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Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's Four-Step Discussion  
on the Four Negations of Arising and  
Related References

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## Abstract

The commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) ascribed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was published along with various other works in the bKa' gdams gsung 'bum by the Peltsek Institute for Ancient Tibetan Manuscripts in Lhasa. The manuscript is included in the eleventh volume and is composed of 52 folios in total. The title of the manuscript is དབྱེས་རབ་ཀྱི་འོད་ཀློན་མ་གཞན་ལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ſī ka sgron ma gsal bar byed pa* which can be translated as “The Commentary on the Prajñā [nāma] *Mūlamadhyamaka[-kārikā]* titled] The Illuminating Lamp”.

This research presents the analysis of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's four-step discussion in various topics. It can be observed that in various cases Pa tshab Nyi ma grags used a four-step structure in order to present various views and argumentation. The analysis of this pattern will be presented in detail.

References that are mentioned by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags are introduced regarding the main topics of studies. The references tracing back to Nāgārjuna and utilized Madhyamaka texts sources with an excursus into Dharmakīrti's Logic within the First Chapter of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's the commentary will be presented. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags characterized the works of Nāgārjuna in context with the logical corpus. Along with a detailed explanation of Nāgārjuna's work, Madhyamaka references and the influence of Buddhist logic and epistemology will be analysed.

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## 1 Introduction

The present research is about the recently discovered manuscript, important commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) ascribed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-ca.1145). In 2006 it was published by the Peltsek

Institute for Ancient Tibetan Manuscripts in Lhasa.<sup>1</sup> The manuscript written in དབུ་མེད་ dbu med script as a facsimile edition, is one of the collected works that is included in the bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Volume 11. The manuscript is composed of 52 folios in total and shows an uncommon division into two columns (hereafter referred to by L: left side and R: right side).

The assumed author Pa tshab Nyi ma grags is one of the best-known translators (lo tsa ba) in the Tibetan tradition. In the later diffusion, ཕྱི་དཀར་ *phyi dar* of Tibetan Buddhism Pa tshab Nyi ma grags contributed a lot with important translation works in collaboration with Indian scholars like Kanakavarman and Tilakakalaśa. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags translated later on the MMK and other Madhyamaka treatises from Sanskrit into Tibetan.

The manuscript is entitled as དབུ་མེད་རབ་ཀྱི་ལྷོ་མ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པ། *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ſi ka sgron ma gsal bar byed pa* which can be translated as “The Commentary on the *Prajñā[nāma] Mūlamadhyamaka[-kārikā]* titled The Illuminating Lamp”. Ascribed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, the manuscript, is in accordance with the explanation by Mahāsumati (or Hasumati) as mentioned in the colophon (Folio 52bR10-52bR11).

The aim of this research is to present new insights about the historical development of translation work in Tibet, with a special focus on Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's characteristic way of four-step discussion.

## 2 References mentioned by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags

### 2.1 Traces back to Nāgārjuna

As we saw in previous observations<sup>2</sup> Pa tshab Nyi ma grags defined his position as a \*Prāsaṅgika translator in the distinction of the Madhyamaka thoughts between \*Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and \*Svātantrika-

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<sup>1</sup>bKa' gdams gsung 'bum *phyogs bsgrigs glegs bam bcu gcig pa bzhugs*, (vol. 11.), *dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib 'jug khang*, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> See Kamarid 2022: 114.

Madhyamaka. Recently it was analysed by C. Yoshimizu that this ongoing discussion was not a past debate of the sixth- and seventh-century in India but a present one during Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's time of studies in Kaśmīr.<sup>3</sup>

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags studied for 23 years in Kaśmīr most probably under the guidance of his teachers Sūkṣmajana, Parahitabhadrā, Mahāsumati and Bhavyarāja<sup>4</sup> with whom he studied Sanskrit and Buddhist Philosophy.

In this commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter MMK) by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, we can clearly see his emphasis on Nāgārjuna's work. In the introduction he mentioned the following works by Nāgārjuna: MMK (1bL2), \**Suhrillekha* (*Letter to a friend*, 2bL6), \**Ratnāvalī* (*A String of Jewels*, 2bL6), *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (*Sixty Verses on Reasoning*, 2bL8), *Śūnyatāsaptati* (*Seventy Verses on Emptiness*, 2bR6), *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (*Rejection of the Disputes*, 2bR1, 11aL1) and *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (*Treatise for the Refutation [of the Sixteen Categories of the Naiyāyika]*, 2bR1).

Further details are presented in the introductory section which Pa tshab Nyi ma grags divides into four parts. Not only in the introduction (1bL2) Pa tshab Nyi ma grags starts a division of his explanation into four parts it further on can be observed within the First Chapter. Those are the following:

- 1) the greatness of the author, (1bL2)
- 2) presenting the relation with [Nāgārjuna's] own treatise, (2bL5)
- 3) the establishment of the Madhyamaka view through the meaning of the title/ the meaning of the characteristics (3aL5), and
- 4) the Mangalam verses/ dedicatory verses with the homage/paying respect. (3aL5)

Further, within the section of 1.2 *The presentation of the [Nāgārjuna's] own*

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<sup>3</sup> Yoshimizu 2020: 1194.

<sup>4</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 44.

*treatises*, 2bL05-3aL04 (32a5-33a4) རང་གི་བཟུང་ཚོས་གྱི་འབྲེལ་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་པ། , Pa tshab Nyi ma grags presented the treatises by Nāgārjuna mentioning the following titles (2bL05-3aL04) while dividing the teachings into two categories: own treatises that are related to the teaching of the absence of intrinsic nature and occasional teachings on the good conduct. For the latter *Letter to a Friend* (\**Suhrllekha*) and *A String of Jewels* (\**Ratnāvalī*) are mentioned. (2bL6)

These two are a *Letter to a Friend* (\**Suhrllekha*) (1.221) and *A String of Jewels* (\**Ratnāvalī*), (1.222)

The first category regarding “teaching of the absence of intrinsic nature” is divided into five texts, mentioning the MMK and the other four texts as follows (2bL6ff):

-*The Root Verses of the Middle Way* (*Mūlamadhyamakārikā*) (2bL7)

-*Sixty Verses on Reasoning* (*Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*) (2bL7)

-*Rejection of the Disputes* (*Vigrahavyāvartaṇī*) (2bR1)

-*Seventy Verses on Emptiness* (*Śūnyatāsaptati*) (2bR1)

-*Treatise for the Refutation [of the Sixteen Categories of the Naiyāyika]* (*Vaidalyaparakaraṇa*) (2bR1)

Here Pa tshab Nyi ma grags introduces in total seven texts that are attributed to Nāgārjuna. This five-prototype structure of the “scholastic corpus” is often found in the Tibetan tradition and was analysed by Ye Shaoyong in Brill’s Encyclopaedia of Buddhism in the section about Nāgārjuna.<sup>5</sup> Therein Ye Shaoyong mentioned that already in the *Madhyamakaratnaprāḍīpa*<sup>6</sup> written by the second Bhavya /Bhāviveka (around 10<sup>th</sup> century?) a similar structure can be found. This treatise is only preserved in Tibetan.

<sup>5</sup> Brill’s Encyclopaedia of Buddhism Volume II: 343.

