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Abstract

The commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK) ascribed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags along with a good number of works in the bKa' gdams gsung 'bum was published by the Peltsek Institute for Ancient Tibetan Manuscripts in Lhasa. The recently discovered manuscript is included in the eleventh volume of the series as a facsimile edition written in དབུ་མེད་ *dbu med* script which is composed of 52 folios in total. This manuscript casts a new light on the research of the historical development of translation work in Tibet. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-ca. 1145), one of the best-known translators (*lo tsa ba*) in the Tibetan tradition, contributed a lot to the later diffusion (*phyi dar*) of Tibetan Buddhism with his important translation works from Sanskrit to Tibetan. The present research deals with the manuscript that is entitled as དབུ་མ་རྩལ་ཤེས་རབ་ཀྱི་ཏེ་ཀ་སྐོན་མ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པ། *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi fi ka sgron ma gsal bar byed pa* which can be translated as “The Commentary on the *Prajñā[nāma] Mūlamadhyamaka [-kārikā]* titled] The Illuminating Lamp”. It is ascribed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags according to the explanation by Mahāsumati (Hasumati) as mentioned in the colophon (Folio 52bR10-52bR11)¹.

This article aims to introduce Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's usage of the terms *prasaṅga* and *svatantra* followed by his distinctive explanations on *Prāsaṅgika and *Svātantrika, of which he took his clear position of the former. As earlier assumed by Mimaki², Pa tshab Nyi ma grags might be the first scholar who introduced the division between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika using these terminologies for the first time. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags might have learned these interpretations from his teachers in Kaśmīr where he worked with scholars such as Mahāsumati (Hasumati), Sūkṣmajana, Kanakavarman and Tilakakalaśa. In the First Chapter of this

¹ Kamarid 2019: Introductory Remarks on Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's Commentary of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, Sengokuyama Journal of Buddhist Studies, Vol. XI: 258-224.

² Mimaki 1983: 163.


commentary on the MMK beside other topics like Logic, etc. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags discussed different viewpoints and pointed out his own standpoint, that of a Prāsaṅgika. This article gives an analytical observation of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's explanation of the *Svātantrika-*Prāsaṅgika distinction and concludes that the earlier assumed argument can be attested with this manuscript. The role of language regarding the different approaches will be discussed in the last part of this article.

1. Introductory remarks on Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and the manuscript

A good number of works in the bKa' gdams gsung 'bum that were recently discovered and published by the Peltsek Institute for Ancient Tibetan Manuscripts in Lhasa cast a new light on the research of the historical development of translation work in Tibet. One of these important manuscripts, located in the 11th volume of the series, is another commentary on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter abbreviated to MMK). The assumed author Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-1145?) commented on the MMK at the end of the 11th century most likely, during his stay in Kaśmīr, where he studied Sanskrit and Buddhist Philosophy under his teachers Sūksmajana, Parahitabhadra, Mahāsumati and Bhavyarāja. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags showed great interest in the works of Candrakīrti and became a well-known translator. He highly contributed to the spread of Madhyamaka works including the MMK and the *Prasannapadā* (PsP) in collaboration with his Indian *paṇḍitas*. He later became the main teacher for those treatises written by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti in Central Tibet.

In 2009 Dreyfus and Tsering introduced the textual material and emphasized the necessity of further research. In 2016 Yoshimizu presented introductory details about the manuscript attributed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and with her recent publication (2020) she clarified the terms *Prāsaṅgika and *prasaṅga* according to her observations gained from Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's commentary. Also, her previous work on Zhang Thang sag pa's commentary to the *Prasannapadā* titled *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi tika* relates to

the subject matter since Zhang Thang sag pa is known as one of the disciples of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags. Further observations I made about the characteristics of the manuscript, the authorship etc. were recently published (2019).



(Folio 3a)

The present manuscript, as a facsimile edition written in དབུ་མེད། dbu med script, is titled དབུ་མ་རྩ་བ་ཤེས་རབ་གྱི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་མ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ། *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ũ ka sGron ma gsal bar byed pa zhes bya ba*, which can be translated as “The Commentary on the *Prajñā[nāma] Mūlamadhyamaka [-kārikā]* titled] ‘The Illuminating Lamp’”. The manuscript is ascribed to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags according to the explanation by Mahāsumati (Hasumati) as mentioned in the colophon (Folio 52bR10-52bR11). Further details about the authorship can be found in my previous paper titled “Introductory Remarks on Pa tshab Nyi ma grags’s Commentary of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*”³. The manuscript is composed of 52 folios in total, written in an uncommon division into two columns with eleven lines in each column (numbered as L1-11; L=left column and R1-11; R =right column).

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags contributed a lot to the later diffusion ཕྱི་དཀར། (*phyi dar*) of Tibetan Buddhism with his important translation works from Sanskrit to Tibetan. This commentary initiates new approaches to elucidating the history of Tibetan translation of the MMK and other Madhyamaka treatises.

³ Kamarid 2019: 224-258.

2. Philosophical awareness of the distinction between *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika

The distinction itself between *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka does not appear in the Indian literature, but the term Svatantrasā[dha]navādin can be found according to Yonezawa's research on **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*, an Indian sub-commentary on the *Prasannapadā*.⁴

The division into these two branches of *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika had been primarily used among Mādhyamikas in the Tibetan tradition. The division was made to identify the different lineages in understanding of the Madhyamka thought, both tracing back its origin to Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

***Svātantrika** (རང་རྒྱུད་པ། *rang rgyud pa*) is represented by Bhāviveka (6th century) and later followed by Jñānagarbha (8th century), Śāntarakṣita (725–788) and Kamalaśīla (740–795). In the 8th century Jñānagarbha incorporated aspects of Yogācāra Philosophy and Dharmakīrti's Epistemology and was mostly known for his work "Distinguishing the Two Truths", *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* and *-vṛtti*, that divides the Madhyamaka approach into the Two Truths doctrine of conventional truth and ultimate truth. In debates among Mādhyamikas, while their presentation is in accordance with the conventional truth, the extreme of non-existence is avoided. Bhāviveka is regarded as the founder of the Sautrāntika-*Svātantrika school of Madhyamaka approach.⁵ The thought of an "independent" (*svatantra*) inference (**anumāna*) and formal reasoning (**prayoga*) had been highly influenced by the epistemologists and Logical

⁴ Svatantrasā[dha]navādin is attested in Sanskrit see Yonezawa 2019: 80: "1.1 Sanskrit Notes on the Pras, §14: Bhāvivekaḥ kila svatantrasāadhanavādi." Also in his footnote 63: "In the Tibetan notes on the Pras, Bhāviveka is designated as Rang rgyud smra ba, which is almost identical with svatantrasāadhanavādin. The text runs as follows: yang Rang rgyud smra bas brgal pa |" (§31, ad Pras_LVP 18.5–9; Pras_M 147.5–7) "Again, the Rang rgyud smra ba (= Bhāviveka) disputes."

⁵ Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 79.

Reasoning (**prāmaṇa* / ཚད་མ། *tshad ma*) by scholars like Dignāga (ca.480-540)⁶. The name “*Svātantrika” itself derives from the argument of independent inferences (*svatantrānumāna*) and syllogisms (**prayogavākya*) in the argumentation about the nature of reality established by Bhāviveka, that was rejected by Candrākīrti later on.

