Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda: A Late Indian Subclassification of Madhyamaka and its Reception in Tibet

Orna Almogi
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1. Introductory Remarks
In a recent publication I briefly touched upon the issue of subclassifications of Madhyamaka, and in particular the rather unfamiliar subclassification into Māyopamādvayavāda—or the “strand which maintains that [phenomena] are one, inasmuch as they are like illusions” (sgyu ma lta bu gnyis su med par smra ba, also known as sgyu ma lta bu ’dod pa: *māyopamamata or sgyu ma rigs grub pa; henceforth Māyopavāda: sGyu ma lta bur smra ba)—and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda—or the “strand which maintains that all phenomena have no substratum whatsoever” (chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par ’dod pa; or simply rab tu mi gnas pa; henceforth Apratiṣṭhānavāda: Rab tu mi gnas par smra ba). There I identified the eleventh-century Tibetan scholar Rongzom Choskyi bzang po (henceforth Rong zom pa) as a proponent of Apratiṣṭhānavāda, and argued that his philosophical stance on various issues can only be understood within the framework of this strand of Madhyamaka.1 However, since a thorough examination of the nature of this subclassification—

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tion was beyond the scope of my study, I announced then that it would be
dealt with elsewhere, having left numerous questions open. In the present
paper I shall therefore make a first attempt to give some answers, by
taking up where I left off, and so addressing some of the main problems or
ambiguities connected with this particular subclassification of Madhyama-
ka, while also briefly touching upon the Tibetan controversy surrounding it.
However, I should perhaps concede from the very outset that while I was
preparing this article for publication it became increasingly clear that I
have just barely managed to scratch the surface and that there is still a long
way to go before we can fully understand this division of Madhyamaka in
general, and Madhyamaka in Tibet during the eleventh to thirteenth
centuries in particular.

2. The Origin of the Māyopamāvāda—Apratiṣṭhānavāda Divide
It is well known that both ways of subclassifying Madhyamaka—that is, the
division into Sautrāntika-Madhyaṃaka and Yogācāra-Madhyaṃaka preva-
lent during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet and the division into
Śvātantra-Madhyaṃaka and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyaṃaka prevalent during
the later propagation period—were attempts made by Tibetan scholars to
systematically define and differentiate the various strands of Madhyamaka
found in Indian sources. Although in both cases the two subclasses were
defined on the basis of accurate observations and have become standard in
Tibet, they do not—as has been pointed out by several scholars—seem to
have existed as such in India, and a characterisation of them is not without
its problems. In fact, the only explicit and clear-cut division into two
branches of Madhyamaka found in Indian sources seems to be that into
Māyopamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda—for all its having often been
criticised by a number of Tibetan scholars.2 It is perhaps important to

2 Among the Tibetan critics were rNgog lo tsā ba, Gro lung pa, and Tsong kha pa
briefly note here that earlier Tibetan scholars such as rNgog lo tsā ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109?) criticised this subclassification as having been made on the basis of differences in the establishment of the absolute level—criticism that would be repeated by several later scholars. Other Tibetan scholars, such as sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405), defending this subclassification, pointed out several Indian sources in which it is found. Some of these sources have already been noted by modern scholars, such as David Seyfort Ruegg; they include the Tattvaratnāvalī of Advayavajra (11th cent.), the *Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama ascribed to a certain Aśvaghoṣa/Śūra, and Candraharipāda’s (11th cent.) *Ratnamālā.3 One may add here Jñānavajra’s (11th cent.?) *Tattvamārgadarśana, several other works by Advayavajra, the *Guruparamparākramopadeśa by the latter’s disciple Vajrapāni (11th cent.), and perhaps also the bKa’ gdambs bu chos ascribed to Atiśa (982–1054). As most of these works can be dated with certainty to the eleventh century, it could well be that this is also when this division of Madhyamaka came into vogue, and that too, probably in circles of scholars belonging to the Madhyamaka-Vajrayāna synthesis.

Interestingly, most of these sources present doxographical schemes that include these two strands of Madhyamaka. Both Candraharipāda’s *Ratnamālā and the bKa’ gdambs bu chos divide Mahāyāna into four schools, namely, Śākāravāda and Nirākāravāda (subdivisions of Yogācāra), and Māyopamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda (subdivisions of Madhyamaka). Jñānavajra’s *Tattvamārgadarśana, following along similar lines, divides the Mahāyāna into five schools, including, in addition to the four just mentioned, the Sautrāntikas. Likewise, Vajrapāni, in his *Guruparamparākramopadeśa, splits the Mahāyāna (in conformity with Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnāvalī, and his followers, to mention only some. Concerning this group and related Tibetan critics, along with references to their works, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 32–35.

3 See Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 34.
upon which it comments) into two strands, the Causal Vehicle of Characteristics and the Resultant Adamantine Vehicle (for which strands, however, Advayavajra employs the terms pāramitānaya and mantranaya). He further divides the Causal Vehicle of Characteristics into three schools: Sautrāntika (regarded by him as inferior), Yogācāra (regarded by him as mediocre), and Madhyamaka (regarded by him as superior). He then goes on to divide Yogācāra into Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda, and Madhyamaka into Māyopamāvāda and Apratīṣṭhānavāda. I shall return to these doxographical schemes below, where they will be discussed in somewhat more detail, but this brief mention of them here should suffice to demonstrate that the Māyopamāvāda–Apratīṣṭhānavāda divide featured prominently in some Indian masters’ systematic presentations of doxographical schemes.

Concerning the division of Madhyamaka into Māyopamāvāda and Apratīṣṭhānavāda, Seyfort Ruegg has remarked that similar terminology was employed in early Tibetan works, such as sKa ba dPal brtsegs’s lTa ba’i rim pa’i bshad pa (= lTa ba’i rim pa’i man ngag snang ba bcu bdun), though in a different sense. Indeed, my preliminary examination of this work, and several early works by the Tibetan scholar dPal dbyangs, leads me to believe that in no case do the terms sgyu ma lta bu and rab tu mi gnas pa (with variants such as mi gnas pa and gnas med pa, or the term rten med (pa), again a rendering of apratīṣṭhāna) refer to two different branches of Madhyamaka, but are apparently used, rather, to refer to the same thing, namely, the nonexistence of phenomena as real entities. Nonetheless, it appears that at least in some (Tibetan) sources, sgyu ma lta bu was used to describe phenomena while establishing the conventional level, and rab tu mi gnas pa to describe phenomena while establishing the ultimate level,

5 On these and similar terms, see Almogi 2009: 231.
which may, however, reflect the Apratiṣṭhānavāda position.  

3. Discussions in Indian Sources

In the following I shall present—by way of either citation or summary—several passages from Indian sources in Tibetan translation in which the Māyopamādvāyavāda—Apratiṣṭhānavāda division of Madhyamaka is discussed.  

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6 See the Thugs rje sphyun thag gi gnas—the first of five short texts (lung) found in the mDo rgyud rtogs pa’i sgron ma discovered by Nyang ral (and said to have been translated by Padmasambhava and Vairocana)—where it is stated (P, 246b4; not found in D; S, vol. 44: 573.18–19):  

"The Muni stated that  
It is in reliance on the two truths  
That the illusory [versus] the substratumless [nature of phenomena] has been taught.  

bden pa gnyis la rab brten nas  
sgyu ma rab tu mi gnas pa  
nges par bden [ = bstan?] zhes thub pas gsungs."

Similarly, the gSangs sngags nges par byed pa’i don, the fourth text in the mDo rgyud rtogs pa’i sgron ma, while apparently emphasising the indivisibility of the two truths from the point of view of Mantrayāna, provides as one [speculative] etymology of the word ‘mantra’ the following (P, 252b3–4; S, vol. 44: 585.19–586.1):  

"[The syllable] ma [means that phenomena are] like dreams [or] illusions;  
[The syllable] tra [means that] they have no substratum, [but that they nevertheless] appear;  
Seeing that the [two] meanings [of phenomena as being like] illusions and [as] having no substratum  
Are indivisible is the meaning of ‘mantra.’  

ma ni rmi lam sgyu ma bzhin  
tra ni de la gnas med gsal  
gsyu ma rab tu mi gnas don  

dbyer med mthong ba gsal sngags don."

7 All Tibetan texts of the Indian and Tibetan sources cited or summarised in the present study—except for the long passage from Jñānavajra’s *Tattvamārgadarśana*, of which merely the main points have been summarised—are provided in the appendix.
Tellingly, all authors cited seem to be Apratiṣṭhānavādins, inasmuch as in all cases the Apratiṣṭhānavāda position is presented as doxographically higher, whereas the Māyopamāvāda position is vehemently criticised.

(a) Aśvaghoṣa/Śūra

The *Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama* is a short versified work that has been ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa (or Śūra) and was translated by Padmākaravarman and Rin chen bzung po. It has the characteristics of a doxography and briefly describes and refutes the philosophical positions of the non-Madhyamaka Buddhist systems. The work seeks to examine ‘the nature of the mind, that is, reality which is bliss’ (sems nyid bde ba’i de nyid) by employing the so-called tetralemma analysis (spelled out, for example, in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 1.1). The two kinds of Madhyamaka systems presupposed by it are obviously Māyopamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda, although these terms are not used. For Māyopamāvāda can be described as the position, so described there, according to which phenomena, when not analysed, impinge on the subject as ‘mere illusions,’ and when analysed, can be shown to be indeed deceptive. And Apratiṣṭhānavāda can likewise be described as a position according to which the true nature of phenomena is that they lack a substratum; moreover, although this nature is expressed by terms such as ‘emptiness,’ emptiness itself is empty, and although it can be illustrated by means of analogies such as ‘like an illusion,’ it is actually not an object susceptible of illustration. The text argues that the very terms employed to designate the various phenomena do not themselves exist, and that in fact there is nothing to be eliminated. According to it, not perceiving any phenomena constitutes awakening. One important difference that the author seems to see between Māyopamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda concerns the method of gaining access to true reality. For the former, true reality is attestable in the form of some kind of affirmation, whereas for the latter it is not. It is
argued, from the second point of view, that the logical fallacies that necessarily result from any affirmation would be subsumable under the fallacies resulting from the postulation of one of the four extremes (i.e., here, existence, nonexistence, both, or neither). The author thus suggests that because Māyopamāvāda resorts to some kind of affirmation it cannot defend itself against the charge of positing one or the other of the extremes.  

If [one assumes that] the fallacies [incurred by] all affirmations are subsumable under these (i.e. the fallacies of maintaining one of the four extreme positions),

Then [Māyopamāvāda] is deluded, inasmuch as [it on the one hand accepts phenomena] in a non-analytical and naive manner,

[And on the other,] based on analysis, [it affirms that their true nature] is mere illusion. (1)

Even those [who maintain that] mind [partakes of] an aspect of illusion

And [that] awakening, too, is like an illusion.  

Are not [able to] see the verbally inexpressible

Freedom from manifoldness, namely, Mañjuśrī (i.e. in his definitive, ‘ontological’ sense). (2)

The illusory [nature proposed by you can] not [be expressed in terms of] mere illusion.

If it [could] be, it would not be [logically] attestable.

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8 *Paramārthatobodhicittabhāvanākrama* (P, 18a6–b4; D, 16a3–7; S, vol. 64: 46.8–47.3).

9 These two lines also occur within a longer passage of citations in Rong zom pa’s *Rang byung ye shes* (121.12–18), *dKon cog ’grel* (199.5–11), and *Theg tshul* (447.11–15). In the *Rang byung ye shes*, the source indicated is a certain *Māyājālatantra* (*sGyu ’phrul drwa ba’i rgyud*).
If it were attestable, it would follow
That other (i.e. non-Buddhist) systems, too, [would be propounding
the same] doctrine of illusionism.
Therefore the nature of illusion is [such that]
It is not expressible through [statements such as] “It is like an
illusion.” (3)
Nonetheless, the Compassionate One (i.e. the Buddha),
Resting [on the scheme of] the two modes of reality,
Proclaimed the [doctrine of] no-self, [which is like] a lion’s roar.
In reliance on the conventional [mode of] reality. (4)
*Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka is illustrated
Through the different modes of the various vehicles,10
[Namely,] by means of synonymous terms such as ‘emptiness’
[And by] numerous analogies, such as ‘being like illusions.’ (5)
[But] although [an attempt can be made] to illustrate [true reality, it
is] not an object [susceptible] of illustration.
There is nothing whatsoever to be eliminated with regard to it.
Given that [it] is empty, emptiness, too, is empty.
In this [dimension] there are neither buddhas nor sentient beings. (6)
Self and other, phenomena [as they] appear and [as they] exist,
Release and bondage are mere names.
Everything resembles space. (7)
Thus, when phenomena are not perceived,
[That very] non-manifestation or non-perception is [considered to be]
perceiving Mañjuśrī.11

10 On the notion of various vehicles, see Wangchuk 2007: 118–119, where
references to Indian and Tibetan sources are provided.
11 On the notion of knowing or perceiving nothing being the correct seeing, see
MacDonald 2009.
Māyopamādvyāvāda versus Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda (Almogi) 143

[In this way one] crosses the ocean of samsāra,
An existence [subject to] birth and dying. (8)

(b) Candrabhairipāda
As I have pointed out elsewhere, Candrabhairipāda—a Kāśmīrī master from whom Rin chen bzang po (958–1055) and rNgog lo chung Legs pa’i shes rab (b. 10th cent.) received a number of Tantric initiations—in his *Ratnāmālā divides Buddhist thought up into seven schools, namely, into Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Pratyekabuddha, Sākāra[vāda], Nirākāra[vāda], Māyopama[vāda], and Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]. Since Candrabhairipāda’s treatment of the schools is rather unsystematic—the work merely consisting of a collection of verses cited from or inspired by various Buddhist treatises—it is quite difficult to determine from it exactly what he conceives the difference between the positions of Māyopamavāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda to be. I shall, however, quote a few verses that are revealing in this regard. The position of the Māyopamavāda (presupposing Yogācāra doctrinal elements) seems to be expressed in the following lines of verse, stating that according to this school of thought phenomena, when analysed on the basis of logical reasoning, are found to be free from the extremes of existence and nonexistence, and when not so examined, are found to be of two kinds, either inanimate matter or cognition:

Self-cognition [as the ultimately existent phenomenon], which is the outcome of [Yogācāra’s] refutation of the absolute [of the lower

12 See Almogi 2009: 180.
14 *Ratnāmālā (P, 69a6–7; D, 71a4; S, vol. 63: 1045.12–14). The meaning of the first two lines is not very clear to me, and the translation provided here is thus tentative.
systems, which they consider] to be conceptually constructed
(brtags pa’i yang dag),
[Is in fact] an illusory conglomerate.
[Phenomena, when] examined [on the basis of] logical reasoning, turn
out to be free from the extremes of existence and nonexistence,
While if [they are viewed] in a non-analytical, naive manner, both
inanimate matter (bems [po]: jadā) and cognitive [constructs are
possible].

A few lines later, Candraharipāda presents a critique of this position—
presumably put forward by Apratiṣṭhānavādins. First it is pointed out that
the postulation of real entities leads to unwarranted conclusions, and these
in turn inevitably lead to disputes, an idea found already in earlier
Madhyamaka works such as the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā.15 Candraharipāda’s presenta-
tion of the issue seems to make it clear that the main bone of contention
between Māyopamavāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda, at least from the latter’s
standpoint, is not the illusory nature ascribed to phenomena or the
description of appearances as illusion-like, but rather the ontological status
of this illusory nature or these illusion-like appearances. The Apratiṣṭhāna-
vādins’ greatest difficulty seems to be the position attributed to
Māyopamavāda according to which the ‘illusory [nature of phenomena] is
attestable on the basis of logical reasoning’ (sgyu ma rigs pas grub [pa])—
which explains why Māyopamavāda has often been designated in Tibetan
sources as sGyu ma rigs grub pa. An Apratiṣṭhānavādin would have no
difficulty in admitting that all phenomena are illusion-like or illusory in
nature insofar as this is accepted as a non-analytical, naive stance as
opposed to a verity based on logical reasoning. (The question as to whether
a Māyopamavādin would indeed posit that the illusory nature of

15 Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 46 (Lindtner 1997: 86 & 175).
phenomena is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning is a separate matter.)

