

Jñānaśrīmitra versus Śāntideva on Perception

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Preamble

Śāntideva is well known as the author of both *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra* and *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. The *Śikṣāsamuccaya* or “Compendium of [Buddhist] Teachings” is an anthology of Mahāyāna scriptures based on the author’s own thought of the conduct of a Mahāyāna practitioner composed of a total of twenty-seven verses. On the other hand, *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra* or “Entering the (Bodhisattva’s) Way to Awakening” is the author’s main work composed, finally, with a total of 913 stanzas.

Although the Tibetan tradition generally placed the author Śāntideva (c. 690-750) in the lineage of the Thal ’gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) branch of the Mādhyamika (dBU ma pa) school, as far as our present knowledge goes, Jñānaśrīmitra (c. 980-1030) was the first who, in his *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, identified Śāntideva as a *sākāravādin* or a “teacher of [asserting a cognition] having the image (/representation) [of an object] within”.¹ With an analysis of Jñānaśrīmitra’s discussion, this paper focuses on an interesting topic whether Jñānaśrīmitra’s understanding of therein-cited Śāntideva’s verse, BCA IX.26, is valid or not in comparison with the context of Chapter IX titled “the Perfection of Wisdom (*Prajñāpāramitā*)” of the *Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra*.

I Jñānaśrīmitra’ understanding of Śāntideva as a *sākāravādin*

¹ For Śāntideva’s philosophical position in the Mādhyamika history, the following five were pointed out in Saito [1996b: 174]:

1. The anonymous author of the **Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra-vivṛtti[pañjikā]* regards Śāntideva as a *Mādhyamaka who asserts the existence of an outer object [for its cognition] (phyi’i don yod par smra ba’i dBU ma).
2. The same author denies some people’s understanding of Śāntideva as a *Mādhyamaka who gives a denial of this [outer object] (’di ’gog par smra ba’i dBU ma).
3. As will be later discussed, Jñānaśrīmitra refers to Śāntideva as admitting “the assertion of [a cognition] having the representation (/image) [of an object] within” (*sākārapakṣa*).
4. Bu-ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364) does not ascribe Śāntideva to a particular school. In the last chapter of his *History of Buddhism (Chos ’byung)*, the catalogue section of Buddhist scriptures and treatises, completed in 1322, he placed the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* together with its nine commentaries in the section of the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra (sPyod ’jug gyi skor)*. However, in his *Catalogue of bsTan ’gyur* compiled thirteen years later, almost all these works related to the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* were incorporated into the Mādhyamaka section (dBU ma’i skor).
5. The Grub mtha’ literature of dGe lugs pa school traditionally places Śāntideva in the same philosophical lineage of Candrakīrti, i.e., Thal ’gyur ba.

In his *Sākārasiddhiśāstra*, Jñānaśrīmitra refers to Śāntideva as admitting “the assertion of [a cognition] having the image [of an object] within” (*sākārapakṣa*) as follows²:

Sākārapakṣa, or the assertion of [a cognition] having the image [of an object] within, is certainly accepted by Śāntideva when he says as follows:
(*sākārapakṣa eva tu śāntidevapādānām abhimataḥ. yadāhuḥ.*)

“[Cognition is remembered]³ since what is seen, heard, or known is never negated here in truth. But the conceptualization [of what is unseen as real], the cause of suffering, is rejected here.” (BCA IX.26)

(*yathā dṛṣṭaṃ śrutaṃ jñātaṃ naiveha pratiśidhyate/
satyataḥ kalpanā tv atra duḥkhaḥetur nivāryate//* iti)⁴

[Jñānaśrīmitra] In fact, here [the stanza says] that **in truth**, or in reality, **what is seen** etc. **is not negated**. Because what is seen etc. refers to the grammatical object (*karman*) [of seeing], it is said [in this stanza] that what is appearing, blueness and softness etc., cannot be denied.