<sup>6</sup> D 3854, tsha 264b5-6: དབྱེད་མཆོད་པ་རྒྱུག་ལྟོང་ཉིད་བདུན་ཅུ་མཇུག་གྲག་ལ། །རྣམ་པར་འབྲེལ་བ་ལ་མཇུག་པམ།

Later on, one of the main disciples of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, མ་བྱ་བུ་རྩལ་བཟོན་འབྲུག་  
 ལེང་གེ། (Rma bya pa Brtson grus seng ge) mentioned also six treatises<sup>7</sup>. Bu ston  
 (1290-1364) presented also six texts that are associated with Nāgārjuna: the  
 five above mentioned by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags with an additional text  
*Vyavaharā-siddhi*.<sup>8</sup> In Tāranātha's History of Buddhism those five texts are  
 also mentioned.<sup>9</sup> For more details on Nāgārjuna's works Lindtner presents  
 twelve texts in his analysis with a different categorization of all known  
 works<sup>10</sup>. Seyfort Ruegg also gave a detailed explanation on the works of  
 Nāgārjuna in his exposition on Madhyamaka Literature<sup>11</sup>. Seyfort Ruegg  
 therein characterised the Yukti-corpus of six [treatises], རིགས་ཚོགས་དྲུག།  
 (rigs tshogs drug) in the Tibetan tradition that corresponds with Pa tshab  
 Nyima grags's presentation. In the Tibetan Tradition sometimes *Ratnāvalī* is  
 substituted by \**Vyavahārasiddhi* that counts a variation between five to six  
 treatises. Beside that the Tibetan Tradition in some cases counts a collection  
 of hymns, the Stava-corpus (བསྟོན་ཚོགས།, bstod tshogs) or a treatise collection,  
 the Parikathā-corpus (གཏམ་ཚོགས།, gтам tshogs) that includes the \**Suḥr̥llekha*  
 and in some cases the Rājaparikathā, *i.e.* *Ratnāvalī*, and other secondary  
 works.<sup>12</sup>

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags mentioned the name Nāgārjuna as ལུ་གུབ་ (klu  
 grub) ten times within the First Chapter and further more times within the  
 introduction narrating the life of Nāgārjuna briefly. While quoting the MMK  
 verses he also refers to Nāgārjuna as “Master” ལྷོབ་དཔོན། (slob dpon) or “Noble  
 One” འཕགས་པ་ཉིད། ('phags pa nyid) four times. Indirectly Pa tshab Nyi ma grags

<sup>7</sup> as translated by Williams in Brill's Encyclopaedia of Buddhism Volume II: 343 and Williams, P.: Journal of Indian Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1984): 73–104. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23444190>.

<sup>8</sup> Chimpa Lama, Chattopadhyaya Alaka, 1970 (repr.1990): 108, n. 15, 385.

<sup>9</sup> Schiefner, A. 1868: Tāranatha Tibetan edition: 57: 3-5, German translation, 1869: 71: 26-28.

<sup>10</sup> Lindtner, C. 1982: 10-11.

<sup>11</sup> Seyfort, Ruegg 1981: 9-50.

<sup>12</sup> Seyfort Ruegg, 1981: 8.

refers to Nāgārjuna many more times. With all these details we can observe that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags emphasised the Madhyamaka position which traces back to Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna's way of logical approach set up in the 2nd century was later combined with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti by Śāntarakṣita.

## 2.2 References to Madhyamaka Texts

Most properly Pa tshab Nyi ma grags learned from works like Śāntarakṣita's (725-788) *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (དབྱེ་མ་རྒྱུན།, dbu ma rgyan), *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti*, and Kamalaśīla's (740-795) *Madhyamakāloka* (དབྱེ་མ་རྒྱུང་བ།, dbu ma snang ba). These Indian scholars from the 8<sup>th</sup> century mainly represented the \*Svātantrika way of interpretation. Śāntarakṣita adopted the logic of “neither-one-nor-many” (\*ekāneka[vi]rahitatva) that was also emphasized by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags in 7bL11 where the argument in the form of \**prasaṅga* is presented in detail. After Pa tshab Nyi ma grags studied these \*Svātantrika approaches, it was his intention to conclude the \*Prāsaṅgika way of interpretation as authentic, which Pa tshab Nyi ma grags himself emphasised to be followed.<sup>13</sup> Regarding the transmission of Madhyamaka, further texts can be included as references though the titles of these texts are not directly mentioned but are supposed to be utilized in the context. In the *Madhyamakāloka*, *The Illumination of the Middle Way* Kamalaśīla presents the “neither-one-nor-many” argument that is included in the five great [Madhyamaka] reasons [for the absence of intrinsic nature] (གཤམ་ཚོག་ཚོན་པོ་ལྔ། gtan tshigs chen po lnga). Here Pa tshab Nyi ma grags

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<sup>13</sup> see Kamarid, D. (2022): “Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's Commentary on the MMK as a Logico-linguistic Key to the \*Svātantrika and \*Prāsaṅgika Distinction”.



mentioned only four great reasons in 12aL8<sup>14</sup> and in 13aL10<sup>15</sup>. Further, the *Madhyamakāloka* is partially quoted in 7bR6 where a similar division into two perceptions is made, that is, “the perception of the contradictory essence of not abiding simultaneously (*\*sahānavasthāna*) or [that of] an incompatibility of coexistence” and “[the perception] of the contradictory essence of mutual exclusion (*\*paraspara-parinirhāra-viruddha*)” can be found. This is also mentioned in the *Nyāyabindu* by Dharmakīrti where he mentioned eleven kinds of perceptions. Several times the work by Buddhapālita, *Buddhapālitaṃulamadhymakavṛtti* is mentioned as reference without naming the text (as in 14aL9 etc.). *Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā* by Kamalaśīla may have been another Madhyamaka text that was accessible for Pa tshab Nyi ma grags though the text title is not mentioned by him. In 13aR5 the reference is also made to the *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhymakavṛtti* by Bhāviveka (500-570)<sup>16</sup> though its title is not referred to in Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's commentary. *Prasannapadā* (PsP) by Candrakīrti (7<sup>th</sup> century)<sup>17</sup> is not mentioned but reference is drawn several times like in 14aL9 ལྟེང་གི་ལྟར་པ་ལེ་ཉེའོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་ནི།, “The third is the assertion of Buddhapālita”. Jayānanda (second half of the eleventh century)<sup>18</sup> who wrote *Madhyamakāvataṛaṭīkā* was also present in Kaśmīr during the time of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. Together with Pa tshab Nyi ma

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<sup>14</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11, 12aL8ff.: དེ་ལྟར་ན་12aL9གཏན་ཚིགས་ཚེན་པོ་ལ [ ]རྩེ་ལ་འགྱུར་བ་འབ་ཞིག་ ལས་རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་སྐྱུབ་མི་བཞེད་དོ། “In that case, Nāgārjuna did not consider all the four great reasons [for proving the absence of intrinsic nature] as an independent [proof] but only a \*Prāsaṅgika [way of proof].”, see Kamarid, D.(2022):112.

<sup>15</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11, 13aL10ff.: དེ་ལྟར་ན་དོན་རྗེ་གཞིགས་མ་དང་། ཉེན་འབྲེལ་དང་། ཉ་དང་དུ་13aL11ལྟེང་གི་ལྟར་པ་ལེ་ཉེའོད་ཚིག་ཚིན་ ལས་འགྱུར་བ་ཙམ་མོ། “In this way, all the [four great] reasons such as the fragments of vajra (*\*vajrakaṇa*), dependent-origination (*\*pratītya-samutpāda*), being free from one and many (*\*ekāneka[vi]rahitatva*), and so forth are the only \*Prāsaṅgika [way of proof].”, see Kamarid, D.(2022): 112.

<sup>16</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 61.

<sup>17</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 7.

<sup>18</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 113.

grags, Jayānanda was considered as an important scholar who established Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika approach in Kaśmīr and later in Tibet.<sup>19</sup>

Concluding here on the references regarding Madhyamaka it is clear that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was highly influenced by the literature of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> centuries with the above-mentioned Indian scholars Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Tracing back to Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti the third part of this presentation *Analysis of a Four-step Discussion by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags* will present Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's influence by these earlier Indian scholars and Nāgārjuna, where in each step of analysis their opinions are reflected.

### 2.3 References to Dharmakīrti's Logic

Throughout the First Chapter different references and translations are assumed to have been the sources for Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, to which he got access during his study time in Kaśmīr. Some passages within the First Chapter of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's commentary on the MMK<sup>20</sup> are cited from Dharmakīrti's works. *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (PV) and *Nyāyabindu* are those examples which encouraged Pa tshab Nyi ma grags to take his logical approach in the First Chapter along with several commentaries on the MMK verses. This logical discussion found in his explanation of the MMK verses takes the translator Pa tshab Nyi ma grags on a journey into logic. It is no doubt one of the noteworthy characteristics that might not have been expected according to the title to be a commentary on the MMK, tracing back to Nāgārjuna.

Another question is whether this text was intended to have the role of a commentary or it was rather a capture of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's activity of studies in a form of study notes that could have been noted down by his

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<sup>19</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 114.

<sup>20</sup> reference on the authorship of this manuscript, see Kamarid 2019: 248.

disciples. One might ask why this journey was taken by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags? The above presentation showed that prior to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, already in the 8<sup>th</sup> century various Indian scholars were influential in combining the Madhyamaka thought with logic and epistemology, like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags intended to ensure this transmission in the light of \*Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka instead of following Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who represented the \*Svātantrika-Madhyamaka approach. A combination with those elements tracing back to Nāgārjuna (2<sup>nd</sup> century) and the logic ascribable to Dignāga (480-540<sup>21</sup>) and Dharmakīrti (7<sup>th</sup> century<sup>22</sup>) was probably intended to be carried on by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.

