara\), giving the impression that he had not read prati. It is also not clear as to which ākṣaras follow his reading of divasasara\). However, based on my examination of this passage in MS P, I assume that he had misread the two ākṣaras manu as sarva, hence reading pratidivasasvarbaṛhmaṇā instead of pratidivasam anubṛhmaṇā, lost in N
\(^{m}\) ca yathā' [PWD, slightly defaced in N
\(^{n}\) 'prayogam' PND, 'prayoyam W
\(^{o}\) 'kho' [PWD, only partly visible in N
\(^{p}\) 'hārprayo' [PWD, lost in N (ākṣara yo partly visible)
\(^{q}\) 'cittotpād' [PWD, lost in N
\(^{r}\) 'prayogaś canuttarāyaṁ sa' WD, 'prayogaś canuttara sa' P, lost in N (lower most part of ākṣaras visible); 'myakṣambodheḥ' WD, 'myakṣambodiḥ P, slightly defaced in N
\(^{s}\) 'meyau' [PWD, slightly damaged in N
\(^{t}\) 'meyau kuśaladharmaśadvē bhāya[151] peyālam\(^{152}\) ND, peyālam W, peyālam P
\(^{u}\) 'pra' [PWD, damaged in N. Cf. Tib. which must have read *drṇhapra\(^{d}\) as in the preceding and the following paragraphs which compels us to take the Tibetan reading more seriously. See the note to the my translation.
\(^{w}\) upanidhā' [PNWD, upadhi\(^{c}\) W
The Resolve to Become a Buddha

equally valuable, "samyaksambodher hetuḥ" 158 sā ca tasyaḥ 159 phalam 159 na tadanyahā sarvāravakapratyakabuddhakusalaparigrahah 160 <N9v> prāgeva tadanyeṣam sattvānam tasmād bodhisattvānam kuṣalaparigrahah 161 tadanyasmāt sarvakuṣalaparigrahah dhetubhavātah phalaṭaḥ ca prativiṣṭaḥ|

4.6.0. dvāv imaṇu drdhpathamacittotpādikasya bodhisattvasya cittoptopādāraṇaṁsaṃcāro 162 saha citoptopāḍa ca sarvasattvānāṁ daksiniyābhūto bhavati gurubhubhā punyāksētaṁ 162 pīrtkālpaḥ prajānāṁ id (b) avyābādhyasya ca 163 punyasya pariprahaṁ 164 karoti tattredam avyābādhyām 165 punyām | (i) yena samanvāgato bodhisattvāc 166 ca kavr̥tadvīguṇenārakeṇārakesṭi e bhavati | yasminn ṣasyārakṣe sādāḥ 167 pratypasthithe na śakunvantiṣuptamattapramattasyāpi vyāḍaḥ vyākṣaḥ va ṣamasyaḥ vā 168 <P14r> naivāsikā vihemahā kartūṃ | parivṛttajāmā 169 punar ayaṁ bodhisattvā 167 tera <W20> punyapariprayaḥalāmbadho bhavaty arogajātiḥ | na j ca dirghena kharesanvāḥ 168 abādhena 168 spreyšiḥ (ii) sattvārtheṣu ca sattvakaraḥ 168 niṣyeṣu asya vyāḥ yacchāyāṃsayaṁ kāyena vāca ṣdharmaḥ ca desayataḥ 169 niṣyaḥ ca kāyah klāmyāḥ 170 na śrīṣuḥ pramuyate na cītaṃ upahanyate | (iii) praṛktyāvaiṣ tadav gotrastho b bodhisattvo mandadauṣṭhulyo bhavati 171 utpāditacitattā tu bhūyasā mātrāyaḥ "mandataraudāuṣṭhulyo" bhavati 172 yad uta kāyadauṣṭhulyena vāgdauṣṭhulyena cītaduṣṭhulaṃ ca | (iv) asiddhaḥ api ca tadanyasattvāḥ hastagātuḥ sattvānāṁ ītyupaḥ "dравoparagasamsāmakāya" mantrapadāni vidyāpadāni taddhaṭlagatiḥ sidhayaḥ | khaṁ 173 punar vādāḥ śiddhāni | (v) avdhikena ca kṣāntisauratyaḥ samanvāgato bhavati | parataupatāpasaḥ 173 aperorātaḥ ca | parenapi ca param upatāpyamanam upalabhāvīyārhaṃ 174 bādhyaḥ | krodhahṣāṭhyamrakṣādāyaṣ cāsyopaklesā hatave-175 <N10v> gām mandāyamanāḥ kadācit samudācaryantā 175 aṣū ca vīgacchanti 176 | yatra

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158 sā ca tasyaḥ<br>159 phalam<br>160 <N9v> prāgeva<br>161 tadanyasmāt<br>162 saha<br>163 punyasya<br>164 paripraha<br>165 avyābādhyām<br>166 samanvāgato<br>167 tera<br>168 abādhena<br>169 niṣyaḥ<br>170 niṣyaḥ<br>168 spreyšiḥ<br>171 utpāditacitattā<br>172 yad uta<br>173 aperorātaḥ<br>174 bādhyaḥ<br>175 aṣū ca vīgacchanti
ca <P14v> grāmakṣetre prativasati |\textsuperscript{177} tasmin\textsuperscript{178} bhayabhairavadv bhrākṣadoṣa\textsuperscript{179} amanuṣya\textsuperscript{b} kṛtās copadravā\textsuperscript{180} anutpānāś ca notpadyante\textsuperscript{181} utpānāś ca vyupaśāmyanti |
sacet punah\textsuperscript{c} prathamacittotpādiko bodhisattva\textsuperscript{182} ekadā <D14v> narakēsv apāya bhūmāv upapadyate |\textsuperscript{183} sa bhūyasyā 'mārayā āśutaram\textsuperscript{184} ca macyate narakēbhyaḥ | tanutaraṁ\textsuperscript{185} ca 'duḥkhāṁ vedanāṁ\textsuperscript{d} vedayate |\textsuperscript{186} bhrātaram\textsuperscript{187} ca saṃvegam\textsuperscript{188} utpādayati\textsuperscript{189} teṣāṁ\textsuperscript{190} ca sattvānām anti ke karuṇācittaṁ\textsuperscript{191} avyābādyapunyaparigrahahetoh | ity evaṃbhāgiyān\textsuperscript{192} bahūn anuṣaṃsān avyābādyapunyaparigrahāh prathamacittotpādiko bodhisattvāḥ pratyanubhavati |\textsuperscript{193} <W21>

5.Ø.Ø. bodhisattvabhūmāv ādhāre yogasthāne dvitiyaṁ cittotpādapaṭalāṁ\textsuperscript{194} samāptam\textsuperscript{e} ||\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{a} cāra\textsuperscript{W} cāra\textsuperscript{ND}
\textsuperscript{b} amanuṣya\textsuperscript{A} PND, amanuṣya 'ā W, manuṣya vā amanuṣya\textsuperscript{D}
\textsuperscript{c} punah\textsuperscript{WD} (Dutt, erroneously(?)) placing the note before sa, states: J 20 omits it.), punah sa PND
\textsuperscript{d} duḥkhāṁ vedanāṁ\textsuperscript{WD} WD, vedanāduḥkham N, vedanāṁ duḥkhan P
\textsuperscript{e} samāptam\textsuperscript{WN, om. PD}, [samāptam] D. Note that P has samāptam at the end of the gotrapaṭalā.
The Resolve to Become a *Buddha*

80. "lambhāya] PND, "lambhāya W
81. "yaṃ] WDN, anusvāra not visible in P
82. "yah] NWD, "yamh P
83. "ti] PND, "ty W
84. "ti] WD, "ti | PN
85. "sphā] NND, "stām W
86. "lān] PD, "lān | N, "lām W
87. "lān] PD, "lān | N, "lām W
88. "lān] PD, "lān | N, "lām W
89. "lān] D, "lān | PN, "lām W
90. "lān] D, "lān | PN, "lām W
91. "lān] PND (possibly printing error)
92. "lān W
94. "yaṃ] WD, "yam W, "yam W
95. "dhā] PW, "dhā ND
96. "yam] D, "yam | PN, "yam W
97. "py] WD, py PN
98. "yam] PWD, "yaḥ N
99. "yaś] PND, "yaḥ W
100. "ye] NWD, "ye | P
101. "hetu] PND, hetu W
102. "hā] D, "hāḥ NW, "hāḥ | P
103. "ye] PWD, "ye | N
104. "yaṃ] WD, "yam N, anusvāra not visible in P
105. "duḥkhā]... "duḥkhād] NWD, "duḥkhā... "duḥkhād P
106. "sām] PWD, "sām NW
107. "paṭī] PND, paṭī W
108. "tā] WD, "tā N
109. "tā] WD, "tā N
110. "tā] WD, "tā N
111. "tā] WD, "tā N
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234. "tā] WD, "tā N
235. "tā] WD, "tā N
236. "tā} WD, "tā N
116 oṭam] D, oṭam PW
117 adhi] W, "dhi" PD
118 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
119 oṭam] D, oṭam PW
120 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
121 oṭam] D, oṭam PW
122 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
123 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
124 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
125 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
126 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
127 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
128 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
129 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
130 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
131 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
132 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
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134 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
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138 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
139 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
140 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
141 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
142 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
143 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
144 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
145 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
146 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
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148 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
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170 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
171 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
172 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
173 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
174 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
175 o] i] idam] WD, "idam" P
Appendix B