It is argued that a demonstration of the illusory nature of phenomena on the basis of logical reasoning—something which, although not explicitly stated by Candraharipāda, seems, according to other sources cited in the present study, to be the conclusion drawn by the Māyopamāvādins, in line with their stance just cited—leads to the logical flaw that phenomena would then be real, and generally questions the logic behind resorting to the term ‘illusion’ in order to illustrate things that have been shown to be unreal:16

If the illusory [nature of phenomena could] be attested on the basis of logical reasoning—
Inasmuch as [all phenomena as they] appear [and as they] exist are illusion-like
And gnoses and buddhas [too] are illusory—
It would follow that [phenomena] are not illusory but [rather] real.
If [the Māyopamāvādins then] said: “No, [that] would not follow, inasmuch it [can] be attested that [phenomena] are illusory,” [Then either] the meaning ‘logically attestable’ would not be applicable,17
[Or] there would be no point in applying the term ‘illusion’ [in the first place].
The learned ones hold that such [a position], too, Has not transcended the demon of clinging to entities.

The Apratiṣṭhānāvāda view is presented in the verses that follow. In the

17 Or: “[Then] a logically attestable entity would be unreal.”
first few lines, the nature of phenomena is stated to be such that it can be established as neither of the components of such pairs as existent and non-existent, empty and non-empty, illusory and real, or *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. Then, in the remaining lines, the notion that there is nothing that can be eliminated or added is underscored, and the view that gnosis does not exist at the stage of a *buddha* is urged.18

(c) **Jñānavajra**

Jñānavajra (fl. 11th cent?), in his *Tattvamārgadarśana*, identifies five philosophical tenets of Mahāyāna, referred to by him as ‘bases’ or ‘fundamentals’ (*rten*): Sautrāntika, Sākāravāda, Nirākāravāda, Māyopama-

vāda, and Apratiṣṭhānavāda. He discusses these tenets under four points: conduct (*spyod lam*), view (*lta ba*), meditation (*bsgom pa*), and flaws (*skyon*), and provides lengthy and detailed descriptions of each of them. But unfortunately the Tibetan translation is very poor, which significantly hinders an understanding of the text. I shall nonetheless attempt to provide here a summary of the main points on the basis of my preliminary reading. First, Jñānavajra states that while there are no differences in regard to the conduct advocated by the above-mentioned five Mahāyāna tenets, there are differences in regard to their views, which he then summarises as follows:19

It is maintained that the five [tenets] do not differ in regard to the conduct during these three phases (i.e. preparatory, actual, and posterior phases of conduct), but that there are differences in regard to

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18 The verses proclaiming that there is nothing to be eliminated or added and those dealing with the question concerning the existence of gnosis at the stage of a *buddha* have been translated and critically edited in Almogi 2009: 311–314 & 436–437, respectively.

19 *Tattvamārgadarśana* (P, 148a5–8; D, 133a7–b2; S, vol. 41: 356.7–12).
[their] views. [Their positions in regard to all] three—preparatory, actual, and posterior [phases of conduct are as follows]: Sautrāntika holds to [the notion of] dependent arising. Sākāra[vāda] holds to [the existence of] mental images. Nirākāra[vāda] holds to [the existence of] ‘good conception’ (i.e. pure cognition). Māyopama[vāda] holds that [phenomena] are like illusions. Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda maintains that] although [this] is [the case on] the conventional level, [it] is not [so on] the absolute level. [It] holds that [on the conventional level they] are unreal appearances, like a dream. [But] regarding the absolute level they take no stand. The other [tenets] take positions in regard to the absolute.

Jñanavajra’s discussion of the views of the two Madhyamaka systems can be tentatively summarised as follows:20 The Māyopamavādins reject the positions of both Sākāravāda (i.e. here clearly Satyākāravāda, which maintains the existence of true images) and Nirākāravāda (which maintains the nonexistence of images), asserting that it is neither the case that images are true nor that there are no images, but rather that images are like illusions, which, like any other phenomena, are impermanent on account of being momentary, but at the same time continuous (skad cig gis mi rtag la rgyun du gnas), that is, in terms of their mode of appearance. Therefore, according to them, on the absolute level images, when analysed, are unattestable; still, the illusions are true, since otherwise experiencing happiness or suffering would be fictitious (brdzun), and it would then be pointless to strive for Buddhahood, while the four buddha-Bodies for their part would not exist either. In support they refer to Buddhaguhya who, according to them, claimed to have shown, on the basis of logical reasoning,

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20 The summary presented here is based on *Tattvamārgadarśana* (P, 160a5–162b5; D, 143b3–145b4; S, vol. 41: 382.3–387.8).
that the physical Bodies are like illusions [resulting from] residual impressions (bag chags); and Kamalarakṣīta, who maintained that ‘these’ (i.e. the non-establishment of images and their being established as illusions?) reflect the state of meditative absorption and the post-meditative state, [respectively]. They also refer to the position of others according to which the physical Bodies appear to sentient beings without any intervening conceptualising.

The Apratīṣṭhānāvādins reject all previous positions, asserting that all of them merely apply to the conventional level, while arguing that in the case of the absolute level neither negative determination (vyavaccheda: rnam par bcad pa) nor positive determination (pariccheda: yongs su gcod pa) is valid. They, too, are said to resort to the ‘four great syllogisms’ (gtan tshigs chen po bzhi) of Madhyamaka. Only three of them, however, are identical with those of other systems, while the fourth one is called the ‘non-establishment of the objects of knowledge and the knower’ (shes bya shes byed ma grub pa). They first set about refuting the charge that they advocate annihilationism, arguing that all the entities that the Māyopamaśvādins claim exist on the absolute level as illusions—namely, the mind in its true nature, emptiness, the perfection of insight, and the dharmakāya—are

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21 Jñānavajra uses here the rather late collective term gyan tshig chen po bzhi, which became very popular among Tibetan Mādhyamikas. For a number of references to this collective term (including in the Madhyamakārthasaṁgraha by the later Bhāviveka/Bhavya and the Bodhimārgaprādipapāṇijāhā ascribed to Atiśa), see Mimaki 1982: 212, n. 547 (I thank Dr. Anne MacDonald (University of Vienna), for pointing out this reference to me). Of the commonly known four great syllogisms, the Apratīṣṭhānāvādins are said by Jñānavajra to make use of vajra slivers/fragments (rdo rje gzegs ma: vajrakana), ‘negation of arising in terms of the four limits’ (mu bzhi skye ba ’gog pa: catsuktyutpadapratisedha), and ‘being free from the one and the many’ (gcig dang du ma dang bral ba: ekānekaviyoga), but to replace ‘dependent arising’ (rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba: pratītyasamutpāda) with ‘non-establishment of the objects of knowledge and the knower’ (shes bya shes byed ma grub pa).
in fact merely conventional [phenomena resulting from] dependent arising. Since the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins accept that phenomena on the conventional level are mere illusions, they cannot be accused of annihilationism when they reject the Māyopamāvādins' postulation that these illusions are true on the absolute level. After presenting their application of the four great syllogisms to establish their case, Jñānavajra highlights some of the points of disagreement between the two branches, in the form of objections and replies. The Apratiṣṭhānāvādins, having no theses in regard to the absolute, refute the Māyopamāvādins' postulations concerning the absolute by means of a series of reductiones ad absurdum (prasaṅga). The objection posed by the Māyopamāvādins that if, on the conventional level, phenomena are illusions, it would follow that it would be no use striving for Buddhahood, [because then even an ordinary being would have access to the true nature of phenomena], is rejected by arguing that even if one accepts the Māyopamāvādins' postulation regarding the absolute, it need not be equally applicable to the conventional [since the distinctive features of individual phenomena are still retained on the conventional level]: just as the functions of water and fire are different and the sensations of bliss and suffering are different, so are samsāra and nirvāṇa, and thus there is no problem in accepting the dharmakāya, svābhāvikākāya, and the two rūpakāyas as conventional phenomena.

In what follows, the objections and replies mainly revolves around the Māyopamāvādins' critique, and in fact rejection, of the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins' claim that, unlike the Māyopamāvādins, who attempt to establish the absolute in the form of a positive determination, they, in their refusal to formulate either a negative or a positive determination, have no thesis in regard to the absolute. First, in an allusion to the fourth syllogism applied by the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins, the Māyopamāvādins pose the question whether their claim that they have no proof (shes byed) refers to the absolute or to the conventional level, to which the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins
reply that in regard to the absolute they have no thesis, and therefore they need no proof, while in regard to the conventional neither a proof (shes byed) nor something to be proven (shes bya) would make any difference in view of the continuum nature of phenomena, which is characterised by momentariness. Then they go on to rebuff the next possible critique—that if they put forward neither a proof nor something to be proven, they are propagating nihilism—by arguing that since they have nothing to postulate they cannot be accused of being nihilist, any more than space can be accused of any fault. The Māyopamavādins then confront the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins with the following critique: You claim that neither a negative nor a positive determination can be achieved. This negatively determining the fault of nihilism, however, amounts to establishing it in the form of a positive determination. So you, too, are left with a positive determination; for you, too, there is something that can be determined on the basis of analysis of the absolute. The Apratiṣṭhānāvādins, in reply, continue to insist that their attempting neither a negative nor a positive determination in regard to the absolute means that they have no thesis, and accuse the Māyopamavādins, in their own attempt to establish the absolute by formulating a positive determination, of wrongly concluding—having found fault with the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins’ analysis of the conventional—that the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins have come to a negative determination on the conventional level, which, as in their own case, would naturally result in a positive determination on the absolute level. The Apratiṣṭhānāvādins, however, claim that, on the basis of their analysis of the conventional level, they merely establish that there is nothing to be established on the absolute level; they do not make any assertions regarding the absolute, as the Māyopamavādins do. The Māyopamavādins retort that the positive determination applied by the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins to the conventional level cannot, in that case, be established on that level, with which observation the Apratiṣṭhānāvādins agree. Consequently the Māyopamavādins enquire
whether this non-establishment of a positive determination can be
determined, and argue that if it can, whether in the form of either a positive
or negative determination, then the Apratiṣṭhānavādins too, like the
Māyopamavādins, would be bound by such a determination, while if they
reject both negative and positive determinations, they would never be able
to prove anything, as nothing can be proven without a proof. In response,
the Apratiṣṭhānavādins claim that they negatively determine what is
postulated by the Māyopamavādins regarding the absolute level, dispro-
ving it by an analysis of the conventional level, and that this refutation is
established on the conventional level. Both positive and negative
determinations eventually cease being compelling or come to a natural
standstill (rang zhi ba)—in other words, become redundant—on the
conventional level, and thus no ‘excluder’ (sel byed) need be proposed by
them for the absolute level. The expressions ‘not affirmed’ and ‘absolute
level,’ they argue, refer to nothing but this state of affairs, and can be
regarded as conventional, inasmuch as one cannot avoid expressing them.
They agree that what is to be established (ci’ grub) is the absolute, and
further, that on the conventional level that which is indeterminate (ci yang
ma yin pa) is transient, being, like a river, an undisrupted chain of moments.

The Māyopamavādins, in a last attempt to point out further fallacies in
the Apratiṣṭhānavādins’ position, ask whether the latter’s non-postulation
of any thesis—which is based on the ‘coming to a standstill’ of the negative
determinations set forth by the Māyopamavādins and their own setting
forth of positive determinations (considered by themselves as valid) —has
come about in the form of some negative determination or not. If not, then
they submit that it must be on the basis of some positive determination, for
otherwise they would incur the fault of postulating a third alternative

\[\text{22} \text{ P reads grub pa ma, D reads grub pa man (P, 162a5; D, 145a5; S, vol. 41: 386.7).}
\text{The text should clearly read either grub pa min or, perhaps better, grub pa med, as in}
\text{the immediately following sentence.}\]
(phung po gsum pa’i skyon). They go on to ask whether, if it has come about in the form of some negative determination, the determinant (gcod byed) has arisen from some other determinant or from itself, and argue that neither can be the case. This, too, is rejected by the Apratiṣṭhānavādins, who counter with the following examples: Seeing and hearing exist due to the existence of objects that are respectively visible forms and audible sounds, and if there were no such objects, the sense faculties would induce neither seeing nor hearing, and thus if these conditions were not present the sense faculties would naturally disappear. Likewise, as long as fuel has not been spent a fire will keep burning, whereas once it has been, the fire will naturally die away. Thus, they state, there is nothing that can be negatively determined, and hence [phenomena] are by nature devoid of a substratum.

(d) Advayavajra
There are two short versified works ascribed to Advayavajra (alias Avadhūtapāda or Maitrīpa) devoted to an explanation of the terms māyā and apratiṣṭhāna, namely, the Māyāniruktī and Apratiṣṭhānaprakāśa.23 Since these two works, extant in both the Sanskrit originals and their Tibetan translations, focus on the meaning of the terms māyā and apratiṣṭhāna and not on the Māyopamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda branches of Madhyamaka, they do not provide information regarding the employment of the two terms by the two branches or the differences between these branches, and thus I shall not discuss them here. In his Tattvaratnāvali, which is a somewhat longer work (also available in both Sanskrit and Tibetan),

Advayavajra explicitly refers to both Madhyamaka branches and deals with them briefly. According to him, the Māyopamavādins hold that phenomena, when analysed, are found to be free from the four extremes of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither, and so long as they are not analysed, can be accepted as existing in the manifold ways they appear. They do not see this as contradictory since they consider phenomena to be one, inasmuch as they are like illusions. The Apratīṣṭhānavādins for their part maintain that phenomena are not their various designations, and insist that they do not propagate annihilationism, since according to them phenomena are neither eternal nor are they disrupted, nor are they both or neither of the two. The true nature of phenomena is that they are all devoid of a substratum. I shall treat this brief presentation by Advayavajra in more detail below on the basis of the rather elaborate commentary by his disciple Vajrapāṇi.

Further, in his *Apratīṣṭhānadeśakavṛtti, Advayavajra briefly presents the view of Yogācāra, only to refute it with the aid of authoritative citations and logical reasoning, both of which he refers to as the great fangs of the lion-like *Apratīṣṭhānavāda-Madhyamaka, which [opponents] cannot withstand (rab tu mi gnas par smra ba’i dbu ma seng ge lta bu’i lung rigs kyi mche ba ches mi bzad pa). First, a certain sūtra is cited in which five methods of examining phenomena are noted, apparently corresponding to Sautrāntika, Sakāravāda, Nirākāravāda, Māyopamavāda, and Apratīṣṭhānavāda, respectively:25

(1) All phenomena exist in the manner they appear, since phenomena, which are rooted in the four elements, exist on the conventional level like illusions.

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25 *Apratīṣṭhānadeśakavṛtti (P, 234b5–235a5; D, 215a3–b3; S, vol. 26: 1535.7–1536.8).
All phenomena are nothing but mind, since phenomena, variously designated, appear at all times variously as a self or as objects, on the basis of residual impressions implanted in the mind, giving a sense of permanence and continuance as conceptual constructs. On the ultimate level, however, they have no own-nature since they do not exist apart from the mind.

The mind itself has not arisen, since it has neither shape nor colour, nor is it subjected to the three times, nor does it have a periphery or middle.

All phenomena appear in the form of illusions and, like illusions, cannot be established, since all phenomena arise and emerge from causes and conditions.

All phenomena are by nature non-arisen and by nature devoid of a substratum, are free from all extremes associated with actors and actions (las dang bya ba'i mtha'), are beyond the domain of conceptual and non-conceptual, and are primordially free from manifoldness, since all this being the true nature of all phenomena.

This is followed by the following logical argumentation:

What is the logical reasoning? The extant well-expounded writings of great beings of the past state that as all phenomena have simply arisen in accordance with the mechanism of dependent arising, they are like illusions. Thus, on the ultimate level, the arising from themselves, something else, both, or causelessly is not at all tenable, and so on the ultimate level they are like a ‘sky lotus.’ This teaching alone is sufficient. If those endowed with the eye of insight would undertake a straightforward, careful examination on the basis of the syllogism of

identity (rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs: svabhāva hetu) alone, they [would realise that] in the end nothing attestable [can] be found, and thus it is established that all phenomena are devoid of a substratum.