Further we can observe that the name Dharmakīrti is five times mentioned in Tibetan as ཚོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པ། (chos kyi grags pa) in 7aL1, 8bL2, 10bL3, 13aL4 and 14bR3, all of which are referred to only in the First Chapter. In order to understand the location of these quotations by Dharmakīrti here a brief explanation of the outline (sa bcad) of the First Chapter is given. The First Chapter is divided into two parts: “2.11 The thesis (\**pratijñā*)” this part refers to the explanation of MMK 1.1. and part 2.12 “its reasoning (\**upapatti/yukti*)” in which the remaining verses from MMK 1.2 onwards are explained (explanation on the citation of MMK verses are examined in my previous paper “On Pa tshab Nyi ma grags’s Way of Citing the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* in His Commentary”<sup>23</sup>). Nāgārjuna’s main thesis is explained in 2.11 referring to MMK 1.1. from folio 5bL1 to 14bR6. MMK 1.2 and other verses are explained far later from folio 14bR6 onwards.

2.11 is further divided into three parts: 2.111 the word-meaning (\**padārtha*), 2.112 the sentence-meaning (\**vakyārtha*) and 2.113 meaning

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<sup>21</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 230.

<sup>22</sup> Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 88.

<sup>23</sup> Kamarid, D. (2021).

of subject matter (skabs su bab pa'i don, *\*prastutārtha*). It seems that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags favoured a four-step division that also can be observed in 2.111-3, where in each section a further subdivision into four was made. Another example is “the negation of arising” in 2.113 with stating the different opinions, that will be explained in the next part.

*Four-step division regarding the sentence-meaning (\*vākyārtha) 2.112*

Demonstrating Dharmakīrti's mentioning here the first reference can be found in folio 7aL1 where it states:

ཚོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་བག་ཆགས་བརྟན་མི་བརྟན་གྱི་ཚད་མ་དང་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཞག་པར་བཤད་དོ།

Dharmakīrti explained, that whether it is a valid means of cognition or not, depends on whether [one's] predisposition (*\*vāsanā*) is firm or not.<sup>25</sup>

This quotation is within the part 2.112 where the meaning of the treatise in terms of the sentence-meaning (*\*vākyārtha*) is explained. The sentence-meaning is further divided into four steps:

“The refutation given by the proponents of existence (*\*vastuvādin/bhāvavādin*) against the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature”, 2.112.1 with reference to the *\*Vastuvādin*<sup>26</sup>. Here, most properly Dharmakīrti is stated against the opponent *\*vastuvādin/bhāvavādin* not holding the view “against the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature (2.112.1)”.

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<sup>24</sup> Inserted below

<sup>25</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 7aL1: ཚོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་བག་ཆགས་བརྟན་མི་བརྟན་གྱི་ཚད་མ་དང་ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བཞག་པར་བཤད་དོ།

<sup>26</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: དོན་འདི་ལ་བག་གི་དོན་གྱི་སྒྲོ་6aL6ནས་བཤད་པ་ལ་ཇ་ཉེ། རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བསྐྱབ་པ་ལ་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་ན་མས་གྱིས་བཟུང་པ་དགོད་པ་དང་།

In the second part, 2.112.2 the reference is made to the \*Svatantra-vādin in “Returning a response to the [above] refutation, the \*Mādhyamika, who state with an independent [proof] (\*Svatantra-vādin), explain their assertion of an independent [proof]”<sup>27</sup>(6aL7).

The third part, 2.112.3 is related to Candrakīrti himself after he demonstrated the Svatantra approach, with referring to “Citing the thought of \*Svāntrika, Candrakīrti himself refutes it”<sup>28</sup> (6aL7). The remaining above-mentioned places where Dharmakīrti is stated with reference to 8bL2, 10bL2 and 10bL4 can be found in this section (2.112.3). Within this section the \*Svāntrika approach is refuted by Candrakīrti. Earlier Candrakīrti refuted Dignāga and here Pa tshab Nyi ma grags seems to continue in the footsteps by associating Dharmakīrti with the \*Svāntrika approach.

In the fourth part, 2.112.4 Pa tshab Nyi ma grags elaborates his own statement in accordance with Candrakīrti’s own assertion, that Nāgārjuna’s intention is in the way of a Madhyamaka \**prasaṅga vādin*: “The statement of Candrakīrti’s own assertion that Nāgārjuna’s intention is the very Madhyamaka [position] of a \**prasaṅgavādin*”<sup>29</sup> (6aL7). Another example for citing Dharmakīrti can be found in 13aL3 referring to part 2.112.4:

ཚོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པས་བཤད་པ་ལྟར་རྒྱ་མེད་དུ་བྱུང་། 13aL4 བ་ལ་སྐྱོ་བའི་མཉམ་པ་ལས་གཤེན་ལེན་པ་འདོད་ཆགས་

མེད་ཀྱི་ལཱ་ལྟམས་ཉམས་ལུ་ཡོད་མེད་དུ་ཐལ་ཏེ། རྒྱ་མེད་གཞན་ལ་མི་སྐྱོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།

If, just as Dharmakīrti explains, it is said that those produced without a cause are adventitious, it would result that these perceived (\**grāhya*)

<sup>27</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: བརྗེད་པ་དེའི་ལན་རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་དབྱེ་མ་པས་གདབ་ཅིང་། 6aL7རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་འདོད་པ་བརྗེད་པ་དང་།

<sup>28</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 6aL7རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་བསམ་པ་སྐྱབས་ཏེ་རྒྱ་གྲགས་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྐྱེན་དབྱེད་བ་དང་།

<sup>29</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: ལྷ་སྐྱབས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་སྐྱེ་བའི་དབྱེ་མ་ཉིད་དུ་རྒྱ་གྲགས་རང་གི་ 6aL8འདོད་པ་བརྗེད་པའོ།

<sup>30</sup> མེད་ཀྱི་*sic, ede* as *ādi* is used for etc. or ལ་སོགས་པ། *la tshogs pa*, མེད་པ། *ede pa*

and perceiving (*\*grāhaka*) aspects and lust etc. permanently exist or do not exist because, [as Dharmakīrti says in his PV III 35]<sup>31</sup> that which has no cause is not related to others.<sup>32</sup>

Here Dharmakīrti is referred to with this verse of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (PV), Svārthānumāna Chapter, *kārikā* 35, which states: “Whether existence or non-existence, it is permanent because what has no cause does not depend on others.”<sup>31</sup>

This statement is related to the part 2.112.42 as follows: The statement of Candrakīrti’s own assertion that Nāgārjuna’s intention is the very \*Prāsaṅgika position with the subdivision with the subject of “Regarding a valid means of cognition (*\*pramāṇa*), [there are] five questions to which answers are given [by Candrakīrti]”<sup>33</sup>.

It can be found in the part of the 5<sup>th</sup> question referring to the third subdivision (2.112.425.3): 2.112.425

ལྡོ་བ་ཐལ་འགྲུ་ལྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དཔེ་དང་། ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ནམ་མ་ཡིན་ཞེས་པ་དང་། ཚད་མ་[མ་]<sup>34</sup>ཡིན་ན་དེ་བཤད་11bR9པའི་དགོས་པ་གང་ཡིན་ཅེས་པའི་དྲི་བ་ལོ།

2.112.425 **The fifth are the questions about** the characteristics (2.112.425.1), and [the role of] an example (*\*dṛṣṭānta*)

<sup>31</sup> This quote can be found in *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (PV) प्रमाणवार्तिककारिका Svārthānumāna Chapter in *kārikā* 35: नित्यं सत्त्वमसत्त्वं वाऽहेतोरन्यानपेक्षणात्। अपेक्षातो हि भावानां कादाचित्कत्व॥३५॥ nityaṃ sattvam asattvaṃ vā 'hetor anyānapekṣaṇāt |apekṣāto hi bhāvānāṃ kādācitkatva||35b||: ཚད་མ་ནམ་འགྲུལ་གྱི་ཚེག་ལེའུར་ D 4210 ce 93b-151a (vol. 174): 96a3 ལྱི་མཚན་ལ་མེ་བརྗོད་ལྱིར། ལྱི་ལྱུ་ཡོད་པའམ་མེད་པར་འགྲུ། དངོས་པོ་ནམས་ནི་རེས་འགའ་ཞིག། འགྲུ་བ་བརྗོད་པ་ལས་ཡིན་ནོ། Whether existence or non-existence, it is permanent because what has no cause does not depend on others.