A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Text of Bodhisattvabhūmi 1.2

1. Introduction

The copying of the bsTan-'gyur was less common than that of the bKa'-'gyur (esteemed as the buddhavacana) and was held to result in fewer beneficial resources (punya). Copying the bsTan-'gyur was also an immense and expensive task involving the reproduction of as many as 225 volumes (as in the case of the Golden bsTan-'gyur) in comparison with the approximately one hundred volumes of the bKa'-'gyur.1 As a result, the number of bsTan-'gyur editions transmitted is far smaller than that of the bKa'-'gyur. Only five bsTan-'gyur recensions are available to modern scholars today, although other handwritten versions of the bsTan-'gyur are known to have been produced in sNar-thang, Zha-lu, 'Phyong-rgyas, rTse-thang, rGyal-rtse, and elsewhere.2 We know more about the history of the bKa'-'gyur than we do about the history of the bsTan-'gyur, thanks to the work of scholars such as Helmut Eimer.3 A thorough study of the history of the bsTan-'gyur tradition, however, remains a desideratum.4 The five bsTan-'gyur recensions available today are:

(1) the Peking bsTan-'gyur, completed in 1724,5
(2) the sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, completed in 1744,6
(3) the sNar-thang bsTan-'gyur, completed in 1742,7

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3 For the names of some leading scholars in the field, see SCHOENING 1995: 122–123 and ZIMMERMANN 2002: 164.
5 See SCHOENING 1995: 143 (Blockprint Editions, no. 8). According to the Bod yig 'bri tshul (p. 33), the original wood blocks of the Peking bsTan-'gyur are no longer extant.
6 For a brief history of the sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, see SCHOENING 1995: 142–143 (Blockprint Editions, no. 4) and the Bod yig 'bri tshul (p. 29). The original wood blocks of the sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur have survived until this day (Bod yig 'bri tshul, pp. 29, 33).
(4) the Co-ne bsTan-'gyur, completed in 1772, and
(5) the Golden bsTan-'gyur of the mid-18th century. 

Except for the Golden bsTan-'gyur, which is the first and so far only handwritten bsTan-'gyur to become accessible to modern scholars, all other recensions are xylographic editions. Schoening has made an attempt to define the stemmatic tree of the bsTan-'gyur editions. As shown by him, the sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur (which is an edition made by collating four different manuscript versions) and the faithful copy of it that resulted in the Co-ne bsTan-'gyur represent one strand of transmission, and the Peking, sNar-thang, and the Golden copies, all of which derive from the 'Phying-bs sTag-rsde recension, compiled shortly after the death of the Fifth Dalai Lama (reigned 1642–1682), another. Both of these bsTan-'gyur traditions have descended in turn from the Zha-lu bsTan-'gyur (early 14th century). The sDe-dge edition in particular is a critical edition of sorts, and seems to have undergone an unusual degree of editorial scrutiny. This is probably the reason why it offers the smoothest readings from the point of view of Tibetan grammar and syntax, although such readings do not necessarily represent the original (‘correct’) ones in the Tibetan translation.

For my critical edition, I have used all but the sNar-thang edition. The method applied here is basically the same as the one applied in the critical edition of the Sanskrit text. A critical apparatus has been adopted, and the numbers used to segment the text (corresponding to the numbers in the Sanskrit edition and the translation) are mine. The folio numbers of each recension are given in raised angled brackets (for instance, \(<\textit{P10a}>\) represents folio number 10 recto of the Peking recension). The variants that I hold to have semantic significance have been recorded in the footnotes (in lettered sequence, beginning on each page anew). In addition, the few instances where all Tibetan editions deviate from the Sanskrit text have been noted. Less significant variants such as the use of strokes (shad), orthographic variants that have resulted from

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7 For a description of the sNar-thang bsTan-'gyur, see SCHOENING 1995: 132, 143 (Blockprint Editions, no. 6). Some of the wood blocks of the sNar-thang bsTan-'gyur are said to have been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Later the wood blocks of the missing texts in the sNar-thang bsTan-'gyur were recarved based on extant prints from the original wood blocks. However, some corrections were made in the process. Since the old and new blocks were commingled, it is now difficult to know whether a particular block belongs to the original or to the new blocks, and thus whether a certain reading is original or emended. (I thank Dr. Felix Erb for sharing this information.) Compare the table (\textit{re'u mig}) in the Bod yig 'bri tshul (p. 33), which merely states ‘[wood] blocks destroyed’ (\textit{par jig}) as a note to the sNar-thang bsTan-'gyur.

8 See SCHOENING 1995: 142 (Blockprint Editions, no. 3) and the Bod yig 'bri tshul, pp. 27–28. According to the Bod yig 'bri tshul (pp. 28, 33), the original wood blocks of the Co-ne bsTan-'gyur were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution when Co-ne Monastery was burnt down. I have used a photocopy made from the microfilm of the xylographic print of the Co-ne bsTan-'gyur kept in the library of the University of Hamburg (Asien-Afrika-Institut, Abteilung für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets).


10 See SCHOENING 1995: 133 (Figure 2: Tentative Tanjur stemma).


12 There is a modern print of the Tibetan Bodhisattvabhūmi published together with the Tibetan Udānavarga by the Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang. See the Byang sa dang tshoms. The editors (dPe skrun gsal bshad, p. 2.12–15) state that they collated the sDe-dge and sNar-thang recensions and, except for serious mistakes, retained all original readings. However, since this edition has no historical and philological value, I have not used it for my critical edition.
abbreviations, obvious scribal errors, and confusion between pa and ba, have been recorded in the endnotes (under Arabic numerals). However, I have not recorded scribal peculiarities (such as the placing of the suffix s below the preceding letter, commonly employed in order to save space) or later scribal or editorial corrections. Likewise, no distinction was made between the common shad and the rin chen spung shad,\(^{13}\) commonly used for the first shad in the line when it occurs after only one syllable.

Some observations may be made on the basis of the Cittotpādapatāla. Although the Peking and the Golden editions belong to the same tradition, their readings are not completely identical. The most notable feature of the Golden edition is its profuse use of orthographic abbreviations (skung yig),\(^{14}\) invariably resulting in simple orthographic variants (e.g. the reading yongsu instead of yongs su). Since the abbreviations were not used consistently throughout, they have been recorded individually. Moreover, the Golden edition abounds in scribal errors or deliberate ‘corrections,’ which are less common in the Peking edition. The Peking version often confuses pa and dpa’ (for example, reading sms pa instead of sms dpa’ and vice versa). And although the readings of Co-ne agree with the readings of sDe-dge to a great extent, these two editions are by no means identical. Most of the variations in Co-ne, however, seem to have resulted from scribal error rather than deliberate emendation.

The following sigla are used in the critical edition of the Tibetan text:

P Peking (P 5538), Sems tsam, vol. zhi, fols. 8b4–14b1
D sDe-dge (D 4037), Sems tsam, vol. wi, fols. 7a6–12a4
G Golden bsTan'-gyur, Sems tsam, vol. zhi, fols. 10a6–17a2
C Co-ne (Reel nos. 49–50), Sems tsam, vol. wi, fols. 7a7–12a5
Skt. Sanskrit (referring to my critical edition)

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\(^{13}\) Lit. ‘the stroke [that looks like] a heap of jewels.’