The main difference between *Prāsaṅgika and *Svātantrika lies mainly in their understandings of the nature of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), the characteristics of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*), and the way of proving emptiness through reasoning.⁷ The question about the understanding of selflessness of phenomena (**dharmanairātmya*) is also emphasised.

Concerning the term *Svātantrika, Yonezawa pointed out in his work on **Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*, that “Bhāviveka as svatantrasā[dha]navādin” is mentioned in the *LT’s Sanskrit notes on the Pras”.⁸ In the commentary on the *Pramāṇavārttika* by Ravigupta the term རང་རྒྱུད་པ། (*rang rgyud pa*) in the Third Chapter⁹ is used. Further there are findings on the term རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམས། (*rang rgyud su smra ba rnams*) in Jayānanda’s *Madhyamakāvātāra-ṭīkā* (MĀ)¹⁰ in which the terms རང་རྒྱུད་པ། (*rang rgyud pa*) and དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ། (*dbu ma rang rgyud pa*)¹¹ are also used. This was earlier pointed out by

⁶ Seyfort Ruegg 2010: 160.

⁷ Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 2014: 1112.

⁸ Yonezawa: 2019,80 §14: “Bhāvivekaḥ kila svatantrasādhanaṅvādin” in which Bhāviveka is clearly designated as svatantrasādhanaṅvādin, see note 4

⁹ *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkāyāṁ ṭīṭiyaparivarta* (ཚད་མ་རྣམས་འགྲེལ་བྱེད་འགྲེལ་པ་ལས་ལེན་གསུམ་པ།) by ཉི་མ་ལྷས་པ། (Ravigupta), D4225 mdo 'grel (mtshad ma), phe 1b-174a (vol. 183):72b1 རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། “...it is not the case with *Svātantrika...”

¹⁰ *Madhyamakāvātāraṭīkā*, དབུ་མ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་འགྲེལ་བཤད་ཅེས་བྱ་བ། (dbu ma la 'jug pa'i 'grel bshad ces bya ba) D 3870, 282b3: དེ་ལ་རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམས་ལ་མར་ནི་ཉུང་པར་བྱེད་བར་དུ་བྱས་ནས་སྦྱོན་བརྗོད་པ། མིན་ནོ། “There the **svatantravādin* first pointed out the fault in the context of particularity.”, and 281b6: དེའི་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ནི་དབུ་མ་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལོ། “for them” means **Madhyamka-Svātantrika*”

¹¹ D3870, 282a2-3: ཡང་རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ལ་སྦྱོན་གཞན་བསྟན་པར་བྱ་བའི་ཕྱིར། “Further, because for the *Svātantrika another fault is to be explained...”

Seyfort Ruegg¹². *Svātantrika itself is not attested in Sanskrit as such. It was used in Tibet later on to distinguish the developments of Madhyamaka understanding in India.¹³

***Prāsaṅgika** (ཐལ་འགྲུར་བ།, *thal 'gyur ba*), the Consequentialist, is represented by Buddhapālita (ca. 470-540)¹⁴ and later on by Candrakṛti (ca. 600-660), to designate the second branch by the name “*prasaṅga*”, a method of reasoning by pointing out an “unwanted consequence”, that was already introduced by Nāgārjuna.¹⁵ Buddhapālita established the Mādhyamika’s argumentation that points out the necessity of an unwanted consequence resulting from a thesis or proposition intended by an opponent to prove the existence of an entity (*bhāva*). As it was summarized by Seyfort Ruegg, the Mādhyamika’s position of the *Prāsaṅgika has the advantage of not committing the critic but using *prasaṅga*, an unwanted consequence, in order to take up the counter-position and maintaining what is denied. This method establishes the counter-position, the reverse of what has been rejected.¹⁶ Taking up any proposition is negated.

In Lang’s article titled “*Pa tshab Nyi ma grags: The Introduction of Prāsaṅgika into Tibet*”, she dated the *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika distinction of the Mādhyamika school in the 14th century though the foundation of this distinction was already set in the 5th century by the Indian scholar Buddhapālita in his commentary on the MMK¹⁷. The first mention of *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika as schools is still not clearly identified.¹⁸ Even without these recently discovered textual materials Lang emphasized the importance of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags during the development of Tibetan

¹² Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 20 note 38.

¹³ Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, 2014: 1470.

¹⁴ Seyfort Ruegg, 1981: 58.

¹⁵ Seyfort Ruegg, 1981: 58.

¹⁶ Seyfort Ruegg, 1981: 36.

¹⁷ Lang 1990, 127.

¹⁸ Vose 2009, 2010, Yonezawa 2019.

scholasticism and in the transmission of Madhyamaka thought in Tibet. Gaining a clear understanding of the transmission of Madhyamaka thought into Tibet as well as the way of how Pa tshab Nyi ma grags translated the root text MMK is no doubt a significant task. Furthermore, how was the distinction between *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika understood by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags? Since Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was one of the first who mentioned these terms at an earlier stage, this commentary gives new evidence. As Seyfort Ruegg pointed out, it was Pa tshab Nyi ma grags who, together with Jayānanda, introduced the distinction of the Madhyamaka thoughts with the notations of Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka and Svātantrika-Madhyamaka to Tibet in order to distinguish the pure Madhyamaka thought.¹⁹

Yoshimizu recently analysed and updated Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's understanding and emphasized that this debate was not a past debate of the sixth- and seventh-century in India, but an ongoing discussion during the time of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, being a *Prāsaṅgika translator.²⁰ In addition, logical issues such as the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature (**niḥsvabhāvatā*) (6aL8) and the “neither one nor many” (**ekāneka[vi]rahitatva*, 7bL11) argument in the form of *prasaṅga* are presented in detail. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags studied those topics in accordance with those Indian scholars such as Śrīgupta, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the 8th century but defined them here in a new light of the *Prāsaṅgika.²¹

In the First Chapter those various topics of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's study time in Kaśmīr are presented. As a commentary on the MMK only few verses are cited from the MMK, instead this commentary in the First Chapter focuses on various argumentations of the Buddhist and Indian Philosophical thoughts and Epistemology. The distinction between *Svātantrika and

¹⁹ Seyfort Ruegg, 2000, 47.

²⁰ Yoshimizu 2020: 1194.

²¹ See Yoshimizu 2020: 1194 ff.

*Prāsaṅgika's ways of argumentation, in the latter of which Pa tshab Nyi ma grags takes a clear position (14aL4), is one of the most important topics dealt with. The citation of the MMK verses is discussed in detail in my latest article titled "On Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's Way of Citing the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* in His Commentary" (2021)²².

Recently Vose gave a detailed analysis about Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's interpretation titled "When Did Svatantra Inference Gain Its Autonomy? Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as Sources for a Tibetan Distinction"²³, mentioning Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's arguments against Śāntarakṣita's "neither one nor many" proof. He marks out that the sources for Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's characterization are not mentioned and still remain unclear.

3. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's commentary on the MMK

It is clear that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was aware of the division of *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika. The manuscript gives a clear insight into the usage of the terms of རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་དབུ་མ་པས། (*rang rgyud du smra ba'i dbu ma pas*) "a Mādhyamika who discusses with an independent (*svatantra*) [proof]" 6aL6, or in 6aL7 as རང་རྒྱུད་གྱི་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ། (*rang rgyud gyi 'dod pa brjod pa*) "a proponent of the assertion with an independent (*svatantra*) [proof]", and 7bR3 རང་རྒྱུད་པ་ནི། (*rang rgyud pa ni*) "*Svātantrika". On the other hand, in 8aL2 "*prasaṅga*" is mentioned as ཐལ་འགྱུར་ནི། (*thal 'gyur ni*) and "*Prāsaṅgika" in 10bR6 as ཐལ་འགྱུར་པ། (*thal 'gyur ba*). These distinctive terms show that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags discusses the different standpoints of the sub-schools already in the First Chapter²⁴. This is confirmed by the following sentences:

²² Kamarid 2021: 1133-1137.

²³ Vose 2020: 703-750.

²⁴ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol.11: 8aL2, 10bR6, 13bR8/9, further discussion is found in 14aL4.

in 13bR8/9: ཐལ་འགྱུར་ལ་སྟོན་མེད་དེ། (*thal 'gyur la skyon med de*). “There is no fault in the **prasaṅga* [proof]...” and further on in Folio 14aL4: རྗེད་ལ་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་ཐལ་ཞེས་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི། དེད་དབུ་མ་པ་རང་། 14aL4གཞན་པ་ཀ་ལ་སྐྱེ་བར་མི་འདོད་པའོ།, “For you, it results in proving the arising [of things] from others; on the other hand, I, a Mādhyamika, do not assert the arising [of things] from themselves or others.” Here Pa tshab Nyi ma grags emphasised his own position similar to the logical discussion in 7aR2:

If you assert that for us, [**Prāsaṅgika*-] Madhyamikas, there is no [property] to be proven (**sādhya[-dharma]*), subject (**pakṣa*), nor proposition (**pratijñā*), therefore, we do not have a valid means of cognition which proves [a proposition] with an independent [reasoning]; however, other [opponents like you] accept a valid means of cognition which regards things as existent, we deny the assertion of existence by the valid means of cognition which you accept, it is not possible, either.²⁶

The usage of the terms *prasaṅga* /**Prāsaṅgika*/**prasaṅgavādin*

While looking in detail into the First Chapter in section 2.112.4 (6aL8) interestingly the term ཐལ་འགྱུར་སྐྱེ་བའི་དབུ་མ་ཉིད། (*thal 'gyur smra ba'i dbu ma nyid*), that can be translated as the Madhyamaka [position] of a **prasaṅgavādin*, is used, whereas later on ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ། (*thal 'gyur ba*), **Prāsaṅgika* (in 10bR6, 11aL10, 12aL8, 13aL10, 47aR10 and 48aL4) is used. The term ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ། (*thal 'gyur ba*) appears six times in the commentary of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, i.e., four times mentioned in the First Chapter and twice in the 24th Chapter. This shows that the main emphasis on the

²⁵ ལ་ *sic*; read ལས་

²⁶ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11: 7aR2 ff.: གལ་ཏེ་ཁྱེད་ན་མེ་དེད་དབུ་མ་པ་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱ་དང། ཚུགས་དང་དམ་བཅའ་བ་ཅི་ཡང་མེད་པས་རང་རྗེས་བསྐྱབ་པའི་ཚད་མ་མེད་ཀྱི་གཞན་དག་ཡོད་ཀྱི། 7aR3བར་ཁས་ལེན་པ་རྣམས་ཚད་མ་འདོད་པས་ཁྱེད་འདོད་པའི་ཚད་མས་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པ་འགོག་གོ་ཞེས་འདོད་ན་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ།

*Prāsaṅgika view is presented mainly in the First Chapter. The expression ཐལ་འགྲུབ། (*thal 'gyur*) instead can be found 37 times within the First Chapter, and 4 times in other chapters (Chapter 15th, Chapter 24th).

Mimaki²⁷ already mentioned that it might have been Pa tshab Nyi ma grags who used these terminologies for the first time. As the colophon states: “*The Commentary on the Prajñā-[nāma]- Mūlamadhyamaka[-kārikā], i.e., treatise titled ‘The Illuminating Lamp’ which writes down the way of explanation by paṇḍita Hasumati’, is completed.*” (52bR10-52bR11)²⁸, it seems most likely that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags’s understanding of the distinction between *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika was handed down by his *paṇḍita* Mahāsumati, through the latter’s teaching in Kāśmīr. Other sources are not mentioned.

The usage of the terms svatantra/*Svātantrika/*svatantravādin

The term རང་རྒྱུད་པ། (*rang rgyud pa*) can be found four times within the First Chapter and one time the expression of རང་རྒྱུད་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི། (*rang rgyud pa smra ba'i*, *svatantravādin) is used in 8aR4, which can be translated as “the proponents of independent [proof]”. Further རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་དབུ་མ་རྣམས། (*rang rgyud du smra ba'i dbu ma rnams*, *svatantravādi-mādhyamika) occurs one time in 8aL4 and can be translated as “the *Mādhyamikas, who state with an independent [proof] (*svatantra)”. Prior to this usage the term རང་རྒྱུད་པ། (*rang*

²⁷ Mimaki 1983, 163: “If Ye shes sde was the first to use the terms Sautrāntika-mādhyamika and Yogācāra-mādhyamika, it still remains to be seen who created the terms Svātantrika (Rang rgyud pa) and Prāsaṅgika (Thal 'gyur pa). They do not figure at all in the text of the first diffusion of Buddhism (*snga dar*). It seems that they were used for the first time by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-?) in the *phyi dar* period, when he made extensive translations of the texts of Candrakīrti.” (Mimaki, 1983:163)

²⁸ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11, 52bR11: དབུ་མ་རྣམས་རྒྱུ་བའི་མེས་པོ་ཉི་ཀུ་བཞུགས་པའི་མཚོ་སྐོན་མ་གསལ་བར་བྱེད་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལན་འདྲི་དྲོ་ཉ་སྐུ་མ་ཉིདེ་བཤད་ལྷགས་བྲིས་པ་རྒྱུ་སྐོན་།།

rgyud pa), *Svātantrika is used one time in 6bR5 and twice in 7bR3 within the First Chapter. Twice this term is used in the 24th Chapter (47aR11 and 48aL4) as well. For the term རང་རྒྱུད། (*rang rgyud*), *svatantra* there are 36 usages within the First Chapter only.

Nāgārjuna’s intention stated by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags explains the sentence-meaning (*ngag gi don*, **vākyārtha*) of the main content of the First Chapter that is “The thesis (**pratijñā*) and its reasoning (**utpatti/yukti*)” as visible in the following outline where in the fourth part Nāgārjuna’s intention and that of a **prasaṅgavādin* is presented by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags as follows:

2.11 The thesis (**pratijñā*) (2.11) and its reasoning (**upapatti*) (2.12), the first [that is, thesis], is a verse (**kārikā*) [consisting of] “not from oneself” (**na svataḥ*) and so forth. There are three [points] in this [thesis]:²⁹

- 2.111 The explanation by means of the word-meaning (*tshig gi don*, **vacanārtha*),
- 2.112 The explanation by means of the sentence-meaning (*ngag gi don*, **vākyārtha*), and
- 2.113 The explanation by means of the meaning of subject matter (*skabs su bab pa'i don*, **prastutārtha*).³⁰

There are four [sub-sections] in the [above] second (2.112) [sentence-] meaning:

²⁹ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11, 5bL1: དམ་བཅའ་བ་དང་། དེའི་འཐད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི་བརྟག་ ལས་མ་ཡིན་ ལ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཚིག་བཅད་ ༡། རྟེན་ འདི་ལ་ནི་ལྟེན།