<sup>32</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aL3 ff.

<sup>33</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 10bR7 ཚད་མ་ལ་དྲི་བ་ལྡོ་བ་ལྱི་གང་པས་རྗོད་ནོ།

<sup>34</sup> ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ན་ *sic*; read as ཚད་མ་[མ་]ཡིན་ན་?, see in later part 12aL6 ཚད་མ་མ་ཡིན་ན་གཞན་གྱིས་སྤྱོད་འདོགས་ཅི་ལྟར་གཙོད་ཞེ་ན།

(2.112.425.2) **for an [unwanted] consequence (\**prasaṅga*) whether [the logic of an unwanted consequence] is a valid means of cognition or not (2.112.425.3)** and, if it is not a valid means of cognition, what is the necessity of its explanation?<sup>35</sup>

Concluding here with the observation that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags stated Dharmakīrti in various contexts, shows that Pa tsha Nyi ma grags might had access to the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* with the Tibetan translation by rNgog Lo-tsa-ba Blo ldan shes rab (རྫོག་ལོ་ཙ་བ་བློ་ལྷན་ཤེས་རབ།, 1059-1109) who worked almost at the same time as Pa tshab Nyi ma grags in Kaśmīr. The synthesis of Madhyamaka thought with logic and epistemology was already earlier emphasised and intended by Śāntarakṣita (725-788) who was highly influenced by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti with the tradition of Buddhist logic. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was no doubt influenced by Śāntarakṣita that was visible in Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's reflection on the neither-one-nor many arguments and implemented by a critical discussion on Yogācāra theories while defending their own position.

### 3 Analysis of a four-step discussion

As we saw in the previous section, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags already used a four-step division within the introduction where Pa tshab Nyi ma grags briefly acquaints the reader with the author Nāgārjuna. In the first place Dharmakīrti is also stated in a four-division where the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature was observed with the different opinions stated in a four-step analysis (2.112.1-4). Further, in this part other examples of a “four-steps of presentation” will be discussed in detail emphasizing on various topics within the First Chapter of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's commentary.

#### *Four-step discussion on the four negations of arising*

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<sup>35</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 10bR7 ff.

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags used four steps of analysis in order to discuss the four negations of arising as formulated by Nāgārjuna in MMK 1.1. The four kinds of negation are: arising from oneself (13aR2), from others (14aL4), from both (14aR8) and without a cause (14bL4)<sup>36</sup>. This is related to MMK 1.1, where it is stated:

གང་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན།གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ལྷུ་མེད་མེན། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་ལྟེ་བ་ན་མ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།།༡།	न स्वतो नोपि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्य अहेतुतः। उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः क्वचन केचन॥१.१
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MMK 1.1: In any place, no things whatsoever ever arise from oneself, from others, from both, or without a cause.<sup>37</sup>

With referring to MMK 1.1 Nāgārjuna's main thesis is stated as explained in 2.11 “2.11 The thesis (*\*pratijñā*)” and as we observed in the previous outline where the subdivision is made into three parts (2.111, 2.112, 2.113). In the third part, 2.113 the negation of arising is placed under the category of “The explanation by means of the meaning of subject matter (skabs su bab pa'i don, *\*prastutārtha*).” (5bL2). The four kinds of negation of arising are stated in 13aR1 (2.113.1-4)<sup>38</sup>.

### The negation of arising from oneself

In the following the four opinions regarding the negation of arising from oneself are discussed and presented partly. The other three kinds of arising are discussed in the same manner following the same structure. While

<sup>36</sup> For the Tibetan Text see appendix

<sup>37</sup> See MMK 1.1, see de la Vallée Poussin (1903): 12, see Ye Shaoyong (2011) 《中论颂》梵藏汉合校·导读·译注: 12: न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्य अहेतुतः।उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः क्वचन केचन॥१.१, D 3824, tsa 1b3-4: གང་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན།གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ལྷུ་མེད་མེན། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ལྟེ་བ་ན་མ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།, P 5224, tsa 2a3, P 5253, tsha 57b7-8, see Saito, A. (1984): 10 “In any place, nothing whatsoever ever originate from themselves, from others, from both, or without a cause.”

<sup>38</sup> for reference, see the sa bcad in Tibetan and English in the appendix



analysing these different positions within the first step the reference is always made to the \*Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka approach, related to Nāgārjuna (13aR2) with an unwanted consequence (\**prasaṅga*). Here “the treatise” is often mentioned mostly referring to the MMK.

The second step reflects the opinion and assertion of Bhāviveka.

Within the third step the explanation of Buddhapālita's assertion is presented. The fourth concluding step shows the rejection of Bhāviveka's dispute against the above Buddhapālita's assertion, here referring most properly to Candrakīrti.<sup>39</sup>

### First step of Analysis<sup>40</sup>

**First step** clearly shows Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's emphasis on the position of the \*Prāsaṅgika within the negation of **arising from oneself** where the Sāṃkhya's assertion is explained (13aR3):

2.113.11 The first of them [is as follows]: “arising from oneself” means arising from an existent one. Regarding the arising of a certain result existent at the time of its cause, this is also the Sāṃkhya's assertion (\**satkārya-vāda*<sup>41</sup>).<sup>42</sup>

This statement is similar to the assertion of the Sāṃkhya proponents (\**satkārya-vāda*). *Satkārya-vāda* as a theory of causal relation means that there is no production of anything that does not previously exist. The

<sup>39</sup> for text reference in Tibetan see appendix

<sup>40</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR3-13bL4.

<sup>41</sup> regarding the causation of *satkārya-vāda*: Sāṃkhya assert that there no production of a thing that is not previously existent, causation means the appearance of thing and its change that is already in the cause as a potential form, the result potentially exists before the change is generated in the “movement of cause”, Production of the result means that the internal atoms undergo a change that is potentially already in the cause inherent. The theory of *satkārya-vāda* means that the result (\**kārya*) is already existent (\**sat*) before the actual change has come into being, see Das Gupta (1922): 257, 213 for main features of Sāṃkhya School.

<sup>42</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR4-5.

appearance and the change of a thing is already existent in the cause. This change is driven by “movement of cause” (see note 41).

By means of an [unwanted] consequence that such an existent [result] arises, the master [Nāgārjuna] himself negated [the proposition] by saying, “only if an existent thing arises, it arises from oneself.”<sup>43</sup>

Here the Sāṃkhya's assertion that only something existent can arise from oneself was rejected. It is because, according to Nāgārjuna, things do not have any own inherent nature.

### Second step of analysis<sup>44</sup>

Further, in 13aR6 the **second step of analysis Bhāviveka's** assertion is stated that in the ultimate the logical subject, that are the inner sense-spheres (\**āyatana*) do not arise from themselves because they already exist just like the self.

2.113.12 The second [is as follows]: Bhavyakīrti ('ba phyra kir ti) (= Bhāviveka) stated that in the ultimate [truth] the logical subject (\**dharmīn*), i.e., the inner sense-spheres (\**āyatana*) do not arise from themselves because they [already] exist <sup>45</sup>, just like the self (\**ātman*).<sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR3-4དེའི་དང་པོ་རང་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཅེས་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་སྟེ། (2.113.11) (MMK 1.1)ལྟའི་དུས་ན་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པ་[ ]ཀྱི་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་དེ་ཡང་གངས་13aR4ཅན་འདོད་སྟེ་དེ་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བའི་སྐོ་ནས་སྐོབ་དཔོན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱལ་ཏེ་ཡོད་པ་སྐྱེ་འབྱུང་ན། །རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་འབྱུང་ཅེས་དགག་གོ།

<sup>44</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR6-13bL4

<sup>45</sup> referring to Bhāviveka in the *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, དེས་མ་ཙུ་བའི་འབྲེལ་པ་ཤེས་རབ་སྐྱོན་མ། D 3853, tsha 49a2-3: འདིར་སྐྱོར་བའི་ཚེག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་བ་ནི་དོན་དམ་པར་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཚེད་ན་མས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་བེས་ཏེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱི་ར་དཔེར་ན་ཤེས་པ་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་བཞིན་ནོ།”Here, the related verse [’s meaning] can be translated: ultimately the inner sense-spheres are certainly without arising from oneself. Because [the sense-spheres] are existent for example, just like the consciousness exist itself.”