\(^{14}\) Already noted in SKILLING 1991: 139. dPa’-ris Sangs-rgyas devotes a chapter of his work Bod yig ’ibri tshul (pp. 109–152) to orthographic abbreviations (yig ge skung tshul). He comments that the tradition of using abbreviations (skung srol) is archaic, one found already in the Tun-huang documents (p. 109). The benefits of skung yig, he states, are speed and the economy of ink and paper (p. 120). In the case of the Golden bsTan'-gyur, however, the judicious use of gold may have been the primary motive behind the extensive use of abbreviations.
2. The Text

1.1.1. 'di la byang chub sms dpai dang po'i sms bsksed pa ni byang chub sms dpai yang dag pa'i smon lam tams cad kyi nang na yang dag [\(\text{C7b}\)] pa'i smon lam gyi dang po yin\(^a\) te | de las gzhana pa'i yang dag pa'i smon lam mams sdu pa yin no \(\text{G10b}\) de lta bas na de ni yang dag pa'i smon lam dang po'i ngo bo nyid yin no ||

1.1.2. byang chub sms dpai de byang chub tu sms kyi smon lam 'debs pa na | 'di ltar sms mgon par 'du [\(\text{D7b}\)] byed cing | tshig 'di skad ces kyang smras te | kye ma bdag bla na med pa yang dag par 'rdzogs pa'i byang chub mgon par\(^b\) rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar gyur cig | sms can thams cad kyi don yang byed cing shin tu mthar thug pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa dang | de bzhin gshegs pa'i ye shes la 'god par gyur cig ces de de ltar bdag gi byang chub dang sms can gyi don sgrub pa na | sms skyed\(^c\) par byed do || de lta bas na sms bsksed pa ni [\(\text{P9}\)] sgrub pa'i nmam pa yin no ||

1.1.3. sms bsksed pa de yang byang chub de dang | sms can gyi don la dmigs nas sgrub par byed kyi | dmigs pa med par ni ma yin te | de lta bas na sms bsksed pa de ni byang chub la dmigs pa dang | sms can gyi don la dmigs pa yin no ||

1.1.4. sms bsksed pa de yang byang chub kyi phyogs kyi dge ba'i rtsa ba thams cad sdu pa'i thog mar 'gro ba'i phyir | dge ba dang | mchog tu' dge ba dang | bzang ba dang | mchog tu bzang ba dang | legs pa dang | mchog tu legs pa'i yon tan dang ldan pa dang | sms can thams cad la brten pa'i lus dang\(^2\) ngag dang\(^3\) yid kyi nyes pa spyod pa dang mi mthun pa yin no ||

1.1.5. 'di lta ste | byang chub sms dpai dang po sms bsksed pa de ni de las gzhana pa 'jig rten pa dang | 'jig rten las 'das pa'i don dag la yang dag pa'i [\(\text{G11a}\)] smon lam dge ba de dag thams cad kyi nang na yang dag pa'i smon lam\(^4\) gyi mchog bla na med pa yin no ||

1.1.Ø. de lta na dang po sms bsksed pa de ni ngo bo nyid las kyang rig par bya | nmam pa dang | dmigs pa dang | yon tan dang | khyad par du 'phags pa las kyang mtshan nyid lngar rig par bya'o ||

1.2.1. byang chub sms dpai ni sms de bsksed ma thag tu\(^5\) bla na med pa'i byang chub thieg pa chen po la zhugs pa dang | 'di lta ste | brda dang | tha snyad kyi tshul gyis byang chub sms dpai' zhes bya ba' [\(\text{C8a}\)] -'grangs su'\(^6\) gro ba yang yin te | de lta bas na sms bsksed pa de ni 'jig par bsdu pa yin no ||

1.2.2. byang chub sms dpai' sms de bsksed nas rim gyis bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub mgon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya bar 'gyur gyi | ma bsksed par ni ma [\(\text{D8a}\)] yin te | de lta bas na sms bsksed pa\(^b\) de ni bla na med pa yang dag par [\(\text{P9b}\)] rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi rtsa ba yin no ||

\(^a\) yin| DC, ni PG
\(^b\) rdzogs pa'i byang chub mgon par| PDC (also Skt.), om. G
\(^c\) skyed| DC, bsksed PG
\(^d\) pa| DC, om. PG
1.2.3. byang chub sems dpa’ sems can sdbg bsgnal ba⁸ rams la snying rje dang ldan zhing | ’yongs su’⁹ bskyab par sems pa yang sems de skyed⁹ par byed de | de lta bas na sems bskyed pa de ni snying rje’i rgyu mthun pa yin no ||

1.2.4. byang chub sems dpa’ ni sems bskyed pa de la brten⁶ cing gnas nas | byang chub sems dpa’i bslab pa byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos rams dang | sems can gyi don bya ba dag la sbyor bar byed de | de lta bas na sems bskyed pa de ni byang chub sems dpa’i bslab pa rams kyi rten yin te |

1.2.Ø. <G11b> de ltar dang po sems bskyed pa de ni bsdu ba dang | rtsa ba dang | rgyu mthun pa dang | rten du gyur pa las rig par bya’o ||⁸

2.1.0. byang chub sems dpa’i dang po sems bskyed pa de yang mdor na rams pa gnyis te | nges par ’byin pa dang | nges par ’byin pa ma yin pa’o || ’de la⁹ nges par ’byin pa ni gang skyes nas gtan du ’jug la phyir ldog par mi ’gyur ba’o || nges par ’byin pa ma yin pa’de’ ni gang skyes nas gtan du mi ’jug la phyir ldog par ’gyur ba’o ||

2.2.0. sems bskyed pa de’i ldog pa la yang rams pa gnyis te | gtan du ba dang | gtan du ba ma yin pa’o || de la gtan du ba ni ’di ltar sems lan cig log nas phyis byang chub kyi phyir mi skye ba’o || gtan du ba ma yin pa ni ’di ltar sems log kyang byang chub kyi phyir yang dang yang skye bar ’gyur ba’o ||

3.1.0. sems skye ba de yang rkyen bzhi dang | rgyu bzhi dang | stobs bzhis skye bar ’rig par⁹ bya’o ||

3.1.1. de la rkyen bzhi gang zhe na | (a) ’di la rigs kyi bu’am¹⁰ rigs kyi bu mos de bzhin gsheds ‘pa ‘am¹⁰ | byang chub sems dpa’i cho <C8⁵> ’phrul dang | mthu bsam gyis mi khyab pa dang | rmad du byung ba mthong ngam | yid brtan pa las thos kyang rung ste | des <P10a> mthong ngam thos nas ’di snyam du sems te | kye ma gang la gnas par ’gyur ba ‘am| zhugs par gyur pa’ti mthu de⁶ lta bu de dang | cho ’phrul de lta bu de mthong ba dang | thos pa’i byang chub de ni mthu che ba yin no¹¹ snyam <D8⁸> nas¹² de mthu mthong ba dang thos pa de’ nyid kyi dbang du byas te | byang chub chen por mos shing <G12a> byang chub ‘chen por¹³ sems skyed’ par byed pa ’di ni sems skye ba’i rkyen dang po’o || (b) des⁶ mthu’ mthong ba’am thos pa med du zin kyang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub las brtams te | ’byang chub kyi sde snod⁸⁹⁷ ston pa na dam pa’i chos nyan par byed do || mnyan nas kyang mngon par dad par byed do || mngon par dad nas kyang dam pa’i chos thos pa’i dbang du byas nas | de bzhin gsheds pa’i ye shes