³⁰ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol. 11, 5bL1: ཚིག་གི་དོན་གྱི་སློབ་མཁན་བཤད་5bL2པ་དང་། བག་གི་དོན་གྱི་སློབ་མཁན་བཤད་པ་དང་། རྟོགས་སུ་བབ་པའི་དོན་གྱི་སློབ་མཁན་པའོ།

2.112.1 The refutation given by the Proponents of Existence (**vastuvādin/bhāvavādin*) against the proof of the absence of intrinsic nature [6aL6]

2.112.2 Returning a response to the [above] refutation, the **Mādhyamika*, who state with an independent [proof] (**Svatantra-vādin*), explain their assertion of an independent [proof] [6aL6], [8aL4-8aR4]

2.112.3 Citing the thought of **Svātantrika*, Candrakīrti himself refutes it. [6aL7], [8aR4-10bR6]

2.112.4 The statement of Candrakīrti's own assertion that Nāgārjuna's intention is the very Madhyamaka [position] of a **prasaṅgavādin*. [6aL7], [10bR6-13aR1]³¹

Regarding the fourth part (2.112.4) on Candrakīrti's own assertion the following explanation can be found. In this part Pa tshab Nyi ma grags explains Candrakīrti's assertion that reflects Nāgārjuna's intention that of the very **Prāsaṅgika* position. Most likely Pa tshab Nyima grags states his opinion accordingly using “for me” and “I” because these statements cannot be found in Candrakīrti's work.

2.112.4 The fourth part [is as follows]: The statement of Candrakīrti's own assertion that Nāgārjuna's intention is the very **Prāsaṅgika* [position] is made in [the following] two [sections]:

2.112.41 Regarding the object of cognition (**prameya*), [there are] five questions to which answers are given [by Candrakīrti], and

³¹ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11, 6aL5: རོན་ལོ་ལ་དག་གི་དོན་གྱི་སྒོ་ 6aL6ནས་བཤད་པ་ལ་ཅ་སྟེ་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་བསྐྱབ་པ་ལ་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་བརྗོད་པ་དགོད་པ་དང་། བརྗོད་པ་དེའི་ལན་རང་རྒྱུད་དུ་སྐྱབ་བའི་དབྱེ་མ་པས་གདབ་ཅིང་ 6aL7རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་། རང་རྒྱུད་པའི་བསམ་པ་རྒྱངས་ཏེ་རྗེ་གཤམ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སུན་དབྱུང་བ་དང་། རྟུ་རྟུ་གྱི་དགོངས་པ་ཐམ་འགྱུར་སྐྱབ་བའི་དབྱེ་མ་ཉིད་དུ་རྗེ་གཤམ་རང་གི་ 6aL8འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པའོ།

2.112.42 Regarding valid means of cognition (**pramāṇa*), [there are] five questions to which answers are given [by Candrakīrti].

Of them the first question is: “Why does the fault, which you previously ascribed to me or an advocate of *svatantra* [reasoning], not involve you, **Prāsaṅgika* or [a proponent of an unwanted] consequence because we are equal in stating the absence of intrinsic nature of all elements (*dharma*)?”

Therefore, “If the absence of intrinsic nature [of all elements] is established by words only, they (all elements) will [indeed] have no intrinsic nature; however, if it is proven by logic, both perception and inference are not possible as stated before.”

The answer to the above is as follows: for me, the probandum (**sādhyā*), what is to be accepted (**abhyupetya*), and the reason for proving my own proposition (**pakṣa*) do not also exist. Because by [the logic of] an [unwanted] consequence (**prasaṅga*) I negate the [proposition] that others accept, [we] do not have such faults [as we] ascribed to you that a logical subject is not established and so forth.

There remains a fault for you who assert that the absence of intrinsic nature is proven by a *svatantra* [reasoning]; however, I have no fault because nothing whatsoever is accepted by me and there exists no proposition (**pratijñā*) [for me], either.³²

³² bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11, 10bR6 ff: 2.112.4 །དོན་ལ་བསྐྱབ་དཔོན་སྐྱུ་སྐྱུ་བྱི་དགོངས་པ་ལ་འགྱུར་བ་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་དུ་རྒྱ་གཞུགས་རང་གི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་རྣམ་པར་གཞུག་པ་སྟོན་པ་ལ་འདྲི་[10bR6-13aR2] 2.112.41 གཞུགས་ཅུ་10bR7ལ་དྲི་བ་ཐུའི་ལན་གཏང་བ་དང་། 2.112.42ཚད་མ་ལྟེ་བུ་ཐུའི་ལན་གཏང་བ་ལས་སྟོན་རྟོ། །དེ་ལ་དྲི་བ་དང་པོ་ནི་དེད་རང་རྒྱུད་འདོད་དཔ་ལ་གོང་གི་སྟོན་བརྗོད་པ་དེ། རྒྱུད་ཐལ་10bR8འགྱུར་བ་ལ་ཅི་སྟེ་མི་འོང་སྟེ། (2.112.41) ཚེས་མེད་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་བར་མཚོངས་པས་སོ། །དེས་ན་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པ་སྐྱབ་ཅིས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱབ་ན་རང་བཞིན་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་ལ། 10bR9 རིགས་པས་སྐྱབ་ན་མངོན་པ་རྗེས་དངལ་པོ་[1]ཅར་ལྷ་མ་སྐར་མི་འཐད་དོ་ཅེས་པའོ། །དེའི་ལན་ནི་དེད་ལ་བསྐྱབ་ཅུ་དང་ལས་སྐྱུར་དང་རང་གི་ལྷན་སྐྱེས་སྐྱུ་བྱི་དེ་ཡང་མེད་ལ། 10bR10 གཞུགས་ལས་ལེན་པ་ཐལ་འགྱུར་གྱིས་འགོག་པ་ཡིན་པས་ན་ཚེས་ཅན་མ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་སྐྱུགས་པ་ལྟེད་ལ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྟོན་དེ་དག་མེད་དོ། །ལྟེད་རང་རྒྱུད་ཀྱིས་རང་བཞིན་མེད་10bR11པར་བསྐྱབ་པར་འདོད་པ་ལ་ཉེས་པ་གནས་ཀྱི། དེད་ལ་ནི་ལས་ལེན་པ་གང་ཡང་མེད་པས་ཉེས་པ་མེད་དེ་དམ་བཅའ་པ་མེད་པས་སོ། །

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's explanations show evidently that the formation of the *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika distinction was well understood and their particular characteristics are clearly demonstrated. The *Prāsaṅgika position states not to have any thesis and negates the alleged faults by such expressions as “nothing whatsoever is accepted by me and there exists no proposition (**pratijñā*) [for me], either.” The discussion of “the absence of intrinsic nature” for the *Svātantrika as mentioned in the first question shows the importance of this discussion regarding the object of cognition (**prameya*). Where it here concludes with “There remains a fault for you who assert that the absence of intrinsic nature is proven by a *svatantra* [reasoning];” it shows Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's understanding in this discussion clearly.

Another example can be observed in section 2.112.4 where Pa tshab Nyi ma grags explains in detail the *Prāsaṅgika position, where it reads:

Because it is already a thesis that, you said, there exists neither what is to be accepted (**abhyupetya*) nor any thesis, you, *Prāsaṅgika, need to prove it.