(e) Vajrapāni’s *Guruparamparākramopadeśa

The eleventh-century master Vajrapāni, in his *Guruparamparākramopadeśa, adopts the doxographical scheme of his master Advayavajra found in the Tattvaratnāvali, dividing the entire Buddhist system as follows:27

The three Vehicles—Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna—rest on a total of four ‘bases’ (i.e. tenets), namely, Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka. Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna follow Vaibhāsika, which in turn is divided into two, Western Vaibhāsika and Kāśmīra Vaibhāsika. Śrāvakayāna is divided into three corresponding to disciples’ faculties, namely, dull, mediocre, and sharp. Those with dull and mediocre faculties are said to follow Western Vaibhāsika, and those with sharp faculties and those following Pratyekabuddhayāna, Kāśmīra Vaibhāsika. Mahāyāna is first divided into two, namely, Causal *Lakṣaṇayāna and Resultant Vajrayāna. The Causal *Lakṣaṇayāna is then divided into three, again corresponding to disciples’ faculties: for those with dull faculties, Sautrāntika; for those with mediocre faculties, Yogācāra; and for those with sharp faculties, Madhyamaka. Both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka are further divided into two, namely, the former into Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda, and the latter into Māyopamavāda and Apratiṣṭhānāvāda.

Vajrapāni then discusses the total of nine systems introduced by him—three subdivisions of Śrāvakayāna for disciples with dull, mediocre, and sharp faculties (1–3); Pratyekabuddhayāna (4); the three subdivisions of Causal *Lakṣaṇayāna for disciples with dull, mediocre, and sharp faculties,

27 *Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 184b6-185a3; D, 164b4-165a1; S, vol. 41: 446.10–447.13). The partitioning as found in Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnāvali is cited and discussed in Mathes 2007: 548–549.
that is, Sautrāntika (5), Yogācāra with its two subdivisions of Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda (6-7), and Madhyamaka with its two subdivisions of Māyopamādyavāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda (8-9)—under four points:28 discernment (so sor rtog pa: pratyavekṣana), meditation (sgom pa: bhāvanā), stains (i.e. risks) in meditation [that should be avoided] (sgom pa’i dri ma), and view (lta ba: drṣṭi/darśana).29

In his discussion of Māyopamādyavāda, Vajrapāṇi first cites and comments upon the four lines of verse from Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnāvalī according to which the Māyopamādyavādins hold that phenomena, when analysed, are found to be free from the four extremes of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither,30 and then goes on to comment as follows:31

Now I shall explain the Māyopama[vāda] system:
[[[...]]]
Therefore, it claims [the existence of] a luminous cognition that is like an illusion and free from the four extremes (i.e. of existence, nonexistence, both, and neither). Moreover, it teaches that nirvāṇic phenomena, too, are like illusions [or] like dreams, and that even if there were a phenomenon superior to nirvāṇa, it, too, would be like an illusion [or] like a dream.32 Therefore, the diverse [phenomena] and the mind itself are one insofar as they are like illusions. This is the

28 For a further discussion on this notion of four tenets and nine systems, see Rig ral’s bSla b pa gsum gyi rgyan gyi me tog (393.3ff).

29 *Guruparamparākramopadesa (P, 185a3-4; D, 165a1-2; S, vol. 41: 447.14-15): de ltar na sbor ba āgu la dbye ba bzhi bzhi ste| so sor rtog pa dang| sgom pa dang| sgom pa’i dri ma dang| lta ba’o ||.

30 The citation has not been translated here, but it is provided in the critically edited text found in the appendix.

31 *Guruparamparākramopadesa (P, 189a3-b6; D, 168a7-169a1; S, vol. 41: 456.11-457.19).

32 A similar statement is found in Rong zom pa’s Theg tshul (447.16-17).
discernment [of Māyopamāvāda]. Maintaining [the realisation that] all the various [phenomena] are one insofar as they are like illusions, neither real nor false—like the moon [seen on a body of] water or a reflection in a mirror—is the meditation [of Māyopamāvāda]. Attachment to [the extreme of] annihilationism is [considered by it] a stain in meditation [that should be avoided]. Acting for the sake of sentient beings after purifying the [first] five perfections in regard to the three spheres [of actor, act, and recipient] by means of the three non-objectifications—by means, [that is,] of a perfection of insight [that cognises that phenomena] are like illusions—is the view [of Māyopamāvāda].33

Further, [Apratiṣṭhānavāda] maintains, as follows, that because all phenomena are devoid of a substratum, that which is like an illusion [can] not be established:34

No one has ever seen [phenomena]—
Be they conspicuous or inconspicuous—as they [really] are.
Thus although [they] may be expressible in words, [they] are devoid of content,
Just like [the expression] ‘the son of a barren woman.’

[Query:] Is that which is like an illusion something luminous (i.e. a cognitive entity) or is it something other than the mind (sems)?
[Response:] A phenomenon that is other than the mind is not attested. If it is the mind, on the level where the mind itself [can] not be established, that which is illusion [can] not be established either. Why is that so? Because there is nothing other than the mind itself.

33 The employment of the term ‘view’ here (as in the parallel passage concerning Apratiṣṭhānavāda cited below) is unusual. One would expect a term such as ‘conduct’ (spyod pa), whereas under the first point, where one would indeed expect ‘view,’ our author uses the term ‘discernment.’

34 The source of this verse could not be identified.
[Perceiving phenomena as being something] like an illusion is the cognition of an injudicious person, [entailing as it does both] false imputation and false depreciation. For example, if a person with diseased eyes looks at the sky, [he] would say, under the influence of his diseased eyes, that a second moon, balls of hair, or the like appear, [thereby] falsely imputing [existence to them]; a judicious person, with his knowledge, on the other hand, would recognise, as soon as [they] appear, that [these phenomena] do not exist, and say that [they] do not exist, [thereby] falsely depreciating [their appearance]. Likewise, saying that illusion-like [phenomena] appear in various [forms] on account of [one’s] karma and ignorance is false imputation; and the statement that [they] are like illusions—made on account of a judicious person’s aptitude [for recognising these phenomena], as soon as [they] appear, to be empty—is false depreciation. Therefore [Māyopamāvāda] rests on the extremes of false imputation and false depreciation.

In his discussion of Apratiṣṭānāvāda, Vajrapāṇi first cites three verses from Advayavajra’s Tattvaratnāvali—the first presenting the view that phenomena are found to be free from the four extremes of eternalism, annihilationism, both, and neither36—follows with a citation of Abhisamayālāmākāra 5.21 (= Ratnagotravibhāga 1.154)37,38 and then proceeds to expand on them as follows:39

35 For the employment of the same analogy (also found in the following passage) by *Madhyamaka-Simha, see Almogi 2009: 303.
36 For a translation and a discussion of these three verses, particularly from the point of view of Mahāmudrā, see Mathes 2007: 551–558.
37 For further references and a translation of this verse, see Wangchuk 2007: 199–200, n. 11; Almogi 2009: 312.
38 The citations have not been translated here, but they are provided in the critically edited text found in the appendix.
Furthermore, the position of the Sarvdharmāpratīṣṭhānavāda:

[[...]]

It rests neither on false imputation of existence nor on depreciation into nonexistence. The experiencing of the mind as various appearances is [the result of] dependent origination, and thus [phenomena] are non-arisen. That which is non-arisen appears as if [it] arises, and thus the two—arising and non-arising—are not different [from each other]. Likewise, if one examines, on the basis of logical reasoning, that which appears, [one realises that it] is empty; while that which is empty, unattested, and unable to withstand logical analysis is appearance. That which is empty is nothing but appearance, and appearance is nothing but that which is empty. For example, the appearance of water in a Fata Morgana is empty of water, and the absence of water [in it] appears as water. The two—the water's appearance and the absence of water [in it]—are not different [from each other]. Likewise, an appearance has no own-nature, while that which has no own-nature appears. An appearance and the lack of an own-nature, [which latter means] emptiness, are not different [from each other]. For example, if a bundle of firewood is consumed by fire, [it becomes] one in essence with the fire. Then, once the firewood is exhausted, the fire does not exist [any more]. Likewise, once [the nature of all] the diverse appearances has been established as emptiness, on the basis of logical reasoning, [one realises that] even the nonexistence of entities and emptiness do not subsist. Similarly,


40 For Rong zom pa’s employment of this analogy in his dKon cog ‘grel, see Almogi 2009: 293.

41 For references to similar employment of the analogy of firewood and other fuels,
regarding [appearance and emptiness as] not being different: once [their] being different [can] no [longer] be attested, [their] being identical is no [longer] attestable either. Therefore, [in order to] eradicate other [beings'] attachment or to eliminate false imputation and false depreciation, or in a provisional sense, one speaks [of phenomena] as being empty and non-arisen. Yet, [when] explored by judicious persons, or in a definitive sense, [even] these (i.e. emptiness and non-arising) do not subsist. Negative determinations, positive determinations, false imputation or false depreciation do not subsist either. Attachment, negation and affirmation, and two [separate states of] meditative absorption and post-meditation do neither exist nor subsist. This is the discernment [of Apratiṣṭhānavāda]. The non-[focusing of] attention (or: non-mentation, yid la mi byed pa: amanasikāra) that is devoid of false imputation, false depreciation, and attachment [in regard to phenomena] is the meditation [of Apratiṣṭhānavāda]. [To be sure, reaching a state of] total blankness (lit. 'becoming [like] inanimate matter') as a result of holding an annihilationistic view in regard to all [external] objects and [thus no longer] experiencing [phenomena] is [considered by it] a stain in meditation [that should be avoided]. Acting for the sake of sentient beings after purifying the [first] five perfections in regard to the three spheres [of actor, act, and recipient] by means of the three non-objectifications—by means, [that is,] of a perfection of insight [that cognises phenomena] without [succumbing to] false imputation, false depreciation, and attachment—is the view [of Apratiṣṭhānavāda]. For example, when a judicious person with healthy eyes looks at the sky, thanks to his healthy eyes he perceives no balls of hair or the like

see the index in Almogi 2009: 528, s.v. analogies: firewood/fuel and fire & wick, sesame oil, and lamplight.
whatsoever, and [that] judicious person does not engage in false 
imputation or false depreciation by saying, “[Such objects] exist” or 
“[Such objects] do not exist.” Likewise, since [according to Apratiṣṭhā-
navāda] the essence of phenomena is that [they] are all non-arisen by 
nature, and so [can] in no way abide in terms of either existence or 
nonexistence, [it] in no way rests on false imputation and false 
depreciation vis-à-vis existence or nonexistence. This is [its] cognition 
of true reality. The compassion [advocated by both] Māyopama-
vāda and Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda] is an objectless compassion. It is an 
objectless compassion because [the focusing of one’s] attention (or: 
mentation) is [in this case] without perceiving any phenomena 
whatsoever.

(f) bKa’ gdamgs bu chos ascribed to Atiśa
The work titled 'Brom ston pa rgyal ba’i 'byung gnas kyi skyes rabs bka’ 
gdamgs bu chos (or short: bKa’ gdamgs bu chos) is found in the recently 
published Jo bo’i gsung 'bum, though it was very probably not written by 
Atiśa but rather by some of his direct Tibetan disciples, and perhaps 
includes input by later followers of his. It is, however, not to be ruled out 
that the work incorporates notes taken during and after oral instructions 
given by the master, such as the passage cited here. In its first chapter, 
relating 'Brom ston’s birth as the Brahmin child gSal ba (dGe ba’i bshes 
gnyen pa bram ze’i khye’u gsal bar ji ltar skye ba bzhes pa’i le’u), a similar 
division of Mahāyāna is found in a passage containing teachings ascribed to 
Atiśa.42

It (i.e. Mahāyāna) has two [schools]: Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. 
Madhyamaka has two [branches]: Madhyamaka which holds [that

42 bKa’ gdamgs bu chos (160.9-16).
phenomena] are mere appearances (i.e. *Pratibhāsamatra-Madhyamaka)\(^{43}\) and Madhyamaka which holds [that phenomena] have no substratum (i.e. *Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]-Madhyamaka). *Pratibhāsamatra-Madhyamaka establishes that the false appearances are false, and demonstrates this with the aid of the eight illustrations of illusion—dreams and the rest. Furthermore, because the pair [comprising] that which is to be demonstrated and the demonstrator are respectively a deceptive object and subject, they need to be abandoned and yet to be known (or: they need to be known as something to be abandoned). *Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]-Madhyamaka teaches that buddhas may appear or may not appear, but the true nature of all phenomena is [that they] have had no substratum since primordial times,\(^{44}\) and therefore it is to be accepted and known. Yogācāra has two [branches]: that which postulates that appearances

\(^{43}\) Here 'mere appearance' (snang ba lta bu: pratibhāsamatra) is clearly used as synonymous with 'mere illusion,' which latter expression, as we have already seen, is used by some interchangeably with 'like an illusion' (sgyu ma lta bu: māyopama) in the context of Māyopamavāda. Of possible relevance is the expression māyopama-pratibhāsamatra used by Vāgīśvarakirti in his Tattvaratnāvaloka (142.16–17), also in connection with Madhyamaka. For time constraints I have not been able to look at the matter more closely. However, it should be noted that the expression 'mere appearance' is more commonly associated with Apratiṣṭhānavāda. See, for example, the table presenting Klong chen pa’s subclassification of Madhyamaka, which includes the subbranch sNang tsam rab tu mi gnas pa. Moreover, as I have shown elsewhere (Almogi 2009, passim), the term 'mere appearance' is central to Rong zom pa’s Madhyamaka, which is clearly to be identified as Apratiṣṭhānavāda.

\(^{44}\) This famous line, found in several versions in various sources (see Wangchuk 2007: 78, n. 24), should actually read affirmatively: “It is taught that the true reality of phenomena subsists primordially [as it is]” (chos rnams kyi chos nyid ye nas gnas par gsungs pas). One possibility is that the negative particle is an error introduced later accidentally. It may also be that the author exploited the phrase ye nas gnas pa and deliberately intended the negative particle so as to reflect the position of the Apratiṣṭhānavāda.
are true and that which postulates that they are false. From the point of view of *Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]-Madhyamaka, both of these [positions] are deluded, and yet need to be known.

4. The Reception of the Māyopamāvāda–Apratiṣṭhānāvāda Divide in Tibet

It is impossible to discuss in detail the Tibetan reception of the partitioning of Madhyamaka into Māyopamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānāvāda within the framework of this article, but I wish to touch upon some of the main issues on the basis of a few examples. As stated above, despite the fact that this division can be traced to Indian sources, it was categorically dismissed by several Tibetan scholars. The first was apparently rNgog lo tsā ba Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109?), who with the following two lines in his sPrings yig seems to have triggered the Tibetan controversy regarding this subclassification:45

The subclassification of Madhyamaka into the two systems


In the centuries that followed, the nature of this division was heatedly debated between those who dismissed it and those who accepted it, particularly as regards whether it was made on the basis of a view concerning the ultimate level, and—related to this—as regards the methods employed by these two branches to establish the ultimate level. Even those who accepted this division held different positions as to its relation to the more familiar division of Madhyamaka—whether Apratiṣṭhānāvāda is to be equated with Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and Māyopamāvāda or not.

45 sPrings yig (Kano 2007: 11.5–6):

sgyu ma gnyis med chos kun mi gnas dbu ma yi‖
lugs gnyis rnam ’byed de yang rmongs pa mtshar bskyed yin‖.
mavāda with Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, or whether both should be subsumed under Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.

(a) Deliberations on the Nature of the Division
Those who vehemently rejected the Māyopamavāda–Apratiṣṭhānavāda divide seem to have associated it with a postulation regarding the absolute. The situation among those who accepted it seems more complex. As we have seen above, the Māyopamavādins are generally said to hold phenomena to be like illusions, while the Apratiṣṭhānavādins assume no thesis. As we have also seen, the terms 'negative determination' and 'positive determination' play a central role in this connection.