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⁵ ba] DC, om. PG  
⁶ skyed] DC, bskyed PG  
⁷ brten] DC, rten PG  
⁸ de la] DC, des PG  
⁹ pa] PDG, right vertical stroke of pa missing in C (Following is a gap measuring approximately the size of three ligatures. This space suggests that extra text curved out wrongly into the wooden block were removed by chipping off the curved out letters.)  
¹⁰ de] DC, om. PG  
¹¹ rig par] PDG, rigsa C  
¹² de] PDG, ’di DC  
¹³ de] PDC, om. G  
¹⁴ skyed] DC, bskyed PG  
¹⁵ des] DC, de PG  
¹⁶ mthu] DC (also Skt.), om. PG  
¹⁷ snod] PDG, snon C  
¹⁸ Note that Skt. has bodhisattvapitaka.
la mos shing | de bzhin gshegs pa’i ye shes thob par bya ba’i phyir ⁴⁴ sems skyed⁰ par byed pa ‘di ni sems’ skye ba’i rkyen gnyis pa’o ⁵ ⁵ (c) des chos ma ‘thos su’¹⁵ zin kyang byang chub sems dpa’i dam pa’i chos nub tu cha bar nye bar gyur pa dag mthong ngo ⁶ mthong nas kyang yang de ‘di rnyam du sems te | kye ma byang chub sems dpa’i dam pa’i chos gnas pa ni sems can dpag tu med pa dag gi sdug bsgsal sel bar byed pa yin gyis | bdag gis ‘di lta ste | sems can ‘di dag nyid kyi sdug ‘bsngal bsal’¹⁶ c’ ba’i phyir | byang chub sems dpa’i ‘dam pa’id’ cho yun ring du gnas par bya ba’i don du sems bskyed par bya gor ma chag snyam nas | de dam pa’i chos gzung ba nyid kyi dbang du byas te | de bzhin gshegs pa’i ye shes la mos shing | de bzhin gshegs pa’i ye shes thob par bya ba’i phyir | sems skyed⁰ par byed pa ‘di ni sems skye ba’i rkyen gsum pa’o ⁶ (d) des dam pa’i ⁶⁴⁷ ngs nub tu’¹⁶ nye bar gyur pa ma mthong du zin kyang | dus kyi tha ma dus kyi mjug”⁵⁰ tu bab pa’i tshe | ⁵¹ dus ngsa pa’i sems can rnam kyi lus ‘di ltar nye ba’i nyon mongs pa bcu po ‘di lta ste | gti ‘g⁵⁰ mug shas che ba dang | ngo tsha med cing khrel med pa shas che ba’⁸⁸ dang | phrag dog dang serh sna shas che ba dang | sdug bsgsal shas che ba dang | gnas ngsa len shas che ba dang | nyon mongs pa shas che ba dang | nyes par spyod pa shas che ba dang | bag med pa shas che ba dang | le lo shas che ba dang | ma dad pa shas che ba rnam kyi nye bar nyon mongs pa mthong ngo ⁶ mthong ⁶⁴⁸ | nas kyang yang ‘di snyam du sems te | kye ma snyigs ma’i dus chen po de ni byung gis med do | nye ba’i nyon mongs pa can gyi dus ‘di’i skabs su’¹⁷ ni nyan thos dang ⁹⁶ rang sangs rgyas kyi byang chub dman pa la sems bskyed pa yang myed par sla ba ma yin na | bla na med pa yang dang par rdzogs pa’i byang chub tu lta ci smos te | re zhig bdag gis sems bskyed pa’i dang | de dag kyang ‘di ltar bdag gi¹ ‘rjes su’¹⁹ slob cing | gzhon dag gis kyang sems bskyed pa’i gyur ro²⁰ snyam nas | de²² dus kyi tha ma’i tshe | sems bskyed pa myed par dka’i dbang du byas te | byang chub chen po la mos shing byang chub chen por sems skyed¹ par byed pa¹² ‘di ni sems ‘skye ba’i;n rkyen bzhì pa’o ²²

3.1.2. de la rgyu bzhì gang zhe na | (a) rigs phun sum tshogs pa ni byang chub sems dpa’i”⁰ sems³ skye ba’i rgyu dang po’o ⁶ (b) sngs rgyas dang | byang chub sems dpa’i dang | dge ba’i bshes gnyen gyis yongs su zin pa ni byang chub sems dpa’i sems³ skye ba’i rgyu gnyis pa’o ⁶ (c) sems can rnam la snying rje ba ni byang ²³ chub sems dpa’i”⁰ sems skye ba’i rgyu gsum pa’o ⁶ (d) ’khor ba’i sdug bsngal dang | dka’i ba spyad pa’i sdug bsngal ²⁴⁷ yun ring po rnam pa sna tshogs pa drag pa bar chad med pas kyang mi ’jigs pa de⁸ ni byang chub sems dpa’i”⁰ sems skye ba’i rgyu bzhì pa’o ²² (a) de la byang chub sems dpa’i”⁰ rigs phun sum tshogs pa ni | chos nyid kyi thob pa nyid yin par

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⁰ skyed | DC, bskyed PG
¹ sems | PDG, defaced in C
² bsngal bsal | PDC, bsngal bsngal G
³ dam pa’i | PDC, om. G
⁴ skyed | DC, bskyed PG
⁵ mjug | DC, ’jug PG
⁶ b | DCG, om. P
⁷ ser | DPG, sem C
⁸ pa | DC, om. PG
⁹ gi | DC, gis PG
¹⁰ de | DC, des PG
¹¹ skyed | DC, bskyed PG
¹² m | DC, om. PG
¹³ skye ba’i | DC (also Sanskrit), bskyed pa’i PG
¹⁴ dpa’i | DGC, dpa’i P
¹⁵ sems | DGC, om. P
¹⁶ Sems | PGC, sams D
¹⁷ dpa’i | DC, dpa’i PG
¹⁸ de | PG, ‘di DC
¹⁹ dpa’i | DCG, pa’i P
Appendix B: A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Text of Bodhisattvabhumi 1.2 385

rig par bya’o || (b) byang chub sems dpal’i bshes gnyen phun’a sum tshogs pa ni rmam pa bzhir rig par bya ste | (i) ‘di la byang chub sems dpa’i bshes gnyen ni thog ma nas kyang | ba’i blan po ma yin zhing | yid brtul’ga’i rang bzhin can ma yin te | mkhas shing mdzangs la lta ba ngan pa la21 zhugs pa yang ma yin pa ‘di ni bshes gnyen phun sum tshogs pa dang po’o || (ii) bag med pa la yang ye ‘jug par mi byed la | bag med pa’i gnas kyang de la sgrub par mi byed pa ‘di ni bshes gnyen phun sum tshogs pa gnyis po’o || (iii) nyes par spyod pa la yang de ‘jug par mi byed la nyes par spyod pa’i gnas kyang de la sgrub par ‘di ngag gnyis ‘rug po’o || (iv) de dad pa dang | ‘dun pa dang | yang dag par blang ba dang | brtson ‘grus dang | thabs kyi yon tan22 ches khyad par ‘dpag phags pa dag las ‘dun pa bzlog la | dad pa dang | ‘dun pa dang | yang dag par blang ba dang | brtson ‘grus dang | thabs kyi yon tan ches dman pa dag la ‘jug par mi byed de | ‘di lta ste | theg pa chen po las ‘dun pa bzlog la | nyan thos kyi theg ‘Grub pa’i am | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa la ‘jug par mi byed pa dang | bsgoms pa las byung ba las ‘dun pa bzlog la | bsams pa las byung ba la8 ‘jug pa’i am | bsams pa las byung ba las ‘dun’pa bzlog la | thos pa las byung ba la ‘jug par byed9 pa’i am | thos pa las byung ba las ‘dun pa bzlog la | zhal ta byed pa la ‘jug par ‘bstan pa’i am10 | tshul khrims las byung ba las ‘dun pa bzlog la | sbyin pa las byung ba la ‘jug pa’i am | de lta ‘di lta bu dang mthun pa’i yon tan ches khyad par du ‘phags pa dag las ‘dun pa bzlog la | ‘di lta bu dang mthun pa’i yon tan ches dman pa dag ‘dzin du ‘rug par mi byed pa ‘di ni bshes gnyen phun sum tshogs pa bzhi pa’o m || (c) byang chub sems dpa’i ni rgyu ma rgyud la bzhis na | sems can mams la snying rje ba’i shes che ba yin te | (i) phyogs ‘bcu’i ‘jig rten23 gyi kham mtha’ yas mu med pa dag na ‘jig rten gyi kham gang na sdug bsgal med pa de lta bu dag kyang yod na | byang chub sems dpa’i de ni gang na sdug bsgal yod cing’24 sdug bsgal dang bcas pa’i ‘kham su25 skye bar byed kyi | sdug bsgal med par ni ma yin te | (ii) gzhon sdug bsgal ci yang rung bas thebs shing gnod par gyur te | non pa’i ‘Grub mthong ba dang | (iii) bdag kyang sdog bsgal ci yang rung bas thebs shing gnod par gyur te non pa mthong ba dang | (iv) gzhon nam bdag gam gnyis ka yang rung ste | sdug bsgal yun ring ba26 ma pa sna tshogs pa drag po bar chad med pas thebs shing gnod par ‘Grub gyur te | non pa mthong na ‘di lta byang chub sems dpa’i de ni rang gi rigs ‘Dpal la brelte cing | rang bzhin gnyis dgé bge na goms pa med par yang dmigs pa rten bzhis po ‘di dag gis snying rje chung ngu dang | ‘bring po dang | chen po skye bar ‘gyur ro’i (d) byang chub sems dpa’i ni sems can mams la snying rje yang dag par sgon’ du btang nas |27 rgyu bzhis po ‘di dag gis ‘khor ba’i sdug bsgal yun ring ba mamb pa sna tshogs pa drag po bar chad med pas kyang mi ‘jigs shing mi skrag na chung ngus lta ci smos te | (i) rang bzhin gys