If you ask how we know that there exists no thesis, the answer is as follows: for the purpose of negating others' assertion of existence, I make such a composition that I have no thesis at all.

However, because it is not established for me to say that a thesis does not exist, nor is it established that it exists, nor both [existence and non-existence] are established, and neither [existence nor non-existence] is established, any proof (**sādhana*) is unnecessary.³³

³³ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11, 11aL10: རྒྱལ་འགྱུར་བ་ལྱིད་ལས་རྒྱུ་བ་འམ་ དམ་བཅ་བ་གང་ཡང་མེད་དོ་
ཞེས་པ་ཉིད་དམ་11aL11བཅའ་བ་ཡིན་པས་དེ་རྒྱུ་དགོས་ཏེ། དམ་བཅའ་ གང་ཡང་མེད་པར་ཅིས་ཤེས་ན། དེད་ལ་དམ་བཅའ་གང་ཡང་མེད་ཅེས་སྐྱེས་པ་
ནི་གཞན་དག་ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པ་དགག་བའི་11aR1འོར་དེ་ལྷོར་སྐྱུར་གྱི། དེད་ལ་དམ་བཅའ་མེད་ཅེས་པ་ཡང་མ་གྲུབ་ལ་ཡོད་པ་ཡང་མ་གྲུབ་པ་
མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་མ་གྲུབ་པས་རྒྱུ་བ་ལྱིད་གང་ཡང་མི་11aR2དགོས་མོ།

Here this part shows that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags had a clear understanding of the division and characterises it, mentioning that the *Prāsaṅgika do not ascertain any thesis etc. while taking position directly. The necessity of the proof is also negated. In another example Pa tshab Nyi ma grags explained that Nāgārjuna did not consider an independent proof:

In that case, Nāgārjuna did not consider all the four great reasons [for proving the absence of intrinsic nature] as an independent [proof] but only a *Prāsaṅgika [way of proof].³⁴

This section concludes in 13aL10 where the *Prāsaṅgika approach is emphasized:

In this way, all the [four great] reasons such as the fragments of *vajra* (**vajrakāṇa*), dependent-origination (**pratītya-samutpāda*), being free from one and many (**ekāneka[vi]rahitatva*), and so forth are the only *Prāsaṅgika [way of proof].³⁵

Beside these examples also the following section gives an insight how the term “*prasaṅga*” is used within the explanation of “The Four Possibilities of Arising”.

The Four possibilities of Arising

The following part in the Chapter One describes the “Four Possibilities of Arising” pointing out the different positions. As visible in the outline of the Chapter One, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags explains the four negations of arising from self, from other, from both and without a cause (2.113.1-4). These four explanations are presented while analysing the different positions; first that

³⁴ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11, 12aL8ff.: དེ་ལྟར་ན་12aL9གཏན་ཚིགས་ཆེན་པོ་ལ་[]ཅར་ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་
འབ་ཞིག་ ལས་རང་རྒྱུ་དུ་སྐྱུ་སྐྱུ་བ་མི་བཞེད་དོ།

³⁵ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11, 13aL10ff.: དེ་ལྟར་ན་རྗོད་མེ་གཞེགས་མ་དང་། ཉེན་འབྲེལ་དང་། །དང་དུ་
13aL11གྲལ་ལ་རྫོགས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིག་ཐིང་ ཐལ་འགྱུར་བ་ཅོས་མོ།

of an unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*) referring to Nāgārjuna, mentioned with “the treatise”, properly referring here to the MMK. The second is the assertion of Bhāviveka that is explained, the third is according to Buddhapālita’s explanation, and the fourth is the rejection of the dispute referring to Bhāviveka. This shows Pa tshab Nyi ma grags’s emphasis on the position of the *Prāsaṅgika itself, followed by the assertion of Bhāviveka and Buddhapālita etc. while presenting the negation by an unwanted consequence in the first place. Here are some examples given from the outline where the “Four Possibilities of Arising” are explained following the different statements and argumentations:

2.113 The explanation by means of the meaning of subject matter (skabs su bab pa'i don, **prastutārtha*) [5bL2] Now, the third [is as follows]: when explained in connection with the meaning of subject matter (**prastutārtha*), there are four [negations], i.e., the negation of arising from oneself and so forth. [13aR1-13aR4]

2.113.1 In that way, the first; for the negation of arising from self, [there] are four [13aR1]

2.113.11 By an [unwanted] consequence being negated, the treatise by Nāgārjuna is connected, this is the explanation [13aR2], Regarding the first [is as follows]: “arising from self” means it arises from existence [13aR3-13aR4]

2.113.12 After repeating the assertion of Bhāviveka ('ba phyā kir ti) [it] is refuted [13aR2] The second [is as follows], Bhāviveka, ('ba phyā kir ti) said, that the inner sense-spheres (**āyatana*) are the logical subject, (**dharmin*), in the ultimate [truth] arising from self does not exist, because it is existent [13aR4]

2.113.13 Buddhapālita's explanation of the assertion [13aR2]
The assertion of Buddhapālita is [as follows]: [13bL4]

2.113.14 The rejection of the dispute [13aR3] From the
rejection of the dispute of the fault, the first has three disputes.
(Bhāviveka)

2.113.2 The negation of arising from others is also as previously
[above mentioned] similar [divided into] four meanings, [14aL4]

2.113.21 The first meaning: by means of an [unwanted]
consequence arising from others is negated, the explanation
connected to the source of the master: [14aL4-14aL6]

2.113.22 The second, after being repeated by the master
Bhāviveka (Bhavyakīrti), from the refutation [that is stated as
follows] it is refuted: [14aL6]

2.113.23 The philosophical assertion of Buddhapālita; arising
from others is refuted by an [unwanted] consequence
(**prasaṅga*). [14aL9]

2.113.24 By Bhāviveka (Bhavyakīrti); here is the dispute of the
rejection of fault [stated as follows]: [14aL10]

2.113.3 [Those who] assert that [things] arise from both, are the
[proponents] of Sāṃkhya [14aR8]

2.113.4 The fourth, for arising without a cause, according to the
previous there are four meanings: [14bL4-]³⁶

Similar structure can be found for all four arisings also in 2.113.3 and
2.113.4. These above examined examples clearly demonstrate the

³⁶ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11: [5bL2ff.] for the Tibetan see sa bcad in the
appendix

understanding by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags in the light of the *Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka position and give new evidence for the previous assertion that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags might have been one of the first scholars who used these terms of the Mādhyamika distinction.

4. The role of Language and its implementation in the debate of Madhyamka

As we saw in the previous section on the examples how Pa tshab Nyi ma grags presented the discussion on the “Four possibilities of Arising” stating the different opinions by Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita and Bhāviveka, we can observe that language is very important to see the differences in their understanding of the topic in question. Pa tshab Nyi ma grags therein places the important emphasis on the *Prāsaṅgika approach.

Bhāviveka (c. 500–570) is mostly known for his criticism of Buddhapālita regarding the first Chapter of Nāgārjuna’s MMK where he proposes that it is unnecessary for a Mādhyamika to state an unwanted consequence (*prasaṅga*) that might be drawn from the position of the opponent. Bhāviveka asserts that a Mādhyamika should state his own position with an autonomous inference (*svatantrānumāna*) or an autonomous syllogism (*svatantraprayoga*).³⁷

As is well-known, Bhāviveka was highly influenced by the work of Dignāga (c. 480-540) with a newly introduced syllogism of logical discussion. That caused him to set up on a logical background for the Svatantra approach by which he later was considered the founder of *Svātantrika, one of the sub-schools of Mādhyamika Philosophy.