<sup>46</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR4-5



2.113.13 The third, the assertion of Buddhapālita is explained [as follows]: Arising from oneself is negated by an [unwanted] consequence. If a thing arises from something existent it is considered as arising from oneself.

Arising from oneself means the assertion of [a thing's] arising from [something] existent.

If a thing would have already arisen there would be no purpose in arising again because the thing has already existed. It would result in arising endlessly.

If [a thing] arose from [something] existent, the arising would be purposeless because [the thing] associated with its purpose has already been existing.

Arising would also result in being endless.

Further an example is given to demonstrate the case: a thing like a pot that has been already produced. If an existent thing arose it would mean that the pot would result in being produced again and again. This gives the reason for negating the arising from oneself and in accepting that arising has its purpose and end and does not continue endlessly.

[A thing] like a pot which has already been produced would result in being produced again and again, because the existent [thing] arose.

Therefore, it is not possible to accept the arising from oneself because arising has its purpose and end, [says Buddhapālita on] the negation of arising from oneself.

#### Fourth step of analysis<sup>50</sup>

The following part 2.113.14 is about Candrakīrti's rejection of the disputed faults wherein the first (2.113.141) has a subdivision of three: An unwanted consequence (*\*prasaṅga*) does not refute other's meaning and because neither a logical reason nor an example is stated, arising from oneself is not refuted by one's own proposition alone. This passage refers to Candrakīrti's commentary found in the *Prasannapadā* where these three are mentioned; a reason (*hetu*) and example (*dyṣṭānta*) are not stated, and because the faults stated by the [Sāṃkhya] opponents have not been refuted, and it is an unwanted consequence (*prasaṅgavākya*), see MacDonald (2015): 53-61.

2.113.14 The fourth [is as follows]: [Candrakīrti's] rejection

2.113.141 of the disputed faults

2.113.141 The first includes three disputes. (2.113.141.1, 2.113.141.2, 2.113.141.3)

The [unwanted] consequence (*\*prasaṅga*) does not refute other's meaning. Because neither a logical reason nor an example is given, arising from oneself is not refuted by one's own proposition alone.<sup>51</sup>

2.113.141.1

<sup>50</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13bL7-14aL4.

<sup>51</sup> this passage refers to Candrakīrti's commentary in *Prasannapadā*: see MacDonald (2015): 53-61, 104 (403 Tibetan), 141 ff.: हेतुदृष्टान्तानभिधानात् परोक्तदोषापरिहाराच्च च। प्रसङ्गवाक्यत्वाच्च च [...], གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་དེའི་མ་བཟོན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། གཞན་གྱིས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཉེས་པ་མ་བསལ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རྟོགས་བར་འགྱུར་པའི་ཚིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ [...]54,55: That [mode of argumentation] is not suitable, because a reason (*hetu*) and an example (*dyṣṭānta*) have not been stated and because the faults pronounced by the [Sāṃkhya] opponents have not been refuted. And because it is a statement of [unwanted] consequence (*prasaṅgavākya*) [...]. (MacDonald, 2015)

Further, if it is refuted by one's own thesis it would result that arising from oneself, a thesis proposed by the Sāṃkhya opponents would be proven.

If it is refuted [by only their own thesis (*\*pratiññāmātra*)], it would result that arising from oneself, i.e., a thesis [proposed] by the [Sāṃkhya] opponents is proven.

The second is as follows, 2.113.141.2: The fault that is pointed out by the Sāṃkhya is not rejected. The inner sense-sphere (*\*āyatana*) will be taken as the logical subject (*\*dharmin*).

The fault pointed out by the [Sāṃkhya] will not be rejected.  
2.113.141.2

[For Buddhists, e.g.,] the inner sense-sphere (*\*āyatana*) is taken as the logical subject (*\*dharmin*).<sup>52</sup>

In the following the thesis is stated as: Because the cause has been existing in the ultimate truth the inner sense-sphere does not arise from itself. But if regarding the primary cause (*pradhāna*) as the object of inference, other people [than Sāṃkhya] say that it does not arise from itself. It is contradictory because the primary cause has been existing.

[The thesis will be as follows:] In the ultimate [truth] [the inner sense-sphere] does not arise from itself because it has been existing.  
[However,] regarding the primary [cause] (*pradhāna*) as the object of

<sup>52</sup> Bhāviveka in PP: Ames, 1993: 221 [Thesis:] In ultimate reality, it is certain that the inner āyatanas do not originate from themselves, [Reason:] because they exist [already]., in PsP, see Mac Donald, 2015: 147, (405 Tibetan) §27: 5-6:

आयतनानि स्वत उत्पन्नानिति स्वतन्त्रा प्रतिज्ञा यस्यां साङ्ख्याः प्रत्यवस्थास्यन्ते।, D 3860, 'a  
6a6: གང་ལ་གཤམ་ཅན་པ་དག་གིས་ལྱིར་རྫོག་པར་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་ལམ་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་རྣམས་དག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་དེ་ཞེས་བྱ་བའི་རང་གི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ལཱི་  
དམ་བཅའ་བ་ལྷ་གི་ལོ་ལོ་, 65ff. §27: “The inner bases (*āyatanāni*) have not arisen from self,  
“regard to which the Sāṃkhya could object,[...]”

inference, other people [than Sāṃkhya] say [as follows]: if it is said that it does not arise from itself because the cause has been existing, it is contradictory. [...] <sup>53</sup>

Here the explanation continues with further subdivisions until 14aL4. For this analysis it would be too vast to go into details.

### **Concluding the four steps of analysis:**

**The first step**, representing Nāgārjuna's rejection towards the Sāṃkhya's assertion is rather short concluding that it is well known according to Nāgārjuna that things do not have any intrinsic nature.

Followed by a longer analysis, **the second step**, is the assertion of Bhāviveka presented more in detail. This step is concluded that it is impossible for Bhāviveka's way of independent (*\*svatantra*) proof to negate the arising from oneself.

The **third step**, the assertion by Buddhapālita is rather short compared to the other parts and concludes that it is not possible to accept the arising from oneself because arising has its purpose and end. This is the negation of arising from oneself by Buddhapālita.

The **fourth step**, the rejection of Bhāviveka's assertion is again longer and detailed. It concludes with Prāsaṅgika statement that "we Mādhyamika do not assert that [a thing] arises both from oneself and from others".

### ***Four-step division regarding the word-meaning (\*padārtha)***

A four-step division is found as well as in the previous section 2.111 and 2.112 where four steps are favoured by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. This subdivision of sentence-meaning (*\*vākyārtha*), 2.112 was already presented

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<sup>53</sup> see Appendix: bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR1-13bL10.

in the context of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags citing Dharmakīrti in the previous section (see *Four-step discussion on the four negations of arising*).

Here another example for a four division regarding the explanation by means of the word-meaning (*\*padārtha*) (2.111)<sup>54</sup> will be explained. The subdivision is as follows: “the first [that is the explanation by means of the word-meaning (*\*padārtha*)] has four meanings: three answers directed to the three refutations [by the opponent] (2.111.1, 2.111.2, 2.111.3) and the explanation by means of the combination of previous and later terms (2.111.4)”<sup>55</sup>. Even though here the three answers directed to the three refutations are not further characterized at this point, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags sticks to a fourfold discussion. Here, from folio 5bL3 onwards Pa tshab Nyi ma grags refers to the discussion of the order of the MMK verses that are stated and the reason why non-arising is stated first. It agrees with what is known in the world and therefore non-arising was proven first. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags seems to follow Candrakīrti's discussion found in the *Prasannapadā*.<sup>56</sup>

2.111.1 Against the teaching as [above], the first of the three objections are as follows: non-cessation is being taught previously, because non-arising is taught later and in the extensive explanation [by previous commentators] non-arising is taught first. If you say, there appears the fault of unsuitable order and [the fault of the order] in comparison with the abbreviated teaching [given in MMK, 1.1 by Nāgārjuna<sup>57</sup>], The answer [is as follows]: it agrees with what is known

<sup>54</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 5bL2.

<sup>55</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 5bL2-3.

<sup>56</sup> See La Vallée Poussin 1903-1913: 12.8-10; MacDonald 2015: 137.3-5.