(i) Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas
Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas (11th cent.), who clearly followed his master rNgog lo tsā ba in categorically rejecting this distinction, states the following:46

Further, some foolish persons [claim that] there are two Madhyamaka schools, namely, Apratiṣṭhānavāda and Māyopamavāda. [They] claim that Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and others proposed that the illusory [nature of phenomena] is the absolute, and that, having categorically negated (i.e. in the form of a negative determination) the true existence (bden pa) imagined by the Substantialists (dngos po[r] smra ba: vastuvādin), [these masters went on], on the basis of logical reasoning, [to] affirm a false existence (brdzun pa), [in the form of] a positive determination. [This can] in no way be [true, given the following] statement in Madhyamakālamkāra [63].47

[46] bsTan rim chen mo (437b7–438a3).
[47] See Ichigō 1989: 212. Compare the English translation in ibid.: 213. See also Mi pham's dBu ma rgyan 'grel (216.2–221.3), where variant readings of the verse are
Therefore these entities

Have the characteristic of [merely being] conventional [reality].

If one posits that it (i.e. conventional reality) is the absolute,

Then what is there that I can do!

[Śāntarakṣita] considered this false existence to be a mere object of perception, and [he also] stated that [what is established in the form of] a positive determination, [of the sort] included among the four [kinds of] affirming negation [employed for] the negation of arising, is false conventional [reality]. If one posits that [a given ‘x’], be it existent or nonexistent, is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning, one would be possessed by the great demon of extreme views, and thus remote from the Middle Way. For [Śāntarakṣita also] stated, among other things, that if [one posits] existence, [one would fall into the extreme of] eternalism.

(ii) Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge

Until recently Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge’s (1109–1169) works have not been accessible, and his positions on various Madhyamaka issues were known of only second-hand, as reported by later Tibetan scholars. Phywa pa has long been considered to have been a Tibetan proponent of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and a vehement opponent of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka—an issue, however, beyond the scope of this study. What I merely wish to do here is to present Phywa pa’s assessment of the Māyopamādyavāda–Apratiṣṭhānavāda divide (which he clearly does not approve of) as found in his doxographical work entitled bDe bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa’i gzung rnam par ‘byed pa (henceforth: gZhung rnam ‘byed). He discusses the issue, in the context of presenting the absolute
discussed.

truth (or reality) according to the Madhyamaka system, as follows:49

In regard to the absolute truth (or reality), some have claimed that there are two [Madhyamaka] systems (lugs), namely, [Māyopamavāda,] which posits that appearances, [things] devoid of true existence, are like illusions (bden pas stong pa'i snang ba sgyu ma lta bur smra ba), and [Apratiṣṭhānaṇavāda,] which posits that no true existence (bden pa) [positively determinable] in the form of an implicative negation [exists] anywhere [as something] having a substratum. [All] this [amounts to] a foolhardy exposition (mun sbrul gyi bshad pa).50

Regarding the claim that Māyopamavāda is a system different (lugs gzhan) from Apratiṣṭhānaṇavāda: (a) Is [Māyopamavāda] a different system because [it] does not accept that [phenomena are] empty of hypostatic existence, or (b) is [it] a different system because [it] accepts that appearances are [positively determinable] in the form of an implicative negation? (a) In the first case, if Māyopamavāda does not accept that [phenomena are] empty of hypostatic existence, this would contradict the fact that it does accept manifold appearances, and thus it would illogically follow that it does not even accept the illusion-like [nature of phenomena]. (b) In the second case, (i) is [Māyopamavāda] different from Apratiṣṭhānaṇavāda because it accepts mere appearances that are [positively determinable in the form of] an implicative negation, or (ii) is [it] different from Apratiṣṭhānaṇavāda because [it] accepts that appearances [that are positively determinable in the form of] an implicative negation are [capable of] withstanding logical analysis (dpyad bzod)? (i) In the first case, it

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49 gZhung rnam 'byed (65.6–67.2).

50 The exact meaning of the word mun sbrul, often employed in exegetical writings, is not wholly clear. It seems to convey something like tramping in the darkness (mun) over places inhabited by poisonous snakes (sbrul).
would follow that even Apratiṣṭhānavāda itself would be a different system from Apratiṣṭhānavāda, inasmuch as [it too] accepts mere appearances that are [positively determinable in the form of] an implicative negation. If it did not accept [that], it would follow that it, like the Lokāyata [system, could be accused of postulating the view of] annihilationism, inasmuch as [it would then] depreciate conventional [truth/reality], and inasmuch as it would deny not only what is not apparent, like the latter (i.e. the Lokāyata system), but even deny what is obvious. (ii) In the second case, it would follow that Māyopamavāda, in accepting that these [appearances] are [capable of] withstanding logical analysis and [positively determinable in the form of] an implicative negation, would not be different from the Substantialists.

Again, if it is maintained that Apratiṣṭhānavāda is a system different from [that of] Māyopamavāda, [the questions would be] whether it is a different system (a) because [it] does not accept [that the nature of phenomena is] illusory or (b) because [it] does not accept that the illusory [nature] is capable of withstanding logical analysis? (a) In the first case, [it would mean that Apratiṣṭhānavāda] accepts no conventional [phenomena] at all (i.e. not even one that is illusory in nature), and thus it would follow that Apratiṣṭhānavāda is censurable even by [the standards of] the Lokāyata [system], for whereas the Lokāyata [system] depreciates [only] a portion of the conventional [phenomena] (i.e. those that are not apparent), Apratiṣṭhānavāda would depreciate all conventional [phenomena]. (b) In the second case, it would follow that Māyopamavāda itself would be different from Māyopamavāda, inasmuch as it would accept (i.e. in contrast not only to the Apratiṣṭhānavāda position but also to its own)

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51 The text has no negative particle here, but the logic of the argument seems to call for one.
that the illusory [nature of phenomena] is capable of withstanding logical analysis. Positing that [it] is capable of withstanding logical analysis [entails] a hypostatic appearance (ṭden paʼi snang ba), and thus the semantics of ‘illusory [nature]’ would not hold [any longer]. And in positing that appearance is capable of withstanding logical analysis, [Māyopamāvāda] would not be [doing anything] different from the Substantialists. Thus no Mādhyamika would consider the illusory [nature of phenomena to be capable of withstanding logical] analysis. There are no differences, then, among the Mādhyamikas, inasmuch as they all accept that the utter unattestability [of phenomena] alone (cir yang ma grub pa kho na) is capable of withstanding logical analysis.52

(iii) Rog Shes rab ’od
We have seen that the terms negative determination (vyavaccheda: rnam par bcad pa) and positive determination (pariccheda: yongs su gcod pa) play a great role in the arguments surrounding the two strands of Madhyamaka under discussion. The issue is complex and needs to be

52 This statement of Phywa pa is a very significant one, since he has often been cited by later Tibetan scholars as having maintained that the absolute truth (or reality) is something that is capable of withstanding logical analysis (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 38, n. 71). Those scholars must have such statements as this one in mind when they reported Phywa pa’s position on the absolute truth, which seems to have been a target of ridicule among Tibetan Mādhyamikas. For the general perception is that what is capable of withstanding logical analysis must by definition be something real, which is of course held to be impossible. Obviously for Phywa pa an ‘x’ can by no means bear the force of Madhyamaka logical analysis, whereas the utter unattestability of ‘x’ can be said to be immune to Madhyamaka logical analysis, perhaps inasmuch as the utter unattestability of ‘x’ is what ultimately prevails as true reality. A careful examination of Phywa pa’s position, however, would be necessary to come to any definite conclusion.
further investigated, but here I shall merely present Rog Shes rab 'od’s (1166–1244) brief explanation of these two terms in connection with the notion of māyopama and apratiṣṭhāna:\(^{53}\)

The second [point], what is to be negated [in the form of] a negative determination, has two [subpoints]: general and specific [ones]. As to the first, [namely,] the characteristics of the general negandum, whatever position one arrives at—after scrutinising on the basis of logical reasoning—according to which there are some features of a true nature (rang bzhin: svabhāva), be it [of] existence or nonexistence, is the negandum. If one specifies the negandum [according to the negation applied], there are two: [that which is negated in] a non-implicative negation (med pa dgag pa) and [that which is negated in] an implicative negation (ma yin pa dgag pa). As to the non-implicative negation, [it is applied to] negate the propounding of external objects as [real] entities by ordinary people and Śrāvakas. As to the implicative negation, [it is applied to] negate what is propounded by the Mind-Only [school], which [posits] self-cognition as the absolute.

[The third point], what is to be established [in the form of] a positive determination, has two [subpoints]: ‘being like illusions’ and ‘having no substratum.’ [The establishment of phenomena as] being like illusions is the negation of the true existence of appearances (snang ba’i dngos po) and in its place the establishment of [their] mere illusory [nature]. [The establishment of phenomena as] having no substratum is the negation of the position maintaining the true existence of appearances and then—without even maintaining a mere illusory [nature in their regard]—[attempting to establish that they] have no substratum.

\(^{53}\) *Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me* (A, 176.5–177.5; B, 264.3–265.3).
(b) Māyoropamāvāda–Apratiṣṭhānavāda versus Prāsaṅgika–Śvātantrika

The question as to whether Apratiṣṭhānavāda is to be equated with Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and Māyoropamāvāda with Śvātantrika-Madhyamaka, or whether both are to be subsumed under Śvātantrika-Madhyamaka, was answered differently by different scholars, who, in this regard, can be generally divided into two groups. The first one, including Rog Shes rab 'od and Klong chen pa (1308–1364), subsumed both Māyoropamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda under Śvātantrika-Madhyamaka, whereas the second, including mKhas pa lDe'u (13th cent.), bCom ldan Rig pa'i ral gri (1227–1305),54 stTag tshang lo tsā ba,55 mKhas grub rje (1385–1438) (followed by other dGe lugs scholars),56 and Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846–1912), identified Māyoropamāvāda with Śvātantrika-Madhyamaka and Apratiṣṭhānavāda (or at least a branch of it) with Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka. In the following I shall first cite Rog Shes rab 'od's presentation, where Māyoropamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda are subsumed under Śvātantrika-Madhyamaka, and provide an overview of the division as presented by Klong chen pa, who, however—unlike Rog Shes rab 'od—further subdivides each of the two (referred to by him as respectively ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ Śvātantrika-Madhyamaka). Then, as

54 For a summary of bCom ldan Rig pa'i ral gri's treatment of the two branches of Madhyamaka, see below in the concluding paragraph of this section.

55 Grub mtha' kun shes kyi rnam bshad (141.22–144.9).

56 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 58–59, n. 174, where reference to mKhas grub rje's understanding of this subclassification is made. According to him, Māyoropamāvāda is the school of Śāntarakṣita and Haribhadra (i.e. Yogācāra-Madhyamaka), and Apratiṣṭhānavāda that of Candrakīrti (i.e. Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka). See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 33–35, n. 60, concerning the view of other dGe lugs scholars, including 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson 'grus (1648–1721/22) and lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717–1786), and other Tibetan scholars, such as Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge (1429–1489), Shākya mchog ldan (1428–1507), and 'Ba' ra ba rGyal mtshan dpal bzang (1310–1391). See also Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 31–32, n. 58, for further references.
representative of the second group, I shall present mKhas pa lDe’u’s and Mi pham’s partitioning of Madhyamaka, followed by Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer’s (1136–1204) explanation of these two strands of Madhyamaka and that of the further subdivisions of Apratiṣṭhānavāda. At the conclusion of this section I shall present a summary of bCom ldan Rig pa’i ral gri’s treatment of Madhyamaka, which in my view reflects the diversity of opinion among Tibetan scholars on this issue and gives a general overview of some of the points of contention.

Rog Shes rab ’od states the following:57

[As to] the fourth general point, [namely,] the object of application (jug yul) of inference (rjes dpag: anumāna), there are two [approaches]: svatantra and prasaṅga. The difference between the two [is as follows]: the mere elimination of faults, namely, doubts regarding one’s own autonomous view, is svatantra, while the refutation of others’ theses is prasaṅga. Among [those who employ] svatantra [there are] two [strands]: Māyopama[vāda] and Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]. The difference between the two [is as follows]: That [strand] which, in determining negatively, negates the negandum and then, in determining positively, affirms that the [nature of phenomena] is like delusive illusions is Māyopama[vāda]. That [strand] which negates [the existence of] real entities from the perspective of a negative determination and has no thesis whatsoever from the perspective of a positive determination is Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]. These two are Svātantrika-[Madhyamaka]. Prāsaṅgika-[Madhyamaka] takes no stance of its own but refutes [whatever is] posited by others as absolute. By what means is it refuted? [It] is refuted by means of the five kinds of logical reasoning (rigs pa: yukti)58 shown above.

57 Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me (A, 189.2–190.3; B, 275.2–276.2).
Klong chen pa’s scheme can be summarised as follows:\textsuperscript{59}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Madhyamaka</th>
<th>Svātāntrika-Madhyamaka</th>
<th>Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mayopamañvāda</td>
<td>= Lower Svātāntrika ((rang rgyud ’og ma))</td>
<td>Apratīśhānavāda = Higher Svātāntrika ((rang rgyud gong ma))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. sGyu ma rigs grub tu ’dod pa</td>
<td>1. Kun rdzob rab tu mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. sGyu ma ltar snang du ’dod pa</td>
<td>2. rGyu mtshan mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. sGyu ma tsam por ’dod pa</td>
<td>3. lDog cha mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... ([\text{rnam grangs rab tu mang}])</td>
<td>4. lDog byed mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. gCig mi gnas pa</td>
<td>6. Du ma mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. gCig dang du ma dang bral ba mi gnas pa</td>
<td>7. gCig dang du ma dang bral ba mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. sNang tsam rab tu mi gnas pa</td>
<td>8. sNang tsam rab tu mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... ([\text{rnam grangs dpag tu med pa}])</td>
<td>9. gCig dang du ma dang bral ba mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The subclassification of Madhyamaka as proposed in the \textit{Theg mchog mdo}\textsuperscript{\textcopyright} \textcopyright 125.1–126.5

mKhas pa lDe’u and Mi pham, who equate Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka with a branch of Apratīśhānavāda, divide Madhyamaka as follows:

\textsuperscript{58} Rog refers here to the five syllogisms (\textit{gtan tshig; hetu}) he has just discussed in the previous paragraph. See the \textit{Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me} (A, 177.5ff; B, 265.3ff.). The five syllogisms presented by him include the common group of four (great) syllogisms (see above, n. 21), and in addition ‘negation of arising in terms of existence and nonexistence’ (\textit{yod med skye (ba) ‘gogs (pa)}).

\textsuperscript{59} Compare Almogi 2009: 475–483, where other divisional schemes drawn up by Klong chen pa are presented in the context of a discussion of various conceptions of Buddhahood.
The subclassification of Madhyamaka as proposed in the lDe’u chos ’byung (119.16–20) and bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (33.1–35.5)

This second scheme is also found in the gSangs sngags lung gi bang mdzod, a gter ma text said to has been discovered by Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer, and one of the main sources for Mi pham’s bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad. This text is one of the few that attempt to explain the difference between the further subdivisions of Apratiṣṭhānavāda found in Tibetan sources:61

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Madhyamaka</th>
<th>Apratiṣṭhānavāda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Māyopamādvaya</td>
<td>Apratiṣṭhānavāda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. sTong pa rab tu mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. bTang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa 60 = Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Madhyamaka is [of] two [kinds]: (I) Māyopamādvaya[vāda] and (II) Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]:

(I) [For] Māyopamādvayavāda. Madhyamaka proper (don gyi dbu ma) is freedom from the four extremes.62 As regards the view of

60 As noted by Seyfort Ruegg, two of the four branches of Apratiṣṭhānavāda named here, namely, Zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa and rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa, were also listed by sGam po pa as subdivisions of this branch. See Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 35.

61 gSangs sngags lung gi bang mdzod (141.6–146.4).

62 An alternative interpretation of the sentence is possible: “Māyopamādvayavāda is the Madhyamaka [school] proper (don gyi dbu ma), [in that it posits] freedom from the four extremes.” In later Tibetan sources, Madhyamaka came to be subclassified broadly into ‘Madhyamaka of content, that which [can] be expressed’ (brjod bya don gyi dbu ma) and ‘Madhyamaka of words, that which expresses’ (rjod
Māyādvaya[vāda], it maintains that there are no external entities out beyond cognition (or mind), [this] by way of refuting the position of the Alikākāravāda [branch] of Yogācāra according to which [the manifold appearances caused by] residual impressions [implanted in] the mind can be described neither as being identical with it (i.e. the mind) nor as being something different [from it], while a perfect nature that is momentary is the absolute. [Query:] Well, how does [it, for example,] postulate (i.e. explain) white and red appearances? [Response:] [It] maintains that these appearances appear on account of residual impressions as mere illusion. Further, given that [they] have been caused by a condition, namely, self-cognition, they are [considered] to be non-arisen.