(*atra hi satyatas tattvato dṛṣṭādir na niśidhyata iti. dṛṣṭādikarmanirdeśāt prakāśamāno nīlakomalādir aśakyanihnava ity uktaṃ bhavati.*)

What then has no essence? Answer: By the very word “**conceptualization**”⁵, it means by implication that the **conceptualization** certainly [works] on the unreal [duality] such as the apprehended [object] and the apprehending [subject], cause and effect, and so forth, because the **conceptualization** [works] on what is unseen (*adṛṣṭa*). And here again [the sentence] is constructed that what is unseen cannot exist in reality just because it is unseen. Therefore, the statement [in the Mahāyāna tradition]: “All *dharma*s have no own-nature” etc. also means that what has the nature of being conceptualized is certainly negated in reality.

² *Sākārasiddhiśāstram*, Thakur ed. [1959: 476-477] and Arai [2016: 87-89, 105-107]. The cited parts correspond to Ms.109a2-b1. The words of BCA IX.26 are herein boldfaced.

³ The word “*yathā*” seems to fit only the context of the earlier version of the BSA, in which the above stanza shows the reason for the author's explanation about how a cognition is memorized without accepting Yogācāra's theory of self-knowledge (*svasaṃvitti*) (21cd): “[Yogācāra]: If there is no self-knowledge, how is cognition memorized? [Śāntideva]: Examination being unnecessary, it is because the [cognition] is memorized by the very object which was remembered.” (don dran gyurd pa'i sgo nyid nas// dpyad myi dgos par de dran no// [St.628, Ka 20a1] = **smṛtārthasya vaśād evāvicārye tad dhi smaryate*!).

⁴ See also *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Minayev 1890, p. 210. 3-4. Jñānaśrīmitra no doubt cited the verse from BCA. See the following [Text and Translation] of BSA-1, VIII.22 ≈ BCA, IX.26.

⁵ Ms.[109a4] *kalpanāśabdād*; cf. Thakur and Arai *kalpanā śabdād*.

(*kasya tarhi nairātmyam ity āha. kalpanaivābhutānām grāhyagrāhaka-hetuphalādīnām ity arthāt kalpanāśabdād eva. adṛṣṭe hi kalpanā. adṛṣṭam cādrṣṭatvād eva na sambhavati tattvata ity atrāpi sambadhyate. tena niḥsvabhāvaḥ sarvadharmā ityādivacane 'pi tattvataḥ kalpitarūpaniṣedha eveti bhāvaḥ.*)

What, again, is the unreal conceptualization (*abhūtavikalpa*) rejected for? Because it is **the cause of suffering**. In fact, it is nothing but the [unreal conceptualization] that brings about transmigration characterized by proceeding and ceasing, etc., since, except the [unreal conceptualization], the mere appearance of its image(/representation) (*tadākāra*) is insignificant.

(*kimartham punar abhūtavikalpavāranam. duḥkhasya hetutvāt. sa eva hi pravṛttinivṛttyādi lakṣaṇam saṃsāram ākṣipati. tam antarena tadākārodaya-mātrasya tatrākiñcitkaratvād iti.*)

On the other hand, when [Śāntideva] connects *satyataḥ* [in the sense of] *satyatvena* or “as true” with *kalpanā* or “conceptualization”, then, in that case also, if, concerning the truth, the conceptualization of “this [all] is true” is rejected, what fault is there in relation to the perfection (*pariniṣpatti*) [i.e., the perfected nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*)] ?

(*yat tu satyata iti satyatvena ya kalpaneti yojayanti. tatrāpi yadi satyatve 'pi satyam idam iti vikalpavāranam pariniṣpattau ko doṣaḥ.*)

[Objection-1] Or if, now again, it means that because [what is seen etc.] is non-existent (*asattva*), adherence to [its] being true (*satyādhimokṣa*) is rejected, [Jñānaśrīmitra’s answer:] then “**what is seen** etc. **is not negated**” is contradicted as follows: though one is caused to fall into untruth [by what is seen etc.], “**what is seen**” etc. is said to “**be not negated.**” [It contradicts] because what causes to fall into untruth is certainly the object of negation.