³⁷ Seyfort Ruegg, 1981: 61.

His criticism was answered later by Candrakīrti (c. 600-650) who argued against Bhāviveka's criticism of Buddhapālita and defended the latter. For Candrakīrti it was inappropriate for a Mādhyamika to use autonomous syllogisms (*svatantraprayoga*). He defended the approach of Buddhapālita against the criticism of Bhāviveka in his own commentaries on the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and emphasised that a Mādhyamika should instead use an unwanted consequence (*prasāṅga*).

Here two different approaches that are communicated via language can be observed: the logic-based elaboration by Bhāviveka with the autonomous syllogisms (*svatantraprayoga*) and the unwanted consequence (*prasāṅga*) supported by Candrakīrti. These logical features like the three-fold inferential mark (*trairūpyaliṅga*) that Bhāviveka ascribes to Nāgārjuna were not yet established within Buddhist scholastic circles at the time of Nāgārjuna (c. 150-250) and are no doubt later developments. Nāgārjuna stated in the first verse of MMK, Chapter 1 that no entities at all, at any place have arisen from self, from others, from both or without a cause³⁸. Here Bhāviveka's understanding is that the conclusion of no-arising is to be established by a syllogistic inference. Bhāviveka considered the ultimate to be a non-conceptual state for Mādhyamikas and not to be the object of any verbal activity. Language does not fully express the ultimate itself but at the same time is necessary for a practitioner or thinker to prove emptiness of all things with an autonomous logic of discussion.

Language here corresponds to a connecting point that brings the different approaches together. Based on this role of language, as well as its

³⁸ MMK 1.1, see Ye Shaoyong 《中论颂》梵藏汉合校·导读·译注, 12: न स्वतो नापि परतो न द्वाभ्यां नाप्य अहेतुतः । उत्पन्ना जातु विद्यन्ते भावाः क्वचन केचन ॥ na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana // བདག་ལས་མ་ཡིན་གཞན་ལས་མིན། གཉིས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་སྐྱེ་མེད་མིན། དངོས་པོ་གང་དག་གང་ན་ཡང་། ལྷེ་བ་ན་མ་ཡང་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།, Saito 1984, 10: “In any place, no things whatsoever ever originate. From themselves, from others, from both, or without cause.”

logical usage, it was later explained by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, who might have used the terminology for the first time, that there occurred in the Mādhyamika school the two different sub-schools: the *Svātantrika, that is represented by Bhāviveka, and the *Prāsaṅgika represented by both Buddhapālita (c. 470-540) and Candrakīrti (c. 600-650).³⁹

Regarding the role of Language in the MMK, it is necessary to mention here a very important and already often discussed part. Nāgārjuna clarified the understanding of emptiness and the usage of the two truths in the 24th Chapter. Here I would like to take a brief journey to Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's commentary regarding this part. In Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's explanation regarding the two truths it is remarkable that he follows the explanation of Candrakīrti, because, in accordance with Candrakīrti's understanding of both the purpose of teaching emptiness and emptiness itself, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags also quoted MMK 18.5 and 18.9 in relation to the above two points, viz. the purpose of teaching emptiness and emptiness itself respectively in his commentary on the 24th Chapter. Further MMK 24.8 to 24.10 are presented by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags with additional explanations. In MMK 24.8 partly quoted, the distinction between the two truths is made, explaining the intellectual difference between ordinary people to whom the conventional truth is applicable and the wisdom of the Noble Ones that relates to the ultimate truth.

24.8 Regarding the word meaning [of emptiness], “the Dharma-teaching of the Buddha” is given by means of the two truths. That is, the conventional truth is taught in accordance with the appearance [of things] for the intellect of ordinary people in the world; the ultimate truth is taught in accordance of the appearance [of things] for the wisdom of the Noble Ones; and it is also taught that ultimately in the realm of the Noble Ones' non-conceptual wisdom nothing is

³⁹ Seyfort Ruegg, 2000: 14.

established in that any elements whatsoever appear or are established.⁴⁰

In MMK 24.9 Pa tshab Nyi ma grags names here those who do not understand the distinction properly as the substantialists, **vastuvādin/bhāvavādin* and explains the opponents' misunderstanding of the Buddha's intention. This is presented as follows:

24.9 “Those who” means substantialists (or those who speak of entities). “Profound reality” means the Buddha's intention. They do not understand the profound intention of [the Buddha's] teaching of existence and that of non-existence beginning from matter to knowing all kinds [of things]. When they understand the distinction of the two truths, they understand that the teaching of existence is intended [to refer] to the conventional [truth] and the teaching of non-existence is intended [to refer] to the ultimate truth, i.e., is intended [to refer] to the non-existence in the realm of the ultimate wisdom.⁴¹

Further in MMK 24.10 Pa tshab Nyi ma grags clarifies that the ultimate truth does not refer to non-existence in the conventional truth. Understanding the convention as empty is a mistake by the substantialists who discard the verbal convention without taking into consideration the role and necessity of the conventional truth. In this way the ultimate cannot be acquired and *nirvāṇa* is, therefore, not attained.

⁴⁰ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11: 47aL11-47aR3 རྟོག་དོན་ལས་སྤྱིར་སྤངས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྟོགས་གསུངས་པ་ནི་བདེན་པ་ལ་47aR1 དུ་གྱི་སྟོན་ལས་གསུངས་ཏེ། འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་སོ་སོའི་སྐྱེ་བའི་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་བསྐྱེན་ནས་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཀྱི་བདེན་པ་གསུངས་། འཕགས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཡི་ཤེས་ ཀྱི་སྐྱེང་བ་དང་བསྐྱེན་ནས་47aR2 དོན་དམ་པའི་བདེན་པ་གསུངས་ཏེ། འཕགས་པའི་མི་རྟོག་པའི་ཡི་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ན་རྟོགས་གང་ཡང་སྐྱེང་ཞིང་བྱེད་པའ་ལ་དགོངས་ནས་དོན་དམ་པར་གང་ཡང་མ་བྱེད་པར་གསུངས་47aR3 ལོ།

⁴¹ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11: 47aR3-47aR6 གང་དགྲུ་ལེས་པ་ཚོས་ བོར་སྐྱེ་བ་རྣམས་སོ། རྟོགས་འདི་དེ་སྐྱེང་ནི་བྱ་ཏེ་བདེན་པ་ལ་སྐྱེ། གསུགས་ནས་རྣམ་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་མཉེན་པའི་བར་དུ་ཡོད་པར་གསུངས་པ་དང་མེད་47aR4 པར་གསུངས་པ་མེད་པའི་དགོངས་པ་རྟོགས་ཏེ། བདེན་པ་ལ་ལྷོ་བཤེས་ན་དེ་དག་ཡོད་པར་གསུངས་པ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་པ་དགོངས་པ། མེད་པར་གསུངས་པ་དོན་དམ་པ་ལ་47aR5 དགོངས་ཏེ། ཡི་ཤེས་དམ་པའི་ཡུལ་དུ་མེད་པ་ལ་དགོངས་ལེས་རྟོགས་པའོ།

24.10 When you charged us with a fault that if [everything] is empty, all [things] such as Four Noble Truths, etc. will result in being non-existent, you do not understand the meaning of the two truths. “Emptiness” refers to the emptiness in the ultimate [truth] and does not refer to the non-existence [in] the conventional [truth]. Because you grasp that it refers to that the convention itself is empty, i.e., nothing is there, you do not understand the meaning of profound reality of the Buddha’s teachings. And because you understand that there is no conventional [truth], you discard verbal convention. Therefore, you will not acquire the ultimate [truth]; because you do not acquire it, “*nirvāṇa* is not attained.”⁴²

Further explanation of the discard of verbal convention is given in line 47aR5 in which this misunderstanding is ascribed also to the substantialists. While discarding the verbal convention they cannot acquire the ultimate truth.