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a phun] PDG, om. C
b dpa’i DCG, pa’i P
c brtul] PG, rtul DC
d du’i DC, om. PG
e bsgoms] PDG, sgom C
f bsams] DC, bsam PG
fla] DC, las PG
h ‘dun] DCG, bdun P
i thos PDG, thas C
j par byed] PG, om. DC
k ‘jug par byed pa’i PG, ‘jug par mi byed pa dang DC
l ches] PDG, chos C
m pa’o] PDG, po’o C
n dpa] PDG, dpa’i C
o Note that Sanskrit reading by D has lokadhātu (= *jig rten gyi kham su).
p non pa] DC, non pa tha mar PG
q gyur] DC, ‘gyur PG
r sgon] DC, mgon PG

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snying stobs che zhing brtan\(^a\) pa dang ldan\(^b\) pas stobs dang ldan\(^b\) pa yin te | 'di ni rgyu dang po'ö (ii) mkhas pa dang | yang dag par sms pa|\(^c\) \(^{P12a}\) ngang tshul can dang | so sor rtog pa'i stobs dang ldan pa yin te | 'di ni rgyu gnyis pa'ö (iii) bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub la mos pa chen po dang ldan pa yin te | 'di ni rgyu gsun pa'ö (iv) sms can mams la yang cher snying rje ba dang ldan pa yin te | 'di ni rgyu bzhi pa'ö

3.1.3. (a) stobs bzhi gang zhe na | nang\(^d\) gi stobs dang | gzhان gyi stobs dang | rgyu'i stobs dang | sbyor ba'i 'stobs so\(^29\) (b) (i) de la rang gi mthus bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub 'dod par gyur pa gang yin pa de ni byang chub sms dpa'i byang chub tu sms skye ba'i nang\(^e\) gi stobs zhes bya'ö | (ii) gzhан gyi mthus bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub la 'dod pa skyed pa gang yin pa de ni byang chub sms dpa'i sms skye ba'i gzhан gyi stobs zhes bya'ö | (iii) sngon theg pa chen po dang ldan pa'i dge ba'i chos la\(^{G14b}\) goms pas dala tarsangs rgyas dang byang chub sms dpa' mthong ba tsam man | de dag gi bsngags pa thos pa tsam gyis kyang myur du sms skye bar' gyur na | dam pa'i chos thos pa'äm\(^f\) mthu mthong 'bas lta ci\(^3\) smos te | de ni byang chub sms dpa'i sms skye ba'i rgyu'i stobs zhes bya'ö | (iv) tshen\(^d\) 'di nyid la skyes bu dam pa la brten\(^{C10b}\) pa dang | dam pa'i chos mnyan pa dang | sms pa la sogs pa dge ba'i chos yun ring du goms par byas pa gang yin pa de ni byang chub sms dpa'i sms skye ba'i sbyor ba'i stobs zhes bya'ö

3.1.Ø. de la byang chub sms dpa'i rkyen bzhi dang | rgyu bzhi po dang tshogs\(^{D10b}\) pa'äm\(^31\) so so la brten nas |\(^32\) gal te stobs gnyis po nang gi stobs dang | rgyu'i stobs 'di gnyis tshogs pa'äm\(^33\) so so las\(^h\) sms de skyes na ni des na de brtan pa dang | snying por gyur pa dang | mi g.yo bar' gyur ro | gzhан gyi stobs dang | sbyor ba'i stobs gnyis\(^{P12b}\) las skyes pa'i sms de mi brtan par rig par bya'ö

3.2.0. byang chub sms dpa' sms Idog pa'i rgyu ni mam pa bzhi ste | bzhi gang zhe na | (a) rigs dang mi ldan pa yin | (b) sdig pa'i grogs pos yongs su zin pa yin | (c) sms can mams la snying rje chung ba yin | (d) 'khor ba'i sdug bsngal yun ring po mam pa sna tshogs pa drag po bar chad med pas 'jigs te | shin tu 'jigs shing skrag la dngangs par'gyur ba yin te | sms Idog par'gyur ba'i rgyu bzhi po 'di dag bzlog pa las snga ma bzhin\(^{G15a}\) du rgyas par rig par bya'ö

4.1.0. 'di gnyis ni byang chub sms dpa'\(^i\) dang po sms bskayed pa brtan pa'i ngo mtshar rmad du byang ba'i chos 'jig rten dang thun mong ma yin pa ste | gnyis gang zhe na | (a) sms can thams cad chung ma'i tshul du yongs su 'dzin pa dang | (b) chung ma yongs su 'dzin pa'i nyes pas kyang gos par' gyur ba ma yin no\(^k\) de la chung ma yongs su 'dzin pa'i nyes pa ni 'di yin te | chung ma la phan 'dogs pa dang | gnod pa byed pa las mthun pa dang mi mthun pas nyon mongs pa can du 'gyur ba ste | de' gnyis ni byang chub sms dpa' la med do

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\(^a\) brtan\(|\) DC, brten PG  
\(^b\) pas stobs dang ldan\(|\) P, stobs dang ldan DC, om. G  
\(^c\) pa'i\(|\) DC, dpa'i PG  
\(^d\) nang\(|\) DC, rang PG  
\(^e\) nang\(|\) DC, rang PG  
\(^f\) bas lta ci\(|\) DCG, defaced in P  
\(^g\) tshen\(|\) DC, byang chub sms dpa' tsho PG  
\(^h\) las\(|\) PG, las nges par DC  
\(^i\) dpa'\(|\) DGC, pa P  
\(^j\) par\(|\) DC, pa PG  
\(^k\) gyur ba ma yin no\(|\) PG, mi 'gyur ba yin no DC  
\(^l\) de\(|\) PCG, da D
4.2.0. 'di gnyis ni byang chub smsa’ dang po smsas bskyped pa brtan pa’i smsas can
rmons la lhag pa’i bsam pa bzang po 'jug par 'gyur ba yin te 'gnyis gang zhe na a (a)
phan pa bya ba’i lhag pa’i bsam pa dang | bde ba bya ba’i lhag pa’i bsam pa’o || de
la phan par b bya ba’i lhag pa’i bsam pa ni mi dge ba’i gnas nas bton nas dge ba’i 'gnas
su | god par 'dod pa gang yin pa’o || bde bar bya ba’i lhag pa’i bsam pa’o || ni smsas
can phongs d pa dang | mgon med pa dang | rten med pa rmons la nyon mongs pa’c can
spangs te | phan pa’i dngos po gshrub par 'dod pa gang yin p13  pa’o ||

4.3.0. 'di gnyis ni byang chub smsa’ dang po smsas bskyped pa brtan’ pa’i
sbyor ba yin te | (a) lhag pa’i bsam pa’i sbyor ba’g dang | (b) gshrub pa’i sbyor ba’o || de
la lhag pa’i 'bsam pa’i sbyor ba ni phan pa bya ba dang | bde ba bya ba’i lhag pa’i
bsam pa de nyid nyin gcig bzhin du yang 2G13b5 dag par spel ba’o || gshrub pa’i sbyor ba
ni nyin gcig bzhin du bdag gis sangs rgyas kyi’ chos yongs su smin par byed pa’i sbyor
ba dang | lhag pa’i bsam pa’i sbyor ba nyid la bren nas ci nus ci lcogs kysis smsas can
rmons la’ phan pa dang | bde ba gshrub pa’i sbyor ba’o ||

4.4.0. 'di gnyis ni byang chub smsa’ dang po smsas bskyped pa’i brtan pa’i dge ba’i
chos chen po ‘du ba’i sgo yin te | (a) bla na med pa yang dag par rdzog pa’i byang chub
yang dag par bsgrub pa’i phyir bdag gi don la sbyor ba dang | (b) smsas can thams cad
kyi sdug bsgal thams cad bsal ba’i phyir gzhvan gyi don la ’sbyor ba’o’om || ‘du ba’i sgo
gnyis ji lta ba bzhin du dge ba’i chos kyi tshogs chen po gnyis dang | dge ba’i chos kyi
phung po dpag tu med pa gnyis kyang de bzhin du sbyar ro ||