(*atha sampraty api satyādhimokṣavāranam asattvād ity arthaḥ, tadā drṣṭādi na pratiṣidhyata iti vyāhatam. asatyam cāpādyate drṣṭādi na ca pratiṣidhyata iti. asatyatāpādanasyaiva pratiṣedhārthatvāt.*)

[Objection-2] Or if [they say] that conventionally it is not negated and in reality it is rejected, this too is not expressed in the letters (*akṣara*) [of the stanza]. The word “**in truth**”, being a qualifier of the **conceptualization**, is differently connected. [Jñānaśrīmitra’s answer:] Then, however, the word “**conceptualization**” is not suitable, because the same “**what is seen**” etc. is accepted as the objects of both affirmation and negation from the viewpoints of verbal convention and the ultimate [respectively].

(*atha na pratiṣidhyate samvṛtyā, tattvatas tu vāraṇam. tad api nākṣarārūḍham. satyataḥśabdo 'nyathāyojitaḥ kalpanāviśeṣanatvena. na ca tadā kalpanāśabdaḥ*

saṅgataḥ. dr̥ṣṭāder evaikasya saṁvṛtiparamāṛthāpekṣayā vidhiniṣedhaviṣayatayā abhimatatvāt.)

Thus, for instance, [the stanza] should have suitably been stated as follows:

“[A cognition is remembered] in the following way: what is seen, heard, or known is certainly not negated here conventionally. But in reality that [which is seen etc.], the cause of suffering, is rejected.”

(*tathā hi*

*yathā dr̥ṣṭam śrutam jñātam naiveha pratiśidhyate/
saṁvṛtyā tattvatas tv etad duḥkhaḥetur nivāryate//*

iti vaktum ucitam.)

Therefore, in this [stanza], concerning the wording, [we see] a repetition of word [i.e. *etad*], supplementation of the word *saṃvṛti*, and a different meaning of the word *kalpanā*. Thus, how greatly do the letters [of the stanza] suffer?

(*tad atra śabdataḥ śabdasya punarāvrttiḥ **saṃvṛti**śabdasyādhyāhārāḥ. **kalpanā**-
śabdasyānyārthateti kim akṣarāṇi kliśyante mahatām.*)

[Jñānaśrīmitra' conclusive remarks:] [Consequently] it is certain that images (*akārāḥ*), being accepted as the objects of six kinds of cognition by sense organs, are not negated because they are self-known (*svasaṃvidita*). But what is conceptualized is certainly negated.

(*vyaktam etat ṣaḍindriyavijñānagocarābhimatā ākāra na niṣidhyante
svasaṃviditatvāt kalpitasyaiva tu niṣedha iti.*)

II Analysis of Śāntideva's stanza BSA-1 VIII.22 (\approx BCA IX.26)

Turning to Śāntideva's meaning and context of the stanza in question, let me first cite relevant BSA (/BCA) verses from 1 to 22 (≈BCA IX.26) with a synopsis given by myself:

[Synopsis]

1 Wisdom (*prajñā*)

BSA-1 (Early Recension) BCA (Skt.)

$$1 \qquad \qquad \qquad \cong 1$$

2 Two Truths (*satyadvaya*)

$$2 \qquad \qquad \qquad \simeq 2$$

3 3

$$4 \qquad \qquad \qquad \simeq 4$$

5 5

$$6 \qquad \qquad \qquad \simeq 6$$
$$7 \qquad 7ab+ \simeq 9ab$$

3 On a Simile of Illusion (*māyopamā*)

3.1 How to Establish Transmigration and Causality

8	9cd + 10ab
9	≈10cd + 11ab
10	≈11cd + 12ab
11	12cd + 13ab
12	13cd + 14ab
13	≈14cd + 15ab

3.2 Criticism of the Yogācāra Theory of Self-knowledge (*svasaṃvitti*)

14	15cd + ≈16ab
15	≈17ab + 18ab
16	≈18cd + 19ab
17	≈19cd + ≈21cd
18	≈25
19	22
20	≈23
21	24ab + _____
22	≈26

3.3 How to Eliminate Unconscious Impressions (*vāsanā*)

23	31
24	32ab + ≈33ab
25	≈34
26	35

[Text and Translation]⁶

Verse no. of the BSA-1 (Verse no. of the BCA Skt.)