Moreover, it accepts two [kinds of truth or modes of reality, namely,] (1) absolute and (2) conventional:

(1) The conventional is of two [types]: (i) false conventional and (ii) efficacious (or functional) conventional. (i) The false [conventional] is like the appearance of two [moons that arise] from [one] moon. Although it (i.e. the second moon) appears, it is not efficacious. (ii) The efficacious conventional is endowed with four characteristics: it has arisen from causes and conditions; it is efficacious; it appears in a similar manner (i.e. to individuals sharing the same form of existence with the same non-erroneous sense of perception); and if it is examined it [is found to] be empty.63

(2) The absolute is of two [types]: (i) quasi-absolute truth (paryāya paramārthasatya) and (ii) absolute truth proper (nisparay-

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63 Compare Rong zom pa’s lTa phreng ’grel pa (324.11-13): de la yang dag pa ’i kun rdzob ni | dngos po’ rgyu rkyen las skyes pa | mthun par snang ba | don byed nus pa | btags na dben pa i mtsan nyid can rnams so || log pa ’i kun rdzob ni | snang du ’dra’ yang de ltar don byed mi nus pa rnams so ||.
āyaparamārthasatya). (i) Quasi-[absolute truth]: By applying the four kinds of logical reasoning (rigs pa: yukti)\textsuperscript{64} to the subject of a thesis (chos can: dharmin), [any] absolute entity (yang dag pa’i dngos po) [can] be rejected, and so [phenomena] are established as mere illusions. [As to the term paramārthasatya (don dam pa’i bden pa):] because [quasi-absolute truth] is the object of correct gnosis, it is called ‘absolute’; because it is non-erroneous and non-deceptive, it is called ‘truth.’ As to [the term] paryāya (rnam grangs), it refers to deconstructive logical reasoning. (ii) Absolute truth proper: If visual perception has not arisen, it [simply] has not arisen. When [it] has arisen, [it] has arisen in the form of visible matter. Visible matter is [in essence] of the nature of visual perception. Since visual [perception] is accompanied by images of visible matter, it is said to be ‘with images.’ Even though [the visual perception] is accompanied [by images of visible matter, the visible matter itself] is empty of real entities. Thus appearances [of visible matter and the like] do not cease, and [they continue to] appear in the form of mere illusions. And as they (i.e. phenomena) [are considered to] be one, [inasmuch as they are all like illusions, this school of thought] is called Māyopamādvāyavāda[vāda].

As regards being free from the four extremes: [The Māyopama-vāda’s view] is free from the extreme of eternalism because [it proposes that phenomena are] empty of true [existence]; it is free from the extreme of annihilationism because [it proposes that phenomena, which] are empty and yet appear, are unceasing; it is free from the extreme of [postulating] both [eternalism and annihilationism] because [it proposes that] the same [phenomena that] appear in the form of mere illusions are also devoid of true existence; it is free

\textsuperscript{64} For a recent brief discussion of the four kinds of logical reasoning along with references to primary and secondary literature, see Wangchuk 2009: 217–218.
from the extreme of [postulating] neither of the two because [it proposes that phenomena can] not be established as neither of the two through [the negation of] both. The Madhyamakālakāra states:65

As [we] do not [claim that] the various [phenomena are characterised by] eternalism,
[And] do not propound annihilationism,
[Or] neither eternalism nor annihilationism either.
[Our position] is free from the four extremes.

The explanation of the position of Māyopamādvaya[vāda] is [herewith] concluded.


(1) Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda that emphasises] emptiness postulates that the absolute and the conventional are separate. That is, [for it] the various appearances are conventional reality, and [thus] are deceptive and untrue appearances. On the absolute level, [phenomena are postulated as] being free from all extremes of manifoldness. [It is also] postulated that these entities are utterly nonexistent (gtan nas

65 This verse is not found in Śantarāksita’s Madhyamakālakāra (or in Ratnakaraśānti’s Madhyamālamkāropadeśa). Compare, however, Āryadeva II’s Jñānasārasamuccaya 28 (as in Mimaki 2000: 241), where the expression catuskotivinirmukta (mtha’ bzhi las grol) is employed in a similar context. The verse is also found in Jetāri’s *Sugatamatavibhakārikā (P, 64b7–8; D, 8a3; S, vol. 63: 885.7–8, where the Tibetan reads mtha’ bzhi dag las nges grol ba), and in Atiśa’s *Dharmadhātuddarśanagiti (P, 271a7–8; D, 256b2–3; S, vol. 26: 1665.10–12, where the Tibetan reads mtha’ bzhi yang ni nges grol bas).
med pa), just as whatever [apparently] substantial entities (rdzas kyi dngos po) that exist in a dream, for example, are utterly nonexistent after one has awakened. The Abhisamayālamkāra states:66

In virtue of [having realised] emptiness, one is released.
If one does not realise it, one is bound.

And:

What is the absolute [reality] of all phenomena like?
[The Buddha] declares: [It is] emptiness.

(2) Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda that emphasises] extinction postulates that as long as conceptual thoughts exist, [their] antidote—the accumulation of gnosis (jñānasambhāra)—also exists, but once conceptual thoughts are exhausted, even the term gnosis no [longer] exists. For example, it is like [charcoal]: as long as charcoal is present, [the colour] white does not occur.67

(3) Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda that emphasises] equanimity [postulates the following]: The preceding views rest on the extremes of false imputation and depreciation: That is, the Śrāvaka [system] has falsely imputed the object–subject dichotomy. [Māyopamāvāda] has suc-

66 These verses are not found in the Abhisamayālamkāra. What is expressed in them is, however, widely familiar. Regarding the first two lines, compare, for example, Hevajratantra 1.1.11ab. See also Wangchuk 2007: 199–200.

67 This analogy does not seem apt. As pointed out above, the usual analogy in this context is that of fire and wood (or fuel), which stand for gnosis and conceptual thoughts, respectively, in the sense that as long as there is fuel there is fire, and once the fuel is exhausted the fire, too, dies out. The analogy based on charcoal and the colour white seems to be used in the case of two things that are mutually exclusive. For such an instance, see Mipham’s ‘Od gsal snying po (110.6); ... sol ba bkrus kyang mi dkar ba .... One could, of course, interpret the analogy here in the sense that as long as charcoal has not been exhausted by fire, the colour white (referring in this case to the colour of the ash it leaves behind), would not appear. However, apart from the fact that I have not been able to locate an instance of such an analogy in this sense, it would still not serve the intended purpose.
cumbed to depreciation, inasmuch as [it] postulates that [phenomena], like illusions, are empty of an own-nature, [while it] has falsely imputed [existence to a logically attestable] illusory [nature]. The Apratiśṭhāna[vāda that emphasises] emptiness has succumbed to depreciation in [postulating that phenomena] do not exist even as mere illusions; [and it] has falsely imputed [existence to utter] emptiness.\footnote{One wonders why no reference is made here to the views of Yogācāra and rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa, both of which clearly fall under the category of views ‘lower’ than that of bTang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa in Nyang ral’s presentation. Moreover, one would naturally expect here that the Śrāvakas, too, would be accused of some kind of depreciation.}

(4) Apratiśṭhāna[vāda that emphasises] the union\footnote{Note that the text erroneously reads here ‘apratiśṭhāna of equanimity.’} [of appearance and emptiness postulates as follows]: Cognitions (or cognitive entities) have no substratum (\textit{yongs su gnas pa med pa = rab tu mi gnas pa}). appearances have no true existence [even] when one’s self-cognitive mind appears in the form of an [endless] cycle of dependent arising. As truly existent entities are not attestable [they can] not be held to be false [either]. [And it] proposes no thesis whatsoever. The Candrapradīpa (i.e. Samādhirājasūtra) states:\footnote{\textit{Ichigō} 1989:212, 213.}

\begin{quote}
No one, [not even] an intelligent [person],
Would be able to challenge
A view that contains no proposition.\footnote{\textit{I was not able to locate this verse in the Samādhirājasūtra. It is, nonetheless, clearly an allusion to Madhyamakālamkāra 68 and Catuḥśataka 16.25, for which see Ichigō 1989: 212, 213.}}
\end{quote}

[Propounding] neither existence, nonexistence, [both] existence and nonexistence, nor neither [of the two].

\footnote{Note the usage of the phrase \textit{khas len gyi lta ba yod med} by Rig ral in the same context in the passage paraphrased below.}
Having refuted the [claim that] appearances are truly existent, *Madhyamaka-Māyopamāyavāda maintains that illusion (or illusory nature) is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning. This is untenable: As far as illusion is concerned, any characteristic (mtshan nyid ci yin) [attributed to it that is allegedly] attestable on the basis of logical reasoning [can] be logically invalidated (rigs pas gnod pa).

[Objection: The position according to which] the cognitive subject that postulates that appearance is truly [existent] is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning is not refutable on the basis of logical reasoning. [Reply:] Well, in that case it needs to be asked whether illusion is existent from having arisen or existent from not having arisen, employing thereby [the logical reasoning of] ‘vajra slivers/fragments’ (rdor jre gzegs ma) [and the following line of argument]: Is appearance existent on account of [its] having arisen or [its] not having arisen? If [Māyopamavāda] states that it is called an illusion on account of its having arisen and [of its nevertheless being] nonexistent, it could be analogously stated (mgo bgre) that it is also called an appearance on account of [its] having arisen and [of its nevertheless being] nonexistent.

The supposed differences between these and other subdivisions of the two branches of Madhyamaka certainly need further investigation. Worth mentioning here, however, is the fact that Nyang ral explains rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa as the branch that maintains that gnosis exists as an antidote as long as conceptual thoughts exist, but once the latter come to an end, even the term ‘gnosis’ ceases to exist. This could certainly be taken as descriptive of Apratiṣṭhānavāda as understood by Rong zom pa. Also worth mentioning is that a number of bKa’ brgyud scholars, such as Padma dkar po (1527–1592), reportedly characterised the distinction between Sūtric and Tantric Mahāyāna as paralleling that between Rab tu mi gnas
Lastly, I would like to summarise the main points of bCom ldan Rig pa'i ral gri's treatment of Madhyamaka in his *Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog*, which attempts to address some of the issues surrounding the Tibetan controversy regarding this Madhyamaka divide. Rig ral first divides Madhyamaka into Svaṭantrika-Madhyamaka and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, and then adds that these are also called (zer) Māyopama[vāda] and Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda]. He goes on to list several differences (as obviously claimed by others) between the two branches—namely, that they differ over whether they postulate the existence or nonexistence of gnosis at [the stage of] a *buddha*; whether they accept or reject hypostatic existence on the conventional level; whether they do or do not have a thesis (*khas len gyi lta ba yod med*, lit. “whether they do or do not have a view [statable in terms] of propositions”); regarding the number of [types of] valid cognition [accepted by them]; whether they do or do not postulate that all objects are false and all minds are deluded; whether or not they postulate subdivisions of the conventional; whether they consider the absolute to be [characterisable in terms of] a non-implicative negation or freedom from manifoldness; and so forth—but then rejects the idea that one can differentiate between them on the basis of these criteria, since this approach would be inconclusive and even misleading. He refrains, however, for reasons of space, from discussing the matter in more detail. In the end, according to him, the basic distinction between the two lies in [the type of] syllogism [employed] (i.e. *svatantra* or *prasaṅga*). After addressing this point and citing from several authoritative Indian works, he goes on to state that what are called Māyopama[vāda] and Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda] in the Mahāmudrā [system] of Maitripa and elsewhere are in fact nothing but

72 See, for example, the discussion by dGe 'dun rin chen (1926–1997), the Sixty-ninth rJe mKhan po of Bhutan, in his *gsung lan dus gi pho nyal* (466.1–465.2).

73 *Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog* (391.1–6).
these two systems (i.e. Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka). This scheme, he opines, simply reflects a shift of emphasis: Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, when expounding on [reality], tend to [emphasise] the illusory [nature of phenomena], while Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamikas tend to [emphasise] freedom from manifoldness, [which means that] not even the illusory [nature of phenomena] has a substratum. Both of them set out to establish the illusory nature [of phenomena] on the basis of logical reasoning, and therefore saying that sGyu ma rigs grub [pa] (i.e. Māyopamāvāda, the school according to which this illusory [nature] is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning) is inferior (ngan pa) is [an expression of] ignorance (mi shes pa). After providing several citations from authoritative works, he continues by arguing that the claim by some that there are Mādhyamikas who postulate that the illusory [nature of phenomena] is the absolute truth is nothing but a superficial evaluation ('ol tshod), for if [this illusory nature] is transient, then [the claim that it is] the absolute cannot hold, whereas if it is not transient, then [the claim that it is] illusion-like would not hold; any postulation of the dependent [nature] on the absolute level would, moreover, conform to the system of the Substantialists. He further argues that the exposition found in some scriptures according to which the illusion-like [nature] is the absolute refers to the quasi-absolute (rnam grangs pa’i don dam). Therefore, he concludes, all Mādhyamikas are in agreement inasmuch as they postulate that the absolute is freedom from manifoldness.

5. Concluding Remarks

From what we have seen in the above-cited sources it can be said that the treatment of the Māyopamāvāda–Apratiṣṭhānavāda divide by both Indian

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74 [Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog] (393.6–394.5).
75 [Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog] (396.2–6).
scholars and their Tibetan successors, while often addressing similar questions and points of contention, was by no means homogeneous. What one can, however, say is that Māyopamādvayavāda is normally presented by Apratiṣṭhānavāda as a Madhyamaka school that attempts to positively determine the illusion-like nature of phenomena, while Apratiṣṭhānavāda is commonly said not only to reject such an attempt but, in addition, not to take a position at all in regard to the absolute (some, though, state that they positively determine phenomena, as being substratumless). Nonetheless, since all Indian sources cited above present the matter from the Apratiṣṭhānavādin viewpoint, one wonders whether there was anyone at all who considered himself a Māyopamādvādin—that is, in the sense portrayed by their Apratiṣṭhānavādin ‘opponents’—or whether the entire ‘controversy’ and ‘debate’ took place, at least initially, within Apratiṣṭhāna- vāda circles alone with (more or less) imaginary opponents. Whatever the case, this subclassification of Madhyamaka is certainly a late one, and apparently confined to a small circle of primarily Tantric Indian masters. This scheme therefore seems—possibly because institutionalised Buddhism on the Indian subcontinent was virtually coming to an end—to have never had the chance to undergo proper systematisation in India or to be systematically subjected to refutation by its opponents. Tibetans therefore inherited this doxographical scheme in a very rudimentary form, to say the least. And although they commonly attempted to systematise and harmonise whatever apparently conflicting doctrines they did inherit, we see in our case an unusually vehement rejection on the part of some Tibetan scholars, despite the fact that the scheme is found in several Indian sources. One possible explanation stems from the fact that the Indian proponents of this scheme, being strongly inclined towards Tantric teachings, did not enjoy much authority among Tibetan masters more inclined towards non-Tantric teachings. What is undoubtedly certain is that this scheme not only did not conform (at least not in an obvious manner)
with the widely accepted subclassification of Madhyamaka during the first propagation period of Buddhism in Tibet (i.e. that into Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka), but it also appeared to relegate highly revered masters such as Śāntarakṣita and other Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas to the inferior Māyopamāvāda branch, which was, at least for some, unacceptable (the same could be said, though, in regard to the Svātantra-Prāṣangika divide). Moreover, this scheme did not seem to correlate any more straightforwardly with the new partitioning of Madhyamaka into Svātantra-Madhyamaka and Prāṣangika-Madhyamaka, which finally gained the upper hand in Tibet (the nature of this latter scheme, to be sure, has also remained, to a certain degree, a matter of debate).