[Regarding “without] relying on” and so forth, substantialists understand the teaching of emptiness as [meaning] the nothingness of this conventional [truth] and denigrate the verbal convention. Discarding the [verbal convention], they do not acquire the ultimate [truth]. Therefore, *nirvāṇa* is not attained. Because, for attaining *nirvāṇa*, it is necessary to acquire the ultimate truth. Therefore, in order to make it acquired it is necessary to rely on the verbal convention. As was stated in the following way: “It is impossible for

⁴² bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11: 47aL9-47aL11: ཉིད་སྣོང་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ན་བདེན་པ་ལ་ 47aL9ལ་སྣོགས་པ་ཀུན་མེད་པར་ཐལ་ཅེས་ རེད་ལ་སྣོན་འགོལ་བ་ན། བདེན་པ་ ༥ གྱི་དོན་མ་རྟོགས་ཏེ་སྣོང་བ་ཉིད་ཅེས་པ་དོན་དམ་པར་སྣོང་བ་ལ་ཟེར་གྱི། ཀུན་རྫོབ་མེད་པ་ལ་མེ་ཟེར་47aL10པ་ལ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཉིད་སྣོང་བ་ཅད་མེད་དུ་སོང་བ་ལ་ཟེར་བར་བབྱང་པས་ན། བྱ་ཏེ་བསྟན་པ་ལ་ཟབ་མོ་དེ་ཁོ་ན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དོན་མ་ཤེས་ཏེ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་མེད་པར་གོ་བས་ཐ་སྐད་སྤངས་པས་དོན་47aL11དམ་པ་རྟོགས་པར་གྱི་འགྲུར་ལ། དེ་སྣོགས་པས་ལྷ་དར་ན་ལས་འདས་པ་རྫོབ་པར་མི་འགྲུར་ཅེས་པའོ།

the wise to climb up to the top of the palace of reality without the steps of correct convention.^{43,44}

5. Conclusion

Firstly, after analysing the examples given above where the *Prāsaṅgika position is stated in Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's commentary, it is clear that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags had a complete outlook on the distinction between the two sub-schools of Mādhyamika. Beside he had taken position after the analysis of the *Svātantrika approach, the *Prāsaṅgika position is explained with reference to Nāgārjuna's intention.

Secondly, placing this discussion within the First Chapter itself shows that it was one of Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's main concerns to clarify the methodology of Mādhyamikas in his role of being one of the first translators of Madhyamaka Literature in the later period of diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet (ཕྱི་དང་། *phyi dar*). This approach may have been taught in Kaśmīr. Even though sources are not mentioned, we can probably assume that this was the scholastic discussion during Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's time in Kaśmīr, where he studied according to Seyfort-Ruegg under Sūkṣmajana, Parahitabhadrā, Mahāsumati and Bhavyarāja.⁴⁵ These scholars may have made the distinction between *Svātantrika's approach and that of *Prāsaṅgika prior to the Tibetan scholars who adopted it later with the translation works by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags.

⁴³ This quotation can be found in the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (MHK) kk.: 3.12, see Ejima p.270-71, Ejima refers to the Abhisamayālaṃkāralokā by Haribhadra and did not regard it as an original verse but as a later insertion though Tib DNP editions take it as Bhaviveka's verse, also see Ichigo's Madhyamakālaṃkāra: 1985, p. 232., for translation see Saito, A. :2020: 519.

⁴⁴ bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, Vol 11, 47aR6 ff.: ར་སྐྱེད་ལ་ནི་ཨེ་དེ་པ་རྫོགས་12པོར་སྐྱབས་སྐྱོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་བཤད་པ་ཀུན་རྫོབ་འདི་ཉིད་ཅང་མེད་དུ་སོང་བ་ལ་གོ།47aR6བས་མ་སྐྱེད་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ལ་སྐྱར་བ་བཏབ་པས། དེ་སྐྱབས་པས་ན་དམ་པའི་དོན་མི་རྟོགས་པས་ལྷ་འདྲ་ལས་འདས་པ་མི་ཐོབ་སྐྱུ་འདྲ་འདས་པ་ཐོབ་པ་ལ་དོན་དམ་47aR7པའི་བདེན་པ་རྟོགས་དགོས་པས་ན། དེ་མ་སྐྱེད་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱེད་དགོས་པས་ཏེ། ཡང་དག་ཀུན་རྫོབ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་སྐས། ལྷོད་པར་ཡང་དག་47aR8པའང་ཚེན་གྱི། ལྷོད་དུ་འཇག་པར་བྱ་བ་ནི་ཅེས་17པ་སྐྱུ་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་སོ།

⁴⁵ Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 44.

In this way this material gives new evidence that has only been assumed by different scholars that Pa tshab Nyi ma grags was probably a key figure in the transmission of *Prāsaṅgika's understanding of the MMK in Tibet.

Thirdly, it was not Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's main intention to explain the verses of MMK within the First Chapter of his commentary. Instead, various topics on Logic and Epistemology as well as Buddhist and Indian Thought were presented. These topics of studies are well related to the presentation of the Mādhyamika's distinction between the two sub-schools, *Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika. The four possibilities are another example where Pa tshab Nyi ma grags places the position of the *Prāsaṅgika first.

Fourth, the role of language is no doubt important for drawing out the different approaches, i.e., the *Svātantrika's approach with an autonomous logic and the *Prāsaṅgika's way of unwanted consequence. With these different approaches that were critical of each other, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags endorsed the *Prāsaṅgika approach to which he also ascribed Nāgārjuna's intention.

Fifthly, in the MMK the role of language is discussed in the 24th Chapter, verses 8-10, of which selected parts were presented in the above discussion together with Pa tshab Nyi ma grags's comments on them. The verbal convention is necessary to acquire the ultimate truth and further to attain *nirvāṇa*.