<sup>57</sup> Here it refers to the citation of MMK, 1.1: see de la Vallée Poussin (1903): 12, see Ye Shaoyong (2011) 《中论颂》梵藏汉合校·导读·译注: 12: न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्य अहेतुतः।उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः क्वचन केचन॥ १.१, D 3824,



in the world and, there is the necessity to [make] them easily understand and because there is a necessity to deny [their] wrong understandings [the order of] abbreviated teaching was reversed, i.e. non-arising was proved first [in the commentaries].<sup>58</sup>

The second dispute regarding the answers directed to the three refutations is as follows: the question is asked for what reason the negation of the four types of arising, (the four types of conditions) is presented.

2.111.2 The second dispute is as follows: if non-arising is taught first, then it is to be examined. [We] are indeed satisfied with the explanation of non-arising by negating arising in general (\**sāmanya*) [then] what is the necessity of negating the [four] particular (\**viśeṣa*) [types] of arising [four types of conditions<sup>59</sup>]<sup>60</sup>.

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tsa 1b3-4: |བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། |གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་སྐྱེ་མེད་མིན། |དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། |སྐྱེ་བ་ནམ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།, P 5224, tsa 2a3, P 5253, tsha 57b7-8, see Saito, A. (1984): 10 “In any place, nothing whatsoever ever originate from themselves, from others, from both, or without a cause.”

<sup>58</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 5bL3 དེ་ལྟར་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ལྷན་ཀྱང་ལས་དང་པོ་ནི་གོང་དུ་5bL4འགག་པ་མེད་པ་དང་ལ་བསྟན་ནས་སྐྱེ་མེད་སྐྱེས་བསྟན་པ་དང་། རྒྱལ་བཤད་དུ་སྐྱེ་མེད་དང་པོར་བསྟན་པས་མདོར་བསྟན་དང་གོ་རིམ་མ་མཐུན་[བའི་] ལྷོན་ཆགས་སོ་ཞེ་ན་ལན་ནི་འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་5bL5གགས་པ་དང་བསྟན་པ་དང་། གོ་སྐྱ་བའི་དགོས་པ་ཡོད་པ་དང་། འོག་རྟོག་དགག་པའི་དགོས་པ་ཡོད་པས་མདོར་བསྟན་པ་བསྟོན་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པ་དང་པོར་སྟབས་པོ།

<sup>59</sup> See MMK 1.2 (\*1.3 according to Ye 2011), de la Vallée Poussin (1903): 76, Ye Shaoyong 《中论颂》梵藏汉合校 • 导读 • 译注: 14, चतवारः प्रत्यया हेतहरारम्भणमनन्तरम्। ततहैवाधिपतेयं च प्रत्ययो नास्ति पञ्चमः॥, D 3824, tsa: 1b4 ལྷུན་རྣམ་བཞི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་དང་ནི། |དམིགས་པ་དང་ནི་དེ་མ་ཐག་ |བདག་པོ་ཡང་ནི་དེ་བཞིན་ཏེ། |ལྷུན་ལ་པ་ནི་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།, P 5224 tsa, 2a4-5: ལྷུན་རྣམ་བཞི་སྐྱེ་སྐྱེ་དང་ནི། |དམིགས་པ་རྟེན་ཅི་དེ་མ་ཐག།, P 5253, tsha (PP), MMK 1.2a-c: 64b2, 1.2d: 64b3, see Saito, A. (1984): “There are four conditions: Cause, object, the immediately preceding one, and the predominant one. There is no fifth condition.”

<sup>60</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 5bL11 བརྒྱུད་པ་ལ་པ་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་མེད་དང་པོ་བསྟན་ན་བརྟག་པར་བྱ་གྱེ། 5bR1སྐྱེ་བའི་ལྷན་པར་དགག་པ་ཅེ་དགོས། ལྷུ་བའི་སྐྱེ་བཀག་ནས་སྐྱེ་མེད་དུ་བསྟན་པས་ཚོག་མོད་ཅེ་ན་ཞེས་པའོ།

The third dispute is that the three kinds of arisings are negated and why are there no less or more than four? Here an answer is given with referring to the *Vastuvādin* or proponents of existence who assert that things do arise with and without a cause, as a contradiction to each other.

2.111.3 Likewise the third necessary dispute is [as follows]: if the [four] particular types of arising are thus negated, it must certainly be so but why is it not more or less [than four]?

The answer is \**Vastuvādin* or proponents of existence; certainly accept both, things arising from a cause and those arising without cause, because these both [arisings, with and without a cause] are in direct contradiction, in the first three [accepting cause] are not separate from each other [arisings], there is no difference from each other.<sup>61</sup>

Further in the fourth part the explanation by means of the combination of previous and later terms is given:

2.111.4 The fourth, regarding the explanation [of the author] in terms of connection of the former and later words [of Nāgārjuna's MMK 1.1].<sup>62</sup>

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags likes to render the dispute in four different ways and it is another example of a four-fold discussion that seems to be present in all three different parts of the First Chapter.

#### 4 Conclusion

First, Nāgārjuna was a very important reference for the source of origin, especially while emphasising the \*Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka

<sup>61</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 5bR5 བསྐྱེད་པ་ནི་པ་དེ་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱེ་བྱེག་འགོག་5bR5ན་དེ་ལོ་ནར་ངེས་ཀྱི་མི་མང་མི་ཉུང་བ་ཅི་འདྲི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན་ཞེས་དགོས་པ་འདོ། །ལན་ནི་དངོས་པོར་སྐྱེ་བ་ནམས་དངོས་པོ་རྒྱ་ལྡན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་རྒྱ་མེད་དུ་སྐྱེ་བར་འདོད་པ་༢(༠)ལ། 5bR6ངེས་སྐྱེ་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་པས་དང་པོ་ནི་༣(༠)པ་གཞན་མེད་པས་སོ།

<sup>62</sup> bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11:5bR7 ལེ་པ་ཚོགས་ལྗེ་ཕྱི་མཚམས་སྤྱར་བའི་སློ་ནས་5bR8བཤད་པ་ལ།

approach. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags emphasised the Madhyamaka position tracing back to Nāgārjuna. Nāgārjuna, having set up his own way of logical approach in the 2<sup>nd</sup> century, was later combined with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti by Śāntarakṣita. Taking similar approaches to Buddhist logic Pa tshab Nyi ma grags presented, after critically analysing the \*Svātantrika way of interpretation, his own way of \**prasaṅga*, an “unwanted consequence”.

Second, regarding his Madhyamaka reference, it is worthy of note that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was highly influenced by the literature of the 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> centuries. These texts that were presented briefly give an insight of Madhyamaka literature that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags may have had at hand. Further his synthesis with Buddhist logic shows that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags followed Śāntarakṣita with a different emphasis on the \*Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka position.

Third, naming Dharmakīrti as reference shows that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was aware of the *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* with the Tibetan translation by rNgog Lo-tsa-ba Blo ldan shes rab (རྟོག་ལོ་ཙ་པ་བློ་ལྷན་ཤེས་རབ།, 1059-1109). This shows that the fusion of Madhyamaka Philosophy with Buddhist logic and epistemology was an ongoing process in Kaśmīr. This commentary testifies to the formation of Prāsaṅgika's approach, while critically analysing the \*Svātantrika way of Madhyamaka Philosophy as represented by Bhāviveka.

Fourth, in the analysis of four steps of his discussion it was clarified how Pa tshab Nyi ma grags structured the approach of negation in detail. With the example of the negation of arising from oneself, the first and third steps of explanation regarding the positions of Nāgārjuna and Buddhapālita are rather short in comparison with the second and fourth that characterize Bhāviveka's assertion and later refutation by Candrakīrti. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags explained these two steps in detail. This shows that with his emphasis on the \*Prāsaṅgika-approach he made a detailed discussion against the

\*Svāntrika position. The four-step analysis was adopted by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags in order to teach his pupils and readers the \*Prāsaṅgika way as the only authentic method of understanding the Madhyamaka texts in general and the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* in particular.

Including the negation of arising from oneself and other three kinds, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags tends to use a four-fold division in different parts. As we saw in the section regarding the word-meaning (\**padārtha*) (2.111) and the different opinions regarding the sentence-meaning (\**vākyārtha*) (2.112), a four-fold division was probably adopted to have enough space and steps for demonstrating his conclusions.