One of the main points of contention, and one reason for the vehement rejection, is no doubt the fact that most (later) Tibetan authors seem to have taken the difference between Māyopamāvāda and Apratiṣṭhānavāda to refer to their allegedly divergent postulations regarding the absolute. The claim that a Mādhyamika would postulate some kind of existence on the absolute level was no doubt unacceptable in their view. However, there remains the question of whether this was indeed the case. As I have shown in my above-mentioned study on various conceptions of Buddhahood—which, broadly speaking, can be subsumed under two groups: on the one hand, a conception of Buddhahood according to which the stage of a buddha comprises the purified dharmadhātu alone, and on the other, several conceptions that propose that the stage of a buddha comprises, in addition, other elements (such as non-conceptual gnosis, pure mundane gnosis, buddha-Bodies, bliss, and the like)—Rong zom pa convincingly shows that these different conceptions of Buddhahood refer to the conventional level and not to the absolute level. That is, the first conception is ascribed to Mādhyamikas who do not seem to follow any of the Yogācāra theories of knowledge for their postulation of the conventional level, while the
remaining conceptions are ascribed to Madhyamikas who follow one of the Yogācāra theories of knowledge towards that end. Moreover, the first group is associated with Apratiṣṭhānavāda, and the second with Māyopamāvāda. Provided that Rong zom pa’s understanding of the nature of the Māyopamāvāda-Apratiṣṭhānavāda divide (which is clearly supported by some Indian and early Tibetan sources) reflects the initial state of affairs, one wonders what would have been the reason for this cleft. I have already pointed out that Rong zom pa’s presentation of the controversy surrounding the constituents of Buddhahood and its connection with the Yogācāra theories of knowledge on the one hand and to the Māyopamāvāda-Apratiṣṭhānavāda divide on the other is unique in its scope and grasp of the issue, not only in comparison to discussions found in other Tibetan sources but also to ones that took place in India. However, as pointed out earlier, the recent publication of the so-called bKa’ gdamgs gsungs ’bum has revealed that Rong zom pa was not alone in his views on the Madhyamaka stance on Buddhahood and other issues, and presumably one is likely to find early material therein that will shed more light on the matter and help us answer at least some of the many open questions. It cannot be ruled out that Rong zom pa, at one end of the scale, is representative of highly sophisticated attempts at clarification and systematisation of the issue, which unfortunately fell into oblivion, whereas later authors, at the other end, reflect unawareness of such efforts, and certainly not of the epistemological issues underlying this divide.

Appendix

(a) Aśvaghoṣa/Śūra

*Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama* (P, 18a6–b4; D, 16a3–776; S, vol. 64:

76 The recto of the wooden block of fol. 16 in D was apparently damaged, since in several cases portions of letters are missing, the most likely explanation being that bits of the wood had broken off prior to printing.
gal te grub pa mtha’ yas pa’i
gnod pa ’di la rab tu ’du
des na ma brtags nyams dga’ ste
sgyu ma tsam la brtags pas bslus (1)
sems ni sgyu ma’i rnam pa ste
byang chub kyang ni sgyu ma ’dra
des kyang tshig tu brjod spangs te
spros bral ’jam dpal mthong ba min (2)
sgyu ma sgyu ma tsam min te
gal te yin na de mi grub
grub na gzhan gyi gzhung lugs kyang
sgyu ma’i chos su thal bar ’gyur
de phyir sgyu ma’i rang bzhin ni
sgyu bzhin ’di zhés brjod du med (3)
“on kyang thugs rje ldan pa yis
bden pa gnyis kyi tshul gnas te
thas snyad don la rab brten nas
bdag med seng ge’i sgra chen bsgrags (4)
stong pa nyid sogs rnam grangs sgo
sgyu ma ’dra sogs dpe mtha ’yas
theg pa sna tshogs thabs tshul gyis
mi gnas dbu ma nye bar mtshon (5)

77 tshig] P, tsheg D (the upper part of the gi gu seems to have broken off)
78 ’jam] P, ’ngam D (the middle stroke of ja seems to have broken off)
79 brjod] P, brngod D (the middle stroke of ja seems to have broken off)
80 ‘on kyang] D, ’di yang P
81 The upper part of the letter da in D is not visible (apparently having broken off).
82 The right-hand stroke of the superscript sa in D is not visible (apparently having broken off).
mtshon kyang mtshon bya ma yin te ||
’di la bsal bya ci yang med ||
stong pa nyid kyang stong pas stong ||
’di la sangs rgyas sems can med || (6)
bdag gzhan snang zhing srid pa’i chos ||
 rnam gro’l rnam par bcings pa yang ||
mint saram yang yod ma yin ||
thams cad nam mkha’ dang ’dra ste || (7)
del tar chos rnams mthong med na ||
mi mgon mi snang ’jam dpal mthong ||
skye dang “chi ba’i srid pa”83 yi ||
’khor ba’i rgya mtsho pha rol ’gro || (8)

(b) Candraharipāda
brtags84 pa’i yang dag bkag pa yis85 ||
shugs la rang rig sgyu ma’i lus ||
rigs86 dpyad yod med mtha’ las gro’l ||
ma brtags nyams dga’ bem87 rig gnyis ||

*Ratnamālā* (P, 69a8–b1; D, 71a5–6; S, vol. 63: 1045.17–1046.1):
snang srid sgyu ma lta bu la ||
ye shes sangs rgyas sgyu ma la ||
sgyu ma rigs88 pas grub na ni ||

83’chi ba’i srid pa] P, srid pa’i ’chi ba D
84 brtags] D, btags P
85 yis] D, yi P
86 rigs] D, rig P
87 bem] P, bems D
88 rigs] D, rig P
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavāda (Almogi) 187

sgyu ma ma yin yang dag thal∥
mi ’gyur sgyu mar grub ce na∥
riggs grub don ni yang dag min∥
sgyu ma’i ming gis ci byar yod∥
de yang dngos ’dzin gdon las ni∥
ma ’das pa ru mkhas rnams ’dod∥

(c) Jñānavajra
*Tattvamārgadarśana* (P, 148a5–8; D, 133a7–b2; S, p. vol. 41: 356.7–12):
de yang spyod lam khyad par med par dus gsum du lnga char°99 ’dod la lta
ba la khyad yod de| sbyor dngos mjug gsum mdo sde pas rten ’brel du ’dod
la| rnam bcas sems kyi rnam par ’dod| rnam med pas°90 bzang rtog tu ’dod
la| sgyu ma lta bus sgyu ma lta bur ’dod|°91 rab tu mi gnas pas kun rdzob
yin gyi don dam ma yin te| rmi lam lta bu mi bden par snang bar ’dod de|
don dam la khas len med pa’o∥ gzhan don dam du ’dod pa’o∥.

(d) Advayavajra
*Apratiṣṭhānadeśakavrtti* (P, 235a5–8; D, 215b4–6; S, vol. 26: 1536.8–16):
riggs pa gang zhe na| bdag nyid chen po rnams kyis sngon du legs par bkod
pa’i gang dag yod par grags pa’i chos thams cad°93 rten cing ’brel par ’byung
ba tsam las byung ba’i phyir| sgyu ma lta bu’o zhes bya ba dang| de nyid
kyis don dam par na rang dang°94 gzhan dang gnyis ka dang rgyu med pa las
skye ba nam yang mi ’thad pa’i phyir don°95 dam par nam mkha’i padma lta

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89 char] D, car P
90 pas] D, dpas P
91 |] D, | P
92 |] D, | P
93 cad] D, cad| P
94 dang] D, dang| P
95 don] P, dan D
bu'o\(^{96}\) zhes bstan pa 'di kho nas chog ste\| shes rab kyi mig dang ldan pa
rnams kyis rang bzhin gyi\(^{97}\) gtan tshigs 'di kho na'i sgo nas drang por zhib
tu bltas na\| mthar ci yang grub pa ma rnyed pas\| chos thams cad rab tu
mi gnas par grub\(^{98}\) pa'o\|.

(e) **Vajrapāṇi**

*Guruparamparākramopadeśa* (P, 184b6–185a3; D, 164b4–165a1; S, vol. 41:
446.10–447.13);\(^{99}\)

rim gyis 'jug pa'i dbang du byas na theg pa ni gsum ste\| nyan thos kyi theg
pa dang\| rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang\| theg pa chen po'o\| theg pa
gsum ni gnas pa bzhi la gnas te\| gnas pa bzhi ni bye brag tu smra bar gnas
pa dang\| mdo sde par gnas pa dang\| rnal 'byor spyod par gnas pa dang\| dbu 'ma par"\(^{100}\) gnas pa'o\| nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas ni bye brag tu
smra ba la gnas so\| bye brag tu smra ba la yang gnyis te\| nub phyogs bye
brag tu smra ba dang\| kha che bye brag tu smra ba'o\| nyan thos la gsum
ste\| dbang po tha ma dang\| 'bring dang"\(^{101}\) rab bo\| de la tha ma dang
'bring po ni 'nub phyogs"\(^{102}\) bye brag tu smra ba la gnas so\| rab dang
rkyen rtogs\(^{103}\) ni kha che bye brag tu smra ba\(^{104}\) la gnas so\| theg\(^{105}\) pa chen
po\(^{106}\) la yang gnyis te\| rgyu mtshan nyid kyi\(^{107}\) theg pa dang\| 'bras bu rdo

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\(^{96}\) bu'o\] D, bu'o\| P
\(^{97}\) gyi\] D, gyis P
\(^{98}\) grub\] P, ma grub D
\(^{99}\) This passage has not been translated but rather paraphrased.
\(^{100}\) ma par\] D, mar P
\(^{101}\) \] P, om. D
\(^{102}\) nub phyogs\] P, nub phyogs kha che D
\(^{103}\) rtogs\] em., rtog PD
\(^{104}\) ba\] D, om. P
\(^{105}\) theg\] P, thig D
\(^{106}\) po\] D, hardly legible in P due to excessive ink
\(^{107}\) kyi\] D, kyis P
rje'i thig pa'o" de la rgyu mtshan nyid kyi thig pa la gsum stey tham deng| 'bring deng| rab bo" tham ni mdo sde pa'o" 'bring ni rnal 'byor spyod pa'o" rab ni dbu ma pa'o" rnal 'byor spyod pa la gnyis te| rnam pa deng bcas pa108 deng| rnam pa med pa'o" dbu ma pa la yang gnyis te| sgyu ma lta bu gnyis su med par smra ba deng| chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par smra ba'o"}

da ni sgyu ma lta bu'i gzhung bshad par bya ste|
[[ «yod min med min yod110 med min» gnyis ka min pa'ang ma yin pa|| mtha' bzhi las ni rnam grol ba|| de nyid dbu ma pa yis rig||111*112 ces bya bas|113 yod pa ma yin pa ni gcig dang du ma'i sbyor bas gnod pa'i phyir ro|| med pa ma yin pa ni snang ba nyams su myong ba yod pa'i phyir ro|| gnyis ka ma yin pa ni gnyis ka la skyon114 yod pa'i phyir ro|| gnyis ka ma yin pa yang ma yin pa ni rgyu med pa mi srid pa deng| phung po gsum pa med pa'i phyir ro ]]}
de bas na mtha' bzhi las grol ba'i sgyu ma lta bu'i shes pa 'od gsal bar 'dod 'do"115 de yang mya ngan las 'das pa'i chos kyang sgyu ma lta bu rmi lam lta 'bu la"116 mya ngan las 'das pa las ches lhag pa'i chos yod na yang de yang117 sgyu ma lta bu rmi lam lta bu'o zhes gsungs pas| sna tshogs dang

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108 pa] P, ma D
109 The text within [[...]] has not been translated.
110 yod] D, lod P
111 ||] D, om. P
112 This is a citation of Tattvaratnavali 25 (6.13–14); Tib. (P, 129a4; D, 118a7–b1; S, vol. 26: 343.2–3).
113 || D, || P
114 skyon] D, skon P
115 do||] P, de| D
116 bu la] P, bu D
sems nyid sgyu ma lta bur gnyis su med pa ni so sor rtog pa’o || sna tshogs thams cad chu zla’am me long gi gzugs brnyan ltar bden pa ma yin la brdzun pa yang ma yin par sgyu ma lta ‘bur gnyis’\textsuperscript{118} su med par ’jog\textsuperscript{119} pa ni sgom\textsuperscript{120} pa’o \|\textsuperscript{121} chad par zhen pa ni sgom pa’i dri ma’o || sgyu ma lta bu’i shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas\textsuperscript{122} pha rol tu phyin pa lnga mi dmigs pa gsum gyis ’khor gsum yongs su dag par byas\textsuperscript{123} nas sems can gyi don byed pa ni lta ba’o ||

gzhan yang chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas\textsuperscript{124} pas sgyu ma lta bu nyid ma grub par ’dod de\textsuperscript{125} de yang ’di skad du |
gsal lam mi gsal yang rung ste ||
sus kyang ji bzhin ma mthong bas ||
mo gsham gyi ni bu bzhin du ||
brjod du zin kyang don med de ||
zhes bya bas sgyu ma lta bu nyid ’od gsal lam| ’on te sems las gzhan zhe na|

sems las gzhan pa’i chos ni ma grub la| sems nyid yin na sems nyid ma grub pa’i dus su sgyu ma nyid kyang mi ’grub bo|| de ci’i phyir zhe na| sems nyid las gzhan med pa’i phyir ro|| sgyu ma lta bu yang mi mkhas\textsuperscript{126} pa’i shes pa ste| sgro ’dogs skur pa ’debs pa ste| dper na skyes bu ’mig ma dag pas\textsuperscript{127} mig nam mkha’ la bltas na mig ma dag pa’i stobs kyis zla ba

\textsuperscript{117} yang] D, yar P
\textsuperscript{118} bur gnyis] D, \textit{mostly defaced} P
\textsuperscript{119} ’jog] P, ’jig D
\textsuperscript{120} sgom] P, bsgom D
\textsuperscript{121} ||] D, | P
\textsuperscript{122} pas] D, pa yis P
\textsuperscript{123} byas] \textit{em.}, spyad PD.
\textsuperscript{124} gnas] P, dmigs D
\textsuperscript{125} ] P, \textit{om.} P
\textsuperscript{126} mkhas] D, ”s \textit{defaced in} P
\textsuperscript{127} mig ma dag pas] \textit{em.}, ma dag pas PD. \textit{Cf. the reading in the parallel passage}
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratīṣṭhānavāda (Almogi) 191

gnyis pa dang| skra'i khor lo la sog sna ng og la snang zhes sgro 'dogs la mkhas pa'i shes pas snang ma thag tu med par shes te| med do zhes skur pa 'debs so||
de bzhin du sgyu ma lta bu yang las dang ma rig pa'i dbang gis sna tshogs su snang ngo zhes sgro btags la| mkhas pa'i stobs kyis\textsuperscript{128} snang ma thag tu stong stel sgyu ma lta bu zhes skur pa 'debs so|| de bas na sgro 'dogs pa dang\textsuperscript{129} skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha la gnas so||

\textit{Guruparamparākramopadeśa} (P, 189b6–190b5; D, 169a1–b5; S, vol. 41: 457.20–459.21);\textsuperscript{130}
de nas gzhan yang chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par\textsuperscript{131} smra bar 'dod\textsuperscript{132} pas
\[\['\text{dzi skad du}|| \text{sna tshogs rtag pa ma yin te}|| \text{chad par yang ni khas mi len}|| \text{rtag dang chad pa gnyis ka dang}|| \text{gnyis ka min pa'ang ma yin no}|| \text{'dir ni thams cad mi gnas par}|| \text{dngos po'i de nyid mkhas pas rig}|| \text{des na 'di lta'i rnam rtog gi}|| \text{sems ni sems kyis rig ma yin}|| \text{ji srid sgro 'dogs thams cad ni}|| \text{de kun thams cad du med pas}|| \text{dbu ma'i don la sgro 'dogs med}|| \text{des na dgag dang sgrub pa med}|| \text{ces bya ba dang}|| \text{gzhan nas kyang}|| \text{ 'di la 'bsal bya}\textsuperscript{135} ci yang med}|| \text{gzhag par bya ba gang yang med}|| \text{yang dag nyid la yang dag blta}\textsuperscript{136}|| \text{yang dag mthong na rnam par grol}||\textsuperscript{137} zhes

\textit{below}: skye bo mig dag pa.