Appendix: Sa bcad in Tibetan for part 2.113

2.113 ལྟུང་ལུ་བའི་དོན་གྱི་སྒྲིབ་མཁུ་བཤད་པ་[5bL2](4) ད་ནི་ལ་ལ་ལྟུང་ལུ་བའི་དོན་དང་ལྟུར་ནས་བཤད་ན་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་
 དགག་པ་ལ་སྒྲིབ་པ་ལ་ལོ། །དེ་ལ་དང་པོ་རང་ལས་13aR2སྐྱེ་བ་འཕྲོག་པ་ལ་ལ་ལོ། ལས་འགྱུར་གྱིས་འཕྲོག་པར་སྐྱེ་བུ་གཞུང་དང་ལྟུར་ཉི་
 བཤད་པ་དང་། འབ་ཕྱེད་ཉི་ཉེ་འདོད་པ་རྗེས་སུ་བརྗོད་ནས་སྐྱུན་དབྱུང་བ་དང་བྱ་ཉེ་ལེ་13aR3ཉེ་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་། དེ་ལ་བཙུང་
 བ་སྐྱང་བའོ།[13aR1-13aR4]

- 2.113.1 བདག་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་དགག་པ་ལ་སྒྲིགས་པ་ལའོ[13aR1 རང་ལས་13aR2སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་པ་ལ་ལེ་མལ་འབྱུར་གྱིས་འགོག་པར་
སྐྱུབ་ཀྱི་གཞུང་དང་སྤྱར་ཉི་བཤད་པ་དང་། འབ་ཕྱ་གིར་ཉིའི་ འདོད་པ་རྗེས་སུ་བརྗོད་ནས་སྤྱད་དུང་བ་དང་བྱ་ཉ་པ་ལི་
13aR3ཉའི་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་། དེ་ལ་བརྗོད་པ་ཐུང་བའོ།
- 2.113.11 མལ་འབྱུར་གྱིས་འགོག་པར་སྐྱུབ་ཀྱི་གཞུང་དང་སྤྱར་ཉི་བཤད་པ་[13aR2] །དེའི་དང་པོ་རང་ལས་སྐྱེས་
ཞེས་པ་ནི་ཡོད་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་སྟེ།13aR3-13aR4
- 2.113.12 འབ་ཕྱ་གིར་ཉིའི་ འདོད་པ་རྗེས་སུ་བརྗོད་ནས་སྤྱད་དུང་བ་[13aR2] །ལ་པ་13aR5འབ་ཕྱ་གིར་ཉི་ནེ།
13aR4- །དེ་ལ་སྐྱེ་གསལ་སྐྱོན་བརྗོད་པ་ནི། 13aR8གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་བརྟག་པ་ལྷ་དམ་བཅའ་བ་ལ་བརྟག་པ་ཉ་དང་དོན་
དམ་བའི་ཁྲུང་པར་ལ་བརྟག་པ་ཉ་སྟེ་ལེ་སྐྱོན་པ་ལ།
- 2.113.13 བྱ་ཉ་པ་ལི་13aR3ཉའི་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་[13aR2/3] །ལ་པ་བྱ་ཉ་པ་ལི་ཉའི་ འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་
ནི།13bL4
- 2.113.14 དེ་ལ་བརྗོད་པ་ཐུང་བའོ།[13aR3] ལེ་པ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཐུང་བ་ལས་དང་པོ་བརྗོད་པ་ལྟེ།
- 2.113.2 གཞན་ལ་ (ས་)སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་ལ་ཡང་ཐུར་གྱི་ལྷར་དོན་བཞི་ལས།[14aL4] དོན་དང་པོ་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མལ་འབྱུར་གྱི་སྐོ་
ནས་14aL5འགོག་པ་སྐོབ་དོན་གྱི་ཁྲུངས་དང་སྤྱར་ཉི་བཤད་པ་ནི།
- 2.113.21 དོན་དང་པོ་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་མལ་འབྱུར་གྱི་སྐོ་ནས་14aL5འགོག་པ་སྐོབ་དོན་གྱི་ཁྲུངས་དང་སྤྱར་ཉི་
བཤད་པ། [14aL4-14aL6]
- 2.113.22 ལ་པ་སྐོབ་དོན་སྐལ་ཐུན་གསལ་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་བརྗོད་ནས་སྤྱད་དུང་བ་ནི།[14aL6]
- 2.113.23 ལ་པ་བྱ་ཉ་པ་ལི་ཉའི་འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་ནི་མལ་འབྱུར་གྱིས་གཞན་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་འགོག་པ་སྟེ།[14aL9]
- 2.113.24 ལེ་པ་སྐོལ་ཐུན་གསལ་པས་དེ་ལ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་ཐུངས་པ་ནི།[14aL10]
- 2.113.3 ལྷ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འདོད་པ་ནི་གངས་ཅན་པ་སྟེ།[14aR8] གཙོ་པོ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་སྟེ་གཞན་ལས་བདག་ལས་སྐྱེས་པས་རང་
14aR9ལས་སྐྱེ་བར་འདོད་པ་སྟེ། དེ་དགག་པ་འམ་ཡང་ཐུ་མ་ལྷར་དོན་བཞིས་རིག་པར་བྱ་སྟེ།
- 2.113.4 ལེ་པ་སྐྱེ་མེད་པ་14bL5ལས་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་ཐུ་མ་ལྷར་དོན་ལེ་ལས། [14bL4]

Abbreviations

MMK *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* by Nāgārjuna. See Ye 2011.

PSP *Prasannapadā* by Candrakīrti, D No. 3860, P No. 5260. See La Vallée Poussin 1903-1913.

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Keywords: Nāgārjuna, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags, *Prāsaṅgika and *Svātantrika, bKa' gdams gsung 'bum, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*

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要 旨

パツァプ・ニマタク作『根本中頌注釈』に みる中観自立派および帰謬派の区分に 関する論理的解説

ドルテ・カマリッド (Dörte Kamarid)

パツァプ・ニマタクによる『根本中頌』(MMK)の注釈は、『カダム全集』*bKa' gdams gsung 'bum*の多数の作品とともに、ラサのペルツェク古代チベット写本研究所から出版された。近年発見されたこの写本は、草書体のウメー (dbu med) 字で書かれた影印本であり、全 52 フォリオで構成され、上記全集の第 11 巻に収録されている。本写本はまた、チベットにおける仏典翻訳史に関する研究にも新たな光を与えている。

チベット訳経史において最も著名な翻訳官 (lo tsa ba) の一人であるパツァプ・ニマタク Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (1055-ca.1145) は、チャンドラキールティの著作を中心に、多くの重要な典籍をサンスクリット語からチベット語に翻訳し、チベット仏教後伝期 (phyi dar) に多大な貢献をなした。

本稿が扱うテキストは、『『根本中・般若 [論]』』に対する注釈『灯明 [論]』』 *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi fi ka sgron ma gsal bar byed pa zhes bya ba* と題し、奥付 (Folio 52bR10-52bR11) にあるマハースマティ (ハスマティ) の説明によると、パツァプ・ニマタクの著作である。

本稿は、パツァプ・ニマタクによる帰謬 [論証] *prasaṅga* と自立 [論証] *svatantra* という用語の使用法と、帰謬派 **Prāsaṅika* と自立派 **Svātantrika* についてのニマタク独自の解説一彼自身は明確に帰謬派の立場を取る一を紹介し、考察を加えることを目的としている。

以前、御牧克己氏が想定したように、パツァプ・ニマタクは、これらの用語を初めて使用し、自立派と帰謬派の区分をチベットの仏教界に導入した最初の学者であった可能性がある。パツァプ・ニマタクは、留学

先のカシミールでマハースマティ (/ハスマティ)、スークスマジャナ、カナカヴァルマン、ティラカカラシヤなどの学者から中観派の区分に関するこれらの理解を学び、チベットに伝承したと考えられる。

この『根本中頌』に対する注釈の第1章で、パツァプ・ニマタクは、論理学や認識論などの主題を中心に様々な見解を批判的に考察し、彼自身の見解とも合致する帰謬派の立場を明確にしている。

本稿は、パツァプ・ニマタクによる自立派と帰謬派の区分に関する解説を分析し、従来想定されてきた議論が当該写本によって裏付けられることを考証し、結論として導いた。