4.5.0. 'di gnyis ni byang chub ‘smsas p313 dang po smsas bskyped pa brtan pa’i smsas
bskyped pa nas bzang ste | byang chub kyi phyir dge ba’ nyongs su ‘dzin pa ni de las
gzhan pa’i dge ba yongs su ‘dzin pa las khyad par du ‘phags pa yin te | (a) rgyu khyad
par du ‘phags pa dang | (b) ‘bras bu khyad par du ‘phags pa’o || byang chub smsas pa’i
dge ba yongs su ‘dzin pa de ni bla na med pa yang dag par rdzog pa’i byang chub kyi
rgyu yin te | de yang de’i ‘bras bu ‘yin no 338 || de las gzhvan pa nyan thos dang rang sargas
rhyas thams cad kyi dge ba yongs su ‘dzin pa yang de lta ma yin na | de las gzhvan pa’i
smsas can rmons p13b5 kyi’ lta ci smos | de lta bas na byang chub smsas pa’i rmons kyi
dge ba’ nyongs su ‘dzin pas’ ni de las 1G16a gzhvan pa’i dge ba yongs su ‘dzin pa C11b
thams cad las rgyu dang ‘bras bu’i ngo bso khyad par du ‘phags pa ’yin no 339 ||

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a Note that Sanskrit has no parallel.

b par] PG, pa DC
c bar] PG, ba DC
d phongs| DC, ‘phongs PG
ea] PDG, om. or lost C
f brtan] DC, bstan PG
g sbyor ba] PDG, sbyos G
h bsam pa’i] DC, om. PG
i gcig] DC, eig PG
j kyi] DC, kys PG
k la] PG, la yang DC
l pa] DC, om. PG
m sbyor ba’o] DC, sbyar ber ro PG
n ba] DC, ba’i PG
o ‘bras] PCG, defaced is D
p kyi] PG, kys DC
q ba] DC, ba’i PG	r pas] DG, pa CP
4.6.0. 'di gnyis ni byang chub sems dpa' dā dang po'i sems bskyed pa brtan pa'i sems bskyed pa'i phan yon yin te | (a) sems bskyed ma thag gis kyang sems can thams cad kyi yon 'gnas su' guyor pa dang | bla mar guyr pa dang | bsod nams kyi zhing dang | skye dgu mams kyi pha dang 'dra bar guyr pa dang | (b) gnod' pa med pa'i bsod nams yongs su 'dzin par byed do || de las gnod pa med pa'i bsod nams ni (i) gang dang Idañ na byang chub sems dpa' 'khor los sgyur ba kun nas bsrung ba'i nyis 'gyur gyis bsrung ba yin te | kun nas bsrung ba de dag de la rtag tu nye bar gnas pas | gnyid log gams | myos par guyr pa'am | bag med par guyr pa na yang | gdug pa'am gnod sbyin nam | mi ma yin pa gnyug mar gnas pa mams kyi gtsa bar mi 'nus pa'o' || tshe brjes' pa'i 'og tu yung byang chub sems dpa' de ni bsod nams yongs su bzung ba des na | gnod pa nyung zhing rang bzhin gyis 'gnod pa'i med pa yin te | gnod pa yun ring ba dang | drag pos 'debs par mi 'gyur ro' || (ii) de lus dang ngag gis sems can gyi don dang | sems can gyi bya ba dag la rtsol' ba dang chos ston pa na shas' cher lus ngal bar mi 'gyur zhing | brjed nas par'i 'gyur la | sems nyams par mi 'gyur ro || (iii) byang chub sems dpa'i rigs la gnas pa ni rang bzhin gyis kyang gnas nagan len shas chung ba yin la | 44 sems bskyed 'na ni'k 'di lta stel' <G16b> lus kyi gnas ngan len dang | 'sems kyi gnas ngan len gyi gnas ngan len shin tu chung bar 'gyur ro' || (iv) gsang sngags kyi tshig m dang | 46 <P14a> rig sngags kyi tshig sems can mams kyi yams kyi nad dang | gnod pa dang | nad 'go ba zhi bar byed pa dag de las gzhan pa'i sems can gyi lag na 'dug pa ma grub pa mams kyang de'i lag tu 'ongs na 'grub par 'gyur na | grub pa dag lta' ci smos | (v) lhag par yang bzod pa dang | nges pa dang Idañ te | pha rol gyi gnod pa byas pa bzod pa yin no || gzhan la yang gnod pa mi byed la | 6 gzhan gyis gzhan la gnod <Cf2a> pa byed pa mthong ngam thos na yang shin tu mi dga' bar 'gyur ro' || de'i nye ba'i nyon' mong pa khong khro ba dang | phrag' dog dang | g.yo dang 'chab pa la sogs pa mams kyang bcom stel | nyams smad pas bergy la spyod par guyr na <D12a> yang myur du 'bral bar 'gyur ro' || de grong gi gnas 'gang na gnas' qa de yang 'jigs pa dang | 'jigs par 'gyur ba dang | mu ge'i nyes pa mams dang | mi' ma yin pas byas pa'i gnod pa ma byung ba mams ni 'byung bar mi 'gyur la | byung ba mams ni ram par zhi bar 'gyur ro' ||

gal te byang chub sems dpa' dang po sems bskyed pa de lan 'ga' zhig ngan song gi sems can dmyal ba 'rams su' skyes su' zin kyang de ni gnod pa med pa'i bsod nams yongs su 'dzin pa'i rgyus shas' cher shin tu myur bar thar bar 'gyur la | sdug bsngal gyi'

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* dpa’] DC, dpa’i PG
* gnod] PDC, bnod G
* log] PDC, logs G
* nus pa’o] DC, nus so P, nuso G
* brjes] DC, mrjies PG
* gnod pa] DC, nad PG
* gyi] PG, mams kyi DC
* rtsol] DC, brtsol PG
* shas] PDG, shes C
* par] DGC, bar P
* na ni] DC, na PG
* Cf. Sanskrit text.
* tshig] PDG, tshigs C
* lta] DC, om. PG
* la] DC, la | gzhan gnod pa byed dam | PG. DC supported by Sanskrit?
* phrag] DCG, phra P
* gang na gnas] DC (supported by Sanskrit), om. PG
* mi] DC, mi dang mi PG
* shas] DC, chas P, ches G
* gyi] PGC, defaced in D
‘tshor ba¹⁴⁹ yang shin tu tshabs chung ba myong bar ’gyur te | skyo¹⁵⁰ ba yang shin tu skye bar ’’gyur ro’⁵³ || sems <G¹⁷a> can de dag la² snying rje’i sems bskyed par ’’gyur ro’⁵⁴ || de ltar byang chub sems dpa’ dang⁴ po sems bskyed pas ni gnod pa med pa’i bsod nams yongs su ’dzin pa las ’di lta bu dang |⁵⁵ mthun pa’i phan yon mang po ’nyams su⁵⁶ myong⁶ bar ’’gyur ro’⁵⁷ ||

5.0.0. byang chub sems dpa’i sa’i gzhis’i rnal ’byor gyi gnas las |⁵⁸ sems bskyed pa’i <P¹⁴b> le’u ste gnyis pa’o || ||

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¹⁴⁹ tshor ba] PG (supported by Sanskrit), tshor ba myong ba DC
¹⁵⁰ skyo] em., skye PDCG
¹⁵¹ la] PDG, la yang C
¹⁵² dang] PDG, dad C
¹⁵³ myong DG, myod PC
Abbreviations and Bibliography

1. Journals, Collections, Reference Books, Series, and Other Abbreviations

BB  Bibliotheca Buddhica
BGG  Buddhismus in Geschichte und Gegenwart
BIB  Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica
BITS  Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica Series
BST  Buddhist Sanskrit Texts
BTS  Buddhist Tradition Series
CIHTS  Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies
Dhīh  Dhīh: Journal of Rare Buddhist Texts Research Unit. Sarnath: CIHTS.
IBK  Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū = Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies
IeT  Indica et Tibetica
IIBS  The International Institute for Buddhist Studies
IJ  Indo-Iranian Journal
Is.M.E.O.  Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente
JAOS  Journal of the American Oriental Society
JIABS  Journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIP  Journal of Indian Philosophy
JPTS  Journal of the Pali Text Society
LIRI  Lumbini International Research Institute


PIATS  Proceedings of the International Association of Tibetan Studies

PK  O-rgyan-'jigs-med-chos-kyi-dbang-po, dpal sprul bka’ 'bum. 5 vols. Photomechanical reproduction of the xylographic prints made from Lhasa blocks. [Chengdu: Southwest Minorities Institute, 1996?].