\textsuperscript{128} kyis D, \textit{defaced in} P
\textsuperscript{129} dang D, dang| P
\textsuperscript{130} \textit{The text within [\ldots]} has not been translated.
\textsuperscript{131} par] \textit{em.}, pa'i mthar PD
\textsuperscript{132} 'dod] \textit{em.}, 'dong D, \textit{defaced in} P
\textsuperscript{133} ||| D, | P
\textsuperscript{134} \textit{This is a citation of} Tattvaratnāvali 27–29 (6.23–7.1) (P, 129a8–b2; D, 118b3–5; S, vol. 26: 343.13–19).
\textsuperscript{135} bsal bya] D, gsal ba P
\textsuperscript{136} blta] P, lta D
\textsuperscript{137} \textit{This is a citation of} Abhisamayālamkāra 5.21 (= Ratnagotravibhāga 1.154). \textit{For further references and a translation, see} Wangchuk 2007, pp. 199-200, n. 11; Almogi
bya bas]

yod pa'i sgro 'dogs dang med pa'i skur pa 'debs pa la mi gnas te| sems nyid sna tshogs su 'snang ba nyams su\(^{138}\) myong ba nyid rten cing 'brel par 'byung bas na ma skyes pa ste| ma skyes pa nyid skye ba ltar snang ste| skye ba dang skye ba med pa gnyi ga tha mi dad do|| de bzhin du snang ba nyid rigs pas brtags na stong pa yin la| stong pa ma grub pa rigs pas brtag mi bzod pa nyid snang ba'o|| snang ba nyid las kyang stong pa gzhan ma yin la| stong pa nyid\(^{139}\) las kyang snang ba gzhan ma yin no|| dper na smig rgyu la chur snang ba nyid la chu yis stong la| chu med pa nyid chur snang ste| chur snang ba dang chu med pa gnyis tha dad pa ma yin no\(^{140}\)|| de bzhin du snang ba nyid na rang bzhin med 'la\(^{141}\) rang bzhin med pa nyid snang ba'o|| snang ba dang rang bzhin med pa stong pa nyid ni tha mi\(^{142}\) dad 'do\(^{143}\)|| dper na bud shing du ma mes bsregs na me'i ngo bor gcig ste| de nas bud shing zad pa dang me nyid mi gnas so|| de bzhin du sna tshogs su snang ba nyid rigs pas stong pa nyid du byas nas dngos po ma grub pa dang stong pa nyid kyang mi gnas so|| de bzhin du gnyis su mi gnas pa yang gnyis su ma grub pa'i tshe\(^{144}\) na gnyis su med pa yang mi 'grub bo|| de bas na gzhan gyi zhen pa bzlog 'pa 'am\(^{145}\) | sgro skur gcad\(^{146}\) 'pa 'am\(^{147}\) | 'drang bai\(^{148}\) don du stong pa dang skye ba med pa zhes brjod kyi| mkhas

2009: 312.

\(^{138}\) snang ba nyams su] P, *om.* D

\(^{139}\) nyid] D, *om.* P

\(^{140}\) no] P, na D

\(^{141}\) la] D, pa || P

\(^{142}\) mi] P, me D

\(^{143}\) do ||] D, de | P

\(^{144}\) tshe] P, che D

\(^{145}\) pa 'am] P, pa'am D

\(^{146}\) gcad] D, bcad P

\(^{147}\) pa 'am] P, pa'am D

\(^{148}\) drang bai] P, drad pa'i D
pas btsal\textsuperscript{149} ‘pa ’am’\textsuperscript{150} nges pa’i don du de\textsuperscript{151} nyid mi gnas te\textsuperscript{151} rnam gcod dang| yongs gcod dang| sgro ’dogs dang\textsuperscript{152} skur pa ’debs pa yang mi gnas la| zhen pa med cing dgag pa dang|\textsuperscript{153} sgrub pa med la\textsuperscript{154} mnyam gzhag dang rjes thob gnyis su med cing mi gnas pa ni so sor rtog pa’o\textsuperscript{155} sgro skur dang zhen pa med par yid la byed pa med pa ni sgom pa’o\textsuperscript{156} don thams cad chad par lta zhing nyams su myong ba med pas bems por gyur pa ni sgom pa’i dri ma’o\textsuperscript{157} sgro skur med pa dang| zhen pa med pa’i shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas pha rol tu phyin pa lnga mi dmigs pa gsum gyis ’khor gsum yongs su dag pas sems can gyi don byed pa ni lta ba’o\textsuperscript{158} dper na skye bo mig dag pa mkhas pa ‘mig gis’\textsuperscript{159} nam mkha’ la ‘bltas pas’\textsuperscript{160} mig dag pas skra’i\textsuperscript{161} ’khor lo la sogs pa ci yang mi dmigs la| mkhas pas yod ces bya ba’am med ces bya bar sgro ’dogs ‘pa ’am’\textsuperscript{162} skur pa ’debs par mi byed do\textsuperscript{163} de bzhin du chos thams cad rang bzhin du ma skyes pa’i ngo bo nyid kyis yod med gang yang mi gnas pas yod med kyi sgro skur gang\textsuperscript{164} du yang mi gnas pa ni de kho na nyid kyi shes pa’o\textsuperscript{165} sgyu ma lta bu dang rab tu mi gnas pa’i snying rje yang dmigs pa med pa’i snying rje ste| chos thams cad cir yang mi dmigs par yid la byed pas na mi dmigs pa’i snying rje’o\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{149} btsal] D, gcal P
\textsuperscript{150} pa ’am] P, pa’am D
\textsuperscript{151} de] P, di D
\textsuperscript{152} ]] D, om. P
\textsuperscript{153} ]] D, om. P
\textsuperscript{154} la] D, la| P
\textsuperscript{155} mig gis] P, cig D
\textsuperscript{156} bltas pas] P, lta ba na D
\textsuperscript{157} skra’i] D, sgra’i P
\textsuperscript{158} pa ’am] P, pa’am D
\textsuperscript{159} gang] P, gad D
(f) Atiśa (ascribed)

**bKa’ gdams bu chos** (160.9-16):

de la gnyis| dбу ma dang| sems tsam mo|| dбу ма la gnyis te| snang ba tsam gyi dбу ma dang| rab tu mi gnas pa’i dбу ma’o|| snang ba tsam gyi dбу ma ni| chos rdzun pa yin pa rdzun par gtan la ’bebs te| rmi lam la sogs pa sgyu ma’i dpe brgyad kyis bstan no|| de yang bstan bya ston byed gnyis ka ’khrul ba’i yul dang yul can yin pas spang bya yin la shes par bya dgos so|| rab tu mi gnas pa’i dбу ma ni| sangs rgyas rnams byon yang rung| ma byon yang rung| chos rnams kyi chos nyid ye nas mi gnas par gsungs pas| blang bya yin la shes par bya dgos so|| sems tsam la gnyis te| snang ba bden par smra ba dang| rdzun par smra ba’o|| de dag gnyis car rab tu mi gnas pa’i dбу ma la ltos te ’khrul ba yin la shes par ni bya dgos|  

(g) **Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas**

**bsTan rim chen mo** (437b7-438a3):

yang blun po kha cig dбу ma’i lugs gnyis te| rab tu mi gnas pa dang sgyu ma lta bur smra ba’o|| slob dpon zhi ba ’tsho la sogs pa ni sgyu ma don dam pa bzhed pa ste| dngos po smra bas btags pa bden pa bkag nas brdzun pa yongs gcod rigs pas bsgrub pa kho na’o zhes zer ba ni ci ’ang ma yin te| dбу ma’i rgyan nyid las|

deb phyir dngos po ’di dag ni||
kun rdzob pa nyid mtshan nyid ’dzin||
gal te don dam ’di ’dod na||
de la bdag gis ci byar yod||

ces rdzun pa de snang ba’i yul tsam du gsungs la| skye ba dgag pa dgag bzhis bs dus pa’i yongs gcod ni log pa’i kun rdzob nyid du gsungs pa’i phyir dang| yod pa’am med pa’ang rung ’ga’ zhig rigs pas gnas par smra na mthar lta ba’i gdon chen pos zin pas dбу ma’i lam las thag ring ba nyid do||
yod na nges par rtag par zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa’i phyir ro||
(h) Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge

*gzhung rnam ’byed* (65.6–67.2):

don dam pa’i bden pa la yang kha cig bden pas stong pa’i snang ba\(^{160}\) sgyu ma lta bur smra ba dang| ma yin dgag tu bden pa gang du yang rab tu mi gnas par smra ba’i lugs gnyis yod zer ba ni mun sbrul gyi bshad pa ste| sgyu ma lta bur smra ba rab tu mi gnas pa\(^{161}\) smra ba las\(^{162}\) lugs gzhan du brjod pa de \(a\) bden pas\(^{163}\) stong par\(^{164}\) khas mi len pas\(^{165}\) lugs gzhan yin nam| \(b\) snang ba\(^{166}\) ma yin dgag tu khas len pas lugs gzhan yin| \(a\) dang po ltar na sgyu ma lta bur smra bas bden pas stong par khas mi len na de snang ba\(^{167}\) sna tshogs par khas len par 'gal bas sgyu ma lta bu nyid kyang khas mi len par ‘thal lo‘\(^{170}\) \(b\) gnyis pa ltar na \(i\) snang ba\(^{171}\) ma yin dgag pa tsam khas len pas\(^{172}\) rab tu mi gnas pa las\(^{173}\) lugs gzhan yin nam \(i\) snang ba ma yin ‘dgag de‘\(^{174}\) dpyad bzod du khas len pas rab tu mi gnas pa las lugs gzhan yin| \(i\) dang po ‘ltar na‘\(^{175}\) rab tu mi gnas par smra ba nyid kyang rab tu mi gnas pa las lugs gzhan du ’gyur te| snang ba\(^{176}\) ma yin

\(^{160}\) ba] *em., text reads pa*
\(^{161}\) par] *em., text reads pa’i*
\(^{162}\) las] *em., text reads la*
\(^{163}\) pas] *em., text reads pa*
\(^{164}\) par] *em., text reads pa*
\(^{165}\) pas] *em., text reads pa*
\(^{166}\) ] *em., text reads]*
\(^{167}\) ba] *em., text reads pa*
\(^{168}\) ] *em., text reads]*
\(^{169}\) ba] *em., text reads pa*
\(^{170}\) thal lo] *exp., text reads thalo*
\(^{171}\) ba] *em., text reads pa*
\(^{172}\) pas] *em., text reads par*
\(^{173}\) las] *em., text reads la*
\(^{174}\) dgag de] *em., text reads te dgag*
\(^{175}\) ltar na] *em., text reads ltar*
\(^{176}\) ba] *em., text reads pa*
'dgag de’77 tsam khas len pa’i ‘phyir ro’78∥ khas mi len na kun rdzob la skur pa ’debs pas rgyang ‘phen pa’79 ltar chad par ’gyur te| des ma mthong ba80 bkag pa ltar ’dis mthong ba81 nyid kyang bkag pa’i phyir ro∥ (ii) gnyis pa ltar na sgyu ma lta bur smra ba dpyad bzod ’di pa ma yin dgag khas len pas dngos por82 smra ba dang tha dad ’med par’83 ’gyur ro∥ rab tu mi gnas pa yang sgyu ma lta bur smra ba las lugs gzhan du brjod na84 (a) sgyu ma khas mi85 len pa’am (b) sgyu ma dpyad bzod du khas mi len pas lugs gzhan yin| (a) dang po ltar na rab tu mi gnas pas86 kun rdzob ’thams cad’87 mi ’dod pas ’rgyang ’phen pas’88 kyang smad par bya bar ’gyur te| rgyang ’phen89 pas kun rdzob kyi phyogs gcig90 la skur91 pa btab pa yin la rab tu mi gnas pas kun rdzob ’thams cad’92 la skur ba btab pa’i phyir ro∥ (b) gnyis pa ltar na sgyu ma lta smra ba nyid kyang sgyu ma ltar smra ba nyid93 las tha dad du ’gyur te|94 sgyu ma dpyad bzod par khas len pa’i phyir ro∥ dpyad bzod du khas len na bden pa’i snang ba95 yin

177 dgag de] em., text reads te dgag  
178 phyir ro] exp., text reads phyiro  
179 ’phen pa] em., text reads phan phar  
180 ba] em., text reads pa  
181 ba] em., text reads pa  
182 The final r is added below the syllable po.  
183 med par] em., text reads par  
184 [] em., text reads []  
185 The syllable mi is added below the line of writing.  
186 pas] exp., text reads pa  
187 thams cad] exp., text reads thamd  
188 rgyang ’phen pas] em., text reads rgyas pa bas  
189 ’phen] em., text reads phan  
190 gcig] em., text reads cig  
191 skur] em., text reads bskur  
192 thams cad] exp., text reads thamd  
193 The text inserts here kyang sgyu mar smra ba.  
194 [] em., text reads []  
195 ba] em., text reads pa
pas sgyu ma'i don mi gnas la| snang ba\textsuperscript{196} dpyad bzod\textsuperscript{197} par 'dod pas dngos
por smra ba dang yang tha dad med par 'gyur ro|| 'de bas na'\textsuperscript{198} dbu ma ba
'thams cad'\textsuperscript{199} kyis sgyu ma lta bu nyid ni dpyad\textsuperscript{200} par mi 'dod pas| cir
yang ma grub pa kho na dpyad bzod par 'dod pa la tha dad gtan med pa yin
no||

(i) Rog Shes rab 'od

\textit{Grub mtha' bstan pa'i sgron me} (A, 176.5–177.5; B, 264.3–265.3):
gnyis pa rnam bcad\textsuperscript{201} dgag bya la gnyis te| spyi dang| bye brag go||
dang po dgag bya spyi'i mtshan nyid ni| dngos po 'am| dngos med kyang
rung ste| rigs\textsuperscript{202} pas dpyad\textsuperscript{203} nas\textsuperscript{204} rang bzhin gyi khyad par 'ga' zhig
dang ldan par 'dod pa gang rnyed pa de dgag bya yin no|| 'dgag bya'\textsuperscript{205} la
bye brag tu phye na gnyis te| med pa dgag pa dang| ma yin pa dgag
pa'o|| med pa dgag pa ni| so so skye bo dang| nyan thos pa| phyi rol gyi
don dngos por 'dod pa 'gogs la| ma yin pa dgag pa ni| sems tsam rang rig
don dam du 'dod pa 'gogs pa'o||
yongs gcod\textsuperscript{206} bsgrub bya la gnyis te| sgyu ma lta bu| rab tu mi gnas
pa'o|| sgyu ma lta bu ni| snang ba'i dngos por bkag nas| shul du sgyu ma

\textsuperscript{196} ba]\textit{ em., text reads pa}

\textsuperscript{197} The text inserts here du khas len na bden pa'i snang ba yin pas sgyu ma'i don mi
gnas la| snang ba dpyad bzod, obviously due to a skip of the eye to the previous
sentence.