- 1 (≈1) “This entire collection of preparations is for the sake of wisdom for myself and others. Therefore, one who desires *nirvāṇa* and happiness should develop wisdom.”

bsdog pa 'di dag thams chad kyang//

bdag dang gzhan gyi shes rab don//

de bas mya ngan 'das pa dang//

bde ba 'dod pas shes rab skyed//

idaṃ parikaraṃ sarvaṃ prajñārthaṃ hi **parātmanoḥ*^{1/}

*tasmād utpādayet prajñāṃ **sukhanirvṛtikāṅkṣayā***^{2/}

1 BCA *munir jagau* (Tib. pāda b: thub pas shes rab don du gsungs//)

⁶ In the following Text, supposed Sanskrit readings of BSA-1 are boldfaced.

2 BCA *duḥkhanirvṛti-* (to be corrected as BCAP *duḥkhanirvṛtti-*) (Cf. BSA-3 pāda cd: de yi phyir na sdug bsngal dag// zhi bar 'dod pas shes rab skyed//)

2 (≈2) “It is taught that there are these two truths: the conventional and the ultimate. Reality is beyond the scope of intellect. Intellect and words are the conventional.”

don dam pa dang ni kun rdzob ste//
'di ni bden pa gnyis su bshad//
don dam blo'i spyod (a8) yul myin//
blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin//

**saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca satyadvayam idaṃ smṛtam*^{1/}

buddher agocaras tattvaṃ buddhiḥ śabdaś ca saṃvṛtiḥ^{2/}

1 BCA *matam* (Cf. BSA-3 pāda b: 'di ni bden pa gnyis su 'dod//)

2 BCA *saṃvṛtir ucyate* (Cf. BSA-3 pāda d: blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod//)

3 (3) “In this regard, people are seen to be of two types: the contemplative and the ordinary. Of these, the world[-view] of the ordinary is invalidated by the world[-view] of the contemplative.”

de la 'jig rten rnam gnyis mthong//
rnal 'byor pa dang de bzhin phan^{1/}//
de la rnal 'byor 'jig rten gyis//
'jig rten phal pa sun yang 'byin//
1 *Sic*; read phal.

**tatra loko dvidhā dr̥ṣṭo yogī prākṛtakas tathā*

tatra prākṛtako loko yogilokena bādhyate//

4 (≈4) “Even [the views of] the contemplative are invalidated by the superior [view] of those at successively higher levels. Thus, by means of seeing the two [worlds], one should contemplate the two characteristics [respectively].”

gong ma gong ma'i khyad par gyis//
rnal 'byord pa yang sun 'byind to//
de ltar rnam gnyis mthong bas na//
(19b1) de phyir don rnams dpyad par bya//

**bādhyante ca viśeṣeṇa*^{1/} *yogino 'py uttarottaraiḥ*

tathobhayena dr̥ṣṭena vicārye tena lakṣaṇe^{2/}//

1 BCA *dhīviśeṣeṇa*

2 BCA *dr̥ṣṭāntenobhayeṣṭena kāryārtham avicārataḥ*

(Cf. BSA-3 rnal 'byor pa yang blo khyad kyis// gong ma gong ma

rnam kyis gnod// gnyi ga yang ni 'dod pa'i dpe// 'bras bu'i don du
ma dpyad phyir//)

- 5 (5) “[Ordinary] people see existent things and also conceptualize them to be real, but not as an illusion. It is in this regard that there is disagreement between the [ordinary] people and the contemplative.”

'jig rten pa yis dngos mthong la//
yang dag nyid du 'ang rtog par byed//
sgyu ma bzhin du myin bas(*sic*) 'dir//
rnal 'byord pa dang 'jig rtend rtsod//
lokena bhāvā dṛśyante kalpyante cāpi tattvataḥ/
*na tu*¹ *māyāvad ity atra vivādo yogilokayoh*// (1 =T260, 261 & BCAP;
BCA *nanu*)

- 6 (≈6) “The objects of perception, color-and-form and so forth, are established by intellect and not by a valid means of cognition. The [intellect] is false, like, for example, a [wrongly] established [view] that impure things are pure.”

gzugs stsogs mngon sum blo yis ni//
rab du grags kyi tshad mas myin//
de ni myi gtsang las stsogs la//
(b2) gtsang stsogs grags pa bzhin ste brzdun//
**pratyakṣaṃ dhiyā rūpādi prasiddhaṃ*¹ *na pramāṇataḥ*/
aśucyādiṣu śucyādiprasiddhir iva sāmṛṣā//
1 BCA *pratyakṣam api rūpādi prasiddhyā* (Cf. BSA-3 pāda ab: gzugs
sogs mngon sum nyid kyang ni// grags pas yin gyi tshad mas min//)

- 7 (7ab+ ≈9ab) “The Protector taught existent things in order to guide people just as an illusion-like Conqueror teaches the appearance of merits.”