**Appendix: Annotated Tibetan Text**

bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR2 onwards different positions

2.113.1 དེ་ལ་དང་པོ་རང་ལས་13aR2སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་པ་ལ་ལྟེ་<sup>63</sup> [ ]སྟེ།།

2.113.2 གཞན་ལ་<sup>64</sup>སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་ལ་ཡང་སྲུང་གི་<sup>65</sup>ལྟར་དོན་ལ་<sup>66</sup>ལས་།།

2.113.3 ན[ ]ཀ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འདོད་པ་ནི་གངས་ཅན་པ་སྟེ།།

2.113.4 ལ་རྒྱ་མེད་པ་14bL5ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སྲ་མ་ལྟར་དོན་ལ་ལས་།།

2.113.1 Of them, in the first **negation of arising from oneself**, [there] are four [positions].

2.113.2 The **negation of arising from others** has, as previously [mentioned], four meanings. Of them,

2.113.3 [Those who] assert that [things] **arise from both**, are the [proponents] of Sāṃkhya.

2.113.4 The fourth [section is as follows]: as for **arising without a cause** (*\*ahetutaḥ*), there are four meanings in the same way as [explained] previously.

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<sup>63</sup> སྟེ་ *sic*; = ལ་,བཞི་, 4 four

<sup>64</sup> གཞན་ལ་ *sic*; read གཞན་ལས་

<sup>65</sup> གི་ *sic*; = གི་

<sup>66</sup> སྟེ་ *sic*; = ལ་,བཞི་, 4 four

**bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 13aR1-13bL10 [...]**

(2.113) <sup>67</sup> དེ་ནི་མ་ལ་སྐབས་སུ་བབ་པའི་དོན་དང་སྐྱར་ནས་བཤད་ན། བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པ་ལ་སྟོགས་པ་  
ལྷོང་།<sup>68</sup>

།དེ་ལ་དང་པོ་རང་ལས་13aR2སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་པ་ལ་ལྷོང་།<sup>69</sup> [།སྐྱེ་ཐལ་འགྲུར་གྱིས་འགོག་པར་ལྷ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཞུང་དང་  
སྐྱར་ཉེ་བཤད་པ་དང། འབ་ཕྱ་ཀིར་ཉིའི་<sup>70</sup>འདོད་པ་རྗེས་སུ་བརྗོད་ནས་སྐྱར་དབྱུང་བ་དང། བྱ་ཉ་བ་ལི་13aR3ཉའི་  
འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་དང། དེ་ལ་བཅུད་པ་སྤང་བའོ། །དེའི་དང་པོ་རང་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཅེས་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱེ། ལྷུའི་  
དུས་ན་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པ[།]༧[།སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་དེ་ཡང་གངས་13aR4ཅན་འདོད་སྐྱེ། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་བའི་  
སྐོན་ས་སྐོབ་དཔོན་ཉིད་ཀྱིས། གལ་ཉེ་ཡོད་པ་སྐྱེ་འགྲུར་ན། །རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཉིད་དུ་འགྲུར་ཅེས་དགག་གོ། །༩་བ་  
13aR5འབ་ཕྱ་ཀིར་ཉི་ན་ལེ། ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཆེད་ནམས་ཚོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་པར་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་<sup>71</sup>མ་ཡིན་ཉེ།  
ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དཔེར་ན་བདག་བཞིན་ནོ། །དམ་བཅ་<sup>72</sup>13aR6བ་ནི་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པར་དགག་  
པ་ཅམ་སྐྱེ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ན་ཤེས་རབ་པ་རོལ་ཕྱིན་པའི་མདོ་དང་འགལ་བར་འགྲུར་ཉེ།མདོའ་<sup>73</sup>ལས་གཟུགས་

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<sup>67</sup> ལྷོང་; round sign marking 2.113  
<sup>68</sup> ལྷོང་; sic; = ལྷོང་, 4 four  
<sup>69</sup> ལྷོང་; sic; = ལྷོང་, 4 four  
<sup>70</sup> འབ་ཕྱ་ཀིར་ཉིའི་; sic; = ལྷ་ཕྱ་ཀིར་ཉིའི་  
<sup>71</sup> ལྱེ་བ་; sic; = ལྱེ་བ་  
<sup>72</sup> དམ་བཅ་; sic; = དམ་བཅའ་  
<sup>73</sup> མདོའ་; sic; = མདོ་

སྐྱེ་བ་ལྟེན་སྐོ་<sup>74</sup> 13aR7ཞེས་སྐྱོད་ན་ལེས་རབ་གྱི་<sup>75</sup> བ་རོལ་དུ་བྱིན་པ་ལ་མི་སྐྱོད་དོ་<sup>76</sup> ཅེས་པ་ལ་སྐྱོགས་པ་  
 གསུངས་པས་སོ། །ཅེས་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱིས་འགོག་གོ། །དེ་ལ་རྒྱ་གྲགས་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པ་ནི། 13aR8གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་  
 བརྟག་པ་ལ། དམ་བཅའ་བ་<sup>77</sup>ལ་བརྟག་པ་ལ།དོན་དམ་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་བརྟག་པ་ལ།<sup>78</sup>སྟེ་<sup>69</sup>ས་སྟོན་པ་ལ། དང་སོ་  
 བོ་ཡོད་པའི་བྱིར་ཅེས་པ་རྒྱུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་13aR9ཡོད་པའི་བྱིར་རང་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་ཟེར་ན། ལྷན་པ་མ་གྲུབ་འབྲས་  
 འུའི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་བྱིར་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་<sup>79</sup>ཟེར་ན་དམ་བཅའ་<sup>80</sup>མ་<sup>81</sup>གྲུབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱབ་སྟེ། འབྲས་བུ་གྲུབ་ཟེན་  
 13aR10བ་སྐྱེ་བའི་སྤྱི་ཡང་གྱི་<sup>79</sup>བཞེད་བའོ། །ལ་དམ་བཅའ་བ་<sup>77</sup>སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེས་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ལ་ནི་  
 ཁྱེད་མི་འདོད། །མེད་དགག་དང་རྟགས་འབྲེལ་བས་སྐྱབ་བྱ་དེ་ལ་སྟོས་13aR11ཉེ་རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མའི་མཚན་  
 ཉིད་དང་གྱི་ལྡན་པར་འགྱུར་ཉེ། ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི་བཅད་པའི་ཡུལ་ལ་མི་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་འབྲེལ་བའི་སྐོ་  
 བས་ཡིན་ལ།13bL1མེད་དགག་དང་རྟགས་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་པས་སོ།།<sup>69</sup> [།]བ་དོན་དམ་པ་<sup>82</sup>ཞེས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་  
 དེས་ཚོས་ཅན་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱེད་དམ། རྟགས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱེད་དམ། འོན་ཏེ་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་13bL2ཁྱད་པར་དུ་བྱེད།

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<sup>74</sup> ལྟེན་སྐོ་ *sic*; = མེད་པའོ་  
<sup>75</sup> གྱི་ *sic*; = གྱི་  
<sup>76</sup> MS unclear  
<sup>77</sup> དམ་བཅའ་བ་ *sic*; = དམ་བཅའ་བ་  
<sup>78</sup> ལ་ *sic*; read ལེག་  
<sup>79</sup> གྱི་ *sic*; = མི་  
<sup>80</sup> དམ་བཅའ་*sic*; = དམ་བཅའ་  
<sup>81</sup> དམ་བཅའ་མ་ *sic*; read དམ་བཅའ་[མ་]  
<sup>82</sup> དོན་དམ་པ་ *sic*; read དོན་དམ་པར་

དང་པོ་ལ་ལྟར་ན་དབུ་མ་བ་<sup>83</sup>ལ་ཁྲད་པར་མི་གྲུབ་པོ་<sup>84</sup>། །སྐྱེ་ལྟར་འདོད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། ཚོས་<sup>85</sup>བ་མེད་སྟེ་<sup>86</sup>།  
 དོན་དམ་པར་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་ཅེས་པ་ཁྲད་པར་13bL3གྲི་རྣམ་གཅད་<sup>87</sup>མེད་སྟེ་<sup>86</sup>ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་  
 ཡོད་ན། དེ་བཅད་པའི་དོན་དུ་རིགས་པ་ལས་<sup>88</sup>རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་དུ་ཡང་མེད་པས་སོ། །དེས་ན་རང་རྒྱུད་  
 གྲིས་<sup>89</sup>13bL4རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པ་མི་འཐད་དོ། །སྐྱེ་བ་བྱུང་བ་ལེ་ཉའི་<sup>90</sup>འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་ཞི། ཟལ་  
 འགྲུར་གྲིས་རང་ལ་<sup>91</sup>སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པ་སྟེ། རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ཞི་ཡོད་པ་ལས་13bL5སྐྱེ་བར་<sup>92</sup>འདོད་པ་ཡིན་ལ།  
 ཡོད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་དོན་དང་བཅས་པ་ལས་སྐྱར་ནས་ཡོད་པས་ན་དོན་མེད་དུ་ཟལ་ལོ། །ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ཐུག་པ་མེད་  
 པར་ཟལ་སྟེ་<sup>86</sup>། 13bL6སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པའི་བུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡང་དས་ཡ་<sup>93</sup>སྐྱེ་བར་ཟལ་ཉེ་ཡོད་པ་སྐྱེ་བས་སོ། །དེས་ན་སྐྱེ་  
 བ་དོན་དང་བཅས་ཤིང་ཐུག་པ་དང་བཅས་པས་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་ཁས་13bL7རྒྱང་དུ་སྐྱེ་<sup>94</sup>བཏུབ་ཅེས་རང་ལས་