RBTS  Rare Buddhist Texts Series


SOAS  School of Oriental and African Studies

SPBMS  Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series


SUNY  State University of New York


Taishō  See Hōbōgirin.

TJ  The Tibet Journal
2. Indian Sources

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Ratnamālá
Candraharipāda, Ratnamālá. P 5297; D 3901; S 3130, vol. 63.

Ratnāvalī

Ratnāvalīpañjikā

Ratnavrksa
Celuka, Ratnavrksanāmaraḥāyasamājavṛtī. P 2709; D 1846; S 0749, vol. 20.

Saddharmapundarīkasūtra

Sāgaramatipariprchāsūtra
Āryasāgaramatipariprchānāmamahāyānasūtra. T 134; D 152.

Śālistambakakārikā
Nāgārjuna, Āryaśālistambakakārikā. P 5485; D 3985; S 3216, vol. 65.

Samādhīrājasūtra

Samādhisambhāra 1
Atiśa, Samādhisambhāraparivartavā. P 3288; D 2460; S 1362, vol. 27.

Samādhisambhāra 2
Bodhibhadra, Samādhisambhāraparivartavā. P 5319; D 3924; S 3153, vol. 64.

Samayabhedoraparacanaacakra
Vasumitra, Samayabhedoraparacanaacakra. P 5639; D 4138; S 3368, vol. 93.

Samayasamgraha
Atiśa (ascribed), Sarvasamayasamgraha. P 4547; D 3725; S 2423, vol. 41.

Samdhinirmocanasūtra

Samdhinirmocanasūtra-vyākhyāna

Samskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya
Daśabalaśrimitra, Samskṛtāsamskṛtaviniścaya. P 5865; D 3897; S 3126, vol. 63.

Samvarasamgraha
Atiśa (ascribed), Samvarasamgraha. P 4547; D 3725; S 2423, vol. 41.

Samvaravimśaka
Candragomin, Bodhisattvasamvaravimśaka. P 5582; D 4081; S 3310, vol. 78.

Samvaravimśakapaṇṭijkā
Bodhibhadra, Bodhisattvasamvaravimśakapaṇṭijkā. P 5584; D 4083; S 3312, vol. 78.

Samvaravimśakavṛtti
Śāntarakṣita, Samvaravimśakavṛtti. P 5583; D 4082; S 3311, vol. 78.

Śaṃvytibodhicittabhāvanā
Aśvaghosa, Śaṃvytibodhicittabhāvanopadeśavarṇasaṃgraha. P 5307; D 3911; S 3140, vol. 64.

Śikṣāsamuccaya (BENDALL)
Śikṣāsamuccaya (Tib.) Śāntideva, Śikṣāsamuccaya. P 5336; D 3940; S 3170, vol. 64.
Śilaparivartaṭīkā Jinaputra, Bodhisattvāsālparivartaṭīkā. P 5547; D 4046; S 3275, vol. 75.
Śrīmālāśimhanādasūtra Āryaśrīmālādevīśimhanādanāmamahāyānasūtra. T 11.48; D 92.
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Suhrillekhajīkā Mahāmati, Vyaktapadāsuhrillekhajīkā. P 5690; D 4190.
Susiddhikaratantra Susiddhikaramahātantrasādhanopāyikapājala. T 757; D 807.
Sūtrārthasamuccayopadeśa Atiśa, Sūtrārthasamuccayopadeśa. P 5354; D 3957; S 3188, vol. 64.
Suvikrāntacintaparipṛcchāsūtra Āryasuvikrāntadevaputaparipṛcchānāmamahāyānasūtra. T 166; D 161.
Suvīśadasampūtaṭīkā Vṛdhakāyaastha, Suvīśadasampūtaṭīkā. P 2321, D 1190; S 0085, vol. 3.
Tantrārthāvatāra Buddhaghuya, Tantrārthāvatāra. P 3324; D 2501; S 1404, vol. 27.
Tarkajvālā Bhavya, Madhyamakahādayavṛttitarkajvālā. P 5256; D 3856; S 3083, vol. 58.
Tathāgata-cintāmyaghyāyanideśasūtra Āryatathāgata-cintāmyaghyāyanideśanāmamahāyānasūtra. T 11.3; D 47.
Tathāgatahṛdayālāmkāra Jñānavajra, Āryalāṅkāvatāranāmamahāyānasūtra-vṛttitathāgatahṛdayālāmkāra. P 5520; D 4019; S 3251, vol. 70.
Tathāgatajñānamudrāsamādhīsūtra  Āryatathāgatajñānamudrāsamādhīnāmamahāyānāsūtra. T 214; D 131.


Tattvasamgrahasyāsūtra  Sarvatathāgatatattvasamgrahasyāsūtra. T 438; D 479. For the edition of the Sanskrit text (vol. 1), see Horiuchi 1983.

Tattvasamgrahatrayavyākhyā  Ānandagarbha, Sarvatathāgatatattvasamgraha-mahāyānābhisamayānāmatantratattvālokakariniyāvyākhyā. P 3333; D 2510; S 1413, vol. 29.

Trisamayavyūhatantra  Trisamayavyūharājanāmatantra. T 467; D 502.

Trisamavarakrama  Niskalankavajra, Trisamavarakrama. P 5375; D 3978; S 3209, vol. 65.

Trisamvaraprabhāmālā  Yibhūticandra, Trisamvaraprabhāmālā. P 4549; D 3727; S 2425, vol. 41.

Trīśaranasaptati  Candrakirti, Trīśaranasaptati. See Sørensen 1986.

Trīskandhakāsūtra  Āryatriskandhakānāmamahāyānāsūtra. T 60; D 284.

Triyānayavasthāna  Ratnakarasānti, Triyānayavasthāna. P 4535; D 3712; S 2410, vol. 41.


Udānavargavivarana  Prajañāvarman, Udānavargavivārana. P 5601; D 4100; S 3329, vol. 83. See also Balk 1984.

Ugrapariprapchāsūtra  Āryagrhapatyugrupariprapchānāmamahāyānāsūtra. T 11.19; D 63.

Vairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra  Mahāvairocanābhisaṃbodhivikurutidhīṣṭhāna-vaiśvāyasyātīnandrarājanāmadharmaparyāya. T 454; D 494.

*Vairocanābhisaṃbodhitantrabhāṣya  Buddhaguhya, rNam par sngon mdzad mgon par byang chub pa rnam par sprul pa'i byin gyis brlabs kyi rgyud chen po'i bshad pa. P 3487; D 2663; S 1569, vol. 35.


Vajraṭākīnaṣūyatatantra  Śrīvajraṭākīnāṣūyatatantra. T 361; D 399.

Vajrapāṇyabhisekatantra  Āryavajrapāṇyabhishekamahātantra. T 456; D 496.

Vajraśākhatarantra  Vajraśākharamāhāgughayogatantra. T 439; D 480.

Vajrayānamūlāpatti  Aśvaghoṣa (ascribed), Vajrayānamūlāpatti. P 3308; not found in D; S 1385, vol. 27.

Vajrayānamūlāpattisamgraha  Aśvaghoṣa (ascribed), Vajrayānamūlāpattisamgraha. P 3303; D 2478; S 1380, vol. 27.

Vajrayānamūlāpattipāṭikā  Maṇjuśrīkirti, Vajrayānamūlāpattipāṭikā. P 3314; D 2488; S 1391, vol. 27.
3. Tibetan Sources


bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad  Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, dPal sgrub pa chen po’i bka’ brgyad kyi spyi don rnam par bshad pa dngos grub snying po. In MS, vol. 21, pp. 1–207.

bKa’ yang dag pa’i tshad ma  Khri-srong-lde-btsan (ascribed), bKa’ yang dag pa’i tshad ma las mdo btus pa. P 5839; D 4352; S 3597, vol. 115.


bSam gtan mig sgron  gNubs-chen Sangs-rgyas-ye-shes, rNal ’byor mig gi bsam gtan or bSam gtan mig sgron. Leh: ’Khoro-gdoṅ gTer-sprul Chi-med-rig’-dzin, 1974.


bShes spring mchan ’grel  Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, bShes spring gi mchan ’grel padma dkar po’i phreng ba. In MS, vol. 8 (hūm), pp. 157–217.

bsTan rim chen mo  Gro-lung-pa Blo-gros’-byung-gnas, bDe bar gshegs pa’i bstana pa rin po che la ’jug pa’i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bshad pa. Lhasa: Zhol-par-khang, 1800s.

bsTod pa rgyad bcu pa  See EIMER 2003.