'jig rten gzud par bya ba'i phyir//
mgon po yis ni dngos bstand te//
sgyu ma lta bu'i rgyal ba las//
bsod nams 'byung bar gsungs pa bzhin//
**lokāvatāraṇārthaṃ ca bhāvā nāthena deśitāḥ*/
*māyopamāḥ jināt puṇyasaṃbhavasya kathā yathā*¹//
1 BCA *puṇyaṃ sadbhāve 'pi kathāṃ yathā* (Cf. BSA-3, 9ab: sgyu
'dra'i rgyal las bsod nams ni// ji lta dngos yod la ji bzhin//)

Verses 8-20 are omitted.

- 21 (24ab+___) “[Yogācāra]: If there is no self-knowledge, how is cognition

remembered?

[Śāntideva]: Examination being unnecessary, it is because the [cognition] is remembered by the very object which was memorized.” (See n. 3 above)

gal te rang rig yod myin na//

rnam shes ci (20a1) ltar dran par 'gyur//

don dran gyurd pa'i sgo nyid nas//

dpyad myi dgos par de dran no//

yadi nāsti svasaṃvittir vijñānaṃ smaryate katham/

**smṛtārthasya vaśād evāvicārye tad dhi smaryate//*

22 (≈26)

“[Cognition is remembered]⁷ since all that is seen or heard is never negated here. But the conceptualization [of what is seen or heard] as real, the cause of suffering, is rejected here.”

'di¹ ltar mthong dang thos pa kun// (1 = St.629 and BSAV (D₁ 343a5); St.628 de)

'di la dgag par bya myed kyi//

'dir ni sdug bsngal rgyur 'gyur ba//

bden² pa nyid du rtog pa zlog// (2 = St.629; St.628 dben)

**yathā dṛṣṭam śrutam sarvaṃ³ naiveha pratiśidhyate/* (3 BCA *jñātam*)⁸
satyataḥ kalpanā tv atra duḥkhahetur nivāryate//

(Cf. BSA-3 ji ltar mthong thos shes pa dag// 'dir ni dgag par bya min te// 'dir ni sdug bsngal rgyur gyur pa// bden par rtog pa bzlog bya yin//)

To understand what stanza 22 (/BCA 26) means, verses from 2 to 6, and 21 are crucial from the context's viewpoint. As verse 5 tells, “[Ordinary] people see existent things and also conceptualize them to be real, but not as an illusion (*lokena bhāvā dṛśyante kalpyante cāpi tattvataḥ*/). It is in this regard that there is disagreement between the [ordinary]

⁷ The word “*yathā*” seems to fit only the context of the earlier version of the BSA, in which the above stanza shows the reason for the author's explanation about how a cognition is memorized without accepting the Yogācāra theory of self-knowledge (*svasaṃvitti*) (21cd): “[Yogācāra]: If there is no self-knowledge, how is cognition memorized? [Śāntideva]: Examination being unnecessary, it is because the [cognition] is memorized by the very object which was remembered.” (don dran gyurd pa'i sgo nyid nas// dpyad myi dgos par de dran no// [St.628, Ka 20a1])

=**smṛtārthasya vaśād evāvicārye tad dhi smaryate//*). Based on the later version of BCA, neither Jñānaśrīmitra nor Prajñākaramai explained how to understand the usage of “*yathā*” here.