\textsuperscript{198} de bas na]\textit{ em., text reads de bas}
\textsuperscript{199} thams cad]\textit{ exp., text reads thamd}
\textsuperscript{200} dpyad]\textit{ em., text reads spyad}
\textsuperscript{201} bcad]\textit{ em., gcod A, gcad B}
\textsuperscript{202} rigs] B, rig A
\textsuperscript{203} dpyad]\textit{ em., spyad AB}
\textsuperscript{204} nas] B, na A
\textsuperscript{205} dgag bya] B, dag ga A
\textsuperscript{206} gcod] A, spyod B
Māyopamādvavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda (Almogi)

tsam cig\textsuperscript{207} sgrub pa’o || rab tu mi gnas pa ni| snang ba’i dngos por ’dod pa bkag nas sgyu ma tsam du yang mi ’dod de rab tu mi gnas pa’o||

Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me (A, 189.2–190.3; B, 275.2–276.2):
spyi don bzhi pa rjes dpag gi ’jug yul la gnyis te| rang rgyud dang| thal ’gyur ro|| de gnyis kyi khyad par ni| rang rgyud kyi lta ba la dogs pa’i skyon sel tsam cig\textsuperscript{208} rang rgyud yin la| gzhan gyi khas len ’gogs pa de thal ’gyur ro|| rang rgyud la gnyis te| sgyu ma lta bu dang| rab tu mi gnas pa’o|| de gnyis kyi khyad par yang| rnam bcad\textsuperscript{209} kyi dus su dgag bya bkag nas| yongs gcod\textsuperscript{210} la rdzun pa’i\textsuperscript{211}|| sgyu ma lta bur khas len pa ni| sgyu ma lta bu’o|| rnam bcad\textsuperscript{212} la bden pa’i dngos po bkag nas| yongs gcod\textsuperscript{213} la khas len gang yang med pa ni rab tu mi gnas pa’o|| de gnyis rang rgyud do|| thal ’gyur ni| rang gi khas len gang yang med pa la| gzhan gyis yang dag tu khas len pa ’gogs\textsuperscript{214} pa’o|| de gang gis ’gogs na| gong du bstan pa’i rigs pa lnga pos ’gogs so||

(j) Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer
gSangs sngags lung gi bang mdzod (141.6–146.4):
dbu ma la gnyis te\textsuperscript{215}; (I) sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med pa dang; (II) rab tu mi gnas pa’o;

(I) \textsuperscript{142} sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med par smra ba ni; mtha’ bzhi dang bral ba don gyi dbu ma’o; sgyu ma gnyis med kyi lta ba ni; sems tsam

\textsuperscript{207} cig A, gcig B
\textsuperscript{208} cig A, gcig B
\textsuperscript{209} bcad em., dpyad AB
\textsuperscript{210} gcod em., dpyod AB
\textsuperscript{211} pa’i A, pa’am B
\textsuperscript{212} bcad em., dpyad AB
\textsuperscript{213} gcod em., dpyod AB
\textsuperscript{214} ’gogs B, ’gog A
\textsuperscript{215} te] em., text reads ste
rnam rdzun gyis\textsuperscript{216} sems nyid kyi bag chags dang; de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du med pa dang don dam yongs grub skad cig mar ’dod pa bkag nas ’di shes pa las ma gtogs\textsuperscript{217} pa phyi rol gyi don med par ’dod pa de; ’o na dkar dmar gyi snang ba ’di ji ltar ’dod zhes na; snang ba ’di nyid bag chags kyi dbang gis; sgyu ma tsam du snang bar ’dod; de yang rang rig pa’i rkyen las bskyed pa’i phyir ma skyes pa ces bya’o;

de yang (1) don dam (2) kun rdzob gnyis su ’dod de;

(1) kun rdzob la yang gnyis; (i) log pa’i kun rdzob dang| (ii) don byed pa’i kun rdzob bo\textsuperscript{218}; (i) log pa ni zla ba las gnyis su snang ba lta bu ste; snang yang don byed mi nus pa’o; (ii) don byed pa’i kun rdzob ni; mtshan nyid bzhi dang ldan pa ste; rgyu rkyen las skyes pa; don byed nus pa| mthun par snang ba; brtags na dben pa’o;

(2) don dam la gnyis; (i) rnam grangs kyi don dam pa’i bden pa dang; (ii) rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam pa’i bden pa’o; (i) rnam grangs ni; gtan tshig bzhi chos can la bzhag pas; yang dag pa’i ‘dngos po\textsuperscript{219} bcad nas; sgyu ma tsam du bsgrub pa’o; ye shes dam pa’i yul du gyur pas don dam pa zhes bya’o; ma nor mi slu bas bden pa ces bya’o; rnam grangs ni ’joms\textsuperscript{220} byed kyi rigs\textsuperscript{221} pa la \textsuperscript{143} bya’o; (ii) rnam grangs\textsuperscript{222} ma yin pa’i\textsuperscript{223} don dam pa’i bden pa ni; mig gi rnam par shes pa ma skyes na ma skyes; skyes na gzugs su skyes; gzugs mig gi rnam par shes pa’i ngo bo yin; ‘mig gzugs\textsuperscript{224} gzugs kyi rnam pa dang bcas pas\textsuperscript{225}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{216} gyis\textsuperscript{216} em., text reads gyi \textsuperscript{217} gtogs\textsuperscript{217} em., text reads rtogs \textsuperscript{218} bo\textsuperscript{218} em., text reads so \textsuperscript{219} dngos po\textsuperscript{219} em., text reads dngos \textsuperscript{220} ’joms\textsuperscript{220} em., text reads ’jam \textsuperscript{221} rigs\textsuperscript{221} em., text reads rig \textsuperscript{222} grangs\textsuperscript{222} em., text reads pa \textsuperscript{223} pa’i\textsuperscript{223} em., text reads pa \textsuperscript{224} mig gzugs\textsuperscript{224} exp., text reads migzugs \textsuperscript{225} pas\textsuperscript{225} em., text reads pa
\end{flushright}
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda (Almogi)

rnam\(^{226}\) bcas\(^{226}\) zhes bya'o\(^{226}\) bcas bzhin du yang dag pa'i dngos por stong pas snang ba ma 'gags te\(^{227}\) sgyu ma tsam du snang ba yin la\(^{227}\) de gnyis su med pas sgyu ma gnyis med zhes bya'o\(^{227}\).

mtha' bzhis las gro' lugs ni\(^{228}\) yang dag pa'i stong pas rtag\(^{228}\) pa'i mtha' dang bral\(^{228}\) stong zhi nga snang ba ma 'gags pas chad pa'i mtha' dang bral\(^{228}\) sgyu ma tsam du snang ba nyid yang dag gi dngos por stong pas gnyis ka'i mtha' dang bral\(^{228}\) gnyis ka bas gnyis med ma grub pas\(^{228}\) gnyis med kyi mtha' dang bral\(^{228}\) dbyu ma rgyan las\(^{228}\).

sna tshogs rtag\(^{229}\) pa ma yin pas\(^{229}\)
chad pa yang ni khas mi len\(^{229}\)
rtag chad gnyis ka ma yin pas\(^{229}\)
mtha 'bzhis las ni yongs su gro'\(^{229}\) ces 'byung ngo\(^{229}\) sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med pa'i 'dod pa bshad zin no\(^{229}\).

(II) rab tu mi gnas pa la bzhi ste\(^{226}\) (1) stong pa rab tu mi gnas pa\(^{226}\) (2) rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa\(^{226}\) (3) btags snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa\(^{226}\) (4) zung 'jug rab tu mi gnas pa

(1) stong pa rab tu mi gnas pa ni\(^{226}\) don dam dang kun rdob thad du 'dod pa ste\(^{226}\) snang pa sna tshogs 'di kun rdzob kyi bden pa 'khrul pa'i snang <144> ba mi bden pa'o\(^{226}\) don dam pa na spros pa'i mtha' thams cad dang bral ba'o\(^{226}\) dper na rmi lam rdzas kyi dngos po ci yod pa las\(^{226}\) sad nas gtan med pa bzhin\(^{226}\) dngos po 'di gtan nas med par 'dod\(^{226}\) mngon par rtogs pa'i brgyan las\(^{226}\)

stong pa nyid kyi syis gro' bar 'gyur\(^{226}\)
de ma shes na 'ching\(^{230}\) bar 'gyur\(^{230}\)

\(^{226}\) rnam] em., text reads rnams
\(^{227}\) te] em., text reads ste
\(^{228}\) rtag] em., text reads rtags
\(^{229}\) rtag] em., text reads btags
\(^{230}\) 'ching] em., text reads 'chi
zhes pa dang;
chos thams cad kyi yang dag pa ji lta bu lags;
bka’ stsal pa stong pa nyid;
zhes pa’o;

(2) rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa ni; ji srid rnom rtog yod kyi bar du; gnyen po ye shes kyi tshogs kyang yod la; rnom rtog zad nas ye shes kyi ming yang med par ‘dod do; dper na sol ba ma zad na dkar po mi yong pa ltar ro;

(3) btang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa ni; de man chad kyi lta ba sgros btags dang; skur ‘debs kyi mtha’ la gnas te; nyan thos kyi yis; gzung ‘dzin du sgros btags; sgyu ma lta bur rang bzhin gyis stong par ‘dod pa pa skur ‘pa btab; sgyu ma sgros btags; stong pa rab tu mi gnas pas sgyu ma tsam du yang med ces skur pa btab; stong pa sgros btags so;

(4) ‘zung ‘jug; rab tu mi gnas pa ni; blo yongs su gnas pa med de; snang ba rang gi sems kyi rang rig rtren ‘brel gyi ‘khor lo sna tshogs su snang ba’i dus na bden pa’i dngos <145> po ma grub; bden pa’i dngos po ma grub pas rdzun par mi ‘dzin; khas gang du yang mi len te; zla ba sgron ma las;
yod dang med dang yod med med;
khas mi len pa’i lta ba la|
de la blo dang ldan pa ni;
sus kyang klan ka bya mi nus;
zhes ’byung ngo;

231 te] em., text reads ste
232 kyis] em., text reads kyi
233 gyis] em., text reads gyi
234 pa btab] em., text reads par btags
235 btags; ] em., text reads btags
236 zung ‘jug] em., text reads btang snyoms
237 de] em., text reads ste
238 pas] em., text reads pa’i
dbu ma sgyu ma lta bu ni\textsuperscript{239} snang pa yang dag du 'dod pa bkag nas\textsuperscript{1} sgyu ma\textsuperscript{239} rig pas bsgrub par 'dod de\textsuperscript{240} mi 'thad\textsuperscript{241} de\textsuperscript{1} sgyu ma ni mtshan nyid ci yin rigs\textsuperscript{242} pas grub la\textsuperscript{1} rigs\textsuperscript{243} pas gnod pa'o\textsuperscript{1} snang ba\textsuperscript{244} dag su 'dod pa'i blo yang\textsuperscript{1} rigs\textsuperscript{245} pas grub pa la rigs\textsuperscript{246} pa mi gnod pa la bya'o\textsuperscript{1} 'on snang ba\textsuperscript{247} skyes nas 'grub bam'\textsuperscript{248} ma skyes pas grub zer nas rdo rje gzegs ma gtong na\textsuperscript{1} sgyu ma skyes nas grub pam\textsuperscript{1} ma skyes pas grub bya'o\textsuperscript{1} skyes\textsuperscript{249} nas ma grub des na sgyu ma zhes bya'o\textsuperscript{1} zhes zer na\textsuperscript{1} skyes\textsuperscript{250} nas ma grub pa des snang ba\textsuperscript{251} yang ces bya'o zhes mgo bgre'\textsuperscript{252} o

(k) Rig pa'i ral gri

Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog (391.1-6):
de 'dra'i dbu mar smra ba la\textsuperscript{1} rang rgyud pa dang thal 'gyur gnyis\textsuperscript{1} de la sgyu ma lta bu dang\textsuperscript{1} rab tu mi gnas zhes kyang zer\textsuperscript{1} 'di gnyis kyi khyad par sangs rgyas la ye shes yod med du 'dod pa'am kun rdzob la bden pa khas len mi len nam khas len gyi lta ba yod med dam tshad ma'i grangs mang nyung ngam yul thams cad rdzun pa dang blo thams cad

\textsuperscript{239} ma\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads mar
\textsuperscript{240} de\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads ste
\textsuperscript{241} 'thad\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads thad
\textsuperscript{242} rigs\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads rig
\textsuperscript{243} rigs\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads rig
\textsuperscript{244} ba\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads pa
\textsuperscript{245} rigs\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads rig
\textsuperscript{246} rigs\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads rig
\textsuperscript{247} ba\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads pa
\textsuperscript{248} grub bam\textsuperscript{1} exp., text reads grubam
\textsuperscript{249} skyes\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads spyad
\textsuperscript{250} skyes\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads spyad
\textsuperscript{251} ba\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads pa
\textsuperscript{252} bgre'\textsuperscript{2} o\textsuperscript{1} em., text reads bgrig'o
'khrul par 'dod mi 'dod dam kun rdzob la dbye ba 'dod mi 'dod dam don dam med dgag dang spros bral la byed pa la sogs pa tsam gyis ni khyad par mi phyed de ma khyab pa dang 'khrul pa'i phyir ro || de rgyas par bshad na ni shin tu mang por 'gyur ro || 'on kyang 'di gtan tshigs kyi dbye ba yin no ||

Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (393.6–394.5):
mai tri pa'i phyag rgya bzhi la sogs pa nas sgyu ma lta bu dang rab tu mi gnas pa zhes 'byung ba de'ang 'di gnyis yin te rang rgyud pa rnams ni sgyu ma lta bu shas cher 'chad la| thal 'gyur ba ni sgyu ma tsam mi gnas pa'i spros bral shas cher 'chad pas shas che chung la btags pa yin no|| 'di gnyis ka sgyu ma lta bu ni rigs pas sgrub pa yin te ... des na sgyu ma rigs grub ngan pa yin no zhes zer ba ni mi shes pa yin no||

Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (396.2–6):
khaciggis sgyu ma lta bu don dam pa'i bden par 'dod pa'i dbu ma pa yod ces zer ba de ni 'ol tshod kho na yin te btags pas 'jig na don dam yin pa nyams la| mi 'jig na sgyu ma lta bu nyams pa'i phyir dang| gzhanyi dbang don dam du 'dod pa dngos po smra ba'i lugs yin pa'i phyir ro || gzhung 'ga' zhig las sgyu ma lta bu la don dam zhes bshad pa de ni rnams grangs pa'i don dam yin no|| de'i phyir dbu ma pa thams cad don dam spros bral la 'dod par mthun pa yin no||

253 pa'i] em., text reads ba'i
254 pa'i] em., text reads ba'i
Sigla and Bibliography

1. Sigla

A & B  See *Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me.*

D sDe dge bKa’ ’gyur and bsTan ’gyur. Numbers according to Hakju Ui et al., eds., *A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkaḣ-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur).* Sendai: Tōhoku Imperial University, 1934.


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*Dharmadhātudarśanagiti*  Atiśa, *Dharmadhātudarśanagiti.*  

*Guruparamparākramopadeśa*  Vajrapāṇi, *Guruparamparākramopadeśa.*  
—Tib. P4539; D3716; S2414, vol. 41.

*Hevajratantra*  Śrīhevajramahātāntrarāja.  
b. Tibetan Sources

*bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad* Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho, dPal sgrub pa chen po ’i bka’ brgyad kyi spyi don


bSlab pa gsum gyi rgyan gyi me tog bCom ldan rig pa'i ral gri, bSlab pa gsum gyi rgyan gyi me tog. In bCom ldan rigs [sic] pa'i ral gri'i gsung 'bum. 10 vols. [Lhasa: Khams sprul bSod nams don grub, 2006], vol. 4 (nga): 258–439. [scans: TBRC: W00 EGS1017426]

bsTan rim chen mo Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas, bDe bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bshad pa. Lhasa: Zhol par khang. [1800s].

dBu ma rgyan 'grel Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho, dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad 'jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa'i zhal lung. In MS, vol. 13 (nga): 1–359.

dKon cog 'grel Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, sGyu 'phrul gsang ba snying po'i rtsa rgyud tshul bzhi yan lag bco lngas bkral ba dkon cog 'grel. In RZChZSB under the title rGyud rgyal gsang ba snying po dkon cog 'grel, vol. 1: 31–250.

Grub mtha' bstan pa'i sgron me Rog Shes rab 'od, Grub mtha' so so'i bzhed tshul gzhung gsal bar ston pa chos 'byung grub mtha' chen po bstan pa'i sgron me. A


Grub mtha’ kun shes kyi rnam bshad


Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog

bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri, Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog. In bCom ldan rigs [sic] pa’i ral gri’i gsung ’bum. 10 vols. [Lhasa: Khams sprul bSod nams don grub, 2006], vol. 5 (ca): 102-425. [scans: TBRC: W00EGS1017426]

gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod

Nyang ral Nyi ma ’od zer (discovered), gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod. In bKa’ brgyad bde gŚegs ’dus pa’i chos skor. The largest version of the bKa’ brgyad or “Eight Pronouncement” system of the rNñiṅ-ma-pa tradition recovered from its place of

\textit{gSang sngags nges par byed pa'i don}

See \textit{mDo rgyud rto gs pa'i sgron ma.}

\textit{gSung lan dus gi pho nya}


\textit{gZhung rnam 'byed}


\textit{lDe'u chos 'byung}


\textit{lTa phreng 'grel pa}

Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po, \textit{Man ngag lta phreng gi 'grel pa}. In \textit{RZChZSB}, vol. 1: 303–351.
**mDo rgyud rtogs pa'i sgron ma** Nyang ral Nyi ma 'od zer (discovered).


*’Od gsal snying po* Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho, gSang ’grel phyogs bcu mun sel gyi spyi don 'od gsal snying po. In *MS*, vol. 19: 1–271.


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