Chos dbyings mdzod  Klong-chen-pa Dri-med’-od-zer, Chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod. In DzD, vol. ga [separate pagination].

Co ne bstana dkar  ’Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa II dKon-mchog’-jigs-med-dbang-po, bDe bar gshegs pa’i bka’i dgyong gser ba’i bstana becs ’gyur ro cog par du sgrub pa’i tshul las nye bar brtsams pa’i gtam yang dag par brjod pa dkar chag yid bzhi nor bu’i phreng ba (on cover: Co ne’i bstana ’gyur dkar chag). Lanzhou: Kan-su’u-ni-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 1986.

Dam tshig gsal bkra  Vilāsavadāra, Dam tshig gsal bkra. P 4744; not found in D; S 2620, vol. 43.


dGongs pa 'dus pa'i mdo
De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba'i ye shes don gyi snying po rdo rje bkod pa'i rgyud rnal 'byor grub pa'i lung kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo theg pa chen po mgon par rtogs pa chos kyi rnam grangs rnam par bkod pa zhes bya ba'i mdo = Sangs rgyas kun gnyi dgongs pa 'dus pa'i mdo chen po [according to the colophon]. P 452; D 829.

dKon mchog 'grel

dPag bsam ljor bzang

dPang skong phyag brgya pa
dPang skong phyag brgya pa. Not found in T; P 933; D 267.

Drin lan bsab pa'i mdo
Thabs mkhas pa chen po snying rgyas drin lan bsab pa'i mdo. T 180; D 353.

Dwags po thar rgyan

Glang chen rab 'bog

Grub mtha' mdzod
Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-'od-zer, Teg pa mtha' dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub mtha' rin po che'i mdzod. In DzD, vol. ja.

gSer gyi thang ma

gSung rab rin po che
sKa-ba dPal-brtsegs, gsung rab rin po che'i gtam rgyud shäkya'i rabs rgyud. P 5844; D 4357; S 3602, vol. 115.

Gur bkra chos 'byung

He ru ka'i gal po

'Jig rten snang byed

Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo
De bzhin gshegs pa thams kyi thugs gsang ba'i ye shes don gyi snying po khro bo rje'i rigs kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo rnal 'byor grub pa'i rgyud. P 454; D 831.

Kun byed rgyal po
Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po. P 451; D 828.

Kun bzang bla ma'i zhal lung
Lam rim chen mo
Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa, mNyam med tsong kha pa chen pos mdzad pa'i byang chub lam rim che ba. In TsSB, vol. pa.

lDe'u chos 'byung

Legs bshad gser phreng
Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa, Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i rgya cher bshad pa legs bshad gser gyi phreng ba. In TsSB, vols. tsa & tsha.

lTa 'grel

lTa ba'i khyad par
Ye-shes-sde, lTa ba'i khyad par. P 5847; D 4360; S 3605, vol. 116.

lTa grub shan 'byed rtsa 'grel

lTa phreng
Padmasambhava (ascribed), Man ngag lta ba'i phreng ba. In NyK, vol. 23 (a), pp. 159–175.

Man ngag mdzod
Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-'od-zer, Man ngag rin po che'i mdzod. In DZ, vol. ga [separate pagination].

mChims chen
mChims 'Jam-pa'i-dbyangs, Chos mgon pa mdzod kyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel pa mgon pa'i rgyan (on cover: mdzod 'grel mgon pa'i rgyan). Reprint: Delhi: Siddhartha's Intent Yashodhara Publications, 1992.

mChims chung

mChod bsgral rnam bshad

mDo rgyas

mDo sde rgyan 'grel
Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, Theg pa chen po mdo sde'i rgyan gyi dgongs don rnam par bshad pa theg mchog bsdud rtsi'i dga' ston. In MS, vol 2 (a), pp. 1–760.

mDo sdud 'grel pa
Id., Yon tan rin chen sdud pa'i 'grel pa rgyal ba'i yum gyi dgongs don la phyin ci ma log par 'jug pa'i legs bshad. In MS, vol. 24, pp. 1–223.

mKhas 'jug
Id., mKhas pa'i tshul la 'jug pa'i sgo zhes bya ba'i bstan bcos. In MS, vol. 22, pp. 1–327.

mKhas 'jug sdom byang

mNgon brjod tshig mdzod
Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, Sher phyin mngon rto gs rgyan gvi mchan 'grel pada ri ka'i do shal. In MS, vol. 4 (pa), pp. 1–347.


mTsho tik

Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, Nges shes rin po che'i sgron me. In MS, vol. 9 (shri), pp. 71–123.


Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, gSang 'grel phyogs bcu mun sel gvi spiyi don 'od gsal snying po. In MS, vol. 19, pp. 1–271.


bSod-nams-rtse-mo, gNas lnga rig pa'i pandi ta chen po zhes yongs su grags pa'i slob dpon rin po che bsod nams rtse mo'i gsun rab glegs bam dang po las rgyud sde spiyi rnam par gzhag pa. In SKB, vol. 3 (ga), pp. 1–147.


Vimalamitra, Rim gvis 'jug pa'i sgom don. P 5334; D 3938, S 3168, vol. 64.

Indrabhūti, dPal gsang ba'i snying po'i rim pa gnyis pa. P 4771; not included in D; S 2647, vol. 44.
Rin chen bskod pa'i rgyud

rNam bshad pad dkar

Rwa ba brgyad

Sangs rgyas kyi sa

sDe dge bstan dkar
Zhu-chen Tshul-khrims-rin-chen, Kun mkhyen nyi ma'i gnyen gyi bka' lung gi dgongs don rnam par 'grel ba'i bstan bcos gangs can pa'i skad du 'gyur ro 'tshal gyi chos shiyin rgyun mi 'chad pa'i ngo mtshar 'phrub gyi phyi mo rdzogs ldan bskal pa'i bsdod nams kyi sprin phung rgyas par dkrigs pa'i tshul las brtams pa'i giam ngo mtshar chu gter 'phel ba'i zla ba gsar pa (on cover: bstan 'gyur dkar chag). Lhasa: Bod-ljongs-mi-mdangs-dpe-skrun khang, 1985.

sDom gsum bstan snying

sDom gsum rab dbye

sDom gsum rgyan

sDom gsum 'grel II
Id., sDom pa gsum gyi rgyan ces bya ba'i rgya cher 'grel las le'u gnyis pa. In PKS, vol. 6, pp. 1–99.

sDom gsum rnam nges

sDom gsum snying po

Sems nyid ngal gso

sGra sbyor bam gnyis

sGyu 'phrul rgya mtsho

Shes bya mdzod
Kong-sprul Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho, Theg pa'i sgo kun las btsus pa gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod bslab pa gsum legs par ston pa'i bstan bcos shes bya kun khyab [rtsa 'grel] (on cover: Shes bya kun khyab), eds. rDo-rje-rgyal-po & Thub-bstan-nyi-ma. Beijing: Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 2002.
Shes rab ral gri Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho, Don rnam par nges pa shes rab ral gri. In Shes rab ral gri'i mchan.


sPyod 'jug rnam bshad dPa'-bo gTsug-lag-'phreng-ba, Byang chub sms dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i rnam par bshad pa theg chen chos kyi rgya mtsho zab rgyas mtha' yas pa'i snying po. Reproduced from a print of the 16th century of the Lho-brag Lha-lun blocks at the order of H.H. the 16th Rgyal-dbaṅ Karma-pa. Rumtek: Dharma Chakra Center, 1975.

sPyod 'jug tshig 'grel mKhan-po Kun-bzang-dpal-ldan alias Kun-dpal, Byang chub sms dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i tshig 'grel 'jam dbangs bla ma'i zhal lung bsdud rtsi'i thig pa. In Byang chub sms dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa rtṣa ba dang 'grel ba. Chengdu: Si-khron-mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 1994, pp. 137–815.


Thub pa dgongs gsal Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan, Phyogs thams cad las rnam par rgyal ba chen po 'jam mgon sa skya paṇḍi ta kun dga' rgyal mtshan dpal bzang po'i zhabs kyi gsungs rab glegs bam dang po las thub pa'i dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba. In SK, vol. 10 (tha), pp. 1–197.

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2 Obviously a printing error for 1 8, a convention used by the author to refer to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* 1.8 (*Balagotrapajñālā). See DE JONG 1987b: 172.


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