<sup>83</sup> དབུ་མ་བ་ *sic*; read དབུ་མ་བ་

<sup>84</sup> མི་གྲུབ་པོ་ *sic*; = མི་འགྲུབ་པོ་

<sup>85</sup> ཚོས་པ་ *sic*; = དགོས་པ་

<sup>86</sup> སྟེ་ *sic*; = དེ་

<sup>87</sup> རྣམ་གཅད་ *sic*; = རྣམ་བཅད་

<sup>88</sup> སྐྱེ་ལྟར་འདོད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། *sic*; = four vertical points as a perpendicular stroke, indicating full-stop

<sup>89</sup> གྲིས་ *sic*; = གྲིས་

<sup>90</sup> MS unclear

<sup>91</sup> ལ་ *sic*; read ལས་

<sup>92</sup> སྐྱེ་བར་*sic*; = སྐྱེ་བར་

<sup>93</sup> space in MS ལ་ལྟ་བུ་ཡང་དས་ཡ་, ཡང་[ ]ནས་ཡང་[ ]དུ་ *sic*; read ཡང་ནས་ཡང་དུ་

<sup>94</sup> ཐུ་ *sic*; = མེ་



སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པ་ནི།<sup>95</sup> ༄<sup>96</sup>[ ]བ་བཅད་པའི་སྐྱོན་སྤང་བ་ལས་དང་པོ་བཅད་པ་ཟླ[ ]སྟེ། ཐལ་འགྲུར་གྱིས་གཞན་གྱི་  
 དོན་མ་ཁེགས་སྟེ།གཏན་13bL8ཚིགས་དང་པོ་<sup>97</sup>མེད་པས་རང[ ]རང[ ]དམ་བཅའ་ཙམ་གྱིས་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མི་  
 ཁེགས་སྟེ་<sup>86</sup>།དེས་ཁེགས་ན་རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་གཞན་གྱིས་<sup>98</sup>དམ་བཅས་པས།<sup>99</sup> རང་སྐྱེ་བྱས་<sup>100</sup> 13bL9བར་  
 ཡང་ཐལ་ལོ།<sup>101</sup> དེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་མ་སྤང་བར་<sup>102</sup>འགྲུར་ཉེ་ནང་གི་སྐྱེ་མཚེད་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་བྱས་ཉེ། །དོན་དམ་  
 བར་རང་ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་སྟེ་ཡོད་13bL10པའི་ཕྱིར་གཙོ་པོ་<sup>103</sup>གཞིལ་བྱ་<sup>104</sup>ལ་ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་ན་རེ་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རང་  
 ལས་མི་སྐྱེ་ཟེར་ན་འགལ། [...]

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<sup>95</sup> རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པ་ནི་ *sic*; read རང་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པའོ་  
<sup>96</sup> ༄. *sic*; =༄, 4 four  
<sup>97</sup> དང་པོ་ *sic*; read དང་དཔེ་as later mentioned in 13bR3 དཔེ་དང་གཏན་ཚིགས་དངོས་པོ་ལ་མེད་  
 ཅས་, see MacDonald: 403  
<sup>98</sup> གྱིས་ *sic*; =གྱིས་  
<sup>99</sup> space in MS  
<sup>100</sup> བྱས་ *sic*;= བྱས་  
<sup>101</sup> MS unclear, space in MS for གཞན་གྱིས་  
<sup>102</sup> སྤང་བར་ *sic*;= སྤང་བར་  
<sup>103</sup> MS unclear  
<sup>104</sup> གཞིལ་བྱ་*sic*;= གཞིལ་བྱ་, space in MS

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BP: *Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*, D 3842, P 5242.

MMK: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* by Nāgārjuna. See Ye 2011.

PP: *Prajñāpradīpa* by Bhāviveka. D 3853, P 5253.

PsP: *Prasannapadā* by Candrakīrti, D 3860, P 5260. See La Vallée Poussin 1903-1913.

PV: *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* by Dharmakīrti ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གྱི་ཚིག་ལེན་རྒྱུ་ལྷན་པུ་ལ།

(tshad ma rnam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa), P 5709, ce, 190a4-250b6,

D 4210, ce 94b1-151a7. For Sanskrit, see Y. Miyasaka, *Pramāṇavārttikakārikā* (Sanskrit and Tibetan). *Acta Indologica* 2, 1971/72, 1-206. Input by Motoi Ono in GRETEL's Sanskrit corpus.

### [Pa tshab Nyi ma grags]

dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka bstan bcos sGron ma gsal bar byed pa zhes bya ba, bKa' gdams gsung 'bum phyogs bsgrigs glegs bam bcu gcig pa (vol.11), Lhasa: dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib 'jug khang, 2006.

dBu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi tika sGron ma gsal byed dang Tshig gsal gyi dka' gnad dang spyi sdom bcas, Pa tshab lo tsās mdzad, Blarung snga 'gyur dpe tshog, 2009(?).

**Jayānanda**

*Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་འགྲེལ་བཤད། (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i 'grel bshad), P 5271; D 3870.

**Jñānagarbha**

*Satyadvayaivibhaṅga-vṛtti* བདེན་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་འབྱེད་པའི་འགྲེལ་བ། (bden gnyis mam par 'byed pa'i 'grel pa), D 3882, sa 3b3-15b1.

**Kamalaśīla**

*Madhyamakāloka* དབུ་མ་སྒྲུབ་བ། (dbu ma snang ba),  
P 5287, sa 143b2-275a4, D 3887, sa 133b4-244a7.

**Śāntarakṣita**

*Madhyamakālaṃkārikākārikā* དབུ་མ་རྒྱན་གྱི་ཚེག་ལེའུར་བྱས་པ། (dbu ma rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa), P 5284, sa 48b7-52b1, D 3884, sa 53a1-56b3.

*Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* དབུ་མའི་རྒྱན་གྱི་འགྲེལ་བ། (dbu ma'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa),  
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**Keywords:** Nāgārjuna, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, \*Prāsaṅgika and \*Svātantrika, Dharmakīrti

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## 要 旨

### 『中論』四不生偈及び関連テーマに対するパツァブ・ニマタクの〈四段階〉議論

ドルテ・カマリッド (Dörte Kamarid)

近年、チャンドラキールティ（月称、600-650 頃）の諸著作のチベット語訳者として知られるパツァブ・ニマタク（1055-1145 頃）自身による『中論』の注釈がラサのペルツェク研究所から出版されたカダム派文集の中に確認され、研究者の注目を集めている。ウメ字（草書体）によって記された同写本は、カダム派文集の第 11 巻に収められ、総計で 52 葉からなる。当該写本のタイトルは、『般若と名づけられた根本中論頌の注釈「解明する灯火」』である。

本論文は、『中論』第一章・第一偈のいわゆる四不生偈他の注釈内にほぼ定型的に見られるパツァブ・ニマタクの〈四段階〉議論に焦点をあて、考察を加えた。この観点からの考察は従来の研究に見られない。

とくに本論文では、パツァブ・ニマタクが、ナーガールジュナ（龍樹）、ブッダパーリタ（仏護）、バーヴィヴェーカ（清弁）、およびチャンドラキールティの著作とともに、それ以降のシャーンタラクシタ（寂護）やカマラシーラ（蓮華戒）等の後期中観派系の論師の諸著作や、またダルマキールティ（法称）他の仏教論理学者の著作をいかに援用しながら、それらを〈四段階〉の議論に組み入れたのかに焦点をあて、詳しい分析を加えた。