⁸ Cf. BCAP p 405.1-4: “Like ‘what is seen’ obtained by direct perception of eye-cognition etc., ‘what is heard’ [obtained] by another person and scripture or ‘what is known’ ascertained because of inference born of the logical mark in its three aspects, based on all conventional usage, is certainly not negated here.” (*yathā dṛṣṭam iti/ cakṣurādīvijñānena pratyakṣeṇa pratipannam// śrutam iti/ parapudgalād āgamāc ca/ jñātam iti/ trirūpalingajād anumānān niścitam/ tad etad iha sarvaṃ vyavahāram āśritya naiva pratiśidhyate/*)

people and the contemplative.” Therefore, according to Śāntideva, those that are seen or heard are “existent things” (*bhāvāḥ*) and not “images (/representations)” (*ākārāḥ*), unlike Jñānaśrīmitra’s [mis- or intentional] interpretation. Then what was highlighted by Śāntideva is whether those existent things are further conceptualized to be real (*tattvataḥ*, = *satyataḥ*) or seen as illusions (*māyāvat*). In this regard, he says, there is disagreement between the [ordinary] people (*[prākṛtaka-]loka*) and the contemplative (*yogin*).

III Concluding remarks

From the inquiry above, we may draw the following conclusions. First, Jñānaśrīmitra understands “what is seen” (*dr̥ṣṭa*) etc. of the BCA IX.26 (BSA-1 VIII.22) as meaning “image (/representation)” (*ākāra*) which appears (*prakāśamāna*) within the scope of cognition by sense organs (*indriyavijñānagocara*). Therefore, according to him, those images are self-known (*svasaṃvidita*).

Second, according to Jñānaśrīmitra, the word *satyataḥ* “in truth” in the sense of *tattvataḥ* “in reality” should be understood as connecting with the first half or whole of the verse. Therefore, “what is seen” etc. in reality is not negated and cannot be denied (*aśakyanihna*).

Third, however, Jñānaśrīmitra’s interpretation of the BCA IX.26 above is not supported by Śāntideva’s discussion as shown in the context of BSA-1 VIII.1-22 or BCA IX.1-26 in which the author clearly denies the theory of self-knowledge (*svasaṃvitti*). According to Śāntideva, without recourse to the theory of self-knowledge, cognition is memorized by the very object which was remembered (*smṛtārtha*).

Fourth, the objects of perception, color-and-form and so forth, are established by intellect (*dhī/ buddhi*) and not by a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). Although ordinary people not only see the objects of perception or existent things but conceptualize them to be real, the contemplative (*yogin*) see them as illusion-like and does not conceptualize them to be real.

Lastly, regarding the interpretation of the stanza in question, BSA VIII.22 or BCA IX.26, the first half is to be interpreted in the context of the memory of cognition, and the two words *satyataḥ kalpanā* are to be connected in the sense of “conceptualization [of what is seen or known] as real”.

Symbol

≈ indicates that the contents of two corresponding stanzas found in the BSA-1 and the BCA are mostly identical, but still appear to contain a partial difference between them.

Abbreviations

BCA: *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, see Minayev 1890.

BCAP: *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*; L. de la Vallée Poussin ed., *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*,

- Prajñākaramati's commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva.* Bibliotheca Indica, Nos. 983,1031,1091,1126,1139,1305,1399, 1901-1914; P No. 5273, D No. 3872.
- BSA-1: *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*, the early recension translated into Tibetan by dPal brtsegs and Sarvajñādeva, composed of nine chapters, and available only in the Tibetan manuscripts from Dūn-huáng. See Saito 1993.
- BSA-3: *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*, the third and latest Tibetan translation by Blo ldan shes rab and Sumatikīrti.
- BSAV: *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravivṛtti[pañjikā]* by an unknown author; D Nos. 3873, 3877, P Nos. 5274, 5279.
- Ms.: Manuscript of *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali* photographed by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and preserved in the Bihar Research Society, a print of which is also kept in microfilm at Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitäts Bibliothek, Göttingen, Nr. XC 14/25.
- St: Tibetan manuscripts from Dun-huang collected by A. Stein; catalogued by L. de la Vallée Poussin, *Catalogue of the Tibetan Manuscripts from Dun-huang in the India Office Library*, 1969.
- T260: A Sanskrit manuscript of the BCA preserved in the University of Tokyo; catalogued by S. Matsunami, *A Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tokyo University Library*, 1965, pp. 97, 352-353.
- T261: A Sanskrit manuscript of the BCA preserved in the University of Tokyo; catalogued by S. Matsunami, *ibid.*, pp. 97-98, 352-353.

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